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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Vandenberg's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence

                           

190. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the Chairman of the Joint Research and Development Board (Bush)

JRDB 49/3

Washington, March 13, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-804, Item 46, Job 84-B00443R, Box 7. Secret. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian on July 29, 1952.

Dear Dr. Bush: Pending the arrival of the Chief of the Scientific Branch, I am most anxious that the Central Intelligence Group afford you every service possible on an interim basis.

I have, therefore, issued a memorandum to my offices which sets up the functional operation within CIG in this respect. This system will, I believe, provide the close cooperation envisioned by our agreement. A copy of this memorandum is attached hereto./1/

/1/Dated January 10. See the Supplement. Also attached was a March 13 memorandum by Wright, printed as an enclosure.

I have designated Colonel Whitely as Acting Chief of the Scientific Branch and have directed him to report to you, and to make himself available to you and your Board for all intelligence requirements, or other intelligence matters which you may desire. I hope you will feel free to refer all intelligence requirements or other matters to us through Colonel Whitely.

If, in any way, I personally, or my Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates can be of further assistance to you at any time, please call on us direct.

Sincerely,

Hoyt S. Vandenberg/2/
Lieutenant General, USA

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Enclosure/3/

/3/Secret. Addressed to the CIG Assistant Directors for Reports and Estimates, Collection and Dissemination, Operations, and Special Operations and the Chief, Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian on July 29, 1952.

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright)

Washington, March 13, 1947.

SUBJECT
Operations--Intelligence Relationship of CIG with JRDB

REFERENCE
"Program for JRDB-CIG Cooperation in the Field of Scientific Intelligence," dated 10 January 1947

1. In accordance with Program for JRDB-CIG Cooperation, which was jointly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, JRDB, the following policies for the functional operation within CIG in its relations with JRDB are announced.

2. The Chief or Acting Chief of the Scientific Branch, ORE, under supervision of the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, is the Intelligence Advisor to the Chairman, JRDB. In performing this function he will:

a. Report to the Chairman, JRDB, as advisor and make himself and the facilities of his branch and the CIG as a whole fully available to him.

b. Be the principal liaison and operational contact between JRDB and CIG.

c. Arrange with the control the working relationships of appropriate offices of CIG with offices, individuals, or committees of JRDB.

d. Coordinate closely with JRDB to develop and pass to OCD for appropriate processing, JRDB requirements, requests, information, and intelligence, except those matters subject to special handling or which cannot be accomplished within the framework of ORE.

e. Receive from OCD, for processing with JRDB, CIG requirements and collection requests which may be susceptible of collection from JRDB sources.

In performing the above functions, he will follow the functional organization of CIG and will be guided by the operational policies announced by the Director.

3. On matters concerning JRDB the other offices of CIG will regard the deal with the Chief of the Scientific Branch, ORE, as they would with the Chief of intelligence of a departmental agency. Contact with operational personnel of JRDB will be arranged through the Chief of the Scientific Branch, ORE.

4. The Assistant Director, OSO, and the Assistant Director, ORE, will recommend to the Director any special arrangements necessary to the security requirements of OSO.

5. Nothing in this directive negates the control of the Scientific Branch by the Assistant Director, ORE, for the purpose of producing national intelligence in the scientific field, and general requirements related thereto or abridges the normal relationship of the Assistant Director, ORE, with the appropriate officers of JRDB.

E.K. Wright/4/
Brigadier General, USA

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

191. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright)

CIG-A-605

Washington, March 28, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-100, Item 5. Secret. Addressed to the CIG Assistant Directors for Reports and Estimates, Collection and Dissemination, Operations, and Special Operations and the Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.

SUBJECT
Establishment and Functions of the Nuclear Energy Group, Scientific Branch, Office of Reports and Estimates

1. The Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates will establish immediately a Nuclear Energy Group within the Scientific Branch of his office.

2. In carrying out its mission, the Chief, Nuclear Energy Group, will follow the functional organization and procedure of CIG so far as security restrictions incident to his relations with the Atomic Energy Commission will permit.

3. The mission of the Nuclear Energy Group, Scientific Branch, ORE, will be:

a. To conduct and coordinate the necessary research and evaluation of intelligence information and intelligence pertaining to the development of nuclear energy by foreign nations.

b. To establish CIG requirements for intelligence information and intelligence pertaining to foreign developments in nuclear energy.

c. To prepare estimates of the nuclear energy capabilities and intentions of foreign nations for coordination with and incorporation in intelligence of national interest.

d. To represent exclusively the Director of Central Intelligence on all contacts with the Atomic Energy Commission.

e. As the AEC may specify, to be the point of contact on nuclear intelligence matters between the Atomic Energy Commission and other governmental intelligence agencies.

f. To receive from the Atomic Energy Commission all requirements for foreign intelligence on nuclear energy which are required by that Commission. All such requirements received from the Atomic Energy Commission, their processing, and the intelligence produced will be subject to such special security restrictions as the Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence may find necessary.

4. In order to promote technical coverage and effect the required special security, the Chief, Nuclear Energy Group, is authorized:

a. To monitor and control all nuclear energy intelligence information and intelligence received by CIG. In so doing, he will place a representative in the Reading Center of the Office of Collection and Dissemination. Except as otherwise personally directed by the Director of Central Intelligence, he is solely responsible for final determination of dissemination of nuclear energy intelligence. He himself will disseminate such special nuclear energy intelligence as security restrictions make necessary.

b. To review and approve all collection directives prepared by OCD which relate to nuclear energy.

c. To coordinate directly, when essential for technical or security reasons, with U.S. governmental agencies other than the AEC and IAB agencies.

d. To maintain such direct relationship with the Office of Special Operations as both intelligence operations and special security require.

e. To maintain, when essential for technical or security reasons, direct contacts with industries, institutions and individuals which have special significance to the Nuclear Energy Group, coordinating such contacts with the Office of Operations so as to avoid duplication of effort and provide maximum coverage in this field.

f. To coordinate with the Security Branch, OCD, on establishment of special policies and routine safeguards on nuclear energy intelligence.

E.K. Wright/1/
Brig Gen

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Wright signed the original.

192. Circular Instruction From the Department of State

Washington, April 9, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/4-947. Confidential. Drafted by P.G. Strong and T.M. Nordbeck. Addressed to American diplomatic and consular officers "except Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea."

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

Sirs:

Reference is made to the Department's confidential circular instruction dated January 31, 1947, FSS No. 670, entitled "Establishment of the NIA, the IAB and the CIG",/1/ and to its confidential circular instruction, dated February 3, 1947, FSS No. 671, entitled "NIA Directive on Coordination of Collection Activities"/2/ and its enclosure./3/ To implement the overall policies and objectives established by the above circular instructions, the following measures will be taken by the Officers in Charge of Foreign Service Missions and Posts:

/1/Not printed. (Ibid., 101.5/1-3147) See the Supplement.

/2/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/2-347) See the Supplement.

/3/Document 181.

A. The Officer in Charge of each American Mission will assume responsibility for the coordination of all intelligence collection activities at all Foreign Service posts within continental limits of the country to which he is accredited, to the end that the announced intelligence objectives of the government as a whole shall be most efficiently and expeditiously accomplished. The senior officer at each Consular Office outside of the continental limits of each country to which a diplomatic officer is accredited will assume responsibility for coordinating all intelligence collection activities at his post and within his Consular District. For example, the senior officer at the Consulate General at Singapore will carry out such duties, reporting directly to the Department.

B. Each coordinating officer shall, wherever practicable and within the limits of security requirements:

1. Establish a central intelligence file for the use of all authorized personnel.

2. Insure that intelligence reports are promptly and adequately prepared by foreign service personnel to meet his needs, the needs of the Department, and the National Intelligence Requirements which may be issued from time to time.

3. Insure that unproductive collection duplication is avoided.

4. Insure, whenever one or more of the intelligence agencies of the War or Navy Departments are not represented at a Foreign Service post or whenever the appropriate representative of such agency is unable for any reason to carry out his mission, that the reporting responsibility is allocated to the extent possible to other members of the staff. When such delegation is for a period in excess of thirty days a report of such action, including the reason therefor, will be made to the Department as soon as practicable. A report of any such allocation of reporting responsibility now in effect should be submitted to the Department not later than May 15, 1947.

5. Insure that intelligence information and material, regardless of collector, shall whenever possible be transmitted immediately to the local field representative of the agency most concerned (see paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of enclosure to Circular Instruction No. 671), if such field representative is attached to the Foreign Service post. If a field representative of the agency concerned is not attached to the post, such intelligence information and material will be transmitted directly to the Department.

6. Insure that in preparing reports under the allocations cited in paragraph 1 (a) of enclosure to Circular Instruction No. 671, reporting officers take full cognizance of the collateral or secondary needs of the Department of State, War and Navy Departments as determined in consultation with the appropriate collecting officers or by reference to pertinent agency collection directives.

7. Insure that, in the implementation of the respective collection programs, full advantage is taken of the individual abilities and contacts of his staff members.

C. Each coordinating officer will issue appropriate instructions to all personnel of the Foreign Service or of the Department assigned to or on temporary duty in his area to the end that such personnel will:

1. Cooperate in the coordination measures prescribed above or as may be directed by the coordinating officer.

2. Promptly bring to the attention of the proper representatives of other departments or agencies intelligence information or material of concern to the latter.

3. Collect information and prepare intelligence reports other than within their own spheres of responsibility when specifically directed.

Nothing in this instruction shall be interpreted as authorizing any officer to delay, suppress, or make substantive changes in any intelligence report without the concurrence of the officer submitting the report. Intelligence information and material which may have no significance to field representatives in a single area or which may appear to be at complete variance with the overall trend may have great significance and form a definite part of a picture being developed by the Departments or the Central Intelligence Group. Any dissenting opinion or commentary will either be incorporated in the report, or be submitted separately as promptly as possible.

Instructions similar to the above are being issued by the War and Navy Departments, whose representatives will be directed to comply with the coordination measures indicated above, and to make available to the coordinating officer all collection directives and instructions received from their respective departments.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
William R. Eddy

193. Circular Instruction From the Department of State

Washington, April 15, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/4-1547. Confidential. Addressed to American Diplomatic Officers in the other American Republics. Drafted by Briggs on February 27.

WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY DIRECTIVE ON "COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES" (FOREIGN SERVICE SERIAL NO. 671,FEBRUARY 3, 1947)

Sirs:

Reference is made to the Department's Foreign Service Serial No. 671,/1/ February 3, 1947, and the preceding instruction (No. 670)/2/ concerning the National Intelligence Authority directive on "Coordination of Collection Activities". Your attention is likewise invited to the Department's circular instruction of April 9/3/ on the same subject.

/1/See footnote 2, Document 192.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 192.

/3/Document 192.

With particular reference to the situation in the other American Republics, there is enclosed for your confidential information a memorandum prepared in the Department when the subject of the duties and activities of Attachés and of liaison between Attaches and Ambassadors was under preliminary discussion last year. While this paper has not been circulated to the War and Navy Departments, and hence is not an official directive, it was considered by the State Department representatives during the discussions leading to the acceptance by State, War, Navy and CIG of the National Intelligence Authority directive of December 20, 1946./4/ It is being made available to our Diplomatic Missions in the other American Republics solely for information and as representing the view prevailing in the offices of the Department primarily concerned with Latin America. With respect to point 3 of the memorandum "Reporting on Non-Military and Non-Naval Matters", the solution reached, subsequent to the preparation of the memorandum, is as set forth in the NIA directive of December 20, 1946, paragraph 1(a).

/4/Reference is to Document 181. December 20, 1946, was the date of the meeting at which agreement was reached on the directive; see footnote 5, Document 179.

The objective sought both by the memorandum and by the NIA directive is the same, namely the achievement under the direction of each Chief of Mission of a smoothly functioning and properly coordinated flow of intelligence.

The Department will be interested in receiving comments from the field concerning the arrangements established at each Mission under the aforesaid National Intelligence Authority directive, the receipt of which provides a favorable opportunity for each Chief of Mission to review the situation, to evaluate the operations hitherto undertaken, and to see to it that our objectives are being attained. It is especially important that Chiefs of Mission eliminate the duplication and resultant confusion which in the past attended reporting activities and information collecting activities at some of the posts in the Latin American area.

This instruction is not being sent to Consulates, but Chiefs of Mission are authorized in their discretion to make it available.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
Ellis O. Briggs

Enclosure/5/

/5/Confidential.

Department of State Memorandum

Washington, July 9, 1946.

DUTIES AND ACTIVITIES OF ATTACHES

1) Liaison Between Attaches and Ambassadors.

Generally speaking it should be the purpose and duty of Ambassadors to see to it that all representatives of other Departments and agencies, including especially Military and Naval Attaches, are fully informed of the overall work of the mission and of the various developments and projects being undertaken by the elements composing the chancery. The Chief of Mission should preside over regular meetings to be attended by his principal officers. At the discretion of the Chief of Mission, he may designate a responsible officer of the political section to act as day-to-day liaison with attaches and officers representing other agencies. The Ambassador himself should, however, have at least one regular meeting per week with the principal members of his staff, including attaches, and should be accessible to them when they desire to take up matters with him.

2) Military and Naval Attaches Responsible for Their Own Reports.

Although Military and Naval Attaches are responsible for their own reports to the War and Navy Departments respectively, they should make copies available to the Chief of Mission prior to transmission, so that, if any difference of opinion arises which is not susceptible of adjustment through discussion, the Chief of Mission can simultaneously transmit his own report, together with a copy of the Attaché's report, and call attention to the difference of views and the reasons therefor. In such circumstances the Attaché shall endorse on his own report wherein the Embassy is not in agreement.

3) Reporting on Non-Military and Non-Naval Matters.

An examination should be undertaken by the War and Navy Departments of the reporting schedule of Attaches with a view to determining to what extent there is duplication of reports prepared by the chancery. The State Department is of the opinion that Attache reporting should be reduced in respect of political, social, economic, and related non-military and non-naval matters. For such time as Attaches may still be required to report on such matters, the chancery should be the primary source of information. The personnel of the chancery will always include officers trained in political and economic reporting, plus in many instances specialists in the fields of particular interest in a given country (petroleum in Venezuela, and sugar in Cuba, for example). Their services are of course available to Military and Naval Attaches in assisting them to prepare reports.

4) Sources of Attachés' Information Should be Made Available to the Chief of Mission on his Specific Request (Except re Information on Military or Naval Matters).

The Ambassador is the personal representative of the President, in addition to being the ranking representative of the United States Government abroad. He must have unquestioned authority over all representatives of all other agencies of our Government abroad. Since the Ambassador is responsible for the success of United States representation as a whole, and for interpreting to the President and the Department of State developments affecting relations between the country to which he is accredited and the United States, there may be times when in his considered judgment, he must (except with regard to information on subjects that are exclusively military or naval in character as noted above) be in a position to ascertain under appropriate safeguards of secrecy the source of an Attaché's information, in order appropriately to evaluate it. On the specific request of the Ambassador, the source of such non-military/naval information should accordingly be made available to him.

194. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 9

Washington, April 18, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Top Secret.

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS ANDPOTENTIALITIES

1. Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946, designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to Federal intelligence activities in the field of foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security are announced:

a. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the direction and control of this Authority, is hereby authorized and directed to coordinate the collection by agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security, and to accomplish the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence is further authorized to arrange with other intelligence agencies of the Government to utilize their collection facilities in this field./1/

/1/On July 25 the NIA agreed to a proposal from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that the AEC become a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. On August 5 the Chairman of the AEC designated Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, the AEC's Director of Intelligence, as the Commission's representative on the IAB. (Memorandum from Hillenkoetter to Leahy, et al., August 12; ibid., No. 131) See the Supplement.

For the National Intelligence Authority:
J.S. Earman
Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

195. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of the National Intelligence Advisory Board (Earman)

IAB 1

Washington, April 21, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-280. Secret. Prepared for the Intelligence Advisory Board.

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

1. Circulated herewith for consideration of the Intelligence Advisory Board at its next meeting are:

a. Recommendations contained in the report of the ad hoc committee appointed to draft a proposed N.I.A. Directive on "The Coordination of Intelligence Production" (Enclosure A).

b. Minority report from the ad hoc committee member representing the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (Enclosure B).

For the Intelligence Advisory Board:

J.S. Earman
Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

Enclosure A

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Intelligence Advisory Board (Lay)

Washington, April 18, 1947.

SUBJECT
Proposed N.I.A. Directive on the Coordination of Intelligence Production

1. The Ad Hoc Committee has prepared the attached draft of a proposed N.I.A. Directive on the Coordination of Intelligence Production. It has the unanimous concurrence of the committee except for paragraph 2 c (4) on which there is attached a minority report from the A-2 member.

2. The proposed compilations of basic intelligence will be called National Intelligence Surveys (NIS). That on the Soviet Union, for example, would be the National Intelligence Survey of the USSR.

3. In the establishment of arrangements for the production, continuing revision, and dissemination of the NIS due consideration should be given, in the interests of economy and efficiency, to the necessity of closely coordinating the NIS with the overall intelligence requirements of the individual intelligence agencies.

4. An essential preliminary to the initial planning for the production of NIS will be consultation with the JIC and the ID, WDGS, with a view to gaining their consent to merging their respective productions, JANIS and SID, with NIS.

5. It is contemplated that in working out the details for producing, maintaining current, and disseminating the NIS careful consideration will be given to the intelligence needs of the JCS and all other agencies with responsibilities involving national security. These needs should be automatically determined in the course of pursuing the following program to initiate the production of NIS:

a. Adoption of an outline of the complete contents.

b. Formulation of the procedure for producing, maintaining current, and disseminating NIS.

c. Establishment of priorities by section and country for production of NIS.

d. Allocation of production and maintenance responsibilities by agreement of CIG and the agencies represented on IAB.

6. Recommendations

a. That IAB concur in the attached draft of a proposed N.I.A. Directive.

b. That IAB go on record as desiring that members of JIC consent to merge JANIS with NIS as mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

c. That IAB recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence that he request the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, to consent to merge SID with NIS as mentioned in paragraph 4 above; and,

d. That IAB and JIC appoint an Ad Hoc Committee with represent-atives from CIG, ORI (SD), ID (WDGS), ONI (Navy), A-2 (AAF), JIS, and JTS to plan, with the aid of as many subcommittees as necessary, the program to initiate the production of NIS outlined in 5a, b, c, d above, the committee to make specific recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the following:

(1) The integrating of the JANIS and SID production into the program to be produced under the name of National Intelligence Surveys, and

(2) The future production and priorities for the integrated program for NIS taking into consideration past production of JANIS's and SID's.

Donald Edgar, Chairman/1/
Mr. Allan Evans
Colonel R.F. Ennis
Captain R.K. Davis, USN
Colonel E.P. Mussett

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

Enclosure

Proposed N.I.A. Directive

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

1. The following overall policies and objectives are established for the coordination of the production of intelligence.

2. In order that all facilities of the Government may be utilized to their capacity and the responsibilities of each agency may be clearly defined in accordance with its mission, dominant interest, and capabilities, the whole field of intelligence production is divided into the following four categories, and responsibilities are allocated as indicated:

a. Basic Intelligence

(1) Basic intelligence is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.

(2) An outline of all basic intelligence required by the Government shall be prepared by the CIG in collaboration with the appropriate agencies. This outline shall be broken down into chapters, sections, and subsections which shall be allocated as production and maintenance responsibilities to CIG and those agencies of the Government which are best qualified by reason of their intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interest to assume the production and maintenance responsibility.

(3) When completed, this outline and tentative allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be submitted for NIA approval and publication as an annex to this directive. It is expected that as the result of constant consultation with the agencies by the Director of Central Intelligence, both the outline and the allocations will be revised from time to time to insure the production of the basic intelligence required by the agencies and the fullest possible use of current agency capabilities. Changes in the outline or allocations shall be effected by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned.

(4) This basic intelligence shall be compiled and continuously maintained in National Intelligence Surveys to cover foreign countries, areas, or broad special subjects as appropriate. It will be distributed to the agencies in such form as the agencies agree will meet their requirements.

(5) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for accomplishing the editing, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys and shall make such requests on the agencies as are necessary for their proper development and maintenance.

(6) Departments or agencies to be called on for contributions to this undertaking may include agencies other than those represented permanently in the IAB.

b. Current Intelligence

(1) Current intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

(2) The CIG and the several agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or external responsibilities.

(3) Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be based on interagency agreement including N.I.A. Directive No. 1 and the principle of informing all who need to know.

c. Staff Intelligence

(1) Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the process of correlation and interpretation of all intelligence material available to it in order to meet the specific requirements and responsibilities of the department or agency concerned.

(2) Each intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility for the preparation of such staff intelligence as its own department shall require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of the departments must be broader in scope than any allocation of collection responsibility, recognition of production capabilities, or dominant interest might indicate. In fact, the full foreign intelligence picture is of interest in varying degrees at different times to each of the departments.

(3) Any agency, either through the Director of Central Intelligence or directly, may call upon other appropriate agencies for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. Such requests shall be made upon the agencies in accordance with their production capabilities and dominant interest.

(4) The division of interests agreed to in N.I.A. Directive No. 7 shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests, subject to refinement and adaptation to the purposes of intelligence production through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(5) As a part of the coordination program, the Director of Central Intelligence will seek the assistance of the IAB intelligence agencies in minimizing the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence in fields outside its dominant interests.

(6) The CIG and the agencies shall, for purposes of coordination, exchange information on projects and plans for the production of staff intelligence.

(7) It shall be normal practice that staff intelligence of one agency is available to the other intelligence agencies permanently represented on the IAB.

d. Strategic and National Policy Intelligence

(1) Strategic and national policy intelligence as defined by the NIA shall henceforth be known by the short title "National Intelligence."

(2) The production and dissemination of national intelligence shall be the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the IAB agencies in order that he may obtain from them within the limits of their capabilities the departmental intelligence upon which national intelligence is based.

(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies receive such estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of mutually undertaken intelligence reports or estimates.

3. The research facilities required by any agency to process its own current and staff intelligence shall be sufficient to satisfy its individual needs after taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies. Each agency shall endeavor to maintain sufficient research facilities, not only to accomplish the intelligence production tasks allocated to it directly under the foregoing provisions but also to provide such additional intelligence reports or estimates within its field of dominant interest as may be necessary to satisfy the requirements of the other agencies under such allocations.

4. Implementation. Assumption of responsibilities as allocated herein shall be effected progressively and rapidly under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Enclosure B

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)

Washington April 17, 1947.

SUBJECT
Proposed NIA Directive on the Coordination of Intelligence Production

1. The AC/AS-2 member of the Ad Hoc Committee is in general accord with the majority report of the Committee as presented, but dissents from that report with respect to paragraph 2 c (4) of the proposed directive.

2. Dominant interest is inseparable from mission, and the mission of each intelligence agency is determined by and must always be responsive to the requirements of the department or agency which it serves. There is no reason for attempting to delineate dominant interests, and consequently no reason for including paragraph 2 c (4) in the directive.

3. It is further considered that dominant interests should not and can not be defined by the assignment of collection responsibilities. Dominant interests flow from the mission of the particular department or agency, which is not necessarily true of agreed collection assignments; collection assignments may be based on capabilities, dominant interest never.

4. Also, in including paragraph 2 c (4) under the heading "Staff Intelligence" there is a danger that, in spite of its broad definition, staff intelligence will tend to become confused with intelligence in fields of dominant interest and consequently its production would be narrowed and restricted.

5. For these reasons, the AC/AS-2 representative is of the opinion that paragraph 2 c (4) should be deleted from the proposed directive.

6. However, if this deletion should not be favorably considered by the Intelligence Advisory Board, the following paragraph is submitted as a substitute for paragraph 2 c (4) and in desire to reach an accord. This proposed substitute accomplishes the purpose desired, and is not open to the objections noted above.

a. Proposed paragraph 2 c (4). For the purposes of par (3) above, the following division of interests agreed to in NIA Directive No. 7 subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests, subject to refinement and adaptation to the purposes of intelligence production through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence--State Department

Military Intelligence--War Department

Naval Intelligence--Navy Department

Air Intelligence--Army Air Forces

Economic and Scientific Intelligence--Each agency in accordance with its respective needs

E.P. Mussett
Colonel, Air Forces

Continue with Introduction:
The National Security Act of 1947