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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Founding of the National Intelligence Structure
August 1945 through January 1946

                           

25. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (King) to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal

Washington, October 9, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy, SecNav/CNO Top Secret Correspondence File, 1945, Box 21, Folder A8. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Intelligence

REFERENCE
(a) Memo from Admiral S.M. Robinson dated 4 October 1945 on the subject of Intelligence/1/

/1/King was responding to an October 5 note from Forrestal (ibid.), asking for his comments on an October 4 letter from Admiral Samuel M. Robinson, Chief of the Navy's Office of Procurement and Material. (Ibid.)

1. Admiral Robinson's memorandum is on a subject of great importance to the United States. It is, as he says, most important that there be provided a proper intelligence department in this Government.

2. As you know, and as Admiral Robinson probably does not know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recognized the inadequacy of present organizations in various Governmental departments and have submitted to the Secretaries of War and Navy their recommendations for the creation of a central coordinating authority for the operation of an intelligence service of the United States.

3. It is understood the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been forwarded by the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State for further transmittal to the President for his information. As you know, this recommendation provides for setting up a national intelligence authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a Director of a central intelligence agency appointed by the President and an intelligence advisory board.

4. In my opinion, the present unsettled question concerning the reorganization of intelligence activities of the Government should be resolved at the earliest practicable date. I recommend that the Navy Department press for an early establishment of the central intelligence agency along the lines recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

EJ King
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy

26. Memorandum From Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to Secretary of War Patterson

Washington, October 13, 1945.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-31, Item 22. No classification marking. The source text is an extract transcribed in July 1952 for the CIA Historian. The original document has not been found.

It occurs to me that these subjects which have common interest to both Departments might be the basis of a discussion between us some time in the near future:...

2. Joint Intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as you know, made a recommendation to the President for a national intelligence organization, the general outline of which provides for intelligence supervision by the War, State and Navy Departments, with a director charged with the working responsibility functioning under these individuals as a group. I think this is a subject which should have our close attention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff paper seems to me soundly conceived and, if you agree, I think we should push it vigorously at the White House....

James Forrestal/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Forrestal signed the original.

27. Memorandum From Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to Secretary of State Byrnes

Washington, October 13, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/10-1345. No classification marking.

I am enclosing memoranda as follows:

1. Captain Souers, Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence, to Mr. Eberstadt, who dealt with the question of central intelligence in his report to me on the proposed unification of the Armed Services;/1/

/1/Printed as enclosure 1.

2. A memorandum from me to Admiral King;/2/

/2/In this memorandum, October 4, Forrestal proposed a meeting with Hoover, McCormack, Inglis, and Bissell. (Ibid.) Attached to the same memorandum Forrestal apparently sent a copy of enclosure 1 and asked for King's "suggestions as to Navy objectives and recommended methods of implementation."

3. A response from Admiral King./3/

/3/Printed as enclosure 2.

I wish you would regard this as an informal transmission and return these papers after reading. Subsequently, I would like to suggest/4/ that you put on the agenda of one of the meetings with Bob Patterson and myself,/5/ this question, which it seems to me is one of the most important, considering the state of the world, that we have before us as a government.

/4/At this point Forrestal added by hand in the margin the words "for your consideration."

/5/A reference to the periodic meetings of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy known as the "Committee of Three."

James Forrestal Enclosure 1/6/

/6/No classification marking.

Washington, September 27, 1945. Memorandum From the Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence (Souers) to Ferdinand Eberstadt

1. As your program/7/ envisages the creation of a strong central intelligence agency, I would like to invite your attention to certain developments which may possibly facilitate the program but if prompt and adequate action is not taken may make it difficult if not impossible of accomplishment in a form satisfactory to the Navy.

/7/A reference to the Eberstadt Report.

2. The President on 20 September 1945 directed the Secretary of State to take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all federal agencies concerned with that type of activity and suggested it be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group heading up under the State Department.

3. This morning it was announced in the press that Colonel Alfred C. McCormack, Director of the Intelligence Group of MIS, has been selected by the State Department to head up the unit of OSS transferred to State and presumably to develop the program for the Secretary of State in line with paragraph 2.

4. That part of OSS not awarded to State has been transferred to the War Department. The Navy was ignored in the disposition of the functions and assets of OSS.

5. To adequately protect the interests of the Navy during this crucial period, it would appear that aggressive action is required and the following recommendations are respectfully submitted:

(a) The Secretary of the Navy attempt to arrange with the Secretary of State for the early creation of a committee or group which would include representatives of the Secretaries of War and Navy. This would make available at the working level the requirements of the services for the guidance of the Secretary of State.

(b) The Naval officer selected should be thoroughly familiar with the intelligence requirements of the Navy, should be thoroughly trained in intelligence and understand the detailed operations of ONI and should understand the manner in which the departmental intelligence agencies operate and overlap.

S.W. Souers
Captain, USNR

Enclosure 2/8/

/8/Secret.

Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (King) to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal

Washington, October 12, 1945.

1. Replying to your memorandum of 4 October,/9/ it is my thought that the Navy has four main objectives in the field of Intelligence.

/9/See footnote 2 above.

(a) Maintenance of an adequate and efficient Naval Intelligence Service with control by the Navy of collection, processing and dissemination of operational communication intelligence and other functions necessary to the exercise of naval command.

(b) Elimination of all unnecessary duplication in ONI of those intelligence functions which properly belong to the State or War Department.

(c) Unification of intelligence activities of common concern to the State, War and Navy Departments in order to synthesize Departmental intelligence on the strategic and national policy level.

(d) Improve facilities for the acquisition of secret foreign intelligence for the use of the U.S. Government.

2. With the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations all intelligence functions in the Navy will be consolidated under the Chief of Naval Intelligence.

3. In November 1942, General Marshall and I directed our intelligence services to explore ways and means of merging their activities in order to eliminate duplication, reduce overlaps and make headway toward a unified intelligence agency. Thereafter, a number of joint activities were established; also each of the services undertook the performance of certain intelligence functions in behalf of both. These activities have been successful. It is my desire that those having peacetime application be continued and that additional joint projects be established.

4. Complete merger of the intelligence services of the State, War and Navy Departments is not considered feasible or desirable since each of these departments requires operating intelligence which is of no value or interest to the others and in the acquisition and processing of which peculiar abilities and background knowledge are indispensable.

5. I recommend establishment of a central intelligence agency, along the lines of the proposal recently approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to coordinate and as far as practicable unify all foreign intelligence activities, and to synthesize all the intelligence concerning military, political, economic and technological developments abroad for the benefit of those responsible for the determination and execution of governmental policy pertaining to national security.

6. If a central intelligence agency is created along sound lines, with the Navy adequately represented on both the policy making and working levels so that a flow of intelligence required for naval planning will be assured, many functions now performed by ONI can be transferred to that agency.

7. It has come to my attention that in a letter bearing the same date as the Executive Order abolishing OSS the President directed the Secretary of State to take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all federal agencies concerned with that type of activity and suggested it be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group heading up under the State Department.

8. It is recommended that the Secretary of State be urged to expedite the establishment of an interdepartmental group for this purpose which will include representatives of the Secretaries of War and Navy who know the intelligence requirements of the services and who are thoroughly familiar with the organization and operating procedures of the departmental intelligence agencies.

E.J. King
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy

28. Minutes of Meeting

Washington, October 16, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Branch, Reference File, Minutes of the Committee of Three, 1944-1947. Top Secret.

PARTICIPANTS
State Department: James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State
War Department: Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, Col. Charles McCarthy
Navy Department: James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, Major Correa

RECORDER
H.F. Matthews

[Here follows discussion unrelated to intelligence.]

Unified Intelligence Service

Mr. Byrnes said that he would like to make a suggestion which had been brought to him by Mr. Donald Russell with regard to a unified intelligence service./1/ He thought there was general agreement that there should be a single intelligence service but the question is to whom should this service report. He suggested that the group of the three secretaries present should be formalized as a Council of National Defense. Mr. Forrestal remarked that this was just what the JCS had proposed in a paper on the subject.x Mr. Byrnes then read from a draft executive order establishing a Council of National Defense and a unified intelligence service. He pointed out that one problem arose with regard to the digestion and evaluation of intelligence reports; he had seen many of General Donovan's memoranda but they had become too voluminous and were not coordinated and what was needed was someone to pull them together. Mr. Forrestal said that Commander Inglis had prepared a very intelligent presentation of this question/3/ and suggested appointment of a Director of Intelligence to concentrate all the material. The fact that such a director would report to the council of the three secretaries would answer the argument that in effect we were setting up a "Gestapo." Mr. Byrnes said that this latter argument was the principal objection to Donovan's plan and that he agreed that reports should come to the three secretaries. Mr. Patterson said that he agreed; and that the director must sift out the reports as well as initiate and direct intelligence activities. Mr. Byrnes thought it highly important that ours be made the most efficient intelligence service in the world. Mr. Forrestal stated that he thought the Army and Navy were pretty close together on this question with the principal difference that the Navy wished to keep operational intelligence in ONI. Mr. Byrnes mentioned that a further question is whether such a unified intelligence service should be set up now or in six months and indicated that he was not entirely satisfied with the interim arrangement whereunder certain functions of OSS have been placed in the State Department. Mr. Forrestal said that he had sent a memorandum to Mr. Byrnes on Sunday with regard to the intelligence question./4/ He said he thought the general scheme outlined in the proposed executive order was sound. Mr. Byrnes referred to his talks in France with General Eisenhower and the high regard which was held throughout SHAEF of General Strong, the British Chief of Intelligence. It was felt that the British Intelligence Service was the best in the business. Mr. Byrnes also heard a number of our Air Corps Officers complain of a lack of adequate American intelligence and praise the high quality of British intelligence. One explanation was that in the past our Congress had had no confidence in our intelligence service and consequently was not inclined to grant adequate appropriations. This created a vicious circle where Congress complained that our intelligence service was deficient and not worthy of funds and our intelligence service complained that the lack of funds prevented improvement. Mr. Forrestal pointed out that there is a further contradiction in Congress at present as they are now attempting to compel the presentation of the exact text of foreign intercepts. Congress is charging that while we had the intelligence we didn't use it properly. There followed some discussion between Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Patterson as to whether harm would be done by making available to Congress official texts of foreign government communications or whether the fact that we had such communications was already so well known as to obviate the need for secrecy.

/1/This appears to be the enclosure to Document 31.

/2/The JCS proposal of September 19; Document 13.

/3/Not found.

/4/Presumably Document 27, which was dated Saturday, October 13.

Mr. Patterson raised the question of the relationship of the proposed intelligence service and its director to SWNCC and whether there would be any overlapping of jurisdiction. It was felt that this question should be looked into./5/ Mr. Forrestal suggested that Mr. Donald Russell get in touch with Commander Inglis on the intelligence question./6/ Mr. Byrnes concluded by stating that the proposed plan should provide for the coordination of foreign policy with intelligence.

/5/The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was established in 1944 to serve as a forum and coordinating group on issues of common concern to the three Departments.

/6/On the following day Forrestal sent a memorandum to Inglis asking him to "get in touch with Don Russell of the State Department and discuss with him the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal for a central intelligence agency." (Memorandum, Forrestal to Inglis, October 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Records of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, 1940-47, General Correspondence 1944-47, 80-1-19, Box 129) No other record of this contact has been found except for the reference in Document 53. At their October 30 meeting the three Secretaries touched only briefly on intelligence. The record notes only that "Mr. Forrestal mentioned this question and the JCS paper on the subject and it was agreed that he should discuss the question in detail with Mr. Donald Russell, Assistant Secretary of State." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Branch, Reference File, Minutes of Meetings of the Committee of Three, 1944-1947) No record of a meeting or discussion has been found.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to intelligence.]

29. Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War (Magruder) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

Washington, October 20, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers, Box 10, Folder 73. Secret.

SUBJECT
National Foreign Intelligence Agency

Discussion

Reference memorandum, with inclosures, for the undersigned, from the Assistant Executive, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, dated 18 October 1945./1/

/1/In this memorandum, Colonel R. Ammi Cutter requested Magruder's views on a national intelligence organization for presentation to the Secretary of War. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. The report was to parallel one being prepared by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on the same subject (Document 30). Cutter's request was prompted by an October 17 instruction (not found) from General Greenbaum for the preparation of studies on the subjects that Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had proposed for discussion with Patterson (see Document 26). Cutter transmitted Magruder's memorandum to Patterson under a covering memorandum dated October 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers) See the Supplement.

1. The Secretary of the Navy has proposed that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy join in vigorous support of a plan for the establishment of a national foreign intelligence organization under a Director charged with working responsibilities, who would serve and report to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, as a group./2/

/2/Document 26.

2. The need for such a foreign intelligence service has long existed and has been heavily underscored by the national experience during the war just ended. The implications of the pivotal position which the United States occupies in world affairs, and the incalculable consequences of the release of atomic energy, call for the immediate establishment of such an organization.

3. In the judgment of the undersigned, the essential elements of such a national foreign intelligence organization are the following:

a. A national foreign intelligence organization must be regarded, and effectively serve, as the instrument of any and all parts of the national government concerned with national security or foreign policy. Since it is the Departments of State, War and Navy which are most directly and immediately concerned in these matters, it is appropriate that they should coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the federal government and exercise joint supervision over such a national foreign intelligence organization.

b. The national foreign intelligence organization should serve as the central agency within the government for the comprehensive analysis and synthesis of information concerning foreign nations. All departments and agencies of the government which collect such information, whatever may be the manner of collection, should be required promptly to deposit with the national foreign intelligence organization such part of the information collected in such form as may be required by the national foreign intelligence organization. The information thus deposited will be collated, analyzed and incorporated into comprehensive studies. This is not intended to interfere with the appropriate activities of the several agencies now engaged in the collection of such information. It is designed to accomplish the pooling of their product. Such a pooling is essential to bring together, for presentation to those charged with responsibility for the formulation of national security and foreign policy, the comprehensive picture necessary to the proper discharge of their responsibilities.

c. The national foreign intelligence organization should also be the national instrument for the procurement of foreign intelligence by clandestine means. The collection of foreign information by overt means by the Foreign Service of the State Department, and by military and naval attaches and other agencies of the government must, of course, continue. But there is important information, vital to the security of the United States, which cannot be obtained except by clandestine means. Such secret intelligence procurement would include both espionage and counter espionage.

d. The national foreign intelligence organization should not engage in the procurement of intelligence by secret means within the United States. Its clandestine intelligence procurement operations would be concerned exclusively with areas outside the United States.

e. The national foreign intelligence organization should not have any police power.

f. The national foreign intelligence organization should have its own independent budget.

g. The national foreign intelligence agency should be so organized as to have great flexibility and to be able to maintain complete security of operations.

Action Recommended

That the Secretary of War join with the Secretary of the Navy in strongly supporting the proposal for the establishment of a foreign intelligence agency, organized in accordance with the principles hereinabove set forth, under a Director who would serve and report to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, as a group. If there should be a merger of the armed forces, the supervisory group might well consist of the Secretary of State and the secretary for the armed forces.

John Magruder/3/
Brig. General

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Continue with Document 30