Washington, October 13, 1963, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT
Chinese Representation

PARTICIPANTS

United States:
The President
Under Secretary of State George W. Ball
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams
Ambassador to Mauritania Philip W. Kaiser
Officer-in-Charge of Mauritania Converse Hettinger
Deputy Chief of Protocol William J. Tonesk
Protocol Officer Jay Rutherfurd
Interpreter Alec G. Toumayan

Mauritania:
President Moktar Ould Daddah
Foreign Minister Sidi Mohamed Deyine
Director of the President's Cabinet Abdoul Aziz Sall
Charge d'Affaires a.i. in Washington Mohamed Nassim Kochman
Aide-de-Camp to the President Lieutenant Mohamed Sidina Sidya

President Kennedy then raised the Chinese representation issue, stressing that it would be a serious mistake to admit to the United Nations a country committed to a policy of war. It would be particularly unfortunate to do this at the expense of the Republic of China, a founding member of the organization, which has some equity in the matter. While the situation may change in time and Communist China may abandon its present policy of attempting to communize the world by war, Communist China's admission to the United Nations at this time would do very serious injury to United States efforts to prevent communist takeovers all around the rim of Asia, where the United States is heavily involved. Commenting that he was aware that President Moktar, in his recent UNGA speech, spoke of the desirability of admitting all nations to the UN, President Kennedy stated that he felt strongly there should be some recognition of a country's peaceful intent before it is invited to join the UN.

President Moktar recalled Mauritania's friendly relations with the Republic of China since his country's accession to independence, and noted that the Republic of China maintains an Embassy in Nouakchott. At the same time, if there is a country in Africa which cannot be accused of being communist, it is certainly Mauritania. On the question of China, however, Mauritania has its own point of view. Mauritania is for universality as are the United Nations. When President Moktar referred to the admission of all independent states to the UN, he meant those which fulfill all conditions of the Charter. When a country fulfills all these obligations, it should be permitted to enter the organization; when not, it should be left out. For Mauritania, the principle of universality has arisen very naturally after the model provided by the UN. The Republic of China is a founding member of the UN and should not be expelled. As for Communist China, Mauritania's point of view is not based on very precise information, since Mauritania does not have all the information available to the U.S. Nevertheless, Mauritania thinks that if Communist China accepts all conditions of the Charter, it should be admitted to the UN. In an organization where the majority of people are reasonable, Communist China would be influenced by the other members and rendered less dangerous than if left to itself. The evolution of Soviet policy suggests the correctness of this view, and the Western decision to negotiate with the USSR has proven successful in that the Soviets have ended by accepting the dialogue. In conclusion, President Moktar said Mauritania, as an African state, intends to respect OAU solidarity, and his country's position is that of the majority of reasonable African states.

President Kennedy replied that the United States is militarily committed by treaty to the defense of a number of free countries right under the belly of Communist China. Under the circumstances, and in view of the recent history of Soviet-Chinese relations, it would be a serious blow to both the United States and the UN to admit to the latter this year a country which is committed to nuclear war. While respecting the Mauritanian view, the President emphasized that the admission of Communist China to the United Nations at this time would have a disastrous effect in the United States. It would, moreover, be awkward, at the very time we are trying to do something about Portugal and South Africa, to admit to the UN a country whose policy, judging from its dialectic, is war. Perhaps, in due time, the situation will change: Communist China may abandon its war policy, and a two-China solution may prove possible.

The discussion then turned to United States-Mauritanian relations.

Washington, October 21, 1963.

SUBJECT
Analysis of General Assembly Vote on Chinese Representation October 21, 1963

The General Assembly rejected an Albanian resolution to expel the representatives of the GRC and to replace them with Chicom representatives by a vote of 41 in favor, 57 opposed and 12 abstentions. The vote in 1962 was 42 in favor, 56 opposed and 12 abstentions. Ethiopia, which normally supports the Chicoms though it recognizes neither the GRC nor the Chicoms, was absent. Kuwait, the only new UN member this year, abstained. As in 1962, the proposal to eject the GRC and seat the Chicoms was rejected by an absolute majority.

Of 110 countries that voted on this issue in 1962, only six (not counting Ethiopia) changed their position. Of these changes, four were in our favor and only two were to our disadvantage. Yemen, whose support for us in 1962 was entirely fortuitous, reverted to support of the Chicoms. Mauritania, alone of the UAM states, defected and abstained instead of voting against as it did in 1961 and 1962. On the positive side, Sierra Leone, which in 1961 and 1962 had voted in favor of comparable Soviet proposals, abstained. Typical abstainers like Cyprus and Togo changed to outright rejection of the Albanian proposal. And Malaya, which last year wandered off the reservation toward abstention, this time returned to the fold and voted against as in 1961.

The question of "Two Chinas" never arose. Wachuku was out of town and never even made a statement. Tunisia asked for a separate vote on the two operative paragraphs of the Albanian resolution, but dropped this request at the behest of Algeria.

Washington, October 22, 1963, 8:32 p.m.

1143. Exploratory Talks with Sov Del re UN Financing.

We are continuing our appraisal of strategy we should follow in exploring with Soviets possibility of reaching understanding on UN financing. Points raised by USUN in very thoughtful papers we had from you earlier this month and in comments to Cleveland in last week's discussion of draft three-point package have raised number of questions on which further deliberation required before we are ready to wrap up strategy paper. We are, in particular, reassessing way in which we could reach understanding with Soviets and others on how larger contributors could be given larger voice in future peacekeeping operations without impairing potential of UN to act in face of Soviet obstruction. Under circumstances it would be premature for you to engage in discussion with Soviets on points of substance even in preliminary manner.

Dept would therefore want you to use occasion of Thursday lunch to set framework for later discussions and to probe Soviet readiness to discuss regular scale in broader context of regularizing arrangements for UN financing, including satisfactory settlement of arrears. Using arguments familiar to you, following would appear to be reasonable and useful line to take:

1. Question of holding line on regular scale cannot be treated in isolated manner. Given U.S. and USSR responsibilities as big powers, such question must be considered in context of two related aspects of UN financing, settlement of arrears and financing of future peacekeeping.

2. We believe that such three-fold framework for exploratory discussion has a chance of proving fruitful since problems interrelated. We have common interest in (a) achieving equitable and stable scale for regular budget; (b) clearing away underbrush of old debts through satisfactory Soviet settlement of its arrears so as to avoid confrontation on Article 19, and (c) harmonizing our views on the handling and financing of future peacekeeping operations so that larger contributors have voice commensurate with their responsibilities. FYI. In this connection, we must assure that any understanding on future arrangements does not impair our capacity to get UN to act if USSR unwilling to do so. We could not agree to any arrangement which would give USSR this kind of veto. End FYI.

3. We do not have fixed views or position on these but believe they offer promising framework for future discussions. We would welcome Soviet views on whether this appears to them reasonable and useful way to approach discussions. We are open to suggestions, but want to make it clear from outset that we would not regard separate and isolated discussion on freezing regular scale as holding hopeful prospect. In particular, settlement of arrears is sine qua non of any accommodation on holding regular scale to more or less present level.

Rusk

Washington, October 23, 1963.

SUBJECT
The Upcoming Talks with the Russians on UN Financing

A memorandum from the Secretary to the President on the U.S. strategy on the over-all problem of financing, including bilateral talks with the USSR, is being prepared, but it is long overdue. I am, therefore, passing along the following as a means of keeping you abreast of the Soviet side of the problem since we must soon be clear as to what our position is before the bilateral talks with the Soviet Union begin (as yet unscheduled).

The Soviet position has not greatly changed since they first suggested in an unofficial memorandum on September 28 that bilateral talks should begin between the U.S. and the USSR on the matter of freezing the existing scale of assessments for ten years. The U.S. is quite amenable to such discussions, but we also have insisted on discussing the matter of settling arrearages in order to avoid confrontation with the USSR on the application [of] Article 19 in the 19th GA. We also would like to discuss the matter of future peace-keeping operations (the U.S., and certainly the Soviet Union, would like to protect the political interests of the big powers against the possibility that the small powers would--because of their numerical superiority--be in a position to direct future peace-keeping operations).

On all three aspects of the problem--regular assessments, payment of arrearages and future peace-keeping operations-our own interests, to some degree, are shared by the USSR. They are the three topics the Department now plans, with the President's approval, to instruct Stevenson to explore with the Russians.

The most worrisome aspect of the problem is how to find a way to avoid a confrontation with the Russians on the application of Article 19. As you probably know, Soviet spokesmen in New York and elsewhere have stated categorically they will confine themselves to discussion only of freezing the present scale of assessments and that they will not discuss their arrearages in peace-keeping operations (we would, of course, have to discuss arrearages before we could properly discuss future peace-keeping operations).

There is no question that we potentially face a most serious problem in the 19th GA if the Russians remain adamant about payment of their arrearages. There has developed a large body of opinion in the UN which will not go along with the ICJ interpretation of Article 19 if it means denying the USSR its GA vote. This opinion is especially apparent among the Afro-Asians and the Latin American states, although it is too early to predict how much of this opinion would be translated into voting strength. The best one can say is that we are not sure we can muster a two-thirds vote on this Important Question. Some countries believe the precedent of denying a GA vote to a member state might one day be used against them; others insist that denial of the USSR's vote would "destroy" the UN.

The Russians thus far have been very cavalier about the matter. They do not appear to believe the GA will throw them out and, even if it did, one member of the Soviet delegation has noted that at least the Soviet Union will continue to have a vote in the Security Council. The Russians base their present approach on their long-standing argument that peace-keeping operations fall under the Security Council as provided by Chapter VII of the Charter which provides that, "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 [also in Chapter VII]/2/ to maintain or restore international peace and security."

As you know, the matter of peace-keeping operations came under the GA by the passage in 1950 of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which authorizes the GA to act when the SC is paralyzed by the veto. The U.S., which then had a dependable, solid majority in the GA, pushed this resolution through, and it has been used as an umbrella for Korea, UNEF, and UNOC. The Russians have consistently insisted (along with the French) that the GA acted illegally in giving itself powers which the Charter had delegated to another UN body.

Despite the foregoing, there is good reason to believe the Russians are more concerned about their posture on financing than they have been in the past. It would appear that, as a minimum, they are seeking a clarification of their position and, in order to do so, they apparently consider themselves in a position to enter into hard bargaining.

It may be that the Russians would find a way to make the minimum payment necessary to get past Article 19 in exchange for U.S. agreement to freeze the present scale of assessments--a formula not wholly unpalatable to the U.S. or the USSR. Another course the Russians might choose would be to make a minimum payment on UNOC (there is a SC resolution empowering the UN to act in the Congo) under protest, based on an understanding that the operation will terminate on June 30, 1964, and as a gesture to help the UN out of its financial difficulties. Another alternative would be the payment of their arrears of $14 million for the UNEF operation as a voluntary-not an obligatory-gesture; thereby not compromising in principle. Any one of these three approaches might be satisfactory; especially as the day of reckoning draws nearer. Actually, in order for the USSR to avoid an impasse on Article 19 in a totally regular way, a relatively small sum is involved-about $6 million on either UNEF or UNOC plus their assessment on the regular budget (which they always pay)./3/

The Department will recommend--and I think rightly so--that we should allow the Russians to have no illusions about our seriousness to see Article 19 applied, but we should also make it abundantly clear that we have no desire to deprive them of their GA vote. We should strongly impress upon them the value we attach to having all members--especially great powers--retain their votes in the GA.

The next step in the exercise is to take the Secretary's proposals for over-all strategy on UN financing to the President-hopefully by the end of the week. After that, as USUN explores the problem with the Russians, we will be in a better position to judge the size of the problem we face and what kind of compromises, if any, we may have to make.

SEB

Washington, November 8, 1963, 7:44 p.m.

1364. Re Enlargement Councils. Dept in general agreement positions and tactics recommended Urtels 1442 and 1457./2/ Dept's specific comments follow:

1. In general, we should maintain our public posture in favor of enlargement of both Councils. There are obvious advantages to us of approach by stages, concentrating on ECOSOC in first instance in order to test Soviet intentions before getting into details of a much more complex nature of Security Council enlargement. Best results from our point of view would be to have reasonable enlargement of ECOSOC but for Security Council remain as it is. Our hope is that division of forces on question of Security Council enlargement will be such as to result in impasse. We know you are fully aware that any enlargement of Security Council less likely to be favorable to us than with present composition. Moreover, Security Council enlargement would raise difficult questions for us in ratification process which not case with respect ECOSOC.

While our bargaining power should not be over-estimated in light of strong feeling that has developed over the years in favor enlargement both Councils, and our public position in favor of enlargement, we would hope it would be possible for USGADel to use as appropriate leverage we have in direction of amendments acceptable to us; no Charter amendment is possible without our agreement.

We realize fully that it may not be possible to focus action on ECOSOC enlargement alone. Therefore, following is supplementary guidance as it relates to possible Security Council enlargement.

2. It of major importance we hold any SC enlargement to 2 in order protect US interests in Council. In this connection Dept fully concurs line taken with LAs (Urtel 1811)/3/ with respect importance coordination WE and LA positions, and encouraged both WEs and LAs apparently prepared agree on 2 (Urtels 1654, 1866)./4/

3. Dept prefers voting majority of 8 with increase of 2. While voting majority of 9 would make it easier defeat proposals in SC, it would at same time make it more difficult obtain necessary majority for Western proposals. Nine would therefore not appear desirable and is unnecessary from viewpoint protecting our interests since our position already protected by veto if situation sufficiently serious from standpoint US interests to warrant its use.

4. Dept agrees that the 2 additional seats should be allocated Asia and Africa, respectively, with "floating" seat reverting Eastern Europe. History our efforts deprive Eastern Europe seat originally allocated to it makes it clear any effort continue do so in enlarged Council would encounter stiff opposition and seriously prejudice chance, if any, Soviet ratification, thereby leaving us open charges bad faith. Moreover it obviously causes fewer political complications for US to accept formula permitting Eastern Europe retain seat it has either held or shared (with one exception) since 1946 than to seek amendment Charter to give Eastern Europe seat de novo.

5. Dept shares your doubts it will prove practical retain both Commonwealth and 2 LA seats. Recent SC elections would appear already to have seriously undermined concept Commonwealth seat and Dept would expect Africans to insist on two seats so long as LAs hold two, even though argument can be made that with Commonwealth seat they would in fact have one plus seats, since Commonwealth seat would for most part be shared between Asia Africa.

6. If Commonwealth seat goes to Africans and Council enlarged by 2, over-all geographic distribution including 5 permanent members would be as follows: Asia--2, Middle East--1, Africa--2, Latin America--2, Eastern Europe--(including USSR) 2, Western Europe-3-, and U.S. Any allocation less favorable our position would raise serious problems for US ratification.

7. Dept also shares your doubts A-As (or EEs) will be satisfied with "understanding" rather than resolution with respect allocation since it clear from experience under "gentlemen's agreement" such understandings unlikely remain firm.

8. We, of course, would like to avoid resolution on across-the-board reallocation non-permanent SC seats entirely, but realize this may not be possible. Dept inclined believe any resolution allocating seats likely be considered procedural as in nature amendment GA rules of procedure and therefore difficult avoid even if LAs and WEs stand firmly together.

9. Re ECOSOC, Dept agrees we should hold line at increase of 6 and believes you should seek encourage LAs join forces with WEs in maintaining this position. With respect allocation these additional seats, Dept would hope see WEs regain seat lost in 1961, 2 seats go to Asia, 1 seat to Middle East and 2 seats to Africa. Dept believes 4 seats for Africa sufficient (2 additional plus 2 it now has) and that 2 additional seats Asia desirable in order permit India and Japan serve more frequently than they can now hope to. With respect return seat lost by GRC in 1960, Dept recognizes this may not prove feasible but believes question should be discussed GRC Del before final decision reached on this point. Re resolution now pending Committee II to enlarge committees of ECOSOC, Dept prepared consider this as interim step to Council enlargement if debate in SPC is concluded without action.

10. Re General Committee, Dept believes plan outlined Urtel 1442 about as much as we can hope for and agrees we should be as flexible as possible with respect its size and geographic allocation in order bolster our position with respect SC and ECOSOC. At same time Dept would hope see increase in number of vice-presidencies held to 2 on grounds GC should not become too unwieldy in size.

Rusk

Washington, November 13, 1963, 4:43 p.m.

1402. Ref: Deptel 1143, USUN 1665./2/ Talks With Sov Del re UN Financing.

In further assessment draft strategy paper you discussed with Cleveland in mid-October, we conclude it would be premature and unprofitable to attempt at this time to reach harmonization of views with Sovs on handling and financing future peacekeeping operations in context your current talks. We believe workable device for giving bigger voice to larger contributors--such as GA financial screening out or opting out provision--is not simply technical matter but is intertwined with (a) policy decision on politically acceptable US share of costlier peacekeeping operations, which necessarily involves Congressional support and (b) safeguards to ensure we do not impair UN capacity to act in face of Soviet opposition. This complex issue must be separated out for intensive planning between us over next few months so that we can take sound and approved position into Working Group discussions. Meanwhile we see no objection (and some merit as suggested below) to your indicating to Sovs on informal basis that we are giving attention to long-range problem of financing and management of future peacekeeping operations in preparation for deliberations of Working Group, taking into account special problems of large contributors.

Under circumstances we would plan to do separate longer-range paper geared to key policy decision on financing and managing future peacekeeping, and limit what follows to strategy in more immediate context of current talks. In place of three-fold framework outlined in Deptel 1143 you should be guided by following considerations in pursuing talks, adapting tactics as necessary.

1. New turn reported in USUN 1930 and 1943/3/ (re proposal for short resolution on 1964 scale of assessments which would list only changes and not publish entire scale) suggests that Sovs may be backing away from freeze idea for time being. We are inclined to doubt that Sovs have dropped idea entirely, and we propose following strategy on assumption they will want to continue talks before end of GA or early next year.

2. You should therefore continue to be receptive to Sov desire resume talks. Our main objective is to achieve satisfactory solution of arrears so as to avoid or at least delay beyond 1964 threatened hassle on Article 19. Despite negative attitude of SovDel reported urtel 1665 (which to be expected at this early stage) we must insist on tie-in between arrears settlement and our receptivity to discuss freeze on regular scale. Without indication of Soviet readiness to clear up arrears issue, we would see no prospect of mutually acceptable outcome on regular scale freeze. This linkage is not to be regarded by Sovs as capricious or artificial on our part, nor is it simply advanced by us as bargaining counter. Sovs should be aware of following considerations: a) we would find difficulty justifying to American people and Congress standstill on regular scale (instead of expected reduction in our share and sizeable increase in Sov share) while Sovs and others continue resist obligation to pay for previously-assessed fair shares for UN operations; b) in same vein we could not argue convincingly for new, higher peacekeeping scale while arrears for past peacekeeping operations remain unsettled; c) other members whose proportionate share of regular budget will be higher if regular scale is frozen can be more readily persuaded to acquiesce in freeze if it is combined with settlement of arrears.

3. At same time you should indicate to Sovs that with solution of problem of old debts we would be in better position to turn our attention to long-range problem of financing and management of future peacekeeping operations, taking into account special problems of larger contributors. On this point too early to discuss particulars but Dept giving close study this problem in developing US position on questions that will come before Working Group next spring. (Unofficially, as illustration one possibility, you might speculate that in event special scale adopted for costly peacekeeping operations, arrangements might be established so that bigger contributors would have larger voice in determining when such special scale would be applied.)

4. In addition to holding out carrot of favorable attitude on our part to their freeze proposal, we believe that despite Sov intransigence you should adopt following course: (a) reiterate that overwhelming GA acceptance of ICJ ruling on peacekeeping assessments removes any doubt as to legal and political validation of their obligation to pay UNEF and UNOC assessments; (b) reiterate, using familiar arguments, that terms of Article 19 make it clear that loss of vote is automatic; (c) continue to assert as you did in last go-round that US position on application Article 19 remains unchanged; and (d) enlist support appropriate third countries in pressing Sovs to clear up arrears problem.

5. Dept believes politically-important third countries could play useful role in urging Sovs to settle arrearage problem. We would like your views on embarking on such corridor talking campaign with third countries in such way as to ensure its getting back to Sovs. Countries such as India, UAR, Nigeria, Brazil occur to us but you are in better position to judge. Our arguments would be: arrears must be settled if UN to go forward in orderly and businesslike manner; underbrush of old debts must be cleared away if we are to make progress on future peacekeeping formula in Working Group next spring; settlement of arrears is not US-USSR issue but involves delinquent behavior on part certain members with which entire UN membership must be concerned.

6. Initial sessions should thus concentrate so far as possible on question of arrears to probe area of give on this matter. You should of course make it clear that we will not make issue of means by which debts are paid, nor do we insist on open confession of sins. We would assume that Sovs could work out acceptable formula with UN Secretariat which would allow them to pay up without appearing to compromise on principle. For example, they could make minimum payment on UNOC, perhaps initially for period in 1960 when UNOC operated under SC reses they endorsed authorizing SYG provide GOC with military assistance and, in addition, for later period when Thant became SYG, and in expectation that operation would wind up by mid-1964. They could advertise payment as act of grace to help out UN in financial difficulties, thus avoiding endorsement Congo operation. They could pay UNEF arrears ($14 million) as "voluntary" act while continuing deny that assessment obligatory. Of course you should not leave impression that any partial payments could be regarded as full discharge of their legal assessments.

7. If Sovs give satisfactory indication that they are moving to resolve arrears issue, you could move on to discussion of substance their proposal for freeze on regular scale. We assume that meanwhile your preliminary "technical" talks would have gone long way in exposing spuriousness of their statistics and arguments re fairness of scale. In substantive discussion of regular scale you should complete refutation their arguments so that whatever accommodation we may reach does not in any way imply acceptance of Sov premise re fairness of scale. Whatever validity there is to Sov plea for more favored treatment has already been cranked into criteria used by Contributions Cmte in determining capacity to pay, and there is no justification for favoring Sovs at expense of rest of membership.

8. We would in any case consider freeze for ten years as unrealistic and unjustifiable in terms of balance of interests of all members. If we were to entertain concept of freeze it would be for next three-year round and would be on two grounds: (1) that arrears had been settled; (b) that stabilization of assessments for this period would be in general interest of UN. It would provide time for Organization to digest effects of recent budget and program increases; take account of effect on UN program and operations of rapid influx of poor members whose demands on organization not offset by contributions; and give UN time to wrestle with problem of achieving viable formula for financing future costly peacekeeping operations. In addition, we would want assurance that any freeze formula would provide some net reduction for US share by taking account of receipts from any new members who will pay their share of regular budget within 100 percent scale. Applying this principle to eight new members now outside scale, our proportionate payment comes out at about 31.90.

9. FYI. You are aware that freezing scale would not be without advantage to us quite apart from arrears settlement. Ceiling principle has become increasingly contentious. While we have been inching our way to GA-approved 30% ceiling, we would not want risk reopening debate on ceiling principle, and it may eventually become desirable for us to acquiesce in maintaining roughly our present share during next 3 year assessment period. On balance, however, we would not find freeze of all shares on regular scale, including Sov share, to our net advantage and it becomes politically palatable only if combined with solution on arrears. End FYI.

10. Dept assumes above strategy would be effective if Sov desire for freeze is important objective. If not, it is unlikely in our estimation that Sovs would back down on arrears this early, if at all. Dept would appreciate early assessment from USUN and Embassy Moscow on how strongly Soviets desire freeze. We would also be interested in probing Sov intentions re future peacekeeping operations. What importance do you attach to Solodovnikov's repeated remark that USSR cannot be expected pay arrears if it not have single technician in Congo operation or in Civops Congo? Is this search for face-saver or does it presage Soviet desire to get directly involved in future peacekeeping acts? If latter, what in your estimation are implications for US policy?

11. Dept believes that whether or not you make headway in achieving kind of deal we have in mind, process of exploration with Sovs will be beneficial to us in preparing our policy on financing and management of future peacekeeping operations. It is thus very timely apart from hopefully successful outcome of immediate issue.

Rusk

New York, November 13, 1963, 7:15 p.m.

2032. Deptels 1045, 1143;/2/ USUN's 1295,/3/ 1449,/4/ 1665,/5/ 1771./6/ Meeting With Sov Del on UN Financial Problems.

Expected technical meeting on USSR ability to pay and why it believes it over assessed on UN regular scale of contributions held Nov. 12: Solodovnikov (USSR) and Ziehl (USDel). Little new learned, but USSR arguments included:

1. USSR dollar contributions to UN and specialized agencies $25 million per year which too large an amount for USSR to pay. SovDel believes Supreme Soviet may refuse pay increased percentage if voted, because too difficult secure foreign exchange. When queried about magnitude total foreign trade and fact USSR refuses publish balance of payments information, Solodovnikov replied he realized this puts USSR in difficult position and he feels his government wrong in not making these data available to show real USSR problem. In response to line of argument "You can't have your cake and eat it," Solodovnikov again repeated this is real problem for USSR and his govt's position on not publishing balance of payments figures makes SovDel's position difficult.

2. Principal argument, that UN scale is based national income figures while accumulated wealth is the significant real factor was that little new wealth accumulated USSR during World War II, and war destroyed much existing wealth. Rates of growth on national income not appropriate measure until real wealth restored. In other words, much Soviet economic growth and capital accumulation still required to re-establish USSR wealth. When asked whether Western European countries did not have similar problems and the relationship their scale rates to scale rates of Soviets, Solodovnikov replied situation is not analogous, but would not elaborate. (It appeared to DelOff that Solodovnikov's heart not in this argument.)

3. Veterans benefits and excess women in labor force lumped together by Solodovnikov, who alleged USSR veteran benefits very high, but stated he did not know magnitude, and that excess of women very high, but he not know numbers. Factual basis had been laid by DelOff that in 1959 disparity between able bodied males and females in USSR was just over 4 million. It hard to reconcile these figures with 20 million excess women figures and relate this figure (often used by USSR) to significant economic arguments bearing on the scale of assessments. Solodovnikov, while insisting this a significant item, supplied no answer except to say that the figures DelOff quoted must deal with USSR as a whole, whereas there were serious imbalances in parts of the Soviet Union. These imbalances had required large expenditures, for example, to create factories for the sole employment of males in areas where 95 percent of the remaining population were women. The arguments advanced were never tied up with their effect on the USSR ability to pay or the fairness of its scale of assessments.

In closing discussion, Solodovnikov stressed personal belief that USSR and US must find ways to cooperate more fully in the UN. He stated he realized many nations, including the Africans, beginning resent this display of cooperation, but it important to world peace. His final (emotional) comment was that all the Russians who had met US military during the wars liked them, and there was a great reserve of friendship for the US.

Solodovnikov also stated he had been on two weeks emergency leave to see his sick wife last summer; hoped to go home for a month and half this summer and "maybe stay there." He stated no one knew about this desire, but that he hoped "to get back to the institute" where he could make a further contribution to economics and international relations. Also stated he planned go to Washington after this GA and hoped see Bowman, US national on Contributions Committee.

Stevenson

New York, November 20, 1963, 7 p.m.

2170. Talks with SovDel re UN Financing. Ref: Deptel 1143 and USUN 1665, 1999./2/

USUN agrees questions of financing and managing future peacekeeping operations in manner more fully in accord with interests of larger contributors is intertwined with US policy decision on acceptance special scale. As pointed out USUN 1999, subject: UNEF financing 1964, it will be difficult negotiate acceptable UNEF financing res early December, unless US prepared during UNEF negotiations indicate it likely be willing agree some version special scale when Working Group 21 meets. Currently expected Working Group begin meeting about Feb 1. USDel concerned unless Congressional soundings already undertaken or can be taken promptly, USDel be very difficult position not only during UNEF financing negotiations in two weeks, but also when Working Group meets. Time and difficulty of both consulting Congress and getting Executive Branch clearance within month of Jan recognized by all.

USUN also concurs safeguards necessary so US capacity to act not impaired. But little time remains for dealing with Soviets exclusively. Several members Working Group 21 have already indicated they believe Working Group mandate to work out methods financing peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures likely be "only chance" to bring USSR back into fold for past arrears and for future participation in time avoid necessity Article 19 showdown.

With respect your suggestion USDel indicate to Sovs on informal basis we giving attention to long-range problem of financing and management of future peacekeeping operations in preparation for deliberation of Working Group, taking into account special problems of large contributors, USDel so far finds little interest by Sovs in this approach, except repeated statements financing must be in Security Council with veto. Therefore, believed imperative US position on acceptable perimeters control mechanism for large contributors be available soonest. Restating to Sovs that with solution of problem of old debts, we be in better position to turn to long range financing and management problem considered highly unlikely be productive. In any case we need decision soon on these questions within Executive Branch so that necessary govt position can be prepared before Working Group meetings.

With respect freezing scale assessments, SovDel appears have dropped freeze idea for present. Tactical situation is that unless Sovs bring this before current GA--only logical item being scale of assessment discussion which began Fifth Committee this week--possibility security freeze becomes increasingly difficult. Best bet work out freeze would have been instructions from this GA to Committee on Contributions, before it meets next June, to take freeze action on the scale. Without instructions, Committee on Contributions will have no alternative but to apply present criteria to development revised scale. (It appears such revision would increase USSR percentage substantially and give reductions to many members.) To reverse such Contributions Committee recommendations once made, would be uphill battle even if Sovs throw in sponge next fall and pay arrears. The appeal of reduced contributions for the many LDCs which be so entitled next year be very difficult LCDs resist. Admittedly, major attack next fall on US ceiling--if USSR not press freeze--might appeal many LDCs as way of getting double reductions. USDel will, of course, continue probe Sovs on their ideas on freeze and future intentions.

With respect role of politically important third countries in urging Sovs to settle arrearage problem, we will continue talking third countries but at this stage mainly to bring our information on their opinions up-to-date. Most these countries appear be waiting for opportunity for negotiations in Working Group 21. Problems likely be created if India, UAR, Nigeria and Brazil go off on their own until US position on financing and managing is shored up. Encouraging these countries take independent lead on settlement arrears might well start snowballing of proposals inimical to US interest.

With respect Solodovnikov repeated remark USSR cannot be expected pay arrears if it not have single technician in Congo operation or Civops Congo, best present appraisal this complaint rather pro-forma. Only usefulness might be inclusion in policy guideline for USDel on US attitude inclusion USSR technicians in future operations. USDel willing explore importance USSR attaches to technician for Civops Congo, if Dept believes it advisable. USDel present view is further mentioning or pressing this point better left to USSR.

In summary, USUN intends keep door open for further talks regarding UN financing and plans be receptive further meetings, preferably during present GA, but (1) unless developments in current scale of assessment debate (which began Nov 20) are other than expected, or (2) Dept furnishes further guidelines on financing and management aspects of future peacekeeping operations, any future talks expected only result in keeping channels open and not in development much new information useful in formulating our position.

Within several days USUN expects submit memo to Dept on analysis of possible opting out procedures. Believe personal talks between Dept and USUN personnel also advisable this and other management phases of US needed position.

Stevenson

Washington, November 26, 1963.

SUBJECT
President Johnson on the UN

The following indications are available as to President Johnson's policy on UN affairs:

1. Ambassador Stevenson was invited to meet with President Johnson yesterday afternoon, before the reception in the State Department building. In the course of the 15 or 20 minute talk, the President confirmed his desire to carry on the policy of President Kennedy in the field of international cooperation on outer space matters. (This is also confirmed by the fact that the paragraphs from Ambassador Stevenson's prospective UN speech on outer space cooperation, which you sent over to the White House for clearance, have been returned with changes that do not affect the main thrust of our recommendation.)

The President had had some homework done on his own previous utterances on international cooperation in outer space, and gave Ambassador Stevenson marked copies of his previous speeches, drawing attention to passages with strong remarks on the subject. A selection of these excerpts, to which the President drew specific attention, is attached at Tab A./2/

2. Ambassador Stevenson also discussed with the President the line he intended to take in the short speech he is making this afternoon in the General Assembly, answering on behalf of the U.S. the dozen or more eulogies that will be given in the General Assembly by representatives from other nations. Ambassador Stevenson told the President that it would be useful to put some words in his (the President's) mouth, in reassuring the Assembly about U.S. policy toward the United Nations. The President said that whatever Ambassador Stevenson said along that line would be alright with him, but to make it strong.

3. At the reception, the President spent 3 or 4 minutes with Secretary-General U Thant; Ambassador Stevenson and I were present. The Secretary-General led off by saying that he had followed with some interest President Johnson's personal public statements on the UN, and it seemed clear that his interest in and support of the UN was strong. President Johnson replied that his support of the United Nations was "total". He went on to say something very much like the following: "It would be hard to be a more vigorous and effective supporter of the UN than President Kennedy was, but if I can manage it, that's what I will be"./3/

After the President's talk with Ambassador Stevenson following the Cabinet meeting Saturday, November 23, the President directed his office to make available to us some quotations from previous speeches about the UN. These quotations are attached at Tab B.

Harlan Cleveland/4/

Washington, November 27, 1963.

SUBJECT
Current Issues Before the United Nations

On Tuesday President Johnson, through Ambassador Stevenson, reaffirmed support for "every practical move to add to the capacity of the UN to keep the peace and aid new nations to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth."

Our ability to achieve the above will depend principally on what happens in regard to the following:

1. Whether the Soviet Union will insist upon provoking a constitutional crisis by maintaining its "financial veto" on peacekeeping operations although threatened with loss of its vote under Article 19.

2. Whether emotionalism over the hard-core remnants of colonialism, plus the racial issues in Africa, will present us with the hard choice of backing mandatory sanctions against South Africa and Portugal or losing the support of Africans on issues vital to us.

3. Whether the majority in the General Assembly--now speaking for the underdeveloped "south"--will insist upon new institutions, programs, or actions in the economic and social areas which are unacceptable to the United States and the other members from the industrialized "north".

The issues which we face in the United Nations fall under five headings:

Much of the growth of UN's peacekeeping capacity has been achieved despite obstruction from the USSR and its associated countries. On the whole these countries have looked upon the UN as an instrument for "conference diplomacy". But despite Soviet vetoes in the Security Council and despite Soviet efforts to impose a troika over the office of the Secretary-General, the UN has steadily moved forward in strengthening its executive and peacekeeping operations.

The Soviets have shown some signs of reconsidering their hard line of attempting to prevent the development of the UN's operational capacity. If there is a change of tactics and they begin participating more actively in the executive side of the UN's work, the opportunities this opens up will be matched by increased difficulties for the United States--for the Soviet policy of boycotting and complaining from the sidelines in the UN has enabled the U.S. and some of its Western allies to build an organization responsive to Western leadership, embracing in our interests the universal symbolism of a global organization. The Soviet attempts to share this leadership in UN operations from day-to-day could require substantial changes in our own tactics-just as things would have been far different if the Soviets had decided to participate in, say, the Marshall Plan or the UN Congo operation in the past.

The Crisis in Peacekeeping Financing. The most urgent problem which will face the United Nations during the next few months concerns the financing of peacekeeping operations. Last year, the General Assembly accepted an Advisory Opinion of the International Court holding that assessments for peacekeeping operations were binding upon all the members. This brings arrearages in the payment of such assessments within the provisions of Article 19 of the Charter. Under this Article if the Soviets fail to pay approximately $14 million of their arrears on the UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo, they would lose their vote at the first meeting of the General Assembly held in 1964. A direct confrontation in the UN on this issue would mean a major constitutional crisis. The Soviets maintain that the loss of vote is not automatic but would require, contrary to the express wording of Article 19, a 2/3 vote of the General Assembly.

Some hints have been dropped to both UN and US officials by Soviet diplomats in New York that a US-USSR agreement with regard to the future financing of peacekeeping operations might be helpful in resolving the arrearage question. Before entering into any serious discussion with the Soviet Union on this matter, the United States (with Congressional support) should be clear as to whether or not we ourselves can accept an assessment scale for peacekeeping operations which would put our assessment in the 37 to 38% range. Secondly, we will need to be clear as to whether any new measures are required to protect the US against future General Assembly assessments for peacekeeping operations of which we might not approve. It is possible that there should be some new screening mechanism through which all special UN peacekeeping financing measures should pass before being laid before the full UN membership in the Fifth Committee. Staff work is underway on both of these issues at the present time and policy decisions will need to be made early in the new year.

The question of arrearages is not a matter for the UN alone. It has arisen in the Organization of American States (OAS), in an even more acute form. Here there is no loss of vote provision and the US pays at an assessed rate of 66%.

Continuation of Present Peacekeeping Operations. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) continues its effective work on the Israel-Egyptian border. The UN Congo Force (UNOC) has been continued until July 1, 1964. The UN Observation Group (UNYOM) in Yemen has been extended until January 4. UN Observers continue to police the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Canada have earmarked military units for UN service. It is anticipated that informal discussions between these countries and the UN Secretary-General on the training of officer and unit personnel will take place soon after the conclusion of the 18th General Assembly.

The decolonization process has now come firmly against the hard-core racial issues in the southern third of Africa. The African countries are beginning more seriously to relate our support or lack of support of their policies in this struggle to other issues in the United Nations (Chinese representation and loss of vote for USSR) which are of major importance.

Apartheid in South Africa. In the Security Council debate on apartheid, which began on November 27, the United States may be faced on a racial issue with the choice of casting its first veto or permitting a resolution to be adopted providing for punitive sanctions against South Africa. We are seeking to sidetrack extreme proposals, including a provision in a resolution calling for an oil embargo. Venezuela's vote is likely to be key and an approach to President Bentancourt of Venezuela will be necessary.

Southwest Africa. Also looming on the horizon is the question of South Africa's attempt to incorporate the mandated territory of Southwest Africa into the Republic and to extend to it South Africa's apartheid policies. The question of Southwest Africa is clearly an international one and poses the sanctions problem in a very different context.

Portuguese Territories. The Security Council will also consider the Portuguese territories question. Our objective is to utilize the Council to promote a resumption of quiet talks between Portugal and the Africans. Council consideration will bring to the fore again the role and relative importance in our overall strategy of the military base in the Azores. The debate will also highlight afresh the apparent Portuguese division of American military assistance for use in the Portuguese territories.

Captain Galvao. The United States may be confronted within the next two weeks with another difficult conflict of obligations. Captain Galvao is opposed to Salazar's policies on the Portuguese territories; he achieved fame by hijacking the Portuguese liner Santa Maria early in 1961. Galvao has now been invited (by an Afro-Asian majority) to appear before the UN General Assembly's Fourth Committee.

Under the UN Headquarters Agreement the U.S. is required to admit him so that he may appear before the Committee. At the same time, the United States has an extradition treaty with Portugal, the terms of which would make him subject to arrest for a hearing on his extradition--once he sets foot on U.S. territory. The Portuguese have said they will exercise their rights under the treaty. We are asking the Portuguese not to exercise their rights under the treaty. If they do, we will need to decide whether to arrange Galvao's visit so as to avoid his being arrested.

Human Rights. The growing power of the Afro-Asian nations in the United Nations has resulted in pressure for the Declaration on Racial Discrimination to be followed by a Convention on Racial Discrimination. This convention would be drawn up early in the new year by the UN Human Rights Commission and would be presented to the next General Assembly. While it is difficult in the present setting to oppose such a convention, the U.S. is exploring ways in which the UN's operational capacity can be increased for defusing certain human rights questions through quiet fact-finding, and in which other human rights questions can be handled in a less political way through being considered in the context of the world-wide development of human rights. This may involve giving the UN Human Rights Commission, or a rapporteur responsible to it, more freedom of initiative. It was decided last week to withhold a U.S. proposal along these lines, in order not to confuse further the domestic debate on civil rights legislation.

With the entry of so many former colonies into independence and UN membership, the confrontation of the world's impoverished "south" and the industrialized "north" is reflected in several issues of major concern at the United Nations.

UN Conference on Trade and Development. Ever since World War II, the United States has relied on GATT as a primary instrument for dealing with trade and tariff questions. Now the less-developed countries are moving to try to create a new mechanism in which they could have a predominant voice. In response to a decision at the Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly, the United Nations beginning on March 25 will hold a Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The conference is expected to last for approximately three months. The less-developed countries, led by Brazil, the UAR, Yugoslavia, India and Nigeria, have indicated they expect a new set of UN institutions to emerge from this conference--with effective powers to review, and if possible to change, existing international arrangements governing trade relationships.

The ability of the Western nations, led in this case by the United States, to preserve the status of GATT, while providing within existing UN framework a better opportunity to conduct trade discussions and debates, will be crucial both for the evolution of GATT and the future usefulness of the UN as an instrument in the trade field.

Initiatives at the 18th General Assembly. In his speech at the opening of the Eighteenth General Assembly, President Kennedy proposed the establishment of a World Health Communications Center under the World Health Organization (WHO), to warn of epidemics and the adverse effects of certain drugs, and the establishment of regional research centers which would advance medical knowledge and provide for the training of scientists and doctors in less-developed regions. Meanwhile the French have proposed the establishment of a World Cancer Research Unit under WHO to which nations would contribute up to 1/2 of 1 percent of their budgets. These several initiatives will be discussed in detail early in the new year by the Executive Board and plenary meetings of WHO.

The United Nations has under way a vigorous program of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. A Declaration of Legal Principles is expected to be approved at this Assembly, followed by the drafting of international agreements on liability for space vehicle accidents and the return of astronauts and equipment which land in other than the launching countries. Measures will be taken under the UN's aegis to strengthen scientific cooperation as, for example, in the endorsement by the UN of a sounding rocket facility in India open to space experiments by all members. The World Meteorological Organization will be implementing plans already approved to establish a world weather watch, using satellites as well as ground facilities, to bring improved weather forecasts and increased knowledge in the atmospheric sciences. Finally, following the successful agreements reached by the International Telecommunications Union on the allocation of radio frequencies for space communications, the U.S. and other countries will be negotiating an international agreement establishing a new organization for the ownership and management of a global communications satellite system.

It is not surprising that an institutional structure developed for an initial United Nations membership of 51 is proving inadequate for a membership of 111.

An Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The United States for several years has been on record publicly in favor of an increase of the Security Council to 13 from its present membership of 11 and an increase of the Economic and Social Council to 24 from its membership of 18. We are being pressed by the new nations to broaden their representation on the UN Councils, and would like to bring them in rather than redistribute seats at the expense of Europe and Latin America. We are concentrating in the first instance on the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council which does not raise a number of delicate issues which arise in connection with the Security Council. In the past the enlargement of the Security Council has been blocked by the Soviet Union since it has linked this question with Chinese representation. This has helped us maintain the present favorable composition of the Security Council without any appreciable adverse criticism being directed at us. There are indications that the Soviets may unlink the enlargement question from the Chinese representation issue. We will continue to indicate our willingness to support a modest increase of two on the Security Council. A resolution incorporating one or both of such proposed Charter amendments may pass this session of the Assembly. Any Charter amendments will be subject to ratification.

Improving the Operation of the UN Agencies. For the past year there has been underway a U.S. program designed to improve the staffing, the effective administration and the financial management of UN agencies. The Department has had the assistance of an Advisory Committee on International Organizations, composed of leading persons who have held important posts either in the UN or the U.S. Government. Two reports have been issued. The first is entitled "Staffing International Organizations." The second is entitled "The Technical Cooperation Programs of the United Nations System". The third report, just being published, deals with financial management of the UN agencies.

The principal proposal made in the technical assistance report was for the merger of the United Nations Special Fund and the Expanded Technical Assistance into a single UN Development Administration. This proposal will be taken up by a UN committee early in the new year. The third report on financial management deals, inter alia, with the problems of effective controls on the budgets of the UN Specialized Agencies. This is a problem which has also been of concern to Congress. The Foreign Assistance Act currently before Congress includes a Senate amendment which would place a dollar limit on the annual contribution of the U.S. to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). While the elimination of this amendment may be possible, it points to the timeliness of the type of initiative already underway in the Department of State.

Economic Aid to Cuba. During the consideration of the AID authorization, the House approved, but the Senate did not insert, an amendment to prevent voluntary contributions to any international organization providing assistance to Cuba. It is thus clear that the United States must have a defensible position on economic assistance to Cuba by UN bodies. This issue could arise in January in connection with the programs of UNICEF or the UN Special Fund. In general, the U.S. continues to oppose economic assistance to Cuba.

Date for the Next Session of the General Assembly. In the election year of 1956, the opening of the General Assembly was delayed until after the United States election. This coming year, UN Headquarters in New York will be undergoing substantial interior reconstruction in order to accommodate the larger membership. In view of the delicate issues likely to arise next fall (Article 19 and Chinese representation), there may be considerable advantage in promoting quietly a delay in the opening date of the 19th General Assembly to November 1964./2/

New York, November 27, 1963, 7:30 p.m.

2245. Enlargement of Councils.

1. From number of sources in all groups we get impression there now enough support pass res for increase of two in SC and six in ECOSOC. All LAs and Eurs lined up. Asians held what is as far as we can determine first Asian group meeting today to discuss increase. Natwar Singh (India) informs us his del and as far as he knows other Asian dels all ready to support two and six formula as long as one seat set aside for Asia. Essafi (Tunisia) and Ben Hima (Morocco) report Africans have decided accept two and six formula as long as two seats set aside for Africa. Tunisia and Algeria wish to qualify for African seat while Morocco hopes maintain Middle East seat which would run from Morocco to Iran; on latter point, Ben Hima says Morocco will not insist.

2. Moves for larger increases in Council do not appear have much chance of success. Campbell (UK) says Dean told Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Ambs last night that although UK would of course consider their proposal for increase of four in SC, he doubted strongly London would agree to this proposal since UK convinced West problems become more difficult with every increase. Mission Off again spoke with Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian Dels, showing them our calculations whereby each increase adds to our problems in SC. We see no sign today that as yet old Commonwealth waging major battle for their proposal. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) quite separately has told us he desires see increase of three in SC with extra seat going to Commonwealth. However, he not sanguine about prospects for his proposal.

3. So far, Sov Bloc Dels keeping very quiet on enlargement except to pass word Communist China being consulted on increase.

4. Principal problem remaining seems to be whether and how to record distribution of SC seats following increase. Brazilians are shying away from recording distribution in formal res and thereby are making other dels wonder whether they have double play in mind. After talking to Correa da Costa (Brazil), we are convinced they have just not thought problem through. We suggested to them it essential work out means of recording distribution at same time res negotiated.

5. SPC has adjourned until Mon/2/ PM in order give time for groups to work out agreement.

Plimpton

New York, November 29, 1963, 9:15 p.m.

2291. Opening Date of 19th Session. Deptel 1530./2/

We, also, have been concerned with possible unfortunate effects of opening 19th Session shortly before US elections. Some days ago Stevenson inquired of Dean (UK) whether UK would be prepared to take lead in proposing later opening date. Dean has told us he expects to be able give reply Dec 2.

In meantime, pursuant reftel Yost raised question informally with Bunche, to whom advantages of delay did not have to be explained. We emphasized, however, fact that capital improvement program would constitute excellent reason. Bunche was entirely sympathetic but did not feel SYG could take initiative in proposing delay. He believed some delegation or delegations other than US could do so and that in that case SYG could concur, noting that extra time would be very useful in assuring completion building program.

Subsequently, at SC luncheon today Bunche mentioned matter to SYG in Yost's presence. SYG said that he had already been giving serious consideration to this matter since he recognized serious disadvantages of having Article 19 confrontation while US election campaign in progress. He was, therefore, also sympathetic but not sure building program could be cited as reason for delay, since he had been assured work could be completed in August. Bunche and we pointed out that construction people rarely complete a job as soon as they expect. (Some days ago Vaughan told Yost he expected to complete work before GA opening but any unforeseen interruption or delay could make this impossible.) SYG concluded by saying he would give further consideration to problem.

Incidentally, in course of conversation, SYG inquired whether US is still determined to push Article 19 issue. Yost replied that our views on financial responsibility UN members, our interpretation of Charter, and our political commitments to US Congress make it certain that we shall do so unless in meantime Sovs find some means of making sufficient payment on arrears so that Article 19 would no longer apply to them. Naturally, we hope the latter will occur. SYG remarked that he had had some indication from Poles that they might follow "Yugoslav formula," i.e., make payments for Congo operations after Nov 1961. However, he had no such indication from Sovs and is deeply concerned with problem and its possible repercussions.

Plimpton

Washington, December 4, 1963, noon.

SUBJECT
United Nations Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

Canadian Side
Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs
Hedard Robichaud, Minister of Fisheries
Marcel Cadieux, Deputy Under Secretary of State for External Affairs
Charles S. A. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador
H. Basil Robinson, Minister, Canadian Embassy

U.S. Side
The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA

Mr. Martin said that he was very much concerned over the proposal for the expansion of the Security Council of the United Nations and the possible loss of the Commonwealth seat. He said the British had reacted as had the United States to the Canadian proposal for four new seats./2/ He knew why the United States wanted two, but such action would be very prejudicial to Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The Secretary said he had not supposed that the Commonwealth seat would be lost if two seats were added. Mr. Martin said he did not see how this could be avoided, since the Africans and Asians would wipe out any possibility of the older Commonwealth being elected. If there were four seats added, the chance would be better, because seats could be given to the Africans and Asians. Canada had already told the United Kingdom it could not agree on the proposal for two additional seats. Canada has been thinking of a resolution in the UN, but realizes that the resolution might not pass, and would be subject in any event to a Soviet veto.

The Secretary questioned again the thought that the Commonwealth seat was lost if only two were added, because of the number of African and Asian countries now in the Commonwealth. Mr. Martin agreed that there were many Asian and African Commonwealth members, but pointed out that the older Commonwealth countries would be at a serious disadvantage. He said that a study had been done in Ottawa which indicated that if two seats were added, the chances of Canada being elected were approximately once in 23 years. The same problem would come up with ECOSOC, despite Canada's importance in the world economy. The Secretary raised a question as to the present distribution of seats, and it was noted that Malaysia and Ghana are now in such seats, but Ambassador Ritchie remarked that Ghana regards its seat as a regional African one. The Secretary wondered whether Ghana obtained its seat with Commonwealth support and the Canadians conceded that this had been so. The Secretary said he would look into the matter to consider the impact on the Commonwealth seat of an addition of two seats in the Security Council.

The Secretary wondered about Mr. Martin's possible reaction to a Japanese regiment available for UN purposes. Mr. Martin said he welcomed the decisions of the Nordic and the Dutch and he thought a Japanese regiment a good idea. The Secretary said it was important to get African and Asian countries in a position of contributing to UN military forces, and he had also thought about Nigeria. Mr. Martin said that he had talked to the Nordics about having a meeting of military people in Ottawa next spring, to review the problem. He certainly could see no objection to having a Japanese unit, but perhaps people like the Indians or the Filipinos might wonder about it. The Secretary said he was conscious of this possibility, and he emphasized we had not talked to the Japanese about the matter.

New York, December 10, 1963, 8:45 p.m.

2436. Enlargement of Councils.

1. Federenko (USSR) dropped bombshell today in SPC when he told Comite Sovs would take tough line against enlargement of councils because of opposition of Chinese Communists (ourtel 2427)./2/ Previously Sovs had indicated they expected take relatively soft line towards enlargement. Hostile reaction of Africans was immediate; Bindzi (Cameroon) proposed delay of mtg in SPC until Thurs/3/ PM. Diallo (Guinea) suggested GA remain in session until enlargement question settled. Under circumstances, all previous bets off on what action will be taken by SPC.

2. SC enlargement: LA draft of increase by two tabled with two year ratification period but without annex until question of ECOSOC distribution agreed upon. Knowing that ASAFs pushing hard for increase of 4 in SC, our liaison officers told Africans and Asians quietly but bluntly that US not in position to support this larger increase. Result was that Asians pulled back from insisting on larger increase, for moment at least. Hakim (Lebanon) tells us Arabs continue oppose larger increase and that those Africans who desire 13 member council will insist on right to vote for LA res. At this state it impossible predict what effect Sov position will have on question of SC enlargement.

3. ECOSOC enlargement: With breakdown apparent Eur-LA agreement on ECOSOC distribution, returning one seat to Eurs, Eurs immediately began talking in terms of increase of 7 or 9; this had auxiliary advantage from UK viewpoint of providing greater support for Commonwealth position on ECOSOC. Eurs proposed formulas for increase of 7 or 9 to LAs and once they got agreement from latter, both LAs and Eurs proposed formulas to Tarazi (Syria) as pres of ASAF caucus. Meanwhile, Malhotra (Nepal) reports Asians have also separately nearly reached agreement on 27 man ECOSOC. In Eur and LA formulation distribution would be as follows: LA--4-1/2, 4 perm members, WE--3-1/2, ASAFs--12, EE--2, Others--1. Asian formula would provide LAs 4, 4 perm members, ASAFs 13, WEs 3, EE 2, plus one floating seat to be divided among various groups on still undecided basis. Proposal for 25 members in ECOSOC came from Netherlands which suggested that of 7 new seats, 6 would go to ASAFs and one to WE.

4. Since we got wind of Eur proposal, and after checking with Dept, we told number of leading Eurs and LAs that US strongly committed internally at this point to limiting increase in ECOSOC to 6 and that all we could do was take their proposal under consideration. We also indicated clearing new position might indeed be time consuming. Our recommendations follow.

5. General Comite: Only new development re GC was Sov statement in favor of amending GC res to provide for annual rotation of GA Presidency in following order: Africa, Eastern Eur, Middle East, Western Eur, LA. We have indicated to number of dels that we strongly opposed to taking decision which would impose rigid schedule of elections for GA Presidency. On other hand Cambridge (UK) showed us tel from London which instructed UK to support formula for deciding GA Presidency. They instructed support amendment to provide for succession to GA Presidency over 10 year period during which EE would hold post only once. Instructions also called for formula which would insure Eur would get GA Presidency in 1964 or 1965. British Emb Wash instructed consult closely with Dept prior to making their position public while UKUN instructed consult with old Commonwealth on point.

Stevenson

New York, December 11, 1963, 1:50 p.m.

2446. Opening Date 19th GA. Ourtel 2349./2/

SYG told Yost yesterday that, following Stevenson approach reported reftel, he had decided to assist in delaying opening 19th GA until after US elections.

He said he had asked his administrative staff to prepare report for circulation end this month to effect that UN building reconstruction probably will not be completed before sometime in Oct. On basis this report SYG would circularize UN members and propose postponing opening GA until second week Nov.

SYG added blandly he had already talked this matter over informally with Sovs, pointing out disadvantages to all concerned of involving Article 19 question in US elections. According SYG, Sovs had agreed informally that delay in opening GA would be advisable, though of course their formal reaction would only come in response to SYG's proposed circular.

Plimpton

New York, December 13, 1963, 8:30 p.m.

2496. Enlargement of Councils.

1. After hectic all-day palaver, ASAFs tonight introduced and decided to press to vote reses for 15 seat SC (majority of 9, non-perm seats distributed as follows; 5 ASAF, 2 LA, 2 Eur and others, 1 EE) and 27 seat ECO-SOC (8 of 9 additional seats to go to ASAF's with other additional seat to rotate between LAs and EURs). It appears there blocking third made up of LAs, Eurs, and EEs, on both ASAF reses but we suspect some of these negative votes may cave under ASAF pressure. Czechs and Poles also introduced amendments to ASAF res in Gen Comite for rotation of GA Presidency. Our vote count shows defeat this amendment small margin but again we fear bandwagon psychology.

2. SC: LAs and WEs remained firm for 13 seat SC and against 15 seat SC, although Italy (because of fear of ASAF retaliation) and Netherlands (because they believe 15 is better number) wobbly. We fear there may be bolt. Decision if ASAFs press vote on 15 seat SC res taken against judgment majority Asian countries, according Kaya (Japan), and most Asians therefore refrained from cosponsoring res as they do not favor pressing it to vote against clear opposition of perm sc members.

3. ECOSOC: ASAFs did not pick up offer made to them by LAs in morning to vote for their res provided LAs specifically assigned 4-1/2 seats in new Council plus 2 comite chairmanships in General Comite. Instead ASAFs appeared, again on African impetus, ready to press their res to vote without agreements other groups.

4. Gen Comite: Czech amendment provides for rotating GA Presidency as follows: Africa, Asia, EE, LA, ME, WE and others. ASAF meeting decided to ask sponsors to replace ME category and rotate that place between Africa and Asia. Sponsors reportedly agreed. ASAFs did not take group position on amendment but only Liberia and Cameroon spoke against rotation concept. LAs almost equally divided between negative vote and abstentions. Third amendment to ASAF res may be submitted by LAs calling for one more VP, to be LA, and removing, at Venezuelan request, according Bueno (Brazil) words "and Caribbean states" from LA category named in ASAF res. Starey (Australia) feels Canadian, NZ, and Australian amendment to Gen Comite might be withdrawn as it has called attention to Commonwealth problem and good effect might be lost if it were voted down.

5. On possibility that ASAFs may withdraw their SC and ECOSOC reses before Plenary if blocking third demonstrated in SPC, we plan speak against their draft reses as well as against GA Presidency rotation amendment at 10:30 SPC mtg Dec 14.

6. Sovs had speech prepared ready to give at Dec 13 afternoon session refuting ChiCom attack on Federenko statement.

Stevenson

Washington, December 13, 1963.

SUBJECT
The Current Session of the United Nations General Assembly

You will be meeting with a number of Delegation heads on Tuesday at the United Nations. The following information may be helpful to you in your discussions.

In general, the current 18th Session of the General Assembly has achieved results quite satisfactory to the United States. The high-lights are:

a. A friendly Latin American (Sosa-Rodriguez of Venezuela) was elected President.

b. Bolivia and the Ivory Coast, whom we supported, were elected to full terms on the Security Council. We also supported Malaysia but it finally had to decide to split the two-year term with Czechoslovakia.

a. The partial test ban treaty and the direct line between Moscow and Washington were endorsed;

b. A historic resolution calling on all States not to station or place in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction was approved by acclamation; and

c. A resolution on a Latin American nuclear free zone was adopted consonant with our interests since it left the matter to members of the region for further study.

The Assembly called for expanded and strengthened cooperation in the exploration of Outer Space and defined legal principles that should govern our astronauts and the traffic of our space vehicles.

a. The U.S. position in favor of unified Korean independence on the basis of free elections was again maintained by virtually the same vote as last year; and

b. Our position on Chinese representation was again sustained, this time by a slightly wider margin than the previous Assembly.

Even though we could not support two African resolutions on Southern Rhodesia appealing against transfer of powers to the white minority groups, and a resolution on South West Africa calling for an oil embargo against South Africa, the results on colonial issues were better than expected.

The Security Council met twice during the General Assembly and adopted resolutions which did not go beyond our arms embargo policies in relation to South Africa and Portugal, and avoided mandatory sanctions and proposals for expulsion from the United Nations. Both resolutions were relatively moderate and designed to stimulate a dialogue between the respective parties.

After a difficult negotiation, we were able to support the universal Declaration Against all Forms of Racial Discrimination, making clear our intention to carry out its terms in accordance with our constitutional processes.

The Assembly carried forward the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East based on a financial formula in which the U.S. contribution is only 37 percent.

During the reception, there will be opportunity only for simple greetings. However, at the luncheon you will have an opportunity to discuss with the Secretary General, the Soviet Representative to the UN (Federenko) and other key Delegates some of the principal issues and problems facing the United Nations. While Ambassador Stevenson intends to take up a number of these matters with you in more detail, we would suggest the following points might be made:

You might indicate our continuing strong support for the United Nations and in particular that its peacekeeping capacity should be strengthened. We do not believe in a United Nations limited to a debating society. Its utility depends on its capacity to act effectively in peace and security crises.

The USSR must find a way to pay its UN arrearages, otherwise the United States will have no alternative but to press for a denial of vote to the Soviet Union when this matter arises in 1964. (This point can be made generally and in particular to the USSR. To the French Delegate [Seydoux],/2/ you might "express the hope" that France will find a way in the near future to pay its own back UN bills.)

The Assembly this past fall has given a shot in the arm to future disarmament discussions. It has referred these matters to the Geneva Conference where the United States will continue to press for further agreement.

On Colonial issues, we are confronted with the remaining hard-core white settler problems in southern Africa. The United States will continue its efforts on the side of moderation and peaceful change. This can be achieved best by quiet talks rather than playing the gallery.

We hope the Secretary General will keep his representative (Spinelli) in Yemen next year to help work out a solution of the problem.

George W. Ball/3/

New York, December 16, 1963, 10:15 p.m.

2515. SPC--Enlargement of Councils.

1. SPC Dec 16 voted three reses: 15 seat SC (96-11-4), 27 seat ECOSOC (95-11-4), and 25 seat Gen Comite. On SC and ECOSOC negative votes were all from France, Sov bloc and Cuba. Albania voted in favor. US, UK (together with SAG and Portugal) abstained on SC and ECOSOC reses. China favored SC res but did not participate in vote on ECOSOC, having alluded to Quaison-Sackey's (Ghana) reference to ECOSOC seats of "four permanent members of SC." France opposed both reses, explaining regret at SPC haste, referring to "problem of majority in SC," and noting that it had expected abstain but had just received instructions to oppose (suggesting a decision by De Gaulle).

2. Wide agreement on SC and ECOSOC reses developed after it became apparent at LA group in morning that ASAFs could not bring sufficient number LAs along with their reses to obtain two-thirds majority. However, when ASAFs conceded to LAs one additional ECOSOC seat, 1 additional Gen Comite VP, and commitment not to raid on LA seat in SC next year if enlargement reses not ratified, entire LA group came along. WEs followed quickly obtaining one of additional nine seats in ECOSOC for themselves. Final agreement expressed in form of ASAF amendments to LA reses. Quaison-Sackey explained that after ECOSOC increased by nine (7 ASAFs, 1 LA, 1 WE) breakdown of 27 would be: 4 perms, 2 EEs, 4 WEs and others, 5 LAs, 12 ASAFs, of which 7 would be Africans, 5 Asians. In SC breakdown, 5 perms, 2 LAs, 1 EE, 2 WE and others, 5 ASAFs; there will be 3 Africans, 2 Asians, he said.

3. Gen Cmite res had separate vote on Polish-Czech amendment, as altered by Nigerian wording which had one opponent, Bindzi (Cameroon) and eleven scattered abstentions. Pres GA and 17 VPs on 25 man Gen Comite now will have following distribution: 7 ASAFs, 3 LAs, 1 EEs, 2 WEs and others, 5 perms, while Comite chairmen will be 3 ASAFs, 1 WE, 1 EE, 1 LA, 1 alternating between WE and LA.

Stevenson

Washington, December 19, 1963.

SUBJECT
Briefing of Congress on Enlargement of UN Councils

As a follow up to our breakfast meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I asked for a meeting with the Committee on December 16 to pursue the question of enlarging UN Councils since it then appeared that resolutions amending the UN Charter to expand the Security Council and ECOSOC would be brought to a vote that day. Although this hearing was worked out on very short notice, I believe we can consider that a reasonable spectrum of Senate opinion was consulted since those attending included Senators Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Sparkman, Aiken, Mundt, and Lausche.

The atmosphere in the Committee was good. While there are clearly many apprehensions about the implications of the increased UN membership for the US power position in the Organization, I had the feeling that everyone present felt this was a problem which we all, as Americans, find thrust upon us and that the Executive Branch and the Congress have a common interest in finding a way to deal with this problem so as to protect vital US interests.

Two major concerns were manifested in the questions asked. The first was whether an increase in the Security Council would result in a substantial dilution of our authority there. I explained that if we had our "druthers," there would be no enlargement, but added that in view of the increased membership and the pressure for greater representation, there will almost certainly be a raid on seats of our friends in the present Council if some sort of an expansion is not forthcoming; thus we would do better to acquiesce in enlargement rather than fight it. Senator Fulbright quickly put his finger on the answer to this by volunteering "It wouldn't be good politics to oppose it."

There was a certain malaise about the possibility that the distribution of seats in an enlarged Council could be changed again by Assembly vote even though the distribution provided for in the current resolutions might not hurt us too much. The tenor of these comments would seem to indicate a preference that the distribution of seats should be actually written into the Charter so that it could not be revised without further Charter amendment. In intimating this, however, I do not think that the Senators present balanced out in their own minds the relative advantage that this would give us against the political disadvantage that some of them might have in voting for a formal Charter amendment which assigns a full-time seat to Eastern Europe.

The second consideration which emerged was that any talk of enlargement of the United Nations will revive a discussion over the one-nation, one-vote principle in the General Assembly. Critical remarks were made concerning a country the size of Zanzibar now joining. There was considerable interest in what the ultimate size of the United Nations is expected to be, and I reported our estimate as 125-130. It clearly sticks in the craw (even of a Senator from South Dakota who has the same vote as a Senator from New York) that the one-half million Zanzibaris should have a vote equivalent to the nearly two hundred million Americans. I agreed that this is a problem we are all concerned with and took the occasion to float in a very tentative manner the possibility of developing something like a special screening committee to approve special scales of assessment for peacekeeping operations. This appeared to strike a responsive chord.

As far as policy on US ratification of the Charter amendments is concerned, I weighted the scale in favor of no submission to the Senate in the absence of a change on the part of the Soviet Union. However, I left a crack in the door in case we should find it desirable to do so. The situation is still too confused in the aftermath of the recent vote to know how other permanent members will proceed, including France, the United Kingdom and China. (France voted against both resolutions, the United Kingdom abstained on both, and China voted favorably on the Security Council resolution. China abstained on the ECOSOC resolution since it does not reinstate China's membership on ECOSOC.) Therefore, I do not believe we need to cross this bridge just yet.

I will send you separately an analysis of the enlargement problem which we will give to Fred Dutton for distribution to interested members of Congress.