NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
From the Strategic Services Unit to the Office of Special Operations
126. Memorandum for Record
Washington, August 19, 1946.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2227, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 3. Secret.
REFERENCE
Letter to the Attorney General from NIA dated 8 August 46/1//1/Document 120.
At 1045 this date the undersigned talked with Mr. Douglas McGregor, Acting Attorney General, concerning the reference letter.
Mr. McGregor stated that the Attorney General had informed him that the F.B.I. would not withdraw from Latin American countries until the Central Intelligence Group had been able to furnish replacements and arrange an orderly transfer. Mr. McGregor said that he understood no formal reply to the reference letter was to be made since the above decision of the Attorney General was already known.
The undersigned expressed the belief that no reply was necessary if the N.I.A. could be assured that the request in the reference letter would be honored. Mr. McGregor reaffirmed the fact that the Attorney General had agreed to this request.
James S. Lay, Jr.
127. Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)
Washington, August 19, 1946.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2227, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 3. Strictly Confidential.
Dear General Vandenberg: Reference is made to the letter of Colonel Edwin K. Wright of the Central Intelligence Group directed to me on August 7, 1946,/1/ which attached a schedule for the transfer of responsibility for intelligence coverage from the FBI to the CIG in Latin America. I must advise that the dates set forth in this schedule for transfer of responsibility, that is, February 15, 1947, for the first group of countries, April 1, 1947, for the second group, and May 15, 1947, for the third group, make the position of the FBI in Latin America rather difficult. Operations under the limited scope and the restrictions necessary incidental to complete withdrawal make difficult efficient and productive operations over an extended period. The FBI personnel involved in Latin American operations are critically needed in connection with our domestic responsibilities and I am most anxious to return them to the domestic field.
/1/Not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
I had hoped that the CIG would be able to take over responsibility in the first group of countries by September 15, 1946; in the second group by November 1, 1946; and the remainder by January 1, 1947. As you will note, this would give approximately six months from the time of the issuance of the directive to the Central Intelligence Group for the orderly transfer of responsibility from the FBI to the CIG in Latin America. I would appreciate your further consideration in this matter and your advice as to any adjustments that can be made in the schedule./2/
/2/In Vandenberg's September 3 reply to Hoover he asserted that "it would not be possible in any case to approximate the dates you mention,...for the three areas indicated." (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2227, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 3) See the Supplement.
With best wishes and kind regards,
Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover
128. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to Secretary of State Byrnes
Washington, September 12, 1946.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/9-1246. Top Secret. Similar memoranda were sent to the other NIA principals.
SUBJECT
External Activities of the Central Intelligence GroupAll activities of the Strategic Services Unit will be discontinued effective 19 October 1946.
Coincident therewith, the Special Operations Office of the Central Intelligence Group will assume responsibility for the conduct of espionage and counter-espionage operations in the field for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security. Every possible effort is being made to extend and develop foreign coverage. Only a limited number of carefully selected individuals formerly with Strategic Services Unit will be employed to inaugurate the program under the new auspices.
It is, and will continue to be, the primary objective of Special Operations, Central Intelligence Group, to make a real contribution to the effective operation of the various departments of the Government.
It is requested that interested agencies of the State Department be advised of the above.
Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Lieutenant General, USA129. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (Braden)
Washington, October 9, 1946.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2461, Job 83-00764R, Box 4, Folder 7. Secret. The date is handwritten on the source text. No drafting information appears on the source text but the tone of the letter suggests that it was written by Vandenberg.
Dear Mr. Braden: The excellent dispatch from Ambassador Flack, in which he sets forth his views concerning essential intelligence services in Bolivia,/1/ has been read by me with interest and appreciation.
/1/Not found.
On the one hand, facts so forcibly brought out in this communication are gratifying to me because they confirm the very real need for effective CIG service in Latin America and manifest an appreciation of that need by an ambassador whose support and cooperation are essential to the success of our activities. On the other hand, conclusions are depressing for I must agree with Ambassador Flack in his conviction that continuous and effective coverage is imperative and that no new organization, regardless of its potentialities, can equal an established service until the novice has gained an equal experience and established comparable contacts. I concur in Ambassador Flack's implication that it would be most desirable to retain in Bolivia, and elsewhere in Latin America, as much of the present functioning FBI organization as it is possible to transfer to CIG. Such a transfer was hoped for when first the Latin American assignment was given to CIG and a proper request for such an arrangement was duly made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Director, FBI, disapproved the transfer to CIG of any FBI personnel stationed in Latin America for the reason that these experienced agents were badly needed in domestic work. I understand Mr. Hoover's desire to retain in his organization experienced personnel trained by the Bureau and of continued usefulness on the home front and I propose to do nothing in violation of his decision. However, I seriously doubt that the withdrawal from Latin America of all FBI representatives, many of whom would cheerfully elect to remain at their posts, is in the interest of the United States.
I appreciate the continued cooperation and support of the Department of State.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely,/2/
/2/Printed from an unsigned copy.
130. Strategic Services Unit General Orders No. 16
Washington, October 19, 1946.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-601, Job 83-00036, Box 4, Folder 9. Restricted. Draft copies (dated September 5) of SSU Headquarters' message to its field stations closing down operations and Vandenberg's parallel message are ibid. Colonel Quinn's October 16 memorandum to Penrose and others outlines administrative arrangements concerning the transfer. (Ibid.)
TERMINATION OF SSU OPERATIONS
1. Effective 2400, 19 October 1946, all operations of the Strategic Services Unit are terminated.
2. Administrative activities incident to disposition of personnel, material, records, claims, settlements, etc., will be continued until final and complete liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit is effected at a later date.
William W. Quinn
Colonel, Infantry
Director131. Instruction From the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Russell) to the Minister in Tangier (Alling)
Washington, January 3, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/1-347. Top Secret. More or less identical instructions presumably were sent to other posts, but no other instructions or list of other addresses has been found.
Sir:
SUBJECT
Security Intelligence Coverage. Relationship Between Department of State and the National Intelligence Authority. Assignment of CIG Representatives to Foreign Service EstablishmentsBackground:
The Secretary of State refers to Department of State Radio Bulletin No. 19 dated January 22, 1946. Within the White House Section, and under the heading Foreign Intelligence, is set forth a Presidential Directive creating the National Intelligence Authority consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and a personal representative of the President. The Secretary of State is Chairman of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). (The Presidential Directive is also contained in State Department Bulletin No. 334, dated February 3, 1946.)
Section Two (2) of the Directive provides for the formation of a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) consisting of persons and facilities assigned from State, War and Navy. Heading CIG is a Director of Central Intelligence, Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg.
Under authority of the intelligence directive, the National Intelligence Authority has charged CIG with world-wide security intelligence coverage.
As will be recalled, during the past few years, there have been operating in a number of our missions and consulates, personnel of other government agencies who have been assisting with security intelligence-- one of these organizations, the Strategic Services Unit (former OSS) of the War Department, was liquidated as of October 20, 1946. Another of the agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, soon will withdraw its personnel from abroad. The new organization, CIG, will assume many of the duties previously performed by both organizations.
State Department Part in the New Security Intelligence Operations:
The member agencies of CIG (State, War and Navy) are each providing that organization with certain facilities as called for in Section Two (2) of the Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946.
[3 pages of source text not declassified]
Communications From Missions and Consulates to the Department:
This document is regarded as the basic instruction covering the relationship between the Department of State and CIG. It is not considered all-inclusive. As necessity requires, there will be other instructions. Missions and Consulates should feel free to request clarification on specific points, and bring to the attention of the Department any phase of the operation which appears to be distinctive to a particular post.
[2 paragraphs and 1 heading (12 lines of source text) not declassified]
Inasmuch as the Secretary of State is Chairman of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and the Department of State is a member of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), much importance is placed in the Department's responsibility as regards the Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946. The Acting Secretary, in a recent communication to the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "I hope that the cooperation between the Department of State and your representatives abroad will result in efficient and cordial integration of our foreign intelligence."/1/
/1/Not found.
The success of this counter-intelligence program depends upon the manner in which it is put into effect at the various posts. Care should be taken in the designation of the Mission's representative who will coordinate the activities. Full responsibility is placed upon the Chief of Mission for implementing the plan; therefore, his personal attention should be given to its activation.
Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of State:
Donald Russell/2//2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
132. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to Secretary of State Byrnes
Washington, January 3, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2227, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 3. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. Secretary: As you are aware, arrangements have been completed for the withdrawal from Latin America of special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who have been performing intelligence duties as legal attaches of the various diplomatic missions in South and Central America and in the Caribbean area. Representatives of the Central Intelligence Group will take over the intelligence duties in Latin America which have been performed by the FBI since 1942. In order that the continuity of intelligence operations in Latin America shall not be prejudiced, arrangements have been made with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to the effect that legal attaches representing the FBI shall not depart from their posts of duty until such time as qualified and trained CIG representatives shall arrive at the respective capitals in the American Republics.
I am transmitting to you herewith a schedule/1/ setting forth the dates when CIG representatives will arrive for duty in the various Latin American countries. This schedule has also been supplied to the FBI, which has indicated that an FBI representative will be present at each post when the local attaché relinquishes his duties and the CIG representative takes over. Mr. Daniel DeBardaleben, of CIG, will proceed to Latin America and his trip will follow the itinerary and schedule attached hereto. Mr. DeBardaleben has my entire confidence and he is completely familiar with the arrangements which have been made as between the FBI and the CIG in regard to the latter's assumption of intelligence duties in the American Republics.
/1/Not printed; see the Supplement.
Mr. Frederick B. Lyon, Director of the Office of Controls of the Department of State, and Mr. Jack D. Neal, Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation of the Department, have worked closely with the appropriate representatives of CIG in the implementation of the arrangements looking forward to the assumption by CIG of intelligence duties in Latin America. Both Mr. Lyon and Mr. Neal are not only entirely familiar with the Intelligence activities of the FBI in Latin America but are also being kept completely informed as to CIG plans to assume intelligence operations in that area.
The purpose of this communication is not only to advise you of the foregoing, but also to suggest that you may care to appoint a representative of the Department of State to accompany Mr. DeBardaleben and Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's representative, in order that the Department of State may be represented in each case when the CIG representative is installed in the various diplomatic missions in South and Central America and in the Caribbean area. The CIG representatives who have been selected and who are currently being trained for duty in the American Republics are, I believe, excellently qualified for their duties. I wish to assure you that I consider the CIG intelligence commitment in the American Republics as second to none in importance and significance, and that CIG representatives who will shortly proceed to their posts of duty in South and Central America and in the Caribbean area are being instructed to cooperate in every way possible with the various chiefs of diplomatic missions in the Latin American capitals, with a view to obtaining the best possible results and integration of the intelligence effort.
Respectfully yours,
Hoyt S. Vandenberg/2/
Lieutenant General, USA/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Vandenberg signed the original.
133. Letter From Secretary of State Byrnes to the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)
Washington, January 8, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2227, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 3. Secret.
Dear General Vandenberg: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 3/1/ with reference to contemplated arrangements covering the replacement in Latin America of special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with representatives of the Central Intelligence Group.
/1/Document 132.
You may recall that as a result of our discussions last year it was agreed not only that the FBI representatives would remain until after the arrival of their CIG replacements, but also that because of varying circumstances at each capital, no period could be specified in advance as representing the time necessary between the arrival of the CIG representative and the departure of his FBI predecessor. It was left therefore that the American Ambassador concerned would be responsible for indicating, after the arrival of the CIG representative at his post, the overlap necessary at that post.
Provided this arrangement is maintained I see no objection to the projected trip of Mr. DeBardaleben of CIG and a colleague from FBI, and I am also prepared in accordance with your suggestion to authorize Mr. Jack D. Neal, Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, to proceed to Latin America as the representative of the Department of State at approximately the same time.
In connection with the foregoing we are fully convinced of the importance of the work which you are about to undertake in Latin America, and we share your desire to have that work accomplished with the fullest and most complete collaboration between field representatives of CIG and the personnel of the Foreign Service.
Sincerely yours,
For the Secretary of State:
Spruille Braden
Assistant Secretary134. Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War (Quinn) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen)
Washington, April 11, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-804, Item 7. Confidential. The source text may be a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian in the early 1950s.
SUBJECT
Liquidation of SSU1. On 2 April 1946 you appointed me Director of the Strategic Services Unit of the War Department. On 3 April 1946 you issued instructions to me directing that liquidation of SSU be completed not later than 30 June 1947./1/ You further directed that this liquidation be coordinated with development of the permanent peace-time intelligence program, and that SSU service the intelligence agencies and make available to the Director of Central Intelligence any facilities or services of SSU which might be useful in the performance of the authorized functions of the Central Intelligence Group.
/1/Document 107.
2. All civilian personnel of SSU have been terminated and military personnel have been transferred or reassigned. Foreign missions and stations were liquidated as SSU installations on or before 20 October 1946.
3. Funds adequate to meet outstanding obligations of SSU have been allocated from appropriations of the War Department available for that purpose. These funds will be administered in accordance with arrangements which have been made with administrative personnel of your office. Experience indicates that claims and inquiries arising out of past operations of OSS-SSU will continue, and no accurate estimate can now be made of their number or when they will cease. They are, however, so few that personnel now on duty with the Central Intelligence Group and familiar with such matters can supply necessary information and assistance. Such questions may, therefore, be referred to proper CIG officials.
4. The disposition of the assets and facilities of SSU has been coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with his requirements and to his satisfaction.
5. Effective this date liquidation of SSU is complete with the exceptions noted in paragraph 3, above, and your instructions have been complied with. It is therefore recommended that I be relieved as Director, SSU./2/
/2/In an April 11 memorandum to Petersen, Vandenberg concurred in Quinn's recommendations. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-804, Item 7)
William W. Quinn/3/
Colonel, Inf./3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
135. Letter From the National Intelligence Authority to Representative Clare E. Hoffman
Washington, June 26, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 3. Top Secret. Representative Hoffman (Republican, Michigan) was Chairman of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. At the time the letter was written, the committee was considering the legislation on armed forces unification, which included provisions establishing the Central Intelligence Agency on a statutory basis. The question of clandestine operations arose in the committee as a result of press stories and press criticism about the efforts to centralize all clandestine intelligence operations in CIG. See Document 319, which records the NIA's discussion of the letter, which was proposed to the Authority by Hillenkoetter.
My Dear Mr. Chairman: It has been brought to our attention that numerous newspaper articles have stated that the Central Intelligence Group has usurped various departmental intelligence functions and forced established organizations out of the field. These charges have been particularly leveled at the operation by the Central Intelligence Group of clandestine intelligence activities. These charges are not true.
It has long been felt by those who have successfully operated clandestine intelligence systems that such work must be centralized within one agency. As a corollary to this proposition, it has likewise been proven that a multitude of espionage agencies results in two shortcomings: first, agents tend to uncover each other or block each other's funds or similarly neutralize each other, being unaware of identical objectives; second, each agency tends to hoard its own special information or attempts to be the first to deliver a choice piece of information to higher authorities. This latter type of competition does not permit the overall evaluation of intelligence on a given subject, as each agency is competing for prestige.
For the reasons cited above, which were highlighted by experience during the last war, it was felt inadvisable, after due study by interdepartmental committees, to permit the several departments to conduct independent clandestine operations. For this reason, the National Intelligence Authority, under date of 8 July 1946, issued the following directive, which is quoted in part:
"Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946, designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities, so as to insure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, . . . . the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to perform the following services of common concern, which this Authority has determined can be more efficiently accomplished centrally: Conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security...."
This Authority reaffirms this directive as of the utmost importance to the national security, for the reasons outlined above. Similarly, the Central Intelligence Group should be free to assume, under our direction, or the subsequent direction of a National Security Council, the performance, for the benefit of the intelligence agencies of the Government, of such services, of common concern, including the field of collection, as this Authority or a subsequent Council determines can be more efficiently performed centrally.
Sincerely yours,
Secretary of State/1/
Secretary of War
Secretary of The Navy
Personal Representative of the President/1/No signatures or any annotation indicating the letter was signed and sent appears on the source text. The NIA minutes cited in the source note above, however, explicitly state that the NIA members signed the letter.
136. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, April 16, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration-- Subject Files, 1944-47: Lot 53 D 28, Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Box 19. Secret. Drafted by Humelsine and Armstrong.
SUBJECT
Publicity on Bogota Intelligence ReportsPARTICIPANTS
CIA--Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter
S/S--Mr. Humelsine
SA-A--Mr. ArmstrongUpon entering Admiral Hillenkoetter's office, he said to Mr. Armstrong, "Well, I kept you off the spot, didn't I?" To this Mr. Armstrong replied, "Perhaps, but you certainly put the State Department on it." Admiral Hillenkoetter admitted this.
Admiral Hillenkoetter then described the circumstances of the hearing before the Committee headed by Congressman Clarence Brown on the preceding day. He said that the statement which he had made before the Committee had been shown to Admiral Leahy (and indicated that the President had been consulted in the matter) and that he had then shown it to Secretary Forrestal. He stated that Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal had told him to go ahead with the statement even if it involved a public hearing. Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that the hearing before the Committee had been first in executive session, but that upon its completion, the Chairman had called in the press and required him to read his statement again to the reporters.
Mr. Humelsine requested Admiral Hillenkoetter to explain his references in his testimony to the CIA report allegedly "censored" by a Mr. O.J. Libert at Bogota. Admiral Hillenkoetter picked up a memorandum, a copy of which is attached, and read it./1/
/1/Not printed; see the Supplement.
The memorandum had been prepared, he said, by the CIA Agent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Bogota and was an explanation of the Agent's instructions to CIA in Washington that the message he sent on March 23rd should not be forwarded to the State Department. Mr. Humelsine and Mr. Armstrong noted that the statement did not indicate that Ambassador Beaulac had interposed any objection to the message being transmitted to the State Department and that the CIA Agent had accepted unquestioningly the authority of an administrative officer of the International Conference Division as sufficient to block the transmission of the message. Mr. Armstrong asked why the Agent had not gone back to the Ambassador and urged the sending of the information, if he thought it was important. Admiral Hillenkoetter responded that the Agent had to "live" with the Embassy and therefore could not afford to antagonize the personnel there.
Mr. Humelsine then said to Admiral Hillenkoetter, "It is inconceivable to me that you personally could have had the information to which your man attached such importance and not have sent it to the Department regardless of your subordinate's instructions from Bogota." Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that in hindsight he felt he should have done so and that, in fact, when the information was received, on or about March 23, he had suggested doing so. However, in a discussion of the matter with his Deputy, General E.K. Wright, his Executive Officer, Captain Ford, and Colonel Galloway, the Deputy Director for Special Operations, he had been advised against doing so on the grounds that their man in Bogota would be placed in serious trouble vis-à-vis the Ambassador and the staff.
Admiral Hillenkoetter went on to indicate the general character of the difficulties which his overseas covert operations have encountered at various [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] posts. He particularly referred to a situation at [1 line of source text not declassified] and pointed out that the man had gone to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in September 1947 and had not as yet been able to make any official report or even send official word of his arrival on duty. Mr. Humelsine said that this was news to him and, it being a serious matter, would be investigated at once.
Admiral Hillenkoetter then recited the history of the efforts CIA has made to obtain departmental agreement to the enlargement of its overseas staff and said that since July 1947 he had been trying to get [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] additional number of agents without success. He stated that he had talked to Mr. Peurifoy about it last fall and had at first found him sympathetic to his request and to the CIA's staffing problem. After a further delay, Mr. Peurifoy had written him to the effect that the additional assignments not only would not be granted, but that by January 1st the overseas force would have to be reduced to no more than 200 agents. He recalled that Mr. Peurifoy had subsequently told him that he had signed this letter only with "great reluctance". Admiral Hillenkoetter recounted conversations which he had had with Mr. Armour, Mr. Neal, Mr. Ravndal, and others on the subject in which the divergence of views on the function of CIA in the field became apparent. He stated that he had also talked to Secretary Forrestal and that the latter had talked to Mr. Lovett. It had been agreed between them that the Committee surveying CIA operations headed by Mr. Allen Dulles would attempt to resolve the impasse. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
Admiral Hillenkoetter said that the CIA had been unjustifiably, in his opinion, put on the spot by the State Department's failure to release publicly the information which had been given by Lincoln White at a Thursday evening, April 15th, press conference and that he thought the Department deserved whatever heat might now be on it. Mr. Humelsine pointed out that the State Department looked upon this situation as being the responsibility of the Executive Branch of the Government, not of one department which could disclaim responsibility by shifting the burden to another. He asked the Director why he had not informed the Department that CIA was under pressure and requested its cooperation. Mr. Humelsine recalled to the Director that he had telephoned him, at Mr. Lovett's request, when he first heard that there would be a congressional investigation and had asked him if there was anything the State Department could do to help. Mr. Armstrong said that he too had telephoned the Director in the same vein and noted that in neither case had the Director indicated that the CIA was under disturbing pressure or that the State Department could, or should, do anything in the circumstances. Admiral Hillenkoetter referred to the fact that the newspapers and radio had continuously indicated that CIA was being held accountable for the alleged intelligence failure at Bogota and said that the Department should have known that the only corrective would be to issue a statement on the quantity and quality of information that had been available.
Admiral Hillenkoetter then reverted to the difficulties he has encountered in getting his program implemented through the State Department and the Foreign Service and said that he would much prefer to have relations with the Department centralized in one office and that if he could do all of his business with Mr. Armstrong's office, he thought that better results would ensue. He emphasized that his relations with Mr. Armstrong and the substantive side of intelligence were satisfactory, and that he hoped that the Department would take steps to make his relations center in one place. Mr. Humelsine said that he thought this was essential and should be carried into effect and he would so report to Mr. Lovett.
In closing, Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that if relations with the Department did not improve in the near future, [2 lines of source text not declassified] he intended to inform the President and, if necessary, the Congress, that they could not hold him responsible for obtaining the intelligence information that he is charged with at present. He stated that he would have to bring the blocking of his plans by the Department to public notice, since not, in some cases, he is able to get only 60% or less of the information that he should and would get if his program were fully put into effect.
Continue with Introduction:
Souers' Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
