Washington, September 7, 1962.

SUBJECT
Cooperation with Europe in the Development and Production of Space Launch Vehicles

The recent establishment of the ten-nation European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the seven-nation European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)/2/ reflects European aspirations in the field of outer space and raises questions of long-range United States policy toward a potentially vigorous and sustained European effort in space science and technology. Current US policy foresees, and NASA has already offered, cooperation with ESRO in space research as well as in launching its satellite experiments. There are many indications, however, that the Europeans will not be content, for economic and political reasons as well as for considerations of prestige, to continue to be dependent upon US launch vehicles. We have been told specifically that ESRO planning looks to the launching of European-developed space satellites by European-built launch vehicles as soon as technically possible. ELDO, with its mandate to develop a European space launch vehicle, is the most obvious expression of this determination. We believe, therefore, that the United States must look beyond cooperation with ESRO to the more complicated question of our cooperation with ELDO in the development of European launch vehicle technology.

The formation of ESRO and particularly of ELDO (despite US offers to supply launch vehicles for the scientific payloads of individual European countries) reflects the force of European determination to mount an active space program and to develop an indigenous capability not dependent upon US technology and US launch vehicles. In addition to considerations of prestige and pride, there is widespread view among European industrial and government leaders that space technology is a frontier of modern industry and of applied science which cannot be left unexploited, if the dynamics of European industry and science are to be maintained in the future. Visits to the United States by representatives of European industry and reports from representatives of American industry abroad point to an impressive level of enthusiasm, activity, and technical progress. It is clear that the Europeans intend to forge ahead in this new technology.

The military implications of a growing European space capability are inescapable, given the fact that the technology of launch vehicles for placing satellites in orbit can be applied in varying degrees to the development of missiles. The extent to which this application will actually occur will depend in part on the general direction in which European space technology develops. It is during the present stage of initial formulation of the European effort that the United States has the best opportunity to influence the direction of that effort, not only toward projects less directly related to military applications, but also toward an integrated, multinational program which would reinforce our broad policy objectives in Europe in other fields. If we exhibit now a willingness to cooperate, it may also be possible to steer the European Community toward a capability in space technology which would complement our own (i.e., one which would avoid duplication of our efforts and would encourage the most effective use of limited Western scientific and industrial resources).

If, however, we stand aloof from the development of European space technology, the Europeans will clearly go it alone. Their capability for doing so is unquestioned. There is considerable evidence that they already possess a large body of knowledge gained from our technical literature, from visits to and from American industry and space laboratories, from exchange of information between American and European industrial representatives, from US military contracts, from the Blue Streak technology, and from their own growing efforts. (A summary of European programs in this field is attached at Tab B.)/3/

Given such an informational base and the enthusiasm displayed in industrial, scientific and engineering circles, there is no doubt that the Europeans will develop an independent space technology. At the same time, despite the fact that the Europeans realize that they must to some extent enter this new field of technology from the ground up, they hope that they may build upon experience already extant in the United States so as to avoid useless duplication and to make it possible for them to advance the over-all Western capability at an early stage. Cooperation to this end in the foundation of an independent European Community capability in space technology would be consistent with our broader goals in Europe. It would parallel the similar developments which we are encouraging in the field of nuclear energy.

The United States has welcomed the formation of ESRO and has indicated its willingness to cooperate with the Organization in the space sciences as well as to provide launch assistance for the Organization's experiments. We have not been enthusiastic about the separate establishment of ELDO since its initial program calls for the development of a space launch vehicle which will largely duplicate existing US vehicles. We have agreed, however, to assist ELDO indirectly in one respect, i.e., we have agreed that the British may pass on to the other members of the Organization certain data (other than information on guidance and re-entry) which we had previously provided to the British and which they have used in the development of the Blue Streak missile (Blue Streak was developed initially by the British as a prototype intermediate-range ballistic missile, but is now to be converted into the first stage of the proposed three-stage ELDO space launch vehicle.)

US policy limits cooperation in space launch technology to that which would not significantly enhance any national ballistic missile delivery capability. As a practical matter, however, no specific guidelines have been agreed as to what areas of cooperation would be permissible; nor has the question whether some cooperation of this sort would be desirable been considered carefully in the broader context of over-all policy toward the European Community. Such guidance is being sought by NASA and by representatives of the American aero-space industry. In the absence of specific guidelines reflecting an over-all policy, we have had to deal with requests for cooperation or assist-ance in this field on an ad hoc basis, applying as the over-riding criterion for decision in each case the lowest common denominator (i.e., the question whether such a release or license approval would appear to assist in any way the development of a national missile delivery capability) without regard to other desiderata or policy considerations. Reliance on this procedure is not only inadequate for NASA and our own industry, but precludes any advantageous initiative on our part and forces us to stand aside from these European developments. It creates the impression that we are unable to cooperate or that our cooperation is grudging at best.

There is attached at Tab A for your consideration a suggested draft United States Position on Cooperation with Europe in the Development and Production of Space Launch Vehicles./4/ It reaffirms our own national interest in such cooperation, sets forth criteria for judging the general acceptability of any proposed area of cooperation, and charges the Department in conjunction with NASA and the Department of Defense to identify specific projects involving space launch technology which would contribute to Atlantic Community aims and would not at the same time contribute significantly to the development of national military missile capabilities.

Washington, November 30, 1962.

Dear Mr. President:

At the close of our meeting on November 21, concerning possible acceleration of the manned lunar landing program, you requested that I describe for you the priority of this program in our over-all civilian space effort. This letter has been prepared by Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and myself to express our views on this vital question.

The objective of our national space program is to become pre-eminent in all important aspects of this endeavor and to conduct the program in such a manner that our emerging scientific, technological, and operational competence in space is clearly evident.

To be pre-eminent in space, we must conduct scientific investigations on a broad front. We must concurrently investigate geophysical phenomena about the earth, analyze the sun's radiation and its effect on earth, explore the moon and the planets, make measurements in interplanetary space, and conduct astronomical measurements.

To be pre-eminent in space, we must also have an advancing technology that permits increasingly large payloads to orbit the earth and to travel to the moon and the planets. We must substantially improve our propulsion capabilities, must provide methods for delivering large amounts of internal power, must develop instruments and life support systems that operate for extended periods, and must learn to transmit large quantities of data over long distances.

To be pre-eminent in operations in space, we must be able to launch our vehicles at prescribed times. We must develop the capability to place payloads in exact orbits. We must maneuver in space and rendezvous with cooperative spacecraft and, for knowledge of the military potentials, with uncooperative spacecraft. We must develop techniques for landing on the moon and the planets, and for re-entry into the earth's atmosphere at increasingly high velocities. Finally, we must learn the process of fabrication, inspection, assembly, and check-out that will provide vehicles with life expectancies in space measured in years rather than months. Improved reliability is required for astronaut safety, long duration, scientific measurements, and for economical meteorological and communications systems.

In order to carry out this program, we must continually up-rate the competence of Government research and flight centers, industry, and universities, to implement their special assignments and to work together effectively toward common goals. We also must have effective working relationships with many foreign countries in order to track and acquire data from our space vehicles and to carry out research projects of mutual interest and to utilize satellites for weather forecasting and world-wide communications.

Manned Lunar Landing Program

NASA has many flight missions, each directed toward an important aspect of our national objective. The manned lunar landing program requires for its successful completion many, though not all, of these flight missions. Consequently, the manned lunar landing program provides currently a natural focus for the development of national capability in space and, in addition, will provide a clear demonstration to the world of our accomplishments in space. The program is the largest single effort within NASA, constituting three-fourths of our budget, and is being executed with the utmost urgency. All major activities of NASA, both in headquarters and in the field, are involved in this effort, either partially or full time.

In order to reach the moon, we are developing a launch vehicle with a payload capability 85 times that of the present Atlas booster. We are developing flexible manned spacecraft capable of sustaining a crew of three for periods up to 14 days. Technology is being advanced in the areas of guidance and navigation, re-entry, life support, and structures-in short, almost all elements of booster and spacecraft technology.

The lunar program is an extrapolation of our Mercury experience. The Gemini spacecraft will provide the answers to many important technological problems before the first Apollo flights. The Apollo program will commence with earth orbital maneuvers and culminate with the one-week trip to and from the lunar surface. For the next five to six years there will be many significant events by which the world will judge the competence of the United States in space.

The many diverse elements of the program are now being scheduled in the proper sequence to achieve this objective and to emphasize the major milestones as we pass them. For the years ahead, each of these tasks must be carried out on a priority basis.

Although the manned lunar landing requires major scientific and technological effort, it does not encompass all space science and technology, nor does it provide funds to support direct applications in meteorological and communications systems. Also, university research and many of our international projects are not phased with the manned lunar program, although they are extremely important to our future competence and posture in the world community.

Space Science

As already indicated, space science includes the following distinct areas: geophysics, solar physics, lunar and planetary science, interplanetary science, astronomy, and space biosciences.

At present, by comparison with the published information from the Soviet Union, the United States clearly leads in geophysics, solar physics, and interplanetary science. Even here, however, it must be recognized that the Russians have within the past year launched a major series of geophysical satellites, the results of which could materially alter the balance. In astronomy, we are in a period of preparation for significant advances, using the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory which is now under development. It is not known how far the Russian plans have progressed in this important area. In space biosciences and lunar and planetary science, the Russians enjoy a definite lead at the present time. It is therefore essential that we push forward with our own programs in each of these important scientific areas in order to retrieve or maintain our lead, and to be able to identify those areas, unknown at this time, where an added push can make a significant break-through.

A broad-based space science program provides necessary support to the achievement of manned space flight leading to lunar landing. The successful launch and recovery of manned orbiting spacecraft in Project Mercury depended on knowledge of the pressure, temperature, density, and composition of the high atmosphere obtained from the nation's previous scientific rocket and satellite program. Considerably more space science data are required for the Gemini and Apollo projects. At higher altitudes than Mercury, the spacecraft will approach the radiation belt through which man will travel to reach the moon. Intense radiation in this belt is a major hazard to the crew. Information on the radiation belt will determine the shielding requirements and the parking orbit that must be used on the way to the moon.

Once outside the radiation belt, on a flight to the moon, a manned spacecraft will be exposed to bursts of high speed protons released from time to time from flares on the sun. These bursts do not penetrate below the radiation belt because they are deflected by the earth's magnetic field, but they are highly dangerous to man in interplanetary space.

The approach and safe landing of manned spacecraft on the moon will depend on more precise information on lunar gravity and topography. In addition, knowledge of the bearing strength and roughness of the landing site is of crucial importance, lest the landing module topple or sink into the lunar surface.

Many of the data required for support of the manned lunar landing effort have already been obtained, but as indicated above there are many crucial pieces of information still unknown. It is unfortunate that the scientific program of the past decade was not sufficiently broad and vigorous to have provided us with most of these data. We can learn a lesson from this situation, however, and proceed now with a vigorous and broad scientific program not only to provide vital support to the manned lunar landing, but also to cover our future requirements for the continued development of manned flight in space, for the further exploration of space, and for future applications of space knowledge and technology to practical uses.

Advanced Research and Technology

The history of modern technology has clearly shown that pre-eminence in a given field of endeavor requires a balance between major projects which apply the technology, on the one hand, and research which sustains it on the other. The major projects owe their support and continuing progress to the intellectual activities of the sustaining research. These intellectual activities in turn derive fresh vigor and motivation from the projects. The philosophy of providing for an intellectual activity of research and an interlocking cycle of application must be a cornerstone of our National Space Program.

The research and technology information which was established by the NASA and its predecessor, the NACA, has formed the foundation for this nation's pre-eminence in aeronautics, as exemplified by our military weapons systems, our world market in civil jet airliners, and the unmatched manned flight within the atmosphere represented by the

X-15. More recently, research effort of this type has brought the TFX concept to fruition and similar work will lead to a supersonic transport which will enter a highly competitive world market. The concept and design of these vehicles and their related propulsion, controls, and structures were based on basic and applied research accomplished years ahead. Government research laboratories, universities, and industrial research organizations were necessarily brought to bear over a period of many years prior to the appearance before the public of actual devices or equipment.

These same research and technological manpower and laboratory resources of the nation have formed a basis for the U.S. thrust toward pre-eminence in space during the last four years. The launch vehicles, spacecraft, and associated systems including rocket engines, reaction control systems, onboard power generation, instrumentation and equipment for communications, television and the measurement of the space environment itself have been possible in this time period only because of past research and technological effort. Project Mercury could not have moved as rapidly or as successfully without the information provided by years of NACA and later NASA research in providing a base of technology for safe re-entry heat shields, practical control mechanisms, and life support systems.

It is clear that a pre-eminence in space in the future is dependent upon an advanced research and technology program which harnesses the nation's intellectual and inventive genius and directs it along selective paths. It is clear that we cannot afford to develop hardware for every approach but rather that we must select approaches that show the greatest promise of payoff toward the objectives of our nation's space goals. Our research on environmental effects is strongly focused on the meteoroid problem in order to provide information for the design of structures that will insure their integrity through space missions. Our research program on materials must concentrate on those materials that not only provide meteoroid protection but also may withstand the extremely high temperatures which exist during re-entry as well as the extremely low temperatures of cryogenic fuels within the vehicle structure. Our research program in propulsion must explore the concepts of nuclear propulsion for early 1970 applications and the even more advanced electrical propulsion systems that may become operational in the mid-1970's. A high degree of selectivity must be and is exercised in all areas of research and advanced technology to ensure that we are working on the major items that contribute to the nation's goals that make up an over-all pre-eminence in space exploration. Research and technology must precede and pace these established goals or a stagnation of progress in space will inevitably result.

Space Applications

The manned lunar landing program does not include our satellite applications activities. There are two such program areas under way and supported separately: meteorological satellites and communications satellites. The meteorological satellite program has developed the Tiros system, which has already successfully orbited six spacecraft and which has provided the foundation for the joint NASA-Weather Bureau planning for the national operational meteorological satellite system. This system will center on the use of the Nimbus satellite which is presently under development, with an initial research and development flight expected at the end of 1963. The meteorological satellite developments have formed an important position for this nation in international discussions of peaceful uses of space technology for world benefits.

NASA has underway a research and development effort directed toward the early realization of a practical communication satellite system. In this area, NASA is working with the Department of Defense on the Syncom (stationary, 24-hour orbit, communications satellite) project in which the Department of Defense is providing ground station support for NASA's spacecraft development; and with commercial interests, for example, AT&T on the Telstar project. The recent "Communications Satellite Act of 1962" makes NASA responsible for advice to and cooperation with the new Communications Satellite Corporation, as well as for launching operations for the research and/or operational needs of the Corporation. The details of such procedures will have to be defined after the establishment of the Corporation. It is clear, however, that this tremendously important application of space technology will be dependent on NASA's support for early development and implementation.

University Participation

In our space program, the university is the principal institution devoted to and designed for the production, extension, and communication of new scientific and technical knowledge. In doing its job, the university intimately relates the training of people to the knowledge acquisition process of research. Further, they are the only institutions which produce more trained people. Thus, not only do they yield fundamental knowledge, but they are the sources of the scientific and technical manpower needed generally for NASA to meet its program objectives.

In addition to the direct support of the space program and the training of new technical and scientific personnel, the university is uniquely qualified to bring to bear the thinking of multidisciplinary groups on the present-day problems of economic, political, and social growth. In this regard, NASA is encouraging the universities to work with local industrial, labor, and governmental leaders to develop ways and means through which the tools developed in the space program can also be utilized by the local leaders in working on their own growth problems. This program is in its infancy, but offers great promise in the working out of new ways through which economic growth can be generated by the spin-off from our outer space and related research and technology.

International Activity

The National Space Program also serves as the base for international projects of significant technical and political value. The peaceful purposes of these projects have been of importance in opening the way for overseas tracking and data acquisition sites necessary for manned flight and other programs which, in many cases, would otherwise have been unobtainable. Geographic areas of special scientific significance have been opened to cooperative sounding rocket ventures of immediate technical value. These programs have opened channels for the introduction of new instrumentation and experiments reflecting the special competence and talent of foreign scientists. The cooperation of other countries-indispensable to the ultimate achievement of communication satellite systems and the allocation of needed radio frequencies-has been obtained in the form of overseas ground terminals contributed by those countries. International exploitation and enhancement of the meteorological experiments through the synchronized participation of some 35 foreign nations represent another by-product of the applications program and one of particular interest to the less developed nations, including the neutrals, and even certain of the Soviet bloc satellite nations.

These international activities do not in most cases require special funding: indeed, they have brought participation resulting in modest savings. Nevertheless, this program of technical and political value can be maintained only as a extension of the underlying on-going programs, many of which are not considered part of the manned lunar landing program, but of importance to space science and direct applications.

Summary and Conclusion

In summarizing the views which are held by Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and myself, and which have guided our joint efforts to develop the National Space Program, I would emphasize that the manned lunar landing program, although of highest national priority, will not by itself create the pre-eminent position we seek. The present interest of the United States in terms of our scientific posture and increasing prestige, and our future interest in terms of having an adequate scientific and technological base for space activities beyond the manned lunar landing, demand that we pursue an adequate, well-balanced space program in all areas, including those not directly related to the manned lunar landing. We strongly believe that the United States will gain tangible benefits from such a total accumulation of basic scientific and technological data as well as from the greatly increased strength of our educational institutions. For these reasons, we believe it would not be in the nation's long-range interest to cancel or drastically curtail on-going space science and technology development programs in order to increase the funding of the manned lunar landing program in fiscal year 1963.

The fiscal year 1963 budget for major hardware development and flight missions not part of the manned lunar landing program, as well as the university program, totals $400 million. This is the amount which the manned space flight program is short. Cancellation of this effort would eliminate all nuclear developments, our international sounding rocket projects, the joint U.S.-Italian San Marcos project recently signed by Vice President Johnson, all of our planetary and astronomical flights, and the communication and meteorological satellites. It should be realized that savings to the Government from this cancellation would be a small fraction of this total since considerable effort has already been expended in fiscal year 1963. However, even if the full amount could be realized, we would strongly recommend against this action.

In aeronautical and space research, we now have a program underway that will insure that we are covering the essential areas of the "unknown." Perhaps of one thing only can we be certain; that the ability to go into space and return at will increases the likelihood of new basic knowledge on the order of the theory that led to nuclear fission.

Finally, we believe that a supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1963 is not nearly so important as to obtain for fiscal year 1964 the funds needed for the continued vigorous prosecution of the manned lunar landing program ($4.6 billion) and for the continuing development of our program in space science ($670 million), advanced research and technology ($263 million), space application ($185 million), and advanced manned flight including nuclear propulsion ($485 million). The funds already appropriated permit us to maintain a driving, vigorous program in the manned space flight area aimed at a target date of late 1967 for the lunar landing. We are concerned that the efforts required to pass a supplemental bill through the Congress, coupled with Congressional reaction to the practice of deficiency spending, could adversely affect our appropriations for fiscal year 1964 and subsequent years, and permit critics to focus on such items as charges that "overruns stem from poor management" instead of on the tremendous progress we have made and are making.

As you know, we have supplied the Bureau of the Budget complete information on the work that can be accomplished at various budgetary levels running from $5.2 billion to $6.6 billion for fiscal year 1964. We have also supplied the Bureau of the Budget with carefully worked out schedules showing that approval by you and the Congress of a 1964 level of funding of $6.2 billion together with careful husbanding and management of the $3.7 billion appropriated for 1963 would permit maintenance of the target dates necessary for the various milestones required for a final target date for the lunar landing of late 1967. The jump from $3.7 billion for 1963 to $6.2 billion for 1964 is undoubtedly going to raise more questions than the previous year jump from $1.8 billion to $3.7 billion.

If your budget for 1964 supports our request for $6.2 billion for NASA, we feel reasonably confident we can work with the committees and leaders of Congress in such a way as to secure their endorsement of your recommendation and the incident appropriations. To have moved in two years from President Eisenhower's appropriation request for 1962 of $1.1 billion to the approval of your own request for $1.8 billion, then for $3.7 billion for 1963 and on to $6.2 billion for 1964 would represent a great accomplishment for your administration. We see a risk that this will be lost sight of in charges that the costs are skyrocketing, the program is not under control, and so forth, if we request a supplemental in fiscal year 1963.

However, if it is your feeling that additional funds should be provided through a supplemental appropriation request for 1963 rather than to make the main fight for the level of support of the program on the basis of the $6.2 billion request for 1964, we will give our best effort to an effective presentation and effective use of any funds provided to speed up the manned lunar program.

With much respect, believe me

Sincerely yours,

James E. Webb/2/

Washington, January 10, 1963.

SUBJECT
Need for DOD-NASA Coordination and Consolidation in Earth-Orbit Space Activities

At the present time the United States is supporting two more or less independent and growing efforts in the development of earth-orbit space capabilities. These include both the near term developments of DynaSoar and Gemini and the longer term development of orbiting space stations for research and reconnaissance purposes. I believe that earth orbit activities will become an increasingly important and costly part of both the military and scientific space efforts, therefore we should make a major effort to unify them now before we become further committed to two large programs.

In addition to the long-term desirability of a single effort, there are a number of possible short-term gains which would be worthwhile. These would include the savings made possible by a major cutback in the DynaSoar program, which would be possible if the Air Force were given a significant role in the Gemini program, and some relief from the technical manpower needs of NASA. Furthermore, I am convinced that you will be increasingly faced with criticism for allowing this duplication to persist. In this memorandum I present a series of arguments for assigning a major responsibility in this area to the Air Force, as follows:

1) There be created a joint NASA-DOD development effort for development of an earth orbiting space station as a national space program facility and that the DOD be the executive agent for the program.

2) Arrangements be initiated for a major investment of the DOD, including funding, in the Gemini program and that the DynaSoar effort be collaterally reprogrammed to a small fraction of its current level.

I believe that Secretaries McNamara and Gilpatric would concur in the desirability of these proposals and support such an effort. Mr. Webb would also agree on the philosophical desirability of such steps, but probably would vigorously oppose such a proposal because of his past experiences with the Air Force, because of the problems which may be created for the tracking network, and because of the peaceful image problem which he believes would be created by the direct involvement of the DOD. There is more than a little justification for his attitude.

During the last few days there have been discussions between Secretary McNamara and Mr. Webb regarding joint support of Gemini. While this would be less sweeping than I regard as desirable, it would nonetheless be an important start in changing the present trend. It is important to move rapidly if we are to affect the Gemini program.

Attention is focused in this memorandum on only four components of the National Space Program; two in NASA and two in DOD. Although other projects could no doubt be included in this analysis, those to be described below are probably the largest in the resources required and in their potential importance for growth of general technological capability for manned space flight.

a) Gemini (NASA). Intended to provide long-duration experience (up to two weeks) with manned flights in earth orbit and to develop rendezvous, docking, and controlled land landing techniques. Because of overlapping time schedules, the development of Apollo rendezvous and docking technology will proceed largely independently of Gemini.

b) DynaSoar (USAF--X-20). Principal objectives are to demonstrate flexible, controlled recovery and landing from space flight, to test vehicle equipment, and to explore man's functions in near earth space flight. Because the X-20 is a winged vehicle, its development is substantially more difficult than that of spacecraft such as Gemini, and the effective orbital payload for a given launch capability is substantially smaller. On the other hand, it would be maneuverable during re-entry, capable of choosing a landing site over a large area, and to execute a landing, more or less, as a conventional aircraft.

c) Military Orbital Development System ("MODS" USAF-648C). The objective is to provide a manned, long-duration orbital base for the conduct of military tests and experiments, under laboratory conditions, in the space environment. The base would be assembled from modules delivered to orbit by the Titan III, and serviced by modified Gemini-type personnel carriers.

d) Manned Space Station (NASA). The objective (as in MODS, above) is to provide a near earth capability for conducting experiments in space, and for testing of spacecraft components. In addition, the station would be used for "maintaining and refueling spacecraft engaged in lunar and deepspace missions." The Space Station would be orbited by a Saturn C-5 rocket, and would have a supply and personnel transfer system based on a variety of launch vehicles as required.

The present budgetary plans for the above four projects are as follows (to date, MODS has only been approved by the Headquarters, USAF Systems Review Board, and a request for emergency funding to conduct a "Phase I Program Definition" during 1963 is being forwarded to DOD):

	Fiscal Years (In Millions of Dollars)
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Gemini (NASA)	55	249	312	28	--
DynaSoar (DOD)	131	125	135	135	50
MODS (DOD)	15	125	324	179	37
Space Station (NASA)	--	4	10	150	350

Past experience would lead me to believe that projections for 1965 and later are probably low.

a) MODS--Manned Station. In general, a major problem in the development of useful and reliable space systems is the great difficulty in realistic reproduction in earth surface laboratories of the stresses due to extended space operations. There is little question that a most important step in accelerating technological development of systems suitable for prolonged space missions, manned or unmanned, will be in providing laboratory and testing facilities in earth orbit. The USAF proposal for a Military Orbital Development System (MODS) and the NASA plan for a Manned Space Station are both principally intended to provide such capabilities. However, it is difficult to see any differences in the basic requirements for an engineering space laboratory for the DOD or NASA--substantially the same technological problems involved in developing equipment suitable for extended operations in space will be met by both agencies, and the same will be true of crew conditioning and training problems. Accordingly, it seems clear that a single Manned Space Station Program, designed to meet all national needs, would be feasible.

Since both the DOD and NASA projects for a Space Station are now in their early planning stages, a decision at this time to the effect that a single development for all national needs will be undertaken would inhibit growth of parallel efforts in both agencies-and would insure future savings not only of funds, but of the relatively scarcer resources in technological and managerial skills.

In view of previous remarks, it would seem advisable that the DOD be assigned responsibility for this development. This step, aside from the important advantage of allowing greater NASA concentration of skills and energies on the Manned Lunar Landing Program, should also serve to advance the rate of growth in the technical maturity of military approaches to the space medium. In addition, it might also result in diminished political pressure for more vague and less rational approaches for expansion of military operations in space.

b) Gemini-DynaSoar. There seems to be general agreement that the use of space for reconnaissance and surveillance activities is a high-priority element of the DOD Space Program. More recently, such agreement has been extended to include communications, navigation and geodesy. Aside from these fairly well defined areas, there is little general agreement either as to the character of worthwhile missions or as to their suitability for DOD implementation.

However, if surveillance of Soviet territory is to be a high-priority element of the national space program, then it can be argued that U.S. surveillance of near-earth space should also have high priority. For example, it must be assumed that if, and as soon as, it becomes technically possible and militarily advantageous, the Soviet Union will use space for military purposes. The fact that no such purposes can now be described as probable is not an argument against research and development of the capabilities for defensive measures; it implies, rather, that such preparations must be flexible, non-specific and not on a crash basis--concerned, for example, with developing the technology of operations in space and the physical capability of discovering and identifying threats if and when these should appear. With respect to initial emphasis in such technological developments, it is now reasonable to say that: (1) development of rendezvous, docking, maneuver, and re-fueling techniques in earth orbit and of routine recovery from earth orbit are prerequisite objectives; (2) such operations must, at least initially, be based on the utilization of manned spacecraft since technical reliability and instrumentation considerations both imply that useful, fully automatic systems will probably take considerably longer to develop.

The current space program of the Department of Defense largely reflects the above line of argument; the purpose of the immediately following remarks is to focus it on the interaction between the DOD X-20 and NASA's Gemini projects.

The X-20 (DynaSoar) vehicle, in view of its relatively greater sophistication, will mature substantially later than Gemini. Moreover, it is not clear that boosters provided by the current national program will be able to support useful military operational versions of glider-type manned spacecraft in this decade. In view of the evident desirability of establishing at an early date the existence (if any) of military potential of manned applications in space reconnaissance and surveillance, the question naturally arises as to whether growth in national space capability would not be accelerated by diversion of technical effort (and funds) from the X-20 to Gemini, which should be available at least 18 months sooner than the X-20. Such diversion in addition to allowing earlier military experience in space, with rudimentary capability for controlled land landings, would complement and accelerate development of techniques for effective use of an orbiting space laboratory--particularly if responsibility for this program is assigned to DOD as suggested above.

Furthermore, because the Gemini project is not integrally related to the Apollo in any important technological respect, and the resources of NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center will obviously be strained to an increasing degree in Apollo technical management, the question must also be asked as to whether greater success in the national space program would be achieved by shifting part of the responsibility for Gemini from NASA to the DOD. In addition to direct management benefits, such reassignment of responsibility would enable more effective and rapid exploration of the military utility of the space medium, as well as have obvious domestic political advantages. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the USSR Space Program is entirely military in character, and because of recent increasingly frequent public utterances in the USSR about the importance of military applications in space, it would not seem likely that seriously damaging political criticism would result from such a step.

Jerry

Washington, February 18, 1963.

SUBJECT
NASA-DOD Project Gemini Agreement

SUMMARY

The recently concluded agreement between the DOD and NASA provides for certain participation in the NASA Project Gemini and as a consequence may pose certain questions. The following background and talking points are for the Missions' information and use in answering questions about the agreement.

On January 22 the Department of Defense and NASA announced that an agreement has been reached between the two agencies under which the Department of Defense will participate in the Gemini Program. Gemini, a two-man follow-up of the single-man Mercury manned space flight program is an experimental program to advance the technology of manned space flight, including rendezvous and docking, and to study the effect of weightlessness for a period of up to two weeks. This NASA-DOD agreement is intended to assure the most effective utilization of Project Gemini. It supplements the NASA-USAF management agreement that has been in effect since the spring of 1962 and which, among other things, provided space vehicle development support, Air Force assistance in contingency recovery of capsules, use of Air Force tracking facilities and the provision of logistic support. Under this new agreement, the Department of Defense will assist in the development, pilot training, pre-flight checkout, launch operations and flight operations of the Gemini Program so as to meet both DOD and NASA objectives. (Enclosure)/2/

Under the terms of the new agreement, NASA will continue to be responsible for managing the Gemini Project. A Gemini Program Planning Board has been established under the co-chairmanship of Dr. Robert Seamans, Associate Administrator for NASA and the Honorable Brockway McMillan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. Other Board Members are Mr. Brainerd Holmes, Deputy Associate Administrator (for Manned Space Flight Centers), NASA, Admiral W.F. Boone, USN (Ret), Deputy Associate Administrator (for Defense Affairs), NASA, Lt. General B.A. Schriever, USAF, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, and Dr. Lawrence Kavanau, Special Assistant (Space) to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. The Board will report jointly to the Administrator of NASA and to the Secretary of Defense. The Board will insure that the Gemini Program is planned, executed and utilized in the over-all national interest in accordance with policy direction of the Administrator of NASA and the Secretary of Defense, so as to avoid duplication of effort in the field of manned space flight.

FYI. As specified in the agreement, the US will utilize the Gemini for the acquisition of scientific and engineering data which, while of potential interest to our national security, has not been permitted to justify the establishment of a parallel program under military direction. End FYI.

The public announcement of the conclusion of this agreement may pose certain questions regarding international relations generally and in particular, the retention of certain foreign support which will be required for Mercury, Gemini, and other space projects.

Department, NASA and Defense unaware extent foreign press coverage given to foregoing agreement and whether unwarranted conclusions reached concerning nature DOD participation in program. Misimpressions that Gemini Program now being converted to military objectives could be particularly undesirable at present time when extension of manned flight tracking station agreements under urgent renegotiation.

Embassies should not take initiative at this time to discuss USAF participation in program, but should be guided by following points in responding any questions which may be raised:

a. Gemini objectives remain unchanged. Project is experimental program to advance technology of manned space flight, including rendezvous and docking, and to study effect weightlessness for periods up to two weeks.

b. As is well known, DOD has in past supported manned flight program through provision of test pilots as astronauts, astronaut recovery operations, boosters, availability of launch sites, and tracking by down-range instrumentation stations. The new agreement provides additional support.

c. Participation of DOD (which is, of course, civilian controlled) will not alter peaceful scientific and engineering character of Gemini program in future any more than in past.

d. NASA continues responsible for management Gemini Project, including planning for and operation of NASA tracking stations.

e. As in the case of the Mercury program, scientific data received from Gemini program will be made available to the world scientific community through customary channels.

f. The total U.S. space effort seeks to exploit to the fullest extent possible the national resources of the U.S. without duplication by individual agencies. The planned cooperation by NASA and DOD on Project Gemini is designed to accomplish this end.

Missions now engaged negotiations extension Mercury tracking station agreements will receive supplemental instructions.

Rusk

Washington, May 1, 1963.

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of March 28, 1963 requesting policy guidance on actions to be taken in the event of a contingency landing during the forthcoming Mercury 9 flight and future Gemini operations./2/ An instruction to our embassies in countries under the orbital path describing in detail the procedures to be followed in contingency situations is attached for your information. This message, drafted in consultation with DOD and NASA, is also being sent to the appropriate military commanders and to posts in intermediary countries./3/

The Department has given careful consideration to the implications of a contingency landing and our objective has been to develop guidance which will secure for us maximum opportunity to effect recovery of the astronaut and his space vehicle. It is our view that the more forthcoming we are with governments in giving them advance notification on the details of the flight, the more cooperation we will receive in an emergency situation. I have therefore outlined in some detail the procedures we will follow so you will have a clear idea of how our planning has developed.

In anticipation of contingencies which might arise during the expanded Mercury and Gemini programs, the U.S. delegation to the UN introduced a resolution in early 1962 in the Legal Subcommittee of the Outer Space Committee which, if adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, would establish the broad, general principle providing for assistance to and safe return of the astronaut and the spacecraft to the launching country. While there was no disagreement with the Soviets or any other country on this principle, Soviet instransigence on other points blocked the adoption of this resolution thus far. Consideration has also been given to the negotiation of separate bilateral agreements outside the UN framework. Practical political reasons argue against this procedure.

It is, however, our intention to inform governments of the spaceflight in advance. The Department feels that prior advice would pave the way for their assistance in effecting immediate recovery. As you know we hold the view that outer space is not an extension of sovereign air space. National sovereignty is not therefore involved and no prior approval to orbit spacecraft over any territory is to be requested.

We plan to follow a similar procedure with the Chinese Communists, where we are instructing Ambassador Cabot to forward a letter to the Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw. In the case of the North Vietnamese, we are exploring the question of whether the International Control Commission in Saigon with access to Hanoi could give the necessary assistance. With respect to Cuba, we shall inform the Swiss in advance.

The Department will be informed by NASA of the possibility of any contingency landing. In anticipation of a contingency landing in non-Communist controlled territory, Search and Rescue or Naval recovery units will proceed to the spacecraft landing area. NASA will inform the Department of such a landing and the mission concerned will be contacted by telephone and Flash precedent telegram to request necessary clearance for Search and Rescue aircraft underway. If known, the coordinates of the landing will be furnished at this time.

Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft should be instructed to observe ICAO regulations and aircraft commanders should follow all instructions issued by Air Route Traffic Control. In the event they are unable to contact the country's Air Route Traffic Control, they should be instructed to proceed according to their flight plan. In the case of a few countries such as Indonesia it may be necessary to modify this policy and we are currently examining this matter.

In the event of an emergency landing within territorial waters of a friendly power, appropriate Naval commanders are authorized to order naval ships, or to request friendly merchant ships, to enter these waters to effect recovery. Embassy and Naval authorities should notify appropriate authorities of host country concerned if this contingency arises.

It should be noted that there are large gaps in the tracking and communications facilities used to track the spacecraft and that an emergency landing could occur in areas outside the range of tracking facilities which could precipitate a search over a vast area. On certain orbits this could include Communist held territory.

Should a known contingency landing take place in Communist China, North Viet Nam or Cuba those countries will be requested through intermediaries to give assistance to and effect the early return of the astronaut and spacecraft. In the case of Communist China, the Department plans to enlist the aid of the British Mission in Peiping in addition to the Ambassadorial channel in Warsaw. Similarly, the British Mission in Hanoi, in addition to the International Control Commission at Saigon, will be asked to intervene with North Viet Nam. The Government of Switzerland will be asked to intervene in the case of Cuba. Prior arrangements will be made with the intervening countries.

SAR aircraft will not be permitted to enter the airspace of or land in Communist China, North Viet Nam or Cuba. In the case of a landing known to be within the Communist-controlled areas of Laos, the ICC will be requested to use its aircraft to assist in locating and retrieving the astronaut and spacecraft. Because of the openness and world-wide interest in the type of flight, it is our judgment that should the astronaut land in Communist territory and be turned over to the governmental authorities he will be returned to the United States. However, little hope is held for return of the spacecraft.

SAR aircraft and Naval forces should be authorized to penetrate the territorial waters of Communist China, North Viet Nam and Cuba for the purpose of locating, rendering assistance to and retrieving the astronaut and the spacecraft. In the event the SAR forces are opposed or fired upon the rescue forces are authorized to proceed to recover the astronaut and spacecraft, if in the judgment of the on-scene commander the recovery is militarily feasible and can be expeditiously accomplished without unduly endangering the life of the astronaut.

If the astronaut or spacecraft is recovered by foreign forces within their territorial waters, SAR and Naval forces should make every effort to effect recovery by peaceful means. The use of force should not be authorized without prior consultation with the Department of State.

In the event the spacecraft lands on the high seas and the astronaut or spacecraft is recovered by a foreign vessel, U.S. forces should be directed to request the transfer of the astronaut and the spacecraft to American control. In the event the foreign vessel refuses to return the astronaut and spacecraft, the American commander should so report through his chain of command to the DOD which should consult the Department of State before issuing further instructions. He should not be authorized to use force but should be directed to keep the foreign vessel under surveillance pending receipt of instructions.

As you will note from the attachment, the Department of State will maintain an around-the-clock watch during the entire course of the flight and will have available facilities providing direct communications with the NMCC, NASA headquarters and Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral. Throughout the flight, Embassies and Mission located in countries orbited will have a senior officer available on an 24-hour alert basis and will maintain a supporting communications watch. Every effort possible is being made by the Department of State to assure that adequate means of communication will be available to all posts involved.

With regard to the suggestion contained in the JCS memorandum of March 15, 1963 to the Secretary of Defense the press as well as the Voice of America, as in the case in previous flights, will provide the world with information on the progress of the flight.

Sincerely,

Alex/4/

Washington, May 3, 1963.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Project Mercury Manned Space Flight (MA-9)

The President is aware of the contingency planning with respect to the possibility of the landing of Mercury 9 or future Gemini flights in the territorial waters of Communist China, North Vietnam, or Cuba, as described in the letter dated May 1, 1963, from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

The President agrees that the Secretary of Defense has adequate authority to authorize the penetration of the territorial waters of the above countries for the purpose of locating, rendering assistance to, and retrieving the personnel and spacecrafts.

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, undated.

IMPLICATIONS OF OUTER SPACE IN THE 1970's

Conclusions

A. The United States should continue to place its main emphasis in the field of space exploration on broadening our horizon of knowledge and breadth of competence in this new medium, with particular attention to the political implications of our achievements measured against those of the USSR, and the assurance of our national security. We should continue to encourage international cooperation in space activities, including bilateral arrangements with the USSR, and including the development of space law. We should continue to stand on the general principle of freedom of space. We should actively seek arms control or disarmament arrangements which enhance national security. At the same time, we should continue to pursue vigorously the development and use of military support activities in space, and to develop the capability to meet as necessary possible Soviet exercise of options for military weapons in space.

B. Military activity in outer space will not be sui generis; rather, it will relate to the character of, and balance among, earth-based military systems, and should not be considered in a vacuum. The occasionally voiced axiom that he who controls outer space will control the earth appears illusory, and at the least is unproven.

1. The essential requirement for military capabilities in outer space will be the need for research, development, testing and operational activity sufficient to enable the US to avoid technological surprise in outer space, and to achieve and maintain that margin of superiority in space activity necessary as insurance to offset possible Soviet military uses of space.

2. We should study fully the possibilities of relatively low cost launching and in-flight propulsion systems which could alter cost efficiency criteria for various civil and military uses of space, and provide maneuverability, range and speeds which would have important scientific and potential military uses.

3. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

4. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

C. There may be a substantial change of pace of over-all US outer space activity during the 1970's. Such a change of pace may begin shortly after a manned lunar landing, or sooner if events indicate that the Russians either are not in a race or disengage from this "race." The "newness" of space may have passed away to some extent. This change of pace will apply to both the character and scheduling of our over-all program, and in differing degree to various parts of the program: to further lunar exploration, to subsequent interplanetary exploration, to space applications involving satellites in earth orbit (e.g., communications satellites, meteorological satellites, navigational satellites), and to the general balance between scientific investigation and practical application. There may be less emphasis on spectaculars; less urgency in our program.

D. The nature of outer space activities themselves, and of the international context in which they will develop, will necessarily lead to increased international interdependence in this field. International cooperation in space and space-related activities should be sought from the points of view both of the foreign support which the US program will need, and of the foreign policy objectives which can be served. The character of this cooperation will, however, change in the following significant respects:

1. There will be an increasing dependence upon tacit or negotiated international agreement for the conduct of our space program (frequency allocation, rescue and return of astronauts and spacecraft, effective channels for the exchange and analysis of data, etc.). Space law, at least through customary usages of space, will continue to develop.

2. We will have to take account of active space programs conducted by other countries, particularly the Western European countries and Japan. Substantial involvement of these countries in space programs will afford a greater opportunity to encourage multinational or regional programs as opposed to purely national programs.

3. Communications satellites will facilitate international intercourse, and will probably be capable of serving either cooperative or adversary use for direct communication to the homes of populations in other lands. The opportunities, and dangers, of this technique deserve further careful study.

4. Outer space developments will accentuate, rather than mitigate, the differences between the industrial countries on the one hand and developing countries on the other. This increasing divergence will in itself argue that the US may find it desirable to be responsive to the worldwide desire for international participation in some outer space programs. There may be an increasing reaction in the economically underdeveloped countries against great expenses in space exploration while millions on earth barely subsist.

5. It is possible that by or during the 1970's some disarmament and/or UN peacekeeping arrangements will come to use spaceborne observation. The US should consider ways to facilitate such international uses of observation satellites without affecting essential unilateral capabilities.

E. The United States should consider the feasibility and desirability--technical and political--of proposing or accepting a joint US-USSR effort to land on the moon, in lieu of a competitive race to the first lunar landing./2/ It should be noted that the USSR has not, so far as we know, committed itself to a race for a manned lunar landing, and may in fact have set other space goals. In the impression of most people, however, there is a "race," even if it is unacknowledged by the Soviets.

1. Conclusion A. Expand last sentence as follows:

"A. . . . At the same time, we should continue to pursue vigorously the development and use of military support activities in space, and the development of capabilities to meet possible Soviet exercise of options for military weapons in space or to develop other operational military space systems necessary for our national security."

Reason: To remove the inference that future US military requirements in space will be determined solely by Soviet space applications. The prime determinant of US military space requirements will be our national security needs rather than merely reactions to Soviet military space uses.

2. Conclusion B. Replace as follows:

"B. The essential requirements for military capabilities in outer space are research, development, testing and operational activity sufficient to enable the United States to avoid technological surprise, to offset possible Soviet military uses of space, and to ensure superiority both in space technology and in operational applications as specific military requirements are identified and established. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We should also continue to seek relatively low cost launching and in-flight propulsion systems which could alter cost efficiency criteria and which would provide the maneuverability, range [2 lines of source text not declassified].

Reason: Deletion of the two introductory sentences of the majority formulation is desired to remove the essentially negative connotation these sentences place on the Conclusion regarding military space requirements. Moreover, the observation that military activities in space are related to the character and balance among earth-based systems is unchallenged and therefore both unnecessary and misleading, in that it suggests the existence of a strong body of official opinion which holds the contrary view. Reference to the so-called "axiom" regarding the relationship between control of space and earth is similarly inappropriate as it also erroneously suggests the existence of a body of official opinion in need of negation. Other modifications set forth in the DOD preferred formulation are intended to (1) remove the inference that future military space requirements will be determined solely by Soviet military uses of space, (2) remove reference to military space developments as purely a form of "insurance" and (3) delete the inclusion of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] from the Conclusion regarding military space requirements. In the latter connection, although use of space [4 lines of source text not declassified].

I am unable to concur in the report as presently written for the following basic reasons:

a. The military aspects of space in the 1970's continue to be disposed of as of little significance other than as a need for "insurance" to offset possible Soviet military uses of space. In my view this does not take sufficient account of technological possibilities of the 1970's.

b. Conclusion A suggests that, in the 1970's, the United States "should continue to place its main emphasis . . . on broadening man's horizon of knowledge and breadth of competence . . . with particular attention to the political implications . . . and the assurance of our national security." This formulation does not, in my view, lend sufficient weight to the fact that, by that time, additional emphasis should have been devoted to those measures necessary to enhance and preserve our national security.

c. As previously noted, a major section of the paper devoted to the lunar landing is predicated on the assumption that the Soviet Union is publicly committed to a moon race at the present time, whether it wishes to be or not. Although it certainly is wise in a paper which considers the implications of outer space in the 1970's to assume that a moon race between the United States and the Soviet Union is in progress, it is considered both inappropriate and dangerous not also to explore fully other courses of action on the assumption that there is no moon race in progress. For one thing, our national strategy probably would be quite different if the United States possessed a unilateral capability for manned exploration and use of the lunar surfaces. A more disturbing possibility is that the USSR may have chosen an alternate national space objective which could be achieved sooner and, at the same time, have more significance from a national security standpoint. Failure fully to explore the possibility of such a course of action could result in major loss of US prestige by default in the USSR version of a space race as well as significant imbalance in the relative military support capabilities in space. In the Report, the "race" theme is the only one afforded substantial consideration.

d. In the discussion and conclusion concerning a possible joint US-USSR lunar effort, I believe insufficient treatment is afforded to the "cons"--both technically and politically.

[Here follows the 72-page text of the paper.]

Washington, July 11, 1963.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to be held at 2:30 p.m. July 17 in Room 274 of the Executive Office Building

Vice President Johnson, the Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, is convening a meeting of the Space Council, the purpose of which is to explore the status and progress of coordination in space activities. More specifically, coordination between NASA and DOD in project Gemini and in the establishment of space stations will be discussed.

On January 22 the DOD and NASA announced that agreement had been reached between the two agencies under which the DOD would participate in the Gemini program. Gemini, a two man follow-up of the single-man Mercury manned space flight program is an experimental program to advance the technology of manned space flight including rendezvous and docking and to study the effect of weightlessness in a period of up to two weeks. The Gemini program, in part, will prepare for the Apollo lunar missions which will land US astronauts on the moon.

The NASA-DOD agreement is intended to assure the most effective utilization of Project Gemini and to provide for Air Force participation in what was originally conceived by NASA to be a purely civilian project.

Under the terms of the agreement NASA will continue to be responsible for the management of the Gemini project but coordination will be effected through a Program Planning Board composed of representatives from NASA and the DOD.

While it is understood that Secretary McNamara and Mr. Webb are in general agreement with regard to the degree of Air Force and NASA participation in the project, it is understood that lower echelons in NASA and in the Air Force are still dissatisfied with the extent of each other's detailed participation. The purpose of the meeting is to attempt to clarify these issues.

The Department, at the request of NASA, recently negotiated the extension of the Mercury tracking agreements for use in the Gemini program with the U.K., Spain, Nigeria and Mexico. Negotiations with respect to the extension of the Mercury agreement with Zanzibar are continuing. In obtaining renewal of the agreements with Mexico, Spain and Nigeria the Department, with the concurrence of NASA and DOD, agreed that acceptance of the agreement by the other governments was based on the understanding that the tracking stations would be used only in experiments of a strictly scientific and technical character without military objectives. The U.S. would notify those countries in advance of Gemini flights which would have objectives other than those stated above if the stations were to be used. It is highly doubtful that these countries would permit the use of the tracking stations for Gemini flights if the military role in the flight were significant.

Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson is familiar with the DOD-NASA Gemini agreement and the problems it could raise with respect to U.S. tracking stations operated abroad. Under the circumstances it would appear appropriate that Mr. Johnson represent you at the meeting of the Space Council on July 17./2/

Washington, July 18, 1963.

SUBJECT
Thoughts on the Space Alien Race Question

During recent discussions the question has occasionally, though rarely, arisen that perhaps we should consider the policy question of what to do if an alien intelligence is discovered in space. Some discussion of this occurred, as you will recall, during deliberations on BNSP Task I. This memo contains some miscellaneous thoughts on the question.

The consensus of scientific view says, with quite good reasons, that the possibility of running across an alien intelligent race in our solar system is negligible. This is due primarily to the presumed unsuitability of conditions upon other planets to support life as we know it. The flying saucer advocates claim, of course, that the scientific viewpoint is nonsense, and that there is overwhelming evidence of such beings. In my own mind, I find it difficult to side with the flying saucer advocates, but the almost total impossibility envisioned by most scientists also is disturbing. Therefore, I present the problem in current perspective, as I see it.

Up until a few decades ago it seemed very improbable that intelligent life existed anywhere outside of the solar system. The chief reasons for this were a combination of scientific theory, scientific knowledge, and religious belief. The most widely accepted scientific theory as to the formation of the solar planetary system held that it was a result of the near collision of two stars. Since such a precise near-miss of two stars would be an extremely rare event, it followed that there would be very few other planetary systems in the universe and, indeed, perhaps this was the only one. Religious belief said, furthermore, that life was a gift bestowed by God. This was a relatively undisputed point since no scientific data existed to bridge the gap between non-living and living materials.

The situation today is vastly changed in these respects. The most widely held theory of stellar formation would predict the formation of planetary systems to be a natural consequence of stellar evolution. On this basis, most stars would possess planetary systems, and the number of habitable planets in our galaxy would be tremendous. Our biggest telescopes cannot resolve planets at the distances even of the nearest stars, so no direct confirmation is yet available. In my own mind, however, the wide prevalence of multiple stars is an overwhelming hint in support of this theory. In addition, the biological sciences have almost completely traced a series of natural occurrences which lead from inanimate molecules to elementary living viruses. Thus, we have the current scientific theory and data not only that there are a huge number of planets in the galaxy, but that life is quite likely to arise spontaneously on a large number of these. This, of course, does not necessarily imply intelligent life. Modern theology is not necessarily incompatible with this. The description in Genesis of the Creation certainly is a better picture of the current theory than of a stellar collision, and since God only spent seven days on this system, He has clearly had lots of time to create many more systems.

Even granting a probable existence of much life in the galaxy, there is still the question of whether another intelligent race exists in our solar system. There are, of course, two methods of its establishment in our system. One of these is that it originated on some other planet, for instance, Mars. Some of the spectacular markings of Mars have been interpreted as indicating intelligence. In particular, the famous "Canali" are rather narrow, and always run from one prominent marking to another, frequently with round splotches at intersections. As far as I know, no one has discovered a "Canali" which goes nowhere. This has quite understandably stimulated much conversation. In fact, a number of decades ago, when scientists thought that any life on other stellar systems was very remote, they seemed to feel that intelligent life probably existed on our other planets. Some of the discussions about life on Mars at the turn of the century seem to indicate a strong urge to want to find intelligent life elsewhere. Today, the situation is completely reversed, and although intelligent life is considered quite probable among the stars, it is held to be quite unlikely within the solar system. We seem more eager to listen with Ozma than to look closely at Canali.

One school of flying saucer advocates claims that the Martians have been mining our moon for natural resources for some time. At first thought, one would think they would rather mine earth. It is interesting to speculate, however, upon space flight from the point of view of a Martian. The escape speed of Mars is only 16,500 fps, and, of course, braking speed on our moon is less than 10,000 fps. Thus, Martians looking at earth would tend to view it the same way Terrestrials look at Jupiter. Our moon might not be less work to get to, since atmospheric braking to earth is possible, but would be very much easier to return from, while the energy requirements to go to and return from the surface of the earth might well be so high as to discourage interest, at least initially. Interestingly enough, even a normal high energy chemical rocket could make a trip from Mars to our moon at favorable times while carrying almost 10% of its gross weight in payload. Space flight starting from Mars, then, is a much easier prospect than starting from Terra. If a suitable refueling base had been painfully established on our moon, the operation could be done quite commendably with merely chemical energy. (The aforementioned high energy chemical rocket could carry at favorable times almost 50% payload back to Mars.) Of course, many flying saucer advocates claim that the discovery of both Martian moons within a week in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century indicates that they are large artificial space stations, otherwise they would have been found earlier. If we were to discover Martians on the moon, it would result in surprisingly little readjustment of our scientific thinking. The biggest question would be why they were there rather than among the Asteroids.

In fact, if we were not as scientifically sure of ourselves as we are, three recent events would be hailed as broad hints of intelligent life on the moon. (1) The discovery of hot gasses emanating from the crater Alphonsus when the moon was supposedly dead. This would be considered evidence of civilization and, since Alphonsus is close to the visible edge, interpreted to mean that the other side of the moon was teeming with population which had begun to spill around to this side. (2) The infra-red scans which show hot spots. These would be interpreted as indications of cities or at least mining camps. (3) The fact that no lunar or planetary probe of significance has been successful, in spite of major efforts on the part of two very successful earth orbitfaring nations. It would be supposed that someone was denying us deep space. (The other-side-of-the-moon pictures from Lunik III show no details of consequence, and the same can be said of the data from Mariner II compared to what we had already known about Venus from earth-based measurements.) Should the Martians have colonized the moon without discovering nuclear energy, then they represent no real problem, and our current national policy would be made to order for the situation. If all of this were true, of course, I would expect the Martians to be scared to death of what they have seen recently on this planet, and would expect that the highest priority development program in the solar system is being conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission of Mars.

Even if we are secure in our belief that intelligent life never would develop on Mars or some other solar planet, there is still the question of visitors to the solar system from other stellar systems. This is normally written off as an extremely low probability, due to the tremendous distances between stars, and the Einstein limitation on travel faster than the speed of light. Therefore, even if there are a large number of intelligent life forms in the galaxy, and even if they are continuously searching for other races, the frequency of investigation of any stellar system would be only once in many thousands of years and contact would rarely, if ever, be achieved. It might never be achieved, since presumably intelligent races die out. (What happened to the planet whose pieces now are spread around the Asteroid Belt? Or, for that matter, why is Uranus lying on its side?) I am not sure that this travel restriction is quite as infallible as it sounds. I believe that it is possible with what we now know about nuclear energy to envision ships driven at half to three-quarters of the speed of light. This, since the galaxy is 100,000 light-years across, still does not make a search of the entire galaxy feasible within the life span of the average man. But suppose some race under pressure of population explosion were expanding as fast as technically feasible from star to star throughout the galaxy. If their ships averaged half the speed of light, and if, on the average, they stopped every 10 light-years for a twenty-year stay at a stellar system to deposit colonists, refuel, and build extra ships, they would only take two hundred thousand years, starting at the center of the galaxy, to spread throughout the whole system. Since the earliest known remains of man have recently been dated at approximately one million seven hundred thousand years, a sustained drive for merely two hundred thousand years may not be unreasonable. Of course, if we were to run across representatives of this kind of interstellar race, they would not be nearly as tame as the previously hypothesized chemical Martians, and our policy would need to be revised accordingly. Fortunately, travel time restrictions would inhibit their ability to bring all forces to bear, in case we should develop differences of viewpoint.

The third possibility, scientifically abhorrent, is that the Einstein theory may only be an approximation, and an alien race which actually travels faster than light exists. If we were to meet such a race, our policy had better be to negotiate fast, because the implications of their far better understanding and control of the fundamental forces of nature would be obvious. If all the scientific speculation were to turn out wrong and we were to stumble across an alien race, we would want to know as quickly as possible which of the three types I have indicated it was, as our diplomatic policy would damned well be influenced by the results.

Although all plausible scientific thinking suggests that we will not find any other intelligence race, the probability that we will is finite, and perhaps should not be completely ignored. Were we to find one, the question of whether it was a race with primitive chemical space flight, space flight equivalent to our best understanding of nuclear energy, or space flight based on physics beyond Einstein should be ascertained as rapidly as possible, since our policies would be affected in the most drastically possible way. In any event, a policy of the immediate burying of all Terrestrial hatchets would likely be in order. Even if we only found tame chemical Martians, or merely the debris from some intragalactic survey mission, it would be a good idea to proceed on the assumption that the human race would finally have found a bigger problem than the ones it has created for itself. There likely is nothing to be done at the moment to prepare for these possibilities (the only body of writing on the subject available in an emergency is science fiction), because no one of consequence is going to take this rubbish seriously unless it happens. At that point, our policy will be determined in the traditional manner of grand panic.

Maxwell W. Hunter, II

Washington, July 19, 1963.

Dear Mr. Webb:

As you know, the chronic balance of payments deficit of the United States has become a source of increasing concern to the President. The urgency which he attaches to the program has been manifested in his public statements, in meetings with business and labor leaders, and in his instructions to officials of the executive branch to take positive steps to reduce wherever possible the level of Government expenditures abroad. As part of this effort, the Bureau of the Budget has recently conducted a special review of all offices and missions overseas based on reports submitted by agencies under Bulletin 63-13. We believe that we have identified a number of actions which, if taken, might have a favorable impact on our balance of payments. Although these various agency actions may not, in all cases, appear to offer dramatic balance of payments savings individually, in the aggregate they could result in a significant reduction in our overseas expenditures. For this reason, I commend the issues noted below to your personal attention.

I realize that, with one or two exceptions, all NASA offices and missions abroad are comprised of tracking and data acquisition stations which have been established to support NASA space flight missions, and that very limited flexibility exists within which action can be taken to reduce these activities without affecting the flight programs. I also realize that any substantial changes may have an impact on existing international agreements or negotiations now in progress. Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of our balance of payments problem, serious consideration should be given at this time to actions affecting the balance of payments despite the circumstances noted above.

Therefore, it is requested that you have your staff conduct a detailed study to identify the effects on NASA programs, total FY 1964 costs, and on the balance of payments, of the actions listed below, plus any others which you may suggest as promising some alleviation of the balance of payments problem. Such studies should be completed by September 15, 1963. These studies, together with parallel information on the international relations aspects of the suggested actions, would provide us with better information on which to base judgment than that developed to date. The actions which we suggest, based on the preliminary information currently available, are as follows:

1. Reduce the tracking stations at Kano, Nigeria, and Zanzibar in Africa to standby status in view of the termination of the Mercury series of flights and the stated NASA plan to place primary reliance on other stations for the Gemini flights.

2. Defer the planned personnel increase at the Johannesburg, South Africa, Minitrack station until FY 1965 or later, retaining the station at its present complement of about 59 employees.

3. Abandon the present plan for establishing a NASA office in Paris.

4. Close the Mercury tracking station in Muchea, Australia, in view of the termination of the Mercury program and the construction of a new primary Gemini station at Carnarvon.

5. Close the Mercury station at Quaymas, Mexico, in favor of conducting the Gemini tracking from some point within the borders of the United States, such as Point Arguello, California, White Sands, New Mexico, or Corpus Christi, Texas.

6. Close the Minitrack station at Autofagusta, Chile, in favor of tracking from other stations in the Minitrack net.

Our preliminary estimates are that these suggestions, if implemented soon, could reduce our balance of payments deficit by $1.2 million in FY 1964 and almost twice that amount annually in future years. I understand that some of these actions are already under consideration within NASA for program reasons, but that others would involve totally new studies. However, my hope is that these suggestions, plus whatever additional suggestions you may have, can be acted upon by October 1, 1963.

Sincerely,

Kermit Gordon/2/

Washington, November 15, 1963.

As you know, the last Project Mercury flight is behind us, and we may have upwards of a year before our next manned flight which will occur in the Gemini program. In the interval, we will be conducting unmanned Gemini flights and frequent scientific and vehicle development flights. At the same time, we are conscious that there is overseas a great reservoir of good will toward our astronauts. Putting these two considerations together, there may be advantages in the near future to sending a small team of NASA astronauts, scientists, and technicians abroad to convey directly and by personal appearances to other nations the character and results of the U.S. manned flight program and to afford our friends overseas an opportunity for the expression of their good will.

The format which suggests itself to us for such a team effort is quite different from the parade and publicity type tours of the Soviet cosmonauts and would be designed to emphasize the seriousness, openness, and carefully balanced character of U.S. space activities. We have in mind the following approach: We would establish some reasonable but limited objective for a single visit abroad, such as interest in inspecting the San Marco platform now being prepared by Italy for launching of an equatorial satellite. We would then contact appropriate European agencies with which we regularly deal to apprise them of the possibility of such a visit and of the availability of the visiting team for one or more de-briefings on the manned flight program and its place in our total space effort. These first contacts would seek to arrange for proper forums under appropriate sponsorship in each area where a stopover might be made (e.g., Madrid, Rome, Paris). The central element of each stopover would be a responsible professional report, followed by extensive questions and answers. Undoubtedly, there would be occasion for public appearances of a more visible character by the astronauts in conjunction with each stopover, and we would endeavor to accommodate a reasonable number.

The details can be arranged following a judgment that an initial trip is indeed desirable, but it may help to provide a few illustrations to facilitate consideration of the matter. The team would involve one or two astronauts and a supporting group of perhaps half-a-dozen persons, including an engineer, aeromedic and scientist, as well as support personnel. (Colonel Glenn would be available and is anxious to contribute to an effort of this kind.) Three to five days could be devoted to each country, with travel by commercial or special aircraft, with a total cost of $15-25,000 per country. For reasons which are indicated below, the timing would be as soon after the first of the coming year as feasible.

In the interests of a balanced final judgment, I would point out that we do not have new material in the area of manned space flight beyond what has already been published or reported in this country and that, as here, there are elements of the scientific community abroad with only limited interest and sympathy for manned space flight. And we always run the risk of a Soviet space spectacular occurring between the planning and execution of a trip such as this. However, bringing the Mercury story graphically into foreign countries, with questions and answers in depth, may be counted upon to attract wide interest, to discharge our obligations to share data, and to help educate the foreign scientific community in the values of manned space flight. A short trip would reduce the hazard of coincidence with a major Soviet spectacular.

I would appreciate your comments on the prospect suggested here. If positive, we will proceed to provide a detailed prospectus and develop, discreetly, the necessary interest and preparations abroad. In this connection, the assistance of the Science Attaches abroad would be most helpful.

James E. Webb