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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

The National Security Act of 1947

                           

230. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army (Royall) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, November 26, 1947.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Records of the National Security Council. Confidential. Sent through the Secretary of Defense. Attached to the source text is a November 28 note on the stationery of the Office of the Secretary of Defense addressed to Souers from John H. Ohly, indicating that Forrestal had not seen Royall's memorandum but that a copy was being held for him.

SUBJECT
Appointment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, same subject, dated 10 October 1947./1/

/1/Document 226.

2. While I agree that it is desirable to create a committee to succeed the Intelligence Advisory Board, it does not appear to me that such is accomplished by the Intelligence Advisory Committee which the Director of Central Intelligence proposes to appoint under section 303 (a) of Public Law 253.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Board was responsible to the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence was required (paragraph 3, N.I.A. Directive No. 1) to refer all recommendations to the Board prior to his submission of them to the Authority. The Board therefore performed two very important functions: (1) it furnished advice to the Director of Central Intelligence and (2) it insured the full interdepartmental coordination of all matters before they were submitted to the National Intelligence Authority.

4. I therefore recommend that the Director of Central Intelligence draft a charter which will provide for a committee as successor to the Intelligence Advisory Board which will perform for the National Security Council those functions which the Intelligence Advisory Board performed for the National Intelligence Authority.

Kenneth C. Royall

231. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, April 7, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 17. Secret.

SUBJECT
Proposed Legislation

1. The General Counsel of the House Military Affairs Committee has informed us by telephone that the Committee may be interested in four particular questions concerning the need for our proposed legislation. They are listed below with information which should serve to form general answers:

(a) How Has CIA Functioned Without the Authorization Contained in the Proposed Legislation?

CIA began to function as CIG on 22 January 1946. Through the remainder of that fiscal year, its operations were small, and administrative support came from the departments from which personnel were assigned and from the Strategic Services Unit of the War Department, which had been assigned the task of liquidating the affairs of OSS and preserving for future use such assets as might be of use for whatever agency was to control the national intelligence. The funds transferred from OSS to SSU were adequate for this support.

In the budget hearings in the Spring of 1946, funds for the support of CIG were earmarked in certain portions of the appropriations for State, War, and Navy. A majority of the funds were in the War Department appropriation in the provision for contingencies. At the request of the NIA and with the concurrence of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget, the Comptroller General authorized the establishment of a Working Fund to which the earmarked portions of the appropriations were transferred for expenditure by CIG. A similar arrangement was followed for the fiscal year 1948. Administration under this procedure was extremely difficult because of varying limitations in the different appropriation acts. Only through the splendid cooperation of the Comptroller General's Office and the other departments and agencies concerned were interim procedures devised for proper administration of these funds. Even with such cooperation, continual problems of administration were encountered, and operations were hampered by restrictions on the use of funds. It was partly due to the Agency's needs and partly due to the suggestion of the Comptroller General's Office that this legislation was drafted to provide a proper legal basis for administration of the Agency's functions.

(b) What Features of This Bill Have No Precedent in Existing Law for Any Other Branch of the Government?

Section 6(a) (page 8, line 11, et seq.) is believed to be without exact precedent in permitting free transfer of funds to and from the Agency and permitting expenditures of funds transferred to the act under the authority of the proposed legislation without regard to limitations of the original appropriation. It is believed that this Section is necessary to preserve the security of funds made available to the Agency while providing a clear basis for their expenditure.

Section 6(f) (page 9, line 19, et seq.) provides in the interest of security an exception from the disclosure required by law of the size of the Agency and the functions of its officers. It is believed that this provision is without precedent but is again an essential security measure.

Section 7(a)(1) (page 10, line 18, et seq.), setting forth the purposes for which sums made available to the Agency may be expended has a novel feature in that it will, in effect, be permanent appropriation language for the Agency. This is required because it is proposed that there will be no specific annual appropriations to the Agency in the interest of security and that by these provisions there will be language on which Agency expenditures may be based and on which audits can be made. All other features of the bill have one or more known precedents.

(c) How Does CIA Propose To Obtain Appropriations Without Disclosing the Amount and the Source?

We believe that in the past the system of earmarking certain funds in regular appropriations for subsequent transfer to the CIG Working Fund has prevented disclosure of the amount and source of funds available to the Agency. With the transfer authorities of Section 6(a) mentioned above and appropriation Sections, this process can be greatly simplified. With these, the earmarked sums may be placed in any limitation of any appropriation, and any number of such sums may be authorized.

CIA will prepare its regular budget for review by certain designated Bureau of the Budget officers, who will suggest how that budget should be split among appropriations of other agencies. Normally, they can be placed in blocks of a few million dollars in the largest limitations of the National Defense appropriations or other large items where the increase would not be noticeable. These proposals would then be discussed in Executive Session with the appropriation subcommittees, and if approved, would then be reported as a part of the normal appropriation. Arrangements for the secure transfer can be made with the appropriate administrative officers of the departments concerned and the General Accounting Office.

(d) What Safeguards Are Provided in the Spending of Money by CIA?

All proposed expenditures are reviewed by a Projects Review Committee, which makes recommendations thereon to the Director. All vouchered expenditures are audited within CIA by representatives of the General Accounting Office especially detailed for that purpose. For unvouchered expenditures, the Director has appointed Special Funds' officers as his personal representatives for their administration. Recognizing, however, that he has sole ultimate responsibility for the propriety of unvouchered expenditures, he has laid down detailed rules and regulations outlining the purposes for expenditure and the controls and approvals which will apply. He has appointed Certifying Officers who are responsible for auditing all unvouchered expenditures to see that they come within these regulations. If there is doubt as to compliance with regulations, the Certifying Officer may refer any question to the Office of the General Counsel for review and recommendation to the Director. Any exceptions or unusual circumstances require personal action by the Director. As a further safeguard, the Director has appointed an Executive for Inspection and Security with a staff of auditors and fiscal experts, who make periodic general inspections of all books and accounts and such special investigations as the Director may require.

All officers of the Agency involved in the expenditure of unvouchered funds are informed that misuse of such funds may subject them to personal liability or prosecution under applicable law.

Lawrence R. Houston/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

232. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 8, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 7. No classification marking.

The Director and Mr. Pforzheimer appeared before Sub-Committee No. 3 of the House Armed Services Committee in connection with H.R. 5871. Present were Mr. Paul W. Shafer of Michigan, Mr. Lyndon Johnson of Texas, Mr. Leroy Johnson of California, Mr. Franck R. Havenner of California, and Mr. J. R. Blandford, counsel to the Sub-Committee. The hearing was in Executive Session with a reporter present except during those times when the discussion was off the record.

A point of discussion arose as to whether debate on the floor would not force out certain classified information regarding the matters for which this legislation seeks to provide and the suggestion was offered by Representative Lyndon Johnson substantially in the following terms:

"Notwithstanding any provisions of existing law the President, after approval of the Comptroller General, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chief of Staff to the President, is hereby authorized to exempt CIA from such advertising, purchasing, accounting, disbursing, contract or other provisions of present law which requirements of security may dictate."

(After discussion with Mr. Webb, the Director of the Bureau of the Budg-et, the Sub-Committee was informed that this proposed language was too broad and would protect nobody if enforced.)

The question of authority for the Director to issue visas up to fifty people per annum was considered, and the Sub-Committee ruled that it was too controversial to include in the present measure and that after the passage of H.R. 5871 it should be offered as a new bill.

After further discussions on the provisions of the bill, the Sub-Committee unanimously approved H.R. 5871 with certain textual changes suggested by the Director.

Walter L. Pforzheimer

233. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Steelman) to President Truman

Washington, April 24, 1948.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. No classification marking.

The Congressional Record for April 21, Pages 4836-7 contains a thirty minute speech by Congressman Devitt of Wisconsin on "We must create a joint committee on intelligence."

Mr. Devitt is very critical of the Central Intelligence Agency. He advocates a concurrent resolution proposing that 18 Members constitute a committee which would constantly study and evaluate the operations of all Government intelligence services.

At the close of the speech he stated as follows:

"I have spoken informally with Admiral Hillenkoetter, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, of my intention to introduce this resolution today, and he has expressed his approbation of it. He told me that while he believes there is much merit to the independent position of his agency in the field of government, he feels somewhat at a loss for the lack of some specific committee of the Congress to whom he can turn for confidential guidance and counsel and to whom he can resort for needed changes in the legislative operations of his agency."

Perhaps someone should have a talk with Admiral Hillenkoetter about this matter.

JRS

234. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, May 7, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-808, Item 10. No classification marking. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on September 10, 1952.

SUBJECT
National Security Act of 1947

1. The following notes are submitted in connection with a discussion of problems arising in operation under the National Security Act of 1947:

a. From an administrative point of view, the primary difficulty experienced was lack of detailed enabling legislation to support CIA's unusual administrative problems. It was thought, and properly so, that so much detail should not be put in legislation of the broad policy nature of the National Security Act. This problem has now been met by submission to the Congress of detailed enabling legislation. It is believed that this Bill, as submitted, will have the support of all the executive departments and substantial support in Congress.

b. It has been generally agreed in past discussions that it would be desirable, if feasible, to have CIA's basic authorization provide for a Deputy Director as well as a Director. Such a provision was discussed again in connection with the CIA enabling act, and it was decided that in view of the current attitude towards military appointments, no such provision would be submitted. A check indicates that no practical difficulties have arisen, or are expected to arise, for lack of statutory authority for a Deputy Director.

c. In its performance of the intelligence functions outlined in the National Security Act, the primary difficulty experienced by CIA has been in certain weakness of language in paragraph 102(d) concerning the meaning of coordination of intelligence activities. Where the Act states "it shall be the duty of the Agency . . . to advise the National Security Council . . . (and) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities", it has been strongly argued that this places on the Director a responsibility merely to obtain cooperation among the intelligence agencies. This weakness of language and the ensuing controversy might have been eliminated by the insertion after the phrase, "it shall be the duty of the Agency", the following words: "and the Director is hereby empowered", or some other such phrase indicating the intent of Congress that the Director was to have a controlling voice in the coordination, subject to the direction of the National Security Council.

d. The collection functions of CIA are provided for only in the general provision, "to perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally and to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the National Security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct". It is known that Congress intended by these phrases to insure control of clandestine intelligence by CIA but considered that security aspects prevented its being spelled out in the language of the law. Lack of such specific direction may be considered a weakness in the National Security Act of 1947 that deserves further consideration by the Congress.

Lawrence R. Houston/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

235. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, September 2, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-208, Item 31. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Comments on Civilian versus Military Head for Central Intelligence

1. The written record arguing the question of a civilian as against a military head for CIA is voluminous. But it boils down to very few points, of which the most important appears to be general recognition of the necessity for continuity of control. The lesser points are fear of pressures and influences from service relationships and a fear that career considerations would hamper independence of action. There is also, in some comment, evidence of a prejudice in favor of civilians and against giving additional important posts to military personnel--the prejudice that talks of the so-called "military mind". This last point would seem rather unimportant, in view of the fact that military background has not generally been considered a handicap in the appointment of the Secretary of State, the President of Columbia University, the Ambassador to Moscow, and the incumbents of many other important diplomatic and industrial positions.

2. The need for continuity of direction is obviously a most important point on which there appears to be no disagreement. The usual argument is that a civilian once appointed has no limit to his tenure and may, as in the oft-cited case of Mr. Hoover and the FBI, stay in office indefinitely. A counterpoint to this argument is the claim that a military man normally rotates positions in short tours of duty or, in any case, could be reassigned by his service at any time. The critics point out the rapid turnover in the early history of CIG-CIA. I believe the argument loses its validity when the terms of the National Security Act are studied. By that Act, an officer of any of the services who is appointed as Director is in effect separated from the service for all purposes except pay and allowances. It would be impossible for anyone in the Military Establishment from the Secretary of Defense on down to order or otherwise arrange his transfer. Section 102(b) provides that a commissioned officer appointed as Director shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian. Strictly construed, such an officer could not be transferred even by the President acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. Of course, the President could remove him in the same way he could remove a Cabinet officer, but this applies equally to a civilian Director. It appears, therefore, that under the Act as presently drawn, the tenure of a military Director is exactly as indefinite as that of a civilian, and he could continue in office in the same manner that Mr. Hoover continues as head of the FBI.

3. The argument that the military Director would be subject to influences and pressures due to service relationships has, of course, some validity. Everyone is influenced by his background and associations. A civilian Director is influenced by his political, social, and economic relationships. The answer in both situations is the same--that any Director appointed should be of such caliber that the pressures and influences, whether civilian or military, are minimized. A practical aspect which is important arises from the fact that although CIA is essentially a civilian Agency serving the Executive in general, its relations with the military are necessarily close, and a Director from the services would normally have their trust and would understand better the problem involved in exercising the control over the military intelligence activities which his position requires. Again, however, this is less a question of background and relationships than it is of the ability of the Director.

4. The argument concerning the influence of career considerations on the Director's decisions receives much the same answer. If the Director is a man worthy of appointment, he would act on principle rather than on considerations for the future. If, on the other hand, the latter outweighed, it appears that a civilian would be just as worried about his future in Government or business as the officer. To some extent, the future of the officer is more assured, since by law he keeps the perquisites of his military position--he is sure that, barring court-martial, he may retire with pay sufficient to assure a livelihood in the future. A civilian has no such assurance until he has been with the Government many years. In addition, presumably the officer would be picked from among the top ranks in the service. Aside from prestige, therefore, there would not be many positions open to him which would offer more in the way of economic inducement. It can, therefore, be fairly argued that the influence of career considerations would not have a decisive effect on a military Director of ability and principle.

5. Even granting that, as a general principle, the Director of Central Intelligence should be a civilian, the discussion in Congress brought up a practical aspect which is most important. Very few people have the experience and qualifications required for the top intelligence job. With very rare exceptions, those who have adequate experience have obtained it in military service. It will take many years of operations before there is a body of civilians with wide intelligence background. A man with proper experience and qualifications would have to be an outstanding figure and, in private life, would almost certainly be economically successful. Considering the drawbacks of Government service in general and of its economic rewards in particular, the appeal to such a civilian would depend only on his willingness to make personal sacrifice. As Mr. Allen Dulles points out, the position requires an almost monastic devotion and idea of service. As a practical matter, therefore, it may be necessary to consider officers for the position. The top officers may not be the best possible men for the job, but they may be the best men available. With the growing importance of the directorship, it should become one of the key posts for any officer, but particularly an intelligence officer, to aim for. To require such a man to separate wholly from the service in order to qualify as a civilian for the post would take away the assurance which his retirement rights afford of a future livelihood and its concomitant independence of action. Therefore, for no other reason than this practical one, the way should at least be left open for the appointment of an officer so long as the President is free to appoint a civilian if he so desires.

6. A final point which might become important concerns possible wartime conditions. In time of war, CIA would inevitably be tied in much more closely with military operations. It might be advisable for the Director to be in uniform even though he was appointed as a civilian. If the Act restricted the directorship to civilians, commissioning would be impossible, unless an amendment were passed. There seems, therefore, to be little basis for the argument that the National Security Act of 1947 should be amended to restrict appointment of the Director to civilians alone. Since the Director is under the immediate control of the National Security Council, the arguments concerning "military dictatorship", "Gestapo", and such like are ignored.

Lawrence R. Houston

236. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Webb)

Washington, December 15, 1948.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Records of the National Security Council, File CIA, Memos for Director, 1948. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. Webb: In accordance with the letter of the President, dated 6 November 1948, regarding proposed agency legislative programs for the coming session, and my reply to you of 29 November 1948,/1/ I am forwarding herewith the text of proposed legislation for the Central Intelligence Agency./2/

/1/Neither letter has been found.

/2/Dated December 15; see the Supplement.

This proposed bill is substantially the same as S. 2688 (Report No. 1302) which was passed by the Senate on 19 June 1948. A similar bill, H.R. 5871 (Report No. 1853), was unanimously approved by the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, but was not passed when lack of time in the closing hours of the session prevented its being called up. Bureau of the Budget approval of last year's draft was contained in a letter to me from Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, dated 6 April 1948. The full concurrence of the Comptroller General was contained in his letter to you dated 12 March 1948./1/

Reexamination of the provisions of S. 2688 indicates that while it was satisfactory, experiences over the past few months have indicated that certain additions to that bill would be most helpful to this Agency. We have, therefore, included them in the accompanying draft bill. I am also enclosing a detailed analysis/3/ of the new provisions, so that you may readily see the additions to S. 2688.

/3/Not printed; see the Supplement.

Sincerely yours,

R.H. Hillenkoetter/4/
Rear Admiral, USN

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

237. Memorandum From the Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Pforzheimer) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, January 6, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 17. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Section 6(g) of proposed CIA legislation

1. Mr. Houston and I conferred today with Mr. Fisher Howe, of the State Department intelligence staff, and Mr. Robert Alexander, of the Visa Division. They have agreed to concur in our visa section 6(g),/1/ and as a result of this conference we will suggest to you certain modifications. Mr. Alexander, however, made certain proposals which he considered preferable to ours, but this will not prevent him from concurring in our section. He did point out, however, that he was constantly being called into Executive session by Congressional committees to testify on all matters concerning visas, and that presumably the State Department would be called in this connection in our bill. He stated that if he were called and were asked for his opinion, he would testify that he did not agree with our approach, although he agreed as to the necessity for such legislation, and that he would be forced to testify as to his own opinion as to the best means to secure our end.

/1/Regarding discussions between Department of State and CIA officials on the visa section of the proposed CIA legislation conferring limited authority on the Director of Central Intelligence, see the December 29 memorandum from Howe to Armstrong (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/4-3149); Pforzheimer's memoranda to Hillenkoetter, December 30 (Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 17), December 31 (ibid.), and January 3 (ibid., Folder 10); and memoranda for the files by Pforzheimer, January 3 (ibid., Folder 17) and by Houston, January 4 (ibid.). All are in the Supplement.

2. While I believe he is under a misapprehension as to the committee before which our legislation will come, and while I think it is doubtful that the Armed Services Committee would ever request his testimony, once the State Department has concurred in our legislation, I believe Mr. Lovett should make it crystal clear that the only testimony Mr. Alexander can give would be in direct support of the language in which the Department has concurred and not his personal opinion. Furthermore, if State Department testimony is considered desirable, it appears to me that it should be given preferably by Mr. Lovett himself or otherwise by Mr. Armstrong. I envisage the possibility, in the light of Mr. Alexander's past legislative performances, that he may attempt to throw some sand in the gears, and this should not be allowed to happen through any private lobbying operations of his own.

Walter L. Pforzheimer

238. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett

Washington, January 11, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/12-2948. No classification marking. Drafted by Fisher Howe and approved by EUR, OFS, CON, ODA, ORP, L/A, and C/L.

SUBJECT
Attached letter re Proposed Revisions to CIA Legislation

Discussion:

1. The proposed revision of CIA enabling legislation involves two major subjects of interest to the Department: an exception to the normal immigration procedures, and administrative arrangements for CIA overseas personnel.

2. With respect to the immigration clause which permits the bringing into the United States of up to 100 individuals without regard to immigration statutes, the following is pertinent:

(a) In discussion with Admiral Hillenkoetter, it is understood that you gave informal approval to this clause.

(b) The Visa Division has concurred in this clause of the legislation and, in fact, in consultation with CIA representatives has suggested improvements in the phraseology which have been adopted by the CIA according to the attachment.

3. With respect to the administrative clauses:

(a) These were approved a year ago when almost identical legislation was put forward by the CIA; it was, in fact, only with the immigration clause that the Department found exception.

(b) The specific grants in powers of this legislation are being sought by the CIA now as a result of requests by the General Accounting Office, and are in accordance with their specifications. It is understood that the Bureau of the Budget also concurs in the need for such modifications to the CIA enabling legislation.

(c) On the whole, the legislation tends to legalize procedures which have been followed in the past two years and which are intended to make the administration of CIA overseas personnel as much like the administration of Foreign Service personnel as is possible.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter concurring in the CIA legislation.

Attachment/1/

/1/Drafted by Fisher Howe on January 11.

Letter From Acting Secretary of State Lovett to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Webb)

My Dear Mr. Webb: The Department has received your letter of December 24,/2/ in which comment is requested by the Bureau of the Budget on the "Proposed Central Intelligence Act of 1949" admitted by the Central Intelligence Agency.

/2/Not found.

The Department perceives no objection to this proposed legislation. You will note that one clause, 6(g), has been revised in consultation with CIA, according to the attachment.

The Department believes that despite the extraordinary grant of powers involved, such legislation is entirely proper and necessary for the efficient operation of an intelligence service.

Sincerely yours,/3/

/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

239. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Rayburn)

Washington, February 11, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90-00610R, Box 1, Folder 17. No classification marking. A similar letter was sent to Senator Millard Tydings, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on the same date. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

Dear Mr. Speaker: There is submitted herewith the draft/1/ of a proposed bill "To provide for the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency, established pursuant to Section 102, National Security Act of 1947, and for other purposes."

/1/Not printed. The bill was enacted as the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, June 20, 1949, Public Law 110, 81st Congress, 1st Session (63 Stat. Ch. 227). A signed copy of the act is reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 287-294.

This proposed legislation is substantially the same as H.R. 5871 which was introduced in the Eightieth Congress and unanimously reported out by the House Armed Services Committee. However, due to lack of time, the bill was not called up on the floor. It was also reported out unanimously by the Senate Armed Services Committee in the Eightieth Congress, and passed the Senate on 21 June 1948. The favorable action of the House Armed Services Committee is reported in House Report No. 1853, dated 4 May 1948.

The purpose of the bill is to grant to the Central Intelligence Agency the authorities necessary for its proper administration. The bill deals with procurement, travel, allowances and related expenses, general authorities, and methods of expenditures of appropriated funds. Further, it protects the confidential nature of the Agency's functions and makes provisions for the internal administration of the Agency. In almost all instances, the powers and authorities contained in the bill already exist for some other branch of the Government, and the bill merely extends similar authorities to the Central Intelligence Agency.

This proposed bill has been resubmitted to the Bureau of the Budget, and we have been advised that they have no objection to its presentation to the Congress in its present form.

Sincerely yours,

R.H. Hillenkoetter/2/
Rear Admiral, USN

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

240. Memorandum From the General Counsel (Houston) and the Legislative Liaison Officer of the Central Intelligence Agency (Pforzheimer) to the Executive of the Central Intelligence Agency (Shannon)

Washington, September 27, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-84, Item 3. Confidential. The source text is a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian on September 9, 1952.

SUBJECT
Legal Responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency

1. The interpretation of an act of Congress is often extremely difficult. At times provisions which are perfectly clear when the act is written become subject to various interpretations in practice, making it necessary to fall back on Congressional Committee reports and Floor debates. This appears to be the case in connection with certain authorities under Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 which sets forth the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency. But whatever uncertainty has arisen out of inadequate wording or subsequent interpretations, in our opinion the basic intent of the Congress is clear and unchanged in regard to this Section of the law.

2. Section 102(d) of the National Security Act sets forth certain duties for CIA to perform "under the direction of the National Security Council". The Agency was placed under the National Security Council, with the approval of the former and present directors of CIA, because it was felt that it should report to a group rather than directly to the President. The President would be too busy to give adequate personal attention to its needs and should not be so burdened. Rather than leave the Agency in a vacuum it was decided that it should answer to a council composed of the President, and the Secretaries of State and the Military Establishment, who were to be the prime users of our material and who should therefore set certain broad patterns and directives for the Agency to follow.

3. While there was little specific discussion on the record, we feel it is quite clear that Congress intended CIA to look to the National Security Council only for broad direction, and that the day-to-day operations of the Agency were to be in the hands of the Director. Furthermore, there is no question but that if anything went wrong with the Agency, or if any questions arose (as they did at the time of the Bogota riots)/1/ the Congress would hold the Director personally responsible and would look no further. It was Congressional intent to create an independent intelligence agency to perform the functions set forth in the Act, the agency to look to the National Security Council only for the broadest type of guidance.

/1/(and at the time of the Korean invasion.) [Footnote in the source text. The note was obviously added later, perhaps when materials were being selected for the use of the CIA Historian.]

4. The first function set forth in Section 102(d) of the National Security Act is that of advising the NSC "in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security." We believe Congress, by imposing this duty, intended CIA to report and give positive advice on the inadequacies, gaps and overlaps in the entire foreign intelligence field. The other intelligence agencies of the Government have been loath to accept such a concept. They have looked upon CIA as just another Government intelligence agency with no supervisory or directive powers over their own intelligence establishments.

5. Section 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act gives the Agency the duty to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of certain intelligence activities of certain departments and agencies of the Government. In this, we believe the intent of Congress was for CIA to make positive and aggressive recommendations for improvement of all intelligence activities relative to the national security. The recommendations which we have made in this connection are not in fact CIA recommendations as contemplated by the law. They are joint papers concurred in by all the intelligence agencies. Inevitably such compromises lack teeth, and the task of obtaining clearances consumes an undue amount of time. We feel that Congress intended CIA to prepare these recommendations for NSC directives in the form which it deems proper. They might then be circulated to the standing committee for comment. If valid objections are presented, they may be accepted if CIA feels that the purpose of the paper is not thereby impaired. It may be that CIA would likewise include IAC dissents in the final recommendation to the NSC. However, that final paper would be a CIA recommendation, as required by the law, and not the watered-down result of compromise.

6. Section 102(d)(3) places the duty on CIA to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and to provide for its appropriate dissemination within the Government. There is no question as to what the Congress intended in this connection. In placing upon us the burden of correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to the national security, it was inherent that we should receive the raw material necessary to perform this function. In the course of the debate in the House of Representatives on 19 July 1947, Congressman Judd pointed out that all intelligence relating to the national security which was developed by the various agencies of the Government must be made available to the DCI. It was with this thought in mind that Section 102(e) was written into the law, providing that intelligence relating to the national security should be made available to the Director for correlation, evaluation and dissemination. (The special proviso that was written in, making it necessary for the Director to make written request to the Director of the FBI, was included, not to preclude the Director from information from that source, but merely to make it impossible for the Director to inspect specific operations of the FBI which are all in the field of internal security.)

7. The intent of Congress is clearest in its determination to make certain that CIA received all the information which it needed to perform its functions. This is indicated by the authority to inspect intelligence of agencies (other than the FBI) to the extent recommended by the NSC and approved by the President. The present directive (NSCID #1), the wording of which was reached by compromise among the agencies, authorizes inspection by the DCI only through arrangement with the head of the intelligence agency concerned. This qualification vitiates the entire inspection authority.

8. The feeling that there was outside interference with CIA was evident in connection with the Bogota hearings. The sentiment of Members of the Congress was expressed in the statement of Congressman Clarence Brown of Ohio, who served as the Chairman of the Special Subcommittee investigating the Bogota incident, and who was also a member of the original Committee which established CIA. He stated, on 16 April 1948, that:

"It may be necessary for Congress to enact additional legislation to give the CIA the independent status it was generally presumed to enjoy."

9. The focus brought upon the subject of intelligence was in great measure caused by the Joint Congressional Committee Investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. In connection with its report on this matter, the Committee stated:

"Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7--Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?"

It was the intent of Congress in establishing CIA to establish an inde- pendent agency which would be the focal point of all foreign intelligence information, to correlate and evaluate all such information and to disseminate the product to the necessary Government officials. The Congress felt it had conferred the statutory authority necessary for CIA to perform these functions, even though it left broad direction largely to the NSC and the President. We believe there is ample authority latent in the law, and that adequate directives will permit CIA to fulfill the role which, even now, the Congress believes the Agency is playing as an essential element in the national defense and security.

Lawrence R. Houston/2/
Walter L. Pforzheimer

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

Continue with Introduction:
Psychological and Political Warfare