Washington, January 29, 1963.

Dear Harlan:

Your letter of January 25, 1963,/2/ recommends immediate implementation of the inspection provisions of the Antarctica Treaty and transmits a draft memorandum concerning a method for carrying out an inspection during the 1963-1964 austral summer season. In considering this matter, I believe that we should differentiate between two questions: first, whether it would be desirable to prepare an inspection plan; and second, when such a plan might best be implemented.

Insofar as preparation of a plan is concerned, I believe that it is important to proceed with the necessary planning effort. In this regard, the draft memorandum prepared by your staff outlines some of the elements involved in one possible approach. However, it will be necessary, in our view, to consider some aspects of the matter in greater depth on an interagency basis in order to identify more specifically the objectives of an inspection (that is, what we are looking for), to determine the feasibility of various techniques (including, in particular, the extent to which aircraft can be used), to evaluate the effectiveness of a multilateral inspection team in contrast with a unilateral inspection team, and to develop additional information concerning skills required, method of financing, and related aspects. Although the informal staff-level consultations that have taken place have been useful in focusing attention on some of these problems, we think that additional effort is required to be certain that the most satisfactory approach has been selected.

The timing of an inspection presents problems of a different character. As you know, we have had some difficulty in convincing others that the United States does not desire inspection for inspection's sake. Particularly at a time when we may be able to make some progress toward an agreement on nuclear inspection, I am inclined to think that it might be counter-productive for us to commit ourselves to an early Antarctica inspection. At the same time, if an agreement on nuclear testing is reached and presented to the Senate for ratification, I would not wish us to be vulnerable to possible charges arising from the fact that we had not implemented inspection provisions of the Antarctica Treaty. In the event of such charges, it would be helpful to have prepared a contingency plan and possibly set a schedule for its implementation. We might possibly mention it in our annual submission of the U.S. Antarctica plan to the other signatories due by the end of November 1963.

With more specific references to the Antarctica situation, I am concerned to learn that the scientific community has not been taking full advantage of Soviet invitations to visit their activities. Such visits could be an important source of continuing reassurance in the absence of formal inspections. Moreover, they could assist in defining inspection objectives and limiting inspections to areas of greatest potential concern, thereby minimizing possible disruptive effects. I understand that we hope to take fuller advantage of such opportunities in the future, and I would like to stress the value of doing so.

In view of the foregoing considerations, I would like to reserve for the time being judgment on the scheduling of an inspection. However, as previously indicated, I favor proceeding with development of an inspection plan without prejudice to the question of timing. With this in view, I am requesting the ACDA staff to complete study of various aspects of an Antarctica inspection as rapidly as possible in consultation with your staff as well as staff of other interested agencies. In view of the progress that has already been made, we should be in a position to resolve any outstanding differences in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

Washington, February 27, 1963.

SUBJECT
Proposed Meeting with ACDA on Inspection in Antarctica

In proceeding with the proposed meeting with ACDA concerning inspection in Antarctica, you will no doubt wish to keep the following points in mind:

1. The inclusion of the inspection provision in the Antarctic Treaty played an important part in obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate. At the time of the approval of the Antarctic Treaty by the Senate, the Department spokesman assured the Senate that we would proceed with the implementation of the inspection provision of the Antarctic Treaty. For Mr. Phleger's statement see Tab D of the proposed memorandum to the Secretary./2/

2. The only effective way to assure compliance with the Antarctic Treaty is through the implementation of the inspection provision of the Treaty.

3. The Department regional bureaus, G/PM and Legal have expressed agreement with the view that we should proceed promptly with inspection in the Antarctic, beginning with the next summer period.

4. According to informal consultations we have already had with other agencies concerned with United States activities in the Antarctic (including the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy), they agree that we should proceed promptly with inspection in the Antarctic, beginning with the next summer period.

5. The two Admirals in charge of United States Naval Support in the Antarctic are of the opinion that we should proceed promptly with inspection in the Antarctic, beginning with the next summer period. Mr. Simsarian has discussed this matter with Admiral Tyree who just retired after four years in the Antarctic; and Mr. Mills has discussed this matter with Admiral Reedy now in charge in the Antarctic.

6. We need an early decision to proceed with inspection in order to carry out an inspection program in November 1963. The Department of the Navy has already urged us to resolve this matter now in order that planning can proceed at this time with respect to the utilization of the few icebreakers available. In fact Admiral Tyree has pointed out that the Glacier should be used for this purpose, and there will be a number of demands on this ship.

7. Admiral Tyree and Admiral Reedy have both pointed out that inspection by planes is not feasible at this time, and that a ship would have to be used for the 1963-64 season. Landing facilities at foreign bases are not safe for use by American planes at this time, according to Admiral Tyree, who certainly is knowledgeable on this subject.

8. An immediate decision on this matter is also necessary to enable the National Science Foundation to proceed with arrangements it already has underway for the recruitment of scientists to be sent to the Antarctic during the 1963-64 season. This program will have to be meshed with logistics arrangements for the inspection program.

9. Since starting our own discussions relating to an inspection program in the Antarctic, the United Kingdom has proposed to the Department the desirability of proceeding immediately with the implementation of the inspection provisions of the Treaty. We have informed the United Kingdom that we are studying this matter and will provide a United States response as soon as possible.

10. All of the above points relate to the urgent need to reach an early decision to proceed promptly with a plan for inspection in Antarctica, beginning with the 1963-64 season. There of course is the separate question of whether we should proceed unilaterally or multilaterally. On this issue there is a difference of opinion that should be resolved. While IO and EUR favor the multilateral approach, Legal and ACDA are pressing for the unilateral approach.

The first preparatory meeting for the Third Consultative Meeting of signatory governments to the Antarctic Treaty was held in Brussels on March 7, 1963. The delegates could not agree on when to hold the meeting, but would request instructions from their governments prior to the next preparatory meeting, scheduled for April 4. No agreement was reached as to whether measures to protect Antarctic wildlife would take the form of a code or a convention (some delegates preferred a code since a convention would require legislative approval). No action needed to be taken to arrange a technical meeting on radio communications in the Antarctic, since one was scheduled in Washington between June 24 and 28. No need was seen for a symposium on logistics until after the Third Consultative Meeting had taken place. (Airgram A-1109 from Brussels, March 22, 1963; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, SCI 11-1 ANT)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Exercise of the Right of Inspection Under the Antarctic Treaty

In reviewing United States interests and objectives in Antarctica, it is gratifying to note the progress made there and the continuing spirit of friendly cooperation between the United States and the other signatories of the Antarctic Treaty; Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom (Tab A)./2/ To the best of our knowledge, Treaty provisions reserving the continent for peaceful purposes only and prohibiting any measures of a military nature have been observed by all countries active in Antarctica. It is in the interest of the United States to foster this situation by continuing to implement the unique provisions of the Treaty which ensure continued use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.

Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty (Tab B) provides that "In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions" of the Treaty, each Contracting Party which conducts substantial scientific research in Antarctica has the right to designate observers to inspect all areas of Antarctica. It seems to us that this inspection provision should be implemented beginning with the 1963-64 season by arranging for the inspection of bases in Antarctica. Extensive logistic requirements do not permit an inspection of all Antarctic bases in any one year, but routine annual inspections should be initiated. (Tab C)./3/

In Senate hearings on the Antarctic Treaty it was made clear that inspections would be carried out. On June 14, 1960 before the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Herman Phleger, representing the Department of State, said ". . . it would be contemplated that upon ratification of the treaty and its coming into force the parties, including the United States would designate observers who would see to it that the provisions were respected." (Tab D)./4/

The inspection provision of the Treaty has not been a controversial subject between signatory countries since the signing of the Treaty. In his opening statement at the Canberra Consultative Meeting under the Antarctic Treaty, on July 24, 1961, the United States representative spoke of inspection as "a normal activity under the treaty." A Soviet legal adviser has stated that "any State with the right to attend consultative conferences may appoint observers. They are free to travel to any part of the Antarctic at any time. The signatories must admit them for inspection of all stations, installations, equipment, and ships and planes at points of discharge and loading in the Antarctic."/5/

United States agencies and departments active in Antarctica are complying with the obligations of the Antarctic Treaty, and they of course do not object to their activities being inspected should another signatory choose to inspect.

The Treaty does not prescribe procedures for carrying out inspection. The precise manner in which inspection is to be carried out will depend upon the procedures which are developed and the precedents established as the Treaty is implemented. Since we do not believe that the Soviet Union, or any other Contracting Party, is presently engaging in improper activities, it should be relatively simple to develop inspection procedures at this stage. It will become more difficult to procure adequate inspection if we wait until the Soviets may have something to hide. Moreover, while we have no reason to believe that the Soviet Union is acting in violation of the Treaty, inspection would provide additional assurance that the objectives of the Treaty are being fulfilled. Finally, inspection would, if properly executed, deter possible violations, and provide a body of experience which might be applicable elsewhere.

Inspection parties would be transported by ship or aircraft of the U.S. Naval Support Force in Antarctica. Since both ships and aircraft are tightly scheduled to carry out existing projects, careful and early planning and coordination will be required in order to carry out effective inspections without disrupting scientific projects. Planning and logistics for 1963-64 are set forth in Tab C.

It is recommended that the United States plan and carry out inspections in accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty of areas in the Antarctic, including bases of the Soviet Union, on a routine annual basis, starting with the 1963-64 austral summer season. It is further recommended that arrangements for carrying out these inspections begin immediately.

The second preparatory meeting for the Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting took place in Brussels on April 4, 1963. The Consultative Meeting was scheduled for the first 2 weeks of June 1964 in Brussels. The delegates discussed a British draft convention for the protection of Antarctic wildlife; representatives of Chile and the Soviet Union said that their governments were preparing drafts of their own. Chairman A. van der Essen said that a convention was preferable to a code since a code would apply only to signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, while a convention could be ratified by other countries. Before adjourning, the delegates discussed representation at the telecommunications conference scheduled for Washington in June, and agreed to ask their governments to submit a list of topics for the agenda of the Third Consultative Meeting. (Airgram A-1262 from Brussels, April 26, 1963; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, SCI 11-1 ANT)

Washington, April 15, 1963.

SUBJECT
Antarctic Inspection

You will recall from your brief conversation with Ambassador Daniels that he continues to believe we should go ahead with picking a person to represent State on a selection board which will designate the persons to be named as inspectors in Antarctica.

Recalling your comment that planning should be more definite so we will know what sort of person to designate, I have listed below the criteria which the selection board will use. These criteria were agreed upon tentatively at several meetings of Ambassador Daniels' subgroup. Admittedly it is something less than firm written planning but I believe all the points will be in any written plan produced:

1. The panel of inspectors, from which teams of 2, 3 or 4 will be chosen, will be about 20 persons.

2. NASA, CIA, DOD, NSF, ACDA and State will be asked to submit names of qualified persons as candidates. Any other agency is welcome to submit names. Agencies submitting names are not limited to their own personnel.

3. Persons not qualified are:

a. Any individual who has served as an exchange scientist in Antarctica. This will prevent present exchange scientists from being viewed as potential inspectors.

b. Any present member of the United States Naval Antarctic Support Force. It is believed that their inclusion might impair the friendly working relationship to personnel of other countries in Antarctica.

c. Any present member of the United States Antarctic Research Program (the scientists). This is for the same reason as b above.

d. Any person known to be connected with CIA.

4. The selection board will consist of one member each from NASA, ACDA, State, DOD, NSF, and CIA.

5. Inspectors chosen by the selection board will be appointed by ACDA. (Probably with some sort of written commission from the Secretary of State and the President).

6. The 20 man panel of inspectors should possess the following qualifications:

a. Fluent knowledge of Russian, Spanish and French.

b. Knowledge and/or experience of Antarctica.

c. Competence in some of the earth sciences studied in Antarctica.

d. Competence in electronics, and space science and (probably) in the use of a camera.

e. An affable, diplomatic personality.

As to the inspection itself, it is pretty firm that we plan to inspect by ship coastal bases between 180º and 90ºE i.e. the French base Dumont D'Urville, the Australian-United States Wilkes base, and the Russian Mirnyy base. If logistics permit, this inspecting group might go on to the Australian Mawson base and Russia's Molodezhnaya base.

Still tentative is a plan to inspect bases of Chile, Argentina and the U.K. in the Palmer Peninsula area. Whether or not we do depends upon political considerations--the nationalist sensitivity of Argentina and Chile. Logistics here is no problem since inspectors could get a "free ride" on a United States ship which plans to go there for scientific purposes.

Also being considered is the possibility of inspection of some bases by overflight. Bases which have so far been discussed for such inspection are Vostok, Sovetskaya and Komsomolskaya, all Russian.

This leaves a number of things still to be decided, but should be enough to permit designation of a State member for the selection board.

I suggest that we contact the Office of Personnel, explain the problem and ask them to produce about 15 or 20 individuals, each of them possessing one or more of the necessary qualifications, and each of them available for any six week period between November 1, 1963 and March 1, 1964.

This is a very big order indeed and needs corresponding justification.

The job of inspecting foreign bases in Antarctica is a very delicate one. A mistake in judgment could have serious adverse consequences for our presently cordial relations there. I believe that the only way we can discharge our responsibility with regard to Antarctica is by having representatives on any group undertaking inspection of foreign bases there and I also believe that any United States inspection team should not be predominately military because of the emphasis on peaceful activities only in the Antarctic Treaty. This might occur naturally simply because DOD has so many more people to draw upon, unless we are able to submit the 15 or 20 names I have suggested.

Washington, April 17, 1963.

SUBJECT
Inspection of Bases in Antarctica

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Viktor Karpov, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Ambassador Paul Daniels, ACDA
Mr. William Mills, OES

Ambassador Daniels explained that because of his Antarctic background he had been asked to help in the planning for implementing the inspection provision of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty, the article included to ensure no violations of the treaty. He said that there has never been any need to inspect and is none now so far as he knew, but it wasn't desirable to let this valuable article atrophy through disuse. In any case, inspections might well serve to inspire confidence. He said that it seemed a good idea to inform other governments--especially the USSR--of our planning, to maintain the mutual confidence and cordial relations which exist in Antarctica. He said it is too early to make definite statements about details of the inspection since we are in the planning stage. He hoped that Mr. Karpov's government would look upon any inspection in Antarctica as the United States does, namely as a routine Antarctic operation. The United States would, of course, welcome inspection of any of our bases. The Ambassador said that he did not anticipate an immediate response from Mr. Karpov, but would like to exchange views as soon as Mr. Karpov could report this conversation to his government.

Mr. Karpov asked whether it was visualized that each nation active in Antarctica should inspect all other bases.

Ambassador Daniels responded that that would be too expensive but we might inspect, say, the French D'Urville base, Mirnyy, where we would expect a cordial welcome, and the Australian base at Mawson with possibly inclusion of bases of Argentina, Chile and the U.K. in the Palmer Peninsula.

Mr. Karpov asked whether United States scientists working in Antarctica would be included in the United States inspection program.

Ambassador Daniels said that they would not, emphasizing that any inspection would be completely separated from the scientific program in Antarctica. He said that later on we will inform all treaty signatories of the names of our observers as required by the treaty.

Mr. Karpov asked whether all governments would be informed simultaneously. Ambassador Daniels said yes.

Mr. Karpov asked how long inspectors would stay at any one base.

Ambassador Daniels said that no very lengthy stay was planned and there was no desire to abuse anyone's hospitality. He added that we have made no announcement about this matter and do not plan to do so. We hope that any inspection would be a "low key" matter not to be "glamorized." The United States views this inspection strictly in the Antarctic context without any connection to the rest of the world.

Mr. Karpov asked whether there was any special reason for planning the inspection now.

Ambassador Daniels said there was none but that we did not want this valuable treaty provision to atrophy from disuse. The Ambassador added that if nobody used the inspection provision until six or eight years had passed, then initiation of an inspection would indeed cause comment and speculation.

Mr. Karpov asked if any procedures had been worked out, noting that there could be many important practical considerations. He also asked whether detailed procedures would be decided by consultation among governments.

Ambassador Daniels said that presumably there will be conversations on this subject, and procedures would be the same for all countries. He noted that there were no rules for the details of inspection and expressed the belief that the matter would resolve itself with the use of common sense.

Mr. Karpov said that he would inform his government and see if we could reach an agreement on detailed procedures.

Ambassador Daniels said that there was no need to reach an agreement about inspection but that we would be interested in any comments on procedural matters. He added that it might be good if Soviets inspect United States bases and others. The Ambassador reiterated that we view this inspection as purely an Antarctic matter, unrelated to other parts of the world. Mr. Karpov proposed "a hypothetical case" in which only the United States and the USSR designated inspectors. He then asked whether we would agree upon procedures to be used. Ambassador Daniels said that there would not be much to agree upon because the right to inspect is established.

Mr. Karpov asked whether the United States would go ahead and inspect if no other country did so because of costs involved and so forth.

Ambassador Daniels said yes.

Mr. Karpov asked whether we had any procedures to avoid overcrowding the base being inspected.

Mr. Mills said that we would not abuse anyone's hospitality.

Mr. Karpov asked whether these things will be subject to agreement "on the spot."

Ambassador Daniels said in most cases, yes. He reiterated that we hope any inspection will be viewed as a routine non-glamorous operation.

Mr. Karpov said that he could not assume a very quick response to this conversation.

Ambassador Daniels reiterated the fact that we have no suspicions about any present activity in Antarctica and are very happy about the cordial relations there.

Washington, May 8, 1963.

SUMMARY RECORD OF MAY 8 ANTARCTICA PERSONNEL
ADVISORY GROUP (PAG) MEETING

1. Those present at the May 8 meeting of Antarctica PAG were Commander Kline (DOD), Mr. Dykes (CIA), Col. Pozinsky (NASA), Mr. Fennemore (State), Mr. Mills (State) and Mr. Freund (ACDA) in whose office the meeting took place.

2. It was agreed that in drawing up the lists of qualifications for inspectors two lists would be needed. One will be a list of general qualifications that would be needed in light of Tab A of the Committee of Antarctica Working Paper dated April 18 ("Possible activities in Antarctica which would be inconsistent with the treaty")./2/ The other list would be based on our knowledge of the specific significant activities known to be carried on at each of the bases we are considering inspecting. Messrs. Mills and Dykes and Commander Kline agreed to collaborate in furnishing for the next meeting of the PAG a list of known activities for each base.

3. It was further agreed that no matter how uninteresting a base might be from the point of view of U.S. national security or how elementary its activities are, the make-up of the group inspecting would take into account both the sensibilities of the government operating the base and of the Soviets. By this it was meant that there would be serious explorations made by fully qualified U.S. personnel and that we would avoid too great contrasts between the groups inspecting, for example, Soviet and Chilean bases. As Mr. Mills suggested, we would in fact have two categories of inspection groups, one where our national security interests are involved and the other where they are not, but this would not be apparent to the hosts.

4. The question of whether military personnel would be included among the inspectors was put off for later consideration, although no group would, in any case, be predominantly military.

5. The question of numbers in each group was also left open, pending examination of the qualifications mix required in each case and the possibilities of finding individuals who combine a variety of capabilities.

6. It was agreed that special efforts both in the selection of inspectors and their training will be necessary to avoid any impression that we are carrying out intelligence activities. For example, former service attachés would be excluded.

7. Inspection groups will be asked to submit serious unclassified reports for later submission to the other signatories. By "serious" we mean that the reports on both the above-mentioned categories of bases will be equally thorough though commensurate with the numbers and kinds of activities going on at any given base.

8. The draft document of April 18 on "Qualification and Selection of Personnel" was briefly reviewed. It was agreed that a thorough review would await the availability of the promised revised draft. Nevertheless, the following points in the paper were considered:

a. Near the top of Page 2 provision will be made for State Department suggestion that the inspection will be designed as a precedent for subsequent inspections.

b. Proficiency in language (Page 3) will be secondary to expertise in substantive fields./3/ In fact, Soviet suspicion could be aroused if we include an inspector fully fluent in Russian who is not also highly qualified in one of the technical fields of Soviet activity at the bases inspected.

c. Observer qualifications (Page 3) should include at least one inspector in each group with good amateur photographic ability. There would still be special training (Page 5) in the peculiarities of photography in Antarctica./4/ We would also consider how much aerial photography can be accomplished by the aircraft carrying the inspector groups in and out of the bases.

d. If there is considered to be any possibility at all that nuclear materials are at or near any of the bases to be inspected, we will consider as a qualification ability to operate detection devices of a relatively simple nature. Mr. Dykes undertook to explore this point in his own Agency and with other Agencies as appropriate.

e. Mr. Dykes pointed out that the last clause of the first paragraph on Page 4 is unnecessary./5/

9. It was agreed that the next meeting will take place at 2 p.m., May 21 in Mr. Freund's office. Among other things, the PAG will consider (a) a draft paper giving the list of functions at each base being considered for inspection and related qualifications for inspectors, (b) the revised version of the "Qualifications and Selection of Personnel" paper, and (c) a draft list of qualifications related to Tab A of the April 18 Antarctica Working Paper.

The third preparatory meeting prior to the Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting was held in Brussels on June 6, 1963. Participants discussed Chilean proposals to modify a British draft convention on the protection of Antarctic flora and fauna. They agreed that the Third Consultative Meeting should decide whether measures to protect wildlife should be in the form of a code or a convention, although preparatory meetings could draft the text. Participants then discussed agenda items for the Third Consultative Meeting, and tentatively agreed to include: a draft text of the convention for the protection of Antarctic flora and fauna, exchange of scientific information, the result of the Washington telecommunications meeting, administrative arrangements between consultative meetings, and creation of a regional meteorological establishment. (Airgram A-1439 from Brussels, June 13, 1963; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, SCI 11-1 ANT)

Washington, June 21, 1963.

SUBJECT
Control of United States Nationals in Antarctica

Mr. Owen's memorandum of November 28, 1961 on "Privately Sponsored Activities in Antarctica",/2/ which you have transmitted to me for my information, asks whether authority exists under United States law to control the conduct of United States nationals in Antarctica, and if not, whether legislation to accomplish this result is desirable. I understand that these questions have not as yet been explored.

As you know, I have not yet had time to become thoroughly acquainted with Antarctic problems, or to research such questions in depth. However, as a basis for further discussion, some preliminary thoughts and comments on the questions raised by Mr. Owen may be useful.

1. U.S. International Legal Obligations Respecting the Conduct of Individuals in Antarctica.

As a Party to the Antarctic Treaty, the United States has an obligation to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are not violated either by the United States Government or by United States nationals. Article X of the Treaty casts this obligation in the broadest possible terms:

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty.

Article X appears to impose an obligation on each Party not only to prevent violations by its own citizens, but also to prevent violations by other Parties or their citizens and even by non-Parties or their citizens.

In fact, few provisions of the Treaty appear to be presently capable of violation by individuals, as opposed to Governments. Thus, it is difficult to conceive of individuals carrying on military or nuclear activities in Antarctica. The principal provisions which might relate primarily to conduct by individuals are those of Article IX(1)(f), concerning the preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. Though these do not in terms impose any positive obligations on individuals, it may be noted that the First Consultative Meeting under the Treaty recommended the issuance of specified general rules of conduct to protect living resources, as well as the adoption of adequate measures to protect tombs, buildings and objects of historic interest from damage or destruction (see pages 8 and 9 of Report of the meeting)./3/ A Convention to Protect Living Resources in Antarctica is currently under consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Third Consultative Meeting. The adoption of such a Convention will doubtless require the assumption by the United States of specific obligations to forbid certain types of conduct or activities by United States nationals.

2. Practical Need for Authority to Control Conduct of United States Nationals.

Authority to control the conduct of United States nationals in Antarctica may as a practical matter be desirable in at least three areas:

(a) If the United States becomes party to a Convention to Protect Living Resources in Antarctica, we will probably need legal authority to ensure that United States nationals do not violate its provisions;

(b) Substantial numbers of United States nationals, both military and civilian, are currently present in Antarctica as part of our Antarctic expeditions. Some measure of regulation of personnel on such expeditions seems highly desirable. Especially in view of the strains of Antarctic life, it is not unlikely that serious criminal conduct may occasionally occur;

(c) It is not impossible that non-Governmental expeditions, financed by private United States individuals or institutions, may in the future attempt to go to the Antarctic. In the absence of any governmental regulation of entry into Antarctica by such expeditions, or control of them while there, they could conceivably interfere with or constitute a burden upon our governmental efforts in this field (e.g. by requiring diversion of official expedition resources for rescue efforts).

Since foreign nationals usually accompany our expeditions as observers or exchange scientists, or may otherwise operate with or in the vicinity of our own personnel, authority to control their conduct might also be desirable. However, measures to control foreign nationals appear to raise substantially more serious problems than measures to control United States nationals, and are probably of a lower order of priority.

3. Existing Legal Authority to Control Conduct of United States Nationals.

I have found no United States legislation by its terms specifically applicable to Antarctica. Moreover, since federal legislation is usually construed to apply only to conduct taking place within the territory of the United States, our criminal and other laws would not, in general, be regarded as applicable in Antarctica unless they specifically so provided. As a general rule, therefore, United States law does not apply in Antarctica.

There are, however, several important exceptions to the above rule.

(a) The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is applicable to all military personnel wherever they may be. Thus, all naval and other military personnel in Antarctica are presently subject to a complete code of United States disciplinary and criminal law. However, a series of Supreme Court decisions has severely limited the reach of provisions of the Code purporting to extend it to civilians accompanying our armed forces in peacetime. It seems virtually certain that the Code could not be regarded as applicable to civilians in Antarctica.

(b) 18 U.S.C. Section 7 defines the "Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction" of the United States to include:

(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.

(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.

(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.

Other provisions of the Criminal Code provide that certain types of conduct within this special jurisdiction as so defined shall constitute crimes. See e.g. 18 USC 81 (arson); 18 USC 113 (assault); 18 USC 2111 (burglary); 18 USC 791 (espionage); 18 USC 2032 (carnal knowledge); 18 USC 661 (larceny); 18 USC 114 (maiming); 18 USC 1363 (malicious mischief); and 18 USC 2031 (rape); and 18 USC 2111 (robbery). The District courts of the United States have jurisdiction over such offenses (18 USC 3231); under 18 USC 3238, "The trial of offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district, shall be in the district where the offender is found, or into which he is first brought".

These provisions may be applicable to such part of the Antarctic Treaty Area as may be considered to constitute part of "the high seas" or "any land reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof". Since we do not recognize any territorial sea in Antarctica, the "high seas" can probably be regarded as extending at least to the edge of the ice. It could even be argued that the "high seas" within the meaning of the statute reached even onto the ice, so long as it was definitely sea ice; certainly this would not appear to do violence to the purpose of the statute. It is also conceivable that paragraph (3) of 18 USC 7 might conceivably be construed to include an Antarctic base; this point may warrant further research.

(c) A few statutes, of relatively minor importance to the question of control of conduct in Antarctica, are applicable to United States nationals wherever they may be, including Antarctica. This is the case, for instance, respecting the treason law (18 USC 2381), the income tax law (See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 911, 2001), and the Universal Military Training Act (50 USC 453).

The legal situation respecting United States nationals in Antarctica would in summary, therefore, appear to be as follows:

All naval and military personnel are fully covered by the UCMJ, and there is no special need for further legislation controlling the conduct of such persons;

United States civilian nationals in Antarctica and aliens accompanying United States expeditions are in general not covered by the United States criminal laws or other United States statutes, except when they are within the limited "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States", in which case they are subject to laws proscribing only the most serious crimes.

There does not appear to be any general authority to prohibit or control travel of United States nationals to Antarctica. While in certain circumstances the Government might conceivably seek injunctions to prevent private citizens from journeying to Antarctica for the purpose of conducting activities violating the Treaty (on the analogy of the injunctions successfully obtained against persons intending to sail into prohibited atomic testing zones), this remedy would seem limited.

4. Consistency of United States Legislation Controlling Conduct of United States Nationals in Antarctica with International Law and the Antarctica Treaty.

The principal Article of the Antarctic Treaty dealing with the question of jurisdiction is Article VIII, which provides:

1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 1(b) of Article III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.

Article IX(1)(e) requires the parties to consider measures concerning "questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica". It is apparent from these articles that the question of jurisdiction was a troublesome one on which no clear decision was reached in the negotiations, and that it was the intent of the drafters that any problems which might arise be dealt with subsequently by mutual accommodation.

There would appear to be no legal barrier, however, under either international law or the Antarctic Treaty, to United States legislation aimed at controlling the conduct solely of United States nationals in Antarctica so long as such legislation is based upon such United States nationality. It is a recognized principle of international law that every state has the right to control the conduct of its own nationals wherever they may be, and the Antarctic Treaty in no way restricts this principle.

The case would be otherwise were we to attempt to base legislation aimed at controlling particular conduct by our nationals or foreign nationals on a claim of territorial jurisdiction. Any such attempt on our part would be inconsistent with what I understand to be our policy of refraining from making any territorial claim in Antarctica. Moreover, such legislation might be interpreted as a "new claim . . . to territorial sovereignty" inconsistent with Article IV of the Treaty, and, under Article IV, need not in any case be recognized by other states.

The right of each state to control its own nationals in Antarctica was expressly stated by Mr. Phleger during the Senate Hearings as follows:

Mr. Phleger. By virtue of recognizing that there is no sovereignty over Antarctica we retain jurisdiction over our citizens who go down there and we would deny the rights of the other claimants to try that citizen. (Hearings, p. 62)

This right is also implicit in the provisions of Article VIII(1) of the Treaty, which makes it clear that observers and scientific personnel of one country present with another country's expedition are to be subject only to the jurisdiction of their national state.

As Mr. Phleger's statement indicates, there is always the possibility of a conflict of jurisdictional claims, e.g. where one nation asserts jurisdiction on the basis of nationality and another asserts jurisdiction on the basis that the act occurred in its territory. Theoretically, both claims may be legally valid and the question simply one of priority of concurrent jurisdictions. However, given the confused situation as to territorial claims in the Antarctic, and the clear recognition of this problem and intent to create a moratorium respecting it in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, it seems most likely that states will in practice permit the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over its own nationals on the undisputed basis of nationality, without asserting possible conflicting claims to exercise jurisdiction over such persons based solely on claims to territorial jurisdiction.

A more difficult question is the right to control the conduct of persons who are not nationals of the United States accompanying a United States expedition. It is clear under Article VIII(1) that if such persons are either foreign observers or exchange scientists or their staffs, the United States cannot exercise jurisdiction over them, and that they are subject only to the jurisdiction of their own states. Since aliens present with United States expeditions will ordinarily fall into one of the above specified categories, the scope of the problem insofar as we have authority to deal with it seems minimal and perhaps best ignored.

5. Possible form of United States legislation.

I would think that legislation to control serious criminal conduct by United States nationals in the Antarctic could be reasonably brief and simple. One possibility would be to incorporate by reference into an Antarctic criminal statute crimes already so defined for the purposes of the "Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States". The statute might provide, for instance, that:

Any national of the United States who commits within the area south of 60º South Latitude an act which would constitute (as defined in 18 USC 81, 113, 2111, 791, 2032, 661, 114, 1363, 2031, and 2111) a crime if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 USC 7), shall be subject to the same penalties provided for such act if committed with the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

This draft is, of course, suggestive only, and would require much more work. It would be easier from a drafting standpoint to define the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States as including Antarctica; however, this would not seem practical since such action by the U.S. might be interpreted as an exercise of territorial jurisdiction on our part. As a possible alternative, the crimes defined with respect to the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States could be completely spelled out with respect to U.S. nationals in Antarctica, though this would, of course, mean a more lengthy statute. In either case, no special legislation would appear required to either make such offenses triable by United States District Courts (18 USC 3231) or to permit trial in the court of the District into which the accused is brought (18 USC 3238).

The drafting of legislation to implement any Convention on the Protection of Living Resources in Antarctica must obviously await the final form of such a Convention and the defining of U.S. obligations therein. It may be noted, however, that conservation legislation of this general sort already exists in U.S. law (see 16 USC 715 [Migrating birds] and 16 USC 631 [seals])/4/ and should not pose any special problems. Even in the absence of such a Convention, unilateral legislation to implement the recommendations of the First Consultative Meeting and protect these resources from harm by United States nationals might be desirable.

More generally, some thought might be given to the seeking of legislation vesting a general power in the Secretary of Interior generally to administer United States bases and expeditions in Antarctica and to make such rules and regulations as may be required for the government of U.S. nationals in the Treaty area. (See e.g. 48 USC 1661 [American Samoa] and 48 USC 1681 [Trust Territory of the Pacific] and Exec. Orders 10264 and 10265). Any such general grant of authority would, of course, have to be cast in a form consistent with the Treaty provisions creating a moratorium on territorial claims so as not to raise any disputes with our Treaty partners.

6. Concluding Comments.

A decision whether actively to seek legislation to control United States nationals in Antarctica will need to take into account the fact that no significant problems in this respect have as yet arisen and the possibility that any attempt to seek such legislation may conceivably give rise to some controversy in Congress and with our Treaty partners.

On the other hand, account must be taken of the possibility that sooner or later a United States national in Antarctica may commit a serious crime not punishable under present law. If this occurs, the Department and other Government agencies concerned might be subject to criticism if steps have not been taken to anticipate and deal with this situation. Moreover, if a Convention to Protect Living Resources in Antarctica is drawn up in the near future, and if we have in any case to seek legislation to implement its provisions, it would not be much more arduous or difficult to at the same time seek additional legislation dealing with related jurisdictional problems. Mr. Phleger's testimony to the Senate indicates that this problem was anticipated, and no reason is apparent why Congress would resist granting such legislation. I would think it at least desirable that this matter be further explored by a small group consisting of representatives of State, Navy, Interior, and Justice.

The Antarctic Treaty Meeting on Telecommunications was held in Washington June 24-28, 1963. For text of the final communique, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1963, pages 107-108. The Report of the U.S. Delegation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctica Files, Multilateral, General, 1963. The Recommendations of the meeting are printed in U.S. Policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica, Message From the President of the United States Transmitting Special Report on United States Policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica, 88th Congress, Second Session, House Document No. 358 (Washington, 1964), Annex III, Document No. 6.

Washington, June 25, 1963.

SUBJECT
Appropriate Subjects for Observation in Antarctica Inspection

In connection with the proposed United States inspection in Antarctica during the coming austral summer, you have asked our views as to what the observers should seek in particular to observe.

As we previously discussed, it seems important that the observers simply observe and report their observations, and not attempt in the course of their inspection to draw any definitive legal conclusions as to whether any of the facts or activities observed constitute a violation of the treaty. The judgment whether a violation may be involved and whether an international complaint is justified should only be reached subsequently by the appropriate United States Government agencies on the basis of the observers' report.

Nevertheless, the observers will need a general idea of what to look for in their inspection and what facts or activities merit report or comment. This memorandum therefore gives some general guidance as to what legal obligations the Treaty imposes on parties. It is impossible, however, to completely catalogue or list the acts or failures to act which might constitute violations of these obligations. While principal guidelines can be given, and technical instructions will be required, the subjects to which the observers direct particular attention may in the last analysis have to be dictated by their good judgment in the light of what they see during the inspection.

DISCUSSION

Article VII of the treaty sets forth the purposes and describes the general procedures and scope of inspection./2/ The purpose of inspection is stated in the first clause of Article VII to be "to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present Treaty." It may be noted that the purpose of the inspection is in terms broader than simply checking for treaty violations; it is designed also to promote the treaty's objectives. Since the Treaty's objectives are very broad, the appropriate scope of concern of the observers would appear likewise extremely broad, and it would not be technically necessary to justify particular desired observations in terms of specific treaty obligations. However, for all practical purposes, the observers will be primarily concerned with matters linked with express treaty obligations. It may therefore be useful to examine these obligations seriatim.

1. Peaceful Purposes.

Article I of the Treaty provides that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only and that there shall be prohibited inter alia any measures of a military nature such as the establishment of military stations and fortification, the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of any type of weapons. It is expressly provided, however, that military personnel and equipment may be used for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes.

The observers should therefore pay particular attention to any indications of the following:

(a) The establishment of military bases and fortifications;
(b) The carrying out of military maneuvers;
(c) The testing of any type of weapons;
(d) Any other measure which might be construed as one of a military nature.

If military personnel or equipment are in use, the purpose and scope of their use should be carefully noted, and, if possible, the reason for the use of military instead of civilian personnel or equipment enquired into.

2. Exchange of Scientific Information.

Article III provides, inter alia, that to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged and scientific observations and results from Antarctica should be exchanged and made freely available.

The observers should, therefore, pay particular attention to the following:

(a) What scientific programs are being carried on?
(b) What scientific observations and results are being obtained?

Of course, the observers will not be in a position to verify whether information regarding the programs, observations, and results has in fact been exchanged and made freely available; this will have to be done by comparing information from their report with information previously or subsequently made available by the foreign government. However, the observers should attempt to obtain as detailed a sense of the scope of scientific activity as feasible in order that an evaluation can be later made in this respect.

3. Nuclear Ban.

Article V of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions in Antarctica or the disposal there of any radioactive waste material.

The observers should, therefore, look for any indications either of:

(a) the carrying on of nuclear explosions, or
(b) the disposal of radioactive waste material.

Article VII(5) provides that each Contracting Party will inform the other Contracting Parties and give them advance notice of all expeditions to and within Antarctica, all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals, and any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica. Paragraph I-VI of the 1961 Canberra Recommendations, which were approved by all the Contracting Parties (TIAS 5094), recommends a more detailed list of such information which should be furnished.

The observers should observe and record information regarding the detailed matters specified in Paragraph I-VI, in order to permit subsequent verification as to whether the provisions for advance notification have been in fact complied with.

Article IX provides that the Parties may, in Consultative Meeting, recommend to their governments measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding the preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. These measures are to become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties.

The Contracting Parties, at the 1961 Canberra meeting, recommended that, as an interim measure, and to the extent possible under national legislation and binding international convention, they issue general rules of conduct for the preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica on the lines of the 1960 SCAR recommendations, annexed to the recommendation. This recommendation, inter alia, was approved by the United States and the other parties (see paragraph I-VIII of TIAS 5094) and was subsequently reaffirmed and reapproved at the 1962 Buenos Aires meeting (see para II-II of TIAS 5274). The Canberra meeting also recommended that governments adopt all adequate measures to protect tombs, buildings or objects of historical interest from damage and destruction (I-IX of TIAS 5094), and this was similarly approved by governments.

While the acceptance of these recommendations appears technically to create only an obligation to issue such general rules, and then only to the extent possible under national legislation, it may be argued that acceptance in practical effect comes close to importing an obligation to conform with the standards. Matters covered by the rules therefore seem an entirely appropriate subject of observation.

The observers should accordingly note whether there are any activities being engaged in inconsistent with the general rules set forth in the Canberra meeting, and in particular: (a) whether indigenous animals or plants are being unnecessarily destroyed or disturbed or injured except as provided in the general rules; (b) whether alien forms of flora and fauna are being deliberately introduced except when rigidly controlled; and (c) whether the activities specified in paragraph 3 of the general rules and conduct are being regulated with a view to preventing serious harm to wildlife (e.g. allowing dogs to run free, discharge of oil from ships, etc.).

Article VII, as previously noted, provides in extremely broad terms for the scope of inspection. Article VIII provides that there will be no exercise of jurisdiction over the observers making the inspection.

The observers should pay particular note to any restrictions on their freedom of movement or observation or to any attempts to exercise jurisdiction over them, and should include any such activities in their report.

The recommendations of the 1961 Canberra Consultative Meeting, accepted by all the Contracting Parties, recommended that Governments undertake to exchange information on logistic problems (para I-VIII) and that governments exchange by all means deemed advisable information on the application of nuclear equipment and techniques in the Treaty area (para I-III).

Matters relating to these subjects would therefore also be appropriate subjects for observation.

Washington, June 28, 1963.

SUBJECT
Responsibility for Carrying out Inspections in Antarctica

I.

Mr. William C. Foster, in a memorandum of June 26 to you,/2/ recommends that ACDA have responsibility for the implementation of Antarctic inspections. He raises three questions in his memorandum:

1. That letters designating observers for the inspection operation in Antarctica be signed by you as Secretary of State. I recommend that you agree to sign these letters. (There may be about a dozen of them.)

2. That ACDA have primary responsibility for the implementation of the inspection operation in Antarctica. On this proposal I raise some questions below.

3. That the Department of State and ACDA consult with one another prior to making proposals to foreign Governments concerning inspection matters. This should of course be standard operating practice.

II.

Our relations with ACDA work very well these days, and I have no doubt that the Agency would do an excellent job of managing the Antarctic "observers" operation (we should probably stick to the Treaty language rather than by calling the "inspectors") if you ask Mr. Foster to assume responsibility for it. However, I do believe there are significant policy questions that should be considered before deciding that Antarctic Treaty responsibilities should be handled as an aspect of arms control and disarmament. I regret the need to raise an essentially jurisdictional question; I do so only because I think real matters of policy are hidden behind the issues of bureaucratic parochialism.

The policy issues are four:

1. There is no example of international harmony and cooperation anywhere in the contemporary world to compare with that presently prevailing in Antarctica. The Cold War has not intruded; the territorial claims and aspirations of the Antarctic powers have been placed in abeyance; and an extraordinary tradition of scientific cooperation has been established. The achievement of this condition of international harmony and cooperation is the result of many years of patient effort on the part of the United States, and its preservation should remain a primary objective of the national policy of the United States. One of the high points of this effort was the conclusion of the Antarctica Treaty in 1959, largely as the result of United States initiative, which provides in Article I that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only." The "observation" provision is an important element of the Treaty, and it should not be allowed to atrophy from disuse. At the same time, the exercise of this right should not disrupt the very harmony and international cooperation which it is the primary purpose of the Treaty to preserve.

2. If you now give ACDA the responsibility for "observers" in Antarctica, it would be hard to avoid the whole operation being publicly presented as an exercise on arms control. Because of the statutory objectives of ACDA and its very name, its identification with inspections in Antarctica would place the program in a military context which could do damage to United States objectives under the Antarctica Treaty. ACDA should certainly participate actively in developing and carrying out the inspection program; something of value may be learned about inspection techniques in general. But the responsibility for the implementation of this program, and for the control of public information about it, might better reside in the Department of State.

3. The inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty involve something quite distinct from the kind of inspections contemplated in the case of nuclear testing and disarmament. Inspections in Antarctica are bound to look rather "soft" to persons thinking in terms of disarmament inspection. The other nations will have plenty of notice, the names of the observers will be fixed well in advance, the inspection will not result from suspicious "events" as contemplated in the nuclear testing field; altogether the Antarctica inspections will not have (and in the absence of some suspicious event should not have) the character of adversary proceedings that will be inevitable in the case of nuclear testing and disarmament. Consequently to identify the Antarctica inspections too closely with arms control and disarmament might give Congress and the general public an entirely erroneous impression of the depth and seriousness of ACDA's plans in other fields.

4. We have no grounds for believing that other nations have arms of any significance in Antarctica. Indeed, the United States has more military personnel and guns in Antarctica than any other nation does. The Soviet Union reports (and there is no contrary evidence) that they have no military personnel and are not using any armed naval ships in the area. In contrast, the United States has about 3,000 military personnel in the area and our logistic support is entirely military including seven armed ships with 6"/50, 5"/38 and 3"/50 guns as well as machine guns. The United Kingdom has one ship with two 4" guns as well as machine guns. An inspection which emphasized the arms control aspect would only serve to attract attention to United States military forces in an Antarctica dedicated by Treaty to peaceful purposes.

III.

ACDA has done excellent work in helping to develop the planning for this program, and it should continue to participate in the program. However, for the reasons cited above, the Department of State should retain the over-all direction of the program, and ACDA's role should be to assist the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in carrying out the inspection program. The Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee on Antarctica, which is chaired by our Bureau, should serve as the coordinating committee for this inspection program as it does with respect to all other United States activities in Antarctica, including the $7,000,000 scientific exploration program. The Commander of the United States Naval Support Force, Antarctica will have responsibility for logistics for this program as he does for other programs in Antarctica.

The Antarctica experts in the Departments of Defense, Commerce and Interior have separately expressed to us their concern on some or all of the above scores; my impression is that they would agree with the substance of this memorandum and with its recommendations. I am sending a copy to Mr. Foster, but making no other distribution.

1. That you authorize the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to carry out the recruitment and supervision of observers under the Antarctica Treaty.

2. That you request ACDA to participate actively in the development and carrying out of the inspection program in Antarctica.

3. That you direct the Bureau of Public Affairs to coordinate all public information on the plan for and activities of American observers in Antarctica./3/

Washington, July 16, 1963.

SUBJ
Commercial Carriers in Antarctica

1. The purpose of this paper is to outline recommendations which should become prerequisites for U.S. commercial carriers to operate in or through Antarctica.

2. Matters related to personnel support and habitability:

a. Berthing. Facilities at McMurdo Station and satellite stations normally are utilized to capacity. Therefore, under normal circumstances, berthing facilities will not be available to commercial carrier crews and passengers. In event of an emergency, and should facilities become available, charges would be in accordance with current U.S. Navy policies and rates.

b. Messing. Food requirements are carefully determined in advance of the operating season to support known personnel requirements. Providing for messing civilians and issuing flight rations would raise shipping and purchasing requirements considerably. There is no provision in our budget for such additional support. In event of an emergency, limited messing would be made available and charges would be made in accordance with established procedures and prescribed rates. If the emergency persisted for more than 24 hours, the only alternative would be to evacuate crews and passengers to New Zealand in military aircraft at the expense of the carrier.

c. Sanitation. Facilities are limited and primitive by stateside standards and there are no special facilities available for ladies.

d. Medical. Facilities and assistance are generally limited, and rudimentary at satellite stations. Humanitarian treatment would be provided in emergencies. It must be understood by the carrier and his insurance company that, in event of an aircraft crash or major disaster, the U.S. Navy does not have the capability to handle a large number of casualties, and that the capability for rapid emergency evacuation is very limited. The Task Force's mission does not provide for improving the medical assistance capability beyond that required to support Deep Freeze operations.

3. Services:

a. POL. Requirements in Antarctica are computed and procured according to operational requirements with a contingency reserve for emergency. This does not provide specifically for any other operations than those directly connected with the Deep Freeze mission. Requirements beyond the present ones will necessitate increasing established POL levels with a resultant increase in shipping requirements and cost. No provisions for this is made in the Support Force budget. Therefore, prior to departing for Antarctica:

(1) Aircraft must make their exact requirements known in advance and receive confirmation that fuel is available.

(2) Ships should be required to depart for Antarctica with sufficient amounts of fuel to assure that refueling in Antarctica would not be required, and that there is sufficient reserve on board to sustain the ships' needs should tanks be damaged by ice, or should ships become beset.

b. Water. Supplies are extremely limited. For the foreseeable future, carriers should be self-sufficient. In an emergency, MSTS ships and icebreakers, if in the area, probably could furnish a very limited amount of water. Here, again, ships should be required to carry sufficient reserves in event of ice damage to tanks. Temperatures and distances preclude "water lines from the beach" as ships are accustomed to arranging in most ports.

c. Electricity. There are no means of providing this to ships. They must provide their own.

d. Crash. Facilities to handle aircraft crashes are very limited generally, and practically non-existent at satellite stations. There is no proper way to provide the services needed in crashes involving large numbers of people. Therefore, the U.S. Navy cannot be responsible for providing adequate crash equipment. It is also not within the mission, or funds available to Commander Task Force 43 to provide the additional equipment necessary to support commercial carriers in this matter. Naturally, existing facilities would be made available. Additionally, there are no crash boats, tugs, etc., to assist ships which may be distressed by ice damage.

e. Vehicular transportation. These facilities are limited but could be made available for special occasions of short duration. There is not sufficient equipment to support "cruises" and sightseers. The Task Force is unable, under present funding, to provide proper transportation to support commercial carriers. Likewise, should commercial carriers desire to provide their own mode of transportation, the adequacy, in severe climatic conditions and rugged terrain, of such vehicles should be approved by an appropriate government agency in advance.

f. Ground support. Commercial ships must provide their own line handlers, make available and install their own dead men for mooring or turning, carry additional mooring lines to guard against severe weather conditions which are rather unpredictable, and provide their own brows and accommodation ladders. Air carriers are required to determine the availability of starters, engine heaters, etc., prior to clearing the flight. Ladders for disembarking passengers and the crew must be carried as standard equipment of the aircraft, as must all means of securing the aircraft to protect it against high winds and blowing snow.

g. Special cold weather clothing. Commercial carriers will be required to have adequate cold weather clothing to protect passengers and crews in Antarctica.

4. Search and Rescue: Would be provided on a humanitarian basis in accordance with established conventions. Here, again, the capability is extremely limited, and any employment for this purpose, of the aircraft or ships severely affects the Task Force Mission.

5. Control of aircraft:

a. ICAO procedures should be extended to include Antarctica.

b. U.S. commercial air carriers will be required to comply with local traffic control procedures which CTF-43 has established to protect military aircraft at its Antarctic stations.

c. U.S. Navy can make available weather and ice information on a "non-interference-with-operations" basis.

6. Special requirements:

a. Pilots of aircraft must be currently experienced in landing on ice and snow. Ship masters should be experienced in operating in waters where ice threatens the safety of a ship and its embarked personnel.

b. Aircraft must be FAA and ICAO certified.

c. Ships should be required to have reinforced hulls to protect them from ice hazards prior to certifying them for Antarctic operations.

d. Aircraft intending to land at U.S. stations other than McMurdo will be required to be ski-equipped.

e. The U.S. Navy will not accept designation as investigator for any accident involving commercial carriers in any manner other than in the case of such an accident involving the Navy anywhere else.

7. Several major problems require resolution:

a. The Department of the Navy has established rates and procedures covering services furnished by military personnel and purchases by civilian enterprises. Existing rules provide for reimbursement for use of military personnel, for POL, for landing fees, for subsistence, etc. Regulations normally require a deposit in advance to cover potential costs. The amount of the deposit would be determined according to the extent and the nature of the services to be provided. This should be resolved in advance of any flight, or trip by ship. It should further be understood that, although CTF-43 purchases these items from allocated funds, payment by the civil carrier is to the Navy Department. The Task Force is NOT, in turn, reimbursed by this amount. The Task Force stands the loss. The exception to this is messing.

b. The problem of jurisdiction regarding the protection of historic landmarks, conservation of wildlife, etc., is a much more complicated issue. Likewise, the problem of handling felonies and misdemeanors is a related problem. At present, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides adequate jurisdiction over military personnel. On board ships and in the air, admiralty and maritime laws appear to provide adequate jurisdiction in these areas. This probably extends to the edge of the ice shelf. At this time, there does not appear to be a way of applying legal jurisdiction over civilians who might commit an offense in Antarctica. If a serious crime were committed, it would be prudent to take steps to protect others, but there does not appear to be established any means for disposing of civil criminal cases. If historic landmarks were damaged, it is considered that the matter would have to be resolved between the governments of the nationals involved. This can become complicated in the instance where U.S. carriers are carrying foreign nationals. The commission of certain offenses is not provided for in the Antarctic Treaty, and this further complicates the matter of jurisdiction over foreign nationals carried by U.S. carriers when the governments of these nationals are not signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Therefore, at this time, Commander Task Force 43, as senior U.S. representative in Antarctica, cannot be responsible for offenses committed by civilians in Antarctica.

J.R. Reedy
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Task Force 43

The fourth preparatory meeting for the Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting was held in Brussels on September 5, 1963. The delegates still had not reached an agreement on whether measures to protect Antarctic flora and fauna should be in a code or a convention. The United States was asked to submit its views in time for the next meeting in November. The agenda for the Third Consultative meeting was discussed, and it was agreed that the establishment of a standing committee on Antarctic meteorology should be placed on the agenda. (Airgram A-270 from Brussels, September 18, 1963; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, SCI 11-1 ANT)

Washington, September 13, 1963.

SUBJECT
President Approves Initiation of Antarctic Inspections

The President has approved the initiation of inspections in Antarctica during the coming austral summer season./2/ The Washington Embassies of the other eleven Governments which are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty were informed of this decision by this office yesterday and this morning. Attached is a copy of the Press Release being issued by the Department of State at noon today (with 3 o'clock as the release time)./3/

Plans are considerably advanced for the inspections to be undertaken. Two teams of Observers will be sent to the Antarctic. One team of four, headed by Russian-speaking John Guthrie, Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs, will go by plane from McMurdo to two Soviet stations (Mirnyy and Vostok) and to two Australian stations (Mannon and Wilkes). This team will also visit the New Zealand Scott station and make a flight over the French station at D'Urville for aerial observation (as expressly authorized by paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty). This team will consist of four rather than three because we are including an interpreter for full coverage of the Russian language.

The other team of three, headed by Richard Hawkins, Spanish-speaking Foreign Service Officer, will travel by the Coast Guard icebreaker Eastwind from Valparaiso to Palmer Peninsula to inspect the stations of Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom (two each).

Nine observers have been selected, seven of them to serve on the two teams and two serve as alternates.

The reaction of the Soviet Union to our plans has been: this is not necessary but if you wish to go ahead with inspections, you are welcome to visit Soviet Stations.

Four other countries have indicated that they also intend to designate Observers and inspect the United States station at McMurdo and the New Zealand Scott station nearby. These four are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Each inspection will be undertaken on a unilateral basis.

Washington, October 29, 1963.

SUBJECT
Appointment of U.S. Antarctic Observers

Notification of the President's formal approval for an Antarctic inspection was transmitted to you in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum of September 3, 1963./2/ The selection of nominees for appointment by you as U.S. Antarctic Observers has now been completed on the basis of agreed qualifications by a special inter-agency Personnel Advisory Group. Nine nominees have passed appropriate physical examinations and have Top Secret clearances.

It is contemplated that each of two 3-Man Observer Teams will consist of a Team Leader (a Foreign Service Officer), a civilian military scientist and a biologist. An interpreter in Russian will be included in the team visiting bases of the USSR, New Zealand and Australia. The other Team, whose leader is a Spanish linguist, will visit the Palmer Peninsula bases of the UK, Argentina and Chile. There will be a photo overflight of a French base. Three Observers will be held available in the U. S. for possible use as alternates in the event that any of the regular Observers becomes incapacitated or is unable to participate for any other reason. There will be a two-week briefing for all team observers and alternates prior to the departure of the Observer Teams.

The names of the nine nominees with a brief biographic sketch for each as well as an evaluation are enclosed./3/ A Letter of Appointment and a Certificate of Appointment for each nominee are attached for your signature. The name of an additional nominee (a biologist) will be transmitted to you for appointment as a U.S. Antarctic Observer when his nomination procedure has been completed.

I recommend that you sign the attached Letters and Certificates of Appointment. After the Letters have been received by the appointed Observers, it is planned to send official notification to the diplomatic missions in Washington of the other 11 signatory Governments, at least one day before public announcement is made of the appointments.

William C. Foster

The fifth preparatory meeting for the Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting was held in Brussels on November 14, 1963. The delegates agreed to postpone the establishment of a standing committee on Antarctic meteorology until the Third Consultative Meeting. Most of the meeting dealt with how to formulate measures for protecting Antarctic wildlife. The United States had submitted a draft of "Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Living Resources in the Antarctic." Chairman A. van der Essen of Belgium regretted that these proposals had not been presented as amendments to a British "Draft Agreement on the Conservation of Wild Life in the Antarctic," and pointed out that a code or "Agreed Measures" would be less binding on individual citizens than a convention would be. The delegates reached no agreement on permanent administrative arrangements between meetings, and scheduled their next meeting for January 9, 1964. The meeting was later rescheduled for the week of January 20-24. (Airgram A-484 from Brussels, November 20, 1963; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, SCI 11-1 ANT)

The U.S. observers conducted their inspections during January 1964. Group A, comprising Richard H. Hawkins, Jr., John L. Buckley, and George W. Rathjens, visited the stations of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom. Group B, comprising John C. Guthrie, Jack P. Ruina, Victor B. Scheffer, and interpreter Michel Ivy, visited the stations of France, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union. For text of their report, submitted in May 1964, see U.S. Policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica, Annex III, Document No. 7, or Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pages 195-203.