Washington, May 10, 1963, 5:15 p.m.

1931. Ref: Dept. Cirtel 1526; CA-9150./2/

1. Special Session of UN General Assembly which begins May 14 must act on resolutions concerning future financing of UN peace and security operations.

2. In reftel Ambassadors were requested to approach non-Soviet Bloc governments at highest level to determine whether governments would support U.S. view that peacekeeping costs for UN Congo and Middle East operations for the last six months of 1963 should be at regular assessment rates, i.e., without reductions in rates levied against less developed countries which rates applied up through June 1962. Since June 1962 no assessments have been levied and UNEF and UNOC costs are being financed from the proceeds from UN bonds. U.S. view was based on fact it difficult to justify continued high level of U.S. financial support-47% of UNEF and UNOC costs and 50% of UN bond issue-while majority UN members owe substantial overdue amounts on their reduced peacekeeping assessments. Tangible demonstration by UN membership of collective financial responsibility required to demonstrate realization that each member has stake in peace and security of world and in UN role in international affairs.

3. U.S. view as contained reftel has been modified because of responses by governments, the outcome of the Working Group of 21, and subsequent consideration within U.S. government.

4. Responses indicate your efforts have produced fuller consideration of UN financing by governments; that many countries have promised to pay arrears within next several months. Therefore, as indicated paragraph 14 reftel it may be possible for U.S. to contribute above 32.02%. We now negotiating in N.Y. financial formula which may include some form of voluntary contributions by U.S. and other developed countries along lines of suggestion originated by U.K.

5. U.S. position currently includes these principal elements:

(a) That the UNEF force in the Middle East must be continued because of the dangerous continuing situation in that area, and that the Congo force, to be greatly reduced by July 1, must be continued until the Congolese national army can be trained to take over the job.

(b) Current estimated budget for last half 1963 for the Middle East operation is $9.5 million and for the Congo operation is $33 million.

(c) We oppose any financial arrangement that would apply to unknown future peacekeeping operations. We also oppose any "special scale" of mandatory assessments for peacekeeping by which U.S. rate would be higher than our regular budget percentage of 32.02.

6. British suggestion on "three bite" approach is as follows:

Bite one would finance an initial amount entirely on regular scale of assessments, U.S. and others being liable for regular shares of an amount which we hope will be ten million dollars per operation.

Under bite two, the remaining cost would be assessed but rate would be different. For the developed countries the regular scale would be used for bite two. For the less developed countries the rate would be one-half their regular rates. Less developed countries would not be eligible for this special rate in bite two unless they indicate willingness to pay their assessments for these peacekeeping operations.

Bite three would cover the shortfall resulting from bite two and would be financed from voluntary contributions from a substantial number of developed members, or possibly by the use of UN miscellaneous income.

Our support for three bite approach is subject to certain conditions to be negotiated during the Special Session GA. However, essence includes U.S. voluntary pledge provided: (a) most other members are in fact contributing to the cost of peacekeeping operations; (b) a substantial number other developed countries also make voluntary contributions to cover shortfall; and (c) it is agreed voluntary contributions may be made "in kind" by supplying goods and services needed for peacekeeping purposes.

7. Arrears situation remains much as reported to you in reftel. Of present total of 100 million dollars peacekeeping arrears the Soviet Bloc owes $62.6 million. However, almost one-third of members have made payments on arrears this year, including payments or promises of sufficient amounts to avoid loss of vote under Article 19 UN Charter by ten countries. It is of continuing importance that member nations demonstrate through payment of their arrears the necessary spirit of collective financial responsibility indicated by some in their payments referred to above or indicated by their promise to pay in response to your earlier approach.

Another way to demonstrate that each member considers it has a stake in peace and security of the world and in UN role in international affairs is to purchase UN bonds. At present only 59 countries have purchased or pledged, and despite U.S. dollar for dollar matching of purchases, $51 million of the authorization still has not been subscribed. Even token purchases by the less developed countries, say in the range of $10,000 each would have a salutary effect on the financial health of the Organization and increase the sense of financial responsibility to the UN of those making the purchases.

8. The above information concerning the modification of U.S. position from that set forth in Cirtel 1526 is provided principally for your information. As appropriate, you are encouraged to pass this information on to appropriate government officials. Solid support for our revised position is necessary in the GA Special Session (financing resolutions require 2/3rds vote), if the financing impasse on peacekeeping operations is to be satisfactorily resolved, and if the UN is to receive the financial resources it needs to carry on these peacekeeping tasks in Middle East and Congo. Such additional efforts as in your judgment will help to accomplish these purposes with govt. you accredited should be undertaken to support our negotiating efforts at Special Session.

Rusk

Washington, undated.

FIRST SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF 24
(February 20-May 10, 1963)

On balance the results of the first session of the Committee of 24 were not as unsatisfactory from our viewpoint as we had anticipated. In our opinion, the following factors in combination produced this relatively favorable outcome:

(1) The Afro-Asian members of the Committee seemed to have been genuinely concerned at the possibility the United States might refuse to serve on the Committee if it indulged in extreme and irresponsible conduct;

(2) At least some of the Afro-Asian members had become disillusioned with the fruitless process of passing resolutions that had no chance of implementation;

(3) On certain issues, e.g., South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the United States was able to go at least part of the way toward meeting the Afro-Asian position;

(4) Our Representatives at the United Nations, headed by Ambassador Yates, engaged in some very successful lobbying on individual issues;

(5) The Soviet Union, probably engrossed in a basic re-evaluation of its policies following the Cuban debacle, played a relatively more restrained role in the Committee and sounded cold war themes less frequently and less virulently than heretofore;

(6) The African members of the Committee presumably anticipated that a definitive anti-colonialist program would be coordinated and enunciated at the Addis Ababa conference and they therefore did not wish to act prematurely on the big issues of sanctions and expulsions.

It is very likely that the outcomes of the Addis Ababa Conference, particularly of its summit phase beginning on May 23, will determine if and in what manner the colonial items are raised either in the Special Session of the General Assembly or in the Security Council during June when the Presidency is held by Ghana. As in the past, colonial and racial incidents on the African continent would also serve to precipitate these issues rapidly into the forums of the United Nations.

When the Committee of 24 concluded its first session May 10, it had discussed the Portuguese territories, Southern Rhodesia, Aden, South West Africa and Malta. When it reconvenes on June 10, the Committee plans to begin with North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Fiji, and British Guiana, as well as considering, whenever the members so choose, the report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia.

The following is a brief summary of the outcome of the Committee's deliberations on the issues it discussed during its first session:

As reported in our memorandum to you of April 12,/2/ the Committee of 24 adopted by a vote of 19-0-5 (Australia, Denmark, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States) a resolution condemning Portugal's attitude and drawing the Security Council's attention to the situation with a view to the Council's "taking appropriate measures, including sanctions, . . . to secure compliance by Portugal of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council." As a result of this resolution, it is quite likely that the issue of the Portuguese territories, including the sanctions question, will face us in the Security Council in June. We are continuing our efforts to induce the Portuguese to adopt a more positive posture on these matters.

Pursuant to the Committee's resolution of April 8, its Sub-Committee (Mali, Uruguay, Syria, Tunisia, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika) held discussions in London between April 22 and 24 with R. A. Butler, Duncan Sandys, and Lord Home. The Sub-Committee was generally impressed by the British desire to improve the situation in Southern Rhodesia but was "depressed" that the British would not intervene militarily if the white minority government in Southern Rhodesia declared its independence. The Sub-Committee's report recommended that the full Committee should consider additional ways and means of dealing with the situation including (a) consideration of Southern Rhodesia at "a special session of the General Assembly"; (b) drawing the Security Council's attention to the deteriorating situation; (c) requesting the Secretary General to continue to lend his good offices. The United Kingdom has withheld granting Prime Minister Field the independence he has sought for Southern Rhodesia, and we continue to support the British efforts towards early broadening of the franchise.

On May 3, the Committee adopted a resolution by a vote of 18 in favor and 5 (Australia, Denmark, Italy, UK and US) against (Sierra Leone was absent) which, among other provisions, called for the sending of a Sub-Committee to visit the Aden Territories "to ascertain the views of the population . . . and hold talks with the administering authority." Australia, Denmark, Italy and the US (with the approval of the UK) had tabled a resolution which demonstrated their support for self-determination and independence and recommended that the people be given an early opportunity freely to decide their future. This resolution, however, was not pressed to a vote following meddlesome attempts by the Soviets to amend it.

On May 10, the Aden Sub-Committee was named (Cambodia as Chairman, Iraq, Madagascar, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia). At that time, the Chairman of the Committee of 24 announced his intention of sending a letter to the UK asking the British Government to reconsider its previously announced decision not to cooperate with the Sub-Committee. We do not believe that this letter will cause the British to change their position, nor do we believe this non-African item has sufficient pressure behind it to reach a larger UN forum before fall. We support the UK position.

Although in Committee debates the US and the UK were subjected to oft-repeated charges that they were "doing nothing" to persuade South Africa to change its policy regarding apartheid and South West Africa, both the US and UK resisted the temptation to describe their parallel confidential diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis the South Africans because public indication at this time might undermine our future efforts to this end. Committee of 24 consideration of this item was characterized by Afro-Asian difficulty in reaching agreement on a draft resolution which would have had the effect of abrogating the mandate and calling on the UN to take over the administration of the territory by force, if necessary. Eventually, with our help, a much more moderate resolution along the lines of previous GA resolutions was tabled, and on May 10 it received the affirmative votes of 23 members of the Committee with only the UK abstaining. It requested the Secretary General to continue his efforts to establish "an effective UN presence" in the territory and drew the Security Council's attention to the situation there.

The Committee on May 10 concluded desultory debate on Malta with the unanimous adoption of a very moderate and non-controversial resolution which noted the UK intention "to consider favorably Malta's request for independence", and invited the UK to hold a conference with the Maltese to that end. We did not speak in the Committee on the subject of Malta because of the absence of any US policy objectives which would have been served thereby.

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
United Nations Financing

The compromise "package" of resolutions of UN financing sailed through both the 5th Committee and the General Assembly with overwhelming majorities. On the 7 resolutions the favorable votes ranged from a high of 95 to a low of 79. But more significant, the negative votes did not exceed 12; the Soviet Bloc, Cuba, and France. The key vote was on the Principles resolution, 92-11-3 (with 5 absences).

The resolutions covered general principles for the sharing of future peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures; the appropriation of $9.5 million and $33.0 million, respectively, for financing the Middle East and Congo operations from January through December 1963; an appeal stressing the essentiality of payment of all the peacekeeping arrears as soon as possible; the extension to December 31, 1963 of the time during which the remainder of $200 million bond authorization can be sold; a request to the Secretary-General to study the "desirability and feasibility" of establishing a peace fund; and the continuation of the Working Group of 21 to study and report in 1964 on equitable sharing of costs among members, other sources of financing, and securing "widest possible agreement among member states on financing." (The last quote is aimed at getting the United States, Russia and France to get together on a way out of the financing dilemma.)

Our insistence that no general agreement should be adopted that would apply to unknown future operations and our opposition to a "special scale" for peacekeeping by which the United States would be assessed at more than our regular budget percentage were successful (this time). The two resolutions providing funds for the Middle East and Congo operations assess the developed countries at 100% and the "economically less developed countries" at an overall percentage of 52%, of their regular scale rates. (Our hope to assess the LDC's at 50% was slightly bettered: they had been paying 20% under previous financing schemes.) The U.S. assessed contributions, at 32.02%, will be $13.6 million: for UNEF, $3. million and for the Congo, $10.6 million. A supplemental appropriation request for State's regular budget will be submitted soon.

The total "shortfall" due to the lesser assessments of LDC's will be about $3.7 million. 17 Western developed countries (includes U.S., subject to its constitutional processes) have agreed to make up this shortfall through voluntary contributions based on their regular percentage scale relationships. This is especially heartening since only the U.S. and the U.K. (in a minor amount) made voluntary contributions last year. The U.S. voluntary contribution share will be about $2. million. Whether this amount should be contributed in airlift and other services under authority of the United Nations Participation Act--and reimbursement from the UN waived under Presidential determination that it is in the national interest--or whether we should face the Congress directly with an appropriation request as a part of AID Chapter 3 funds must be determined within the next several weeks.

We also managed to find a way which we believe will avoid the accusation that U.S. voluntary contributions are being used to give reductions to communist countries, such as Cuba. The resolutions provided that the voluntary contributions of the developed countries can only be used to match proportionally contributions actually paid in for these assessments by the less developed countries by December 31, 1965. Because the Satellites refuse to pay, Western funds cannot be used to offset their reductions. Any unused voluntary contributions revert to the donor members.

Although the results of the Special Session of the General Assembly are gratifying, agreement has been reached on UN financing for only six months. Many of the same questions, in varying degrees of urgency, will have to be faced again at the General Assembly this fall, in financing UN peacekeeping operations for 1964.

Woodruff Wallner/2/

CA-166

Washington, July 3, 1963, 5:04 p.m.

SUBJECT
Security Council Election at 18th General Assembly

There are at this time four candidates-Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, and Malaya--for election at 18th GA to fill three SC seats currently occupied by Ghana, Philippines, and Venezuela. Both Malaya and the Ivory Coast have said they are candidates to succeed Ghana in what has been traditionally the Commonwealth seat, although we hope they will decide to drop their specification about which seat they want. (This is important. Otherwise they will compete with each other, leaving Czechoslovakia uncontested for the Philippine seat.) According to Malayans, they have endorsement of the old Commonwealth, Ghana, Nigeria, and several other Asian and African countries, while the Ivory Coast candidacy has UAM endorsement and reportedly that of a substantial number of other African countries. There are, so far as Dept aware, no other African or Asian SC candidacies on horizon.

UN Charter stipulates that in electing non-permanent members SC "due regard" should be paid to their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of Charter and also to "equitable geographical distribution". The original geographic allocation of SC seats provided such equitable distribution in terms original membership. In terms of present membership it fails to do so, making no separate provision for either Asian or African representation.

Only real solution to this problem lies in enlargement SC, which however, USSR prevents by its position it will ratify no amendments UN Charter until Chinese Communists seated in UN. In this situation U.S. has taken position since 1955 that seat originally allocated Eastern Europe should be considered "floating" pending enlargement. While this approach has not been entirely successful, it has provided some opportunity for Asian representation outside Commonwealth members; Philippines twice and Turkey once have held "floating seat" for term split with Eastern Europe and Japan occupied "floating seat" for full term. With the large increase since 1960 in number of African UN members further adjustment obviously required if legitimate African as well as Asian demands for greater opportunity representation on SC to be met. A second seat can, however, only be made available at expense of free world and therefore presents delicate political problem. Moreover, further political problem of protecting Western voting position on SC is also involved, since loss of WE or LA seat to A-As would undermine this position.

In circumstances, Dept believes best device is now to think in terms of an "African" and an "Asian" seat, using "floating seat" and "Commonwealth seat" for this purpose, at same time seeking to preserve concept that one of non-permanent members continues to be from Commonwealth. Adoption of this concept would give Africa, the Middle East (under original allocation), and Asia each one SC seat, thus providing the A-As as a whole with three out of the six non-permanent seats on SC, and thereby meeting the Charter criterion of equitable geographic distribution since the A-As constitute roughly one half UN membership. Adoption of this concept would also be consistent with the precedent set by the 12th GA resolution allocating geographically GA vice presidencies and committee chairmanships. Finally, adoption of this concept would have least adverse effect on over-all composition SC from Western standpoint since Commonwealth now very largely comprised newly independent countries, most of them in Africa or Asia.

If matter SC elections raised by FonOff or on first appropriate occasion Embassy should therefore make clear to FonOff, unless it perceives serious objections, U.S. believes A-As should continue hold three of six non-permanent SC seats as they do now (Ghana, Morocco, Philippines) commensurate with their number in UN. Dept also believes both Asia and Africa south of Sahara, as well as Middle East, should continue be represented on SC. Therefore, while U.S. has so far given no formal commitment of support to any candidates for election SC at 18th GA, Dept expects vote for an Asian and an African candidate to succeed Philippines and Ghana, respectively, and to vote for LA to succeed Venezuela. On basis present candidacies this would mean Malaya and Ivory Coast, both of which US would be happy see on SC. U.S. also expects vote for an LA to succeed Venezuela. Malaya in Asian seat would also represent Commonwealth.

Dept hopes other friendly UN members will reach same conclusion. Not only does Dept believe this only equitable solution problem created by Soviet prevention enlargement SC but also that denial seat to Eastern Europe is concrete means of maintaining pressure on USSR to permit enlargement.

If possibility shifting one of two LA seats on SC to Africa is raised, Embassy should make clear that in U.S. view remedy of one injustice by another offers no solution. LAs originally proposed and have since consistently supported enlargement SC to provide great opportunities for representation of new UN membership and USSR alone prevents success of this LA initiative. In these circumstances, U.S. would hope free world nations would not permit situation to arise in which regional groups within free world bicker among themselves over possibility raiding LA seat, and thus jeopardize success one of their candidacies to advantage Soviet bloc.

Embassy should also make clear U.S. not prepared see "floating" seat go back to Eastern Europe until USSR permits enlargement SC.

For LA Posts: You should indicate FonOff Dept assumes LAs will wish make every effort protect their SC seat in view possible development African drive, apparently led by Ghana, gain SC seat at expense LA. Dept believes LAs would be well advised promptly agree support both African and Asian candidates, once situation with respect these candidacies sufficiently clarified, in return for assurances of support of LA candidate. Dept recognizes some defections among A-As probably inevitable but sees no real threat LA candidacy even if Soviet bloc fails support, so long as no concerted drive for LA seat develops among A-As.

For AF Posts: FYI. Success formula described above depends not only on minimization bickering over particular seat to be filled but also on avoidance rival candidacies within region. You should point this out as appropriate and report any indication of AF candidacies other than that mentioned first paragraph. End FYI.

For Abidjan: Embassy may wish draw particular attention FonOff desirability its not continuing specify seat for which it candidate.

For London: As Embassy will recall, need provide for African representation SC and possible shift of Commonwealth seat to meet this need has been discussed both with FonOff and UK Del in New York. UK has never given any definitive response our approaches this subject. It is USUN's impression insistence on response most likely produce negative one but that British prepared, so long as formal concurrence not requested, acquiesce in solution described first full paragraph on page 2 above.

Rusk

Washington, July 16, 1963.

SUBJECT
Portugal and South Africa in United Nations Bodies

While I went along with Nat McKitterick's proposal to delete the specific reference to Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter in the formula on South Africa's participation in the Economic Commission for South Africa, I continue to feel that the question of South Africa's conformity with Charter obligations remains a highly relevant one./2/ We do not want to take the position that, when a United Nations Member's policies reach a certain level of unpopularity, that Member's further participation can simply be declared incompatible and the Member in effect excluded. The significant thing about the South African situation is that its highly "unpopular" policies of racial discrimination and apartheid constitute a systematic violation of solemn obligations laid down in the UN Charter. This affords a far firmer ground for an "incompatibility" formula than a set of national policies which are merely highly distasteful to a majority of the UN membership.

I agree with you that "klieg light diplomacy" of exposing through the UN what is in fact going on in the different countries of the world is a powerful means of inducing better conduct on the part of governments. One of the weaknesses of the Human Rights Commission has been its theoretical inability to consider actual situations in particular countries, and the restriction of its activities to the realm of the abstract. In effect, the General Assembly and even the Security Council have come to fill this vacuum in the more egregious instances.

I would favor putting this function on a more regular and organized basis, as a means of promoting effectuation of the Charter's obligations on human rights. This could prove more practical and effective than the prolonged effort expended on human rights covenants which may never be completed and which, if completed, may never be widely ratified as treaties. The Human Rights Commission could be given new terms of reference so that it could consider actual situations-making findings, measuring government performance against Charter standards, and proposing recommendations for action where this appeared useful. I believe we ought to give serious thought to a proposal of this kind as a means of making the Human Rights Commission a more meaningful agency for forwarding the purposes and obligations of the Charter.

London, July 29, 1963.

I have sent you my official reply to your proposal for a "moderate" Resolution on Portugal and Angola but it only hints at what I want to say for your and the President's ear./2/

2. Time and again you face us with situations in which you ask us to vote for Resolutions which will undermine any chance we have to keep the pace of independence for our remaining colonial territories under reasonable control. Time and again you beg us on bended knee to prevent British Guiana from achieving independence within the foreseeable future, but everywhere else you make it almost impossible for us to maintain control. I do not seem to be able to persuade your people that you cannot have it both ways.

3. If we have to vote for a Resolution which insists on the employment of a highly placed United Nations personage who will go to colonial territories with instructions which clearly contemplate that he will confer with the members of the opposition parties, our policy of bringing independence by orderly processes would be completely undermined.

4. If you set store, as you obviously do, by our maintaining control of the situation in British Guiana, we cannot obviously allow a United Nations personage to consult with Dr. Jagan.

5. If we are to bring Southern Rhodesia to the point of adjusting their franchise and accepting a programme whereby the African majority will control the government machine within a reasonable time, the very last thing we would do would be to introduce the United Nations. It would immediately close the ranks against any such plan and make Rab's aims unobtainable.

6. I do beg you to help us in this matter and not to corner us and face us with a dilemma whether to veto, because we cannot wish upon Portugal what we could not accept for ourselves, thereby getting the Africans steamed up about us again in Southern Rhodesia and the High Commission territories; or whether rather ingloriously to abstain and then see action taken under a Resolution for which we have voted solely because we did not like being parted from our friends and find ourselves the next victims and unable to stand up for ourselves because we have set a precedent.

7. I have sent certain suggestions in my "open" message and I do hope they can be adopted. The Prime Minister and I feel very strongly about this and I hope you can instruct your Delegation in New York to take account of our difficulties.

8. Without your help we will be bound to chuck in our hand in our remaining Colonies and you cannot, I know, want that. I look forward to talking about this soon. Meanwhile, forgive this straight talking.

H./3/

London, July 29, 1963.

I am still very worried about the wording of paragraph 3 of the American draft Resolution about the Portuguese Territories. I realise that your delegation has made an effort to help us by altering somewhat the reference to the functions of the eminent person designated by the Secretary-General, but the latest wording, as we see it, would still make it absolutely impossible for us to resist a demand that a United Nations Mission should visit territories such as Southern Rhodesia and British Guiana. The words which give us difficulty are "to visit the territories and to take such other steps as may help to bring about the attainment of self-determination." We would go along with amended wording which read "to conduct such other consultations as may be appropriate to attain the elimination of the causes of international friction, etc."

I am very anxious that we should be able to associate ourselves with your moderate resolution which has a number of valuable features in it; and I should be very unhappy if we found ourselves separated from working closely with your delegation by the difficulty over the words I have concluded. Do you think you could possibly see your way to getting these words omitted and those I have suggested substituted? Alternatively, if this is out of the question, I should like you to know that we would be prepared to go along with your resolution as it stands provided your delegation makes it clear in the debate that their interpretation of these words is that the action taken in operative paragraph 3 will be taken in consultation with the Portuguese.

Washington, August 13, 1963, 7:22 p.m.

422. Committee of 24.

1. Pursuant to US-UK talks held by Cleveland in London we have (a) weighed pros and cons our continued participation in work of Cmte and (b) desirability of making effort with key members prior to Sept 5 meeting to induce greater moderation.

2. Re (a), Cmte's 1963 record thus far exhibits both moderation and lack of realism. Initial consensus to approach Portugal for talks with Cmte representatives without preconditions was model of how we believe Cmte should act. GOP sharp rebuff triggered res drawing situation to attention SC. In our view, Cmte acted with moderation in cases of SWA and Malta but acted unwisely re Aden, Fiji, High Commission Territories, British Guiana. To date, Cmte's officers have resisted pressures take up Puerto Rica. Because Cmte now scheduled consider US Trust Territory Pacific Island and can be expected take up other US territories in next six months, Dept inclined believe over-all US interests best served by remaining on Cmte for the time being in order have possibility explaining and, if need be, defending our record in person. Since we suspect UK anxious to have us remain for their own reasons, we should be careful not to give UK impression our decision firm but rather that it "knife edge" similar to UK position described Cleveland (London's 144) and subject to constant review.

3. Re (b), we should where not counter-productive seek to convey to key Afro-Asians our sincere conviction that remaining "hard core" colonial problems not susceptible to doctrinaire approach of immediate independence in every instance. US dedication to principles 1514 (XV) requires no proof. We earnestly desire assist remaining two per cent of world's population living in dependent territories to achieve self-government or independence as rapidly as possible without precipitating serious new dangers for such populations. Certain actions of Cmte have come close to falling into latter category. Unrealistic res calling for early independence SR at this delicate stage of negotiations on colony's future ran risk of provoking what Cmte and UN most wishes avoid-independent SR under white supremacist govt. Similar indiscriminate action re High Commission Territories risked provoking their incorporation into South Africa. Worst example of Cmte's 1963 session was its call for immediate independence Fiji with almost total disregard for complicated internal political situation and effect Cmte's action would have thereon. We have all too often heard otherwise responsible Cmte members explain privately that, while they recognize important differences between territories considered, once others raise demand for unqualified immediate independence they unable do anything but support simplistic approach. US hopes more responsible trend in Cmte will prevail and that greater discrimination and leadership will be shown by responsible members Afro-Asian group, enabling Cmte play constructive role in decolonization process. If less responsible trend should prevail, we see real danger Cmte's actions could damage rather than further cause of decolonization, and could cause us reassess our attitude towards Cmte.

4. Would appreciate addressee's comments and suggestions soonest re approach along lines para 3 to: non-bloc Cmte members except LA's and Cambodia. We would not plan approach LA's since ASAFs are key to possible future moderation. After comments received we will, as Cleveland promised FonOff, consult UK.

Rusk

New York, August 19, 1963.

Dear Mr. President:

I understand you want my views as to whether you should attend the General Assembly.

Yes, I think you should because:

1. The United States must stay in the forefront of the "peace" issue, and this would be a good occasion and forum to carry forward the American University speech.

2. The Assembly would afford an opportunity to make our desire for further detente and disarmament emphatic and sincere.

3. A more affirmative and hopeful posture about the Test Ban Treaty breakthrough will be desirable after all the deflating talk during the ratification process./2/

4. You could give some balance to an Assembly that will be largely an "African session", by demonstrating that anti-colonialism is not the only problem the world faces.

5. The Assembly would afford an opportunity to reaffirm emphatically our policy on colonialism, self-determination and human rights, and perhaps temper the next assault by the Africans and Soviets.

6. With so many African and other Heads of State coming to the Assembly, it might be misinterpreted if you did not come.

7. I think Khrushchev will come to exploit the "peace" and "end colonialism" issues to strengthen his position in the dispute with China. If you should then decide to come, it would look like "me too."

8. It would be helpful in the Congress and the country to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the United Nations and the building of international organizations for peace and progress. The Assembly would be a good time to do it after the Test Ban Treaty which grew out of the U.N. Committee of 17, the U.N. Congo operation, which is now popular even in England and Belgium, the U.N. settlements in New Guinea, Yemen, and now Malaysia.

9. A good speech can be built on developments since your last appearance in 1961, successful U.N. peacekeeping, the test ban and further steps to peace, other fields of East-West cooperation large and small, "openness" as an ingredient of cooperation, human rights and change, etc.

But, there may also be reasons for not coming that should be considered:

1. While they may come anyway, I think your decision to come would insure the attendance of Macmillan and Khrushchev (and Nasser, Tito, etc.)--Macmillan for domestic political advantage and Khrushchev for the reasons mentioned above. An informal "Summit" meeting would logically follow. But, as I wrote you in July, I think periodic and more casual Summit meetings at U.N. sessions would actually be better than the occasional over-dramatized meeting.

2. While there are plenty of good generalities and atmospherics for a speech, the "hard content" might be modest, depending on how much you could say at that point on next steps in disarmament and détente. Of course, East-West cooperation in space, medicine, communications, cultural exchanges and other fields of research could be dealt with but there may not be enough new programmatic content for a Presidential speech.

3. It is unlikely that an "African Assembly" can be diverted from colonialism, human rights and the problems of Southern Africa. Any frailties or omissions in your speech in this area would be conspicuous. I think, by the way, that we must promptly formulate our own policy on these questions and not risk being dragged along reluctantly, thereby losing influence and friends on both sides.

4. With the Congress still in session and the program so far behind schedule, there may be domestic reasons why public attention should not be diverted by a full dress affair and your presence at the General Assembly.

An alternative to a comprehensive Presidential speech in the general debate might be a ceremony for the registration of the Test Ban Treaty with yourself, Khrushchev, Macmillan and U Thant making brief speeches, as suggested in my letter of July 29, a copy of which is attached./3/ To arrange this would require some initiative on our part with Khrushchev and Macmillan, and I doubt if we could be sure that Khrushchev would restrain himself.

I think it would be well to have a general strategy conference about the Assembly, including the question of your appearance, the speech and the timing of the announcement.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson/4/

Washington, undated.

UNITED STATES STRATEGY AT THE 18TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Summary

Two themes are likely to dominate the 18th United Nations General Assembly:

1) Colonialism and racial discrimination; and

2) the opportunities for international cooperation opened up by the limited test ban agreement.

The African members, strengthened by the presence of a number of Heads of State and increasingly disturbed by the lack of progress in the Portuguese territories and the apartheid policy of South Africa, will use the Assembly to press African issues hard.

At the same time, the conclusion of the limited test ban agreement seems likely to stimulate interest in "next steps" in the disarmament field and perhaps other aspects of East-West cooperation. The "cold war" between the USSR and China will have some effect in the Assembly, and there are signs that the Soviets are perhaps reassessing certain aspects of their attitude toward the United Nations in this light.

The need to avoid complete preoccupation with African issues and to build on the limited test ban lead us to conclude that we should probe systematically for next steps to new agreements on the basis of mutual national interest; that we should seek to engage the USSR in an increasingly complex network of cooperative undertakings based on mutual interest; and that the UN has a role to play in both the probing operation and the engagement process, if the latter is in the cards.

We hope it may be possible to focus proportionately less attention on African issues and to use the Assembly to increase the incentives to the Soviet leaders to live at peace with us. To do this will require broadening the focus of the Assembly at the outset, to which end we recommend a major address to the Assembly by the President, picking up from the American University speech and stressing the great common interests of man, both in relation to his environment and to his fellow man. Such broadening can be accomplished only if there is some visible crack in the almost total impasse over self-determination in the Portuguese territories and apartheid in South Africa.

There follows a review of the major problems at the 18th Assembly, including where possible preliminary policy recommendations respecting the United States position.

The key African issues are the Portuguese territories, apartheid in South Africa, and perhaps Southern Rhodesia. Unless the United States is prepared to lend some support to African demands for more far-reaching measures against Portugal and South Africa, we risk being accused in the Assembly of frustrating the anti-colonialist crusade. The Africans will also threaten to bargain their votes on non-African issues of importance to us (e.g. Chinese representation) against United States support on African issues. To minimize U.S. losses, we shall probably have to go beyond our past positions in the absence of significant movement by Portugal or South Africa. We must also be prepared to deal with a possible African walk-out or other disruptive parliamentary tactics directed against the presence of Portugal and South Africa in the Assembly. The United States should frankly tell the Africans that the future not only of the UN but of all international institutions is threatened by such conduct and urge, publicly if necessary, that orderly procedures be followed. By thus standing firmly for peaceful change, we shall inevitably be cast in the role of honest broker between extreme positions, pleasing no one entirely, hopefully alienating no one totally.

The Assembly will be dealing with a report of the Secretary General on the action of UN members to eliminate racial and religious discrimination and with a Draft Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. This will sharpen the Assembly's focus on racial issues. With UN interest increasingly turned to the problem of implementing respect for human rights we are considering the possible establishment of some new institution in the field of human rights which could investigate and report on how Members are fulfilling their Charter obligations on human rights. We think this would, among other advantages, spotlight human rights problems in closed societies and help broaden attention beyond racial issues.

The conclusion of the "hot line" with the Soviets and the limited test ban agreement should have a favorable impact on the debate and create momentum for further progress. We expect full discussion of disarmament questions. The Assembly will certainly endorse the test ban agreement and call on all States to adhere. It may also repeat its call for agreement on an underground test ban with effective verification. Our general objective should be to encourage further negotiations in the ENDC or through bilateral or limited multilateral channels on collateral measures (e.g. surprise attack) and further negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We hope to be able to refer specific issues such as those related to prohibition and dissemination of nuclear weapons to the ENDC for detailed consideration.

The United States should be prepared to take the initiative to put new energy into UN outer space activities and to reach agreement in areas that will promote the peaceful use and exploration of outer space. We may wish to make specific proposals for new cooperative projects and to move forward with our plans for a Declaration of General Principles regarding the legal aspects of outer space by the UNGA.

We expect to be able to achieve our objectives on two East-West issues, Chinese representation and Korea, on the same basis as in the past. This means maintaining the seating of the Republic of China and reaffirming the aim of Korean unification through free elections under UN supervision.

The questions of Hungary and Tibet are not now on the agenda. We do not anticipate further discussion of the Hungarian question. In the absence of some new major reason for its inscription, we should probably take no initiative on Tibet.

The only Near Eastern issue certain to arise is the problem of the Palestine refugees, on which prospects for progress remain poor. We hope heated debate can be avoided. No major action is required since at the 17th General Assembly UNRWA was extended for two years.

The continuation of the UN military operation in the Congo is likely to be considered. Although the Secretary General now seems disposed to recommend its closing out by the end of this year, we believe it would be useful to continue the operation another six months. We have been actively discussing UNOC's future with key UN Members. especially the Africans, to ascertain whether there is broad support for continuation and whether necessary financial arrangements can be made. We estimate the cost at about $8-9 million, which would have to be assessed by an appropriate financing resolution in the General Assembly.

To strengthen the UN's military capabilities, we will continue our efforts (1) to obtain a modest increase in the Secretary General's military staff; (2) to encourage the earmarking of national forces for UN peacekeeping service; and (3) to set the stage for the training of officer personnel for UN service. Bearing in mind the broad objective of strengthening UN peacekeeping institutions we should support the establishment of a United Nations Institute which would train personnel for service with the UN system or with UN-related functions in their own country; conduct operations research designed to enhance the UN's effectiveness; and engage senior citizens of UN members as faculty, lecturers or part-time fellows who could be used by the Secretary General for special missions.

The arrearages of the Soviet bloc members will not bring them within the provisions of Article 19 until January 1, 1964. The question of the application of Article 19 is not on the agenda, but interest has been shown in the idea of referring to the International Court of Justice the question of the automatic application of Article 19 to Members who are now more than two years in arrears. If there is general sentiment in favor of resort to the Court, we should agree. If the ICJ decides the question in favor of automaticity, this should strengthen our position in an eventual showdown.

The final two sections describe economic, trade and development matters and the prospects for elections to the Security Council, Economic and Social Council and International Court of Justice, as well as for officers of the General Assembly.

[Here follows the remainder of the paper.]

Washington, September 6, 1963.

1. You are meeting Monday afternoon/2/ with State and Ambassador Stevenson to survey the UN General Assembly that begins September 17. The session is for general discussion and guidance, not firm decisions. The gist of State Department views is contained in a 4-page summary (Tab II) in the attached briefing book./3/

2. There are presently apparent no crucial issues or overriding subjects for the GA-e.g., Chinese representation will probably not be a serious issue, unless it gets tied in to bargaining over African problems.

3. In addition to the South Viet Nam Buddhist issue, the biggest item will probably be another round on African issues with several African heads of states present; under last month's Security Council's resolutions the Secretary General will report back the end of October on South Africa and Portuguese Africa so we will automatically be caught in these dilemmas again in both the Security Council and the GA. It is too early to say yet what we can do about those.

4. The only important question for your decision on Monday is your own possible appearance and speech in New York (a State Department draft of a proposed speech is attached)./4/ The Department would propose to tie your appearance to UN interest in further peaceful initiatives following the Test Ban Treaty; you will have to consider whether you want to use the UN at this time as a place to say anything important on this subject. Although the State Department argues that your appearance might deflect some emphasis from African topics, it seems more likely that the South African and Portuguese issues would be just as strenuous and difficult in any event.

5. State may particularly ask your views on several other points, such as-(a) the Hungarian issue which will not be on the GA Agenda unless there are some particular domestic reasons for reviving it at this time; (b) a possible proposal for a "UN Commissioner on Human Rights" (Tab IV, page 7)/5/ on the general proposition that our human rights problems are already an international open book and that such a Commissioner might help to illuminate comparably the human rights problems of some of our critics abroad.

William H. Brubeck/6/

Washington, September 7, 1963.

SUBJECT
Subjects for Discussion with the President on September 9 Relating to the 18th General Assembly

In our meeting with the President on September 9, there are a number of points I believe it would be useful for you to highlight. We do not yet need to ask the President to make specific decisions on individual issues, except the very important question whether he will address the General Assembly. However, a number of policy questions covered in the Strategy Paper for the Eighteenth General Assembly should be brought to his attention because of their political ramifications with a view to having the President provide us with any further guidance. Accordingly, I recommend that in addition to discussing the possibility of a Presidential statement to the General Assembly, you touch on the following points:

1. Congo. The Secretary-General expressed the view that if UNOC is to be retained beyond December 31, the minimum viable level is 6,000 men, which would cost $30 million. We have pressed for his agreement at the 3,000-man level, which our JCS believes feasible, at a cost of about $10 million. We have suggested a compromise to the Secretary-General under which there would be 6,000 troops in the Congo on January 1, 1964, but they would be phased down to 3,000 by March 30, looking toward their total withdrawal by June 30. We estimate the cost at $15 million. We would have to mobilize a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly for the necessary financing (hopefully on the basis of the formula adopted at the Fourth Special Session). It may be possible to get such support in the Assembly if, as now seems possible, U Thant's report does not recommend against it. The critical decision will be whether the United States should take an initiative early in the General Assembly session to this end. More consultations with key U.N. members are required. We will also want to consult with selected members of Congress, especially on the Appropriations Committee, if we decide to pursue this course in the General Assembly.

2. Enlargement of Councils. The question of enlargement of United Nations councils is assuming increasing importance to the new members, especially in Africa. There are indications that the U.S.S.R. may be prepared to support or take an initiative on enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and possibly of the Security Council (unlinking this from the Chinese representation question). We must measure the pressures and determine whether we should take any lead in securing enlargement of the Councils. We should not abandon our announced position that the new members are entitled to greater representation. However, our recent experiences in the Security Council require us realistically to admit that we would be in a less favorable position in an enlarged Security Council. There may be a major decision for the President to take on this question during the course of the Assembly. Any Charter amendment would require ratification in accordance with our Constitutional processes, including Senate advice and consent.

3. Chinese Representation. We expect to be able to mobilize the necessary support to maintain our position on Chinese representation. However, if the Soviets should decide to relax their position and opt for a "two China" solution (there is one unconfirmed report to this effect) we will face serious difficulties in the Assembly. The President should be made aware of this possibility even though it is remote.

4. "Cold War" Issues.

(a) Korea. We expect to be able to maintain our position on the Korean unification item, but the amount of support will be affected by whether and how the October elections are held.

(b) Hungary. For the first time since 1956 there is no Hungarian item on the provisional agenda, and we do not anticipate taking an initiative. Support would not be forthcoming in view of the general amnesty and the Secretary-General's trip. We will need to decide during the Assembly whether to express again a reservation on the Hungarian credentials as we did at the Fourth Special General Assembly. In view of the past keen Congressional interest, we can expect some domestic fall-out.

(c) Tibet. India now is willing to have the Tibetan item inscribed and would support a resolution limited to human rights. There is an even chance therefore that two or three countries may again ask Assembly consideration.

5. Colonial Issues. We cannot assess the full dimensions of the Portuguese territories question until we know the outcome of Mr. Ball's efforts in Lisbon.

In the case of South Africa, we must expect to be pressed again to take far-reaching sanctions, including suspension or expulsion.

We will be pressed again by the United Kingdom to help it on Southern Rhodesia.

Consideration of these items is likely to stimulate strong emotions and possibly staged walkouts. We will be required to take a strong stand in favor of orderly procedures.

6. Human Rights. We will be pressed to take a vigorous stand against religious persecution in South Vietnam.

On a broader scale, given increasing preoccupation of the world community with the human rights questions, we will need to decide whether to encourage the United Nations to intensify its activity in this area. One possibility would be the establishment of a U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights.

7. Reference of Article 19 Question to ICJ. The question of applying Article 19 to the Communist bloc for non-payment of dues will not arise directly. However, we can expect a sharp division in the Assembly on whether Article 19 has automatic application. While holding firmly to the view of automaticity, we will probably be pressed for a decision to refer this question to the Court. Our initial estimate is that we could accept a properly framed question to the Court, though we will wish to make a final decision on the matter in light of developments.

8. Disarmament and Nuclear Issues. In general, we will seek to remand most of the disarmament and nuclear issues to the 18-nation Disarmament Commission. In addition, we will have to (a) counter pressures from third countries, including Canada, for more far-reaching measures than we would like; (b) oppose any unpoliced moratorium; (c) face a final decision on whether to support the Brazilian proposal for a denuclearized Latin American zone. Finally, the presence of Gromyko and other foreign ministers will offer further opportunity for quiet probes.

Washington, September 9, 1963, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Strategy at the 18th General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

The White House
The President
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Schlesinger
Mr. Sorensen (in part)

The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Mr. Ball
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Cleveland, IO
Mr. Sisco, UNP
Amb. Thompson, S/AL

The question of the President's possible attendance at the General Assembly is discussed in a separate memorandum./2/ The Secretary indicated that the enlargement of the Councils and the question of the Congo were two important issues before the Assembly.

The Secretary asked Mr. Cleveland to outline briefly the question of the enlargement of UN Councils. Mr. Cleveland said there were indications that the USSR may be prepared to support or take an initiative on enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and possibly the Security Council by unlinking the latter from the Chinese representation question. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that we have come out publicly in favor of enlargement, but we must recognize that, bearing in mind recent difficulties, we would be in a weaker position in an enlarged Security Council. He pointed out also that any Charter amendment would require ratification in accordance with our Constitutional process, including the Senate's advice and consent. He indicated also that ratification requires a two-thirds vote of the UN membership, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Ambassador Stevenson indicated the strong interest of the Africans in this matter and expressed the fear of possible defection of the Africans on the Chinese representation question if we are not able to adopt forthcoming positions on such questions as enlargement of the Councils, the Portuguese territories, apartheid and other similar issues. The President decided that we should restate our public position in favor of enlargement of the Councils, but that we should not push the Security Council proposal, leaving the initiative to others.

Ambassador Stevenson outlined the difficulties we are encountering with Secretary-General Thant regarding retention of UNOC for six months beyond the end of this year. The President suggested that he might write to four or five African Prime Ministers. Ambassador Stevenson suggested deferring this matter until he has had a further opportunity for discussion with key Africans, including the Nigerians. The President agreed. He also agreed we should include an appropriate reference in favor of an extension of UNOC in the United States speech before the Assembly.

The President asked whether an OAU Force is not a viable substitute. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that, while such a force might be helpful in the Congo, there is danger that it might be used in other places in Africa, i.e., Angola and Mozambique. Mr. Ball likewise agreed. The President thought we might talk to the Portuguese on this matter with a view to seeing whether they would be willing to talk to the French. He thought the Portuguese might tell the French that the alternative to UNOC extension is an OAU Force which, in turn, carries risks for Portugal in Angola.

It was decided that the following additions would be made to the United States speech: (a) a stronger section on the significance of the test ban designed to offset some of the negative thinking that has been projected as part of the ratification process; (b) a paragraph or so indicating our support for continuation of the Congo operation; (c) a reference to the trade negotiations and the World Trade Conference scheduled in early 1964; (d) references to the hard issues, including Laos, Viet-Nam, Berlin and Cuba; (e) material on enlargement of the Councils; (f) reference to the Buddhist issue in Viet-Nam; and (g) strengthening the "Man's Mastery over Environment" section based on suggestions made by the President's Advisory Committee. Ambassador Stevenson was asked to provide the President with suggestions on the above material.

The question of supplying South Africa with three submarines was discussed inconclusively after the Secretary raised the question. The President felt the question was primarily one of balancing the foreign exchange advantage (one hundred million dollars) against the anger which it might cause among the Africans. Ambassador Stevenson felt that, from the point of view of our position in the United Nations, it would be better not to provide the submarines, but he realized there were other considerations that must be weighed in making a decision on this matter. The President said we would need to discuss this matter further at a later date. Moreover, no decision was taken regarding the sending of a technical mission to South Africa.

After Ambassador Stevenson outlined the difficulties confronting us if the Soviets should decide to relax their position and opt for a two-China solution, the President said we should do what is necessary to keep Red China out and to maintain our position.

The Secretary said there did not appear to be much concern domestically over this question. The President took note of the fact that no item will be submitted this year. The question of whether the United States should state a reservation in the Credentials Committee, as it did at the Fourth Special Session, was left open.

There was a very brief reference to the human rights questions as the meeting was breaking up. The President said that this matter could be decided in the context of what to include in the United States speech.

Washington, September 9, 1963.

SUBJECT
The President's Attendance at the General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

The White House
The President
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Schlesinger
Mr. Sorensen (in part)

The Department
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Mr. Ball
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Cleveland, IO
Mr. Sisco, UNP

After a brief discussion of the pros and cons, the President decided that he would attend the Assembly and asked Ambassador Stevenson to arrange with the Secretariat to speak the first thing on Friday morning, September 20. The President felt that his presence at the Assembly would give him an opportunity to put the test ban treaty in perspective and to dispel doubts in the world that may have arisen as a result of the debate within our country over ratification. At the Secretary's suggestion it was agreed that the President's attendance at the General Assembly would be announced on Monday, September 16, and that this late announcement would help to avoid stimulating a huge attendance of high-level leaders at the Assembly. The President asked Ambassador Stevenson to provide Arthur Schlesinger and Ted Sorensen with any further substantive thoughts he might have for additional material for inclusion in the President's speech./2/

Washington, September 26, 1963, 10 p.m.

Tosec 70. Subject: Talk with Gromyko re UN Financing. Ref: Talking Paper--Gromyko, 18th GA-P/7, 7th Para, 9-16-63./2/ Problem of UN financing likely lead to open confrontation with Soviets at first session of GA in 1964 when perforce Article 19 will be involved unless Sovs have made payment of back UN peacekeeping assessments totaling about $6 million and are fully up to date on regular budget assessments. If there is resumed or special session this confrontation could take place early in 1964. We therefore believe it important in view of impact that will have on US-Soviet relations to alert Gromyko to this prospect. Following are suggested talking points:

We hope USSR is giving most serious attention to settling its financial accounts with UN. USSR is aware of our position on application of Article 19. While this essentially matter between USSR and UN, unless issue satisfactorily resolved, it could affect prospect for long-range cooperation between us both inside and outside UN framework.

At this stage important thing is to remove the specter of such confrontation by having the Soviets settle all or most of their arrearages so that Article 19 is not brought into play. We do not want to advise Soviets on how to go about this. We do note that other countries that share USSR reservations have nevertheless paid assessments on some peacekeeping operations (e.g., France and Morocco on UNEF).

Dept assumes you will not want to discuss this issue in first go-around beyond such general exhortation and assertion of our seriousness in this matter. However, in event you find it useful to pursue matter further at future meetings, following additional talking points may prove useful in event they seem to be looking for way out.

Assuming UNOC phased out by mid-1964 could not Soviets consider paying some or all of their Congo arrears in 1964--if necessary "under protest"--based on fact or expectation that UNOC terminated but that they want to help UN clear up its financial problem. Or Soviets might offer to make voluntary contribution in settlement of assessed arrears. (We not sure whether UN could accept such substitution under regulations now in force, but if USSR even made probe of feasibility of such substitution this would show readiness consider settlement).

Soviets might consider paying UNEF arrears (about $14 million) as voluntary act without explicitly recognizing assessment as obligatory. (Though Soviets oppose assessments because UNEF not authorized by SC, they are aware that states concerned have accepted UNEF as useful peacekeeping operation.)

We also hope Soviets will tacitly drop their earlier insistence on withholding part of their assessment on regular budget which goes to servicing of bonds and paying for special missions (UNTSO, Field Service, etc). Organization's operational capacity would be seriously impaired if members attempt to pick and choose among budgetary items they will support.

Ball

New York, September 28, 1963, 2 p.m.

1042. UN Scale of Assessments.

Fedorenko (USSR) called me out of plenary today to discuss UN scale of assessments and handed me an unofficial Sov memo as fols:

"In his address to the plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on 20 September the President of the United States John F. Kennedy expressed the opinion that 'it is high time that many disputes on the agenda of this Assembly were taken off the debating schedule and placed on the negotiating table.'

The scale of assessments for sharing expenses of the United Nations is one of the highly disputed and unsettled question on which there exist substantial differences between the positions of the United States and the USSR and on which heated discussion had taken place at a number of General Assembly sessions. Further aggravation of differences of opinion on this question would affect most adversely the development of cooperation of states within the framework of the United Nations and could threaten the whole financial basis of this organisation.

The divergencies on the scale of assessments have resulted from the wrong approach to assessing the contributions of the USSR and other socialist countries, on the one hand, and of the United States and other Western powers, on the other hand. The bias of this approach is due to the failure to take into account, contrary to the decision of the 1st General Assembly session, such an important criterion set by the 1st session as comparative income per head of population. This failure was due to fixing the ceiling of 30 per cent for the United States assessment. Although it was intended to use this ceiling only when normal conditions prevail in the world, in practice this ceiling is wrongfully used already now.

Besides while determining the scale of assessments such important criteria as opportunities of individual members for acquiring foreign currency and temporary dislocation of the national economy as a result of World War II had not been taken into account.

The first of these criteria is of paramount importance for the USSR and other socialist countries whose foreign trade is still being subjected to barriers established mainly by the United States.

The second criterion is still of some importance for assessing the contributions of the USSR and a number of other countries, which is proved, for example, by the fact that according to the 1957 census the number of women in the Soviet Union exceeds by 20 million the number of men. These data reflect most important and grave consequences of war which still greatly influence many aspects of life in our country. It is as a result of World War II that the Soviet Union still bears enormous expenditure on pensions to the veterans of war and their families, as well as big expenditure on medical service for both the military and civilian personnel--veterans of war whose health had been undermined during the war.

As a result of these wrong attitudes there exists such an abnormal situation when the assessments of the United States and other Western countries are substantially reduced with every passing year while the assessments of the USSR and other socialist countries increase, as is shown by the following table.

Assessments for United Nations Budget

	1947	1963	1963 (percentage of 1947)
USA	39.88	32.02	80.3 percent
Great Britain	11.98	7.58	63.2 percent
France	6.00	5.94	99.0 percent
USSR	7.40	17.47	236.0 percent
Poland	0.95	1.28	134.7 percent
Czechoslovakia	0.90	1.17	130.0 percent

Replying to a reporter's question Mr. Adali Stevenson, United States Representative to the United Nations, said on 21 May 1961 with reference to the United States assessment that based on the ability to pay, the United States assessment for the United Nations regular budget is smaller than it should be. He said he believed that the figures of total national output indicated that the United States should pay 38.5 per cent instead of 32 per cent.

A year later, on the 27th of June 1962 Mr. Stevenson, replying to a question concerning the assessments of the United States for the United Nations budget, stated in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, 'that, based on ability to pay, the United States should pay something like 44 or 45 per cent of the UN assessments'.

The Soviet Union regards as most unsatisfactory the present situation in regard to the scale of assessments to the United Nations budget, and believes that the USSR assessment was established on a wrong and unjust basis.

Not only socialist countries but many other members of the United Nations object against the failure to observe the above mentioned criteria adopted by the 1st Session of the General Assembly and particularly against fixing the ceiling for the United States assessment.

To avoid the aggravation of the situation during the consideration at this and future sessions of the General Assembly of the scale of assessments for the United Nations budget, including the question of the ceiling for the United States, which could have certain effect on the general political atmosphere, the Soviet Union is prepared to seek ways of settling this question on the basis of the proposal to freeze the existing scale of assessments for the United Nations budget for the period of ten years." End Verbatim Text.

I attempted find out what exactly meant by last para. Fedorenko explained that they wanted discuss with us bilaterally possibly changes in scale of assessments, taking present scale as basis for discussion, and then fix scale agreed upon for 10 years.

Stevenson

SecDel/MC/97

New York, October 2, 1963, noon.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963

SUBJECT
Nigerian Foreign Minister's call on the Secretary

ITEM OF DISCUSSION
Enlargement of UN Councils

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Mr. Dickinson
Mr. Dean (reporter)

Mr. Jaju Anucha Wachuku--Foreign Minister
Mr. E. Anyaoku--First Secretary at Nigerian Del to UN
Mr. A. O. Nnorom--Private Secretary to Minister

The Secretary asked whether there is any possibility of enlarging the Security Council and ECOSOC without thereby raising the question of Chinese representation. The Nigerian Foreign Minister replied that on the basis of his conversation with Mr. Gromyko, he concludes there has been no change in the Soviet position. According to Wachuku, Gromyko feels that the Eastern European seat in the Security Council "really isn't of much use to them" since it has only rarely been occupied by a Communist country. If there is no support for revising the UN Charter, Wachuku continued, the Africans are determined to try for enlargement of certain organizations in order to give Africa fair representation. Hence the amendment of the Charter proposed by the Africans might be limited to this specific point.

The Secretary then asked whether all African nations would support the Ivory Coast's candidacy in the Security Council. Wachuku did not think so because the Ivory Coast is seeking the Commonwealth seat and Nigeria is already committed to supporting Malaysia for this seat. The Secretary pointed out that if the Ivory Coast is elected to the Security Council, it would give Africa two seats inasmuch as Morocco is already a member. Wachuku indicated that this approach is not acceptable to the Africans because they are interested in the principle of clearly setting aside a certain number of seats as African seats. He stressed that the Africans don't want to "raid" seats allotted to other geographic or political areas, nor do the Africans want to be forced to lobby for seats in every General Assembly. The Africans feel they deserve seats on a strictly geographic basis. Referring to his speech before the General Assembly, he repeated that Nigeria does not want Latin America to lose its seats.

Mr. Dickinson suggested that voting for Malaysia does not automatically force Nigeria to support Czechoslovakia. Since Nigeria can vote for three candidates, it would be able to vote for Bolivia and the Ivory Coast in addition to Malaysia.

In determining which countries to support for the Security Council seats, ideological differences among Africans will also play a role, said Wachuku. Furthermore it is not certain that all UAM states will vote for the Ivory Coast and that petty rivalry among UAM members may lead to some defections.

The Nigerian Minister said that Guinea had asked the Special Political Committee to give priority to the question of enlargement of the UN Councils. On the basis of the outcome of this debate and what is said at that time, the Africans will determine their position on who to support for the Security Council. Wachuku also said that he had emphasized to Gromyko that the question of enlargement should not be linked to the question of Chinese representation in the UN.

SecDel/MC/98

New York, October 2, 1963, noon.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963

SUBJECT
Nigerian Foreign Minister's Call on the Secretary

ITEM OF DISCUSSION
Chinese Representation

PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 270.]

Wachuku stressed that there is no question of expelling Nationalist China from the UN, but he was equally determined that Continental China should be admitted to the UN. As for which one of the two Chinas should obtain the seat on the Security Council, Wachuku suggested that the Asians may wish to decide this question.

The Secretary expressed the opinion that the Chinese communists would not accept admission to the UN under these circumstances. He then pointed to a number of acts by the Chinese communists which would indicate that they have not renounced their policy of aggression. He cited the Moscow-Peking debate in which the Peking regime reasserted its view that war remains an instrument of foreign policy. He mentioned Peking's decision not to sign the test ban treaty and pointed out how China has blocked agreement on the Geneva Accords dealing with Indo-China. While listing examples of ChiComs aggressive policy, he also mentioned that there appears to be some kind of a review going on within China which may determine its future foreign policy. Therefore, it is important that no encouragement be given at this time to those who advocate a hard line. The Secretary added that it may be of some significance that it was Albania and not the Soviet Union which introduced the motion on Chinese representation this year.

The Nigerian Minister stated that there is no evidence that Continental China would not live up to its obligations which it would have to assume by becoming a member of the United Nations. Unless China accepts the principles embodied in the UN Charter, it would be in the same position as South Africa and then would become the object of the same types of pressures from member states as presently experienced by South Africa. Wachuku expressed the opinion that China would also not wish to alienate its supporters by violating the UN Charter.

Ambassador Stevenson asked whether Continental China might be admitted under the two China policy? Wachuku replied that it was his intention to introduce an amendment asking for the admission of China "provided they apply for it." He added that he doubts Continental China would accept under these conditions. Nevertheless, he believes that this tactic would smoke out China's real intentions.

Ambassador Stevenson injected that it would indeed be a very significant day if China would apply for membership and also renounce its claim on Taiwan.

Wachuku explained that if Continental China would apply for membership, this in itself would imply renunciation of its claim to Taipei and disavowal of aggression as an instrument of Chinese policy. Mr. Dickinson pointed out that the real question is whether China should be admitted before its views have been fully tested or afterwards when Chinese membership may disrupt the UN. To this, Wachuku replied that Chinese membership in the UN could have no worse effect than Soviet membership.

Ambassador Stevenson queried whether this was a propitious moment to advance a two-China policy especially since the question of Chinese representation is scheduled for discussion on October 11. Wachuku replied that the best thing that can be done now is "to call China's bluff which would take the wind out of China's sails." He claimed that at the present time the onus of keeping Continental China out of the UN is clearly on the United States. The tactics he is advocating would change this. He stressed again that neither Nigeria nor the other Africans want to expel Taipei. The Chinese Nationalists have proven themselves to be good and loyal members of the United Nations. Also, Nationalist China has the veto to prevent its own expulsion.

The Secretary suggested that events in Continental China may make it desirable to postpone the discussion of Chinese representation in the United Nations beyond the presently scheduled date. Mr. Dickinson asked whether the Nigerian Minister had thought of the adverse effect increased support for Chinese admission would have on small Southeast Asian countries which have been pursuing an anti-communist policy. If China were admitted, Wachuku replied, it would become subject to UN pressures and the UN certainly has means at its disposal to deal with China if it interfered in the internal affairs of another country.

The Secretary said that China is not bent on building a peaceful world. Its decision not to sign the test ban treaty is merely an example of this. If China ever became a nuclear power, it would create major problems for the world. Wachuku replied that Chinese membership in the UN would also solve some of the problem. Once China comes into the United Nations it would have to behave like any other peace-loving nation. He repeated again that "no harm would be done to the UN or anybody else if an amendment is brought forward to bring in China."

Ambassador Stevenson asked whether China's refusal to sign the test ban treaty should not affect its admission to the UN. Wachuku replied that it is easier to control China from within the UN than from without. Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that were China to be admitted at this point, after its refusal to sign the test ban treaty, it would be tantamount to rewarding China for its aggressive policies.

The Secretary said that he would have a clearer picture of the problem once he knew what is presently going on in Peking. He promised to keep in touch with the Nigerian Government on this important question.

New York, October 7, 1963, 7 p.m.

1200. Soviet Views re UN Financial and Administrative Problems.

Roshchin (USSR) stated to Mission officer that USSR considers that Fifth Comite agenda at current session contains three difficult and important problems: (1) financing of peace-keeping operations, (2) regular scale of assessments (report of Comite on Contributions), and (3) personnel item.

Roshchin said that scale of assessments issue could be removed if US agreed to freeze scale for ten years in accordance with memo handed by Fedorenko (USSR) to Stevenson./2/ He felt confident that Comite Five would accept such freeze if US and USSR concurred.

Although making no specific proposals re other matters, Roshchin stated several times that US and USSR Dels should sit down and discuss all difficult questions presently in Comite Five. Re financing peace-keeping operations, he added it was unthinkable that USSR should be forced pay $60 million in so-called arrears for financing operations which had been dealt with in violation of Charter. He appeared more defensive on this point than at any time in past, and his manner indicated Soviets now feel their position more difficult re this issue.

When Mission officer expressed surprise that USSR Del considered personnel item to be difficult one, Roshchin said Soviets still very unhappy about fact they had absolutely no influence within Secretariat and that Secretariat decisions constantly made without any consideration being given to Soviet views.

Stevenson