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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Vandenberg's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
181. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 7
Washington, January 2, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Confidential.
COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
1. The following over-all policies and objectives are established by the National Intelligence Authority for the interdepartmental coordination of collection activities so that measures may be taken promptly to effect sound and efficient utilization of the various departmental overseas collecting and reporting services:
a. There shall be an allocation within certain broad categories of agency responsibility for collection in the field, as follows:
Political--State Department
Cultural--State Department
Sociological--State Department
Military--War Department
Naval--Navy Department
Economic--Each agency in accordance with its respective needs
Scientific--Each agency in accordance with its respective needsb. Intelligence information and material regardless of the collector, shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may also send copies to his own agency.
c. The senior U.S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service post shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities in his area and the proper implementation of that coordination within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein.
d. In order to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap all collection facilities will be utilized to their maximum within budgetary limitations for the production of that full flow of intelligence material which is the major need of all departments.
e. There shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental flow of intelligence information and intelligence to meet the recognized secondary need of each department for intelligence usually prepared or obtained by other departments. At present this Directive is interpreted to apply only to those departments represented by the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
f. Common sense shall be applied in the implementation of these established over-all policies and objectives to insure the full utilization of individual initiative and favorable contacts by collecting agents.
g. No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objectives shall negate the basic principle that all departmental representatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to Washington of all intelligence material of possible usefulness to their departments and to the effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
182. Memorandum From the Chief of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, Central Intelligence Group (Edgar) to the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates (Huddle)
Washington, January 13, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-804, Item 29. Confidential. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on July 16, 1952. This copy gives no indication of the sender but the document appears to be identical to one described in Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 141. This memorandum is referred to as a draft in a memorandum from Montague to the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, January 29. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-450) See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
Program for OREAs you know, I consider ORE as the heart of CIG and believe that our reputation with the President and the agencies will depend more on the intelligence produced by ORE than on any other activity.
1. Current Intelligence. I have therefore been somewhat concerned with the findings of the adequacy survey conducted by OCD./1/ Although there are several parts of the OCD report that I know you will heed in your continuing effort to improve the ORE output, I invite special attention to the comment attributed to the Aide to Admiral Leahy:
/1/Memorandum from Olsen to DCI, December 9, 1946. (Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 80-01731R, Box 43, Folder 1) Edgar also commented on this OCD survey in a memorandum to the Executive to the DCI, January 2. (Ibid., Folder 5)
"It appears that the concept of the summaries has changed somewhat since their beginning. Originally they were intended primarily to keep the President informed and secondarily for the information of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. Now, in view of the dissemination given to the summaries, it seems they are designed as much for the information of planners as for the President."
I see in this some small feeling of pique which we must overcome promptly.
2. I believe that you, while making plans to correct this situation, should also review your whole allocation of production responsibility. This request is based on past performance and on those future requirements which I foresee as a result of my conversation with NIA and IAB members, both in regular meetings and in personal talks.
3. I therefore request your prompt consideration of and comment on the following proposals:
A. that you designate certain members of your staff as current intelligence officers who will have as their sole or principal responsibility the production of current intelligence.
4. Although the work of the current intelligence officers must be closely integrated with the work of the strategic intelligence researchers, I think you will agree that two distinct types of personality and abilities are required for the two types of work.
5. I am not yet sure in my own mind whether these current intelligence officers should be centralized in a special unit where they will, with the assistance of an editor, produce the current intelligence daily digest; or whether they should be decentralized in the several branches with the editor centralized close to the Assistant Director.
6. With this specialization, the CIG should be able to concentrate on meeting the complaints recorded in the adequacy survey.
7. My reading of that survey leads me to believe that in trying to meet the needs of several levels requiring foreign intelligence with one series of reports, all of which are receiving almost identical distribution, we are not fully meeting the requirements of any. We appear to be overwriting for some and underwriting for others.
8. I propose that we prepare a special daily for the President, so written that it should reach the President regularly, in its original form, and without the need for any preliminary annotations by aides. This will require very special selection and writing.
9. I propose that we supplement this for NIA members with additional items which although not worthy currently of Presidential notice should be brought to the attention of the NIA members.
10. Current Intelligence Summaries. The recent NIA allocation of collection responsibilities places on CIG the job of meeting the several agencies' requirements for intelligence secondary to their own but necessary to the development of their staff intelligence. I believe this can be met if CIG revises its weekly in such a way that it will become a Current Intelligence Summary of the preceding period. Well done, these should go far toward meeting the G-2, A-2, and ONI requirements at the working level for foreign intelligence outside their specialized fields.
11. Strategic Intelligence. CIG has received much praise for its ORE No. 1./2/
/2/See footnote 4, Document 174.
B. that ORE issue situation reports on the several strategic areas of the world.
12. Since the area branches are divided according to such areas, each branch should produce a Strategic Intelligence Estimate on a monthly basis. Each new issue should supersede the previous issue, the latter being recalled for destruction. Strategic Intelligence Estimates should also be prepared by the Functional Branches for their several subjects. If well done and kept currently up to date, these estimates should come to be regarded as forming a handbook for the reference purposes of policy officers and intelligence chiefs. To my knowledge no such handbook now exists.
13. Special Estimates. The above publications should be supplemented from time to time by special estimates as and when special developments so warrant. In most cases special estimates should be written for special recipients.
14. Nothing is more indicative of poor planning and lack of appreciation of recipients' needs than the indiscriminate distribution of intelligence reports. Overwriting places a burden on aides to interpolate explanations; underwriting demands the marking up of reports to indicate "must reading" and "skip reading". I desire that CIG do this editorial work at the time of initial preparation in so far as it may be possible.
15. Basic Intelligence.
C. that you create a working group in ORE, drawn from present personnel of the several branches to prepare an outline for the development of National Intelligence Digests. If possible this group should be balanced among geographic areas, functional subjects, and IAB agencies.
16. Discussions in the IAB indicate that some form of responsibility in this field will fall to CIG in the near future. The Defense Project/3/ group is revising its outline as a proposed outline for all areas. I desire that CIG give sufficient advance study to this matter so that when I require a CIG recommendation it will be forthcoming promptly. The group should consider all obtainable outlines, whether prepared by IAB or other U.S. Government or private agencies or by foreign governments or private enterprises.
/3/An early effort to produce a digest of basic intelligence on the Soviet Union and a forerunner of later efforts to produce basic intelligence "encyclopedias." For the early history of the Defense Project, see Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 84-86.
17. In collecting and integrating these outlines, collection should be made of the related handbooks so that when once approved the outline can be fleshed out in part and initially at least with this material.
18. I believe that if the above program is adopted by ORE, I should receive fewer queries from the agencies as to when CIG is going to produce intelligence. In proposing this program I do not want you to believe that I am placing overemphasis on publication. Much of the work of ORE must continue to be laying that groundwork which prepares for emergencies. And I believe that ORE will be called upon more and more to do oral briefings. But I do consider that the above program is a minimum essential to our reputation.
183. Central Intelligence Group Directive No. 18
Washington, January 23, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 130. Confidential.
COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
1. To implement the overall policies and objectives established by the National Intelligence Authority for the interdepartmental coordination of collection activities/1/ the following program is announced:
/1/See Document 181.
A. Responsibilities.
1. There has been made the following allocation within broad categories of agency responsibility for collection in the field:
Political--State Department
Cultural--State Department
Sociological--State Department
Military--War Department
Naval--Navy Department
Economic--Each agency in accordance with its respective needs
Scientific--Each agency in accordance with its respective needs2. In preparing reports under these allocations, reporting agents will take full cognizance of the collateral or secondary needs of other agencies for such information. Determination of these needs may be made by consultation with appropriate collecting agents or by references to pertinent agency collection directives.
3. Intelligence information and material, regardless of the collector, shall wherever possible be transmitted immediately to the local field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may also send copies to his own agency.
4. There shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental flow of intelligence information and intelligence to meet the recognized collateral or secondary need of each department for intelligence usually prepared or obtained by other departments. This directive shall be interpreted to apply only to those departments represented on the Intelligence Advisory Board by permanent members.
B. Designation and Duties of the Coordinating Official.
1. In all areas where the United States maintains a foreign service establishment, the senior U.S. representative will be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities within his area to the end that the announced intelligence objectives of the Government as a whole shall be most efficiently and expeditiously accomplished.
2. Field collection shall generally follow but not be limited by the allocated responsibilities of the respective departments or agencies. The coordinating authority, in the implementation of the respective collection programs, shall take full advantage of the individual abilities and contacts of his staff members.
3. To implement this program each coordinating authority shall, wherever practicable and within the limits of security requirements:
(a) Establish a central intelligence file for the use of all authorized personnel.
(b) Insure that unproductive collection duplication is avoided; and that the information obtained is properly channeled.
(c) Insure whenever one or more of the departmental intelligence agencies are not represented at a foreign post or whenever the appropriate representative is unable for any reason to carry out his mission, that the reporting responsibility is allocated to the extent possible to other members of the staff. When such delegation is other than temporary, the responsible officer will advise the agency concerned through his parent agency of his action and the reason therefor.
C. Responsibilities of Collecting Agents.
1. Field representatives of each intelligence department or agency, whether permanently attached to the establishment or on temporary duty in the area, will be directed by their department or agency to:
(a) Cooperate in the coordination measures prescribed by the responsible officer as set forth in paragraph B above.
(b) Promptly bring to the attention of the proper representatives of other departments or agencies any intelligence information or material of concern to them.
(c) Collect information and prepare intelligence reports other than within their own categories when specifically directed by their agency or by the senior U.S. representative.
(d) Make available to the senior U.S. representative all collection directives and instructions which are received from their departments.
2. Nothing in this directive shall be interpreted as authorizing any officer to delay, suppress, or make substantive changes in any intelligence report without the concurrence of the officer submitting the report. Intelligence information and material which may have no significance to field representatives in a single area or which may appear to be at complete variance with the overall trend may have great significance and form a definite part of a picture being developed by the individual department or by the Central Intelligence Group. Any dissenting opinion or commentary will either be incorporated in the report, or submitted separately as promptly as possible.
3. Subject to the limitations of security, reports will bear the following information:
(a) Name of collector and name of reporter.
(b) The CIG index number (when established).
(c) Local distribution given the report.2. In order further to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission through the avoidance of conflicting or duplicating instructions to the field, agency directives implementing or affecting the above procedures or policies as well as directives assigning collection missions in the unallocated fields of economics or scientific information will be coordinated with CIG prior to issuance.
3. Any existing instructions or directives in conflict with the provisions of this directive will be rescinded or appropriately amended.
184. Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Staff, Central Intelligence Group (Montague) to the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates (Huddle)
Washington, January 29, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-450. Confidential. The source text is a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian on December 16, 1952.
SUBJECT
The Mission of ORE1. The true primary mission of ORE is clear in the light of the President's Letter and of N.I.A. Directives No. 1 and No. 2./1/ It is to produce strategic and national policy intelligence through the correlation, evaluation, and final synthesis of all intelligence information and finished departmental intelligence available in the State, War and Navy Departments and other Federal agencies. By "strategic and national policy intelligence" should be understood that intelligence required at the highest policy making and planning level as a basis for the determination of national policy and strategy in the broadest sense. It relates to those issues which are of collective concern to the State, War, and Navy Departments, or, conversely, which are not the exclusive concern of any of them. In this concept ORE has no occasion to duplicate or compete with departmental intelligence agencies--rather it is charged to make full use of them and of their product--but ORE does have the function of final evaluation and final synthesis. The departmental agencies are tributary to it. Its own contribution is the added value provided by authoritative final interpretation and synthesis for the benefit, primarily, of the high authorities whom it serves, and incidentally of the contributing agencies. It must be supported and manned in such a way as to assure that it does speak with recognized authority.
/1/Documents 71, 141, and 142.
2. Since the inception of N.I.A. Directive No. 5/2/ this clear concept has been confused. That paper introduced considerable ambiguity regarding a research function in ORE. No new authority was required to expand the staff provided to perform the supplemental research found necessary to accomplish the mission indicated in paragraph 1. The initial draft of the Directive, however, had reference to basic research, and so alarmed the departmental agencies by its implications regarding duplication and eventual supercession of their activities that ever since there has had to be resort to all sorts of expedient explanations intended to allay these fears. There is reason to suppose that the confusions and contradictions introduced in the course of these explanations result from their expediency and lack of candor. Their general tenor is to give verbal assurance against duplication of functions while at the same time justifying the establishment of duplicate research facilities. To this end it is said that ORE will not conduct research in fields of primary interest to any department, but will conduct research ab initio in certain undefined fields not of primary interest to anyone. These "gaps" cannot be defined because they do not exist. If, however, this doctrine were taken literally, it would reduce ORE to the status of a drudge performing miscellaneous tasks in the service of the departmental agencies, inverting the order indicated in N.I.A. Directives No. 1 and 2. Never, during the last six months, has there been any indication that C.I.G. understood, or was even aware of, the mission indicated in the preceding paragraph, although that is the primary mission of C.I.G. in the terms of its basic charter, the President's letter.
/2/Document 160.
3. Until this dichotomy is resolved there can be no firm basis for planning the organization, recruitment, and work program or ORE, nor any stability in our relationships with departmental agencies. Hitherto the cart has been put before the horse--we have been required to devise an organization and a T/O to accomplish we know not what, and are now called upon to state the qualifications required in personnel in ignorance of the tasks they may have to perform. It is impossible to determine such qualifications, or to induce the most highly qualified personnel to accept positions in ORE, until this situation has been clarified and stabilized. In any case, no coherent program of research can be based on the concept indicated in paragraph 2. The departmental agencies are as confused as we as to where they stand, and react accordingly. In short, the failure of ICAPS to establish a clear concept of the mission of ORE and of its functional relationship to the departmental agencies is preventing the development of ORE as an effective instrument for the accomplishment of any purpose.
Ludwell L. Montague/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
185. Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority
Washington, February 12, 1947, 11 a.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-245. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the Department of State. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 113-121.
PARTICIPANTS
Members Present
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central IntelligenceAlso Present
Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence GroupSecretariat
Mr. J. S. Earman, Acting Secretary
Coordination of Intelligence Activities Relating to Foreign Atomic Energy Intelligence Developments and Potentialities (N.I.A. 6)/1/
/1/Document 162. NIA 6 as approved was issued as NIA Directive 9, April 18; Document 194.
Secretary Patterson gave a brief report on the present status of N.I.A. 6. He stated that the Atomic Energy Commission desired to retain three people to go over information contained in the files to be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group. He said that these three people were to search these files for information pertaining to uranium deposits and such information was to be retained by the Commission. Secretary Patterson suggested that C.I.G. take up the matter of the transfer of the personnel with Mr. Lilienthal.
After some discussion,
The National Intelligence Authority:
Agreed to the transfer of the personnel mentioned in N.I.A. 6 and directed the Director of Central Intelligence to work out the details with Mr. Lilienthal. (Transfer subsequently completed on 18 February 1947)
Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
At Secretary Marshall's request, General Vandenberg stated that his last report/2/ was rather comprehensive in pointing out the accomplishments of C.I.G. since its inception. However, this time he wished to report some of the difficulties encountered by C.I.G. He said that before taking up these difficulties he wished to point out a few accomplishments recently effected by C.I.G.
/2/See Document 169.
General Vandenberg said that when it was first agreed that the C.I.G take over the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the South American field, there was some doubt as to whether C.I.G could ably accomplish this assignment. He mentioned that he had received a letter/3/ from Ambassador Pawley which commended the smooth transfer of these activities accomplished by the C.I.G. representative attached to his staff. General Vandenberg also mentioned that Mr. Dawson of the State Department had also stated that the C.I.G.'s representatives who had replaced the F.B.I. personnel were of a particularly high type. General Vandenberg brought out the point that C.I.G. had a roving mission to check these newly assigned personnel in South America and their reports indicated that they were carrying out their functions in an exemplary manner.
/3/Not found.
General Vandenberg then gave a brief report on C.I.G.'s monitoring of foreign broadcasts and stated C.I.G. was now preparing to negotiate a new agreement with the British Broadcasting Corporation for better exchange of material and the future transfer of C.I.G.'s Cairo Monitoring Station covering the Middle East from Cairo to Cyprus.
[2 paragraphs (19 lines of source text) not declassified]
General Vandenberg pointed out that C.I.G. was coordinating the exploitation of documents collected in the Far East and that plans are now being completed for similar exploitation of documents from Europe.
General Vandenberg stated he would now like to mention some of the principal difficulties being encountered by C.I.G. in its operations. He said that what he believed to be essential coordination to reduce duplication had been retarded by an uncertainty as to the directive authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. He said that the President specified that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission." (Paragraph 3 of President's letter of 22 January 1946, emphasis added)
General Vandenberg further stated that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "Recommendations approved by this Authority will where practicable govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for insuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments." (NIA Directive No. 1, par. 4)
General Vandenberg said that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all federal foreign activities related to the national security to insure that the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed." (NIA Directive No. 5, par. 3, emphasis added)
General Vandenberg pointed out that it was the feeling of the agencies (Intelligence Advisory Board) that the current interpretation of coordination was "by mutual agreement." This placed the Director of Central Intelligence only in the position of an executive secretary to the I.A.B. and that he did not believe this was what was contemplated by the N.I.A. General Vandenberg then pointed out that in some instances it had taken six to eight months to get agreement on a paper. He stated that in order to rectify this he recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be considered as having authority similar to that given to the Joint Research and Development Board--"The Joint Research and Development Board shall operate within its jurisdiction as an agency of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the necessary authority its hereby delegated by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Board so that its decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such." (JRDB 1/1, 6 June 1946, as amended 3 July 1946)/4/
/4/Not found.
General Vandenberg suggested that as an alternative to the above recommendation that C.I.G. forward its implementing directives to the N.I.A. members for subsequent issuance from their offices. However, such a practice would be cumbersome and involve a great loss of time on the part of all concerned.
General Vandenberg stated that the production of strategic and national policy intelligence has been hindered further by an uncertainty among the agencies as to its definition. In order to clarify this situation, C.I.G. had developed the following definition, which he requested the N.I.A. approve: "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department."
General Vandenberg stated it was his understanding that those persons who developed the plan for the creation of a Central Intelligence Group had in mind that the C.I.G. would replace the Joint Intelligence Committee. This, so far, had not taken place, nor had any working relationship been achieved; further, that J.I.C. continues to have responsibilities paralleling those of C.I.G., and until this is resolved, complete coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency in the national intelligence mission cannot be attained. General Vandenberg recommended that J.I.C. be abolished, and that C.I.G. provide the necessary intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, however, he believed that some members of the J.C.S. had stated that if this were done, it would lower the original concept of a Central Intelligence Group. General Vandenberg said it was difficult for him, in appearing before appropriation committees, to defend C.I.G.'s request for funds since he was constantly confronted with the question as to the amount of overlap in intelligence. It was his understanding that one of the principal tasks expected of the Director of Central Intelligence was the reduction of such overlap to an absolute minimum.
General Vandenberg stated he would also like to point out that when C.I.G. went to the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments for information, there was constant friction as to whether J.I.C. or C.I.G. should have priority. In short, two agencies were asking for the same type of intelligence but requested in a slightly different manner. This duplication was unnecessary and occupied the time of personnel which should be engaged in more productive intelligence activities.
Secretary Forrestal then asked whether the question of dissolution of the J.I.C. and the assignment of its duties to C.I.G. had been taken up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Vandenberg answered that he believed it had through the I.A.B. members.
Mr. Eddy stated that he thought that it was important now to abolish J.I.C. and to have all interdepartmental intelligence under the C.I.G.
After some discussion,
The National Intelligence Authority:
a. Agreed that while they believed that the J.I.C. should be abolished and its functions assumed by C.I.G., they desired to withhold decision until such time as it had been discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. Noted that Admiral Leahy would take up this matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At Secretary Marshall's request, General Vandenberg then reread his first recommendation.
Secretary Patterson stated that he saw no alternative to the N.I.A approving this recommendation. He added, however, that a proviso should be inserted in the recommendation to allow any aggrieved agency to appeal to the N.I.A. through that agency's respective Secretary.
General Vandenberg said it was realized that each agency has the inherent right to appeal through its respective Secretary any objection to a specific directive.
Admiral Leahy stated that he recommended approval, but that he was in agreement with Secretary Patterson's proviso.
Secretary Patterson raised the question as to whether General Vandenberg's recommendation would involve C.I.G. entering into the field of operational intelligence of the agencies.
General Vandenberg stated that this was not the intent.
Mr. Eddy asked, if authority was delegated by the N.IA. to the Director of Central Intelligence that his directives shall be considered as emanating from them, would such authority be interpreted to allow the Director of Central Intelligence to draft personnel from other agencies to perform specific jobs.
General Vandenberg stated that C.I.G. had no intention of interpreting this authority as indicated by Mr. Eddy.
Secretary Patterson asked if C.I.G. was contemplating recommending that some of the intelligence manuals now published by the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments be discontinued.
General Vandenberg stated he would like to have an opportunity to look over these publications before answering this question.
Secretary Forrestal stated he believed that the proviso to be added to General Vandenberg's recommendation under discussion should read along the following lines: "Provided in cases of objection to specific actions, any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."
Mr. Eddy stated he assumed that any directives, before being issued by C.I.G., would normally have had prior discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board.
General Vandenberg concurred.
The National Intelligence Authority:
Approved the recommendation that "The Director of Central Intelligence shall operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy to the Director of Central Intelligence so that his decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such, provided any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."
At Secretary Marshall's request, General Vandenberg then repeated his recommended definition of "Strategic and national policy intelligence."
After some discussion, in which General Vandenberg pointed out the reason why an approved definition of this term was needed,
The National Intelligence Authority:
Approved the following definition: "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department."
Secretary Marshall stated that in a recent conversation Congressman Taber was concerned from a security standpoint with reference to appropriations for intelligence activities. Secretary Marshall further stated that Mr. Taber had said that it appeared to him that too many people had to be consulted in considering such appropriations. Secretary Marshall went on to state that he believed the best way to maintain proper security was for the President or the Secretary of State to control these funds, and that a request should be made for a flat appropriation.
General Vandenberg stated he had appeared recently before a joint committee, which he was told before appearance would consist of four or five people. However, upon arrival he found there were actually twenty-two people present. He went on to state a subsequent meeting had been called and he would continue to be careful of the information presented. However, he agreed that security of intelligence operations could best be protected by funds which should be concealed and appropriated in a lump sum controlled by one person.
186. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Eddy) to Secretary of State Marshall
Washington, February 15, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/2-1547. Top Secret. Marshall annotated this memorandum "Hold. G.C.M."
SUBJECT
Comment on the Central Intelligence GroupI
A central agency for national intelligence under civilian control is needed continuously in time of peace in addition to intelligence services in the several Departments. Its functions should include the following:
A. Interdepartmental intelligence required by interdepartmental agencies such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and other agencies and commissions of the national Government whose responsibilities extend beyond the province of any one Department.
B. Intelligence on matters which may be of secondary interest to any one Department, and which would, therefore, otherwise be neglected, but which may be of prime interest for national policy.
C. Under-cover intelligence and espionage abroad which should not compromise the official representatives of the United States of America. Espionage, which is certainly needed, and which involves the employment of unofficial agents, both American and foreign, should be operated by an agency outside the Departments and with funds not subject to departmental accounting.
II
The Central Intelligence Group (CIG), with the passage of requested legislation, should be able to perform the valuable services described above since:
A. The CIG operates under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) which reports directly to the President. The NIA is composed of the Secretary of State, as Chairman, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a personal representative of the President, thus representing a balance between civilian and military needs.
B. The NIA, controlling as it does both its executive agency, the CIG, and through its individual members, the intelligence services of the Departments represented, is well constituted to promote the efficient coordination of all national intelligence.
III
The CIG has already made a good beginning and should be directed to confine itself to the following fields:
A. Interdepartmental intelligence and other special assignments made by the NIA.
B. Coordination of intelligence reports produced by the several Departments and by its own special operations to make the total available intelligence accessible to those who guide our national policy.
C. Avoid entering the field of departmental intelligence where duplication would be wasteful. Only the Army and the Navy are technically equipped to direct their operational intelligence services; and only the Department of State, through its Foreign Service, attempts to cover the world with expert political and economic reports for its daily political and economic operations.
D. Operate an under-cover espionage service with freedom to use for this purpose special agents and special funds. Of all the great nations of the world, the United States of America has lacked an efficient espionage service which, in many critical parts of the world, is the only way to acquire indispensable information.
IV
The CIG budget. The present plans of the CIG contemplate a total budget of something less than $40,000,000. for the fiscal year 1948. With the extent of CIG's operations at present unpredictable, it is not practicable to verify or deny their need for such a sum, with the single exception, however, of the Office of Reports and Estimates, for which it is believed a total personnel of 500 would be more than adequate, instead of the 852 requested. The budget appears to be a reasonable request on the understanding that it is a permissive maximum, to be used on projects expressly approved in each case by the NIA.
It would seem the part of wisdom to publish only the administrative budget for the CIG and to have the funds required for secret and special operations segregated in a special fund entrusted to the President, or, if that is inadvisable, to the Secretary of State, with knowledge of that fund and an accounting of it confined to a very few Congressional leaders.
William A. Eddy
187. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, February 19, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/2-1947. Drafted by Allan Evans. The memorandum was covered by a brief handwritten transmittal note from Evans to Eddy and had attached a paper, possibly a draft, entitled "Relations With Other Government Intelligence Agencies," dated June 14, 1946. See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
CIG Meeting, 19 February in General Vandenberg's OfficePARTICIPANTS
General Vandenberg
Mr. Eddy
Mr. Edgar
Mr. Huddle
Mr. Cullen
Mr. EvansMr. Eddy and I met with Messrs. Edgar, Huddle, Cullen. The General indicated the need for agreement on the mutual functions of ORE and OIR in view, among other things, of budget. He pointed out that he and General Chamberlain had both faced the question "what do we know about Russian strength now and five years from now, etc., in case of war?" This involved questions of military strength, and in the course of developing his remarks he showed clearly that he did not think it affected us very much in the State Department and, therefore, was primarily a matter of CIG development. At this inconclusive point he asked if his colleagues had anything to say.
Edgar started off by saying there was one clear point of agreement which was that CIG should undertake the gathering and formulation for all consumers of basic intelligence. Mr. Eddy at once commented that we of course were concerned with the political, social, and economic sides of that enterprise and had responsibilities. In the course of discussion the following points were made:
The General spoke from time to time in terms of the Department's contributing materials but CIG doing the compilation on these basic matters.
We presented the concept that the Departments prepared their contributions on these and other matters of joint interest while CIG coordinated in the sense of insuring the complementary nature of the outlines in advance and being equipped with overall experts and evaluators who would fuse the contributions and work them into a whole.
Edgar raised the familiar point that these evaluators could not evaluate without covering all the intelligence involved in the matter. We countered by saying that really high quality people could undoubtedly act as would our own Review Section in evaluating and appreciating intelligence through acquaintance with top-flight materials, through understanding of style, presentation, and internal evidence. Such top-flight evaluators and re-writers are what we most particularly hoped to find in CIG so that they might from a national point of view stimulate our own work and planning and help to point out oversights and omissions in our general plans. To this there was no objection and some appreciation by the General.
The conversation turned to the defense project./1/ The General made it clear that he was most anxious to secure control of the defense project. Edgar requested that we propose at the next opportunity that the project be transferred to CIG. It was, I think, agreed that Mr. Eddy would at least support the proposal, if not make it at the IAB.
/1/See footnote 3, Document 182.
In regard to timing the control of CIG over SID,/2/ Mr. Eddy indicated that the contemplated date was 1 July. It was discussed whether, as the old SID were completed, CIG should not take over responsibility piecemeal for continuing the SID project under the new outline. I made it clear that the new SID outline was prepared and contributed to by us as an outline for the particular purposes of G-2 and not as a national outline; furthermore, that no commitments for the implementation of the outline had been made except in the old defense project agreement.
/2/Strategic Intelligence Digest, the publication in which the work of the Defense Project was issued.
At one point Captain Cullen mentioned the great desirability of close contacts between ORE and OIR. Mr. Eddy emphasized the importance of this and proposed that Mr. Huddle and I should develop contacts at all working levels between our staffs. To this the General explicitly assented, while at the same time injecting a phrase to show that he thought ICAPS should participate in such contacts.
The General at one point indicated that his great desire to establish CIG control over the SID type of enterprise was to insure proper allocation of responsibilities among departments and notably allocation of political and economic responsibility of State. (I take this statement to be associated in the General's mind with the problem of reporting from the field; it does not/3/ modify, I believe, the thought in his mind that all compilations of SID material shall be performed in CIG.)
/3/The word "not" has been inserted by hand in the source text.
Mr. Eddy explained in general terms the area of responsibility of the Department by pointing out that this area of responsibility was unchanged since the time before CIG existed and comprised essentially the processing and interpretation of reporting by Foreign Service officers from the field. Centering about this fundamental responsibility the division of appropriate functions properly related to the State Department's concerns from those additional or nationally oriented concerns of CIG could be developed.
188. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Eddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Washington, February 28, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/2-2847. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Directorship of the Central Intelligence GroupI have been unable to confirm officially the report that Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg will resign as Director of Central Intelligence and will be succeeded by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter./1/ Whether or not such a move takes place, I would like to call to your attention certain matters which I feel are important in the selection of any Director of Central Intelligence. If the reported new appointment has not been finally decided upon by the President, perhaps you might like to discuss this question with the Secretary. I hasten to add that my remarks should not be construed as an attack on, or support for, any individual. I am concerned with what I consider to be an important basic principle, that the Director of Central Intelligence should be a civilian.
/1/Admiral Leahy noted in his diary that the NIA had discussed the question of a successor to Vandenberg (so he could move on to the future Air Force) at its meeting on February 12. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William D. Leahy, Leahy Diary, 1947, p. 12; February 12, 1947) The discussion was not recorded in the minutes; see Document 185. Leahy's brief entry does not mention the names of any potential successors. On February 17, Leahy wrote in his diary that he had obtained the approval of all NIA members and the President for Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter to replace Vandenberg. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William D. Leahy, Leahy Diary, February 17, 1947, p. 13) In a note written some years later, Ludwell Montague, the chief of CIG's Intelligence Staff (and at that time on detail to the CIG from the Department of State) recalled that as of February 27 or 28, Eddy's office was not aware Hillenkoetter had been definitely selected and that Eddy's deputy had approached him for his views on a State Department nomination of Allen Dulles to succeed Vandenberg. (Memorandum for the record, April 7, 1970; Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-400, Item 8)
In the thirteen months of its existence, the Central Intelligence Group already has had two directors, each a Service representative. Should there be a continuation of the policy of selecting directors from one of the Services, there is always danger that demands of the appointee's department may result in similar early shifts in the directorship. Necessity for continuity of leadership can hardly be overestimated, especially in a new and growing organization like the Central Intelligence Group.
The nature of the Central Intelligence Group requires that its director be, as far as possible, untouched by any departmental bias or influence. Under such circumstances a Service director will always and inevitably be torn between absolute objectivity and natural allegiance to his own Service.
Continuity and objectivity of leadership can best be assured by a director drawn from civilian ranks and not subject to demands from or allegiance to any single department. This seems especially true in the light of the proposed National Security Act of 1947. Under its provisions the National Intelligence Authority would be dissolved and its functions assumed by a National Security Council. Since the composition of the Council is weighted on the side of the Armed Forces, it is important that the national, as opposed to the military, character of its central intelligence agency be emphasized in the form of a civilian director.
William A. Eddy
189. Central Intelligence Group Paper
CIG 24
Washington, March 12, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-276. Confidential. For the background on this paper, see Document 185.
ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCEAUTHORITY
Memorandum by the Secretary
Pursuant to a request by the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the enclosed paper, which is to be placed on the agenda of the Intelligence Advisory Board, is circulated herewith.
J.S. Earman/1/
Acting Secretary, N.I.A./1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure
ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCEAUTHORITY
The Problem
To establish procedure for the Intelligence Advisory Board in considering matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority for action.
Facts
N.I.A. Directive No. 1,/2/ paragraph 3, requires that all recommendations be referred to the Intelligence Advisory Board for concurrence or comment prior to submission to the National Intelligence Authority. However, no procedure has been established to accomplish this action by the Intelligence Advisory Board.
/2/Document 141.
Discussion
It is believed that the requirements of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3, can be satisfactorily met by formal or informal procedure, depending upon the importance of the particular matter under consideration. If members of the Intelligence Advisory Board were furnished copies of the agenda for the N.I.A. meeting, together with copies of papers or a statement of the problems up for consideration, they could then, with respect to each item, express their concurrence, submit comments, or request a formal meeting to discuss the matter. Such procedure would insure that the secretaries had the views of the heads of their own intelligence agencies when acting on all matters presented to them.
Conclusion
It is concluded that a procedure should be established for the Intelligence Advisory Board in considering matters being submitted to the National Intelligence Authority for action.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the following procedure be adopted for securing the concurrence or comments of the Intelligence Advisory Board on all matters being submitted to the National Intelligence Authority:
(a) The agenda for the National Intelligence Authority meeting be referred by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Board, together with copies of all papers to be considered or a statement of subjects to be discussed.
(b) Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board informally express concurrence or submit comments on all items on the agenda to the Director of Central Intelligence for submission by him to the National Intelligence Authority.
(c) In case of important matters on the agenda any member of the Intelligence Advisory Board may request a formal meeting of that committee for the purpose of discussing such subject prior to its submission to the National Intelligence Authority.
Continue with Document 190
