The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated at the Conference on Antarctica held in Washington October 15-December 1, 1959; it was signed by 18 nations on December 1, 1959. For documentation on the sessions of the Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume II, pages 580-632. For text of the Treaty, see 12 UST 794 or American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 452-458. The United States ratified the treaty on August 18, 1960, and it came into effect on June 23, 1961, after ratification by all the signatories.

Washington, January 31, 1961.

SUBJECT
Antarctica

PARTICIPANTS
Members of Foreign Embassies: Dr. Guyer (Argentina); Mr. Morrison (Australia); Mr. Steyaert (Belgium); Mr. Bianchi (Chile); Mr. Barthelemy (France); Mr. Sugihara (Japan); Mr. McLean (New Zealand); Mr. Blaksted (Norway); Mr. Franklin (Union of South Africa); Mr. Filippov (U.S.S.R.); Mr. McCall-Judson (United Kingdom)
George R. Owen, IO; Wayne W. Fisher, IO

The Chairman of the Twenty-seventh Interim Meeting of representatives of Antarctic Treaty signatories, held today, was Mr. Morrison of Australia./2/

The Chilean representative, who returned recently from a visit to Santiago, stated that the only reason the Treaty has not been pushed is that the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chilean Senate has been "occupied with other urgent and pressing matters." He said Parliament is now in recess to permit campaigning for the March elections, and will reconvene on March 14. The Foreign Office, he said, would make every effort to have the Treaty considered between mid-March and the end of April.

The French representative distributed copies of an explanatory note (copy attached)/3/ to accompany Item 12 of the list of 17 tentative agenda items. Item 12, which relates to reciprocal assistance among expeditions, was proposed for the agenda by France. He said France had no intention of attempting to define a code of conduct for expeditions, but hoped for some definition of the measures the head of an expedition could take in an emergency without consulting with his Government. He did not envisage the establishment of any special group to study this question at Canberra, although the matter could be discussed at the meeting if there were experts on the question present.

The Japanese representative said he had received instructions from his Government stating that after consideration it does not wish to propose an agenda item on the subject of cooperation in joint scientific research projects, joint management of bases, and joint logistic support. He had raised this matter at the Twenty-fourth Interim Meeting on December 6, 1960 when he had announced that Japan was considering abandoning its Antarctic operations next year (memorandum of conversation, IO: WWFisher, December 6)./4/

Referring to Item II of the proposed agenda (preservation of historic sites), the New Zealand representative said that this year's New Zealand expedition was making an effort to restore the two huts used by Captain Scott on his expeditions, and would also try to restore Shackleton's hut. This action was being carried out in full consultation with the Royal Geographic Society and would provide experience which might be useful in consideration of this Item.

In a discussion of this subject, the French representative said that the draft Rules (distributed by the Australian representative at the Twenty-fifth Interim Meeting on December 14, 1960) should be amended to refer to "recommendations" rather than "decisions" of the meeting, to accord with the wording of Article IX. Otherwise France approved of the draft Rules. France, he said, believed that the final report of the meeting should contain only these recommendations unanimously adopted. If all decisions were reported, however, minority opinions should also be included.

Speaking as the Australian representative, the Chairman said his Government hoped to be able to avoid majority and minority reports and wanted the final report of the meeting to be unanimous. Hopefully, the drafting committee would be able to agree unanimously on a form of words, which the plenary would then adopt. Any differences could be ironed out in the plenary session, or deleted from the report entirely.

Mr. Owen said the main question was not how decisions of the meeting are to be reached, since the meeting was, under Article IX, intended to be consultative and to recommend "measures" that would in any event become binding only if approved by the Governments. The actual problem was what kind of report it was desired to have the meeting produce; a report could be in narrative form. He recommended that this be given further thought.

The Chairman acknowledged the receipt, since the last meeting, of papers distributed by the Belgian and Chilean representatives. With reference to the Chilean paper, which referred several times to "the Chilean Antarctic Territory," the Argentine representative distributed a statement in Spanish (copy attached)/5/ reaffirming Argentina's "rights of sovereignty throughout the totality of its Antarctic territory." He then translated the statement aloud in English. Referring to both the Chilean paper and the Argentine statement, Mr. Owen recalled the traditional position of the United States which does not recognize the validity of any territorial claims in Antarctica. The Chilean representative stated that the mention of "Chilean Antarctic Territory" in the Chilean paper had not been intended as a reaffirmation of Chilean claims in Antarctica, and that he did not understand why there was objection to it. The Argentine representative pointed out that in the paper he had distributed previously on Argentine Antarctic activities, there had been a conscious effort to refrain from using any language that would bring up the problem of sovereignty in Antarctica. (Mr. Bianchi has been handling Antarctic matters for the Chilean Embassy since 1958. Had he been in Washington at the time the Chilean paper was distributed it is quite possible that he would have favored removing the controversial reference prior to distributing the paper.)

Washington, February 10, 1961.

PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
ANTARCTIC TREATY FOR USE OF OCB WORKING GROUP

I. Exclusively Peaceful Use of Antarctica (Article I)

U.S. practice has consistently been in accordance with Article I of the Treaty and will continue to be so. Beyond this, in order to maintain U.S. initiative, enhance U.S. prestige in connection with this Treaty that resulted from a U.S. proposal, and promote world-wide recognition of the provisions of this Treaty, it is desirable to give emphasis to the peaceful nature and nonmilitary purpose of our programs. In this connection, the use of military personnel to assist in peaceful scientific efforts has been traditional in the United States.

All agencies concerned will give proper emphasis, in public pronouncements and press releases, as well as in organizational and administrative procedures, to the peaceful and nonmilitary purpose of our programs.

To date there is no evidence of non-peaceful activity by other countries. However, it should be noted that a major difficulty exists in the identification of what constitutes a non-peaceful activity. Current U.S. estimates indicate that Soviet and other interests in Antarctica are primarily scientific. Under Communist ideological concepts, however, such Soviet research has long-range utility for military as well as peaceful purposes. These research activities, however, cannot be excluded or prevented under the terms of the Treaty.

Since Soviet basic research already serves long-range military interests and in the face of the unlimited inspection terms of the Treaty, it is not expected that the Soviets will undertake any overt military activities and none have been observed to date.

In this connection, there are in particular three types of scientific activity, permitted under the treaty, which could have possible non-peaceful applications of significance in the present state of military technology.

First, known Soviet interest in satellite tracking could make such data usable against the U.S. reconnaissance satellite, and, in the event of war, such facilities could even provide midcourse guidance for an extended range ballistic missile attack against the United States. Second, ionospheric and magnetic research, both important in Soviet programs, may prove useful to controlled blackouts of communications at conjugate points in the Northern Hemisphere. Third, the large expansion of Soviet whaling (to four flotillas by the 1961-62 season) could provide a fleet of 60 or more ships to serve as auxiliaries to Soviet Southern Hemisphere submarine operations.

The measures to be taken in regard to the foregoing and the means by which covert military activity could be detected are discussed in connection with the inspection system.

In the event of activities contrary to Article I (or of any other of the Treaty provisions), the United States will consider what course of action is most suitable, in the light of the circumstances, including consultation with other parties and implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning disputes and activities of non-parties.

II. Matters Related to the Inspection System (Article VII)

We are satisfied with the inspection provisions established by Article VII of the Treaty which ensure absolute unilateral rights of inspection and over-flight.

The inspection provisions relate to ensuring observance of the various other provisions of the Treaty. The major objectives in the U.S. exercise of the rights of inspection is to forestall and detect the use of Antarctica for military purposes, chiefly by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Whereas, inspection for other activities prohibited by the Treaty present no insurmountable obstacles, there are complications relative to inspection for evidences of military activity, part of which have been outlined in Section I above. In addition to these, the following factors are pertinent:

Inspection planning and operations are confronted with environmental characteristics unique to Antarctica: extremely low temperatures and high winds, the predominance of ice in the interior, widespread coastal inaccessibility because of heavy sea ice conditions. These will lend a distinctive and unique character to the inspection system and program that will evolve. These unique characteristics will both complicate and facilitate inspection planning and operations. Activities currently are generally limited to a few stations. Main stations are dependent on ships operating out of non-Bloc controlled ports. In the future, accessibility may be significantly increased by the USSR employment of the atomic icebreaker, and jet air power which could broaden Bloc station deployment. In this connection, Soviet interest in the mapping of one-half of the ice-free areas is noteworthy.

The complexity of identifying Soviet activities which may violate any of the Treaty provisions and the harsh environmental conditions make an absolutely fool-proof inspection system all but impossible. Nevertheless, because of the elaborate logistic arrangements presently required for Antarctic operations, it will be possible, in the immediate future, to keep track of the establishment of stations and support operations therefor by other countries, by means of relatively few over-flights and normal procedures for observation of shipping.

Moreover, to a considerable extent, observation of the activities of other nations at existing facilities may be accomplished through continuation of certain practices without necessarily resorting to all of the procedures for inspection provided by the Treaty. Among these practices are:

1. The exchange of resident scientists, such as has been practiced with other countries, including the USSR. It is, indeed, more difficult to hide a covert military operation from a technically qualified inspector who is spending his entire time at a station than from a similarly qualified inspector who visits the site on a periodic basis. This does not mean that U.S. scientists assigned to foreign stations need be designated observers under the Treaty procedures, nor that they should become clandestine observers. Their presence, in the normal performance of their scientific functions, provides, in effect, a first-hand opportunity to become aware of many of the types of activities which might result in possible violations of the Treaty.

2. Visits to other stations by air, sea, or overland will also provide opportunity to observe foreign activities.

3. Continuation of the program of exchanging persons to accompany resupply expeditions (who have heretofore been designated "official observers") will provide a similar opportunity. In certain situations, it may be found useful to designate these persons observers under the Treaty procedures. However, the practice has been to exchange them by agreement, through State Department channels. An observer under the Treaty does not, of course, require prior agreement for his presence. It is noted that the USSR has not, to date, agreed to exchange these "official observers."

4. Implementation of the observer codicil/2/ to the international whaling convention might also provide a means outside the Treaty machinery to keep informed of Soviet activities in Antarctic waters.

In view of the foregoing considerations and the conditions peculiar to Antarctica, it is believed that the establishment of an elaborate inspection system is not an absolute necessity at this time./3/ However, there are certain factors which make it both necessary and desirable to conduct a program of inspections of activities, facilities, equipment, ships, aircraft and ground stations by observers specifically designated in accordance with the Treaty:

1. Exercise of the inspection procedures set forth in the Treaty will provide information on the activities of other countries which might be unobtainable either by the methods outlined above or otherwise.

2. There is the likelihood that the right of inspection will be impaired if it is not exercised. It is desirable that inspections be made as a matter of course, whether or not there is evidence indicating a special need for inspection. Establishing the routine of inspection during the early stages of the Treaty will minimize the probability of interference with inspection at a later date.

3. Because the Antarctic Treaty is the first that grants the right of inspection, the Treaty may come to be viewed as a precedent which should influence our position in negotiations on inspection arrangements in other fields. It would be dangerous to our long established position on arms controls if we fail to exercise the right of inspection granted by the Treaty./4/

4. The conduct of inspections under the Treaty might serve as a deterrent of violations.

5. The actual conduct of operations may provide useful experience in inspection procedure, which might be helpful in the future development of inspection arrangements relating to arms controls, under [sea] nuclear testing, and outer space.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the logistic support required for large-scale official inspection, involving visits on an unannounced or minimum notice basis, is substantial, and must be weighed against the benefits to be gained. To transport an observer to Mirnyy or Lazaryev requires caching of fuel at Pole or other stations and special logistic arrangements. In order to avert undue diversion of present resources from support of scientific programs, present resources, appropriately supplemented, should be used for inspections, or sizable increases in the men, planes, and ships committed to Antarctic operations will be required.

Although the U.S. may, for reasons of economy, rely primarily on over-flights, the observation of shipping, and other practices already described to prevent/5/ or detect violations of the Treaty, at least in the initial stages, these measures alone cannot satisfy the inspection requirements and the U.S., in the interests of security should also conduct land, sea, and air inspections of ground stations, installations, facilities, equipments, ships, and aircraft. These inspections should be instituted during the first Antarctic season after the Treaty enters into force, and should be applicable as a minimum to the main Soviet station and to stations of one or two other countries.

The assignment of tasks to establish a U.S. inspection program in Antarctica should be consistent with the alignment of functions implicit or specifically designated within the mission of the various agencies of the Executive Branch as well as with the special arrangements made for conduct of U.S. operations in Antarctica. Whereas the Department of Defense is responsible for the conduct of arms control inspections, the Department of State is responsible for conduct of relations with other countries, and hence has an interest in scheduling Antarctic inspections so as to maintain the best climate for these and other foreign relations. [The Department of State being responsible for conduct of relations with other countries would have to determine when a specific inspection or program of inspection would be undertaken.]/6/ The inspection provision of the Antarctic Treaty is not limited to scrutiny of activities to determine their military application alone, but extends to other prohibited actions, such as the disposal of nuclear waste, in which the Department of Interior and National Science Foundation, among others, will have an interest. Finally, any sizable inspection effort will impinge on other U.S. Antarctic programs and hence become subject to the coordination control of the Operations Coordinating Board, the agency presently charged with the over-all direction of U.S. operations in Antarctica.

1. Appropriate agencies involved shall continue to collect, evaluate and maintain information on the activities of other nations in Antarctica through utilizing the information provided by the means above, in addition to any other sources available. The need to keep informed of activities of other countries will be taken into consideration in the plans of agencies conducting operations in Antarctica and they shall advise the Department of State when violations are suspected or detected.

2. The Department of State will accumulate from participating agencies all information concerning activities of other countries in Antarctica, pertinent to their observance of the Treaty provisions. The evaluation of the information in relation to military or other significance will continue to be responsibility of the appropriate agencies.

3. The Department of Defense shall have continuing responsibility for developing and maintaining capabilities to conduct inspection operations. Supporting agencies will be CIA, AEC, and others with demonstrated interest. In particular, the Department of Defense should develop specific plans for the conduct of over-flights and air, sea, and ground inspections to be initiated as early as possible after the Treaty enters into force, and maintained on a continuing basis.

4. The persons to be designated as observers under the Treaty provisions shall be recommended by interested agencies, selected by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Department of State, which shall designate them as such, and inform the other Governments, in accordance with the Treaty.

5A. The Operations Coordinating Board (or successor agency) will determine the scope of the inspections on an annual basis, specifying the foreign installations and activities to be officially observed, as well as other measures that may be required. The Senior U.S. Representative in Antarctica will be authorized to depart from this schedule to the extent that unforeseen contingencies necessitate, and when timely action would be aborted by referral of the matter to higher authority.

[5B. Specific Inspections and Programs of Inspection of foreign installations in Antarctica will be initiated by the Department of State at the recommendation of, or in consultation with agencies conducting operations in Antarctica and carried out by the Department of Defense in accordance with paragraph 3 above.]/7/

No particular difficulty is envisaged here since the United States does not engage in activities contrary to the Treaty provisions. Instructions are being prepared for the Task Force to permit the admission of observers of foreign nations to all installations, stations, and ships in the Antarctic area in accordance with the Treaty. The inspection of ships and aircraft by foreign observers is limited to those discharging or embarking cargo or personnel in the Antarctic area. The purpose of this latter qualification is to be sure that we do not permit the establishment of a precedent whereby our ships on the high seas could be halted.

At the present time, except for cryptographic gear, and a limited amount of classified material aboard ships and aircraft (such as sonar, ECN), there is nothing maintained in Antarctic stations or placed aboard ship which, if made open to inspection by the Soviets, or others, would compromise the national interest. The Department of Defense has the principal interest in this area, and is prepared to take administrative action to eliminate from ships and aircraft participating in the Antarctic operations, all classified matter, except written material./8/

The Department of Defense and other agencies concerned should take such measures as may be necessary to insure that facilities, equipment, aircraft, and ships are open for inspection to foreign observers officially designated for this purpose by the signatory power concerned. The Department of State is to keep all agencies involved informed as to the names of officially designated observers and those empowered to appoint observers. The United States position should be that we are open to inspection.

We are satisfied with the Treaty provisions as they stand and see no advantage in multilateral discussion of inspection procedures at the present time. However, several friendly countries maintain that in view of public interest in the inspection feature of the Treaty (as a deterrent, not only of military, but also other, e.g., nuclear, activities), matters related to the inspection system should appear on the agenda of the Canberra meeting to be held under Article IX of the Treaty, which refers to measures regarding the "facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection" as a matter to be considered at such meetings.

If matters related to inspection procedures are raised by other countries for multilateral discussions among the Treaty countries, the U.S. position will be:

1. To prevent any impairment of the unilateral inspection rights as set forth in the Treaty.

2. To support discussion and recommendations concerning agreement on the scope and nature of information to be exchanged under Article VII, paragraph 5.

III. Nuclear Explosions and Waste Disposal (Article V)

The extent to which the operation of our planned reactor may involve disposal or emission of waste may be questioned. The United States has consistently maintained that Article V does not preclude the installation and operation of a reactor. The United States must be prepared to show that a reactor can be operated in strict compliance with Article V and also should be able to reassure any Government which may be concerned with the effect that a reactor may have on scientific programs.

Present and planned installation of nuclear reactors in the Antarctic under U.S. sponsored programs should provide means whereby disposal of waste would be accomplished outside Antarctica and all prudent measures taken to insure against the possibility of nuclear accidents. The United States should make available to other signatory powers such information that may be helpful in understanding the plan to avoid nuclear contamination from nuclear power plants.

At the present time there is no foolproof means by which we could monitor against the occasion of a nuclear explosion or disposal of nuclear waste in Antarctica. However, through normal seismic observations and air sampling for radioactive particles, it is fairly certain that any open nuclear explosion that took place in Antarctica would be detected. The question of where it took place would be difficult to determine. In any event, this does not seem to be an immediate problem or one for which we should take special measures. Rather, the United States should encourage the dissemination and exchange among signatory powers of information relative to nuclear activities in Antarctica.

The U.S. position should be to encourage strongly the exchange of information among signatory countries regarding nuclear activities in Antarctica. Agencies involved in Antarctic operations should keep alert to the possible use of nuclear devices by other nations.

IV. Scientific Cooperation (Article III)

Article III of the Treaty sets forth the obligation of the parties to promote scientific cooperation, in particular, by means of (1) exchange of information regarding programs, (2) exchange of scientists, and (3) exchange and making available of scientific observations gathered in Antarctica. The United States favors scientific cooperation among the Treaty parties. The Special Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), the nongovernmental sub-body of International Council of Scientific Unions, which sponsored the IGY, now serves as a nongovernmental mechanism for the free exchange of views among scientists and for the development of scientific cooperation in an advisory capacity. There is no current need for the Governments to set up a new mechanism for the discussion of scientific problems nor is it desirable to convert SCAR into an official body, since this would inhibit the free discussion of scientific programs. However, the United States should be prepared to support inter-governmental action and arrangements in the field of scientific cooperation in circumstances where such official action would be more effective in relation to U.S. policy objectives.

In inter-governmental discussion of scientific cooperation, the United States should be in a position to demonstrate its active interest therein.

1. The United States favors full exchange of information regarding scientific programs among the Governments who are parties to the Antarctic Treaty or among their scientists, including information as to scientific work being done and being planned, and information regarding equipment that is being used, and also by encouraging our participation in meetings and symposia on Antarctic scientific research.

2. The United States favors increasing the exchange of scientific personnel and joint research among scientists with other countries in Antarctic operations. The National Science Foundation, in consultation with the Department of State, shall coordinate and make arrangements regarding the conduct of joint scientific work with other countries; and may seek the assistance of public and private scientific organizations, when appropriate, in making these arrangements.

3. The United States favors the broadest possible exchange of scientific data gathered in Antarctica and should be prepared to support appropriate inter-governmental arrangements which would assure the availability of scientific data gathered by other countries, including arrangements for systematic reporting on ice conditions and weather conditions by vessels and aircraft operating in the Antarctic area.

V. Matters Related to the Question of Claims of Sovereignty

The Treaty, by virtue of Article IV, does not, of course, modify the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of any of the territorial claims which have been asserted. On the other hand, the Treaty does not either imply renunciation of these claims by the claimant countries. Although the Treaty precludes the assertion of new claims, it is nevertheless useful, from the standpoint of maintaining a leading U.S. position in Antarctica, that a convenient legal record of current U.S. activities in exploration and discovery be available.

1. The agencies concerned with Antarctic affairs shall continue to avoid any action that might be construed as evidence of recognition of any claim of sovereignty over any part of Antarctica by a foreign country and shall reaffirm, whenever appropriate, the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of such claims and of reservation of all U.S. historic rights.

2. The agencies having responsibility for operations in Antarctica shall, insofar as practicable, assure that orderly and convenient public records be established of future instances of discovery and exploration by persons participating in U.S. operations.

Washington, April 12, 1961.

SUBJECT
Antarctica: Inter-Agency Coordination of Activities and Policy Guidance

Pursuant to the abolition of the OCB and the Department's responsibility to "provide policy guidance and ensure coordination for all activities in Antarctica," IO has been holding regular weekly meetings (Wednesdays, 2:00 p.m.) with representatives of the agencies concerned (list attached, Tab A)./2/ This function is carried out by George H. Owen, Antarctica Staff, IO. There have been five such meetings to date.

You may be interested in the manner in which this non-crisis function of the Department is being carried out, and I have enumerated, by way of illustration, matters of both long-term and short-term import which have been dealt with at the meetings referred to above (Tab B).

The main reasons why coordination is necessary, are:

(1) Our scientific programs in Antarctica are conducted by the National Science Foundation through grants to other agencies or universities. The Navy furnishes logistic support therefor. The two agencies budget separately for their respective functions. Scientists have said that the scientific program sometimes receives secondary consideration in the use of logistic facilities. The weekly meetings provide a forum in which these problems, big and small, can be aired.

(2) In countless ways our Antarctic programs affect U.S. foreign relations. There is international cooperation in science, joint programs with certain other countries, and the scope, nature and "image" of the U.S. presence in Antarctica must conform to U.S. policy and the Antarctic Treaty.

MATTERS DEALT WITH AT THE INTER-AGENCY
COORDINATION MEETINGS

1. Future usefulness of Byrd Station for the scientific program. The question has been raised as to whether scientific programs in the future require the elaborate logistic facilities which the Navy is setting up there.

2. The suggestion of NSF that consideration be given to establishing a new base to provide airlift support to a planned mobile station in a particular area for a particular project in ionospheric physics.

3. The question of whether we should make arrangements, bilateral or otherwise, to ensure continuation of scientific work at the Belgian and Japanese stations which are about to be abandoned. The Soviets maintain aviation gas depots at both of these locations.

4. Ensuring that no foreign scientists, VIP's or correspondents are invited by either NSF or Navy without knowledge and concurrence of the Department of State. In the past this has not been properly coordinated.

5. Coordinating the manner in which foreign correspondents are selected to accompany our operation. USIA is suggesting a planned program of selecting those who will produce the most from a USIA standpoint.

6. Ensuring that publications of the U.S. Antarctic Projects Office of DOD are cleared with State as regards references affecting our position toward foreign countries.

7. Obtaining preliminary but official views from the agencies concerned on the matters we are discussing with representatives of other Antarctic Treaty signatory Governments at the "Interim Meetings," which have been held regularly since the Antarctic Conference, pending entry into force of the Treaty; in particular, with reference to the agenda of the meeting which is to take place in Canberra after the Treaty enters into force. (Of the 12 signatories, only two have not yet ratified, Argentina and Chile. As of now, they are expected to do so before the middle of the year.)

8. Ensuring that NSF distributes to other agencies concerned matters referred to it by the scientists designated by the National Academy of Sciences, who participate for the United States in SCAR (Special Committee on Antarctic Research, a sub-body of the non-governmental International Council of Scientific Unions), in order that a coordinated U.S. Government view can be worked out.

9. A Navy initiative to organize a symposium in the United States of logistic support experts with representatives of other countries under the aegis of SCAR.

10. A further effort of coordination will have to be made regarding the separate funding of NSF requirements and Navy support activities, season by season. By working closely with the Bureau of the Budget in this connection, it may be desirable to establish procedures where the Department could assist in coordinating these budgetary operations in the light of a long-term plan which reflects the real objectives of our presence in Antarctica.

11. A variety of other problems are also dealt with, such as the recent illness of the Soviet exchange scientist at Byrd Station which required his evacuation on an emergency basis; problems related to transmission through Navy communications facilities of scientific reports between stations, et cetera.

Washington, July 10, 1961.

SUBJECT
Recent Antarctic Developments

The Antarctic Treaty, which was signed at Washington on December 1, 1959, entered into force on Friday, June 23, 1961 upon the simultaneous deposit at noon on that day of the instruments of ratification of Argentina, Australia and Chile. Attached is a White House announcement made on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty./2/

The Treaty provides that a Consultative Meeting shall be held at Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty. The Canberra Meeting convenes today and is expected to last about two weeks. Ambassador Sebald is the U.S. Representative to this Meeting. George Owen is the Alternate U.S. Representative. Attached is a press release listing the members of the U.S. delegation./3/

At the Interim Meetings of representatives of Antarctic Treaty signatories which have been held regularly in Washington since January of 1960, a proposed agenda (copy attached) for the Canberra Meeting was developed./4/ U.S. position papers on Items 6 through 20 were prepared and cleared with the various interested offices in the Department, as well as with other Government agencies concerned with Antarctica.

The Canberra Meeting is expected to be of a more technical nature than was the Conference on Antarctica. We have had no indication up to now that the Soviet Union or any other country plans to raise highly controversial questions at the Meeting. The proposed agenda does not include items that directly concern such important Treaty provisions as nonmilitarization and inspection in Antarctica, but several countries, including the United States, may make reference in their opening statements to the inspection provision and to their intention to exercise their inspection rights, not necessarily as a result of suspicion but as a normal activity under the Treaty.

Poland acceded to the Treaty on June 8, 1961. She has not, however, sought to be included among the countries participating in the Canberra Meeting. In the event of such a request, our position has been that Poland is not entitled to participate in the Meeting since she is not engaged in "substantial scientific research activity" in Antarctica, which is a Treaty requirement that acceding countries must fulfill before they are entitled to participate in the Consultative Meetings.

Washington, July 28, 1961.

SUBJECT
Recent Antarctic Developments

The Antarctic Treaty was signed at Washington on December 1, 1959 by the following 12 countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and United States. The Treaty entered into force on June 23, 1961 upon the simultaneous deposit on that date of the ratifications of Argentina, Australia and Chile.

The Treaty provided that a Consultative Meeting be held at Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty. The Canberra Meeting was held July 10-24, 1961./2/

At Canberra 16 recommendations in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty were unanimously approved. These recommendations will now be submitted to the Governments concerned for approval.

On the whole, the recommendations conformed to United States positions adopted prior to the Meeting. They relate mainly to scientific and logistic cooperation in Antarctica, conservation of living resources, and preservation of historic sites. A recommendation was also approved that the Governments exchange information on the application of nuclear equipment and techniques in Antarctica. An Australian proposal to create a secretariat to service the Antarctic Treaty and to locate it at Canberra was rejected. We believe that there is as yet no demonstrated need for such a secretariat, and that if there is to be one, it should be in Washington. Antarctic discussions have been centered here for the past several years and all the Treaty signatories are adequately represented here.

It was decided to hold the next meeting at Buenos Aires, approximately a year from now.

The Canberra Meeting was more of a technical meeting than was the Conference on Antarctica. The agenda did not include items that directly concerned such important Treaty provisions as nonmilitarization and inspection in Antarctica.

The attitude of the Soviet delegation was friendly and cooperative throughout. This is in keeping with the generally cooperative attitude they have shown in Antarctica since the days of the IGY. The Soviets raised no controversial issues, nor did they raise the question of Polish participation in the Meeting.

Poland acceded to the Treaty on June 8, 1961. She did not, however, seek to be included among the countries participating in the Canberra Meeting. We would have opposed such a request on the grounds that Poland is not entitled to participate in the meetings since she is not engaged in "substantial scientific research activity" in Antarctica. This is a Treaty requirement that all acceding countries must fulfill before they are entitled to participate in the Consultative Meetings.

Following the abolition of the OCB by Executive Order on February 18, 1961, the Department of State assumed the responsibility of providing policy guidance on Antarctica and ensuring coordination for all activities in Antarctica. Since March 3 weekly meetings for this purpose have been held under the chairmanship of Mr. George H. Owen, Special Assistant for Antarctica in the Department of State.

These meetings are attended by representatives of Department of Defense, National Science Foundation, Department of Commerce, Department of the Interior, CIA, USIA, and Bureau of the Budget. At the meetings there is discussion and decision on action with respect to the great variety of problems that arise in connection with Antarctic operations and planning. The main purpose is coordination in specific matters as well as long-term plans. Participants are the officials mainly concerned with Antarctic operations in each agency.

Donald B. Easum/3/

Washington, October 2, 1961.

SUBJECT
Exercise of Rights of Inspection under Antarctic Treaty

Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty provides that "in order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions" of the Treaty, each party has the right to designate observers to (1) inspect, in effect, the activities of others, and (2) carry out overflights anywhere in Antarctica.

Among the main provisions of the Treaty are: (1) Antarctica is to be used for peaceful purposes only; (2) a prohibition of nuclear explosions and disposal of nuclear waste; (3) cooperation in science.

The Treaty was signed December 1, 1959, entered into force June 23, 1961, and the First Consultative Meeting under the Treaty was held at Canberra in July 1961./2/ The inspection provisions (other than paragraph 5 of Article VII referred to below) have not been the subject of discussions either during the "interim talks" (between the signature and the entry into force of the Treaty) or at the Canberra Meeting. However, the opening statement of the United States at the Canberra Meeting contained the following:

"The provisions of the Treaty are complemented by a system of inspection designed to promote the Treaty's objectives and ensure the observance of its provisions. We expect that the exercise of the rights of inspection established by the Treaty will be a normal activity under the Treaty. We would not regard the exercise of these rights as necessarily indicating that there is suspicion of activities contrary to the Treaty. Indeed, the practice of inspection is the best way of assuring the absence of suspicion. The inspection system is a useful and practical feature which will contribute to the effectiveness of the Treaty and the realization of its basic objectives, which are peace and co-operation."

In the course of the "interim talks" and at the Canberra Meeting, the Soviets have hardly commented at all on the inspection provisions. In a published article (in February 1960), G.I. Tunkin, Legal Adviser of the Soviet Foreign Office, who participated in the Antarctic Treaty Conference, briefly outlined the inspection provisions and discussion thereof at the Conference and concluded with this statement:

"Thus, the specific conditions prevailing in the Antarctic, where inspection cannot be used against national security, permitted agreement on unlimited inspection."

The present question is whether or not it would be advantageous to exercise our rights of inspection under the Treaty, in particular of Soviet activities. Since this is the only Treaty with the Soviets providing for inspection to control its observance, the exercise of our rights there-under may significantly relate to our attitude or policy in other negotiations where inspection rights are important.

In Antarctica, the Soviets have three year round stations. As regards Soviet activities in Antarctica itself, we have received no evidence that the Soviets are engaged in any activity in violation of the Treaty's provisions.

Moreover, during five of the six years in which the Soviets have been active there, a U.S. resident exchange scientist has wintered over at Mirny, while a Soviet scientist was assigned at our McMurdo Station.

Logistic problems being what they are in Antarctica, observers' inspection visits, whether by ship or aircraft, would inevitably require diversion of transport facilities for that purpose from our own regularly scheduled activities there, i.e., logistics support of scientific programs. Our resources in ships and aircraft are usually fully committed to these programs. It would be most appropriate if the Navy could spare an icebreaker for a trip along the Antarctic coast, visiting the two Soviet coastal stations, Mirny and Lazarez--which are over 2,000 miles apart--as well as Australian and other stations in between. Designated observers could be aboard and perform inspections at places visited. But we have hardly enough icebreakers for our regular programs.

About the only inspection trip which our logistic capability would allow this year would be to have an officially designated observer accompany a flight that is planned (subject to weather and other logistic considerations) to go from McMurdo to Mirny Station in connection with a gravity research program. The purpose of the flight is to transport a U.S. physicist to Mirny Station to make gravity measurements. The type of aircraft which will probably be used would require refueling at Mirny. The flight may be feasible in November or as late as January 1962.

The question of whether the time is appropriate for the United States to exercise its inspection rights under the Treaty has been discussed with DOD, NSF, and CIA. In these discussions the following points have been considered:

(1) The argument has been made that it may be desirable that inspections be carried out under the Treaty, whether or not there is evidence indicating a special need for inspection. Establishing the "routine of inspection" during the early stages of the Treaty would minimize the probability of interference with inspection at a later date.

(2) The argument has also been advanced that this being the first treaty providing for inspection, the Soviets might argue that our failure to exercise Treaty given inspection rights would demonstrate that our insistence on inspection in other contexts is insincere.

(3) The actual conduct of an inspection operation might provide useful experience in inspection procedures.

(4) On the other hand, the advantages to be gained by exercising the Antarctic Treaty inspection rights, may not be substantial enough to outweigh the possible risk of arousing suspicion and adversely affecting the climate of friendly cooperation by "bringing the cold war" to Antarctica. Relations among the scientists in Antarctica, and also in the diplomatic field with the Soviets on negotiations concerning Antarctica as late as the Canberra Meeting in July, have been outstanding in the absence of Soviet cold war tactics and maneuvers and recriminations.

(5) It might also be borne in mind that to exercise inspection rights when there is no evidence of wrongdoing, may provide the Soviets with an argument that our predilection for inspection systems is based on inspection-for-its-own-sake.

In any event, I would not wish to proceed further in a decision to undertake an inspection under the Treaty without thorough consideration being given to the relationship of such action on our part to our attitude and policy in other fields where inspection is important.

Article VII also provides that each party inform the others of its expeditions and stations in Antarctica and any military personnel or equipment it introduces there. This feature has been the subject of discussion both at the "interim talks" and at the Canberra Meeting. In fact, representatives of the signatories agreed to exchange this information before the Treaty entered into force, and we provided the most comprehensive information on our expedition. The Canberra Meeting approved a recommendation (Recommendation VI) listing in some detail the kind of information that should be provided. We are compiling the information we will distribute to the other Governments this year, and when we do so will state to the others, including the Soviets, that we expect them to provide us with similar information.

There are attached copies of the Antarctic Treaty and of the Report of the Canberra Meeting. There is also attached an excerpt of Tunkin's article in which he dealt with the inspection provisions./3/

I would appreciate discussing this problem with you at your earliest convenience.

Washington, October 13, 1961.

SUBJ
Exercise of Rights of Inspection under Antarctic Treaty

I believe there are strong arguments in favor of exercising our rights of inspection of the Antarctic Treaty regardless of any suspicion of activities contrary to the treaty. These reasons are sufficiently well adduced in your memorandum to me dated October 2, 1961/2/ and require no further amplification by me.

I believe, however, that the timing of the exercise of these rights of inspection ought to be considered in light of other aspects of Soviet-American relations and in light of the time required to mount an inspection trip of more than a perfunctory character. I can see no immediate need to exercise our right of inspection on strictly disarmament considerations and I do not think it would be harmful if the Soviet Union were the first to ask for an inspection. Specifically, I believe that the period November 1961 to January 1962, the time mentioned in your memorandum, is too early. It is too early considering the many other difficulties we can expect to find besetting Soviet-American relations at that time and it is too early to set up an inspection trip properly manned and equipped. I would suggest, therefore, that we contemplate an inspection trip sometime in late 1962, which is presumably the next earliest feasible time.

In connection with plans for mounting the inspection, I would refer you to Section 34(c) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. This provision is as follows:

"(c) the Director is authorized (1) to formulate plans and make preparations for the establishment, operation, and funding of inspection and control systems, which may become part of the United States arms control and disarmament activities, and (2) as authorized by law, to put into effect, direct, or otherwise assume United States responsibility for such systems."

We will be in touch with you further concerning the inspection operation. Our preliminary opinion is that we should think of the inspection operation in terms of its precedent-setting value as a model for other inspection arrangements. From this standpoint, the inspection might be more elaborate than might otherwise be required.

Washington, October 23, 1961.

SUBJECT
Inspection under Antarctic Treaty

U.S. Navy ships participating in the Deep Freeze operation which are likely to find themselves in circumstances where they would be subject to inspection under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty, now carry only such cryptographic equipment and materials, the "viewing" of which gives rise to no problem of "compromise" or only to such "compromise" as may be eliminated.

One of the ships has, in effect, inquired what should be done in relation to inspection procedures as regards classified papers, documents, and books, other than cryptographic materials. The Navy has asked for an "interpretation" from the Department (see Navy messages on this case, State Department Control Nos. 8677 and 8816)./2/

Apparently there are some such classified papers which have to remain on board. The Navy would like us to interpret the inspection provisions in the sense that, as far as papers are concerned, inspection may go no further than to determine that they are, in fact, papers.

A statement of this position might be made as follows:

1. The United States maintains the position that the inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty do not establish the right of a foreign observer to examine the contents of written materials, whether in the form of books, documents or other papers. The right of inspection of these materials is confined to such examination as is reasonably necessary to ascertain that they are papers.

2. U.S. personnel in Antarctica shall prevent the examination by a foreign observer of any documents classified "Secret" or "Confidential" except to the extent reasonably necessary to ascertain that they are documents.

3. U.S. stations in Antarctica and ships that may be subject to inspection under the Antarctic Treaty shall retain only the essential minimum of classified documents.

I would appreciate ACADA's expression of concurrence or other views. This is one of the first instances of development of "inspection law."

I am also sending a copy of this memorandum to L (Mr. Neidle) for comment.

Washington, October 25, 1961.

SUBJ
Inspection Trip to Antarctica

We believe that the trip referred to in Naval Message R220130Z should not be designated as an inspection trip./2/ We would have no objection at all to other work being performed by the mission as may be appropriate under the terms of the Antarctica Treaty. In particular, we have no objection in principle to the taking of aerial photographs during the trip as suggested in paragraph 2 of the referenced message.

Our reasons for recommending that this particular flight not be designated as an inspection trip are as follows.

First, we do not believe that the right of inspection under the Antarctica Treaty will atrophy if it is not utilized during the current summer season in Antarctica.

Secondly, we see no useful purpose from the standpoint of disarmament negotiations which would be served by an inspection trip at this time; on the contrary, we would be concerned that an inspection trip now would have the appearance of an over-eagerness to conduct inspection and thus lend credence to the Soviet charges that the U.S. seeks nothing but espionage privileges in disarmament negotiations.

Thirdly, we think the general state of Soviet-American relations at the present time should not be exacerbated needlessly as might be the case with this particular inspection trip.

Fourthly, when the inspection trip is made, we believe it should be mounted with more thoroughness and greater attention to the expected results of the inspection than appears to be possible in the case in question.

Washington, May 4, 1962.

SUBJECT
Treaty Inspection Rights in Antarctica

Your memorandum of April 24, 1962,/2/ requested our views on whether the United States should include an inspection trip in its plans for Antarctica operations during the 1962-63 season. As this Agency has stated in its previous correspondence with you, and particularly in Mr. Fisher's memorandum of October 25, 1961,/3/ we think it would be useful to exercise our right of inspection but we have also felt that the timing has not been propitious for such an inspection. We are not inclined to think that these rights would atrophy if not exercised in the near future. It seems to us that there is no pressing need this year for an inspection and therefore we would recommend that no plans be made for such a trip during the 1962-63 season.

It is our understanding that in the course of normal contacts between the personnel of various countries engaging in Antarctic operations, the United States is acquainted with all activities being carried out in Antarctica. If, however, there is some Soviet activity in the Antarctic with which we are unfamiliar, it would be reasonable to suggest that an inspection of that particular activity be carried out. We would therefore suggest that in your discussions with Admiral Tyree you should ascertain whether there are any activities with which we are unfamiliar and which might justify a request by us for an inspection. If there is any such activity, we would be happy to reconsider our decision that no inspection should be contemplated this year.

Washington, June 13, 1962.

SUBJECT
Antarctica: Questions related to Internationalization as Long-term Objective

Supplemental to the tactical problems attendant upon U.S. advocacy of a secretariat for Antarctica (my memorandum of June 7, 1962),/2/ following are some more fundamental considerations on the merits of internationalization as an objective and the usefulness of a secretariat as a means to that, or some other desirable, end, assuming that somehow a secretariat would be agreed to by all.

Our present position is based on the consensus of opinion among U.S. agencies concerned, as developed in our running interagency coordination. It is therefore the position of the Department making judgments on the basis of consultation principally with NSF, DOD, and CIA. A reassessment of this position would require careful consideration of the following:

1. Would a secretariat lead to greater internationalization with eventual surrender of claims? Actually, there is reason to expect that, even if the Latins, by inadvertence or under pressure, accepted a secretariat, the result might well be to aggravate their attitude on the claims issue.

2. More fundamentally, although we do not recognize any of these claims and have made none of our own, does it necessarily follow that renunciation by all claimants is a good thing for us? We did consider various formulas of "pooling claims" in the past. But this was before it became necessary to make the Soviets full partners in a treaty on Antarctica. There is much crystal gazing involved here, but are we certain that it is in our interest to persuade countries like Australia or Argentina to surrender their claims (albeit unrecognized by us) in exchange for a joint tenancy which includes the Soviets?

3. Aside from eventual surrender of claims, are there other advantages for the United States in a secretariat? There is practically no function which requires a secretariat. A real international secretariat would cost money, involve problems of getting the right officials selected, and, since the proponents apparently refuse to consider Washington as the situs, would probably close the door to our objective of retaining Washington as the center of consultations.

4. We might successfully strive either to (1) control such a secretariat or (2) keep it innocuous and useless. Otherwise, a secretariat as well as any attendant expansion of international administrative measures is likely to restrict our freedom of action beyond what is now in the Treaty. It would tend to create pressures for such things as coordination of our science programs with those of others, and U.S. logistic support to others. In the present state of knowledge about Antarctica, the possible future uses of the area that we may have to engage in or prevent, will become identifiable only with scientific and technological progress. For instance, we may find it necessary to set up a system of tracking stations there, or engage in some other activity which, while within the terms of the Treaty, is nevertheless one in which interference or the restrictions resulting from a secretariat may be undesirable.

5. It is true that retaining our freedom means leaving others with theirs. But we already have a Treaty prohibiting nonpeaceful use and nuclear explosions, with rights of inspection. We believe it is too early to state with confidence that, on balance, we would gain with further restrictions on the freedom of action that remains. While we would, as usual, abide by new restrictions, there is doubt whether a secretariat would effectively limit, any more than does the present provision for inspection, that kind of action by those others which we, precisely, would have reason to be concerned about. The only countries whose freedom of action we may have to worry about are (1) the U.S.S.R. and (2) the Latin Americans in the event of political changes unfriendly to us in their governments.

6. Would the halfway step suggested by the British for a secretariat, not truly international, but provided by one of the countries (Australia), really be a step towards internationalization? As a practical matter, such a secretariat would be subservient to the government which provides it. The Australians are nice people, but would they always consult us in time in connection with eventual initiatives a secretariat would undertake?

7. On the other hand, international administration on a basis broader than the countries that have been active in Antarctica would present other factors: It is easier for us to deal on Antarctic affairs with those actually concerned than with all comers.

8. I should add that there are implications of domestic politics to be considered in adopting a pro-internationalization position. The minority in Congress that opposed the present Treaty as going too far in pooling our interests with the Soviets, would be even more adamant. In the Senate, besides the "southern bloc" led by Byrd and Russell, and Mr. Goldwater, this group included Messrs. Engle, Gruening, and Dodd.

So, the objections to a shift of position boil down to (1) tactical difficulties and (2) uncertainty as to the future significance of Antarctica. I know that having to deal with trees should not obscure one's sight of the forest, and it would be a pity to forego a good opportunity to push for an experiment in international government when it comes along. So far, I sincerely wish I could think of good reasons why we should advocate a secretariat, or internationalization, but I cannot think of any which do not involve complications or unknowns.

Washington, July 12, 1962.

STATEMENT OF U.S OBJECTIVES REGARDING ANTARCTICA
AND COURSES OF ACTION DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

The basic objective of the United States with respect to Antarctica may be stated as follows: To take advantage of present and possible future uses of Antarctica (political, scientific, economic, and other) that benefit the security and welfare of the United States and to prevent any use of Antarctica which would be detrimental thereto.

This basic objective is the underlying reason for our having undertaken a program of Antarctic activities at the time of the IGY, and of having proposed and concluded an international treaty providing for freedom of scientific research and for the peaceful use of Antarctica.

At the present time, the principal and clearly identifiable profitable use or "resource" of Antarctica is the scientific information which can be gathered there. The benefit derived from this information is increased knowledge in the United States a) of the physical characteristics of Antarctica and b) in those branches of science to which observations conducted in the unique location of Antarctica are especially useful.

Consequently, United States activities in and concerning Antarctica should, first of all, be those of carrying out, providing logistic support for, and promoting international relations which facilitate, a long-term program of scientific observations and studies in Antarctica. However, the operations of United States agencies conducted for this purpose in Antarctica, as well as activities in diplomacy and scientific exchange concerning Antarctica, should, wherever practicable, serve the broader scope of the basic objective.

The nature of future activities which United States agencies may be required to perform in Antarctica to meet this broad objective will be determined in the light of scientific and technological progress, particularly in fields where utilization of the Polar areas is significant, of unpredictable political developments, and of the significance of the area in relation to economic and population growth. As in the case of unknown or unoccupied areas in the past, it is reasonable to assume that the ability to "have things our own way" is more likely to be enhanced by a position of leadership in Antarctic affairs than by letting others overtake us in the scope of what they do regarding Antarctica.

In this connection, the present objectives of Soviet activities in Antarctica apparently are: (1) to increase their scientific knowledge through data obtainable in Antarctica (including that of military value) as a part of their systematic investigations of the earth as a whole from its core to outer space, and (2) to demonstrate superior Communist capabilities by their achievements in Antarctica. In pursuit of these objectives Soviet activities are expected to include as they do now: (a) gradually expanding scientific research and exploration, with long-range planning, and permanent occupation of sites; (b) participation in international scientific cooperation to obtain as much scientific data as possible; (c) increasing participation by bloc countries; (d) expansion of whaling and interest in potential mineral resources; (e) possible use of Antarctica for satellite monitoring; (f) propaganda exploitation of their activities in discovery, scientific findings and in production of reports and maps.

United States activities of exploration, discovery, mapping, the permanent occupation of a certain number of sites, the movement of personnel and equipment to, from and within the Antarctic area, cooperative scientific efforts with other countries, and instances of assistance to other expeditions, besides being a necessary element of a long-term scientific program, are of the kind that maintain the leadership and increase the experience of the United States in Antarctica. We should continue to engage in them, even when the return is not immediately apparent in terms of specific scientific data, so long as they do not disproportionately detract from the carrying out of the scientific research programs and provided the cost of any such particular undertaking is not out of proportion to the reasonably foreseeable benefits to be derived therefrom.

In the light of the foregoing, the following policies concerning Antarctica shall be pursued:

Statement of Policy

(1) To conduct, with adequate logistic support, a long-term program of scientific observations and studies in Antarctica.

(2) In combination with the effort of supplying logistic support for the foregoing, to engage in and encourage other activities that contribute to maintaining United States leadership in Antarctic affairs in view of the basic objective concerning the use of Antarctica.

(3) To observe the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, make certain their observance by governments and persons of all countries that engage in activities in Antarctica, and conduct our relations with other nations, in particular the consultations under the Antarctic Treaty, with a view to securing the basic U.S. objective concerning present and possible future uses of Antarctica.

(4) To continue the policy of not recognizing any of the claims of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which have been or may be asserted by other countries, and reserving our rights throughout Antarctica.

(5) To continue the tradition of scientific cooperation in Antarctica and maintain and develop the kind of contacts with foreign governments and their nationals which are advantageous to the United States whether in Antarctic scientific work, or otherwise.

(6) To plan for and conduct all activities in and concerning Antarctica in a manner which assures effective coordination among the agencies having responsibility for funding or executing them, or of formulating policy with respect to Antarctica.

It is assumed that in the absence of developments of overriding importance, the foregoing objectives can be adequately pursued during the next few years without any major change in the level of activities conducted at the present time. The following courses of action should be undertaken or continued during the next several years:

Statement of Courses of Action concerning Antarctica to be Pursued by the United States
during the Next Several Years

1. Continue permanent occupation of McMurdo Sound Station, so long as it can profitably be used as:

(a) a supply base for activities in other locations in Antarctica (administrative services, transportation, communications, storage, quarters, and utilities including nuclear power supply),

(b) a site for year-round scientific studies, such as meteorology, marine biology, and a number of upper atmospheric physics programs,

(c) a site from which to carry out scientific summer studies, such as programs in biology, geology, limnology, pedology, etc., in the surrounding area.

2. Continue permanent occupation of Pole Station, so long as it can profitably be used:

(a) as a site for scientific studies, such as upper atmospheric physics, meteorology, and geophysics, and as a site to carry out specialized programs in the surrounding area,

(b) for its value, because of its unique location, to United States prestige in Antarctic affairs.

3. Continue permanent occupation of Byrd Station, so long as it can profitably be used as:

(a) a site for scientific studies, such as upper atmospheric physics, meteorology, geophysics, and other sciences,

(b) an advance supply base for activities at other locations which can be supplied from Byrd Station.

4. Establish a small, preferably relocatable, year-round site (Eights Station) in the Ellsworth Land area south of the Bellingshausen Sea for use primarily for upper atmospheric physics and meteorological studies to take advantage of a favorable location with respect to the auroral zone, and magnetic conjugateness to accessible land areas of the northern Hemisphere.

5. Investigate the feasibility of establishing a station in the Palmer Peninsula area, possibly in cooperation with one or more of the countries already operating in the area, to be used as:

(a) a site for scientific observations in marine and land biology, meteorology and upper atmospheric physics, the installations to include a biological laboratory facility,

(b) to serve as a supply base for inland geological and biological operations in that area.

6. Continue to maintain advance headquarters in New Zealand with facilities for the conduct of supply operations there and conduct relations with New Zealand in a manner conducive to securing the continued cooperation of that country for this purpose.

7. Secure observance of the agreements with Argentina and Australia concerning operations at Ellsworth and Wilkes Stations, continue arrangements for joint operations at Hallett Station with New Zealand, and participate in activities at these stations to the extent that is useful in the light of the policy directives stated above.

8. Continuation of a coordinated program of aerial photography, geodetic control and cartography.

9. Undertake, as practicable, geographic exploration in Antarctica, by ship, air, and on the surface of the continent, in combination with suitable scientific or supply operations and in cooperation with other countries when desirable, and visits to stations of other countries.

10. Be prepared to exercise rights of inspection under the Antarctic Treaty, exercise these rights at appropriate times and places, and make apparent, as a deterrent, our capability to exercise these rights.

11. Encourage the participation in Antarctic programs of countries friendly to the United States.

12. Engage in programs for the exchange of scientific or other appropriate personnel to participate in the activities of other nations concerning Antarctica and, in particular, assure continuation of the exchange of scientists with the USSR. Within the transportation facilities to and from Antarctica that are available for the purpose of conducting U.S. activities there, maintain the capability of transporting a number of scientists, representatives or invitees of other countries which it is desirable to accommodate to carry out personnel exchange programs, or in view of any other objectives stated herein, including a small number of foreign journalists for the purposes of paragraph 14 below.

13. Continue to participate in international cooperative arrangements furthering the collection, dissemination and analysis of scientific information, both concerning Antarctica and that related to the Antarctic aspects of global scientific studies and programs.

14. Promote publicity concerning U.S. activities in Antarctica which enhances the prestige of the United States.

15. Promote the systematized study of the scientific data gathered through Antarctic operations.

16. Assign responsibilities among appropriate United States agencies for the planning, funding, management, execution and coordination of all activities undertaken in fulfillment of the foregoing courses of action in conformity with the statement of policies set forth above.

Washington, August 20, 1962.

SUBJECT
Buenos Aires Antarctic Meeting

I wrote all the telegrams from Buenos Aires during the Antarctic Meeting except the last one, No. 300 of July 30,/2/ which apparently was sent after I had left. I believe the following comments may be useful:

It is true that the Soviet delegation was, as at Canberra, displaying the utmost cordiality. The Soviet Ambassador made a point of telling me at great length how he thought the Antarctic Treaty should be an "example" for other agreements. Their Foreign Office man, Movchan, who had been at Canberra, was also cooperative. However, there was a marked difference in his attitude in conversation with me, depending on whether his Ambassador was present or not. At all receptions the Soviets stuck together like particles of an atomic nucleus so long as the Ambassador was with them. When on their own they relaxed and talked quite freely.

As for the other remarks in the telegram, I feel I am not familiar enough with UNESCO meetings to comment on the simile, but I believe the remark about delegates taking in "each other's laundry" may be misunderstood. The delegates did make much use of references to the cordiality that marked earlier meetings. If there was less disagreement than there had been at Canberra, this appeared to be due to the fact that several of the delegations that had opposed us on some issues at Canberra were coming around to the U.S. views, in particular the British and Australians, on such questions as the immediate creation of an all Australian secretariat or the adoption of additional multilateral regulations on a variety of subjects. But no special favors were made as among any delegates.

As to the desirability of not having these meetings too frequently, this, as you know, is well known to us. However, I advised against making a public statement to that effect since the United States is already accused of "holding back" too much. We can negotiate as to the date of the next meeting as we see fit. That the achievements of the meeting were "not very memorable" is true, but the main thing is that this was in accordance with the U.S. position papers.

The British acted too quickly in withdrawing their "jurisdiction" item. This was the result of Chilean pressure. The Argentines really did not want to make an issue of its inclusion in the agenda. We formally stated our approval of its inclusion and even suggested to the British that they should not cave in so easily.

Washington, undated.

REPORT ON SECOND CONSULTATIVE MEETING
UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY

There is attached a report of the proceedings of the Second Consultative Meeting under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, held at Buenos Aires from July 18 to July 28, 1962. It is arranged by topic in the order of the agenda adopted for the meeting. There is also included a summary of the manner in which the question of "jurisdiction" was dealt with, which was not included in the approved agenda.

As at the Canberra Meeting, the Rules of Procedure provided that neither minutes nor a summary record of the debates should be produced. The Argentine Government as host may, however, have a taped recording of the proceedings. In the attached summary of the proceedings an account is given of the background of each topic as well as of the manner in which it was dealt with at the meeting.

Noteworthy features of the meeting may be summarized as follows:

(1) Unlike the Canberra Meeting, no efforts were made at Buenos Aires to convert SCAR into the official instrument for discharging the Governments' responsibilities regarding scientific cooperation. In this regard, the British had obviously changed their earlier position. They appear to agree that it is best not to convert SCAR into an official body indirectly by delegating to that body the responsibilities of governments. However, the British, Australians and New Zealanders did oppose certain features of the Soviet proposal regarding exchange of scientific information (Item 6 of Agenda) on the grounds that the Governments would seem to be "dictating" to SCAR. In the main this view was shared by the United States, since the U.S. Government, although it finances the U.S. scientists engaged in Antarctic research, does not control them so that it can commit itself to meet deadlines on scientific exchange.

(2) On the question of the secretariat, the chief proponents of the establishment of one at the Canberra Meeting, namely, the United Kingdom and Australia, were practically silent. The opponents of a secretariat made lengthy speeches on the subject. The British and Australians did not put forward any arguments in favor of a secretariat. Nor did the British and Australians make any overt statements against resuming consultations in Washington (as they had at the Canberra Meeting). Washington as a site for interim consultations was favored not only by Belgium (as at the Canberra Meeting), but also by New Zealand, Norway, and Japan.

(3) The Soviet attitude, as at the Canberra Meeting and at the Washington Conference, was on the whole friendly and cooperative. It may be noteworthy that while the Soviets have up to now avoided any references to the inspection provisions, one of their representatives in a working group meeting emphasized the fact that the topic, "Exchange of Information under Article VII, Paragraph 5" (Item 9 of Agenda), was a "political" topic and related to the inspection system of the Treaty. The same Soviet delegate in the course of discussions of the press communiqué of the meeting, stressed the need to include a reference to the spirit of harmony and cooperation in which the meeting was conducted. The Soviet Ambassador made a point of telling the U.S. delegation what a fine thing the Antarctic Treaty was and that it should be an "example" to other agreements.

(4) There appeared to be general recognition of the fact that there had been insufficient consultation among the Governments in preparation for this meeting, and that as a result the meeting "accomplished" very little. Actually, the Governments that had so emphatically expressed their desire for the adoption of more "measures" at and after the Canberra Meeting, especially the United Kingdom, had not responded to efforts of the United States to consult on these matters prior to the Buenos Aires Meeting; and at the meeting, they did not press for even an exchange of views on some of their favorite topics. For instance: The British took steps to withdraw their modest proposal on jurisdiction at the first rumblings of Chilean opposition. The Australians did not avail themselves of the opportunity to present their reasons for the early convening of a meeting on communications.

(5) The recommendations adopted were in accord with the U.S. position for the several topics. The United States did not seek the adoption by this meeting of any recommendations for new measures or agreements beyond existing ones and believes that additional measures (for instance, on conservation, logistics, et cetera) require considerable consultation among governments prior to their formulation by meetings such as this.