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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

The National Security Act of 1947

                           

215. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 26, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 2. Confidential. The memorandum is unsigned but appears to have been drafted by Pforzheimer.

At the request of Senator Gurney on 24 May, I went up and talked with him this morning. He stated that he was "holding his breath" on Section 202 of the National Security Act, which was coming up for discussion and decision this morning. He stated that General Donovan had been very active on the Hill in opposition to Section 202 and had talked with Senator Gurney, among others, about it.

Senator Gurney then asked me to read two letters and a memorandum from Donovan to him, dated early in May 1947, which included an early top secret JCS paper on the subject, and also General Donovan's letter to Harold Smith, Director of the Budget Bureau, written in 1945./1/ Senator Gurney stated that General Donovan had told him that the clandestine operations should remain with the Army and Navy, and read a sentence in General Donovan's letter which he felt supported this. I told him that my interpretation of that statement was that General Donovan contended that departmental intelligence functions of G-2 and ONI should be retained in the services, but then read him several paragraphs from Donovan's memorandum which specifically stated that clandestine operations should be placed in the Central Intelligence Agency and in no other departments of the Government. This cleared up Senator Gurney's apprehension on the point.

/1/None of these documents has been found.

I then commented on Donovan's suggestion that the Agency should be placed under the Secretary of National Defense, indicating that this would not be fair to the State Department components. I pointed out that placing us under the Secretary of National Defense would contain us within the military establishment, which was not the design at all. Senator Gurney agreed on this point.

Senator Gurney asked whether the Admiral/2/ had talked with Mr. Cheston and I stated that I thought the Admiral was attempting to make an appointment to see him. I pointed out that General Vandenberg had written General Donovan requesting an appointment, but that Donovan had not answered our letter. Senator Gurney felt that Donovan should have answered the letter, and that this in some measure took the original burden off us in that connection.

/2/Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Another suggestion in the Donovan correspondence was that Section 202 be deleted in the bill and that the whole matter be thrashed out at the time detailed legislation is submitted. I indicated that it was my feeling that there could be no harm in passing Section 202, as it merely gives legislative status to our present existence, adding that if General Donovan and his associates wished to make a fight on our detailed functions, that would be appropriate at the time our enabling legislation comes up.

216. Memorandum From the Chief of the Legislative Liaison Division, Central Intelligence Group (Pforzheimer) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter)

Washington, May 29, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 2. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Unification Bill in the House

1. Reference is made to our conversation, in which you requested information on a report that the House leadership would not take up unification legislation this session.

2. The following confidential information was secured for me from the Chairman of the Rules Committee, Mr. Allen:

a. The unification bill is considered controversial; and once the Party has secured its basic program, (taxes, appropriations, labor legislation, etc.) the House leadership does not contemplate going into further controversial matters.

b. While there has been no definite decision or vote on the matter, current thinking is to let the measure ride for this session and not bring it up.

c. A few Congressmen--notably Wadsworth of New York--are eager to bring it out and may be able to force it through the Rules Committee.

3. As Mr. Gamble, (R., N.Y.), told me the other day, Chairman Hoff-man of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments is perfectly willing to go ahead with the hearings and report out a measure. However, he takes the position that the President himself has delayed action by sending up the two reorganization bills, both of which must be acted upon within 60 days or automatically become law. The Committee, having virtually completed hearings on these two measures, is now faced with a third reorganization bill, (the one on housing), which was sent up this week, and which therefore will delay the merger hearings further.

Walter L. Pforzheimer/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. P>217. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (Gurney)

Washington, June 3, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Files, HS/HC-805, Item 10. Secret. The source text is a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian on September 11, 1952.

My Dear Senator Gurney: Through your courtesy, there has been communicated to me for comment the contents of a letter, dated 2 June 1947, which was written to you by Mr. Charles S. Cheston./1/ I had a very pleasant meeting with Mr. Cheston on Memorial Day, and we reached substantial agreement on all matters connected with the Central Intelligence Group.

/1/Not found. Cheston had been an Assistant Director of OSS in 1943-45.

As he noted in his letter to you, there were three points about which Mr. Cheston felt some concern. I would like to review briefly my position on them.

Mr. Cheston had two arguments for his position that the Central Intelligence Agency should be headed by a civilian. The principal argument was concerned with a lack of permanency and continuity in the position of Director. The second was that the Director must be in such a position that he cannot be influenced by any one Department, through fear or favor. We both agreed that there would be no objection to the Director being an officer of the armed services, provided that he serves in a retired status and in a civilian capacity. However, the proposed legislation should specifically provide for this contingency, for the absence of a specified period of service as Director would work an undue hardship upon an officer required to forego his military career to accept this position for an uncertain period of time. This could be remedied by establishing a specific term for the Director. The question of tenure of office seems to have been omitted from the proposed legislation in order that the President might have a free hand in nominating a Director of his own choosing, as he does in the case of other executive positions in the Government.

I informed Mr. Cheston that, were the bill passed and were I appointed to the post of Director of the new Agency, I would be willing to retire from active service and consider the position of Director as a career job. I feel sure that Mr. Cheston understands that in such a case it must be a career job--that is, for a specified period. It would be manifestly unfair for me to retire now, with the idea of making the position of Director my career, and then, perhaps, after the next election, be relieved of my post because of a desire to fill it with a political or personal appointee. If I were thus relieved, I would be without a career in the Central Intelligence Agency and foreclosed from returning to the Navy.

The second point raised in Mr. Cheston's letter is "that the Agency should have its own independent budget." With that point I am in no disagreement. As I have explained to him, we do, in effect, have our own independent budget at the present time, and no other Department or Agency has control over the funds which the Congress allocates to us in that budget.

The third point is that the Director should report to an individual rather than to a Committee. As I previously stated before the Senate Appropriations Committee, I feel that this is a matter to be determined by the Congress rather than by me. On purely theoretical grounds, it would, of course, be best to report to one individual rather than to a group. However, I can work with a Council equally well, and see no great difference in either solution that Congress may determine. There may be some question as to the wisdom of having the Director of Central Intelligence report to the Secretary of National Defense. This, in effect, might be considered as placing the Agency within the military establishment, which would not, in all probability, be satisfactory to the State Department. They have a great interest in the operations of the Agency, and their contributions in the intelligence field are particularly important in time of peace, when the Foreign Service can operate throughout the world.

As General Donovan stated in his memorandum to you of 7 May 1947,/2/ intelligence "must serve the diplomatic as well as the military and naval arms." This can best be done outside the military establishment. As General Donovan stated further, on page ten of his memorandum, "Since the nature of its work requires it to have status, it should be independent of any Department of the Government, (since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the natural bias of an operating Department.)"

/2/Not found.

In view of Mr. Cheston's remarks and my views expressed above, it is my opinion that there is no necessity to change the wording of Section 102 of S. 758/3/ to restrict the position of Director to a civilian only. It is my feeling that Section 102 should be left in its present form.

/3/The Senate version of the national security legislation.

I very much appreciate your having given me the opportunity to express my views to you on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

R.H. Hillenkoetter/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

218. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 19, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 2. No classification marking.

I talked this morning with Congressman James Wadsworth, (R., N.Y.), regarding our position before the Committee on Expenditures. I told him we were somewhat concerned regarding the feeling of certain members of the Committee and some witnesses appearing before it that we were or might become an incipient Gestapo, or interested in domestic intelligence of any sort. I told him that we were considering addressing a letter to the Chairman, suggesting that a provision be included in the bill substantially in the form that it appears in the Presidential Directive, prohibiting any police or internal security or law enforcement powers. Mr. Wadsworth thought that it would be an excellent idea and endorsed it, although he thought that the feeling was not very general.

I then explained to Mr. Wadsworth our position on enabling legislation; and, while he stated that certain other agencies created by the bill had their functions spelled out, he seemed receptive to withholding any statement of functions and general authorities which we need until the proper time for our enabling act.

I also explained to him the FBIB situation and the unfavorable publicity which we had received in this connection, indicating that I thought Mr. Busbey might raise the problem in executive session, and that we wished to have him in possession of the facts. He was most sympathetic with the problem, stated that he felt we should not be under Civil Service at all, and agreed that the Director should have the right to fire at will.

I subsequently spoke with Mr. Clare Hoffman, Chairman of the Committee, (in the absence of his son, the General Counsel), and Mr. Hoffman stated that he would be pleased to receive any amendment we cared to offer, introduce it, and give it every consideration.

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Chief, Legislative Liaison Division

219. Central Intelligence Group Memorandum

Washington, July 21, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 5. No classification marking. The source text is neither addressed nor signed and contains no drafting information. It appears that it was drafted in the office of the CIG's General Counsel. At the time that this memorandum was written, the differing House and Senate versions of the national security legislation had gone to conference.

MEMORANDUM OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE VERSIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

1.(a). The provisions of Section 102 of S. 758 relating to the Central Intelligence Agency are thoroughly acceptable and workable.

(b). However, if Section 102 of S. 758 is adopted by the Conferees, it would be preferable if it were also to include Section 105 (e) of H.R. 4214. It gives the Director the right to terminate the employment of any employee of the Agency. This provision is extremely important at the present time, in order that any possible subversives may be removed at once.

2. Section 105 of H.R. 4214 as originally introduced is also thoroughly acceptable and workable. It is, in fact, preferable to Section 102 of S. 758. It is to be preferred for the following reasons:

(a) The salary of the Director is placed at $14,000, which is more in keeping with the relative importance of the position within the national security structure.

(b) It authorizes the Director to terminate the employment of any employee.

(c) It more clearly delineates the functions of the Agency instead of relying on the provisions of the Executive Order of 22 January 1946.

3. By amendment, the House of Representatives has changed Section 105 (a) of H.R. 4214 to provide that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be selected only from civilian life. Previous versions had provided that the Director be selected from civilian or military life. It is hoped that the Conferees will restore the provision permitting the President to select the Director either from civilian or military life. In this connection, the provisions of S. 758, attached as Tab "A",/1/ or the provisions of H.R. 4214 as originally introduced, attached as Tab "B" herewith, are both thoroughly acceptable. In addition, as an alternative, a possible compromise is submitted as Tab "C", attached hereto.

/1/None of the tabs is printed; see the Supplement.

4. The provision requiring that the Director may be appointed only from civilian life appears to place an unfortunate restriction upon the Presidential powers of appointment. The President should be allowed to exercise his discretion in appointing the best available Director, either from civilian or military life, depending upon the qualifications of personnel available at the time of appointment. The necessity of Senate confirmation of the Director would eliminate the possibility of a poor selection; and the Senate in its discretion would probably reject appointees from the armed services if they were continually rotated for short tours of duty. If at some time in the future we were plunged into another war, the most qualified appointee might well be a reserve officer who had entered on active duty from civilian life. The proposed restriction would prevent his appointment by the President. Such a limitation would have prevented the appointment of the Director of Strategic Services during the past war.

5. The main argument advanced in the House of Representatives against a military Director was that the people "are afraid, in this particular instance, over the possibility that there might be some sort of a Gestapo set up in this country. . . . You might have a military officer who would like to do that; . . . if you require a civilian to be the head of this Agency, then you will not have any danger within the Agency of military influences or military dictatorship. It is felt that this argument is an excessive interpretation of the facts. The Agency deals only with foreign intelligence. It would have none of the publicity necessary for building its Director into a public figure of such stature that he might aspire to dictatorship. The Director of Central Intelligence, heading a small organization, would never be in a position to build up that great popular following upon which dictatorship must be predicated.

The New York Herald Tribune, commenting editorially on the above quotation, on 21 July 1947, stated that it "reflects the ancient American misunderstanding and suspicion of the military and military affairs, which throughout our history has always made sound military policy so difficult for the civil arm."

220. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) to the National Intelligence Authority

Washington, September 11, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 129. Confidential. The source text carries a handwritten annotation "Approved by Adm Leahy 20 Sept 1947." Another copy of this memorandum is in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 137-138.

SUBJECT
National Security Act of 1947/1/

/1/For a photographic copy of the National Security Act of 1947, approved July 26, see ibid., pp. 131-135.

1. Upon the coming into effect of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Intelligence Authority automatically ceases to exist and the Central Intelligence Agency comes under the National Security Council./2/ Inasmuch as no date has been set for a meeting of the National Security Council to carry on the work of the National Intelligence Authority, the following suggestions and recommendations are made:

/2/On September 19, after the act had come into effect, Hillenkoetter addressed a briefer version of this memorandum to the NSC; see Document 222.

a. At the first meeting of the National Security Council, it is recommended that all directives of the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group be continued in full force and effect until the National Security Council has had an opportunity to study the problem and to make amendments and changes that they may consider desirable.

b. In order that the National Security Council make an early approach to this problem, it is recommended that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be directed to submit, within sixty days, his proposal for National Security Council directives to bring former directives of the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group into line with the National Security Act of 1947.

c. In consideration of the size of the National Security Council, as compared to the National Intelligence Authority, it is recommended that a subcommittee be established to act similarly to the National Intelligence Authority to furnish the active direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. This subcommittee should be composed of a minimum number of members and, as a suggestion, could be either the Secretary of State and the Secretary of National Defense, or the Secretary of State, Secretary of National Defense, and the three Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force. Personally, I believe the first suggestion is better since the Secretary of State has equal representation with the military. If the second suggestion is followed, there may be some complaints from State that the military is overshadowing them.

2. The Director of the Central Intelligence Group sat as a non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority, and, while I believe it presumptuous and awkward on my part to suggest that he so sit with the National Security Council, still it would be of utmost assistance if he could attend all meetings of the National Security Council in some capacity, either as observer, counsel or advisor, in order to keep informed of what the thoughts of the National Security Council may be. In addition, by being present, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency would also be available for such direct questions as may be propounded.

3. If you will indicate your approval or disapproval of the suggestions and recommendations above, I shall go ahead and have formal statements prepared to be furnished to the National Security Council at its first meeting.

R.H. Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN

221. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) to the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, September 18, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-806, Item 6. Confidential. Addressed to Eddy, Chamberlin, Inglis, McDonald, and Gingrich. The source text was transcribed on October 1, 1952, for the CIA Historian.

SUBJECT
Interdepartmental Coordination and Planning

1. The National Security Act of 1947 has required a careful reconsideration of the organization of the Central Intelligence Group, its relationship to the intelligence agencies of the Government, and its transformation into the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Notice has already been given by the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority and to the Intelligence Advisory Board of his intention, under authority of Section 303(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, to create an Intelligence Advisory Committee to be composed of intelligence representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air and the Atomic Energy Commission, as the successor of the Intelligence Advisory Board. The purpose of the Committee will be to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his functions and those of the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. After consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Board, the Director of Central Intelligence has determined to continue under the new regime the existence of his Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) with the duties and responsibilities with which it has hitherto been charged. Although its personnel will remain under the supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence, it is requested that each Intelligence Advisory Committee member consider the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff member assigned from his department as his principal liaison contact in the Central Intelligence Agency on all matters pertaining to interdepartmental coordination and planning. It is desired to utilize these Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff members to a greater degree than heretofore in achieving the maximum possible mutual understanding and appreciation of each other's aims and objectives. To this end, it is suggested that they be encouraged to maintain close relationships with their agencies and be called into their staff meetings and conferences on pertinent subjects. In this manner, it is expected that they may present their agencies' views in the Central Intelligence Agency for consideration in advance of the submission of papers to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency's aims to their agencies. It must be understood, however, that although these Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff members will be expected to present their agencies' views in full, they cannot be expected in all cases to support them in the face of conflictions in the interests of the accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

4. It is not contemplated to change the present composition of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff. However, future developments may require a request for additional members from the Intelligence Advisory Board agencies.

5. The need in the past of the Intelligence Advisory Board for a policy and planning body to consider the details of special problems and to make specific recommendations upon which the Board might act in its advisory capacity has been recognized. The present Intelligence Advisory Board procedure of nominating ad hoc committees for this purpose has not in all cases proved satisfactory. In some cases, officers assigned on a temporary basis have not had the background knowledge required for full understanding, and/or were not vested with sufficient authority to act for their chiefs. This situation naturally leads to an excess of caution detrimental to "give and take" compromise required to reach a mutual agreement.

6. It will therefore be proposed to the Intelligence Advisory Committee at its first meeting that it concur in the establishment of a standing committee composed of permanent representatives of each Intelligence Advisory Board member plus the members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, the Committee to be under the chairmanship of the Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.

7. It is not contemplated that these intelligence representatives will be assigned on a full time basis, but that they will be ready to meet whenever an interdepartmental problem arises with the view of attempting to overcome those divergent views which from time to time develop in the preparation of papers for the Intelligence Advisory Committee advisory opinion and National Security Council approval.

8. In making assignments of these agency representatives, consideration should be given to selection of officers with sufficient competence to act for their Intelligence Advisory Committee members in concurrence or dissent, except in the most controversial issues, thus reducing to a minimum the need for detailed discussion at Intelligence Advisory Committee meetings.

9. Subjects under discussion by the Standing Committee may at times require the attendance at meetings of additional agency officers to advise the permanent members, but in these cases the presence of the permanent members are desired to arrive at decisions.

10. It is considered that the principal value of including the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff members on this committee lies in preliminary discussion on controversial issues between individual agency representatives and their corresponding Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff member. Their participation will also facilitate compliance by the Director with his duty to advise and make recommendations to the National Security Council, always with the advice of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

11. It will also be proposed that the Secretariat of the Intelligence Advisory Committee will be supplied from within the Central Intelligence Agency.

R.H. Hillenkoetter/1/
Rear Admiral, USN

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

222. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) to the National Security Council

Washington, September 19, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 62 D 42, IAC. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Appointment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 established an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads, or their representatives, of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to the national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority, to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Security Act of 1947 makes no specific provision for the continuance of the Intelligence Advisory Board nor for a successor. However, Section 303 (a) of the Act authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence (among others) to appoint such advisory committees as he may deem necessary in carrying out his functions and the functions of the Agency under his control (Central Intelligence Agency).

2. Recognizing the advantages to be derived from such an advisory group, it is the proposal of the Director of Central Intelligence to appoint an Intelligence Advisory Committee which will to all intents and purposes continue in existence the Intelligence Advisory Board established under the National Intelligence Authority by the President in his letter of 22 January 1946.

3. It is therefore requested that the National Security Council

a. authorize the participation by appropriate members of the several departments in the Director of Central Intelligence's Intelligence Advisory Committee.

4. If the National Security Council approves this proposal, the Director of Central Intelligence will send Enclosure 1 as an invitation to the officers designated by them and to the Intelligence Director of the Atomic Energy Commission.

R.H. Hillenkoetter/1/
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

Enclosure

APPOINTMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 establishing the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group also provided:

"(7) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority."

2. The National Intelligence Authority determined in its Directive No. 1 that:

"3. The composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board will be flexible and will depend, in each instance, upon the subject matter under consideration. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, the Chief of Naval Intelligence and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence (or their representatives) will be permanent members. You will invite the head (or his representative) of any other intelligence agency having functions related to the national security to sit as a member on all matters within the province of his agency."

3. The experience of three Directors of Central Intelligence has established that there are advantages in having the several agency intelligence chiefs available to him in an advisory capacity. As no provision is made for the continuance of the Intelligence Advisory Board under the National Security Act of 1947, these advantages will be lost unless a similar advisory body is constituted.

4. Therefore under authority of Section 303 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947, there is hereby appointed an Intelligence Advisory Committee to be composed of the intelligence representatives of the State, Army, Navy, and Air Departments, and the Atomic Energy Commission:

"(a) This permanent membership will be expanded to include the heads (or their representatives) of other agencies having intelligence or related functions on such occasions as their participation may be desirable."

5. The Intelligence Advisory Committee will be called upon by the Director of Central Intelligence to advise him in those matters related to the carrying out of his functions and the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947.

6. The Director of Central Intelligence will supply from the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency such secretarial assistance as the Committee may require.

7. The Intelligence Advisory Committee shall meet on the call of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence or his representative shall serve as Chairman.

8. The Secretariat will circulate to the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee all communications addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence by a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Such papers shall bear an Intelligence Advisory Committee series number and all subsequent papers related thereto shall carry a sub-number under the originally assigned series numbers. Communications of the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Committee shall be numbered in the same series.

9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee will hold itself available to advise the Director of Central Intelligence on such recommendations as the Director may plan to make to the National Security Council under authority of Section 102 (d) (2) of the National Security Act of 1947. In cases where there is disagreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and any member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee in matters of the substance of such recommendations, the Intelligence Advisory Committee member will prepare a formal statement of disagreement so that it may accompany the Director of Central Intelligence's recommendations to the National Security Council.

10. In order to obtain the considered opinion of the several intelligence agencies represented in the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the Director of Central Intelligence will not as a matter of policy permit discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Committee of matters which members have not had opportunity to study, including all related papers, and, where appropriate, have obtained the opinion of other members of their departments.

11. Any recommendation two or more IAC members believe should be submitted to the National Security Council will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence in such form as to set forth his recommendation and the comments of the Intelligence Advisory Committee members.

12. The participation of any intelligence chief in the Intelligence Advisory Committee shall not be construed as precluding such intelligence chief from having access to the National Security Council through his regularly established departmental channels.

223. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) to the National Security Council

Washington, September 19, 1947.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Intelligence File. Confidential.

SUBJECT
National Security Act of 1947

1. The National Security Act of 1947 established a Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council. Section 102 (d) of the Act sets forth the basic functions of that agency to be performed under the direction of the National Security Council. Effective when the Director of Central Intelligence takes office, the National Intelligence Authority is abolished and the personnel, property, records and funds of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Agency. On that date, therefore, the Agency will be prepared to perform its statutory functions, but will be without direction from the National Security Council as specified by the Act. The following recommendations are therefore submitted for consideration by the National Security Council at its first meeting:/1/

/1/At its first meeting on September 26 the National Security Council approved both recommendations; see Document 225.

a. That all directives of the National Intelligence Authority to the Central Intelligence Group be continued in full force and effect. The Agency will function under this authorization until specifically repealed, altered or augmented by the National Security Council, or changed in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph b. below.

b. That the National Security Council direct the Director of Central Intelligence to submit to the Council within sixty days, proposed author-izations supplanting the former directives of the National Intelligence Authority and specifying his functions and those of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947.

R.H. Hillenkoetter/2/
Rear Admiral, USN

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

224. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Lovett to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, September 23, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/9-1147. Confidential. Drafted by William A. Eddy on September 18. Attached was a vote slip form, signed by Lovett and addressed to the secretary of the NIA, indicating Department of State approval of the September 11 memorandum subject to Lovett's comments. Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence Group became the Central Intelligence Agency on September 19, and Hillenkoetter became the Agency's first Director of Central Intelligence on September 20.

SUBJECT
Your memorandum of 11 September 1947 regarding the National Security Act of 1947/1/

/1/Document 220.

1. I am in agreement with your recommendation (1-a) to the effect that all directives of the National Intelligence Authority and of the Central Intelligence Group be continued in full force and effect until the National Security Council has had an opportunity to study the problem and to make any changes that they may consider desirable.

2. I also approve your recommendation (1-b) to the effect that the Director of Central Intelligence Agency submit, within sixty days, his proposal for National Security Council directives to bring the former directives of the National Intelligence Authority and of the Central Intelligence Group into line with the National Security Act of 1947. In this connection, however, I would suggest that this report by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be coordinated with the Intelligence Advisory Board to insure the prior consideration of the problem by the chiefs of the intelligence services of the several Departments whose concurrence would thus be expedited.

3. With regard to recommendation (1-c) to the effect that a subcommittee of the National Security Council be established to act similarly to the previous National Intelligence Authority, with special responsibility to direct the Central Intelligence Agency, it would seem to me that, in principle, this is a very useful and practical suggestion. In view of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency will be the only inter-departmental intelligence agency authorized to coordinate peacetime political and economic intelligence with the intelligence program of the Armed Forces, it would seem to me very important that the Department of the Government, responsible for foreign affairs, the protection of our foreign commercial interests, and the maintenance of friendly diplomatic relations with all other countries, should be fully represented. The Armed Forces, for their part, have a further coordinating, and common intelligence agency, in the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would, therefore, suggest that the proposed subcommittee to direct the Central Intelligence Agency be composed of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of National Defense, with a personal representative of the President, if that should be the President's desire. It will be recalled that the National Intelligence Authority included the Secretary of State as Chairman, and a personal representative of the President.

4. With regard to the recommendation contained in paragraph 2, it would seem to me essential that the Director of Central Intelligence be present as a non-voting member at all meetings of the subcommittee of the National Security Council established to direct the Central Intelligence Agency. It would seem to me also desirable that he attend meetings of the National Security Council as an adviser or observer.

For the Secretary of State:

Robert A. Lovett/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.

Continue with Document 225