Washington, January 19, 1961.

Sir:

The following instructions will guide you in your capacity as United States Representative to the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to be convened at New York, New York, on January 24, 1961. I shall appreciate your communicating these instructions to the other members of the delegation.

The conference at New York will be an official inter-governmental conference called to adopt a single convention on narcotic drugs, to replace the existing multilateral treaties in the field. A position paper has been prepared on specific items of the agenda and on the principal issues expected to arise. This paper, which is enclosed, constitutes a part of your instructions./2/

It will be noted that the enclosed position paper bears an administrative control designation. Even after the substance of this paper has been made known to the conference in the presentation of the position of this Government, there may remain in it material that should not be revealed. For this reason the position paper is to be protected in accordance with its administrative control designation even after the United States position has been made public.

In the absence of specific authorization from the Department, no representative of the United States may offer or subscribe to any written or oral statement that might be construed to commit this Government to a definite course of action requiring specific approval by the President or the Congress or that might involve an obligation to expend governmental funds not previously appropriated and allocated.

Your delegation has been officially accredited to this conference and is accordingly attending in an official capacity for the United States Government. Any statement made for the delegation or by its members will be interpreted as the official views of the Government and not the views of individual members or of organizations or groups with which they are affiliated. The delegation accordingly must act as a unit. You are responsible for maintaining necessary conformity within the delegation, and in the event of a division among the members of the delegation, your decision shall be final and binding.

If prompted to express opinions on United States policies or programs not germane to the conference, delegation members should be especially mindful to be cautious in their remarks and to identify them as personal.

As head of the delegation you are responsible for its organization and the specific assignment of work to each member. If because of absence, disability, or any other reason you should become unable to discharge your duties, you may delegate your authority for as long as necessary to another member of the delegation of appropriate rank.

Upon reaching New York, you should report promptly to the United States Mission to the United Nations in order that the United States Representative to the United Nations may be informed of your arrival. You should look to the Mission for any official assistance required during the conference. Substantive matters affecting foreign policy not covered by your instructions should be discussed with the Mission and, if appropriate, referred to the Department without delay.

Funds have been made available to the delegation for the official entertainment of foreign delegates and officials of the conference secretariat, and the Mission has been authorized to expend these funds at your discretion. The amount approved was determined on the basis of experience with similar meetings and an appraisal of any special circumstances concerning this meeting. You are responsible for ensuring that representation activities are carefully planned and that expenditures do not exceed the amount authorized unless prior approval has been received from the Department.

Upon the successful negotiation and conclusion of an instrument concerning narcotic drugs, the Department will recommend to the President that he issue full power to sign the instrument on behalf of the United States of America. When the document has been issued, indicating that the President has invested you with full power to sign in the name of the United States the instrument agreed upon at the conference, it will be transmitted to you. Signature of the instrument for the United States will be only by you and such other person or persons as may be designated in the Presidential document. It is to be understood that signature will not commit the United States to the terms of the instrument until the stipulated requirements for bringing it into force have been fulfilled and until such action as may be required by this Government has been taken to make the instrument effective for the United States. If it should be deemed necessary or advisable during the conference to sign the instrument subject to a specific reservation or understanding, inscribed together with the signature, instructions for this purpose should be sought. The document should be deposited with the conference authorities at such time as you deem appropriate. If its use is not required, the document will be returned by you to the Department of State. Aside from the instrument itself, you are authorized to sign other statements of findings reached as a result of the labors of the meeting, provided they are within the terms of these instructions and are in the form of final acts, resolutions, recommendations, or the like, and not in the form of a further treaty or other binding international agreement.

During the course of the meeting the Department will appreciate being kept fully informed of all significant developments. The reporting facilities of the Mission are available to you for this purpose.

Within thirty days after the close of the meeting, you are requested to submit a report covering the work of the delegation and the final actions taken. This report, which will become a part of the permanent records of the United States Government, should follow as closely as possible the enclosed guide entitled "Reports Required of United States Delegations to International Conferences" (IC/7)./3/ You are also requested to submit a separate classified report covering the subjects mentioned in the above guide under the heading "Classified Report of the United States Delegation." Reports should be addressed to the Secretary of State and marked for the attention of the Office of International Conferences. In addition, you should assure that four complete sets of all official conference documents and United States Delegation documents are assembled and sent to the Department marked for the attention of the Office of International Conferences.

The Department of State is pleased that you will again head a United States Delegation to an international conference concerned with the problem of narcotic drugs and its confident that you will effectively represent the interests of this Government at this important meeting.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
Francis O. Wilcox/4/
Assistant Secretary

Washington, April 10, 1961.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics-Friday, April 7

A meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics was held at the White House from 2:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Friday, April 7. Mr. Flues, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, served as Chairman and there were representatives present from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the White House Staff, and the Bureaus of Narcotics and of Customs. The Department of State was represented by Mr. Gardner of IO, Mr. Bevans of L/T, and Mr. Mulliken of OES.

The announced purpose of the meeting was to provide for the Committee being briefed by Mr. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, on the recent negotiation of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and to consider Mr. Anslinger's recommendations that the U.S. signature to the Single Convention be held in abeyance until such time as the indications are that the 1953 Protocol will definitely not come into force./2/

Mr. Anslinger gave an account of the development of the Single Convention and pointed to what he considered its weakness in that it did not provide a closed list of countries which could export opium. He referred to the 1953 Protocol, which contained such a list, and argued that the U.S. should continue its efforts to secure the ratification of the 1953 Protocol prior to considering signing the Single Convention. Mr. Bevans of L/T and Mr. Gardner of IO presented the arguments that the Single Treaty was on balance a satisfactory instrument and should be signed, especially since the U.S. had taken the lead in the ten years of negotiations leading up to the formulation of the Single Convention. It was further pointed out that the 1953 Protocol had been in existence for eight years and had not yet been ratified in such a manner as to bring it into effect and the prospects of appropriate ratification in the near future were not promising.

Most of the discussion took place between the representatives of the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury, with the other members of the Committee asking questions for clarification.

During Mr. Anslinger's presentation, he referred to the fact that Mr. Flues was going to be attending a meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Geneva in the near future and that he could easily proceed to Ankara, Turkey to persuade the Turkish Government to ratify the 1953 Protocol. The ratification by Turkey would put the Protocol into effect. The general sentiment of the Committee was that this might be done without necessary prejudice to the signing of the Single Convention and that the delay involved was not significant.

The Committee agreed that the Department of State would decide whether there were any overriding objections to approaching the Turkish Government on this matter.

Subsequent to this decision, the Committee would meet again to decide whether the U.S. negotiating position with respect to the Turkish Government would be strengthened if the U.S. had signed the Single Convention.

It was also agreed that before a decision on signing the Single Convention was taken there would be a consultation with Congressional leaders, but there was no agreement as to how this consultation should be arranged.

Mr. White of the White House Staff requested the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to provide Committee members in writing with the argumentation which had been advanced in favor of and in opposition to the signing of the Single Convention.

There then took place a discussion as to whether there should be a White House Conference on Narcotics. The President during the campaign had promised that he would call such a conference. Officials concerned with narcotics problems have been skeptical as to the value of such a conference. At the same time, the domestic political ramifications of the problem have been recognized. It was decided to set up a subcommittee under the chairmanship of the representative from the Attorney General's office. The Department of State was requested to provide a representative.

Washington, May 23, 1961.

[Here follow Section 1, Background of the Conference; Section 2, Agenda for Conference; Section 3, Participation in Conference; Section 4, United States Delegation; and Section 5, Organization of the Conference.]

The Committee on Illicit Traffic reviewed the illicit narcotic traffic for the year 1960. The work of the Committee was guided by summaries on illicit transactions and seizures, by annual report documents, by discussion of international investigations, and by special documents prepared for study by the Committee.

The representative of the United States on this Committee presented documented cases showing international cooperation in tracing the source of the narcotic contraband, and obtained endorsement of strict enforcement procedures for presentation to the Commission.

The Commission adopted two resolutions presented by the United States Delegation, as follows:

a. Abuse of Drugs (Drug Addiction)

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs,

(1) Declares that one of the most effective methods of treatment for narcotic addiction is civil commitment in a hospital institution having a drug-free atmosphere;

(2) Urges Member Governments having a serious drug addiction problem, and the economic means to do so, to provide such facilities.

b. Illicit Traffic

(1) Recognizing the urgent need for increasingly effective narcotic enforcement procedures, for close co-operation between governments with prompt exchange of information, and for strong national legislation including adequate narcotic penalty provisions,

(2) Realizing that too great a disparity in penalties awarded in different countries to convicted traffickers and smugglers of narcotics prejudices international efforts to counter illicit traffic in cocaine, opium, morphine, heroin and cannabis in many areas of the world,

(3) Considering that in countries having a serious problem of illicit narcotic traffic sustained programs of strict enforcement which would ensure the arrest of narcotic traffickers and the certainty that on conviction they would be confined for substantial minimum periods without any provisional release, in accordance with the constitution of any country concerned,

(a) Recommends that Governments having a serious problem of illicit traffic in narcotics take necessary measures for close co-operation and for prompt exchange of information and to ensure imposition of adequate sentences against such unlawful narcotic traffickers.

The Commission adopted a resolution presented by the United Kingdom calling for a study and ratification of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as follows:

(c) The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs recommends to the Economic and Social Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

(1) Noting with satisfaction that the Plenipotentiary Conference called under the terms of its resolution 689 J (XXVI) for the adoption of a single convention on narcotic drugs has adopted such a treaty,

(2) Considering that this Convention when in force will in particular codify the multilateral treaty law in this field and simplify the international control machinery,

(3) Desirous that the international society of States should benefit from these new provisions as soon as may be possible; desirous also that the transitional period of simultaneous existence of the old and new treaty system should be shortened to the greatest possible extent, and

(4) Noting that under the terms of the new Convention the ratification and accession of forty States will be necessary for its coming into force,

(a) Invites all Members of the United Nations and all non-member States which are Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice or members of a specialized agency of the United Nations, to study as expeditiously as possible the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 30 March 1961, with a view to signing and ratifying, or acceding to, the Convention, as the case may be.

The United States Delegation was able to obtain a postponement until the 17th session of debate on a resolution sponsored by Turkey, United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia concerning international control of barbiturates. The resolution proposed is as follows:

The Commission,

Recalling resolutions VI and VII adopted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its twelfth session,

Considering the social danger and the danger to public health arising from the abuse of barbiturates, as reported by the World Health Organization,

a. that governments should take appropriate measures to place the production, distribution and use of such drugs under strict control;

b. that the competent organs of the United Nations and the World Health Organization should examine the necessity and the possibility of adopting adequate measures for the international control of such drugs.

At the opening of the Sixteenth Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the following statements were made with reference to the Question of the Representation of China. The statements of the USSR, Hungary, and Yugoslavia were apparently political instructions. Statements of this nature are usually made at the beginning of each meeting of the Commission.

QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA

Mrs. Vassilieva (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) expressed regret that the People's Republic of China, a country which occupied nearly one-quarter of the total land area of the globe and had a population of more than 600 million inhabitants, was not represented on the Commission.

Mr. Liang (China) found it regrettable that the representative of the USSR had once again raised a political issue in a functional Commission. The General Assembly at its fifteenth session had rejected proposals to discuss the question of the representation of China and it was out of place for a body such as the Commission to touch upon it.

Mr. Vertes (Hungary) deplored the fact that China was unable to participate in the campaign against narcotic drugs. The possibilities of increased international co-operation in that field were hampered by the fact that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was not represented on the Commission.

Mr. Flues (United States of America) regretted that the representative of the USSR had raised the question of China's representation. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, like other functional commissions, had repeatedly refused to consider the issue on the grounds that it was not competent to do so.

Mr. Nikolic (Yugoslavia) urged that the Chinese seat on the Commission should be occupied by a representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

The Chairman said that the views expressed would be noted in the summary record of the meeting.

The USSR, Hungary, Yugoslavia, India, and the United Kingdom abstained in the vote on the United States sponsored resolution for civil commitment of narcotic addicts. The United Kingdom, explaining its abstention, stated its own narcotic addiction problem was minor.

Twelve delegations, including the USSR, Hungary, India, Yugoslavia, joined the United States Delegation in voting for strict enforcement of narcotic laws, including minimum mandatory penalty laws for traffickers.

Turkey abstained, its representative stating that his country believed strict controls should be applied in all countries rather than in only those countries having a serious narcotic problem, as stated in the resolution.

The United Kingdom resolution on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted with 12 votes for, and 3 abstentions, they being the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.

The United States proposal to postpone debate on barbiturate control until the 17th session was adopted by 8 votes for (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, and China), 2 against (India and Hungary), and 5 abstentions (USSR, Yugoslavia, Hungary, United Arab Republic, and France).

Generally, Soviet Bloc action during the session was at a minimum. The United States was able to maintain leadership and substantial support throughout the session. The support of the Canadian delegate as Chairman and a close working relationship with the United Kingdom delegate were strong factors. Among the observers, representatives of Thailand, Greece, Burma, Iran, Ghana, and Brazil were particularly strong in their interest and support of the United States Delegation.

The two resolutions adopted under the sponsorship of the United States Delegation represent important forward steps in repressing and correcting narcotic addiction and traffic. The delay on the resolution concerning barbiturates was obtained to prevent the adoption of a resolution concerning drugs which are not significantly found in the illicit traffic, and which more appropriately should be subjected to strict national control rather than international control.

The United States is a recognized leader in narcotics control, both licit and illicit, throughout the world. It has vigorously encouraged and assisted every effort toward better controls wherever and whenever narcotics problems exist. The resolutions sponsored by the United States Delegation and adopted by the Commission are significant milestones along the road toward effective narcotics control, and as expressions of world opinion speaking through such an expert body as the Commission represents must have a definite impact on the programs and procedures for narcotic control within the several countries. As such steps as civil commitment of narcotic addicts for treatment in a drug-free environment, closer cooperation between governments, more prompt and comprehensive interchange of information, and minimum mandatory sentences for illicit traffickers, become accepted procedures, enforcement authorities the world over will look confidently toward achieving their control objectives, while people everywhere will benefit from an alleviation of the narcotic addiction curse.

Geneva, undated.

1. The criticism of the Single Convention made by the U.S. at the Narcotics Commission session was that illicit production would be greater under the Single Convention than under the existing conventions (E/CN.7/SR.466)./2/

2. First, as regards licit production, since surplus licit production tends to find its way into illicit channels. Under the existing conventions there is no international obligation at all to limit production of opium, or to control the process of cultivation and production, if production takes place, by a Government monopoly, or against exporting opium.

3. Under the Single Convention, on the other hand,

(a) new producers for export would have to notify the Board, up to 5 tons, and get the permission of the Council over 5 tons (Article 24);

(b) all countries producing opium, for internal consumption or for export, would have to set up a strict internal Government monopoly on the lines of the Indian system (Article 23);

(c) subject to the transitional provisions (Article 49), which apply only to countries in which opium smoking or opium eating is at present traditional and legal, and which have a limited life, all countries would be under an obligation to limit the cultivation, production and consumption of opium to medical and scientific purposes (Article 4).

4. Comment as regards Article 24. It is quite true that the limitation provisions, either as regards more or less than 5 tons, do not provide for any specific limits and are not worth much in themselves: except that they do provide for advance notice of intention to export by new exporters--which, if any country did develop this intention, could be a valuable provision, since it would enable the matter to be discussed in advance and considerations such as those below to be pointed out.

But the fact is that, during the U.N. period, for commercial and social reasons, even though there has been no limitation on producing opium for export, countries have in fact been giving up such production--Iran and Afghanistan in particular.

The licit market for opium amounts to something between 800 and 900 tons a year. There is not enough money in this--900 tons at $20 a kilo--$18 million as a rough estimate-to make it worth while for more than a very few big producers. The cost of administering a highly-policed Government monopoly (Article 23) emphasizes this situation. In fact, India and Turkey have a dominating position in this market in the Western world, with well-established connexions with purchasers, and new producers would be likely to burn their fingers. (Burma for instance which had ideas of this kind appears to have given them up.)

Again, the largest proportion of the opium in licit trade is used to produce codeine. As soon as a fully acceptable synthetic replacement for codeine comes into wide clinical use--several have already been marketed with partial success--the long-term outlook for opium will be further affected.

5. Illicit opium. The Single Convention maintains and does not weaken the obligations of Governments as regards fighting the illicit traffic. For those countries which are constitutionally able to accept the 1936 Convention, that convention will continue, while in Articles 35 and 36 the Single Convention provides more general obligations which should be acceptable to all Governments--many of whom are not now bound by any such obligations--and not only to the limited group of the 1936 Convention.

The U.S. spokesman stated in the Commission that U.S. experts estimated that under the existing conventions the illicit production amounted to 3,070 tons and that under the Single Convention it would be 5,575 tons. Others in the Commission were simply not able to follow this argument (E/CN.7/SR.466)./3/

There is nothing in the Single Convention to encourage either the licit or illicit production of opium, and much to control licit production and to stop leaks therefrom. It is difficult to see how any valid estimates can be made for a hypothetical future. Are the U.S. prepared to name publicly even one country in which illicit production will go up as a result of the Single Convention? The main factor in the increase or decrease in illicit opium in the future must be the relative effort which the Governments concerned put into the policy of limitation and suppression.

Attention is drawn in this connexion to para. 234 of the Commission report (E/3512) in which a short account is given of the frank views expressed by a group of administrators from South-East Asia regarding the admittedly high production of illicit opium in that region. This passage indicates the sort of effort that is required, over and above any type of action that can be expressed in treaty form, if headway is to be made as regards indigenous opium production in such regions.

6. 1953 Protocol and the Single Convention. The 1953 Protocol would come into force if ratified by one further producing country of the following 7: Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, USSR, Yugoslavia; India and Iran having already ratified, and Iran's ratification being valid for this purpose even though it is in fact no longer a producer of opium.

7. The 1953 Protocol applies to opium only, not to other narcotics, and its provisions are considerably different from, and more elaborate in a number of respects than, those of the Single Convention.

8. Article 44 of the Single Convention provides that, as from its coming into force, the Single Convention will replace, as between the parties to it, the older conventions, including the 1953 Protocol if that Protocol should by then have come into force.

9. The effect of the 1953 Protocol coming into effect before the Single Convention would therefore be very confusing. It would introduce a new regime for opium--and one which a number of producers have said they regard as unacceptable--for a period which would not be known in advance. This regime would then be superseded within a relatively short time by that of the Single Convention. The process would be burdensome and confusing both for producing and importing countries and for the international organs, especially the Board.

10. The time it will take for the Single Convention to be ratified can of course only be guessed. It requires ratification by 40 Governments, but without any limitations to their being producers, manufacturers, etc. 43 countries signed the Convention at the close of the conference. There are more than 100 countries entitled to ratify it, and it is thought that there are considerably more than 40 who are quite willing to ratify it.

11. The disadvantages also of two international regimes, adhered to by different groups of countries, i.e. one under the Single Convention, and one under the old conventions plus the 1953 Protocol, continuing for an extended period of time after the Single Convention comes into force need no underlining.

Ankara, July 15, 1961, noon.

63. Pass Treasury. Reference: Deptel 21./2/ After briefing by Ambassador per reftel Flues accompanied by Cusack Narcotics/Rome and Embassy officer during three-day Ankara visit conferred with Minister Agriculture Tosun and Minister Commerce/Acting Minister Foreign Office Baydur, Minister Interior Zeytinoglu, Minister Finance Kurdas and Assistant Secretary General Foreign Office Hayta along lines reftel.

Suggested in general terms desirability GOT reexamining implications ratification 1953 protocol particularly in terms provisions governing opium production/export in the several previous treaties in light provisions included Single Convention. Importance to Turkey as one of authorized producing countries of adequate international control legislation reemphasized as well as importance to US. Very receptive attitude evinced by Ministers Commerce, Agriculture, Finance, Interior.

Hayta interested, sympathetic but said frankly re-look unlikely change GOT position on 1953 protocol which developed by technical experts. This connection also conferred M. Ozkul, Turkell UN Narcotics Commission and top Turkish Technical Adviser International Narcotic Affairs now on leave as member constituent assembly. His views well known Department and Treasury. Has been committed to Turkish non-ratification 1953 protocol for past eight years and talk indicated he unlikely change views. Hayta however promised take new look at Turkish position on 1953 protocol as well as Single Convention. He agreed persuasiveness previous GOT objections to protocol might be lessened by deficiencies controls in Single Convention to point where advantages ratifying protocol might prevail. Hayta stressed, Flues agreed talk pertained usefulness re-look, not substantive discussion GOT position. All Ministers voiced thanks usefulness conversations as contribution to GOT study. Especial support for re-study/discussion GOT position given by Kurdas who took initiative stress broad social/economic aspects favoring strictest control this critical field.

Hare

Athens, July 17, 1961, 7 p.m.

97. Reference: Department telegram 24./2/

1. Assistant Secretary Flues of Treasury and Cusack arrived Athens July 13 for two-day visit. After meeting with Charge d'Affaires, Flues and Cusack, accompanied by Embassy officer and USOM public safety advisor, called on following: Deputy Interior Minister Kalantzis and staff; Director Customs Research and Investigation, Ministry Finance; Foreign Office Director General Palamas; Foreign Office Deputy Director Economic Affairs; and Bank of Greece Governor Zolotas (courtesy call).

2. Flues reviewed with Greek officials present and pending international narcotics controls, pointing out weaknesses "Single Convention" and advantages 1953 Narcotics Protocol. He suggested Greeks re-study their position and give serious thought to ratification 1953 Protocol, which would bring it into effect. This would provide reasonably satisfactory control system pending efforts US and others to modify and strengthen "Single Convention."

3. Greek officials expressed appreciation for presentations by Flues and Cusack, some indicating they previously unaware implications of ratification 1953 Protocol. Palamas said GOG would undertake re-examination its position in light of points raised by Flues. Both Palamas and Foreign Office Deputy of Economic Affairs commented they not aware any technical objections to ratification 1953 Protocol, but Greece would have to take into account Turkish views this subject. Lalantzis showed lively interest in Flues' remarks. Ministry Finance officials said concerned only with the technical aspects of control which would re-study. They asked Flues if competent US narcotics control officer could be detailed Greece for a few months to help reorganize narcotics contraband controls. Flues offered look into this and give answer.

4. Flues remarked on departing Greece that his discussions here very useful and that he intended follow up by forwarding memoranda on this subject for use by GOG officials in position re-study.

Bennett

Indianapolis, July 26, 1961.

Dear Commissioner Anslinger:

As a producer of narcotics and a company much concerned with public health and proper control over the manufacture and distribution of narcotics, we have studied carefully the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which was adopted March 25, 1961, by a Plenipotentiary Conference convened by the United Nations. We should like to express to you our views in relation to this document.

It is our considered judgment, after thorough analysis of the Single Convention, that it radically departs from the initial purpose of codifying the existing treaties and of supplementing these treaties with such additional measures as were required to attain more effective international control. In our opinion, this Convention, on the contrary, would substantially relax existing controls in opposition to the public interest.

In this presentation of our views, we shall not attempt to enumerate the many inadequate provisions of the Single Convention but shall comment on some of its principal weaknesses.

In general, it is quite evident that the reservations by which individual nations may depart from the general requirements for transitional periods lasting for as long as twenty-five years seriously weaken the force and control of the treaty. In effect, these reservations practically negate international control of the use of narcotics.

Perhaps even more serious is the threat to world health posed by the relaxation of production and export controls over opium. So-called "new countries" may, under the Convention, export 5 tons of opium annually without international control or sanction.

While the Convention provides for establishment of a Narcotics Control Board, it also permits signers to void the right of the board to

1. establish estimates for a country which has failed to file its annual estimate reports [Article 12, Sections 2 and 3]/2/

2. examine statistical returns to determine whether a party has complied with the provisions of the Convention [Article 13]

3. ask for explanations from a government it believes is not abiding by the provisions of the Convention [Article 14, Section 1(A)]

4. call upon such government to adopt remedial measures [Article 14, Section 1(B)]

5. call the attention of the parties, the Commission of Narcotics, and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to a government's failure to adopt recommended remedial measures [Article 14, Section 1(C)]

6. recommend imports and exports be stopped until compliance is achieved [Article 14, Section 2].

In short, the Narcotics Control Board would not have the authority needed to control parties unwilling to honor the intent of the Convention. Many of its rulings could be ignored and flouted with impunity.

Under the Single Convention, parties may also elect to export drugs to another country in excess of the established import quotas for that country. They may also elect to void the final determination by the International Court of Justice of any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention.

It is obvious that these provisions emasculate the Convention as an effective tool for international control of addicting drugs.

Only one more nation is needed to bring the 1953 Protocol into force. In view of the fact that this Protocol, together with existing treaties would provide far more effective international machinery for proper control of the production and distribution of addicting drugs, we believe that it would be very much against the public interest for the United States to sign and ratify the Single Convention.

We should welcome an opportunity to discuss this matter in greater detail with you or others in government who are concerned with the tremendously important problem of adequate international control of addicting drugs.

Sincerely,

Eugene N. Beesley/3/

Washington, October 18, 1961.

SUBJECT
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Mehmet Baydar, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
Mr. Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs
Miss Sylvia E. Nilsen, L/T
Miss Helen Dougherty, OES

Mr. Baydar came in at 10:30 this morning by appointment to discuss the above-mentioned subject.

Mr. Baydar explained that his Government was seriously considering ratifying the Single Convention, but wished to have the views of other governments before reaching a decision. He stated that he was unfamiliar with the narcotics treaties, and that someone in the Embassy had given him a short briefing on the 1948/2/ and 1953 Protocols and the Single Convention.

I informed him that the United States Government had not yet reached a position regarding the Single Convention; that the Convention was not signed on behalf of the United States during the period it was opened for signature because no position was reached during that time. I pointed out to him that among the matters requiring further consideration by this Government was the omission from the Single Convention of a closed list of export-producing countries. It was pointed out that under the terms of the Single Convention any country could export up to 5 tons of opium which it produced, provided it first notified the International Narcotics Control Board and indicated the names of the countries it expected to export such opium to and the controls in force as required by the Single Convention. Under the 1953 Protocol only the 7 named export-producing countries would be permitted to export opium. It was pointed out that at the present time any country is free to produce opium and to export it so far as the narcotics conventions in force are concerned. In the course of the discussion it was brought out that thirty-nine States have ratified the 1953 Protocol but that among the States which had not ratified were the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the African States.

I pointed out to him also that we were giving serious consideration to the reservations permitted with respect to certain articles but that we were very much gratified to see that the States which took advantage of those reservations at the time of signature did not do so to the full extent permitted but limited the effect of the reservations to their relations with countries not permitted to participate in the Convention.

I told Mr. Baydar that we would keep him informed of any position reached by this Government with respect to the Single Convention.

Washington, December 6, 1961, 9:20 p.m.

1456. Re your 1774./2/ U.S. position on Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 not yet determined. Two U.S. representatives to whom reference was made were probably Assistant Secretary Flues of Treasury and Mr. James Reed of Justice who recently visited a number of countries on Treasury business. In course of discussion of Treasury business they also exchanged views and comments on the Single Convention with the representatives of the other governments. Both men however stressed that the views expressed at this time were those of Treasury and Justice and not agreed U.S. Government views which have not yet been formulated.

Rusk

Washington, January 25, 1962.

SUBJECT
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. A. Gilmore Flues, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. James A. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
IO--Mr. Cleveland
L/T--Mr. Bevans
OES--Miss Dougherty

Mr. Flues' call on Mr. Cleveland today was purportedly for the purpose of introducing Mr. Flues' successor, Mr. Reed.

After introductions, however, Mr. Reed stated that they would like to discuss this Government's position regarding the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Mr. Flues stated that he would be remaining on at Treasury as a Consultant to see several matters through, including that of the Single Convention.

Mr. Flues summed up Treasury's position regarding the Convention. He felt that the 1953 Protocol contained provisions more acceptable to Treasury, and asked if the Department would consider again asking the Greek and Turkish Governments whether it is their intention to ratify the 1953 Protocol, which needs ratification by only one of them to bring it into force. He stated that the Greek official with whom he had discussed the subject on his previous trip,/2/ had since been deceased, and that he felt his successor was inclined to look a little more encouragingly at the subject.

Mr. Cleveland stated that the subject of narcotics control was the responsibility of the Treasury Department, and that it was not the position of the State Department to ask Treasury to accept a treaty under which they felt they could not operate. He asked whether, if certain provisions were included in the Single Convention, Treasury would be satisfied with it, to which both Mr. Flues and Mr. Reed answered yes. Mr. Flues thought that perhaps another conference might be held and the Single Convention amended to include these provisions. Mr. Cleveland stated that, if Treasury considered the Single Convention unacceptable, we would not only not seek ratification of it, but we would circularize other governments advising that we did not plan to ratify and give our reasons for this decision. He pointed out that it was up to Treasury to prepare a memorandum which we could use in circularizing other governments. Mr. Bevans suggested that in the preparation of such memorandum, care be taken that it contain specifics rather than general conclusions.

Mr. Cleveland felt that a new conference might be held at a later date at which a new Single Convention might be negotiated.

Mr. Bevans pointed out that, even if the 1953 Protocol comes into force, we will only have 40 countries parties to it, and that this was less than half the present number of countries in the world. He stated that at the conference in New York at which the Single Convention was adopted, the African states had made it quite clear that they would not become parties to the 1953 Protocol, and it was equally clear that neither the UK nor any members of the Soviet Bloc would ratify it.

To sum up, Mr. Cleveland decided:

1. That since Treasury was opposed to the Single Convention, we would not seek ratification of it.

2. That we would again seek to obtain information as to whether Greece or Turkey is planning to ratify the 1953 Protocol. Mr. Flues will attempt to have a talk with Ambassador Labouisse before he leaves for Athens and brief him on this. He also indicated that he would communicate with Ambassador Hare.

3. That we would circularize other governments informing them that we did not plan to seek ratification of the Single Convention, and giving them our reasons for not doing so. In this connection, it was up to Treasury to provide State with a memorandum giving specific reasons which we might use. Mr. Bevans, Mr. Mulliken and Miss Dougherty were to work with Treasury in seeing that this memorandum is obtained.

Circular telegram CW-7653, March 28, 1962, set forth the U.S. position on the Single Convention as follows: "The Mission is instructed, at its discretion, to inform the host government that after a thorough study of the document, this Government has concluded it should not seek ratification of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. It believes the Convention in its present form contains defects which are material and important, and which, if the Convention were to come into legal effect, would seriously weaken the control and restrictive systems which presently govern the production and distribution of narcotic drugs. In its opinion, one of the harmful results would be an increase in the illegal traffic in narcotic drugs, and a compounding of the world problem of law enforcement in the narcotics field." The rest of the telegram provided background information and guidance to diplomatic missions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, 341.9/3-2862)

A-906

Ankara, April 7, 1962.

SUBJECT
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

REF
Deptel 735 and Embtel 1060/2/

Following discussions with the Ambassador and the Economic Counselor, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Flues, now Special Consultant to Secretary Dillon, and Mr. John Cusack, District Supervisor, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, conferred during the week ending March 24 concerning the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1953 Protocol on Opium, with Turkish Government Ministers and key officials responsible for this subject. Accompanied by the Financial Attache and Embassy Economic Officers, Mr. Flues and Mr. Cusack met with, among others, the following:

Ihsan Gursan, Minister of Commerce
Majhar Ozkol, Under Secretary, Ministry of Commerce
Ekrem Geris, President, Foreign Trade Department, Ministry of Commerce
Cahit Hayta, Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vahap Asiroglu, Director General, Third Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Osman Derinsu, Director General, Fifth Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ahmet Topaloglu, Minister of Interior
Fethi Celikbas, Minister of Industry

Mr. Flues informed the GOT officials that the United States will not ratify the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in its present form and will seek to obtain support from other countries for its position.

The major conference of the week was held under the Chairmanship of Under Secretary of Commerce Ozkol, who has been the permanent Turk expert on narcotics and represented Turkey in that capacity at international meetings. Under Secretary Ozkol will lead the Turkish delegation at the Geneva session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs in May, and it is expected that he will probably be elected to preside over the session. On the Turkish side, this meeting was attended also by the President and other representatives from the Foreign Trade Department and representatives from Toprak, including Huran Balkan, who has acted as GOT opium monopoly salesman abroad. No representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other Ministries participated. The major presentation by Mr. Flues was made to the Ministry of Commerce at that meeting since conversations earlier with other Ministries indicated that they normally defer to Commerce at the technical level as the Ministry directly responsible for narcotic matters.

During the course of the meeting, Under Secretary Ozkol stated the GOT position and views as follows, in summary:

a) Turkey agrees that the Single Convention is defective, should be corrected, and Turkey would not ratify it in its present form; but it believed that some 37 countries will ratify the Convention, including three already in.

b) The GOT considered the 1953 Protocol a good treaty and consequently has already put its provisions into effect internally, but believes its scope to be too narrow. Ignoring the 1948 convention, Ozkol made his usual lengthy statement regarding the need for better controls on synthetics and marijuana, and indicated his belief that the U.S. is not sufficiently interested in this area.

c) The GOT would not ratify the 1953 Protocol now but would reexamine it as an interim opium agreement if Geneva produced no prospect of meaningful changes in the Single Convention in the near future. Ozkol believes that ratification of the Protocol before the Geneva session would indicate that Turkey had been pressed by the U.S., and would thereby create a basis for adverse propaganda. He believes the prospects for obtaining support from other missions for making changes in the Single Convention are better if Turkey is not committed to the Protocol in advance.

d) Mr. Ozkol suggested use of the Geneva session to press for modification of the Single Convention, and urged that the GOT and the U.S. present a common approach and seek support meanwhile from other countries. He stated a readiness to discuss the Protocol with Mr. Anslinger at Geneva in this context. He stated also that if Geneva was a failure in generating support for modification of the Single Convention, then he would immediately discuss the situation with Anslinger and could use the full discussion of Geneva as a basis for a new look at the Protocol.

e) During the conversation, Mr. Ozkol pointed out that the United States purchased 191 tons of opium from India last year. Mr. Flues advised him that the United States also bought 20 tons from Yugoslavia, its first purchase from that source in 25 years, and stated that the GOT price was not competitive on the world market. It appeared that the GOT and Ozkol were under economic pressure with Toprak reporting 350 tons of uncommitted stocks of opium on hand and prospect of a bumper crop of 250/300 tons this year. Mr. Flues requested Toprak's latest price quote and was informed that it was $18 per kilo. Mr. Flues requested that Toprak reexamine this price, with the possibility that U.S. business could help GOT clear its stock overhang if Turkey's price were more competitive.

It was the impression of Mr. Flues and the Embassy officers present at these conversations that the Foreign Office sees the narcotic problem and the U.S. position with respect to the Single Convention in a broader context and desires closer GOT/US collaboration on the subject. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that, while the Ministry of Commerce is the Ministry technically responsible for the subject, other Ministries also are involved in other aspects of the problem, such as control and enforcement, agricultural reform, etc., and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes a coordinating role, particularly with respect to international negotiations and broader considerations which may affect those negotiations. It was evident that there was some Foreign Office irritation with the Ministry of Commerce. Other Ministries appeared to have a somewhat similar attitude in looking at the problem more broadly and desiring closer Turk-American collaboration.

Summarizing the results of his conversations on the United States position with respect to the Single Convention, Mr. Flues stated the following to the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs:

a) The discussions revealed a clearer area of agreement than previously and remaining differences relate largely to strategy/emphasis. With respect to strategy, however, the U.S. believes that changes in thinking about the Single Convention at Geneva are more likely if other nations are confronted with the 1953 Protocol in legal effect.

b) The Protocol has already been overwhelmingly ratified by other nations and thus it appears that Turkey should support world opinion by taking action to seek international adoption of effective opium controls. Moreover, as Mr. Ozkol has indicated, Turkey itself had already adopted the provisions of the Protocol for its own internal use.

c) Geneva at best has a limited role since it can only promote a better climate for changes in the Single Convention, which may take time. Meanwhile, the present opium control system needs strengthening by bringing the Protocol into legal effect.

d) While expressing gratification for the progress made during the talks, the United States, in supporting the combined effort at Geneva, will not cease its present efforts to bring the Protocol into effect.

Assessing the results and implications of the week-long series of discussions with GOT officials, Messrs Flues and Cusack, and Embassy representatives concluded:

a) The combination of the U.S. position on the Single Convention; the enlarged responsibilities of Ozkol as Under Secretary of Commerce; the Toprak stock problem; pressure from other interested Ministries, especially the Foreign Office; etc., may have influenced the Ministry of Commerce to a more responsible position. Mr. Ozkol may wish to use his suggested approach at Geneva as a more responsible and yet a fact-saving tactic; however, we doubt if he likes the Protocol any better than he did as a GOT technical narcotics expert.

b) Opinions can differ as to what meaningful results Geneva produces regarding the Single Convention. Mr. Ozkol can drag further on the Protocol by claiming that the GOT is satisfied with the progress at Geneva; Ozkol still appears to be the key GOT figure with regard to this question.

c) In view of the limited time before the Geneva sessions, it is not likely that there will be any parliamentary action on the Protocol before then in either Greece or Turkey. As a consequence, probably little would be lost by expressing respect for Ozkol's strategy, while not abating pressure for Protocol ratification as soon as possible. In light of his statements, however, it could be difficult for Ozkol to assume a completely negative position after Geneva.

After assessment of the real effect of the concessions made by Ozkol, in his final visit with Mr. Hayta, Mr. Flues suggested that he (Mr. Flues) might try to obtain a Greek concert on the Protocol so that Turkey need not feel alone.

Hare

A-1191

London, April 30, 1962, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT
British Comments on US Position Relating to Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

REF
CW 7653, dated March 28, 1962/2/

The Embassy has received a statement of British views regarding the reference subject, which was prepared by Mr. Green of the Drugs Branch in the Home Office. In forwarding these comments the Foreign Office indicated that it was instructing its Embassy in Washington to raise the question with the Department. The verbatim text of the British note is reproduced below.

THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961

Although it is now nearly nine years since the 1953 Protocol was drawn up it has still not come into force. While it is true that all that is required to bring it into force is ratification by one other opium producer, it is most unlikely that the Protocol will ever be as widely accepted as most of the other international narcotic Conventions have been. This was perfectly clear at the plenipotentiary conference which drafted the new Single Convention, where many countries explained that they were not prepared to accept several of the provisions of the 1953 Protocol.

There would indeed be objections to pursuing a policy that would bring the 1953 Protocol into effect. The only other opium producer now likely to ratify the Protocol is Greece. If Greece were to ratify, the treaty would then be ratified by three producers, India, Iran and Greece. Greece has not for many years produced opium in significant quantities. Iran has not produced any opium for the last six years or so. India would therefore be the only effective producer, but all the other countries which had ratified the Protocol would be bound by it to obtain their opium from India. This would establish a monopoly of the supply of opium for India so far as countries parties to the Protocol were concerned. The other producers would, however, continue to trade with non-parties and there would be no incentive for any of them to come into the Protocol.

Objection has been taken to the provision in the Single Convention which would allow a country to produce and export as much as five tons of opium without obtaining international authority. Although it is true that this would not be possible under the 1953 Protocol, it is also true that under that Protocol any country can produce opium for its own use. Moreover, the comparison should not be with a protocol which is unlikely to come into general effect, but with the present situation, in which any country can grow as much opium as it wishes without obtaining anyone's authority. There would not appear to be any reason why, if the Single Convention comes into effect, countries which could at present produce and export opium but do not do so should suddenly decide to do so. Indeed the Single Convention should discourage them from doing this since they would first have to satisfy themselves that their production of opium would not lead to overproduction in the world as a whole, and they would have to establish a national monopoly to control production. The Single Convention would therefore impose additional safeguards which do not exist at the present time.

It is true that the reservations clause of the Single Convention was, in the rush of the last week of the plenipotentiary conference, drafted in somewhat wider terms than had been intended. There does not appear, however, to be any reason to think that the provision will be abused. If the scope of possible reservations is studied carefully it will be seen that they can be of only a limited nature. What is more important, however, is that there is no reason to expect that any signatory is going to make unreasonable reservations. Such reservations as have already been made under this Article are in accord with the intentions expressed by the plenipotentiary conference and do not go beyond what the conference envisaged.

As regards reservations being made about the Board's power of imposing sanctions, the arguments in the previous paragraph would again apply. In this connection it may be noted that the Board has never made use of its present powers of sanction and it seems very improbable that it will ever wish to make use of the more drastic powers given to it.

The United Kingdom Government expects to be able to ratify the Single Convention in due course, but some further consideration of one or two points is necessary. It will probably also be necessary to have some minor legislation before the Convention can be ratified, and in view of the congested parliamentary time-table, it may take a little time for this legislation to be passed.

The United Kingdom Government takes the view that the Single Convention is in many respects an improvement on the existing narcotics treaties, and it hopes that the Convention will come into effect in the near future.

Bruce

Geneva, May 28, 1962, 7 p.m.

1269. From USDel NARCOM. During today's session of Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Greek observer announced his government's intention seek ratification 1953 Opium Protocol. UK Delegate angrily asked Greek observer for explanation why Greece, after lapse of nine years, now seeking ratification. After explanation, apparently acceptable to other delegates, was given UK Delegate asked for formal explanation from Greek Government, which was ignored by Greek observer.

FYI. Purpose this cable inform Embassy Athens officers who worked with Treasury Dept officers and Greek officials to bring about ratification 1953 Protocol, to be alert for possible pressure on part UK to have Greek Govt shelve plans for ratification. End FYI.

Message Unsigned

Washington, August 15, 1962.

[Here follow Section 1, Background of Conference; Section 2, Agenda for Conference; Section 3, Participation in Conference; Section 4, United States Delegation; and Section 5, Organization of the Conference.]

The Committee on Illicit Traffic reviewed the illicit narcotic traffic for the year 1961. In its work the Committee was guided by summaries of illicit transactions and seizures, by annual report documents, by discussion of international investigations, and by special documents prepared for study by the Committee. Among the Committee's conclusions were the following:

Opium and the opiates, cannabis and cocaine continued to predominate in the illicit traffic. However, it was reported that in Thailand the major problem since shortly after opium was prohibited in 1959, was diacetylmorphine. There were also indications the traffic in cocaine was spreading through Latin America and thence to other parts of the world.

Canada, the United States, Hong Kong, Japan and Thailand continued to be targets for the illicit traffic in diacetylmorphine.

There was evidence that clandestine conversion of opium into white drugs was being carried out in closer proximity to producing areas.

Governments in the Near and Middle East, and in the Far East, were urged to make every effort to bring about closer working relationships for the implementation of control measures.

The Representative of the United States expressed his Government's appreciation of the cooperation extended by Canada, France, Italy, Lebanon, Mexico, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey.

The subject of acetic anhydride and acetyl chloride was discussed at the request of the United States. The Representative of the United States stated that experience over the past 30 years indicated that countries which had a problem of illicit manufacture of diacetylmorphine and which were not themselves producers of acetic anhydride could promptly bring the situation under control by placing import and internal restrictions on this chemical. He also called attention to the important contribution which manufacturers of acetic anhydride and acetyl chloride could make in maintaining surveillance over the distribution of their products.

The Commission adopted three resolutions for submission to the Economic and Social Council, as follows:

A resolution, sponsored by Canada, India and the Netherlands, inviting governments to ratify the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. The vote was 12 for (Brazil, Canada, Hungary, India, Japan, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, USSR, UK, Yugoslavia), 2 against (Mexico, US), with 5 abstentions (China, France, Iran, Turkey, UAR). The Mexican Representative voted against because he felt the resolution was premature, the United States because the Single Convention was unacceptable in its present form. Of those abstaining, several did so because their governments had not yet completed their study of the Single Convention.

A resolution requesting the Secretary General to prepare a legal commentary on, and to draft an administrative guide for the application of, the Single Convention. The vote was 10-0-8.

A resolution inviting the Government of Lebanon to cooperate more fully with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in its work and, in particular, to be represented by an observer at the 18th session of the Commission and at the meetings of its Committee on Illicit Traffic.

In addition to the above, the Commission adopted the following:

A resolution noting the resolutions of the Inter-American Consultative Group which met at Rio de Janeiro in 1961, and drawing the attention of the ECOSOC to the desirability of stationing an officer of the Secretariat in Latin America with a view to facilitating regional cooperation in the field of narcotics control in that part of the world.

A resolution proposed by the United Arab Republic and co-sponsored by Brazil and the United States, requesting States Members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to encourage research into the socio-economic and medical aspects of drug addiction and illegal drug consumption, and to furnish the Secretary General with reports on the results and findings thereof.

A resolution requesting countries mentioned in paragraph 2 of resolution VII (XIII) and paragraph 3 of resolution 6 (XIV) to send to the United Nations Laboratory authenticated samples of seized opium, and if that is impossible, authenticated samples obtained from poppies cultivated under natural conditions and under control of the government.

The United States Delegation to the 16th Session of the Commission had been successful in having consideration of a resolution on Control of Barbiturates, reading as follows:

Recalling resolutions VI and VII adopted by the Commission at its twelfth session,

Considering the social danger and the danger to public health arising from the abuse of barbiturates, as reported by the World Health Organization,

1. that governments should take appropriate measures to place the production, distribution and use of such drugs under strict control;

2. that the competent organs of the United Nations and the World Health Organization should examine the necessity and the possibility of adopting adequate measures for the international control of such drugs.

postponed until the 17th Session. The resolution was taken up by paragraphs and then as a whole. The first paragraph was changed to read "resolution VI adopted by the". Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by a vote of 17 for, none against, with 2 abstentions (Poland, US). Operative paragraph 2 was defeated by a vote of 8 for, 10 against (Canada, China, Hungary, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, US), with 1 abstention (Poland). The resolution was adopted in the following form:

(a) Recalling resolution VI adopted by the Commission at its twelfth session,

(b) Considering the social danger and the danger to public health arising from the abuse of barbiturates, as reported by the World Health Organization,

Recommends that governments should take appropriate measures to place the production, distribution and use of such drugs under strict control.

by a vote of 16 for, none against, with 3 abstentions (Poland, Turkey, US). During the debate on the resolution the United States Representative stated that there was no illicit traffic in barbiturates and the establishment of international control would place an enormous additional administrative burden on governments. In his opinion, the problem could best be handled by educating the medical profession in the matter, and particularly to ensure that the medical profession did not issue prescriptions that could be filled more than once.

At the beginning of the discussion on Preparations for the Coming into Force of the 1961 Convention, the observer for Greece announced that his Government would ratify the 1953 Opium Protocol. The United States Representative and the Representative of the UAR expressed satisfaction with this announcement, but it was not met with any great enthusiasm by the majority of the Commission, and it was stated that the announcement could have the effect of accelerating ratification of the Single Convention. It was pointed out that when the 1953 Protocol enters into force, India will enjoy a monopoly on the licit production of opium for export to the parties to the 1953 Protocol. The Observer for Italy stated that the announcement had altered the situation and his Government would have to review the Single Convention in the light of the entry into force of the 1953 Protocol.

The United States Representative stated that for a number of reasons his Government could not ratify the Single Convention. It would encourage opium production, which would go completely out of control, and thus result in an increase in illicit production. He pointed out that in addition to permitting any country to produce up to 5 tons of opium for export, the Single Convention permitted the export of opium seized in the illicit traffic without limitation, and permitted any country to grow and stockpile as much opium as it wished. Also, under the Single Convention the effectiveness of the estimates and statistics systems of the 1931 Convention had been destroyed. Any party to the Single Convention could by reservation prevent examination of its statistics. He stated that under the Single Convention the powers of the International Narcotics Control Board, which would replace the present Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body, would be seriously limited and weakened. The United States Government urged governments to consider carefully all provisions of the Single Convention before deciding to ratify it. It hoped that at some time in the future the Single Convention could be revised so as to retain and strengthen, rather than weaken, the control measures of the existing treaties, including the 1953 Protocol.

The majority of the Commission, however, spoke in favor of the Single Convention and urged its ratification. The Representative of the United Kingdom stated his Government intended to ratify as soon as the necessary domestic legislation to implement the provisions of the Single Convention could be enacted. The Representative of Canada pointed out that his Government had already ratified. The Representative of India stated that the provisions of the Single Convention were realistic and wider than those of the 1953 Protocol, and urged that the Single Convention be brought into force as quickly as possible. The Representative of the Netherlands stated it was essential that the Single Convention be brought into force at an early date. The Representative of Yugoslavia disagreed with the United States Representative and felt the Single Convention was a step forward. The Representative of Switzerland stated that his Government had the Single Convention under study and there appeared [to be] no objection to its ratification. The Representative of Morocco pointed out that while his Government was not a signatory to the Single Convention, it was one of the first to ratify it. The Representative of Poland said that his Government considered the Single Convention a progressive measure.

The Observer for Afghanistan stated that his Government considered the Single Convention a major United Nations achievement. He expressed the hope that the Single Convention would enter into force as soon as possible. The Observer for Burma stated that his Government had the Single Convention under examination and would not hesitate to ratify it if it were found that it would contribute to the effectiveness of the anti-narcotic campaign.

A resolution, addressed to the Economic and Social Council, inviting governments to ratify the Single Convention, was introduced and adopted.

A resolution, addressed to the Economic and Social Council, requesting the Secretary General to prepare a legal commentary on, and an administrative guide for the administration of, the Single Convention, was introduced and adopted.

In addition, the Commission decided to request the Secretariat to prepare, for consideration at the 18th session,

(a) a draft document indicating the form, manner and dates of government communications containing the information required in respect of annual reports, seizure reports, laws and regulations, manufacture of drugs, and offices charged with authorizing international transactions;

(b) a draft import certificate; and

(c) a document, for submission to the Council, describing the procedure for the election of members of the new International Narcotics Control Board.

The Commission also decided to invite the WHO Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs to make recommendations regarding the necessary amendments to the Schedules to the Single Convention in preparation for its coming into force.

The Commission decided to request the Secretary General to take such Secretariat action as he deemed necessary in the event of the coming into force of the 1953 Protocol.

The Commission decided to each year give special emphasis to a particular region of the world, beginning with the Far East, in documents prepared by the Secretary General reviewing the illicit traffic, and in the work of the Committee on Illicit Traffic.

It was also decided to recommend to the technical assistance authorities that they give favorable consideration to the Peruvian request for organization of a regional seminar on the problems of the coca leaf. The Commission felt that the Secretary General should explore the question of preparation of a report by the Food and Agriculture Organization on the possibility of replacing the licit and illicit cultivation of the coca leaf, cannabis or opium by other crops.

A provisional agenda for the Commission's 18th session was adopted.

It was agreed to invite Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Cuba, Federation of Malaya, India, Israel, Italy, Laos, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Viet Nam, Spain and Thailand to send observers to the Commission meetings on the illicit traffic and to meetings of the Committee on Illicit Traffic.

It was agreed to invite the following countries to send observers: Italy and the Netherlands to the Commission's meetings on opium and opiates; Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia to the meetings on the coca leaf; Lebanon and Pakistan to the meetings on cannabis; Belgium, Israel, Italy and the Netherlands to the meetings on control of other substances, including barbiturates.

Generally, Soviet Bloc action during the session was at a minimum. The question of Chinese representation was raised by the Representative of Poland, supported by the Representatives of Hungary and the USSR. The United States Representative regretted that the question had been raised and pointed out that technical commissions were not competent to consider the issue. The Representative of China stated that his was the only legal government of China.

The United States was able to maintain leadership and substantial support throughout the session except for the discussions on the Single Convention.

Mr. James P. Hendrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was assigned to assist the delegation during the last two weeks of the session. He and Mr. Cusack conferred with numerous delegations in relation to the Single Convention. They talked with those delegations who were known to be unfavorable to the Convention and also with those who indicated a considerable degree of doubt as to whether the instrument would result in stricter international controls in suppressing the abuse of narcotic drugs. They stressed the two major weaknesses; lack of limitation of opium production and the reservations which would destroy controls under the 1931 Convention. It was pointed out that many improvements found in the Single Convention could be maintained in case of revision of that document or through revision of the 1953 Opium Protocol after it goes into effect.

A-176

Washington, November 30, 1962, 5:33 p.m.

SUBJECT
United States position in General Assembly plenary on resolution urging ratification of Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961

The United States Delegation should continue to vote against the resolution./2/ It is recommended that the Delegation make the following explanation of its negative vote:

"The United States has opposed passage of this resolution in the Third Committee and in the Economic and Social Council for reasons which were explained at that time. Since then, the Government of Greece has ratified the 1953 Protocol, an event which the United States believes is a major new development in the field of international control of narcotic drugs. As a result of this ratification it is expected that the 1953 Protocol will soon enter into force. [In the event that Greece deposits its ratification before the explanation is given by the Delegation, the preceding sentence should be replaced by one reading 'As a result of the deposit of the instrument of ratification by Greece, the 1953 protocol will enter into force on-----.']/3/

"I shall not take your time at this point to give what would be a very technical explanation of what this development means. But I am convinced that further action at this time towards implementing the Single Convention, in the absence of experience with the operation of the 1953 Protocol, is premature. I hope other governments may come to share this view once they have had the opportunity to evaluate this new development."

USUN should not lobby for the US position. It should consult with the Greek delegation and if possible prevent any lobbying on its part. Agreement should be reached with the Greek delegation on the statements to be made by the United States and Greece. The United States Delegation should request both the Greek Delegation and the Secretariat to inform the USDel the minute the Greek instrument of ratification is deposited and the date the Protocol will enter into force.

In explaining our negative vote on this resolution in the Third Committee we stated that our opposition to the Single Convention was: (1) because it permitted any country to produce up to 5 tons of opium for export; and (2) because it permitted ratification subject to reservations which allowed countries to gain the benefits of adherence with few, if any, of the liabilities.

Greek ratification of the 1953 Protocol furnishes a third reason. The terms of the 1953 Protocol are sufficiently rigid to provide for the first time the legal control over opium production which has been sought by all persons seriously concerned with the problem since it was first discussed on an international level. It would be highly desirable, now that this system of control is at last to be put into effect, to allow nations to experience the benefits which should accrue from this system over a period of time. It can be confidently predicted that this experience will be rewarding and the chances of getting even broader international agreement on this basis after a trial period are considered good.

While this new development presents a strong reason why member countries should not ratify the Single Convention, USUN should not attempt to change the vote of other countries at this time. A very substantial number of delegations voted in favor of the resolution in the Third Committee. Presumably most of these did so under instructions, and it is unrealistic to hope that other delegations could get their instructions changed in time for a negative vote or abstention in plenary. Also, should the United States make this attempt and should the plenary vote be overwhelmingly in favor of the resolution, then the United States' new argument will appear to have been publicly repudiated. In addition, argument at this point might harden the position and thus make it more difficult to persuade other governments to change their position in the future.

Rusk

On February 6, 1963, Greece deposited its instrument of ratification of the 1953 Opium Protocol. The Protocol then entered into force on March 8. (Circular airgram CA-8445, February 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, SOC 11-5)

A-1817

London, February 15, 1963, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT
Narcotics--1953 Protocol vs Single Convention

REF
CA-7714 of January 22, 1963/2/

The United States point of view in support of the 1953 Opium Protocol vis-a-vis the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (reference airgram) was presented on February 13 to the United Kingdom during an interview with Mr. T.C. Green of the Home Office, which bears primary responsibility in all matters pertaining to narcotics control. Mr. Green expressed considerable disagreement with the American position, and his arguments are summarized below. He hastened to add, however, that the United Kingdom fully shares the United States concern for securing a workable international agreement to facilitate control over illicit production and traffic in narcotics. Mr. Green felt that our disagreements stem only from honest differences of opinion as to the best means to achieve that end.

The following matters were discussed:

(1) Closed List of Producers. In regard to the United States contention that the 1953 Opium Protocol provides superior control over narcotics production through the use of a closed list of seven countries permitted to produce for export, Mr. Green argued that even before the Protocol comes into force on March 8 of this year the list will be outdated, and that in any case the list could never serve as a practical working device. Of the seven producing countries, three (USSR, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) have long since made clear their opposition to the 1953 Protocol and their intention not to ratify or support it. Of the other four countries (Greece, India, Iran, and Turkey), only Greece, India, and Iran have ratified the Protocol. However, since 1953 Iran has ceased production of opium for export, and Greece, according to Mr. Green, has not produced opium for export for many years. Therefore, since the manufacturing parties to the 1953 Protocol soon will be obliged to import only from one of the producing parties on the closed list, the result will be that India will have a monopoly on legal international trade in opium. Possible future ratification by Turkey would provide only one alternative legal market for the opium manufacturing countries who adhere to the Protocol. The United Kingdom opposes this very severe restriction on the legal sources of supply, and feels that other countries which might otherwise support the 1953 Protocol are discouraged from doing so by this situation. As for the countries which do not adhere to the agreement, they are not subject to any form of production control now, and will not be any more circumscribed even after the 1953 Protocol comes into force.

Furthermore, the Home Office rejects the United States argument that the provisions of the 1961 Convention, authorizing any state to produce up to 5 tons annually for export, will encourage new countries to enter the opium export trade. Those desiring to do so at present are already producing as much opium as they wish, and the introduction of an international agreement legalizing exports up to 5 tons a year will not necessarily serve to spark new production.

(2) Limitations on Stocks. On the closely related problem of establishing limits on the total stock of opium which may be held by a nation, the United Kingdom is again opposed to the United States view. The specific percentage limitations on stocks set forth in Article 5 of the 1953 Protocol are actually, in Mr. Green's words, "a farce." Since a producing nation may select any year after January 1, 1946 as the base for the computation of its total medical and scientific needs for opium, and presumably will select the year of highest volume, the limit thus established will be so high as to be meaningless. It was in recognition of this fact that the nations which participated in the drafting of the Single Convention in 1961 omitted any reference to stock limitations. Considering the other provisions for supervision of international narcotics trade contained in the 1961 Convention, the Home Office believes that there need be no fear or expectation that any country will amass an unduly large amount of opium. Mr. Green commented that at present by far the largest single stock of opium in the world is held by the United States.

The matter of disposition of seized shipments of illicit narcotics was raised in this regard. The British here too support the terms of the 1961 Convention over the 1953 Protocol. They contend that the Single Convention actually offers greater incentive for non-producing countries to increase their surveillance over illicit traffic in narcotics. Under Article 7 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 1953 Protocol, a non-producing nation which has confiscated an illicit narcotics shipment, and which requires no additional narcotics for its own use, is compelled either to return the narcotics to the lawful owner, if possible, or to destroy the shipment. The 1961 Convention, on the other hand, allows such a country the further option of exporting the narcotics to a manufacturing country, under normal control provisions, for a profit. It therefore will be clearly in any nation's self-interest to search out and confiscate illegal shipments of drugs.

(3) Reservations. While conceding that the reservations section of the 1961 Convention is broader than the United Kingdom would wish, Mr. Green explained that it had been designed primarily to obtain the support of the Soviet Bloc countries for the final draft. The Bloc countries had raised a serious objection concerning so-called "Third Countries," or countries outside the United Nations (particularly Outer Mongolia at that time, Red China, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam). Since the 1961 Single Convention would be administered solely by the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc countries insisted that they would not support the extension of the control mechanism to "Third Countries" who were unable to secure United Nations membership. This objection was met by allowing the reservation in respect to Article 12 paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 13 paragraph 2, of the Single Convention. Mr. Green asserted that since then the Soviet Bloc countries have in fact made clear that they do not intend to make any broader use of the reservations, and he believes that it is doubtful that other nations will do so to thwart the purposes of the agreement. If that is their intention, they would find it simpler to remain completely outside any international narcotics agreement. The participation of the Soviet Bloc countries, is, however, so vital to any system of narcotics control that the United Kingdom feels that to attain that end the concession on reservations is well worth any risk that may be involved.

(4) Possible Amendments to 1953 Protocol. Mr. Green called attention to the fact that the 1953 Protocol deals only with opium, while the 1961 Single Convention covers the entire range of narcotics, most especially coca leaf and cannabis (marijuana). In accordance with the reference airgram, the view was expressed that the United States shares the same concern, and would be happy to consider means of amending the 1953 Protocol in due course to cover all drugs, just as we would be prepared to discuss possible limited modification in the closed list of producers, and some alteration in the provisions for local inquiry and mandatory embargo. It is the opinion of the Home Office, however, that to achieve these worthwhile ends it would be necessary to convoke an international conference almost identical to that which produced the 1961 Single Convention, and that it would be most unrealistic to expect that the final agreement would be materially different from that document. Mr. Green volunteered his belief that a United States attempt to gather international support for a conference to discuss only the change we desire, and no others, would not be successful.

On the basis of these convictions, Mr. Green stated that the United Kingdom remained convinced that the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs would prove to be a more practical instrument of narcotics control than the 1953 Opium Protocol. Therefore it is still the intention of the Government to seek enabling legislation, possibly in 1964, to permit ratification of the Single Convention. He expressed his hope that the United States, regardless of its misgivings in this matter, would cooperate in administering the 1961 Single Convention when and if it comes into force.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:
Donald R. Lesh
Third Secretary of Embassy

A-1136

Ankara, June 24, 1963.

SUBJECT
Narcotics: Turkey Ratifies 1953 Opium Protocol

REF
CERP D-15; Embassy A-543, November 29, 1962/2/

SUMMARY

The draft bill proposing GOT ratification of the 1953 Opium Protocol which was submitted to the Turkish House of Representatives late in March, became law on June 4, 1963 (Law 245), and appeared in the Official Gazette of June 11, 1963 (No. 11425). The Embassy believes that the low level of opium exports and large stocks have been influential in promoting the ratification of the Protocol. The export price of Turkish opium is still not competitive with the Indian product. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing a draft bill proposing GOT ratification of the 1961 Single Convention, but according to the Ministry, present plans do not include its submission to Parliament during this session. Representations explaining U.S.G. opposition to this Convention have been made to the Ministry. End of Summary

Following the visit of Assistant Secretary James A. Reed to Ankara during November 1962 (see A-543 under reference), the Embassy has made frequent follow up representations during December, January and February urging GOT ratification of the 1953 Opium Protocol. Despite these representations, which received polite attention, effective action on the part of the GOT did not seem to be forthcoming. As a result of the Greek ratification and the UN announcement on February 6, 1963, the Embassy sent a formal note to the Turkish Foreign Office on March 1 (Enclosure 1)/3/ notifying the Government of Turkey that with the deposit of the Greek instrument of ratification, the United Nations had announced that the Protocol would enter into force on March 8, 1963. The only reaction received by the Embassy was a note acknowledging receipt of our Note (see Enclosure 2).

However, soon afterward a draft bill proposing GOT ratification of the 1953 Protocol was submitted to the Turkish House of Representatives and was referred to the Temporary Legislative Committee where it remained for almost a month. It was reported out of Committee and approved by the House on April 29 just prior to its recess. The Bill was then sent to the Senate and the Minister of Commerce requested that it be discussed on an urgent basis by the Senate when it reconvened on May 14. Senate discussion was delayed due to political disturbances but the Bill was approved by the Senate on June 4 and became Law 245. The Protocol appeared in Official Gazette 11425 of June 11, 1963.

The Embassy believes that the low level of opium exports has been an influential factor in promoting the ratification of the 1953 Protocol. Mr. Hurem Balkan of TOPRAK, without giving specifics, described opium exports as very "disappointing," adding that stocks are currently at the high level of 400 tons and after the new crop is harvested may reach 700 tons. This may be a conservative figure since TOPRAK in the past has not disclosed complete stocks. The Embassy has pointed out to Mr. Balkan that the relatively high price of Turkish opium was harmful to Turkish exports. He replied that costs were such that Turkish opium could not be sold for less, but as in the past, Embassy requests for cost data were refused.

On May 12 the press carried the story that opium purchase prices would be reduced. The press claimed that TOPRAK had decided to reduce purchase prices for opium by 10% and that the decision would be officially announced after Cabinet approval. The reason given was the low price of Indian opium and competition from synthetics. Decree #6/1785 of May 29, 1963 (Official Gazette of May 31, 1963) determined the raw opium domestic sales prices for 1963 substantially at 1962 levels. The price, depending upon the class, ranges from TL 80-100 per kilo with an additional 10% premium for the best qualities of each class.

Along with the favorable developments regarding the 1953 Protocol, there is an unfavorable development in GOT narcotic policy which the Embassy is continuing to watch closely. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing a draft bill proposing ratification of the 1961 Single Convention. This bill has not been submitted to the House of Representatives and according to an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, present plans do not include its submission to Parliament during this session. In addition to the presentation made to the Ministry reported in Airgram under reference, the Embassy has made follow-up calls explaining the reasons for United States Government opposition to the ratification of the 1961 Single Convention. These representations always receive polite attention and assurances are given that the USG viewpoint will be taken into consideration, but no definite commitment is ever made. With the 1953 Protocol ratified, and the GOT proclivity for delay, it is hoped that the Bill proposing ratification of the 1961 Single Convention will get pigeon-holed in the Ministry. Unless otherwise instructed, the Embassy will not raise the matter with the Ministry again because such action might be counterproductive, but will endeavor by other means to keep abreast of any developments regarding the progress of this Bill.

For the Ambassador:
L. Wade Lathram
Counselor of Embassy
For Economic Affairs

Washington, June 28, 1963.

[Here follow Section 1, Background of Conference; Section 2, Agenda for Conference; Section 3, Participation in Conference; Section 4, United States Delegation; and Section 5, Organization of the Conference.]

The Far East and South-East Asia were the most important areas under discussion because of the enormous traffic involving Burma, Thailand, and Hong Kong. The United States representative particularly urged the governments of the Far East to ascertain the source of "999" morphine blocks which caused a substantial part of the illicit traffic. It was evident that they were all dragging their feet in locating the source.

Hong Kong sent its chief of the Narcotics Bureau, who painted a picture of gravity but in no case mentioned Communist China as a source.

The observer of Thailand for the first time presented a case of increased and vigorous enforcement, which brought commendation from the Commission.

The observer of Burma showed that his country was in the throes of helplessness in dealing with the hill tribes in the Shan State. He presented a resolution for technical cooperation in the nature of a survey of opium-producing regions in Burma with the idea of crop substitution. He stated that the situation was practically out of control of the Central Government.

Thailand, Turkey, France, and Mexico commended the United States for its cooperative effort in dealing with illicit trafficking.

The United States representative commended the Governments of Thailand, Turkey, France, Mexico, Lebanon, Italy, and Japan for efforts put forth to suppress the illicit narcotic traffic and for the excellent cooperation extended to our U.S. Bureau of Narcotics by their police authorities.

Illicit trafficking in synthetic drugs presented no problem.

The USSR representative stated that there was no illicit traffic in her country. The United States representative presented three press clippings with Moscow datelines reporting illicit trafficking whereupon the USSR representative admitted there had been cases of hashish trafficking but stated that they had been dealt with severely.

Cannabis was the subject of considerable discussion, as this traffic is growing throughout the world and very little can be done at this time except increased police measures.

A proposal some years ago by the United States representative to bring the clandestine heroin manufacture under control by watching the trade in acetic anhydride and acetyl chloride was producing results in some countries.

There were sharp exchanges among the representatives of the Near and Middle East, with charges and counter charges. The situation in that area is not one where there is close cooperation, in spite of the Middle East Regional Conferences. Each time one of the countries was mentioned as a source of illicit narcotics the representative of that country would go on the defensive and attempt to obscure the problem. This is one of the unfortunate situations prevailing in the Commission, where most of the countries try to conceal the traffic by making long statements that there is no illicit trafficking.

The United States representative gave incontrovertible evidence of large illicit cocaine trafficking from Cuba to the United States. The Cuban observer stated in his reply that there was no illicit trafficking and that the Revolutionary Government of Cuba brought about social reforms and preventive measures against drug addiction. He launched into a long political tirade against the United States, whereupon the United States representative called a point of order and the Chairman insisted that the Cuban observer confine his remarks strictly to technical matters.

The Cuban observer made serious allegations about the smuggling of narcotic drugs to Cuba which he stated were sent along with other medicines from the United States in exchange for prisoners from Cuba. The United States representative replied that these drugs had been requested by the Cuban Red Cross and that the Cuban Ministry of Health had given a receipt for them; that these drugs were desperately needed for the sick in Cuba, and that no smuggling was involved. The Cuban observer also stated that these narcotics had been returned to the United States. This is not true, with the exception of a small amount of codeine compound which had deteriorated.

The United States representative stated that a list of fifty traffickers, against whom cases had been made some years ago by agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics in cooperation with the Cuban police authorities, had been sent to the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and that nothing had been heard about the action taken. The Cuban observer stated that all of these traffickers had been expelled to the United States.

The United States Government's decision to send narcotic drugs along with other medicines to Cuba in exchange for prisoners was unfortunate. As a result it enabled the Cuban Government to make charges to the Permanent Central Opium Board claiming that our action in doing so was in violation of narcotic treaties to which both Governments are parties. The narcotic drugs in question were sent at the urgent request of the Cuban Red Cross that they were desperately needed. In a spirit of cooperation and as a matter of expediency the United States Government authorized shipment of the narcotics only after being assured that an official Cuban import permit had been issued which would be delivered to an American Red Cross representative when the narcotics arrived in Cuba. This permit had, in fact, not been issued but a receipt was given by the Cuban Minister of Health for the narcotic drugs.

The United States representative placed in nomination as Chairman the name of Dr. J.F. Mabileau of France, who was elected by acclamation.

The Yugoslav representative proposed Dr. I. Vertes of Hungary as First Vice-Chairman. He was evidently a popular choice, as his nomination was supported by the representatives of Turkey, USSR, Poland, India, Iran, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Arab Republic.

The United Kingdom representative nominated Mr. B.N. Banerji of India as Second Vice-Chairman. His nomination was supported by the representatives of the United States and many other countries.

The representative of Canada, supported by the representatives of the United States and many other countries, proposed Dr. M. Dadgar of Iran as Rapporteur.

The representative of the USSR, supported by the representatives of Poland and Hungary, said the right to represent China in the Commission belonged exclusively to the Government of the People's Republic of China.

The representative of China, supported by the representative of the United States, regretted that the question had been raised, as it had already been settled by the General Assembly in October 1962.

The representative of India maintained that the People's Republic of China should obtain its rightful place in the United Nations but considered that the question should not be voted upon or decided in the Commission.

The consumption of codeine was increasing in keeping with the increase in population. The United States representative pointed out that since there were three generations of medical practitioners and one generation in the medical schools, it would not be likely during the next ten years that consumption of codeine, a drug with little addiction liability, would decrease to any marked extent.

The USSR representative made an interesting statement that in her country they had been working with some chemicals to produce a codeine synthetic and that results were promising.

The considerable increase in the manufacture of morphine from poppy straw was of concern, as it would tend to bring about overproduction of opium. So far no illicit traffic has been reported, as the countries manufacturing morphine from poppy straw had shown proper control.

The United States representative pointed out that manufacture of morphine from poppy straw was not economically advantageous; also, that many useful alkaloids from opium could not be obtained from poppy straw.

The Hungarian representative challenged the right of the Nationalist Chinese Government to submit estimates for narcotic drugs for Communist China. It is incredible that the Nationalist Chinese Government would make an estimate for 800,000,000 people for a total of about 290 kilograms of codeine. Countries like Denmark and Sweden consume this amount. The Soviet Bloc missed a big opening here to show the stupidity of the Nationalist Chinese Government for making such a ridiculous estimate.

There had been considerable doubt that the Indian Government would permit Mr. E.S. Krishnamoorthy of the Permanent Central Opium Board to represent the Commission on the Drug Supervisory Body. One high Indian official pointed out to the United States representative that if another Indian was appointed to a prominent position in the United Nations there would be strong voices of disapproval. However, at the last moment the Indian Government decided to allow his name to be placed in nomination. In the meantime the representative of France made a strong plea for the United States representative to place the name of Mr. Charles Vaille in nomination, even though this was not consistent with the resolution of the Economic and Social Council that there should be a personal union in the membership of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body. As the Bureau of Narcotics now has a man stationed in Paris and one in Marseille who are assisting in making large cases of illicit heroin trafficking which is aimed at the United States, it was strongly felt by both the French and United States representatives that not to follow the wishes of the French Government might result in a lessening of cooperation which had been laboriously built up for many years. The United States representative placed the name of Mr. Charles Vaille in nomination. The vote was 14 for Mr. Krishnamoorthy and 6 for Mr. Vaille, with one abstention. However, it should be pointed out that the 4 votes which swung the election were from the Soviet Bloc.

Mr. Vaille's election would have been of great importance to the world, as he was the author of the 1953 Opium Protocol and he unquestionably is one of the world's outstanding experts on every phase of narcotics outside of the illicit traffic.

The Commission adopted a resolution on the illicit traffic in the Far East, sponsored by Canada, India, and the United Kingdom, urging that the Governments concerned take all necessary measures to deal with the situation, in particular by

(i) obtaining more precise information about the areas in which the opium poppy is illicitly cultivated and about the location of illicit laboratories for the manufacture of morphine and heroin;

(ii) registering opium smokers, where such smoking is still permitted, with a view to the eventual elimination of the practice;

(iii) strengthening wherever necessary their enforcement services and improving the training and methods of operation of those services so that they may be able to deal more effectively with the illicit cultivation of the opium poppy, the illicit manufacture of morphine and heroin, and illicit traffic in these drugs;

(iv) controlling to the extent necessary and practicable the import and internal distribution of acetic anhydride and acetyle chloride;

(v) studying the problem of eliminating the cultivation of the opium poppy by hill tribes or other less-developed groups as a means of livelihood, and taking any necessary measures to achieve that end.

(vi) cooperating closely with other countries in the area in the direct and coordinated exchange of information useful in countering the illicit traffic;

(vii) including in their applications for technical assistance provision for appropriate assistance which may be required with a view to facilitating the implementation of plans for countering the illicit traffic, whether by way of training personnel, obtaining expert advice, or for any other purpose.

The vote on this resolution was 18 for, 1 abstention (China), 2 absent.

Government reports showed great variations in form and substance and indicated that many countries are now submitting more extensive information.

No developments were reported in progress toward finding a cure for addiction as for alcoholism. Some governments felt that the approach should be psychiatric. The United States representative said that there should be both treatment and rehabilitation and prevention by way of heavy penalties for trafficking, which was supported by several delegations.

In referring to the quasi-medical use of opium in India, the United States representative pointed out that one of the most remarkable developments in the history of narcotics was the reduction in opium consumption in India for smoking and eating purposes from 500 tons twenty years ago to some 2 tons in 1961.

Heroin addiction in Hong Kong was regarded as being of a serious nature.

Addiction among the medical profession was considered of great concern but no decision was reached as to how this was to be approached.

The United Nations Laboratory continues to produce excellent reports on determination of opium origin which are always challenged by the country of origin.

The coordination of the scientific research in many laboratories throughout the world was particularly gratifying. The United States representative, however, pointed out that now is the time to begin work on the source identification of heroin and that the Oak Ridge Laboratory has already produced some interesting data.

The work of the Consultative Group on Coca Leaf Problems which met at Lima, Peru, in November-December 1962 was reviewed.

The Bolivian observer made a strong statement that chewing of the coca leaf was harmless. The United States representative pointed out that the Bolivian Minister of Health and all of the Bolivian officials present at the Lima conference had condemned its use. The United States representative apologized for having brought this division of opinion within the Bolivian Government to the attention of the Commission. The decision of the Commission was unanimous that coca leaf chewing was dangerous and should be eliminated. Accordingly, the Commission adopted a resolution (sponsored by Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and the United States) addressed to the Economic and Social Council which recommends to the General Assembly the exceptional appropriation, if necessary for 1964, of sufficient funds for an Inter-American Seminar on the Coca Leaf in 1964.

An article entitled "The Cannabis Habit" by Dr. H.B.M. Murphy of Ottawa, Canada, in Volume XV, No. 1, of the Bulletin on Narcotics drew criticism from the United States representative because it placed too much emphasis on the supposedly harmless effects of cannabis. After discussion, which included reference to an opinion of the World Health Organization that cannabis is harmful and addicting, the Commission decided that the drug is dangerous.

Little or no progress was reported in this field. The United States representative pointed out that it was of urgent importance that a cannabis test be developed for field law enforcement use and that present identification was not satisfactory. Also, in relation to road accidents, in contradistinction to the possibility for police to determine that a driver was under the influence of alcohol, their only means of determining that a driver was under the influence of cannabis would be for the driver to admit his use of it. With the growing increase in cannabis abuse throughout the world and increase in road accidents, it was necessary to have scientific research pointed in that direction.

The United States representative raised the question of Hexalgon, a substance developed many years ago in Germany, which had been distributed in Hungary, Argentina, and other countries and had not been placed under international control. He pointed out that there had been cases of addiction; that this could be a mad dog run loose in the world, and it was up to the Commission to take the necessary action. It was decided to have the drug tested for addiction liability so that the proper control action could be instituted on recommendation of the World Health Organization. It is evident that in this instance the international control machinery did not function properly.

While the discussion on these items was rather brief, it was decided not to take any action but to keep these problems under constant surveillance.

The United States representative stated that in its interim report the committee of experts appointed after the White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse had advised against subjecting the manufacture, sale and distribution of barbiturates and amphetamines to the narcotic laws; if they were so subjected, the medical use of those drugs would be seriously hampered. Legislation had been introduced for their control, but the controls applicable to dangerous drugs were not so strict as those applicable to narcotics. There was no illicit traffic in barbiturates, and the establishment of international control would place enormous additional administrative burdens on governments as well as on the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body.

In addition to the resolution on technical cooperation in the field of the coca leaf, the Commission adopted a resolution (sponsored by India, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia), addressed to the Economic and Social Council, calling for a survey of economic and social requirements of an opium-producing region in Burma to see whether any progress could be made in substituting other crops for opium cultivation among the hill tribes.

At the time of the Eighteenth Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs seventeen nations had ratified the 1961 Single Convention. All of these, with the exception of Canada and Thailand, are small nations of minor importance in respect to narcotic problems.

An Administrative Guide for the 1961 Convention had been prepared by Mr. Bertil A. Renborg, former head of the Opium Section under the League of Nations. His voluminous work was not regarded with favor by any delegation.

The question of preparing a commentary was raised. The task had been offered to Sir Samuel Hoare, the United Kingdom representative on the Economic and Social Council. The fee will be $34,000 and the work will take about four years. Sir Samuel Hoare wisely rejected the task, as he does not have the legal or technical knowledge to produce such a document on the Single Convention. Apparently there is no one in sight who can take on this work.

A number of the delegations announced their intention to ratify the 1961 Single Convention, but evidently with tongue in cheek, as they privately stated that they would await action of the United States Government.

There was very little discussion on the subject, as previously the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom decided to limit the discussion to bare essentials.

The United States representative pointed out that at the last meeting of the Permanent Central Opium Board a comment on the 1961 Single Convention had been prepared by the Secretariat which took a position parallel with that of the United States-that the reservations could have a substantial effect on the success of the Convention. The secretary of the Board declined to disclose the document in question.

The Government of Turkey announced that ratification of the 1953 Opium Protocol was in process and would soon be accomplished. This caused keen disappointment among proponents of the 1961 Single Convention.

The Yugoslav representative raised the question that the 1953 Opium Protocol might not be legal and asked what proper legal steps could be taken to have a decision handed down by the International Court of Justice.

The question of an international body to administer both the 1953 Opium Protocol and the 1961 Single Convention, if it came into force, caused no difficulty as it was felt that the present two bodies could carry on this work satisfactorily, especially since the 1953 Protocol would have to be in operation for the next five years.

The Commission unanimously adopted a resolution (sponsored by Brazil, Canada, India, United Arab Republic, and the United States) requesting the Secretary-General to present to the 20th session of the Commission a report which will cover and evaluate the work done and the results obtained during the preceding 19 years.

The decision of the Economic and Social Council that the next session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs last only three weeks was an excellent one. Unquestionably the Commission, if it worked full time, could dispose of all of its work in three weeks without loss of effectiveness. Most of the representatives are experts and little time is lost in arriving at a decision.

A provisional agenda for the Commission's 19th session was adopted.

It was agreed to invite Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Cuba, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Laos, Lebanon, Federation of Malaya, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Syria, Thailand, and Viet Nam to send observers to the Commission meetings on the illicit traffic and to meetings of the Committee on Illicit Traffic.

It was agreed to invite the following countries to send observers: Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Netherlands, Pakistan, and Thailand to the Commission meetings on abuse of drugs (drug addiction); Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands to the meetings on opium and scientific research on opium; Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia to the meetings on the coca leaf; Greece, Lebanon, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, and South Africa to the meetings on cannabis and scientific research on cannabis; Belgium, Ethiopia, Greece, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Somalia, and Yemen to the meetings on questions relating to other substances, including khat; Greece, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, and Poland to the meetings on the 1961 Single Convention.

Mr. Otis E. Mulliken, Adviser from the Department of State, was extremely helpful in guiding the policy of the delegation in accordance with the position papers.

Commissioner of Narcotics Henry L. Giordano represented the United States in the Committee on Illicit Traffic and conducted his debates with force and courtesy.

The Honorable James A. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, assisted the delegation during the first week of the Commission meetings. He conferred with the delegations of the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Finland, China, and others about the undesirability of ratifying the Single Convention of 1961 and urged action to make the Opium Protocol of 1953 a success.

Mr. John T. Cusack, District Supervisor of the Bureau of Narcotics in Rome, Italy, assisted the delegation in the handling of many necessary details.

The entire Eighteenth Session was a modicum of harmony, coordination, and efficiency. With few exceptions there was no acrimony and debate.

The Soviet Bloc behaved particularly well and did not place any technical obstacles to halt the work. It showed every indication of wanting to help and took advantage of the information which was presented by many delegations.

The future work of the Commission will be seriously affected by the following developments:

The departure of Mr. Gilbert E. Yates as Director of the Division of Narcotic Drugs and the transfer of Dr. Adolf Lande to head the secretariat of the Permanent Central Opium Board to succeed Mr. L. Atzenwiler who has retired, left a very serious gap in the Division to maintain the high standards of former years. With the departure of Dr. Lande, no one in the Division is qualified as a legal expert on the nine treaties and protocols and the Single Convention.

Mr. Daniel A. Chapman of Ghana took over the directorship of the Division. Representatives expressed their unanimous wish to support him in his difficult task. Neither Mr. Chapman nor three top assistants recently appointed have the slightest knowledge of narcotics. Thus the quality of the United Nations work on narcotics will be seriously hampered. There is no question that the appointments were of a political nature and without regard to efficiency. At least four of the high officials in the Division have not the slightest knowledge of the many intricate and manifold problems of narcotics. The new director, highly conscious of his disability in staff, is going to take steps to correct the situation.