Washington, January 10, 1961.

[Here follow Section I, Introduction; Section II, The Ballistic Missile Program; Section III, Organization and Management; and Section IV, The Booster Program.]

We have a large military space program in being and continuing to grow. In addition, each of the three major military services plus the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is clamoring for a major role in space. The organizational hiatus posed by these conditions is treated elsewhere in this paper.

There are important and unique uses of space for national security and in support of our treaty alliances throughout the world. There are also important uses of space systems for arms-control purposes.

There are also many uses of space for military purposes which are now in the planning or study stage which, if allowed to continue, will jeopardize the value we can derive from valid military space programs. It is necessary that these projects and concepts be eliminated at an early date.

In absence of treaties preventing all nations from exploiting space for military advantage, the United States' policy on this matter must be that we take no new action which will foreclose development of space systems in support of our legitimate military needs.

The most urgent and immediate use of space systems for military purposes is for surveillance and target reconnaissance over the land masses of the world with particular emphasis on the Sino-Soviet bloc of nations. The technical progress we have made in this area will be discussed separately. This program is presently organized with a special security organization in such a manner that our other military space programs and plans are subordinated and to an extent interfered with. This can and must be corrected.

Perhaps the most disturbing and potentially dangerous part of the space program is the international aspect of the Samos and Midas programs. Our present policy concerning the use of these devices is criticized in an article by G. Zhukov--"Space-Espionage Plans and International Law"--published in the English edition of International Affairs in October of 1960. This publication originates with the Soviet Society for the Popularization of Political and Scientific Knowledge. It is suggested that members of the incoming administration read this article and seriously consider taking emergency steps to salvage the Samos program from destruction by international political action on the part of the Soviets. Many suggestions have been advanced in this connection. One such suggestion is that we unilaterally announce the Samos flights to the U.N., invite U.N. inspection (technical details of inspection to be defined by the U.S.), and that we make available the data obtained from Samos to all the nations of the U.N. The urgency of arriving at a new solution to the Samos international relations problem is of the highest order of priority for our national security.

The U.S.A.F. provides 90 percent or more of the resources and physical support required by the space programs of other agencies and is the nation's principal resource for the development and operation of future space systems, except those of a purely scientific nature assigned by law to NASA.

In view of the likely need of large boosters for military purposes, the military establishments have a vital interest in the development of such boosters. This emphasizes again the necessity of a really effective national effort for the development of large boosters. The question should be re-examined whether this program should or should not be carried out entirely by a civilian agency.

[Here follow Section VI, Science in Space and Space Exploration; Section VII, Man in Space; Section VIII, Non-Military Applications of Space Technology; and a Summary of Recommendations.]

Washington, January 19, 1961.

SUBJECT
National Aeronautics and Space Council

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,/2/ besides establishing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), established the National Aeronautics and Space Council. The statute provides that the Council shall be composed of--

"(1) the President (who shall preside over meetings of the Council);

(2) the Secretary of State;

(3) the Secretary of Defense;

(4) the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;

(5) the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission;

(6) not more than one additional member appointed by the President from the departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and

(7) not more than three other members appointed by the President, solely on the basis of established records of distinguished achievement, from among individuals in private life who are eminent in science, engineering technology, education, administration, or public affairs."

As the additional member from Government, the President designated Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation. As members from private life, the President first designated Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, Mr. William A. M. Burden and General James H. Doolittle. In May 1959, after General Doolittle resigned, Dr. John T. Rettaliata was designated in his stead. In October 1959, Mr. Burden resigned to accept appointment as Ambassador to Belgium and the vacancy thereby created on the Council has not been filled.

On August 19, 1958, in a letter to the Administrator of NASA, the President stated that it was important that appropriate working relations be established between the NSC and the Space Council. He invited Mr. Gordon Gray to attend all Space Council meetings as a participant; Mr. Lay attended informal meetings with him or as his alternate. (See pertinent correspondence, Tab A)/3/

The statute authorizes the Council to employ a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and compensated at the rate of $20,000 a year. The executive secretary is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of necessary personnel, including not more than three persons who may be compensated at the rate of $19,000 a year.

The President never filled the post of executive secretary. In September 1958, Mr. Robert O. Piland from the staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology was designated Acting Secretary. In January 1959, he was succeeded as Acting Secretary by Mr. Franklyn W. Phillips of NASA. In February 1960, Mr. Phillips was succeeded by Mr. David Z. Beckler, Secretary of the Science Advisory Committee.

The Space Council held eight meetings: three in 1958, four in 1959 and one on January 12, 1960. The Council has not met since the last mentioned date. Meetings were held in the Cabinet room at the White House.

By way of preparation for formal meetings with the President, the Space Council frequently held so-called informal meetings attended by members (except the President) or their alternates, accompanied by staff. The purpose of the informal meetings was to discuss the items scheduled on the upcoming Council agenda with a view to disposing of unnecessary details and clarifying issues for later discussion at the Council itself. The informal meetings were usually held in a conference room in the Executive Office Building.

At the January 12, 1960 meeting of the Space Council, U.S. Policy on Outer Space (NSC 5918 which was prepared by an Ad Hoc Working Group from the interested agencies and then processed through the Planning Board) was adopted, subject to certain revisions. The policy paper as approved by the President was distributed to the Space Council members by the Acting Secretary. It was also distributed to the National Security Council by its Executive Secretary, although not issued as a numbered NSC paper. It superseded the August 1958 paper "Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space," NSC 5814/1. (Tab B)/4/

At the January 12, 1960 meeting the President also stated that the transitional period of the Space Program seemed to be over and that the Space Council had completed its assignment. (Minutes, 1/12/60 Meeting, Item 5) (Tab C)

CAH

Washington, March 8, 1961.

SUBJECT
Outer Space

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. James Webb, NASA
Dr. Hugh Dryden, NASA
The Secretary
Mr. W. Wallner, IO
Mr. W.I. Cargo, UNP
Dr. W. Whitman, S/SA
Mr. P.J. Farley, S/AE

The Secretary said that there was keen interest in the possibility of a productive approach to the Soviet Union for outer space cooperation. The question arose whether the United Nations was the place for this or whether it should be done bilaterally. Mr. Webb said that he had been examining our outer space goals and objectives intensively. We have a big program on the order of $1 billion a year. The implications are tremendous, not only scientifically, but also militarily and commercially. In the communications field particularly we have a major new technology which gives great opportunities for international action if we wish to use it creatively. He thought that decision on approaches to the Soviets was incidental to deciding what we want to do in the space field.

The Secretary observed that there are really only a few countries which are "producers" in the space field and that most of the others are "consumers". The United Nations might be a good place in which to handle exchange of information between the producer and consumer countries, rather than the place to arrange cooperation between the producers. Dr. Dryden reviewed briefly the course of consideration of a U.N. Outer Space Scientific Conference and establishment of a U.N. Outer Space Committee. He said that it was important to NASA to have a decision as to whether or not there would be a United Nations Conference. He remarked that, outside the United Nations, he saw Blagonravov perhaps twice a year and talked about possibilities for scientific cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in outer space. Blagonravov was always interested but nothing ever seemed to happen.

The Secretary said that perhaps we had held up action in the United Nations unnecessarily. Mr. Farley said that the United Nations activity ought to go ahead and referred to the telegram just received from Ambassador Stevenson./2/ He pointed out that the terms of reference of the U.N. Committee are carefully drafted and that we will retain freedom of action to approach the Soviet Union in whatever way we decide to after current studies have been considered. In response to the Secretary's question, he said that Dr. Rossi had completed the report of the outer space task force on the previous day and it would be distributed shortly for review by the agencies concerned and agreement on recommendations for the President./3/ Dr. Dryden said that he understood that this outer space task force report might not be considered until broader studies by Dr. Wiesner regarding scientific relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were completed. Mr. Farly said that, while decisions might not be taken until the whole group of scientific studies were in hand, he thought that staff work on outer space could and should begin immediately. Dr. Whitman endorsed the idea of convening the U.N. Outer Space Scientific Conference as soon as possible, citing the usefulness of the two U.N. Atoms for Peace Conferences./4/ He urged also that an effort be made to give scientists as free a hand as possible in working out arrangements. Mr. Wallner said that we hoped it would now be possible to get organizational details agreed with the Soviet Union but warned that the Soviet approach was highly political and one could not realistically expect a purely scientific exercise.

Mr. Webb spoke further of the opportunities for foreign relations inherent in the space program and particularly communications and meteorology. He said that he was re-examining in particular the role of NASA in the immediate future in developing space communications techniques and systems. He felt that the implications of space communications were so great and the stake of the Government in development costs to date so considerable that the Government ought to take the lead in developing and testing space communications systems, leaving aside for the time being the question of the ultimate mode of operation. Such an active Government role would provide greater opportunities for using this new tool internationally. He mentioned also that a preliminary review had indicated the desirability of further acceleration and funding of the NASA program by a substantial amount and asked what the attitude of the State Department would be toward such an increase. The Secretary said that he wondered what the purpose was of activities in space on this major scale. Should not the objectives be clearly identified and undertaken not competitively but on behalf of the human race as a whole. With our many skills and forms of power, the human race in its pride is rapidly approaching a point where we may destroy ourselves. This was peculiarly an area where we might be able to stand aside and take a different and more rational approach to whatever was most worth doing in space. Mr. Webb endorsed the idea that we should look urgently at our objectives and, if necessary, re-define them. At present the spirit which he found was primarily one of exploring all possibilities for development of a new technology. The Secretary said that the State Department ought to be addressing itself to all aspects of these problems. He asked Mr. Farley to work with the Policy Planning Council and other interested parts of the Department in identifying the questions which ought to be considered and recommending answers. Mr. Farley said that this was essential in developing recommendations on the basis of the Rossi task force report. We could not sensibly address ourselves to cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries unless we had defined our own objectives and programs. A good deal of preliminary thinking was already underway in the Department in the communications, legal and other policy aspects of outer space and could be drawn on in formulating the recommendations requested by the Secretary. Mr. Webb said that he was going to look particularly to Dr. Dryden in this area.

Dr. Dryden then reviewed some of the cooperative activities which NASA has had under way in the past in COSPAR, with the British and Canadians, and more recently with other European countries. He emphasized that there was much which the United States could do with free countries aside from what could be done with the Soviet Union or in the United Nations, and pointed out that NASA had a statutory charge to engage in international cooperation. The Secretary asked whether we had the kind of restrictions on international cooperation in this area that we did in the atomic energy field. Dr. Dryden said that the principal limitation was the classification of some of our large boosters which had missile application. Mr. Farley said we did not have the restrictions and procedural requirements in outer space that were laid down by the Atomic Energy Act for atomic energy cooperation. Referring to Dr. Dryden's summary of present cooperation, he called attention to the recent emergence of European interest in an integrated space research organization. He said that the Department with the concurrence of NASA was actively encouraging this development. It was politically advantageous as a form of European cooperation cutting across the Community of Six and the Outer Seven. It also made sense in view of the cost and complexity of space research. Furthermore, the United States did not want to encourage individual national space programs on a competitive basis primarily for prestige considerations, and we did not want to start a rush among individual countries to enter into bilateral cooperation with the United States regardless of practical importance. Dr. Dryden said that NASA was of course glad to cooperate with such a multilateral venture.

The Secretary said that it was important that we think out what we are doing in this field. He asked that action be taken in the meanwhile to resume efforts in New York to activate the U.N. Committee, since that would be desirable in any event and would not prejudice decisions on other matters.

Washington, March 21, 1961.

Administrator's Presentation to the President

The U.S. civilian space effort is based on a ten year plan. When prepared in 1959, this ten year plan was designed to go hand in hand with our military programs and permit a steady closing of the gap caused by Russian successes. Prior to this plan, U.S. procrastination for a number of years had been based in part on a very real skepticism by President Eisenhower personally as to the necessity for the large expenditures required, and the validity of the goals sought through the space effort.

In the preparation of the 1962 budget, President Eisenhower reduced the $1.35 billion requested by the Space Agency to the extent of $240 million and specifically eliminated funds to proceed with manned space flight projects beyond Mercury. This decision emasculated the ten year plan, before it was even one year old, and unless reversed guarantees that the Russians will, for the next five to ten years, beat us to every spectacular exploratory flight.

We have already felt the effects of the fact that they were the first to place a satellite in orbit, have intercepted the moon, photographed the back side of the moon, and have sent a large spacecraft to Venus. They can now orbit 7-1/2 ton vehicles about the earth, compared to our 2-1/2 tons, and they have successfully recovered animals from orbital flights lasting as much as 24 hours. Their present position is one from which further substantial accomplishments can be expected, and our best information points to a steadily increasing pace of successful effort, on a realistic timetable.

The budget levels of the previous administration did permit extensive scientific investigation, the application of satellites to meteorological and communication systems, the Mercury man-in-space effort, and the support of these through advanced research and technological development. However, these levels have not been sufficient for the successful conduct of programs calculated to give us any substantial initiative in space exploration.

The first priority of this country's space effort should be to improve as rapidly as possible our capability for boosting large spacecraft into orbit, since this is our greatest deficiency. The present Russian booster has a 750,000 pound thrust compared with an Atlas thrust of 320,000 pounds. We are developing a cluster of 8 Atlas engines, known as Saturn, which will have a thrust of 1,500,000 pounds. Our request for additional funds to advance its available date one year (to 1966) has not been recommended to you by the Budget Bureau. In addition, we are asking funds to speed up work on the engines for a more advanced vehicle with 8 to 9 million pounds thrust, which we call Nova. Our information shows that the Russians are continuing with booster developments, and we should not put ourselves in the position of having to start such a major project with its long lead time after they are in a position to exploit their possession of such a development.

The funds we have requested for an expanded effort will bring the entire Space Agency program up to $1.43 billion in FY 1968 and substantially restore the ten-year program. The future effect of our recommendations will be to increase expenditures to an annual rate of $2.0 billion by 1965 or 1966.

The Department of Defense benefits from the NASA space program just as NASA does from the military space program. NASA research centers are investigating re-entry physics, high temperature structures, and propulsion techniques for both military and civilian needs, to mention only a few major technical areas of common interest and effort. In addition, NASA-developed electronic equipment for telemetry, tracking, data processing, stabilization and guidance will have application to military systems. Most important of all, the boosters now under development and the launching facilities to be constructed will be used directly by the Department of Defense. NASA's Centaur launch vehicle will be used to place the Defense communications satellite, Advent, in orbit and ultimately it can be expected that NASA's Saturn will make possible military missions not even foreseen at this time. We feel it is important to proceed aggressively with our program not only for civilian considerations but also to provide improved technological capability for the DOD.

Under the NASA ten-year program, we will need the large boosters we are requesting sooner than the military will need them in order to achieve a number of major space exploration milestones. Among these milestones are unmanned exploration of the moon and planets as well as manned space flight beyond Project Mercury. The Mercury vehicle carries a single man and can remain in orbit for but a few hours. For important biomedical studies, we wish to make modifications that will extend the possible flight time to one day.

To make flights about the earth with multiple crews or trips to the vicinity of the moon, we must develop a new space vehicle and team it up with the Saturn booster. President Eisenhower eliminated from his budget the preliminary design studies required to begin this effort. Unless research and development funds for an advanced design of this type are restored, the important milestone flights will be delayed at least a year.

The United States space program has already become a positive force in bringing together scientists and engineers of many countries in a wide variety of cooperative endeavors. Great Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Argentina, all have in one way or another taken action or expressed their will to become a part of this imaginative effort. We feel there is no better means to reinforce our old alliances and build new ones.

The Soviets have demonstrated how effective space exploration can be as a symbol of scientific progress and as an adjunct of foreign policy. Without necessarily following the Soviet lead in this kind of exploitation, we should not fail to recognize its potential. We cannot regain the prestige we have lost without improving our present inferior booster capability, and doing it before the Russians make a major break through into the multi-million pound thrust range.

Looking to the future, it is possible through new technology to bring about whole new areas of international cooperation in meteorological and communication satellite systems. These new systems will be superior to present systems by a large margin and so clearly in the interest of the entire world that there is a possibility all will want to cooperate-even the USSR. However, the extent to which we are leaders in space science and technology will in some large measure determine the extent to which we, as a nation, pioneering on a new frontier, will be in position to develop this emerging world force as a basis for new concepts and applications in education, communication and transportation, looking toward more viable political, social and economic systems for nations willing to work with us in the years ahead.

Washington, April 7, 1961.

SUBJECT
Hazardous Launch Trajectories

Twice in the past six months, pieces of U.S. space vehicles have landed on foreign territory. On September 26, 1960, a malfunction in the second stage of an attempted NASA lunar probe caused its premature re-entry over Africa and the impact of some metal pieces upon the Union of South Africa. On November 30, 1960, a failure in the Thor booster rocket attempting to place a Transit satellite in orbit caused the rocket motor and tank pieces to fall upon Cuba. Fortunately, with the reported exception of one Cuban cow, these impacts caused no known casualties or property damage. Fortunately, too, the reaction of the South Africans was phlegmatic curiosity and that of the Cubans over-played histrionics. As a result, neither impact has produced a significant international demand for curtailment of our space program. There has been created, however, a certain undercurrent of international uneasiness and, in conjunction with our much-publicized launching failures, some feeling that the United State is insufficiently cautious in pursuing its space goals.

In my judgment, we must, in the interests of the future conduct of the U.S. space program, make every effort to prevent impacts of space vehicles on foreign territory. The cumulative effect of such impacts would be likely to arouse substantial opposition to our space program as a whole, would render already unpopular U.S. space projects like SAMOS more vulnerable to propaganda attack, and could be expected to foster powerful resistance to future experiments with nuclear power in space and launch vehicles. Additional impacts on foreign territory would also provide justification should proposals be made (e.g., in the UN) for requiring prior consent to overflight of countries by satellites, particularly in the case of experimental launches.

At present, we are especially concerned at the chances of impact afforded by three space programs. One is the forthcoming Mercury abort shot, scheduled for April 20, in which an empty Mercury capsule is intended to be recovered at sea in the vicinity of the Canary Islands. Malfunction of the retro-rockets, which have not been flight-tested at orbital velocity, could bring the capsule down in Africa. Malfunction of the launching vehicle at a critical stage in its burning period could cause an African or an Australian impact.

A second hazardous program involves one or two additional launches of the Transit satellite over the same ill-fated trajectory that produced the impact of November 30 on Cuba. Mr. Nitze has written you about these launches and has asserted that the statistical odds against a Cuban impact were 2,100 to 1 last November when the impact occurred. Although last November's failure raises doubt as to the validity of the Cuban odds, our principal concern has always been for an impact on South America. Transit's pre-orbital trajectory traverses the entire continent from Venezuela to southeastern Brazil with estimated impact odds of one in twenty-one.

The third program of a hazardous nature is Centaur, in which this unique hydrogen-oxygen fueled second-stage rocket is tested over a trajectory crossing the width of Africa from northwest to southeast. To our knowledge, this is the first time it has been proposed to flight-test an untried launch vehicle over a land route.

It is admittedly difficult to strike a balance between the technical requirements of present space programs and the necessity to preserve opportunities for our programs in the future. Nevertheless, with respect to the foregoing programs, I recommend:

1. Because the Mercury program has the highest national priority, has proceeded thus far at great expense and effort, and would presumably bring substantial prestige rewards if successful in first placing a man in orbit and recovering him, I recommend that, despite the hazards involved, you interpose no objections to the April 20 and subsequent Mercury flights./2/

2. Because the Transit program has no overriding priority (while taking fully into account the value of the associated pickaback experiment) and would be delayed at the most one year by our non-concurrence in the requested research and development launches over South America, I recommend that you sign the attached letter to Mr. Nitze (Tab A)/3/ regretting that the political risks are too great to permit you to concur in the launches over South America.

3. Because the important Centaur program is still in the planning stage and susceptible of modification, I recommend that you sign the attached letter to Mr. Webb (Tab B)/4/ requesting that the dangers to our over-all space program and to our political relations with Africa be carefully considered before a final technical decision is made to test the Centaur vehicle over Africa or other major land areas.

Washington, April 17, 1961.

Dear Mr. Webb:

I am writing you in reference to the Centaur program as recently described to officers of this Department by officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

I am told that the presently conceived Centaur program calls for initial test flights of this hitherto untried vehicle over the continent of Africa and that utilization of the customary water range for testing would yield less complete performance data. In view of the volatile and highly unstable political situation currently prevailing in Africa, it would seem to me unwise to risk an impact on the Congo or elsewhere along the trajectory for anything but a project of the greatest national importance for which no alternative flight path could suffice.

In the light of two recent impacts of U.S. space vehicles upon foreign territory,/2/ I am also concerned at the cumulative effect of repeated impacts upon our space program as a whole. At some point, particularly if we should suffer an especially unlucky hit causing damage or casualties, substantial international opposition to our space program as a whole would arise. Not only would this provoke proposals in the United Nations and elsewhere for requiring prior consent to overflights of countries by U.S. satellites, particularly in the case of experimental launches, but also it would render already unpopular U.S. space projects like Samos more vulnerable to propaganda attack. Of especial interest to NASA would seem to be the predictable unfavorable response to an impact upon their territory of those African countries who have granted NASA tracking and communications facilities and staging privileges for contingency recovery of the Mercury capsule. In addition, a pattern of impacts upon foreign territory could be expected to foster powerful resistance to future experiments involving the use of nuclear power in space and launch vehicles.

Admittedly, risks must be run in the vigorous pursuit of our national space program. It is this realization that has caused us to evaluate the very real hazards of the Mercury program as being outweighed by its overriding importance. However, I hope that you will agree that the interests of our space program as a whole demand that we accept risks of impact upon foreign territory only in those rare instances involving projects of the highest national priority. Accordingly, I should very much appreciate your assistance in assuring that the foregoing considerations are taken into account before NASA makes its technical decision to propose testing of the Centaur vehicle over Africa or other major land areas./3/

Sincerely yours,

Chester Bowles/4/

Washington, April 22, 1961.

a. "By putting a laboratory in space?"

There is no chance of beating the Soviets in putting a multi-manned laboratory in space since flights already accomplished by the Russians have demonstrated that they have this capability. The U.S. program must include the development of a multi-manned orbiting laboratory as soon as possible since it is essential for the accomplishment of the more difficult flights to the moon.

b. "Or by a trip around the moon?"

With a determined effort of the United States, there is a chance to beat the Russians in accomplishing a manned circumnavigation of the moon. The Russians have not as yet demonstrated either the booster capability or the technology required for returning a man from a flight around the moon. The state of their booster technology and other technology required for such a difficult mission is not accurately known. With an accelerated program, it is not unreasonable for the U.S. to attempt a manned circumlunar flight by 1966.

c. "Or by a rocket to land on the moon?"

On September 12, 1959, the Russians crash-landed a small package on the moon. This package did not transmit any information from the surface of the moon. The NASA program currently includes impacting instruments on the moon in such a way that they may survive the impact and transmit scientific information back to earth. The first flight in this program is scheduled for January 1962. Close-up television pictures will be obtained of the surface of the moon, as the spacecraft descends to the moon. In August 1963 the current NASA program also includes a soft landing of instruments on the moon. Several flights in succeeding months are included in this program to insure the possibility of success. The Russians can accomplish this mission now if they choose.

d. "Or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man?"

There is a chance for the U.S. to be the first to land a man on the moon and return him to earth if a determined national effort is made. The development of a large chemical rocket booster, the spacecraft for landing and return, and major developments in advanced technology are required to accomplish this most difficult mission. The Russians initiated their earth orbiting program probably as early as 1954 as evidenced by their flight of a dog in November 1957. In the earth orbiting competition the United States was attempting to accomplish in less than three years what the Russians had worked on for seven years. It is doubtful that the Russians have a very great head start on the U.S. in the effort required for a manned lunar landing. Because of the distinct superiority of U.S. industrial capacity, engineering, and scientific know-how, we believe that with the necessary national effort, the U.S. may be able to overcome the lead that the Russians might have up to now. A possible target date for the earliest attempt for a manned lunar landing is 1967, with an accelerated U.S. effort.

e. "Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?"

(1) The current NASA program provides the possibility of returning a sample of the material from the moon surface to the earth in 1964. An experiment of this kind would have dramatic value and may or may not be a part of the Russian program. The Russians could carry out such an experiment in the same time period or earlier if they choose.

(2) The lead the U.S has taken in developing communications satellites should be exploited to the fullest. Although not as dramatic as manned flight, the direct benefits to the people throughout the world in the long term are clear. U.S. national prestige will be enhanced by successful completion of this program. The current program will provide for the flight of an active communications satellite in mid-1962. The experiment will enable live television pictures to be transmitted across the Atlantic. The continuing program will lead to the establishment of worldwide operational communications systems.

(3) The U.S. lead established in our successful meteorological experiments with the Tiros satellites, should be maintained with a vigorous continuing program. The whole world will benefit from improved weather forecasting with the possibility of avoiding the disastrous effects of major weather disturbances such as typhoons, hurricanes and tornadoes.

An estimate of the cost of the 10-year space exploration program as planned under the Eisenhower Administration was 17.91 billion dollars, as shown in Table A-1, attached./2/ In this program it was planned that manned lunar landing and return to earth would occur in the time period after 1970 but before 1975. Re-evaluation of the cost of this program based on providing adequate back-ups in all areas of the work has recently been made and the original cost estimate revised to 22.3 billion dollars for the ten-year period through 1970. (Table D-1) For an accelerated national program aiming toward achieving manned lunar landing in the 1967 period, it is estimated that the cost over the same ten-year period will be 33.7 billion dollars, as shown in Table E-1. The additional 10 billion dollar cost of the program is due largely to paying for the program in the shorter time period. The resulting annual costs are naturally higher.

A list of the major items that would be initiated in 1962 with an accelerated program is shown in Attachment F. The total FY-62 funds, $1,744 millions, shown in Table E-1 is $509 million more than the approved current FY-62 budget.

There is not a 24 hour a day work schedule on existing NASA space programs, except for selected areas in Project Mercury, the Saturn C-1 booster, the Centaur engines, and the final launching phases of most flight missions.

a. Project Mercury at Cape Canaveral has been since October 1960 on a three-shift, seven-day-a-week basis plus shift overtime for all phases of capsule checkout and launch preparations. The McDonnell St. Louis plant, where the capsules are made, has averaged a 54-hour week on Mercury from the beginning, but also employs two or three shifts as needed in bottleneck areas. It now runs three shifts in the capsule test and checkout areas.

b. Saturn C-1 project operates at Huntsville around-the-clock throughout any critical test periods for the first-stage booster; the remaining Saturn work is on a one-shift basis plus overtime which results in an average 47 hour week.

c. Centaur hydrogen engine, which also is needed for the Saturn upper stages, is on three shifts in Pratt & Whitney's shops and test stands.

d. Lastly, the final launch preparations of most flight missions require around-the-clock work at the launch sites at Cape Canaveral, Wallops Station, or the Pacific Missile Range. In addition, NASA computer installations at Goddard and Marshall Centers operate continuous shifts in order to handle launch vehicle test analyses promptly, and determine orbital and trajectory data, and provide tracking and telemetry of space vehicles in flight.

NASA and its contractors are not working 24-hour days on the rest of its projects because:

a. Certain projects are at an early stage of experimental study or design engineering where exchange of ideas is difficult to accomplish through multi-shifts.

b. The schedules have been geared to the availability of facilities and financial resources. The funding levels for both contractors and government laboratories have been sufficient only for single-shift operations plus overtime (generally from 5 to 20%) as required to keep up the schedules.

c. The limitations on manpower and associated funding determine the extent to which the NASA flight development centers may employ extra shifts.

In a number of areas in the national space program, the work could be accelerated if more manpower and more facilities were to be provided and funded in the immediate future. Recommendations to accomplish this are made elsewhere in this memorandum.

In building the large launch vehicles required for the manned lunar landing mission, the immediate emphasis must be on the development of large solid and liquid rockets. It is believed that, in order to provide the necessary assurance that we will have a large launch vehicle for the lunar mission, we must have a parallel development of both a solid and liquid fueled large launch vehicle. The program on nuclear rockets must be prosecuted vigorously on a research and development basis. It is not believed that the nuclear rocket can play a role in the earliest attempt at manned lunar landing. The nuclear rockets will be needed in the even more difficult mission following manned lunar exploration. Use of the nuclear rocket for missions is not expected until after 1970 although flight test for developing the rocket will occur before then.

No, the space program is not proceeding with a maximum effort. Additional capability exists in this country which could be utilized in this task. However, we believe that the manpower facilities and other resources now assigned are being utilized in an aggressive fashion.

Our program is directed towards unmanned scientific investigation of space, manned exploration of space, and application of satellites to communication and meteorological systems. The scientific investigation is achieving basic knowledge important for a better understanding of the universe and also provides data necessary for the achievement of manned space flight and the satellite applications. It is generally agreed that our scientific program is yielding most significant results.

The Mercury program is the first and necessary step in an ongoing program leading to the manned laboratory, circumlunar flight, and manned lunar landing discussed under Item 1. A manned ballistic flight is scheduled in May, unmanned orbital flights and orbital flights with chimpanzees are scheduled for the Spring and Summer providing the background for the manned flight planned in 1961.

Future manned flight depends upon improved launch vehicle capability as well as a new spacecraft for the crew. The Saturn will provide our first capability for large payloads but must be followed by a still larger vehicle for manned lunar landing. The launch vehicle for the first manned lunar landing will utilize either clustered F-1 liquid engines or solid propellant motors as discussed in item 4. We are achieving necessary technical data on the liquid engines but not on the large solid rocket engines. Ultimately, nuclear propulsion will be used to carry heavy payloads long distances into space. With our great capacity for engine research we have the capacity in this country to proceed more rapidly towards our objectives.

The Tiros and Echo satellites have provided important background data for meteorological and communication satellite systems. Additional experimentation is required in both fields before operational systems can be completely defined. We are continuing our meteorological program with Tiros flights and will use a newly-designed satellite called Nimbus when it is available in 1962. The first communication satellite (Echo) was a 100-ft. balloon which reflected ultra-high frequency signals between transmitters and receivers. The Echo type experiment is continuing and in addition we are instituting a program called Relay which carries microwave equipment for power amplification. This process decreases the requirements on the ground equipment but requires electronic equipment in the satellite with extremely high reliability compared to present day standards.

In summary we are achieving significant scientific and technical results. We welcome the opportunity of reviewing these results with you to ensure that these results are compatible with our national goals.

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
The Mercury Program and NASA's Conduct of Public Relations

At the staff meeting yesterday morning several questions were voiced about the desirability of proceeding with the current Mercury shot in view of its having been over-publicized and the chances that it may be unsuccessful.

Although there is some basis for the concern recently expressed by Mr. Tubby, Mr. Chayes, and others about the adverse effects of failures during Project Mercury, I believe we must proceed with the Mercury ballistic and orbital flights as expeditiously as possible. The problem is not the program itself but the way it has been handled publicly.

It is apparent that the excessive and over-personalized publicity build-up surrounding NASA's Project Mercury manned ballistic launch fosters at least four undesirable impressions among foreign audiences:

1. By again violating the precept that an achievement not be publicized before the fact, such publicity contributes to a foreign image of American braggadocio and lack of restraint;

2. By providing for a microscopically detailed coverage of the astronaut, the present information arrangements encourage reporting in unfortunate terms;

3. Because our massive media coverage of the manned ballistic launch might suggest to foreign audiences that the U.S. is attempting in this way to meet the Soviet space challenge, even an entirely successful launch at this time would seem destined to appear as obviously inadequate, perhaps even a pathetic, American response to a major Soviet achievement;

4. Most importantly, the fanfare of pre-flight publicity would make a catastrophe, especially the death of the astronaut, all the more damaging to American prestige.

Despite the foregoing, the stake of the United States in achieving manned space flight argues strongly against any delay in pursuing the Mercury program. The program itself has been exhaustively reviewed by a special panel established by Dr. Wiesner and adjudged scientifically and technically sound./2/ In this connection, the Mercury ballistic flights were determined to be an integral part of the program.

We obviously should not cancel a project to which we are so heavily committed and which is, in any case, our first venture in the field where we are going to have to take our first step some day. On the other hand, we can try to bring public relations aspects of the project back into balance and prevent recurrence of the circus-like atmosphere which has exaggerated tomorrow's ballistic attempt beyond all reason. There is no question here of "freedom of the press" versus "censorship." There is a question of sensible handling of the project to give out all necessary information without incurring the risks of over-publicizing events that haven't happened and that are of secondary importance when they do.

In order to minimize or prevent unfavorable foreign reactions to publicity attending NASA's space programs, the Department should be assured that the public relations connected with these programs will be fully coordinated in advance between NASA and the Department. If this were done, we would hope to influence NASA's public relations toward effectively contrasting our open space program pursued for meaningful scientific ends with Soviet secrecy, while concurrently avoiding the carnival-like atmosphere characterizing present publicity. Because of its need for favorable domestic publicity to facilitate public and Congressional support of the program, such restrictive counsels are difficult for NASA to accept without an assurance that they accurately reflect the judgment of the highest levels of the Department of State.

Because of the intimate involvement of the U.S. space program with American prestige and the conduct of foreign relations, I recommend that there be close, complete coordination between NASA and the Department of State on all public relations aspects of NASA's space program. If you approve, Mr. Tubby and I will make the necessary arrangements promptly with the appropriate people in NASA./3/

Washington, May 12, 1961.

TO
Dr. Edward C. Welsh, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council

SUBJECT
Official Announcements of Launching Into Space of Systems Involving Nuclear Power in Any Form

The President desires to reserve to himself all first official announcements covering the launching into space of systems involving nuclear power in any form. The President is especially concerned with announcements relating to the planned use of SNAP devices aboard Transit satellites which are tentatively scheduled for launching in June and July of 1961. Will you please advise members of the Space Council of the President's interest.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

Washington, May 19, 1961.

SUBJECT
United Nations Outer Space Committee and Conference

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Hugh Dryden, NASA
Dr. John P. Hagen, NASA
Mr. Arnold Frutkin, NASA
Mr. Philip Farley, S/AE
Mr. Wreatham Gathright, S/AE
Mr. Herbert Reis, L/UNA
Ambassador Plimpton, USUN
Mr. Peter Thatcher, USUN
Mr. Harlan Cleveland, IO
Mr. Richard Gardner, IO
Mr. William Jones, UNP
Mr. William Buffum, UNP
Mr. Oliver Crosby, UNP

Mr. Cleveland said he was pleased to have this opportunity to hear Dr. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, speak on United States space plans, expected Soviet space accomplishments and the relevance of these to the proposed Outer Space Conference. After a review of Soviet and United States space accomplishments, Dr. Dryden observed that the early Soviet development of large rocket boosters has given them an advantage in manned space flight which we can only hope to overcome over the long run. He said that while NASA hopes to put an astronaut in orbit by the end of the year, the Soviet Union has the capability to put a manned space laboratory in orbit immediately. Dr. Dryden estimated that a manned lunar orbiter or lunar landing, perhaps in 1967, offers the United States its first chance to overtake the Soviet Union in manned space flight. For this, however, the NASA budget would have to be increased to $4-5 billion a year. Dr. Dryden said President Kennedy will be sending up a message to the Congress on this in a week or so.

Dr. Dryden stated that the United States clearly leads the Soviet Union with respect to scientific research in outer space and particularly in development of meteorological and communications satellites. He indicated that the Weather Bureau's Nimbus meteorological satellite system should be operational by 1963 or 1964 and should bring great advantages in terms of weather analysis and typhoon warning as well as forecasting for military operations and reconnaissance purposes. The communications satellite is in an earlier stage, but a contract has just been signed with RCA for construction of a repeater satellite, and AT & T is making arrangements for a similar experiment at its own expense.

Although Dr. Dryden said there was some question as to the relative value of prestige derived from scientific accomplishments and from manned flight in outer space, he expected that we would stand up well vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in an international Outer Space Conference if it were held soon. As time passes, however, the Soviet Union will have an opportunity to catch up in the scientific area, and the comparison will be less favorable for the United States. Dr. Dryden estimated that the Conference might become of somewhat dubious value if it were not held until 1962. Mr. Farley asked whether in light of this we should continue to plan for an Outer Space Conference or whether we should take advantage of the difficulties with the Soviet Union to let the matter die. Dr. Hagen said that if the Conference can be held by the end of 1961, we will be able to meet our major objectives and demonstrate the significance of our outer space achievements.

Mr. Thatcher asked how important the intelligence aspects of such a Conference might be. Dr. Dryden said there would be some possibility of intelligence value, but this would have to be judged together with prestige aspects. Mr. Gardner observed that since Soviet space accomplishments are bound to produce publicity harmful to United States prestige, an Outer Space Conference might offer us a countering opportunity to draw attention to our scientific accomplishments, which have too often been eclipsed by Soviet spectaculars.

Brief mention was made of the possible desirability of going ahead with the United Nations Space Conference without Soviet participation. Dr. Dryden said opinion was divided within NASA on this score, and he was skeptical of the idea.

Mr. Frutkin pointed out that we cannot wait for agreement on a United Nations Space Conference to capitalize on our space accomplishments, and Dr. Dryden indicated that NASA is examining the question of the comparative utility of an overall Outer Space Conference versus individual conferences of a more specialized nature. If there is no action on the United Nations Outer Space Conference by the middle of this year, Dr. Dryden said NASA will have to abandon its preparations for such a conference and salvage what it can for use in other conferences. NASA plans on June 6th to release the findings from the Freedom Seven ballistic flight of Commander Shepard. Over the longer range, NASA plans to play an active role in the International Astronautical Federation Congress in Washington this October, plans a conference on meteorological satellites in the next six months, and plans a space research conference in the Spring of 1962. Mr. Gardner suggested that the theme of a meteorological conference should be the use of outer space for the benefit of humanity, for this would point up the contrast between the open United States and closed Soviet approaches.

Ambassador Plimpton said it was difficult to tell from his conversation with Zorin on May 11 whether the Soviet Union is really interested in the Outer Space Committee and Conference. The Indian Representative at the United Nations, after talking with Zorin, has advocated agreement on a unanimity rule in the Outer Space Committee, but Ambassador Plimpton stated that we would be willing only to make a statement expressing the hope that the Committee will be able to perform its work without the need for voting.

Dr. Hagen asked if USUN had sounded out our friends on the question of convening the Space Committee despite a possible Soviet boycott. Mr. Thatcher said that conversations with the friendly members of the Outer Space Committee had indicated they might be reluctant to proceed in the face of Soviet boycott. Mr. Farley commented that it might nevertheless be possible to bring about a meeting of the Committee without the Soviets if this is necessary.

With regard to the work of the Outer Space Committee, Mr. Cleveland said the two central questions are: a) what outer space projects will we be pursuing in which international cooperation is possible, and b) what pressures can we bring to bear on the Soviets to internationalize those aspects of their space program in which they are ahead of us?

There followed some discussion of present international cooperation in connection with the United States Tiros meteorological satellite program, the Mercury program and other operations. Mr. Frutkin asserted that NASA has opened up its programs to the maximum foreign cooperation possible, and he added that the bilateral cooperative programs which we now have with Italy, Japan, and various other states figure prominently in the reports of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), representing pressure on the Soviets to adopt a more cooperative approach.

The meeting closed with some discussion of the institutional aspects of international cooperation in outer space. Dr. Dryden hesitated to suggest any specific cooperative proposals for submission to the Outer Space Committee until the role envisioned for the Committee is clarified. Mr. Cleveland stated that the United States should decide soon how it wants to proceed in international space cooperation, for we are the leaders in building international institutions and should be in the forefront in promotion of an international regime for outer space. Mr. Gardner suggested that a beginning might be made by pressing for agreement on the legal status of outer space and celestial bodies. He also pointed out that the operational problems of communications or other satellite systems would be simplified if the operating agency were of an international character. Mr. Farley said he envisioned that the communications satellite system would be a joint, cooperative project in which United States participation would be by private companies and that of most other countries by public agencies. Mr. Cleveland observed that establishment of an international regime for outer space calls for a broader jurisdiction and competence than that available in the ITU or WMO, and he envisioned establishment of an international body which would move toward assumption of an administrative role with respect to outer space activities. Dr. Dryden expressed the view that it would be very difficult to establish a workable international agency for outer space cooperation and questioned whether the United Nations has operational capabilities which would permit it to play such a role. Mr. Cleveland agreed that most problems of international administration have become tremendously complex, but he cited the successful operation of the European Coal and Steel Community and expressed the conviction that this is the kind of approach that will be called for in the field of outer space in the next twenty years. As far as United Nations capabilities are concerned, Mr. Cleveland pointed to the operation in the Congo as an example of its executive potential and drew attention to the relative success we have enjoyed in the Congo in contrast to the experience in other areas where we have relied on a unilateral approach.

Washington, July 17, 1961.

SUBJECT
Space Launcher Assistance to Other Countries

This Department, in close cooperation with Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, has formulated a proposed approach to answering queries from the Europeans about the degree to which we will assist them in the space launcher field. The urgency of replying to such queries is dictated by British efforts to persuade European countries to participate in the development of a space launcher using the British Blue Streak as the first stage, a French rocket as second stage, and possibly a German rocket as third stage.

We believe Blue Streak would be an unwise project for the Europeans because it would require large investments of money, time, and effort and would be obsolescent (although usable) by the time of its operational readiness. Moreover, its development might facilitate the acquisition by the Europeans of independent capabilities to develop and produce ballistic missiles.

Apart from the question of a French capability, the chance of an independent German nuclear capability could be increased since missiles are an essential and expensive part of such a capability. We believe that German entry into the nuclear weapons field would have profoundly divisive effects in NATO in addition to the other disadvantages of further national nuclear weapons capabilities: increased risk of war by accident or miscalculation, greater likelihood that any conventional clash would escalate quickly into nuclear war, lessened ability to have a controlled nuclear response, and heightened obstacles to arms control.

We would therefore propose to offer for sale certain United States space launchers (Scout and Thor), in order to offer other countries an alternative to the Blue Streak proposal as well as to assist in legitimate space science activities. We would carry out any sales in a manner which would minimize any contribution to the development of independent ballistic missiles capabilities.

I believe this approach would be consistent with your June 5 conversation with Prime Minister Macmillan. The record of that conversation indicates that it might be possible to give the French some military information, particularly about aircraft, and that this might be done ostensibly by the United Kingdom possibly in connection with a "European Space Project." We assume that this conversation should not be interpreted as contemplating any general relaxation of our policy against facilitating the acquisition of independent nuclear weapons delivery capabilities, including ballistic missiles, by other countries, or as representing an endorsement of the Blue Streak proposal.

If our interpretation above is in accord with your views, I recommend that you authorize me to proceed with an appropriate instruction to the United States Embassies in the countries concerned setting forth our approach to the sale of space launchers.

Dean Rusk

Washington, August 18, 1961.

This meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council was convened by the Chairman (Vice President Johnson) at 4:00 p.m. August 18, 1961 in Room 274 of the Executive Office Building. In addition to the Vice President, the principals attending the meeting were: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

Those who participated in the briefing were: Colonel Earl McFarland, Jr., representing the Intelligence Community; Dr. Harold Brown, representing the Department of Defense; Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, representing NASA.

Others present at the meeting were: Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency; Dr. Lawrence Kavanau, Department of Defense.

The Chairman opened this meeting of the Council with reference to some of the major actions which had been taken through the Space Council mechanism. He referred to the coordination of the new space program, which the President had sent to the Congress on May 25; the policy recommendations on communication satellites which the President had announced on July 24; and the development of the Government position on the West Ford project, which the President had approved on August 11. He then stated that, in addition to developing policy recommendations, he planned to have the Council meet from time to time to discuss some major aspect of the space program. He illustrated this point by reference to such topics as the lunar project, potentialities of nuclear power in space, the space position of the United States before the United Nations, and problems of management and interagency coordination in space matters.

The Chairman then announced that the purpose of this meeting was to examine this country's space position vis-a-vis that of the USSR.

The first portion of the briefing was devoted to intelligence information regarding the Soviet space program. It was pointed out that most of the hard evidence regarding their program was derived from knowledge of their actual accomplishments, while evidence regarding specific future shots and timing, as well as regarding their military space plans, was "soft." It was emphasized, however, that there was no question that since 1955, the Soviets had established a firm objective of manned interplanetary travel.

A chart was displayed to point out graphically the number of Soviet launchings and the approximate size of the payloads in each successful shot. It was noted that through mid-1960 all of the shots, including the ICBM tests, had been made from the same launching site. (This should not be interpreted to mean that the Soviets do not have a number of operational ICBM launching pads at various locations.) The figures displayed indicated 46 successful space orbits by the U.S. and 14 by the USSR. The approximate total payload weights were 55,000 pounds for the U.S., and 110,000 pounds for the USSR. At this point, it was stated that the individual shot capability was deemed more important than the number of successful shots.

Attention was directed to the following about the Soviet program: the steady rate of increase in payload weight from about 185 pounds in Sputnik I to about 14,000 pounds in Sputnik VII; estimated that by 1962 they might orbit 25,000 pounds, and by 1965 from 50 to 100 tons; they have used essentially the same booster thrust, with some question as to Sputnik I and II, and have used military vehicles for the larger vertical firings.

As for the military aspects of the USSR space program, it was pointed out that there was little evidence of their immediate intent to use space for military purposes, although there was always the capability with their large boosters. In this regard, it was suggested that there was less USSR need for many of the types of military space projects such as the ones we are developing. Hence, it appeared that they had done little in space for reconnaissance, early warning, communications, meteorology, or navigation. (These are all projects in which the United States has shown progress, and in some cases operational accomplishment.)

One view was expressed that the U.S. was ahead in space programs except for boosters. However, others pointed out that they were at least equal to us on guidance capabilities and had possibly done more in their bio-medical program. It was further added that we should not overlook their demonstration of manned multi-orbit flight and recovery.

Some of the broad features of the USSR space program are that they focus on few objectives; they aim toward actions which will build world prestige and give indications of strength; they have integrated their ICBM development and their space program, in a single disciplined management chain; they have been particularly adroit in obtaining propaganda value on their space activities, in building a world image of military strength and technical competence; and ability to orbit large payloads, giving implication of growing capability toward using man in space for maintenance of space vehicles, for intercepting satellites of other nations, and in possibly demonstrating bombardment competence. (In regard to this latter, it was pointed out that this would be more of a threat than an efficient method for bombing.)

The comparison of U.S. and USSR space programs also brought out the following points regarding space science: (a) the Soviets failed to capitalize on their early fast start, particularly Sputnik III. This was contrasted to their outstanding achievements in technology as represented by their Luniks and the manned flights. (b) The average quality of scientific research is about the same in both countries, although nearly all of the highly original work has come from the United States. (c) The U.S. has led in the publication of scientific papers by a ratio of about 6 to 1, although there is some indication that the USSR plans to release more of its scientific data. (d) The openness and international cooperativeness features of our program have been difficult for the Soviets to counter. This may cause them to be more generous in the public exposure of their work, although there is little evidence that they are withholding much substantive scientific information. (e) Their ability to launch large payloads enables them to perform more comprehensive planetary probe experiments than the U.S., and they will have advantage in this regard until we have larger boosters in operation. (f) They have done some research in hydrogen technology but are probably not as far advanced as the U.S. (g) There is limited evidence that they are engaged in atomic power technology for interplanetary payloads. Their earliest test flight is not expected before 1970.

The United States is expected to run behind the USSR in manned earth orbital flights for some time, because of our limited launch vehicle capability. How long this U.S. disadvantage will continue depends on the relative rates of the U.S.-USSR big launch vehicle programs. It is estimated, however, that we will have a successful manned round trip to the moon in the 1967-68 period, while intelligence data for a Soviet accomplishment of this nature is about 1970. The latter estimate, however, cannot be considered firm. It is believed, however, that the Lunar program is the point at which the U.S. has reason to hope to overtake the USSR.

In a more detailed exposition on the U.S. space accomplishments, the following points were made: (a) We have definite military requirements, and have made substantial progress in the reconnaissance, communications, early warning, navigation, weather, and rendezvous and inspection areas.

[1 line of source text not declassified] (It was pointed out that some space programs such as those in weather and communications, were also being developed outside the Department of Defense, but would also have value to the military.) (b) As for our large boosters, the Saturn first stage will be flight-tested this year, with a 3-stage C-1 in 1963; the F-1 will be qualified for flight in 1964; and the C-3 or the C-4 flight test will take place in 1965. (c) For military purposes, as for non-military purposes, larger payloads are always important, but for certain types of projects the rate of increase is of decreasing importance.

It was pointed out that there is a probable role for military men in space as well as for men in space for scientific and other purposes. The advantage of having men in a space vehicle is the opportunity to use judgment and to adapt to unprogrammed or unexpected conditions. To some extent this advantage is offset by the increased vulnerability of man and the substantial weight and additional equipment which needs to be given over to the problem of survivability. However, many of the problems of vulnerability also exist as regards advancing electronic systems or films in space vehicles. Reference was made to the Dina Soar as a manned military space project. It was pointed out that this needs to be given further careful examination, to ascertain the military reasons for the space flight reentry capability. Further on the military space side, it was pointed out that there is need of a capability to maintain complex electrical equipment of at least 5000 pounds in space for extended periods of time. Little value was given to the use of space vehicles for bombardment purposes. On this aspect of military use of space, some question was raised as to whether there was significant military importance to this competence and as to whether very large payloads in space were needed for defense. It was emphasized, however, that the R & D program should be maintained to make certain that we had the competence to meet all military space requirements. At this time, there is only one manned Lunar flight program, and that is under NASA management.

Brief reference was made to the relative percentages of the respective GNP's which are being devoted to space by the U.S. and the USSR. It was stated that the U.S. will be spending about .6 of 1% of its GNP in FY 1962 while the Soviets were undoubtedly spending "very much less." This latter was explained on the basis of their smaller number of shots, lesser variety of projects, highly integrated management structure, and economy on the number and use of launching facilities. [Note: The .6 of 1% reference was undoubtedly to new obligational authority, not spending, and was probably a little high even so. The GNP for FY 1962 should be close to $520 billion; the NOA for space is about $2.9 billion; and the expenditure estimate is about $2.4 billion. Hence, the percentages would approximate .56% (NOA) and .46% (exp.)]/2/

In the questions and discussion by the principals at the briefing, the following points were made: (a) Warning against spreading our resources too thinly and thereby creating inefficiency in the overall space program; (b) Statement of the Defense Department position to have the military concentrate on those projects of defense significance and not to have them duplicate or overlap with NASA; (c) Question of the adequacy as well as the fragmentation of our life sciences effort; (d) Coordination between NASA and DOD is excellent, with every intention to keep it that way; (e) Announcement that NASA is working actively to gear its organization to the new and accelerated space program; (f) Reaction of officials of other nations as to whether the U.S. should be spending upwards of $40 billion on a Lunar space effort was that the U.S. just had no choice but to spend the resources and try to win the race; (g) Substantial impetus given to the U.S. space efforts by the basic policy decisions made by the President and the increased funds approved by the Congress.

E.C. Welsh/3/
Executive Secretary

Washington, September 12, 1961.

Dear Mr. Webb:

Mr. Bowles' letter of April 17 called attention to the undesirability of launching Centaur over a trajectory involving hazard of possible impact in an extensive region of mid-continent Africa. Your acknowledgment of April 28 stated that political considerations would be taken into account./2/ I am now writing you to confirm the understanding on the Centaur program reached with your staff and to express our continuing interest in timely consultation respecting such matters.

On the basis of discussions with NASA staff we understand that a year's delay would be involved in changing launching trajectory and that such a delay is considered unacceptable by NASA because of the relationship of Centaur to the Saturn and Nova developments. We also understand the Centaur test program has been altered to include an initial ballistic flight which is to provide additional data before the first orbital attempt is made. According to NASA staff, there remains a chance of impact, but all practicable precautions will be taken.

It remains this Department's considered view that the United States must make every effort to hold to the minimum hazards to other countries arising from the conduct of our space programs. However, we appreciate that occasions will arise necessitating the use of launching trajectories not completely free of risk, and we are prepared to make exceptions where clearly necessary.

In the present case, we recognize that the key role of Centaur in our future space effort makes undesirable the further delay we are told would result from a change in trajectory. With this in mind and with the understanding that all precautions will be taken, this Department will not interpose objection to the two Centaur launchings planned for the mid-continent trajectory. Accordingly, we shall, as requested, seek arrangements so that Project Mercury facilities in Bermuda, the Canary Islands, and Australia can be employed in support of the Centaur tests. We have been informed that the other Mercury facilities will not be used.

Although we shall proceed as indicated, the information available to us points toward the conclusion that selection of the proposed trajectory was dictated by the location of existing NASA ground facilities rather than by mission and safety of flight considerations. In the circumstances, it seems clear that NASA should seek greater flexibility in its ground launching and support arrangements to make possible the avoidance of hazardous trajectories. If failure to achieve such flexibility should result in additional impacts in other countries, the political cost and the cost in possible limitations on our space activities would appear likely to outweigh the monetary costs involved.

Timely consultation is a crucial factor in minimizing problems such as the present one. We hope that as NASA proceeds with planning for the testing of new systems (such as Saturn, Nova, and Rover) and for new missions (lunar and interplanetary missions as well as further space research), this Department will be informed of such plans at a time which will permit any necessary changes to be made without undue program delays.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson/3/

Washington, February 23, 1962, 6:49 p.m.

1465. For Principal Officer. Department requests you arrange appointment with Foreign Minister or other appropriate official at your discretion to express deep gratification US Government and specifically National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for effective cooperation extended by host country in behalf Project Mercury manned space program. Successful orbital flight of astronaut just concluded due in no small degree presence tracking facilities in host countries. This participation by other lands in American space program deeply appreciated. Posts may wish stress again that Project Mercury is open peaceful scientific experiment designed further man's exploration of space and results of which available world. Posts may wish note that US will continue conduct its manned space program in open cooperation with other nations to benefit of mankind. You may wish inform officials US proposes launch manned space missions approximately every 60 to 90 days beginning April.

Department pouching text statements made US expressing gratification for participation your country in Project Mercury.

Rusk

Washington, March 13, 1962.

SUBJECT
Request for Highest National Priority for the Apollo Program

1. The programs that now enjoy the highest (DX) national priority are: Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris, BMEWS, Samos, Nike-Zeus, Discoverer, Mercury, and Saturn. Of these, the first eight are managed by the Department of Defense, and the last two by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The prescribed criteria under which the President has made these determinations is that these programs have objectives of key political, scientific, psychological or military import.

2. The NASA is requesting that the Apollo program be added to this list. Recognizing the need to restrict the number of projects on the list to the absolute minimum, NASA is prepared to drop Project Mercury from the list by the end of Calendar Year 1962, at which time its mission should be essentially complete. NASA will also expect to drop the Saturn vehicle project from the list except insofar as it pertains to the Apollo mission. In adding Apollo, the NASA would be requesting a DX priority for all of these elements of the Apollo program that are essential to its ultimate mission: to effect a manned lunar landing and return in this decade. The essential elements of the Apollo program would include development of the spacecraft and launch vehicles as well as the facilities which are required for their development, testing and use. Elements of certain other name projects would thus be included, such as Saturn and Gemini, but only insofar as they are directly applicable to the manned lunar landing.

3. Decisions on the assignment of highest national priority are made by the President and in the case of space program projects, he takes into consideration the advice of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Therefore, I ask that this matter be placed before the Council at an early date.

4. I shall be pleased to supply any further information you think is essential to the Council's consideration.

James E. Webb/2/

Washington, March 23, 1962.

Dear Mr. President:

At the National Aeronautics and Space Council meeting on March 21, 1962, consideration was given to the merits of assigning the highest (DX) priority to the Apollo space program. Administrator Webb had requested that this matter be taken up by the Council, so that appropriate recommendation might be made to the President.

It was made clear by Administrator Webb that, if such priority were assigned, it would be employed only to the extent necessary and only to those elements in the program which would otherwise be delayed in performance and which would consequently postpone a successful manned lunar flight. He stated further that NASA was prepared to remove the Mercury program from the DX priority list by the end of calendar year 1962, and also that the Agency planned to drop from such list all elements of the Saturn project, except those applicable to the Apollo program.

Based upon the premises referred to in the preceding paragraph, Defense and NASA urged that recommendation be made by the Council to the President that a DX priority be so assigned. State and AEC concurred, with the statements that they agreed with the urgency and importance of the program and had no objection to the assignment of a DX priority to it. The Chairman also expressed his agreement with these views.

In light of this unanimity, I respectfully advise that it is the sense and the recommendation of the Council that the highest (DX) national priority be assigned to the Apollo space program.

I do this with the expressed understanding that this recommendation is intended to be of assistance to you in this policy matter and is not a means to short-circuit or otherwise take the place of any essential procedures which may be required in the matter of assigning priorities.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, April 11, 1962.

TO
The Vice President (as Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Council)
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT
Assignment of Highest National Priority to the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Program

In response to a recommendation by the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which approved a proposal by the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency, the President under the authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950 today established the program listed below as being in the highest national priority category for research and development and for achieving operational capability.

Apollo (manned lunar landing program, including essential spacecraft, launch vehicles, and facilities).

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, June 7, 1962.

SUBJECT
Evolution of and Reflections on the U.S. Approach to Political Aspects of the Reconnaissance Satellite Program

I do not wish to burden a busy official with more reading matter. However, I thought you might find it at least of historical interest to review the attached papers,/2/ which relate to certain past stages in the development by the U.S. of its approach to political aspects of the reconnaissance satellite program. In this connection, I have summarized below, largely from memory, some of the principal developments in this regard and have offered some personal reflections on the matter.

Technical consideration of the potentialities of satellites for reconnaissance purposes dates back at least to 1946. However, in what may not unfairly be called a classic example of the lag of political planning behind technological developments, it was not until late 1958 and early 1959 that the Department of State began examining in some depth political aspects of the problem. By that time certain developments had already taken place which had set the framework which has affected the flexibility of political movement ever since.

As was the case with other space programs, the reconnaissance satellite program had derived substantial impetus from the successful demonstration by Sputnik I of the feasibility of placing satellites in orbit about the earth. What had previously been a single program was divided into three projects: Discoverer, Samos, and Midas. Treatment of Discoverer as an entirely developmental effort was probably helpful. However, a developmental effort involving over 30 launchings has not passed unnoticed, and Discoverer as well as Samos and Midas has been identified in the public press and by foreign propagandists as a "spy in the sky" program. This identification, particularly in the case of Samos, found support in public statements by military spokesmen and in official releases (see Tab A as an example of one of the least ostentatious of these public pronouncements). Finally, the program was oriented entirely to intelligence purposes rather than to a logical extension of space observation capabilities.

The first major political effort led to consideration within the government of a position calling for prohibition of "weapons" in orbit combined with "no weapons aboard" inspection and with affirmation of the right of transit of other types of space vehicles (including reconnaissance satellites). The position was rapidly rejected although it was later to emerge in modified form in the "no bombs in orbit" proposal of 1960.

During the summer of 1959, meetings of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space provided an opportunity to advance to a degree the concepts that the passage of satellites does not violate national sovereignty and that outer space is free for exploration and use. Both arguments became standard features of U.S. contingency position papers on the reconnaissance satellite program. A defensive approach was gradually elaborated including such features as argumentation that observation from space is permissible and desirable, noting a linkage between observation satellites and arms control and disarmament (see Tab B), drawing on "precedents" (such as Tiros and, subsequently, Titov's amateur photography) as they occurred, and contrasting the urgency of prohibiting the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit with the undesirability of attempting to prohibit observation of the earth from space. The foregoing represented essentially a collection of debating points rather than an attempt to meet basic issues.

The U-2 affair lent the then impending launch of the first experimental Samos a fearsome prospect, and an especially agonizing reappraisal of the U.S. approach to political aspects of the reconnaissance satellite program was conducted during the summer and early fall of 1960. The paper attached under Tab C was prepared by State Department staff and circulated for simultaneous consideration by higher officials within the Department and by other interested agencies. The position recommended by the paper (one of "responsible openness") was in due course rejected by the Department as well as other agencies. However, in my view, the issues outlined by the paper remain substantially the same today as two years ago except for the fact that an additional period of procrastination in facing up to basic issues has made the problem more difficult to resolve on a timely basis.

The approach finally adopted in 1960 is presented in the paper attached under Tab D. The central feature of the approach was to be an attempt to handle Samos "in extremely low key with minimum disclosure." The experimental character of the program was to be emphasized (as it had been with a degree of success in the case of the Discoverer program) and achievement of an operational capability was to be presented as a distant possibility rather than an imminent reality. Only limited public statements were to be made, but these were to be factual in character in order to avoid replaying at least part of the U-2 scenario. The product of the program was to be in the hands of the intelligence community absent specific contrary decision by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of CIA. The approach was inaugurated upon the first attempted Samos launching (see Tab E). As it turned out, the first attempt failed, and the schedule slipped to the extent the new administration found itself confronted with a Samos launching during its first weeks of office.

From the outset, the present administration clearly believed that too much had been said about the program by military spokesmen (which was correct) and initiated a trend toward even less disclosure than that contemplated under the 1960 approach. This trend ultimately led not to an approach of remaining silent about launchings but of refusing to identify what object had been launched. It is not clear why it was believed that such an approach would be politically advantageous. In any case, as you know, this approach ran head on into the simultaneous U.S. effort at the UN to inaugurate a procedure for registering space vehicles.

It will be clear that the foregoing account is necessarily limited by the extent of my involvement in staff level consideration of this problem. However, I believe the main trends are accurately identified.

Under the continuing impact of the U-2 affair, political handling of the reconnaissance satellite program has to date reflected primarily the desire to avoid in the short-term precipitating a similar direct clash with the Soviet Union. The goal is an understandable but not necessarily an attainable one. In view of the basic conflict of interests involved, it has always been questionable how long a clash could be postponed. However, the approach taken by the U.S. can be said to have bought time but possibly at the expense of placing the program on a sounder long-term footing.

The Soviet Union appears to have faced up to the issue sooner than the U.S. and to have embarked on a political offensive against reconnaissance satellites. At the time of this writing, it remains to be seen whether (or perhaps more accurately when) this offensive will be carried to the point of a major clash. Although we have no interest in hastening such a clash, it would be illogical for us to continue to refrain from taking steps to place the program in a more defensible position if such steps can be developed and implemented in a manner calculated to place the least strain on our relations with the Soviet Union.

If the reconnaissance satellite program could have been conducted entirely in secret, that might have been the safest approach. The steps that would be required to achieve complete secrecy now would be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out with credibility. In the long-term, steps in this direction would be headed for collision with arms control and disarmament arrangements affecting outer space and involving the inspection of space vehicles.

Even if apparently practical steps toward increased secrecy could be devised, they would involve certain hazards. We would be fighting on the Soviet Union's terms rather than our own by acting as if we accepted their view that the activities involved were not legitimate. Moreover, we are always embarrassed when we are "caught in the act", a handicap the Soviet Union does not share. Our conscience plagues us, and we are likely to border on incoherence or actually to become incoherent, as in the U-2 affair. If we need to undertake certain types of activities, we ought to conduct them, where possible, in the manner we feel most comfortable about. We are generally somewhat ill at ease with excessive secrecy. It may be a flaw in our national character, but it is there nonetheless.

In the long-term conflict with the Soviet Union, "openness" would seem as a general matter to be advantageous to the United States. Obviously, we cannot conduct all activities openly, but where we can (or where we can approach "openness"), we relieve ourselves of some of the burdens outlined above, act more consistently with our political and social philosophy, and provide an effective contrast with the Soviet way of doing things. Moreover, although we are not likely to pry the Soviet Union away from its philosophy of secrecy, it would seem in our interest to do what we can to convince it that the trend is in the direction of "openness". As long as we remain on the defensive in the reconnaissance satellite field, we cannot play what might in time prove to be one of our best cards in this game, and the Soviet Union can feel warm, if not completely safe, in its cocoon. We do not want to arouse fear, but it might be helpful if the tenant of the cocoon were to become gradually aware that its hiding place is exposed to the sun.

The problem, of course, would be to develop in considerable detail (sufficient for fair assessment) an operational approach which might enable us to move, in low-key, toward gradually increasing openness in the conduct of "observation" satellite programs. Under such an approach, observation from space would be emphasized. Military intelligence would not be curtailed but would be derivative rather than paramount. The unfolding of capabilities would take place at a deliberate pace. The issues confronting us today in both forums in Geneva we will have to deal with as best we can. But I hope the present review will provide an opportunity to consider possibly more constructive alternatives for the future.

Washington, July 10, 1962.

RECOMMENDED POLICY

1. The United States should maintain the legal position that the principles of international law and the UN Charter apply to activities in outer space and, specifically, that outer space is free, as are the high seas.

2. The US should therefore continue to avoid any position implying that reconnaissance activities in outer space are not legitimate. Similarly, we should avoid any position declaring or implying that such activities are not "peaceful uses."

3. The US should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance" satellites, and where appropriate use instead such broader and more neutral terms as "observation" or "photographic" satellites.

4. Further studies should be made on an urgent basis to determine whether there are releaseable data, such as mapping information, or procedures such as occasionally calling Tiros and Nimbus vehicles "photographic" satellites, which would help create wider public acceptance of space observation and photography.

5. NASA should study urgently the possibilities of accelerating bilateral international cooperation to develop non-military space activities involving space observation, perhaps including photography.

6. It is recognized that the US cannot entirely avoid or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, so that where feasible the US should also seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the legitimacy of space reconnaissance.

7. When confronted by specific Soviet pressure to outlaw reconnaissance activities in space, the US should continue to take a public stand for the legitimacy of the principle of reconnaissance from outer space, the precise form and extent of which would depend upon the circumstances of the confrontation.

8. The US should not at this time attempt to conduct a truly clandestine program (by which we mean a program with covert and unregistered launchings, and public denial that the US is engaged in reconnaissance). However, the US should pursue the research and development for a stand-by capability for clandestine operations in case circumstances ever make such operations necessary.

9. The present practice of not identifying individual military space launchings by mission or purpose is sound. We believe, however, that there should also be a more open (but not more detailed) public reference to the general over-all military program. An appropriate nickname for public identification should be given to the over-all military program, with its objectives intentionally stated in broad and general terms. All military launchings would be described in terms of the general objectives of the over-all military program. No specific mission would be ascribed to any particular launch.

10. The US should not, at this time, publicly disclose the status, extent, effectiveness or operational characteristics of its reconnaissance program.

11. Strict control over public statements and backgrounding concerning reconnaissance satellites should be exercised to ensure consistency with the policy guidelines suggested in these recommendations.

12. No public attention should be directed toward development of anti-satellite capabilities, and any publicized demonstration of developmental work and any actual test of such a capability should require White House approval, with full account given to the adverse effects for our reconnaissance satellite program. We should avoid any indications that physical countermeasures to reconnaissance vehicles would be justified, and as appropriate the US should make a positive effort to propagate the idea that interference with or attacks on any space vehicle of another country in peacetime are inadmissible and illegal.

13. The US should discreetly disclose to certain allies and neutrals selected information with regard to the US space reconnaissance program, making each disclosure orally and at a time and in a manner that will preserve the essential security of our program while impressing upon them its importance for the security of the Free World. Disclosures should be made in a manner that will preclude acquisition by the Communist Bloc of usable evidence of an official US acknowledgment that we are conducting a satellite reconnaissance program. Proposals for such disclosures should include clearance by the National Reconnaissance Office.

14. The US should in private disclosures emphasize the fact of our determination and ability to pursue such programs because of their great importance to our common security, despite any efforts to dissuade us.

15. The US should note in connection with private disclosures that, except in some cases for specifically defined disarmament agreements, the US cannot agree to (a) declarations of the precise purpose of all satellites, (b) declarations of the equipment of all satellites, (c) general requirements for advance notification of all satellite launchings and the tracks of satellites, (d) pre-launch inspection of the satellites, or (e) a specific definition of peaceful uses of space which does not embrace unlimited observation.

16. The possible roles of space reconnaissance in disarmament inspection arrangements or in creating military stability should be further studied.

17. The US should stand by the disarmament proposal for a provision in Stage One of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament banning weapons of mass destruction from being carried in satellites, and providing for advance notification and inspection of all missile and space launchings to insure that ban. The US should continue to exclude any ban on reconnaissance satellites.