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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Souers' Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence

                           

145. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, April 2, 1946, 11 a.m.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Confidential. The meeting was held at the Department of State. This was an instance in which the meetings of the National Intelligence Authority and the Committee of Three overlapped. A record of the NIA portion of the meeting also exists in the Committee of Three minutes. (Ibid., RG 107, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Secretary of War Patterson's Subject File, RPP Committee of Three, Safe File No. 1) A note on the source text indicates Admiral Leahy "subsequently approved the action taken at the meeting."

PARTICIPANTS

Members Present
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal

Also Present
Mr. Howard C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Edward Hidalgo, Navy Department

1. Progress Report by Director of Central Intelligence

At Secretary Byrnes' request, Admiral Souers gave a brief report on the progress of organization of the Central Intelligence Group, and noted some of the more important projects now in progress. He invited attention to the fact that the most urgent problem concerning the disposition of the Strategic Services Unit was covered by the paper/1/ for consideration at this meeting. Admiral Souers also explained that further details concerning current projects were available in the weekly Status Report which was distributed to the Authority./2/

/1/See the source note, Document 106.

/2/Not printed.

2. Policy on Liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit (N.I.A. 3)

Secretary Patterson suggested the following amendments:

a. The addition of a new paragraph to the proposed N.I.A. Directive (page 4) as follows:

"5. The War Department shall retain the right to determine what portion of War Department funds, personnel and facilities can be made available to SSU by the War Department."

b. Insert the words "within your capabilities" in the second line of the third paragraph following the word "service", and in the sixth line of the third paragraph following the word "available."

The National Intelligence Authority:

Approved N.I.A. 3 subject to the above amendments (Enclosure A thereto subsequently circulated as N.I.A. Directive No. 4)./3/

/3/Document 106.

146. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, April 8, 1946, 3 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Confidential; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the New War Department Building.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Kingman Douglass, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present

Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS

Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence

Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Also Present

Captain W.B. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel C.P. Nicholas, USA, Central Intelligence Group

Secretariat

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority

1. 1947 Budget for Intelligence Work of the Department of State

Mr. McCormack submitted the letter in Enclosure "A"/1/ for consideration.

/1/In the April 8 letter, McCormack asked Douglass to obtain the IAB's views on a possible recommendation by the NIA to Congress in support of the Department of State intelligence budget. See the Supplement.

Mr. Douglass asked for the comments of the other members on the suggestion in Mr. McCormack's letter.

General Vandenberg felt that the Secretary of State had considerable influence in the Congress and might well be able to secure the requested appropriation if he so desired. Therefore, until the Secretary of State requests assistance from the other N.I.A. members, General Vandenberg is very reluctant to advise the Secretary of War to take any action. General Vandenberg noted that Admiral Souers in the last N.I.A. meeting had already expressed the opinion, from the viewpoint of C.I.G., that more than $2,000,000 was required for State Department intelligence. General Vandenberg understood that the Secretaries of War and the Navy had concurred with Admiral Souers.

Admiral Inglis agreed with General Vandenberg that N.I.A. action should not be taken until the Secretary of State requested such assistance. Admiral Inglis asked whether Mr. McCormack was representing the Secretary of State in presenting this matter.

Mr. McCormack explained that his action was not taken on a specific request from the Secretary of State. In his capacity as Special Assistant, however, Mr. McCormack felt that it was his duty to do all in his power to secure the appropriation which the Secretary of State had requested and had not officially revised or withdrawn. He admitted that there was some difference of opinion within the Department of State as to the organization and even the need for intelligence activities in that Department.

Admiral Inglis did not wish to comment upon any matters of internal disagreement within the Department of State. He felt, however, that the Central Intelligence Group should take over from the Department the basic intelligence research and analysis function.

Mr. McCormack stated that he was not insisting that any action be taken, but he thought it entirely appropriate that the Board advise the N.I.A. what effect the reported action of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, if sustained by the Congress, would have upon the work of the Central Intelligence Group.

General Vandenberg believed that the N.I.A. would always have difficulty in such cases until it has its own operating funds. With such funds its recommendations regarding departmental budgets will have more weight with Congress. So long as its funds come from the various Departments, however, its recommendations regarding budgets will not have great influence. General Vandenberg questioned whether this Board should become involved in this matter at this time, or whether it would not be preferable to find out first what the Secretary of State proposes to do.

Mr. McCormack believed that this Board has the authority to advise the N.I.A. at this time on its own initiative.

General Vandenberg maintained that Admiral Souers had already advised the N.I.A. of the C.I.G. views on this point; the only question at present was whether that advice was sufficient.

Mr. Douglass thought there was an additional question of how much burden would be placed upon the War and Navy Departments to fill the gap created by the lack of a State Department intelligence organization. He thought this might require an increase in War and Navy Department budgets for intelligence.

Admiral Inglis pointed out that the Navy Department intelligence budget had already been submitted. It might, therefore, be harder to change that than to attempt to retain the State Department budget.

General Vandenberg felt that if the State Department intelligence budget was refused, Congress would react unfavorably to a subsequent War and Navy Department request for additional appropriations for the same purpose.

Admiral Inglis believed that the Board should either suggest doing nothing, or recommend to the N.I.A. that the research and analysis function be transferred from State to C.I.G. In the latter case, he felt that the personnel assigned to C.I.G. should be carefully screened and that the funds for research and analysis should come from the State Department for the 1947 fiscal year. He thought that C.I.G. should have an independent budget for the 1948 fiscal year.

General Vandenberg thought that the N.I.A. was already in a difficult situation for the coming year, and questioned whether the additional burden of a research and analysis unit should be added during that time. He was in agreement, however, with the ultimate desirability of having such a research and analysis unit in C.I.G.

Mr. Douglass thought that the Secretary of State might feel that $2,000,000 was enough to meet his needs and would be reluctant to transfer anything to C.I.G. Mr. Douglass, however, also agreed with the desirability of a research and analysis unit in C.I.G.

General Vandenberg said that if the State Department decided to decentralize intelligence, he did not think that Department could object to C.I.G. assuming the research and analysis function.

General McDonald thought that the N.I.A. should not do anything unless the Secretary of State requested its assistance.

Mr. McCormack pointed out that so far as the official record is concerned, the Secretary of State had requested over $5,000,000 for intelligence, which the Bureau of the Budget had reduced to about $4,000,000.

Admiral Inglis thought that C.I.G. could be properly concerned about the loss of the $330,000 earmarked for its operations.

General Vandenberg thought that the C.I.G. had a proper interest in this budget, but that the actions of C.I.G. should depend on what action the Secretary of State planned to take. General Vandenberg therefore thought that the first step should be for the Director of Central Intelligence to discuss the matter with the Secretary of State and find out his views and proposed actions.

Colonel Nicholas questioned whether the Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of this Board, could not advise the Secretary of State of the detrimental effect upon C.I.G. of the proposed cut in the budget.

General Vandenberg agreed. He thought that if the Secretary of State indicated that he felt further action in support of his intelligence budget was unnecessary, this Board might justifiably express its alarm at that time.

Mr. McCormack suggested that his letter be tabled until the Director of Central Intelligence had seen the Secretary of State and until the House Appropriations Committee had acted on the budget.

Mr. Douglass thought the solution might be to advise Admiral Leahy of the situation.

General Vandenberg thought the C.I.G. should find out what the Secretary of State intends to do. If he intends to accept the refusal of the budget without further action on his part, the C.I.G. should express its alarm. However, if the Secretary of State proposes to take all possible action in support of his budget. General Vandenberg believed that no further action was necessary by C.I.G.

Mr. McCormack noted that the great difficulty is the uncertainty in the minds of his employees created by the action of the House Appropriations Subcommittee. This uncertainty causes the capable personnel to resign in favor of more secure employment.

Mr. Douglass agreed to attempt to see the Secretary of State as suggested.

Admiral Inglis suggested that the possibility of transferring the research and analysis function from State to the C.I.G. might also be discussed with the Secretary of State.

General Vandenberg expressed his willingness to concur in such a transfer if State agreed to finance the operations for the next year. He believed, however, that C.I.G. should not oppose the State Department if it desired to retain that function.

Admiral Inglis said that he still considered the transfer as the best ultimate solution.

General Vandenberg thought that the Director of Central Intelligence might find out from the Secretary of State his reactions to a recommendation by this Board that C.I.G. assume this research and analysis function. General Vandenberg thought that intelligence would be forthcoming if this function was in either the State Department or the C.I.G., but he agreed that transfer to C.I.G. was the preferable solution.

Mr. McCormack expressed the belief that the Secretary of State has not yet formulated a definite opinion regarding the ultimate form or composition of the intelligence activities in the State Department.

After further discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Agreed to recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence that he:

(1) Advise the Secretary of State of the adverse effect, upon the work of the Central Intelligence Group, of a substantial reduction or deletion of the 1947 appropriation for intelligence work in the Department of State.

(2) Ascertain the views and proposed actions of the Secretary of State regarding this appropriation.

(3) Ascertain, if the opportunity arises, the views of the Secretary of State as to the possibility that the intelligence research and analysis function, for which this appropriation was requested, might be transferred from the Department of State to the Central Intelligence Group./2/

/2/No record has been found of a communication or discussion between Souers and Byrnes on these subjects.

b. Agreed to defer further consideration of Mr. McCormack's letter (Enclosure hereto) pending the above action by the Director of Central Intelligence and further information concerning the action of the House Appropriations Committee on the 1947 budget for State Department intelligence work.

147. Central Intelligence Group Administrative Order No. 3

Washington, April 19, 1946.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-208. Confidential. The source text is dated by hand and carries the handwritten notation "Revised."

ACTIVATION OF THE CENTRAL REPORTS STAFF
Reference: N.I.A. Directives Nos. 1 and 2/1/

/1/Documents 141 and 142.

1. Pursuant to N.I.A. Directive No. 2, the Central Reports Staff is hereby established, its initial strength to be as authorized in N.I.A. Directive No. 2, Appendix A./2/

/2/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers) Attached to NIA 2, February 5, in the Supplement.

2. The Chief, Central Reports Staff, shall be responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence for the preparation, substantive content, and appropriate dissemination of all intelligence reports produced by the Central Intelligence Group pursuant to paragraph 3-a of the President's directive of 22 January 1946 and to N.I.A. directives.

3. One Assistant to the Chief, C.R.S., shall be designated by each permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. In distinction from other C.R.S. personnel, who, in accordance with N.I.A. Directive No.1, shall be assigned to C.I.G. and responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence, these Assistants shall be assigned to the offices of the permanent members of the I.A.B. and responsible to them, although detailed to serve full-time with the Chief, C.R.S. They shall:

a. Represent the interests of their respective members of the Advisory Board in the operations of the Central Reports Staff.

b. Represent the Central Reports Staff in its relations with their respective agencies.

c. Assist the Chief, C.R.S., in:

(1) The formulation of directives to the subdivisions of C.R.S and of requests upon departmental agencies for essential information.

(2) The review of summaries, estimates, and studies prepared by the subdivisions of C.R.S.

(3) The recommendation of appropriate dissemination of such summaries, estimates, and studies.

Although it shall be the endeavor of the Chief, C.R.S., and his Assist-ants to effect such reconciliation of conflicting departmental estimates as to obviate disagreement at the level of the Intelligence Advisory Board, unanimous concurrence shall not be required, it being the responsibility of the Chief to determine the position to be taken in the C.R.S. report in accordance with the weight of the evidence or of opinion. In all cases of important disagreement, however, the substance of the disagreement shall be reported.

4. On assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and detail to the Central Reports Staff, the remaining personnel authorized in N.I.A. Directive No. 2, Appendix "A", shall be responsible to the Chief, C.R.S. They shall be selected with a view to obtaining a proper balance of regional and functional specialization. The internal organization of the Central Reports Staff shall be effected in a manner calculated to utilize the resources inherent in this group as a whole in the preparation of both periodical summaries and special estimates. During the period of activation the Chief, C.R.S., is authorized to organize the personnel then present as he may consider most expedient for the accomplishment of the tasks then undertaken, keeping the Director of Central Intelligence informed. When the Staff has been fully activated, he will submit to the Director a formal plan of organization based on experience for approval and publication.

5. The initial task of the Central Reports Staff shall be the production of a daily summary in accordance with paragraph 4-a of N.I.A. Directive No. 2.

Sidney W. Souers/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

148. Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence (Souers)

CIG 8

Washington, April 29, 1946.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276. Top Secret; Limited Distribution.

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON U.S.S.R.

1. By informal arrangement under the coordination of the C.I.G., M.I.S. has sponsored the organization of a Planning Committee, with representation of the C.I.G., State Department, M.I.S., O.N.I., and A-2, to formulate a plan to utilize the facilities of all interested Government agencies for the production of the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time. It was agreed that C.I.G. would take over formal sponsorship of the project at the earliest possible moment, but that meanwhile active work on it would be started.

2. The Planning Committee has drawn up a plan for Development of Intelligence on the U.S.S.R. which has been approved informally by each of you. The plan provides that after such approval, formal action will be arranged for as deemed advisable by C.I.G.

3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary formal directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

4. A draft of a formal directive is enclosed. If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the draft be approved and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for any additional implementation required by this Department.

Sidney W. Souers/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Enclosure/2/

/2/Top Secret.

Draft Central Intelligence Group Directive

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON U.S.S.R.

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. There is an urgent need to develop the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time. By informal agreement, a Planning Committee, composed of a coordinator from the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G.) and representatives from the State Department, Military Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (O.N.I.) and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), has been formed and has drawn up a plan to coordinate and improve the production of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. This plan has been approved informally by all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board and is now in operation.

2. The purpose of this Directive is to formalize the temporary agreement and establish it as a project under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence. The mission of the project is to develop and pool the appropriate resources of all agencies of the United States Government in order to insure the production of the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. and its peripheral areas in the minimum time.

3. A Planning Committee is established to devise ways and means for carrying out the mission. This Committee will consist of a coordinator, furnished by the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one representative each of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S.; the Chief of Naval Intelligence; and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2. The coordinator will act in a supervisory capacity. The Planning Committee will select a chairman and a secretary from among its representatives. The chairman of the Committee will consult the coordinator whenever necessary to secure assistance of the Central Intelligence Group on problems confronting the Committee. When appropriate, the coordinator will meet with the Committee. In case of disagreement within the Planning Committee, the matter will be submitted by the coordinator to the Director of Central Intelligence for decision.

4. a. A Working Committee is established to carry out the policies and plans prepared by the Planning Committee. It will be composed of the necessary personnel from the State Department, G-2, O.N.I. and A-2. The secretary of the Planning Committee will be the chairman of the Working Committee. The chairman of the Committee will consult the C.I.G. coordinator on the Planning Committee whenever necessary to secure assistance of the Central Intelligence Group on problems confronting the Committee. When appropriate, the C.I.G. coordinator will meet with the Committee.

b. The Working Committee will establish and coordinate a system to compile a digest of all types of factual strategic intelligence on the U.S.S.R. This digest shall be known as Strategic Intelligence Digest (S.I.D.). Facilities of the member agencies will be utilized to the maximum extent. The Committee will establish its own methods of operation.

c. Copies of S.I.D. will be distributed to member agencies and the C.I.G. only. Strategic Intelligence Estimates (S.I.E.), based on the S.I.D., will be prepared by member agencies individually as required to meet their own needs and also whenever requested by the Director of Central Intelligence. All estimates prepared by member agencies will be furnished the C.I.G. Whenever the national interest requires it, estimates will be prepared by the C.I.G.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S., will provide office space and other necessary facilities for the Working Committee in the Pentagon Building.

5. Each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will furnish the name of his representative on the Planning Committee to the Director of Central Intelligence. These representatives will be responsible for furnishing the lists of personnel authorized to work in or help the Working Committee.

6. a. The classification of this project shall be Top Secret. The greatest care will be taken to maintain the security of the existence of the operation.

b. Access to Government agencies other than those participating in the project will be arranged by C.I.G. Representation on the Working Committee from additional Government agencies will be approved first by the Planning Committee.

149. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Souers) to the President's Chief of Staff

Washington, May 7, 1946.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Secret. Truman had directed General Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, to recommend a successor to Souers. Eisenhower proposed General Bonesteel. (Letter, Eisenhower to Truman, April 27; ibid.) See the Supplement.

Attached is a brief of the biographical data of Major General Charles Hartwell Bonesteel./1/ The data on which it is based was obtained from public sources and was not discussed with anyone.

/1/Not printed, but see the Supplement.

There is nothing in the record of this officer to indicate that he has ever had any broad experience in intelligence matters. He has had no intelligence duties.

The N.I.A. is a new concept in intelligence which requires a breadth of view and a deep understanding of the entire field on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence. The officers in the various departments engaged in this activity on the working level are generally experts in their spheres and too often the officers assigned to the higher level posts have been possessed of limited experience in intelligence. To insure the most beneficial results in the Central Intelligence Group it is necessary that the Director be an officer to whom those specialists will look for leadership and guidance based on a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of this complex subject.

In order that coordination be effected to the greatest extent, and the transfer effected of many functions of ONI, G-2, A-2 and State to the C.I.G., it is essential that these services recognize the strong leadership and inherent skill in C.I.G. top level personnel.

General Bonesteel is 61 years of age and seems to have passed the peak of his career some years ago. His record while honorable is not too impressive.

Lieutenant General Vandenberg is 47 years of age, has a fine war record, is regarded as an outstanding officer and is keenly interested in intelligence. His leadership in G-2 has been strong and determined. He has demonstrated his recognition of the necessity for the reorientation of the intelligence structure.

Respectfully,

Sidney W. Souers

150. Memorandum From the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to President Truman

Washington, May 9, 1946.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 131. Secret.

Referring to the attached letter addressed to you by General Eisenhower on 27 April 1946/1/ in regard to the appointment of a Director of Central Intelligence to relieve Rear Admiral Souers, I have looked into the suitability of Major General Bonesteel for this assignment and am in agreement with the memorandum of 7 May by Rear Admiral Souers attached hereto./2/

/1/Not printed, see the source note, Document 149.

/2/Document 149.

In my opinion it is essential in the formative period of the National Intelligence Authority to have as Director of Central Intelligence an officer of proved ability in the collection and evaluation of intelligence, who has also superior executive ability and an established prestige in the intelligence field, as well as in the opinions of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

We appear to be unable to find any available officer of the Army other than General Vandenberg who fully meets these specifications.

It is therefore recommended that the Secretary of War be informed of the high importance that the President attaches to the successful completion of the development of the National Intelligence Authority and that he desires that General Vandenberg be made available for assignment as Director of Central Intelligence to relieve Rear Admiral Souers within the ensuing two months.

W. D. Leahy/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

151. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, May 9, 1946, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-281. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the War Department.

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Members Present

Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S.

Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)

Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Mr. D. M. Ladd, for Items 1 and 2 (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)

Also Present

Mr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel M. N. Huston, G-2

Captain R. K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.

Colonel E. P. Mussett, A-2

Lt. Colonel F. K. Newcomer, G-2

Colonel L. J. Fortier, Central Intelligence Group

Captain W. B. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel R. H. Boberg, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel H. F. Cunningham (for Item 1), Central Intelligence Group

Captain R. Goldthwaite, USN (for Items 2-4), Central Intelligence Group

Colonel C. P. Nicholas, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel W. A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group

Colonel T. J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group

Secretariat

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority

Mr. J. K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

1. Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties With Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G.7 and C.I.G. 7/1)/1/

/1/Neither printed. (Both ibid., HS/HC-276)

The proposed amendments to C.I.G. 7, as contained in C.I.G. 7/1, were taken under consideration.

Admiral Souers was of the opinion that the screening committee recommended by the Chief of Naval Intelligence in C.I.G. 7/1 would be difficult to administer and in fact, was an unnecessary duplication of other provisions of the paper, since Paragraph 8 of C.I.G. 7 provided that no individuals could be certified for duties with the Central Intelligence Group until after a security inquiry which would include a records check of member agencies of the I.A.B.

Commodore Rend felt that it is impossible to do too much in the interests of security. He saw no completely desirable substitute for the proposed formal screening committee, even if it were to involve some degree of duplication, and he was sure that he spoke the views of the Chief of Naval Intelligence in this connection.

Admiral Souers agreed that all practicable security measures should be taken even if they involved extra work, but he thought all such measures should be practical and capable of efficient administration.

In the course of further discussion, in which other members expressed satisfaction with the language of the section as written, Colonel Boberg proposed as the basis of a generally agreeable solution the revision of Paragraph 7 of C.I.G. 7 to read:

"7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for an assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence."

The amendment was accepted.

The recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the State Department were then considered. Admiral Souers said that he agreed with Mr. Hoover's criticism of Paragraph 9 of C.I.G. 7 and believed that the remedy should be the addition to that paragraph of the following provision:

"In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate."

Mr. Ladd and other members of the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed to this change.

Dr. Langer set forth the purpose of the State Department recommendations covering exceptional cases, but after discussion it was agreed that the provisions of C.I.G. 7 (Paragraph 13) were satisfactory to all concerned. After accepting further minor amendments offered by the Central Planning Staff,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved C.I.G. 7, subject to the amendments above (Enclosure to C.I.G. 7 subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 8/2/).

/2/Dated May 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 130) See the Supplement.

2. Provision for Monitoring of Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers (C.I.G. 1/1 and C.I.G. 1/2)/3/

/3/CIG 1, February 25, 1946, CIG 1/1, April 26, 1946, and CIG 1/2, May 8, 1946. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.

Admiral Souers reviewed the history of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). He noted the recommendation in his own report (C.I.G. 1/1) that the service be continued under C.I.G. direction and War Department administration, and invited attention to the dissenting recommendation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in C.I.G. 1/2, that the project be administered by the Department of State or by the C.I.G. directly. On the second point, Admiral Souers could not agree with General Vandenberg that the Central Intelligence Group should administer such a service directly. The C.I.G. is not an independent agency and thus is not empowered to sign contracts, nor does it have technical personnel readily available. While the C.I.G. was authorized to perform "such serv-ices of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally", he believed the most efficient procedure in this case was probably that outlined in C.I.G. 1/1.

General Vandenberg agreed it would be difficult for the C.I.G. to assume direct administrative control of FBIS at this time. Yet he felt that the position of the War Department should be appreciated and understood. As he saw it, the War Department had accepted the interim responsibility for administering FBIS until the end of this fiscal year, in order to serve the many Government agencies interested in the product of monitoring. Now, more than ever, it was clear that the bulk of the information obtained by this means was not primarily related to military intelligence; rather it related to political and economic intelligence, and for this reason was surely of greater interest to the Department of State than to the War Department. He doubted whether G-2 could continue to justify requests for FBIS appropriations for these reasons, and he felt there should be no delay in placing the administration of FBIS in an agency of primary interest, such as State, or in C.I.G. as a centralized service.

Admiral Souers noted that the disposition proposed in C.I.G. 1/1 would require the approval of the National Intelligence Authority. Should the Authority agree that the War Department was the appropriate agency to administer the service, it could be presumed that the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy could defend the conclusion in relation to appropriations.

General Vandenberg thought it would be easier for the three Secretaries to defend the service within State or C.I.G. than in the War Department.

Admiral Souers said he had originally thought the State Department would be the ideal lodgment for FBIS, and in fact he believed the former Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Mr. McCormack) had once held the same view. However, there had recently been so much question as to the scope of the operations to be undertaken by State that he thought it best to leave the administrative responsibility where it was-- that is, in the War Department-- with over-all direction from C.I.G.

General Vandenberg pointed out that, since only about 5% of all foreign broadcasts are monitored, priorities must be constantly shifted to meet the most important requirements. The War Department is unable to anticipate the shifting requirements for political and economic information, and thus to adjust its coverage of foreign output, as promptly as would a directly interested agency such as the Department of State. Moreover, all that would be necessary for such a change would be to transfer the existing technical group and point their activities in the direction of major interest.

Dr. Langer said he recognized the force of General Vandenberg's argument. Much of the material which FBIS was obliged to cover dealt with political, economic, and psychological developments of the greatest interest and importance to the State Department. It might be logical to place FBIS administration under State. At the same time, in view of the current heavy burden on State Department administrative facilities, he was not sure that the Department could now assume a new responsibility of such dimensions. The subject was one on which he could not express a final judgment without checking with his own Department.

General Vandenberg added that G-2 would be glad to lend to State the services of necessary experts, and to arrange for a gradual transfer of administrative responsibility, if such measures would assist a solution.

After concluding discussion, and on the motion of Admiral Souers,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. Deferred action on C.I.G. 1/1 pending further study.

b. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence directed the Central Planning Staff to consult with appropriate officials in G-2 and the State Department as to the practicability of transferring the monitoring function to the State Department, and to recommend any revisions in C.I.G. 1/1 deemed appropriate.

3. Development of Intelligence on USSR (C.I.G. 8/4/ and C.I.G. 8/1/5/)

/4/Document 148.

/5/Dated May 8, 1946. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276) See the Supplement.

The memorandum of the Director of Central Intelligence (C.I.G. 8) and the proposed amendments thereto (C.I.G. 8/1) were considered by the Members.

After discussion, the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 8 were adopted:

a. In Paragraph 3 the fourth sentence was revised to read: "The Planning Committee will select a chairman from among its representatives. The Secretary shall be furnished by a member agency by mutual agreement."

b. In Paragraph 4.a., the words "as necessary and available" were inserted at the end of the second sentence.

c. In Paragraph 4.b., the word "practicable" was inserted at the end of the third sentence.

4. Distribution of C.I.G. Daily Summary

Admiral Souers advised that inquiry had been received from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to the possibility of his being placed on the distribution for the C.I.G. Daily Summary. He noted that since the distribution of the Summary had been established by the National Intelligence Authority, any increased distribution would require the Authority's approval.

After discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would discuss informally with the Secretary of State the distribution of the C.I.G. Daily Summary to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

152. Memorandum From President Truman to Secretary of War Patterson

Washington, May 16, 1946.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File. No classification marking.

Admiral Souers, who has been serving as the Director of the Central Intelligence Group, will be leaving that position in a short time

I discussed his successor with General Eisenhower and suggested to him that Lieutenant General Vandenberg was the proper man to succeed Admiral Souers. General Eisenhower told me that he needed General Vandenberg and he recommended Major General Bonesteel to me./1/

/1/See the source note to Document 149.

It seems to me that Lieutenant General Vandenberg is the proper person for this position--he knows it from "A to Z", he is a diplomat and will be able to get along with the State and Navy, as well as the War Department, and if it will not completely cripple General Eisenhower I would like very much to have Lieutenant General Vandenberg assigned to serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Group./2/

Harry S. Truman/3/

/2/Vandenberg was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence on June 10.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates President Truman signed the original.

153. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Langer) to the Secretary of State's Staff Committee

Washington, June 6, 1946.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees-- State Department, Lot File No. 122, Box 94. Restricted. Transmitted by a covering note stating that the Advisory Committee on Intelligence had considered the problem and decided that it required a decision at the level of the Secretary's Staff Committee. (Memorandum from Langer to John Gange, June 7; ibid.) See the Supplement. The action by the Advisory Committee on Intelligence is in the minutes of its first meeting, June 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees-- State Department, Lot File No. 122, Box 94) See the Supplement.

ARMY AND NAVY DESIRE TO ESTABLISH INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AT U.S. CONSULATES

The Problem:

The War and Navy Departments have requested the State Department to undertake negotiations for permission to assign military and naval personnel for intelligence activities at a number of U.S. consulates throughout the world. The State Department has drawn the attention of the Army and Navy to the unprecedented character of the requests in peace-time and to the inevitability of reciprocity having to be accorded the foreign nations involved.

On April 29 the Department forwarded memoranda to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Chief of Naval Intelligence, requesting that their Departments provide (a) details of the total program which each contemplated, (b) statements of the privileges and immunities desired for the personnel attached to the consulates and their archives and (c) a statement of the extent to which they are prepared to have reciprocal privileges granted to the countries concerned./1/

/1/None of the documents referred to in this memorandum has been found.

On May 23 the War Department furnished the requested information. Its program contemplates the establishment of intelligence activities at nine locations, involving a total of 53 persons on a permanent basis. The War Department desires that its personnel and their archives have the same privileges, exemptions and immunities as the personnel of the State Department at consular offices, and it has no objection to according reciprocal privileges to the countries concerned. Up to this time no reply to the April 29 memorandum has been received from the Navy Department.

Recommendation:

1. That the Department formulate an overall policy with respect to the establishment of Army and Navy intelligence personnel and activities at U.S. consulates which will provide for the disposition of the requests of the War and Navy Departments.

Discussion:

Since November 1945, in the case of the War Department, and since May 1945, in the case of the Navy Department, the State Department has received requests from time to time to initiate negotiations with certain foreign governments for permission to assign military or naval personnel to designated U.S. consulates for intelligence purposes. A meeting of representatives of the Offices and Divisions of the Department whose areas were affected by the requests was held on March 13, 1946, to consider the fundamental problems raised by those requests. The matter was referred to LE for an opinion on the feasibility of concluding such arrangements. While recognizing the lack of precedent for agreements of that nature, LE found nothing to estop arrangements being negotiated with the foreign countries concerned, pointing out, however, that the privileges and immunities to be accorded the assigned military or naval personnel and their archives should be specified clearly in any agreement concluded.

After further discussion of the question among the affected Offices and Divisions of the Department, on April 29 substantially identical memoranda were dispatched to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Chief of Naval Intelligence (Annex I)./2/ It was pointed out that the Department felt it necessary to be apprised of the complete programs contemplated by the Army and the Navy before approaching other governments in the matter, and it was requested that information to that end be provided, together with statements of the privileges, exemptions and immunities desired for the assigned military and naval personnel. A statement was also requested of the extent to which the War and Navy Departments were prepared to grant reciprocal privileges to each country concerned. It was pointed out that the granting of such privileges to one power would probably cause others to request like privileges, whether or not the U.S. desired to establish intelligence personnel within their territory.

/2/None of the annexes has been found.

The War Department replied on May 23 and furnished the information requested in the memorandum of April 29 (Annex II). The program of the War Department contemplates a total of nine locations; three would involve the consent of France, three of Great Britain and one each of Holland, Belgium and Portugal. The program provides for the assignment of 18 officers, 10 warrant officers, and 25 clerical assistants, or a total of 53 persons (Annex III). The War Department states that the arrangements would be of a permanent nature in each case. It desires that the proposed assigned personnel have the same diplomatic privileges, exemptions and immunities as personnel of the State Department at consular offices. It states that it has no objection to according reciprocal privileges to the countries concerned but it does not indicate its attitude with respect to other countries.

No reply to the April 29 memorandum to the Chief of Naval Intelligence has as yet been received. The individual requests made to the State Department by the Navy Department from time to time indicate, however, that the Navy desired arrangements which would involve the consent of Great Britain, Holland and Norway.

154. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Souers) to the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, June 7, 1946.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-39, Item 1. Top Secret. Also reproduced with title page in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 41-51.

SUBJECT
Progress Report on the Central Intelligence Group

1. Establishment

The Central Intelligence Group was officially activated on 8 February 1946 pursuant to the approval of N.I.A. Directive No. 2. Actually, a small group of personnel from the State, War, and Navy Departments had been assembled beginning on 25 January, three days after the President signed the letter directing the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority.

2. Organization

The Central Intelligence Group has been organized in accordance with N.I.A. Directive No 2. The major components at the present time are the Central Planning Staff, charged with planning the coordination of intelligence activities, and the Central Reports Staff, responsible for the production of national policy intelligence. A Chief of Operational Serv-ices, with a small staff, has been designated as a nucleus from which an organization to perform services of common concern may be built. A small Secretariat to serve the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and the Intelligence Advisory Board, has been created. The Administrative Division consists of an Administrative Officer, a Security Officer, a Personnel Officer, and a small group of trained personnel to provide necessary administrative services for the Central Intelligence Group.

3. Personnel

Personnel for C.I.G. has been requested and selected on the principle that only the most experienced individuals in each field of intelligence activity should be utilized in this vital preliminary period. The responsible officers in the Departments have cooperated wholeheartedly toward this end. However, the procurement of C.I.G. personnel has necessarily been a rather slow process, in view of the demobilization and the fact that C.I.G. and departmental requirements for qualified individuals naturally had to be reconciled in many specific cases. The present status of C.I.G. personnel is shown in the following tabulation:

/1/"Auth."-- Authorized by N.I.A. Directive No. 2. [Footnote in the source text.]

/2/"A"-- Personnel assigned by A-2. [Footnote in the source text.]

/3/Includes Office of Director, Secretariat, and Chief of Operational Services. [Footnote in the source text.]

It may be seen that the organization of the Central Planning Staff has been given priority, since effective planning is considered a necessary prelude to accomplishment of the C.I.G. mission. Concentration is now placed on manning the Central Reports Staff. The need for filling positions in the Administrative Division has been largely alleviated by the part-time use of the personnel and facilities of the Strategic Services Unit, although this Division will require reinforcement when centralized operations are undertaken.

A development of great importance regarding personnel has been the designation of specially qualified consultants to the Director of Central Intelligence. An outstanding scientist with wide intelligence experience, Dr. H. P. Robertson, is Senior Scientific Consultant to the Director. Arrangements are well advanced for the designation of Mr. George F. Kennan, recently Charge d'Affaires in Moscow and a Foreign Service Officer with a distinguished career, as Special Consultant to the Director, particularly on U.S.S.R. affairs.

4. Activities

The activities of the Central Intelligence Group to date have been characterized principally by the administrative details of organization, the consideration of urgent problems, and the basic planning for a sound future intelligence program. Basic policies and procedures regarding the organization have been established. Urgent problems in the intelligence field, especially as regards certain vital operations, have been carefully studied and appropriate action has been or is ready to be taken. Substantial progress has been made in the analysis of long-range intelligence problems. The throes of initial organization and planning are, therefore, generally past, and the time for initiation of centralized intelligence operations has now been reached.

Coordination of Intelligence Activities. Beginning on 12 February 1946, four days after the activation of C.I.G., the C.I.G. has been receiving numerous suggestions or recommendations for studies leading to the effective coordination of Federal intelligence activities. A number of other studies of this type have been initiated by C.I.G. These problems generally fall into three categories: (a) problems for which partial but inadequate solutions were evolved during the war; (b) problems which existing Governmental machinery was unable to solve or incapable of solving; and (c) problems which required new solutions in the light of the post-hostilities situation.

Some of these problems, particularly in the third category, require urgent interim solution. Among these problems for which interim solutions have been evolved or initiated are the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit, the development of intelligence on the U.S.S.R., and the coordination of scientific intelligence.

Problems for which immediate solutions are well advanced include the following:

a. Provision for monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers.

b. Provision for coordinating the acquisition of foreign publications.

c. Coordination of collection of intelligence information.

d. Coordination of intelligence research.

e. Essential elements of information.

f. Provision for collecting foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods.

g. Intelligence on foreign industrial establishments.

h. Interim study of the collection of intelligence information in China.

i. Central Register of Intelligence Information.

Projects which are in various stages of study or planning cover the following additional subjects:

a. Disposition of files of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

b. Censorship planning.

c. Intelligence terminology.

d. Resources potential program.

e. Application of sampling techniques to intelligence.

f. Survey of coverage of the foreign language press in the United States.

g. Intelligence on foreign petroleum developments.

h. Coordination of geographical and related intelligence.

i. Disposition of the Publications Review Subcommittee of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

j. Survey of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board.

k. Disposition of the photographic intelligence file in the Department of State.

l. Coordinated utilization of private research in the social sciences.

m. Index of U.S. residents of foreign intelligence potential.

n. Exploitation of American business concerns with connections abroad as sources of foreign intelligence information.

o. Planning for psychological warfare.

p. Utilization of the services of proposed minerals attaches.

One of the functions of C.I.G. which has assumed great importance is the support of adequate budgets for Departmental intelligence. Coordinated representation to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, of the budgetary requirements for intelligence activities, promises to be one of the most effective means for guarding against arbitrary depletion of intelligence resources at the expense of national security. So long as the C.I.G. is dependent upon the Departments for budgetary support, however, its authority to speak as an unbiased guardian of the national security will be suspect and therefore not wholly effective.

Production of National Policy Intelligence. Pursuant to N.I.A. Directive No. 2, the Central Reports Staff concentrated on the production of a factual Daily Summary, the first issue of which was dated 13 February. Although this Summary covered operational as well as intelligence matters and involved no C.I.G. interpretation, it has served to keep the C.I.G. personnel currently advised of developments and formed a basis for consideration of future intelligence reports.

Despite the undermanned condition of the Central Reports Staff, the urgent need for a Weekly Summary has resulted in the decision to produce the first issue on 14 June. Until adequately staffed in all geographic areas, however, this publication will concentrate on those areas for which qualified personnel are now available. The concept of this Weekly Summary is that it should concentrate on significant trends of events supplementing the normal intelligence produced by the Departments. Procedures are being developed to ensure that the items contained therein reflect the best judgment of qualified personnel in C.I.G. and the Departments.

The primary function of C.I.G. in the production of intelligence, however, will be the preparation and dissemination of definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries as they affect the national security of the United States. The necessity of assigning the best qualified and carefully selected personnel to this vital task has delayed its initiation. Solution of the relationship of this C.I.G. activity to the Departments, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies concerned with the national security, has also been deferred pending the procurement of adequate personnel. This procurement has now been given priority, and it is anticipated that the Central Reports Staff will be prepared to produce national policy intelligence at an early date.

Performance of Centralized Operational Services. The operation of central services by the C.I.G. has been considered to be a subject requiring careful study to insure that Departmental operations are not impeded or unnecessarily duplicated. The urgent need for central direction of the activities and liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit was recognized by the N.I.A. and an arrangement was effected whereby this Unit is operated by the War Department under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence. This arrangement temporarily provided C.I.G. with facilities for direct collection of required information but is admittedly only a stop-gap measure.

C.I.G. planning and organization has now progressed to the point where firm recommendations may be made for C.I.G. operation of intelligence services which can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. Among those operations under consideration as C.I.G. activities are:

a. Monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers.

b. Collection of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods.

c. Production of static intelligence studies of foreign areas, to replace Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS).

d. Establishment of a Central Register of Intelligence Information.

e. Basic research and analysis of intelligence subjects of common interest to all Departments, such as economics, geography, sociology, biographical data, etc.

In the consideration of performance by C.I.G. of central operations, however, the administrative, budgetary and legal difficulties of the present organization have presented real problems. The reduction of Departmental funds and personnel for intelligence activities have made it difficult for Departments, despite their desire to cooperate, to furnish the necessary facilities to C.I.G. The inability of C.I.G. to recruit personnel directly from civilian life, and the administrative complications of procuring personnel from the Departments, are likely to jeopardize effective conduct of C.I.G. operations. The lack of enabling legislation making the C.I.G. a legal entity has made it impossible to negotiate contracts which are required for many operations, such as the monitoring of foreign broadcasts.

5. Conclusions

a. The present organizational relationship between the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and the Intelligence Advisory Board is sound.

b. The initial organizational and planning phase of C.I.G. activities has been completed and the operation of centralized intelligence serv-ices should be undertaken by C.I.G. at the earliest practicable date.

c. The National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group should obtain enabling legislation and an independent budget as soon as possible, either as part of a new national defense organization or as a separate agency, in order that (1) urgently needed central intelligence operations may be effectively and efficiently conducted by the Central Intelligence Group, and (2) the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group will have the necessary authority and standing to develop, support, coordinate and direct an adequate Federal intelligence program for the national security.

Sidney W. Souers/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Continue with Introduction:
Vandenberg's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence