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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Psychological and Political Warfare

                           

270. Draft Proposed NSC Directive

Washington, May 5, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. For another version, see the draft NSC directive, May 4 (ibid.), in the Supplement.

1. There is hereby established under the NSC the position of Director of Special Studies. The Director shall be nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by the NSC.

2. The Director should have initially a full time staff of four representatives assigned from the Department of State and one representative each from the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the CIA, and one member to be designated by the Secretary of National Defense.

3. For the purpose of coordinating covert operations as defined in this paper, in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Director, under the direction of the National Security Council:

a. To arrange for the preparation, by his own staff or other agencies as appropriate, of plans for covert operations.

b. To review all such plans, and if he approves them to arrange for their execution by appropriate agencies.

c. To review the execution of such operations to insure that they are being conducted in accordance with approved plans, provided that nothing contained herein shall require the disclosure of secret intelligence sources and methods.

d. To arrange for the development of a program for the conduct of covert operations in time of war or national emergency to include such matters as organization, training, equipment and logistical support.

4. The Director of Special Studies is charged with ensuring that such covert activities are consistent with US foreign policies and overt activities and that appropriate agencies of the US Government both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area) are kept informed of such operations which will directly affect them.

5. The Director is charged with giving timely notification of intended plans and operations to directly interested governmental agencies. Any disagreements arising should be resolved by the staff of the Director in their respective agencies, and in event of no resolution of important features of the plans or operations, the matter shall be referred to the NSC.

6. Covert operations are understood to be all planned measures exclusive of armed conflict by recognized military forces and overt information emanating from a legitimate source designed to influence the thought, morale, and behavior of a people in such a manner as to further the accomplishment of national aims.

271. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, May 5, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret.

1. Reference is made to the draft of the proposed NSC Directive establishing the functions of a Director of Special Studies--as distributed this date./1/ This Agency desires to place itself on record as follows:

/1/Document 270.

a. If it appears desirable, in the interest of national security, to designate an individual responsible for the planning and coordination of psychological warfare activities, this Agency feels the individual should be the present chief of current activities in that field. War-time activities in that field should be a natural growth and expansion of peace-time activities. The individual responsible for future planning should be identical with the individual responsible for current planning and operations.

b. The existing operation and its liaison with the Department of State is handicapped only by the absence of a State Department officer having authority to represent the Department in regard to over-all policies.

c. It is assumed that the word "all", in the first line of paragraph 3 of the subject draft paper, is a typographical error in view of the provisions of NSC 4-A and NSCID 5.

d. If the National Security Council feels, in opposition to subparagraphs a, b, and c, above, that a necessity still exists for the appointment of a Director of Special Studies, it is urgently recommended that one of two actions be taken, as follows:

(1) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed directive be changed to read substantially as follows:

"2. The Director should have initially only the necessary clerical staff to perform his designated functions.

"3. For the purpose of planning covert psychological operations for implementation by the operating Agency, in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Director, under the Direction of the National Security Council:

"a. To develop a program for the conduct of both overt and covert psychological operations in time of war or national emergency.

"b. To plan for emergency or war-time organization, training, equipment and logistical support."

(2) Divorce the existing covert psychological operations from the control and operation of CIA by the rescission of NSC 4-A and place it under the control and operation of a new Agency. Security in the conduct of this sensitive operation cannot be maintained except through control by one Agency.

2. It will be noted that the proposed draft directive provides for the full control of covert psychological operations without the responsibility. It is not believed this is the intent of either the Congress or the National Security Council as indicated in NSC 4-A, NSCID 5, and the National Security Act of 1947.

RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN

272. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, May 6, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret.

Reference is made to the attached draft copy of a proposed NSC Directive/1/ to be discussed by your Staff on 7 May 1948. We have advised our representative to present our views on the subject paper, as follows:

/1/Most likely a reference to Document 270.

1. We feel the appointment of a Director of Special Studies for purposes other than war-time planning is a dangerous duplication of existing assigned functions.

2. We desire to call attention to the fact that this Agency, acting under NSC 4-A, has made considerable strides in the subject field, has obligated itself to a considerable expenditure of funds for equipment, transportation, and experienced personnel, and has made firm commitments for clandestine psychological operations outside the United States for a long period of time. Interference with this activity infers a disruption of current activities and the possibility of serious breaks in security.

3. We feel that paragraph 3 of the proposed directive, if issued, should be changed to read as follows:

"3. For the purpose of planning for war-time or emergency covert psychological operations, in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Director, under the direction of the National Security Council:

"a. To arrange for the preparation, by his own staff or other agencies as appropriate, of plans for war-time or emergency covert psychological operations.

"b. To be prepared to recommend area and material priorities in the field of psychological warfare in the event of emergency or state of war.

"c. To develop a program for the organization, training, equipment, and logistical support for war-time or emergency covert psychological operations."

4. We must call attention to the fact that paragraph 4 of the proposed directive is an exact duplication of this Agency's directive under NSC 4-A.

5. We must call attention to the fact that paragraph 5 of the proposed directive is an exact duplication of our present arrangement under NSC 4-A.

6. We feel that paragraph 6 of the proposed directive should either be eliminated as being out-dated by events or that the word "psychological" be added after the word "covert" in the first line of that paragraph and the words "and overt information emanating from a legitimate source" be deleted.

7. We feel that the proposed directive infers the necessity for a rescission of NSC 4-A and the reestablishment of covert psychological functions under an Agency other than CIA. It is a step toward placing secret intelligence and Special Operations (in the accepted international sense) under separate agencies. We respectfully invite attention to our own experience and the experience of other nations in this regard. There is no question but that war-time operations require a division between combat (or tactical) psychological warfare and strategic psychological warfare. From the standpoint of national security, we strongly urge a realistic understanding of our current needs as balanced against our needs in the event of war.

8. In view of the above, we again urgently recommend that the present operations under NSC 4-A be not jeopardized and that war-time planning be placed in the hands of the facility conducting current activities in the subject field.

RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN

273. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, May 11, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 22. Top Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian in 1953. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, p. 201.

SUBJECT
Psychological Operations

1. Reference is made to the proposed NSC Directive, as drafted 7 May 1948,/1/ pertaining to covert (psychological) operations. This Agency has several times, during the discussion phases of this proposed directive, placed itself on record as opposed to the plan on which the proposed directive is based. The proposed directive, if enacted, will establish a staff function providing for Authority in a delicate field of operation--without the Responsibility.

/1/The May 7 draft has not been found.

2. This Agency again strongly urges that the provision of NSC 4-A, as written, be continued without change. If the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel the need for emergency and wartime planning in the covert psychological warfare field, then we again suggest that advance planning be made the responsibility of the facility currently in operation.

3. However, if the National Security Council approves this proposed draft of 10 May 1948,/2/ the Central Intelligence Agency, of course, will cooperate to the best of its ability in an endeavor to make a going concern of the proposed Special Studies organization.

/2/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2) See the Supplement.

R. H. Hillenkoetter/3/
Rear Admiral, USN

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

274. Draft Report by the National Security Council

NSC 10

Washington, May 12, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Transmitted under a covering note from Souers to the NSC submitting the report for consideration at an early meeting. For a May 10 draft of this report, see the Supplement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2)

DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES

The Problem

1. To consider measures for the furtherance of covert operations in the interest of our national security.

Analysis

2. The means employed by a nation in pursuit of its national objectives may be both overt and covert. They range in time of peace from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP), and "white" informational activities, to such covert operations as unacknowledged support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" propaganda and encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

3. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged in a "cold war" by the full might of the Kremlin, the United States cannot afford to leave unmobilized or unemployed its resources for covert operations. The United States cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to reply upon improvised covert operations as was done at the time of the Italian elections.

4. In NSC 4-A/1/ provision was made for the conduct of certain covert psychological (propaganda) operations. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee has considered such matters as utilization of refugees from the USSR in the United States national interest (SANACC 395),/2/ plans for evacuation of key foreign personnel (SANACC 396), demolition of oil facilities (SANACC 398), and psychological warfare (SANACC 304)./3/ In connection with psychological warfare, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, have been referred to the National Security Council for consideration. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the military point of view "there should be established, as soon as practicable, under the National Security Council, a Psychological Warfare Organization, but with its peacetime scope and activities limited to that of a working nucleus for planning and coordination" (SANACC 304/14)./4/ The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State has also recommended that covert operations be immediately instituted under unified direction./5/

/1/Document 257.

/2/The SANACC numbers refer to series rather than to individual papers.

/3/See, for example, Document 249.

/4/JCS memorandum for SANACC, undated (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-291) and SANACC memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, April 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2) See the Supplement for both; the JSC memorandum is filed under date of January 1948.

/5/See Document 269.

5. In the light of the above considerations, there is a need for an organization which is designed to strengthen and extend current covert operations in the interest of our national security and to provide for plans and preparations for the conduct, in time of war, of covert operations and of the overt phases of psychological warfare. The establishment of such an organization will require the revision of NSC 4-A.

Conclusions

6. The proposed National Security Council Directive in Annex A should be approved, and if approved, the proposed revision of NSC 4-A in Annex B should be approved

Annex A/6/

/6/Top Secret. The proposed directive is a further revision of Document 270.

Proposed NSC Directive

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council the position of Director of Special Studies. The Director shall be nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by the National Security Council.

2. The Director should have initially a staff of four members assigned from the Department of State, one service member each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and one member from the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense may assign a member if he so desires. The staff members will act both as assistants to the Director, in the performance of his duties, and as liaison between him and their respective agencies.

3. It shall be the duty of the Director, under the direction of the National Security Council:

a. To be responsible for the preparation by his own staff or by other agencies, as appropriate, of plans for all covert operations. It is intended that each operating agency will develop the details of that part of a plan covering its own operations.

b. To review all such plans and, if he approves them, to arrange for their execution by appropriate agencies.

c. To review the execution of such operations to insure that they are being conducted in accordance with approved plans, provided that nothing contained herein shall require the disclosure of secret intelligence sources and methods.

d. To develop an over-all program for the conduct of covert operations and overt phases of psychological warfare in time of war or when directed by the President, to include organization, training, equipment and logistic support, and to arrange for initiation of such training and preparations in time of peace as necessary for the prompt initiation of such a program.

4. The Director is charged with:

a. Giving timely notification of intended plans and operations to each government agency represented on his staff through the respective staff members and to other government agencies which may be affected. Problems arising in connection with the formulation of plans for or the conduct of operations shall be resolved directly between the Director and the agency or agencies involved.

b. Insuring that such covert activities are consistent with US foreign policies and overt activities and that plans for war-time covert operations and psychological operations are consistent with and complement Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plans for military operations.

5. The ends envisaged in this paper will require unvouchered funds other than those already appropriated.

6. As used in this directive "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (excluding armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage) which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.

7. "Overt psychological warfare" referred to herein shall be construed to mean information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding at home and abroad of the status and progress of any war effort in which the United States may be engaged and of the war policies, activities and aims of the Government.

Annex B/7/

/7/Top Secret.

Draft Revision of NSC 4-A

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts and covert operations of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert operations and covert intelligence activities makes the Central Intelligence Agency an appropriate agency to conduct such operations. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102 (d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council:

a. Directs the Director of Central Intelligence to continue, within the limit of available funds, such covert propaganda operations as may be arranged with and approved by the Director of Special Studies in accordance with the latter's directive from the National Security Council.

b. Authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to conduct such other covert operations as may be arranged by the Director of Special Studies in accordance with the latter's directive from the National Security Council.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged with ensuring that appropriate agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), are kept informed of such operations which will directly affect them.

4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details concerning its secret intelligence techniques, sources or contacts.

275. Memorandum From the Intelligence Survey Group to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, May 13, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4. Top Secret. The NSC appointed the Survey Group in February 1948 to evaluate the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence system generally. Its members were Allen Dulles, who served as chairman, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson.

SUBJECT
Interim Report No. 2: Relations between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence

In connection with our study of the intelligence operations of the Government, particularly those of CIA, we have been informed that a plan for developing certain other covert operations is being submitted to the NSC. As we understand it, such operations would be directed particularly towards affording encouragement to the freedom-loving elements in those countries which have been over-run by Communism and toward combating by covert means the spread of Communist influence.

We understand that it is suggested that a Director of Special Studies, to be nominated by the Secretary of State, and appointed by the NSC, with a staff of nine members assigned from the Department of State, the armed services and CIA, be given the responsibility to develop and give general direction to a program of covert operations as indicated above, including work in the covert psychological field, which under NSC 4a has already been initiated in CIA.

The question of policy involved in these measures is not directly within our terms of reference. However, these projects have an important bearing on the future of the intelligence operations of CIA, and, for this reason, we feel justified in commenting on this phase of the subject.

We suggest, in particular, that further attention should be given to the means for the carrying out of the special operations contemplated and the relation between these operations and the proper conduct of secret intelligence.

A central planning and coordinating staff, as proposed in the new plan, is essential, but the centralized control of operations is equally important. In this delicate field, actual control must be exercised by the Director, who should be in intimate touch not only with plans and policies but also with the details of the operations. We do not believe that these types of operation can be "farmed" out to various existing agencies of the Government without jeopardizing their effectiveness and involving serious security risks. In particular, it would be dangerous to have several unrelated and uncorrelated clandestine operations carried out in such sensitive areas as those behind the Iron Curtain. There would be duplication of effort, crossing of wires in the use of clandestine agents, and serious risk for the chains and agents used in the respective operations. In our opinion, the Director and staff, if removed from actual operations, as apparently contemplated under the proposed NSC directive, would not be able to control this situation.

In carrying out these special operations, the Director and his staff should have intimate knowledge of what is being done in the field of secret intelligence and access to all the facilities which may be built up through a properly constituted secret intelligence network. Secret operations, particularly through support of resistance groups, provide one of the most important sources of secret intelligence, and the information gained from secret intelligence must immediately be put to use in guiding and directing secret operations. In many cases it is necessary to determine whether a particular agent or chain should primarily be used for secret intelligence or for secret operations, because the attempt to press both uses may endanger the security of each.

The special operations contemplated will require a staff operating abroad both under State Department and other cover, as in the case of secret intelligence. Unless the personnel for both operations is under one overall control in Washington, even though a measure of insulation is provided in the field, there is likely to be overlapping of activities and functions in critical areas which will imperil security.

The Allied experience in the carrying out of secret operations and secret intelligence during the last war has pointed up the close relationship of the two activities. The British, for example, who had separate systems during the war, have now come around to the view that secret intelligence and secret operations should be carried out under a single operational head and have reorganized their services accordingly.

We recommend:

1. That a Director, subject to appropriate policy guidance as suggested in the proposed NSC directive, should be made responsible for all forms of covert activities, including secret intelligence, secret operations, clandestine psychological work and such other covert operations as may be assigned to the Director by the NSC.

2. That each branch of these covert activities should be under a chief reporting to the Director.

3. That the Director should be immediately responsible to the NSC or to the Director of CIA as the NSC might determine.

The practical effect of the decision reached under point 3 would be to determine whether CIA should continue to be charged with the collection of secret intelligence. It would, in any case, continue to be the recipient of all intelligence collected by the Director of Special Studies, and even if secret intelligence were removed from its control, CIA might be used as a "cover" agency for the new operations.

It had been our intention to reserve for our final report our recommendations as to whether the collection of secret intelligence should or should not continue to be a function of the CIA, as we had wished to complete our survey of the entire intelligence set-up before dealing with this key question.

However, if the NSC should now determine that a program of secret operations is to be undertaken, and desires any further views from us as to how this would affect the handling of secret intelligence, we shall be glad to submit a report on this subject.

276. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) and Secretary of State Marshall

Washington, May 19, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563. A May 11 version of this memorandum (ibid.), is in the Supplement.

Attached is an NSC paper, Director of Special Studies, dated May 10, 1948./1/ This is an important matter--expansion of covert activities and establishment of a central directorate over all such activities. I would be glad to explain it personally to you, if you wish.

/1/Document 274.

The underlying paper has been cleared with Bohlen but not with other offices of the Department because it intimately involves NSC 4-A, a document knowledge of which for security reasons has been limited to you, Assistant Secretary Allen, and the Policy Planning Staff. It is, however, based largely on and adheres to the fundamental principles of one prepared by this Staff, entitled "Political Warfare"./2/ Our paper on political warfare was made available to Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Allen, and the four geographical offices. They either gave affirmative approval or indicated no objection. I therefore feel that the attached NSC paper would be generally acceptable to them.

/2/Document 269.

Outside of this Department, the underlying NSC paper has been cleared by the other consultants to the NSC and, I understand, it has been approved in principle by Mr. Forrestal and the JCS.

The recommendation that the Director of Special Studies (covert operations) be directly under the NSC does not represent the ideal solution sought in the attached NSC paper. Organizationally, the ideal solution would be to place the Director of Special Studies, for cover and intelligence reasons, under the Director of CIA. S/P did not recommend this solution because, at the present time, the CIA set-up in respect both to personalities and organization is not favorable to such a development and it is not likely that there will be any material change in this situation in the near future. We therefore reluctantly decided to let the CIA sleeping dog lie and recommend a separate organization which might at a later date be incorporated in CIA.

Subsequent to approval of the attached paper by the NSC consult-ants, I received a copy of a memorandum to Admiral Souers from the Survey Group headed by Allen Dulles (Tab A)./3/ Dulles hits the organizational problem head on, recommending (a) removing secret intelligence from CIA and placing it, with covert operations, under a separate director or (b) placing covert operations under CIA--which we feel should not be done at this time. I have high regard for Dulles' experience and knowledge in this field and, therefore, attach great weight to his recommendations. But the implications of his recommendations are so far-reaching that I think they should be discussed by you and Mr. Forrestal rather than in the lower levels of NSC.

/3/Document 275.

Meanwhile, time is running out on us. If we are to engage effectively in intelligent, organized covert activities, appropriations must be obtained from the Congress. Congress, however, is soon to adjourn. Therefore, if we are to get into operation in this field before the end of summer, Congress must be approached immediately with a request for the necessary funds.

Recommendations:/4/

/4/There is no indication on the source text that Marshall approved or disapproved the recommendations.

It is recommended that :

1. You approve the principle underlying the attached NSC paper that this Government expand and bring under unified direction its covert activities;

2. You propose to Mr. Forrestal that together, in your discretion, you invite Dulles either to (a) replace Hillenkoetter as Director of CIA, with covert operations under him, or (b) assume directorship of covert operation and secret intelligence under Hillenkoetter, or (c) accept the position of Director of Special Studies as recommended in the attached NSC paper;

3. If Dulles accepts, you ask him (a) to present for your and Mr. Forrestal's approval his plans for covert operations and (b) immediately to approach Congress for the funds necessary to conduct these operations;

4. If Dulles declines, you ask him to recommend a Director of Special Studies as proposed in the underlying NSC paper.

George F. Kennan/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

277. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 11th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 20, 1948.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on May 21. According to the minutes of the 11th meeting, the following persons were present: Secretary of State Marshall; Secretary of Defense Forrestal; Secretary of the Army Royall; Secretary of the Navy Sullivan; Secretary of the Air Force Symington; NSRB Chairman Hill; Under Secretary of State Lovett; DCI Hillenkoetter; NSC Executive Secretary Souers; and Assistant Executive Secretary Lay. (Ibid.)

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, U.S. position on support for Western Union and other related free countries.]

2. Director of Special Studies (NSC 10)/1/

/1/For the draft of NSC 10, see Document 274.

Mr. Lovett said that the subject report is intended to provide for an expansion of our covert activities. He said that he had not had time to match up the subject report with the comments of the Dulles survey group. He would, therefore, like further time to study this matter.

Secretary Royall said that he was opposed to creating new organizations. He asked why CIA could not direct these activities instead of setting up a Director of Special Studies.

Mr. Lovett said that from the beginning of the National Intelligence Authority it was the general feeling that CIA should have no police duties for fear that it would become a Gestapo. He was afraid that if CIA undertook to conduct these covert operations, the Congress might be afraid that it was becoming a gestapo.

Secretary Royall felt that setting up another organization would merely result in duplication of what CIA is doing.

Secretary Forrestal noted that one important consideration is that, if intelligence activities are to be effective, they must be secret.

Mr. Souers noted that comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet been received.

Mr. Lovett said that although the JCS comments would be interesting, it must be remembered that we are not talking about wartime activities but rather about activities to be conducted at the present time. He noted, however, that the covert operations were of a type which the State Department could not conduct.

Secretary Forrestal said that these operations must not be conducted on an ad hoc personal basis as in the past.

Mr. Lovett said that he had talked with Senator Bridges/2/ who had at one time offered to appropriate $50,000,000 for this type of operation.

/2/Senator Styles Bridges, Republican-New Hampshire.

Admiral Hillenkoetter noted that the Director of Special Studies could not properly conduct sabotage and counter-sabotage. He felt that current operation should be done as at present by CIA but should be taken over by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in wartime.

Mr. Lay explained the background of this report. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed the creation of a nucleus psychological warfare operation immediately. SANACC concurred in this proposal and submitted it to the NSC for consideration. The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State had proposed an organization to conduct political warfare. The NSC Staff considered both of these proposals and prepared the subject report which envisaged a Director of Special Studies under the NSC who would control, but not conduct, all covert operations. The Dulles survey group on the other hand proposed that both covert operations and secret intelligence activities be performed by a single Agency, either under CIA or directly under the NSC.

The National Security Council:/3/

/3/The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 47. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

Deferred action on this report until the next meeting of the Council.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3-8, protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures, scheduling of NSC meetings, documents resulting from conversations with the British regarding the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, U.S. policy on atomic warfare, review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States, and NSC status of projects.]

278. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the National Security Council

Washington, May 24, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. The memorandum was originally addressed to Souers and was readdressed for circulation to the members of the Council. The only other difference between the original and the circulated version was the addition of footnote 2 below to the latter.

SUBJECT:
Covert (Psychological) Operations

1. With regard to the discussions at the National Security Council meeting the other afternoon on this subject, I wish to present the following idea which I think possesses many advantages. I believe a plan worked out, as suggested below, would overcome almost all of the objections raised, and I believe it would be in consonance with the Dulles-Jackson-Correa paper/1/ and would satisfy the State Department's demands for a directing hand in what forms of propaganda are to be used and what underground resistance movements are to be supported. Furthermore, the suggested plan would be in consonance with NSC 4-A and would answer the objections of the Secretary of the Army regarding the establishment of a new Agency and regarding making the National Security Council an operating body. Also, I believe this suggested plan would receive the warm support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and certainly would be in line with the intent of Congress as derived from conversations with both Senators and Representatives.

/1/Document 275.

2. To begin with, in the proposed paper/2/ on a Director of Special Studies, as presented, it is necessary to divide "Covert Operations" into two sections: (1) those operations that will be carried out in peace time and (2) those that will be carried out only during war time or during a period when the outbreak of war is imminent. The first group of such operations, those to be carried out in peace time, will involve black propaganda, including morale subversion, assistance to underground movements, and support of resistance movements. The second group, which it is very obvious that the United States would not perform except in relation to war or when war was so close that it was felt it could not be avoided, are the positive operations involving sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, subversion against hostile states, guerrilla support, and evacuation. The above division appears to be a most logical one inasmuch as it is very difficult to believe that we would send in parties to accomplish physical destruction in any phase of a "cold" war.

/2/NSC 10. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. To carry out this concept, it is suggested that a paper be prepared to set forth the following points:

(a) To provide in the State Department a high-level liaison officer for covert operations. This officer should be of sufficient stature to have the authority to pass on the forms of propaganda to be employed and to tell the Central Intelligence Agency that it is the policy of the United States to support such-and-such an underground or resistance movement and to deny such support to another underground or resistance movement. (It has been the lack of any such liaison with authority that has really caused the present discussions.)

(b) Covert operations of the first group, involving black propaganda, assistance to underground movements, and support of resistance movements, to be carried on in peace time, shall be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with NSC 4-A and in accordance with the policies derived from the liaison officer mentioned in (a) above.

(c) Covert operations of the second group, involving sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, etc., which are not to be carried on in peace time but only in war time or in a state of emergency, to be considered and planned now by a committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with members from the Armed Services and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is to be emphasized that only "planning" is to be done now for this second group of operations.

(d) Both groups of operations in war time or emergency will naturally fall under the military commander. Upon the outbreak of war or in a state of emergency, the organization conducting covert operations in (b) above should be lifted bodily from the Central Intelligence Agency and placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to the plans for the covert operations mentioned in (c) above.

(e) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be kept informed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the measures undertaken under (b) above, in order that the transition from a peace time status to a war time status can be made smoothly and efficiently.

RH Hillenkoetter

279. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

Washington, May 25, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files, 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Box 719, Pol & Psych Warfare. Top Secret.

We are concerned here in the Staff about the political warfare question. If the Executive Branch does not act soon to firm up its ideas as to what should be done along these lines, the possibility of getting secret funds out of Congress for covert operations will be lost. If this is not done now, it will mean that this Government has given up hope of conducting effective political warfare activities for the duration of this administration.

If nothing is done along the lines recommended in NSC 10, this Staff will have to recommend that the State Department press for the abrogation of NSC 4-A, which is not working out well.

If you want further information on the background of this project, I would suggest that you talk with Davies,/1/ of my staff, who is thoroughly familiar with it.

/1/John P. Davies, Jr.

I understand that Allen Dulles is arriving in Washington on Thursday and will be here through Saturday morning. He is fully acquainted with the NSC 10 project and it is our hope that he will head the organization. During his stay here, he will make himself available for discussion and comment on NSC 10. We are informed by Mr. Forrestal's office that Mr. Forrestal is so strongly in favor of implementation of NSC 10 that he is prepared to come over to the Department to discuss the problem with you and Mr. Dulles if you wish./2/

/2/Next to this paragraph a handwritten annotation from Lovett reads: "I think we ought to meet with Forrestal promptly. L"

GFK

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