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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Psychological and Political Warfare

                           

241. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, September 25, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-805, Item 12. Secret. Attached to a brief transmittal note from Houston to Hillenkoetter summarizing the contents. See the Supplement.

SUBJECT
CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda and Commando Type Functions

1. A review of the National Security Act reveals two provisions which might be construed as authority for CIA to engage in black propaganda or the type of activity known during the war as S.O., which included ranger and commando raids, behind-the-lines sabotage, and support of guerrilla warfare. Section 102 (d) (4) provides that it shall be the duty of the Agency to perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. Section 102 (d) (5) provides that the Agency shall perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may direct. Taken out of context and without knowledge of its history, these Sections could bear almost unlimited interpretation, provided the service performed could be shown to be of benefit to an intelligence agency or related to national intelligence.

2. Thus, black propaganda, primarily designed for subversion, confusion, and political effect, can be shown incidentally to benefit positive intelligence as a means of checking reliability of informants, effectiveness of penetration, and so forth. Even certain forms of S.O. work could be held to benefit intelligence by establishment of W/T teams in accessible areas and by opening penetration points in confusion following sabotage or riot. In our opinion, however, either activity would be an unwarranted extension of the functions authorized in Sections 102 (d) (4) and (5). This is based on our understanding of the intent of Congress at the time these provisions were enacted.

3. A review of debates indicates that Congress was primarily interested in an agency for coordinating intelligence and originally did not propose any overseas collection activities for CIA. The strong move to provide specifically for such collection overseas was defeated, and, as a compromise, Sections 102 (d) (4) and (5) were enacted, which permitted the National Security Council to determine the extent of the collection work to be performed by CIA. We do not believe that there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage. A bitter debate at about the same time on the State Department's Foreign Broadcast Service tends to confirm our opinion. Further confirmation is found in the brief and off-the-record hearings on appropriations for CIA.

4. Aside from the discussions of normal departmental expenses for CIA as a whole, approval was given to the unvouchered funds requested by the Director of Central Intelligence mainly for the specific purposes of conducting clandestine intelligence operations outside the United States. We believe that there was no intent to use either the vouchered or unvouchered funds for M.O. or S.O. work. Either of these activities would require establishment of a new branch of office, employment of considerable personnel, the procurement of huge quantities of all types of goods and materials, and large sums for expenses of administrative support and incidentals. We believe this would be an authorized use of the funds made available to CIA. It is our conclusion, therefore, that neither M.O. nor S.O. should be undertaken by CIA without previously informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the functions and the expenditure of funds for those purposes.

5. There is, however, one function now being properly performed by CIA which is so closely related to the matters discussed above as to be mentioned in connection therewith. An important by-product of the clandestine intelligence function is the acquisition of extensive information on plans in Western Europe for establishment of resistance movements in the event of further extension of Communist control. These plans include training of agents and W/T's, organizing groups, providing outside contacts, and every other form of resistance. It is on such groups that M.O. and, particularly, S.O. would depend for most efficient function.

6. It is felt that this body of information might be the basis for consideration by the National Security Council, or a sub-committee thereof, in order to form a basic policy of cooperation with planned or actual resistance movements and to assign the implementation of such policy to the proper agency or body. If such implementation were then assigned to CIA, it would, we feel, still be necessary to go to Congress for authority and funds.

Lawrence R. Houston/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

242. Memorandum From the Secretary of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (Moseley) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

Washington, October 15, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret.

SUBJECT
Proposal for a National Psychological Warfare Organization

In accordance with procedure whereby the more important papers under consideration by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC)/1/ are brought to your and the Secretary's attention, it is believed that you will be interested in SWNCC 304/6/2/ which proposes the establishment in time of war or threat of war of a National Psychological Warfare Organization. This paper is a report of the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations which consists of full time representatives of State, CIG and the Armed Services, who have been directed to study and propose plans for the conduct of psychological warfare in time of war or threat of war. (Mr. Ralph Block, OIE, is Chairman of this Subcommittee.)

/1/Earlier known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).

/2/Dated September 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1) See the Supplement.

This paper proposes for approval (Tab A)/3/ the plans for a Psychological Warfare Organization which in time of war or threat of war would be either under the National Security Council or the reconstituted State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee. This organization would be empowered to provide unified direction and authoritative coordination of the national psychological warfare effort and activities, and operations related thereto. It would be headed by a director, appointed by the President; the director also to be chairman of a policy planning board which would include representation from the JCS, CIG and the Armed Services. The paper further recommends that the Organization should be provided with the necessary allocations of manpower, funds, facilities, etc.

/3/Although the source text identifies two enclosures, SENC 304/1 and SWNCC 304/6, it does not specify which is at which Tab A. SWNCC 304/1, which was forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority for concurrence on December 12, 1946, has not been found. (Memorandum by Earman; Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-243, Job 84-00473R, Box 3, Folder 1)

The paper concludes (Tab B) that a psychological warfare specialist category should be established and training instituted now in the Army, Navy and Air Force and that rosters of available people for this type of work should also be made up by the State Department, CIG and the Armed Services.

The paper also brings out the facts that:

a. The SANACC Subcommittee is the only peacetime organization of the Government charged with the preparation of policies, plans and studies for employment of psychological warfare in time of war.

b. The Department of State and the Military Establishment have no funds appropriated for psychological warfare purposes.

c. No psychological warfare specialist reserves exist within the Military Establishment or the Department of State.

d. Adequate training of personnel for psychological warfare would require a training school, recruitment policies and measures, and an extensive training period.

It should be pointed out that the terms of reference of the SANACC Subcommittee authorize it to prepare policies and plans for employment only in time of war or threat of war, and that it is not authorized to conduct psychological warfare in peacetime. Thus, the plans proposed in the paper relate only to a wartime agency except for the proposals that there be created now a psychological warfare category by the Armed Services and that rosters of available personnel be prepared.

243. Memorandum by the Army Member of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (Pixtou)

SANACC 304/8

Washington, undated.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret. Transmitted under an October 20 transmittal note from the committee secretariat.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. With the question of the functioning of the National Security Council still undetermined and with the SANACC now being reconstituted, I consider it premature and unnecessary at this time to determine the agency to whom the proposed psychological warfare agency shall be accountable. I recommend, therefore, that this remain a problem for future determination in the light of subsequent developments in the organization and operation of the National Security Council and the SANACC. Subject to this reservation I approve SANACC 304/6./1/

/1/See footnote 2, Document 242.

2. I note that the terms of reference of the Subcommittee limit its considerations to those within the time frame of war or threat of war as determined by the President. I am of the opinion that the changing tenor of events of the past few months has raised for serious consideration the problem of determining the desirability or necessity of engaging in deliberate coordinated psychological effort on a national scale at the present time. I recommend, therefore, that the Subcommittee be directed to consider and make recommendations as a matter of urgency, on the problem "Should the U.S. at the present time utilize coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of its national objectives? If so, what organization is required and what should be its terms of reference?"

244. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

Washington, October 22, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret.

SUBJECT
Psychological Warfare

REFERENCE
SWNCC 304/6 dated 30 September 1947/1/

/1/See footnote 2, Document 242.

The Central Intelligence Agency approves SWNCC 304/6 dated 30 September 1947 subject to the following provisions:

1. In view of the fact that the functioning of the National Security Council is still undetermined, and the fact that SWNCC is now being reconstituted, I recommend that the decision of determining the agency to whom the Psychological Warfare Agency shall be accountable be deferred at this time. When the question does arise, however, I recommend that study and thought be given to assigning accountability of the Psychological Warfare Agency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The paper envisages guidance for a Psychological Warfare Agency which will be established in time of war or threat of war as determined by the President. I am of the opinion that conditions now indicate that psychological warfare measures be instituted now as a matter of urgency. I, therefore, recommend that the Ad Hoc Subcommittee undertake a study and submit recommendations on the program "Should the U.S. at the present utilize psychological warfare measures in furtherance of the attainment of its National objectives."

RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN

245. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Secretary of Defense Forrestal

Washington, October 24, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret.

The attached memorandum/1/ from Secretary Harriman is a very persuasive and accurate appraisal of the need for psychological warfare operations to counter Soviet-inspired Communist propaganda, particularly in France and Italy.

/1/Not found.

Secretary Harriman, however, leaves the question of appropriate organization somewhat indefinite. It seems to me that this problem could be solved fairly simply along the following lines:

(a) Continue and support the strengthening of the overt activities of the Information Division of the Department of State.

(b) Assign the conduct of covert activities to the Central Intelligence Agency, since it already has contacts and communications with appropriate organizations and agents in foreign countries.

(c) Establish policies for both of the above activities and coordinate their operations by means of a full-time interdepartmental board under the chairmanship and supervision of the Department of State, with representatives from the National Military Establishment and CIA.

It is my understanding that sufficient unvouchered funds to initiate these activities might be obtained from CIA or the Military Establishment. Also, I understand the Department of State already has a qualified psychological warfare expert serving as chairman of a subcommittee of SANACC which deals with this subject.

SANACC, incidentally, has formed a special group to prepare a recommendation for the President that the United States initiate this type of operation, which I understand will be transmitted through the National Security Council.

Sidney W. Souers/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Souers signed the original.

246. Memorandum From the Assistant Executive Secretary (Lay) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, November 3, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Psychological Warfare

REFERENCE
SANACC 304/10/1/

/1/Dated November 3. (Ibid., RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1) See the Supplement.

The organization proposed in SANACC 304/10 does not appear to offer a practical solution for the following reasons:

a. It is proposed to establish it under either the National Security Council or the Committee of Two. The Council appears inappropriate since it is only advisory to the President and was not legally designed to supervise interdepartmental activities, with the sole statutory exception of CIA. The Committee of Two/2/ is an informal body like its predecessor, the Committee of Three,/3/ which never to my knowledge undertook to supervise interdepartmental organizations. SANACC, on the other hand, already supervises two interdepartmental organizations (Military Information Control and the Security Advisory Board) which are similar in character to that required for the coordination of foreign information and psychological warfare activities.

/2/The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

/3/The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, who met informally under this rubric from 1944 to 1947.

b. SANACC 304/10 proposes a full-time working group headed by a specially appointed director, with separate funds and personnel. This would only create another governmental agency. Its director would be usurping the functions of the head of the State Department's Information Service. Finally, a request for separate funds for the proposed organization would jeopardize the security of psychological warfare operations.

A much less complicated and more effective organization could easily be built along the following lines: Establish, under SANACC, a board whose functions would be to formulate coordinated policies and plans for the conduct of foreign information and psychological warfare activities and, upon their approval by SANACC, to coordinate the implementation of such policies and plans. This board would be composed of officials in the various departments and agencies who are responsible for the conduct of foreign information and psychological warfare activities. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs should be chairman. The other members should consist of the official in CIA charged with covert activities, and any officials in other Government departments who are responsible for similar activities. The members of the board should jointly furnish the funds and the personnel required to form a full time staff for the board.

The above plan would have the following benefits and advantages:

a. An established interdepartmental coordinating body, SANACC, would furnish policy direction which incorporated the views of the State Department and the Departments of the National Military Establishment.

b. A separate agency, with a new director, separate budget, and additional personnel, would not be required.

c. The formulation of policies and plans and the coordination of their implementation would be in the hands of the officials responsible for the actual conduct of foreign information and psychological warfare activities.

James S. Lay, Jr./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

247. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Wright) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, November 4, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 4. Secret.

SUBJECT
Psychological Warfare

1. You are aware that I have been keeping in close touch with the subject of Psychological Warfare and the various studies being conducted in connection therewith. It now appears that the latest SANACC conclusions will be aired today in a full committee meeting. You (or your Deputy) have been invited to attend and I urgently recommend that you (or your Deputy) be fully briefed as to the desires of the NSC prior to this meeting.

2. The subject of Psychological Warfare has been an active issue with SWNCC since 6 June 1946 (see SWNCC 304) and has been under urgent consideration since the formation of SANACC. While techniques and organization of a Psychological Warfare Agency have been argued pro and con, all parties are agreed on the following:

a. The present world situation requires the U.S. immediately to develop and utilize strong and concerted measures designed to produce psychological situations and effects favorable to the attainment of U.S. national objectives.

b. The organization to carry out the proposed project should be operated within the framework of the National Security Council.

3. At one period of the SWNCC (later SANACC) studies there was proposed an organization which, with minor changes, could efficiently carry out the national program envisaged. (See paragraph 31 of SSE 1, 1 August 1947--SWNC Subcommittee Special Studies and Evaluations.) After further studies were conducted, however, it has become apparent to me that thought is being focused on another inter-departmental coordinating committee completely unable to do an efficient job in this important field. The SANACC ad hoc Committee on Psychological Warfare has stated their latest proposal under date of 3 November in SANACC 304/10./1/ This proposal would only provide, in my estimation, the following:

/1/See Document 246.

a. An inter-departmental committee to sit over another inter-departmental committee with a "Director" in between.

b. The nucleus of another national intelligence organization.

4. As you know, I have recently discussed these matters with General Donovan and other individuals with wartime experience in Psychological Warfare organization and technique. I urgently recommend that, if you and the NSC concur, we present to SANACC our views on this matter as follows:

a. The immediate development of an organization, within the framework of the NSC, to implement both white and black psychological warfare designed to the attainment of U.S. national objectives.

b. The proposed organization to be under the control and direction of a "Director" appointed by the President from military or civil life. (See Annex I, herewith.)

c. "The Director" to be the chairman of a Planning and Policy board composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air, the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other government agencies whose participation may be necessary or desirable.

d. The Organization be so established as to be easily merged into the Military Establishment in the event of war or threat of war.

e. The necessary authority, guidance, information, and resources of manpower, funds, facilities, and materials be provided to enable the organization its efficient functioning in the achievement of national aims.

f. The Organization to be authorized to merge into a national effort all activities and operations related to psychological warfare using established agencies where practicable.

g. The Organization to be fully responsible for the planning, development, and coordination of all phases of the national program of radio, press, publications, and related propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information in the national interests.

E. K. Wright/2/
Brigadier General, USA

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

Annex I

SUBJECT
Psychological Warfare

Reference is made to paragraph 4. b., of basic Memorandum, herewith.

1. You will remember that General Donovan in my recent discussion with him, was positive in his opinion that all Psychological Warfare be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency. He agreed that it would be desirable if it could be done under proper cover. His recommendation in this regard was as follows:

a. The "Director" mentioned in my basic memorandum should actually be appointed by the President as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense--with the specific understanding that he was actually under the operational control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. That the knowledge of this operational control be known only to the fewest possible individuals.

2. General Donovan of course is a firm believer, as are most of those people having operational experience in this field, in the principle that the greatest propaganda success will be found in the field of Black operations. He, therefore, feels the organization must be so operated as to foster the use of Black methods. Since such methods are solely within the jurisdiction of CIA, General Donovan feels the Director of Central Intelligence should be firmly in control of the entire operation, both White and Black.

3. I submit this separate paper for your consideration since I know you are fully cognizant of the magnitude of the whole project. Personally I would like to see the proposed "Director" appointed as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense with the Director of Central Intelligence and an Assistant Secretary of State designated as Advisory Consultants.

E. K. Wright/3/
Brigadier General, USA

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

248. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Wright) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, November 4, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 4. Secret.

The results of the War Council/1/ Meeting held this date generally took the following line in connection with an organization to carry out psychological warfare measures. The position of the Security Council was that any propaganda measures in time of peace were a primary function of the State Department and that in any case should not be handled by the Security Council as such since it is in effect an advisory group to the President.

/1/A group consisting of the Secretary of Defense, the three service secretaries, and the three service chiefs, established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the Secretary of Defense on "broad policy pertaining to the armed forces."

It was decided that the project for carrying out psychological warfare will be restricted solely to the foreign field and would be under the direct supervision of an Assistant Secretary of State. The Assistant Secretary of State to carry out these functions to be appointed from among individuals to be recommended in the next two or three days by the members of the War Council.

It was decided that insofar as public knowledge was concerned that this new organizational set up would deal only in what is known as White propaganda. However, it was agreed that the fullest advantage of any propaganda measures would have to be obtained in the field of Black propaganda. That, therefore, the Assistant Secretary of State to handle this project would have as Advisory Consultants, the Director of Central Intelligence and a military representative to be selected by the War Council.

The Security Council is cognizant of the fact that they will have to issue a directive to the Director of Central Intelligence to provide him the legal status for assisting the State Department in carrying out our phase of operations in this field.

New subject:

At the SANACC conference this afternoon the Committee was confused by a statement made by Mr. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of Air, that the War Council intended to appoint a Director to carry out these operations under the Assistant Secretary of State mentioned above. This was not the intent nor the expression of the War Council. Their discussions with regard to the appointment of an individual to carry out the project had to do with the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary of State.

I have already submitted to Admiral Souers the name of David K.E. Bruce, currently an Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and have indicated that tomorrow I will furnish him additional names for consideration.

E. K. Wright/2/
Brigadier General, USA

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

249. Report by an Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

SANACC 304/11

Washington, November 7, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of the Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 2. Top Secret. Although dated November 7, SANACC amended and approved the report on November 13, and the last 2 pages of the source text bear the typed notation "Revised 13 November 1947." The source text is an enclosure to two memoranda, neither printed. (Ibid.) The first is a November 13 covering note from the SANACC secretaries explaining the changes. The latter is another note by the SANACC secretaries, dated November 7, which indicates that the text amended and approved by SANACC was a revised version of the report originally submitted by the ad hoc committee on November 3 and designated as SANACC 304/10. (Ibid.) See the Supplement for SANACC 304/10.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The Problem

1. To determine whether at the present time the U.S. should utilize coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of its national objectives; if so, what organization is required and what should be its terms of reference.

Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion

2. a. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the U.S. and is employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine all non-Communist elements in foreign countries which are capable of opposing Soviet aspirations.

b. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the U.S. and the effectiveness of its national policy but to weaken and divide foreign opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet aspirations is no longer attainable by political, economic or military means.

c. In conducting this campaign, the USSR is utilizing all such meas-ures available to it through satellite regimes, Communist parties, and organizations susceptible to Communist influence.

d. The U.S. is not now employing coordinated psychological meas-ures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the attainment of its national objectives.

e. The extension of economic aid to certain foreign countries, particularly in Europe, is one of the principal means by which the U.S. has undertaken to defend its vital interests. The extent of this aid and other U.S. contributions to world peace is unknown to large segments of the world's population. Inadequate employment of psychological measures is impairing the effectiveness of these undertakings.

f. None of the existing departments or agencies of the U.S. Government is now charged with responsibility for utilizing coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives.

g. Taking into account the foregoing considerations the ad hoc Committee has reached the following Conclusions:

Conclusions

3. The present world situation requires the U.S. immediately to develop and utilize coordinated measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives and to counteract effects of anti-American propaganda.

4. It is considered that the initial steps to implement paragraph 3 above should be designed to provide closer coordination of policies, more effective integration of existing facilities, and intensification of psychological measures.

5. a. The Secretary of State should be charged with responsibility for the general direction and coordination of psychological measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives and to counteract effects of anti-American propaganda. It is assumed that this responsibility will be delegated to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, hereinafter referred to as the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary should be assisted by an informal group composed initially of representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force Departments, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and subsequently of other departments or agencies at his discretion.

b. All participating departments and agencies should be directed to insure the most effective utilization of all their appropriate facilities, and to perform such additional functions as may be necessary, for the execution of approved policy decisions.

c. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished with qualified full-time personnel from each participating department or agency, headed by a director appointed by the Secretary of State. The major responsibilities of the Director should be to implement the policies and plans established by the Secretary of State by:

(1) Obtaining the most effective utilization and coordination of all informational facilities and of related psychological activities within the participating departments and agencies;

(2) Providing effective liaison with other departments and agencies whose related activities can be profitably employed;

(3) Initiating and developing for the approval of the Assistant Secretary specific plans and programs designed to influence foreign opinion in a direction favorable to U.S. interests and to counteract effects of anti-American propaganda.

6. As a matter of priority, the Assistant Secretary should take steps to determine the need for such funds as may be necessary to insure performance of the responsibilities assigned in paragraph 5 above.

7. The Assistant Secretary and Director should be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency with appropriate foreign intelligence.

8. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished with classified information necessary for the fulfillment of his responsibilities by the participating departments.

9. In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in paragraph 5 above, the Assistant Secretary and the Director should maintain the closest possible liaison with the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, in order that the latter may adequately fulfill its responsibilities.

10. The utmost secrecy should be observed with regard to the contents of this report.

Recommendations

11. It is recommended that:

a. SANACC approve the above Conclusions.

b. After approval by SANACC, the Conclusions of this paper be forwarded to the National Security Council for appropriate action.

Continue with Document 250