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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Psychological and Political Warfare

                           

301. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Lovett to Secretary of Defense Forrestal

Washington, October 1, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/10-148. Top Secret. Drafted by Kennan on September 30. Sent to Lovett for signature under cover of a September 30 note from Kennan that reads: "Mr. Wisner is going to encounter, as one of his first major obstacles, the problem of cooperation with the Army in Germany. He has asked us to give him a boost in this respect. Here it is." (Ibid.)

My Dear Mr. Secretary: As you know, the Office of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency, established under NSC 10, is preparing to discharge its mandate to conduct political warfare. This political warfare program in Europe will be effective only if it receives the whole-hearted cooperation of the United States military authorities in Germany. Among other things, it may be necessary for the Director of the Office of Policy Coordination to make certain requests of these authorities concerning (a) political activity among refugees from the Soviet world and (b) handling of bona fide political refugees and deserters from the Soviet Zone. There may be other requests of this nature which will have to be made.

The Department of State considers that political warfare will be an important factor in the implementation of United States policies in the coming period. If effectively conducted, it may affect materially the possibilities for the achievement of United States objectives by means short of war.

For this reason, considerations of foreign policy require, in the view of this department, that every effort be made to assist the Director of the Office of Policy Coordination in the implementation of his programs. In particular, it hopes that he will have the full cooperation of the United States military establishment in Germany which is a key territory from the standpoint of political warfare.

It will be appreciated if you will instruct the American Military Governor in Germany, General Clay, in the sense of the foregoing.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.

302. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Wright to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, October 8, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, OCB 10/2-10/5. Top Secret.

Reference is made to your Memorandum/1/ of 8 October 1948, addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence and pertaining to the action of the National Security Council in amending our directive in connection with NSC 29./2/

/1/Not found.

/2/Not printed. NSC 29, a paper entitled "Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries," was approved by the NSC at its 19th meeting on September 2. At that meeting the Council expressed concern over the vulnerability of Venezuelan petroleum installations to hostile action and instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to refer to the Office of Special Projects the preparation of a plan for the security of the facilities. (Memorandum of discussion at the 19th meeting of the NSC, September 3; Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File) At its 23d meeting on October 7, the NSC amended this decision to provide that it should be carried out by the CIA but not by the Office of Special Projects. (Memorandum of Discussion at the 23d meeting of the NSC, October 8; ibid.)

It would be appreciated if this Agency could be informed of the considerations which prompted the decision of the Security Council to amend their original directive. The implementation of our functions in connection with NSC 29 can best be accomplished if we have full knowledge of any new considerations brought to the attention of the Council.

It is strongly recommended that Central Intelligence be represented at Security Council meetings when matters pertaining to CIA operations are discussed.

E. K. Wright/3/
Brigadier General, USA

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

303. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Acting Director of Central Intelligence Wright

Washington, October 11, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, OCB 10/2-10/5. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Amendment of Directive to the Director of Central Intelligence re NSC 29

REFERENCE
Memo for Executive Secretary, NSC, from Acting Director of Central Intelligence, same subject, dated October 8, 1948 (CIA 22896-a)/1/

/1/Document 302.

In response to the reference memorandum, the main consideration mentioned in the NSC meeting which prompted the amendment of the original directive on this subject, was the fact that this directive placed an excessive burden on the recently organized Office of Special Projects which was not commensurate with the other more urgent and important projects for which this Office was created. The point was also made that the NSC 29 project was not necessarily an appropriate function of the Office of Special Projects, since many of the activities required by this project might be overt in nature.

The propriety of having the Council tell the Director of Central Intelligence which part of his organization he should use for a given project was discussed. In this connection it was pointed out that, whereas the intelligence organization of CIA was created by statute under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Projects, which is not truly an intelligence operation, was created by the NSC itself to operate independently of other components of CIA to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency. Incidentally, this independence of operation of the Office of Special Projects is also recognized more specifically in a "Memorandum of Conversation and Understanding" which the Director of Central Intelligence has initialled./2/

/2/Document 298.

The principle that CIA should be represented at NSC meetings when matters pertaining to CIA operations are discussed is recognized by the Council, as indicated by the attendance of the Director of Central Intelligence at all Council meetings when he is in Washington. No provision was made for such representation at the last meeting, since it was not anticipated that CIA operations would be on the agenda for that meeting.

Sidney W. Souers/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

304. Letter From Secretary of Defense Forrestal to Acting Secretary of State Lovett

Washington, October 13, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/10-1348. Top Secret.

My dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your letter of 1 October 1948,/1/ which brings to my attention the need for obtaining the cooperation of the United States military authorities in Germany in order that the Office of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency may effectively discharge its mandate to conduct political warfare.

/1/Document 301.

I wish to assure you of my wholehearted agreement with you in regard to the importance of political warfare and the desirability of obtaining the full cooperation of the United States military authorities in Germany with respect to those measures, mentioned in your letter, which will support the political warfare program.

With my approval, Mr. Wisner, Director of the Office of Policy Coordination, has discussed this problem with the appropriate authorities in the Department of the Army. They have expressed complete agreement with the proposals in your letter and are transmitting their views to General Clay. Mr. Wisner will be informed of General Clay's comments and of further developments in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Forrestal

305. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

Washington, October 29, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Pol & Psych Warfare. Top Secret.

A cardinal consideration in the establishment of Wisner's office under NSC 10/2 was that, while this Department should take no responsibility for his operations, we should nevertheless maintain a firm guiding hand.

If we are to do this, a small body of personnel--perhaps no more than five men--who have Foreign Service and Departmental experience must be designated to guide Wisner's operation, both from within this Department and within Wisner's own office.

I realize the necessity of this and Wisner is genuinely anxious to have this type of help. But we have both met with stubborn resistance from our own personnel people.

This resistance is caused in part by the fact that our personnel, necessarily uninformed of NSC 10/2, do not understand the overriding importance of the assignments which we request. Consequently, with no sense of proportion they resist the release of officers who are assigned to functions of relatively minor importance and their appointment to the job which Wisner and I wish them to take.

Because of the high security classification of NSC 10/2, it is impossible for me to reason with our personnel people on this score. I am therefore reluctantly persuaded that the only way to cut the gordian knot is to ask Peurifoy to instruct the personnel division chiefs along the lines of the attached memorandum/1/ prepared for your signature.

/1/Reference is to an October 29 memorandum from Lovett to Peurifoy, not printed. See the Supplement.

George F. Kennan

306. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, October 29, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2155, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 20. Secret. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 241-242.

SUBJECT
OPC Projects

REFERENCES
(a) National Security Directive 10/2
(b) Memorandum of 28 October 1948 from the Director to ADPC re: Fiscal Year 1949 Budget/1/

/1/Not found.

1. During your absence, OPC has been holding a series of meetings of an Advisory Council which consists of high-level, security-cleared representatives of Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS and State. These representatives were nominated by the respective Secretaries to assist in formulating and coordinating policies for OPC in accordance with the charter outlined in reference (a). Although this preliminary planning has not yet been completed, the overall program is beginning to take shape along the following general lines of clandestine activity:

Functional Group I--Psychological Warfare
Program A--Press (periodical and non-periodical)
Program B--Radio
Program C--Miscellaneous (direct mail, poison pen, rumors, etc.)

Functional Group II--Political Warfare
Program A--Support of Resistance (Underground)
Program B--Support of DP's and Refugees
Program C--Support of anti-Communists in Free Countries
Program D--Encouragement of Defection

Functional Group III--Economic Warfare
Program A--Commodity operations (clandestine preclusive buying, market manipulation and black market operation)
Program B--Fiscal operations (currency speculation, counterfeiting, etc.)

Functional Group IV--Preventive Direct Action
Program A--Support of Guerrillas
Program B--Sabotage, Countersabotage and Demolition
Program C--Evacuation
Program D--Stay-behind

Functional Group V--Miscellaneous
Program A--Front Organization
Program B--War Plans
Program C--Administration
Program D--Miscellaneous

2. Until the overall plans and policies were formulated, it was obviously impossible to present an accurate or realistic outline for budgetary allocations as set forth in reference (b). However, the senior staff officers of OPC are currently working on such specific plans which I shall be in a position to review with you in the very near future.

3. In the meantime, we have had no alternative but to accept certain sub-projects which have been literally thrust upon us, such as the old Umpire Project/2/ which was inherited from SPG, and Dr. Hilger, Czech Refugee Group. You may be sure that we have done everything possible to hold such emergency assignments to a minimum. In those instances where we had no alternative, we have limited our commitments and have set up ear-marked funds to control expenditures.

/2/A plan for broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the U.S. Zone of Germany.

Frank G. Wisner/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

307. Memorandum for the File

Washington, November 16, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-453, Job 83-00036, Box 3, Folder 4. Secret.

SUBJECT
Relationship and proposed course of dealing as between OPC and ECA; memorandum of conversation between H1, H2 and FGW/1/

/1/The identities of H1 and H2 are conjectural, although they are obviously senior officials of the Economic Cooperation Administration and/or the ECA representation in Europe. Among possible identifications are Paul G. Hoffman, the ECA Administrator; W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Special Representative in Europe; and David K.E. Bruce, the head of the ECA mission in Paris.

1. On the afternoon of November 16, I had a very extensive conversation with H1 and H2 at their office and the following are some of the most important features of this conversation.

2. I explained generally our significance and I mentioned a few of the thoughts which we have had in connection with our possible usefulness to the mission of ECA in Europe. H2 wanted to know whether we would be handling the ECA counterpart fund arrangement in Italy and I told him that we would take this over as soon as we were in a position to do so. He then spoke of France, saying that the situation there was most critical and that he believed that everything should be done by way of giving support to the anti-communist elements of French labor. [28 lines of source text not declassified] H1 having reentered the room the conversation broadened out to a detailed discussion of the situation in general within France. H1 and H2 are both of the opinion that the Marshall Plan is less successful, less understood and less appreciated in France than in any other Western European nation. They are very concerned about this and they proposed that a fully coordinated all out effort should be made to regain control of the situation which has slipped so badly. They requested me to take the lead in working out an overall plan for [1 line of source text not declassified] building up the Marshall Plan in France and combating the communist efforts to wreck it. H2 is very keen about this and wants to follow up early next week. I suggested that as the first step he and I should meet with George Kennan to discuss this problem and to block out the work. I further stated that by the time this meeting occurs, I would endeavor to have ready in rough form a memorandum raising the various possibilities which had occurred to me. [2 lines of source text not declassified] They both stressed that time is of the essence and that matters have taken such a serious turn in France that no effort should be spared. H1 said that he had been devoting some thought to various types of overt publicity and H2 said that his people in Paris had also been thinking about this but with the general conclusion so far that obviously self-serving and American financed publicity might do more harm than good. He was not satisfied with this conclusion and agreed with H1 that it was a matter of method and presentation. H1 then suggested that it might be possible to use ECA counterpart funds for the publication of a "report" on the Marshall Plan aid, mentioning quantities and the uses to which the aid had been put. [3 lines of source text not declassified] H2 undertook to cable Al Friendly/2/ to get his reaction. H2 then stated that he believed the military should be interested in this overall program since the situation in France is crucial to their plans for Western European defense. If France falls out of line, the whole military defense program (Western Union Military Alliance) will crumble. H1 then stated that moving picture might be employed. He thought that what the French need most is a rejuvenation of spirit and he believed that an extensive showing of the recently released "Joan of Arc" might have an electrifying effect upon French psychology. He asked me to send a qualified person to see this movie and to give him a report on its possible effect upon the French people.

/2/Chief of Information in the office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe.

3. The conversation having turned toward the subject of French morale and its effect upon the political situation, I then asked H2 for his view about the prospects of deGaulle's accession to power. He replied at length stating that although this appears to be an odds-on bet, he felt that it would be very bad and that it might well result in an impossibility of dealing constructively with the French on either military or economic matters. [3 lines of source text not declassified] I mentioned that certain very competent observers of the French political situation had become convinced that deGaulle's accession to power was inevitable and had suggested that we should start laying our plans with a view to establishing a basis of dealing with deGaulle. I wondered what H2 thought of this. He first replied that it would be "playing with fire". Later on, however, he seemed to modify his position by stating that we should certainly establish better contacts with deGaulle and his people than we now have. Moreover, toward the close of the conversation and in commenting upon the overall program, H2 was at pains to make it clear that this should be done on a completely "non-partisan" basis. H1 agreed with H2 that the whole emphasis should be laid upon French economic recovery and the successful working of the Marshall Plan. I was left in some doubt as to the strength of H2's conviction in regard to the deGaulle business.

[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

F.G.W./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

308. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State (Kennan) to the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)

Washington, January 6, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-759, Job 83-00036, Box 5, Folder 8, Top Secret.

Mr. Wisner:

I have examined carefully the volume entitled "OPC Projects Fiscal 19-9-1950"./1/

/1/Not found.

In my opinion, this presentation contains the minimum of what is required from the foreign policy standpoint in the way of covert operations during the coming year. There may be one or two instances in which we will have to ask you to add to the list of functions set forth in this representation.

As the international situation develops, every day makes more evident the importance of the role which will have to be played by covert operations if our national interests are to be adequately protected.

George F. Kennan

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in France (Bruce)

Washington, April 26, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2065, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 12. No classification marking. The source text is annotated with somewhat confusing marginalia, which suggest that another version of this document may exist.

[6 paragraphs (19 lines of source text) not declassified]

The Department of State has instructed Mr. Caffery to take up with the French Prime Minister the question of removing the ration on newsprint in France and making it freely available so that at least part of the pre-war large Paris information press could get going again. Mr. Caffery has not yet reported the results of his démarche, if any, to the French Prime Minister, but a telegram has gone forward to him in the last few days requesting him to please press the matter. If this is not successfully completed by the time you get back to Paris, I should be grateful if you would do what you can to press it.

F. G. Wisner/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

310. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Members of His Staff

Washington, June 1, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-342, Job 83-00036, Box 2, Folder 11. Secret. Addressed to "Messrs. Offie, Frank [and] Lindsay." There is no typed or written signature on the memorandum but the level of the conversation and the context of the file in which the source text was found point to Wisner as the drafter.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Mr. John McCloy

1. Last night I talked for about forty-five minutes with Mr. McCloy pursuant to the suggestion which had been made to Mr. McCloy on my behalf by Mr. Robert Murphy. I explained to Mr. McCloy the general significance and origin of OPC and then I took up with him certain aspects of our present and prospective operations in Germany. In the latter regard I mentioned in particular the conversations and exchange of communications which I had had with General Clay in regard to the radio broadcasting activity from Germany. In this connection I filled him in on the background and significance of the developments regarding the formation of the various refugee national committees and the New York Committee, pointing out that General Clay had said that he saw no problem in allowing duly authorized representatives of "really responsible and broadly representative" national committees of refugees to enter Germany and there to arrange for broadcasts. I also told him of our current rather modest activities in Germany today, emphasizing the point that up until the present time our people have had no authorization from us to engage in any activities aimed at targets within the U.S., British or French zones. In this connection I said that the British were a bit ahead of us and that we were considering bringing ourselves abreast of their activities, at least to the extent of authorizing our people to undertake on a selective basis--fully approved from here in advance--campaigns calculated to discredit the communist activities and leadership within our zone.

2. Mr. McCloy stated that he thought he understood the nature of our program and he seemed to be impressed by my statement that the original architects of the whole deal included Messrs. Lovett, Harriman, Forrestal, Kennan, Marshall, et al. He wanted to know whether and to what extent he would be kept informed of our activities in Germany and what precautions would be taken to make certain that our activities there would not interfere re conflict with his responsibilities for policy and administration. I told him that we would be prepared to keep him as fully advised as he might deem desirable--but that we felt he would probably arrive at the conclusion that he would not want to know the minutiae of our business. He replied that he wanted to be kept generally informed but he wanted to make certain of this. I said that we were looking forward to getting to Germany soon a top level representative who would be of such stature and caliber as to be able to represent our activities to him.

311. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Counselor of the Department of State (Kennan)

Washington, September 7, 1949.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-761, Job 83-00036, Box 5, Folder 8. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

312. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Johnson to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, October 6, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2051, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 12. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Support of Covert Operations of CIA

With reference to your memorandum request for supply bases, dated 11 May 1949,/1/ I have received the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and give you herewith the position of the Department of Defense with respect to the principles on which we will support covert operations of CIA. These principles of operation will generally apply regardless of the particular form of the organization to conduct various covert operations and are given without reference to present or future organizational structure.

/1/Not found.

As Secretary of Defense I recognize the importance of covert foreign operations under present world conditions, and I intend to take measures to support such operations. I have great concern, however, regarding the proper location of administrative responsibility for these operations and, pending further study, I reserve my position with respect to whether this responsibility should reside in your Agency. Since these operations effectively conducted constitute one of the best ways of supporting our national defense in time of peace and contribute importantly to success in war, I am proceeding to state herein the reasonable conditions on which the Defense Department will cooperate in the planning and conduct of such operations.

There are two very important factors which I believe must be emphasized as this organization for covert operations develops. First, the organization must assume autonomous responsibility and be so effectively obscured as to assure that neither the President nor the Secretaries of State or Defense will be placed in a position of having to answer publicly for its activities.

The second factor, and this derives partially from the first, concerns financial support of these operations. As indicated in NSC 10/2, operational funds are hereafter to be provided out of the CIA budget. As we reduce expenditures and personnel within the Department of Defense, you and your Assistant Directors must understand that there may be less money and manpower available to contribute to these and other functions of your Agency unless such contributions are of substantial value to U.S. national security.

With the foregoing in mind the following principles will constitute the basis for Department of Defense support of covert operations.

We recognize that the equipment which will be required to carry out covert operations, either in peace or in war, should be available in the areas in which required. There are, however, certain differences between the peacetime scope and the wartime scope of Department of Defense participation in and support for such operations of the Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency. NSC 10/2 directs the Office of Policy Coordination in time of peace "to plan and conduct covert operations" and "in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime." In addition, NSC 10/2 states that "in time of war or national emergency, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and execution of covert operations in military theaters shall be under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Peacetime and wartime differences are not involved in the currently prescribed method of financing covert operations. NSC 10/2 states that after fiscal year 1949 "operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency budget requests." It is, therefore, expected that the Department of Defense will be reimbursed by transfer of funds from the Central Intelligence Agency for most of the material and services furnished.

As a general rule, covert operations planned and conducted by the CIA in time of peace should not be inconsistent with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States military policies, and should not be undertaken if specifically disapproved by the Department of Defense. The participation of the Department of Defense therein will be subject to the following general conditions:

a. Captured enemy equipment at the disposal of the Department of Defense and equipment which has been or may be declared surplus will be made available upon request by CIA without reimbursement, except for expenses incident to rehabilitation, packing, crating, transportation and any storage costs incurred through utilization of other than military facilities;

b. Subject to consideration of other requirements, military equipment and supplies in stock in the several Departments will be made available on a reimbursable basis upon request of the CIA. In this connection, military equipment and supplies with distinctive markings which would indicate the Department of Defense as their source will not be transferred unless such markings can be altered or obliterated to prevent such identification;

c. Military type supplies not available under a. and b. will, upon request by the CIA be procured by the Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis;

d. Personnel, supplies, and equipment will be transported to overseas storage points under military control and supplies and equipment will be stored and protected at such points without reimbursement where additional, extraordinary expenses to the Department of Defense are not involved. Details regarding the designation of storage points and the storage, protection, readying for use, and release of supplies and equipment must be arranged locally with the United States military commander of the area (including unified commands) who must first receive appropriate military instructions from the appropriate Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where the Service incurs additional, extraordinary expenses in providing transportation or establishing and maintaining at overseas points dumps for covert operations, the CIA must make reimbursement therefor. However, military commanders may provide, to the extent that they are able to do so without adversely affecting normal military operations, necessary military personnel at overseas storage points without reimbursement for services, such personnel to be available for normal military duty only; and

e. Peacetime movement of supplies and equipment from military overseas storage points to areas in which or from which covert operations are to be launched will be the responsibility of the CIA. The Department of Defense would expect further that very special and effective precautions would be taken by the CIA to insure that such operations cannot be attributed to the Department of Defense.

Where the Department of Defense requests or embraces particular operations in covert support of specific military missions (e.g., the establishment of escape and evasion organizations), special arrangements for support and reimbursement will be made in each instance.

With respect to plans and preparations for covert operations to be conducted in military theaters in time of war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion, with which I concur, that, consistently with NSC 10/2, the following conditions and limitations must apply:

a. The operations for which military equipment and supplies are to be stocked must first be integrated in the war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and any actual preparations must be specifically approved by them;

b. Military supplies and equipment for wartime covert operations will be made available from stock or procured on a reimbursable basis subject to consideration of other requirements. Special arrangements may be necessary in the procurement of highly specialized supplies for such operations; and

c. All details regarding the integration of military personnel for technical, security, and other purposes, in connection with covert operations, and all details regarding dumps of operational supplies, aircraft and aircraft equipment (including location of these supplies and equipment), must, after integration in each instance with war plans indicated in a. above, and with Joint Chiefs of Staff policy guidance, be locally coordinated with and agreed to by the representatives of the CIA and of the Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the theater concerned.

It should be pointed out that the foregoing views do not cover the actual conduct of covert operations in military theaters under JCS control in time of war since this is more properly an integral part of war plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that detailed arrangements for the matter discussed herein can be made through designated representatives of the Department of Defense until such time as a military organization to work with the CIA on covert operations is established.

If the above arrangements are satisfactory to you, I will issue the necessary directives to the Services to execute them. Please let me have your views at early convenience.

Louis Johnson/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.

313. Letter From Secretary of Defense Johnson to Secretary of State Acheson

Washington, October 7, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Executive Secretary of the NSC, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: At our luncheon on September 23, 1949, we discussed the location and various aspects of certain special activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I expressed to you my very great concern at the present situation, and we both agreed that on an interim basis we should make special and direct arrangements to provide policy guidance for these activities.

I am familiar with your arrangements in the State Department whereby Mr. Kennan serves as your adviser on these activities, and in accordance with our understanding I am designating Brigadier General John Magruder, U.S. Army (Retired), as my special adviser on these activities. He will be particularly concerned with the subject contained in NSC 10/2, but in addition, and for the purpose of providing the necessary integration of other interrelated matters, he will concern himself on my behalf with NSC 4 and NSC 43 series. Your Department and mine under this arrangement can then proceed to guide these activities in a direction that we deem mutually desirable, and likewise to seek agreement respecting an appropriate organizational setting for the activities comprised in NSC 10/2.

The designation of General Magruder as my policy representative does not alter the previous arrangements for the Joint Chiefs of Staff representation in NSC 10/2 and NSC 43 matters.

I am also informing the three Secretaries of the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, of my action.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Johnson/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.

314. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Joseph A. Frank of the Office of Policy Coordination

Washington, October 13, 1949.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2301, Job 83-00764R, Box 1, Folder 9. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Recommended Lines of Thought for Operational Planning

1. At the weekly meeting in Mr. Webb's office Tuesday afternoon/1/ I covered practically all of the subject matter upon which I had been briefed by yourself and the others who attended the morning briefing session, and a considerable amount of interest was shown on the part of Mr. Webb and General Magruder, in particular. Toward the conclusion of the session, Mr. Webb began to spark off a number of ideas and as he warmed to his subject, he began to produce some very useful thoughts. All of the others present at the meeting were much impressed about his grasp of the significance and operational possibilities of the OPC activity, and General Magruder was especially enthusiastic in his comment upon Mr. Webb's suggestions.

/1/October 11.

2. In view of the fact that Mr. Webb has taken this degree of personal interest and has gotten to the point of generating some lines of policy guidance to us, I believe that we would be well advised to do what we can to develop some refinements, and ultimately to produce some plans and projects along the lines of Mr. Webb's recommendations. We will surely be asked from time to time in the future what we are doing about his proposals, and in addition there is no doubt that he has got hold of some useful thoughts.

3. The first line of thought developed by Mr. Webb originated with a discussion of the situation in Yugoslavia, and the fact that Tito's performance and the Tito heresy are causing the Cominform more disturbance and woe than any single thing which has occurred since the war. [20 lines of source text not declassified]

4. Mr. Webb went on from this to propose that we should put considerable effort into spreading the story of the Tito heresy, and moreover that we should endeavor to induce similar developments in other Communist areas and within the Communist Parties of free areas. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

6. Mr. Webb made reference to the article on Tito by Hamilton Fish Armstrong in the current issue of the Atlantic Monthly magazine, and whereas he agreed that it could not be effectively used in its present form because of its American origin and authorship--he said that we should draw material from it which should be caused to appear in disguised forms.

[1 paragraph (39 lines of source text) not declassified]

FGW

ADDENDUM

You will recall that in the talk which Mr. Kennan gave in Q Bldg. this morning, he listed as the first and perhaps the most serious weakness in the international position of the U.S. the inadequate and unsatisfactory character of the situation as regards Germany and Japan. In this connection he stated specifically that for the improvement of the German situation, it is absolutely essential that the German people be able to see the prospect of a position for themselves as full-fledged members of the Western European community, and that this will require the development of a better understanding between the German people and the peoples of the Western European countries. (These may not be his exact words but it is the sense of what he said.) I believe that this serves to reinforce Mr. Webb's suggestion as outlined in paragraph 7 of the foregoing memorandum and that we may therefore with confidence proceed to work up the outlines of one or more projects calculated to accomplish the desired result.

I believe that it would be useful for you to make this memorandum available to your senior staff officers.

315. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to Secretary of Defense Johnson

Washington, October 18, 1949.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. The source text indicates that a copy was sent to the Executive Secretary of the NSC.

SUBJECT
Support of Covert Operations of CIA

REFERENCE
Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, above subject, 6 October 1949/1/

/1/Document 312.

1. The reference memorandum reduces to four basic principles the supply support of CIA covert operations by the Department of Defense:

a. The Department will expect reimbursement from CIA for the costs of supplies and their storage and transportation when additional or extraordinary costs to the Department are involved, unless such expenses are unmistakably associated with particular operations requested or embraced by the Department of Defense in covert support of specific military missions.

b. Operations should be consistent with U.S. military policies and approved by the Department of Defense prior to implementation in time of peace, support details to be arranged with the local U.S. military commander concerned.

c. Precautions should be taken to insure against identification of the Department of Defense with operations in process.

d. Operations, planned to be conducted in military theaters in time of war, should be in accordance with plans integrated in the war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should have local coordination and agreement in the theater concerned.

2. These principles are generally agreeable to this Agency and are accepted subject to:

a. Any deviations which may be directed by the President or the National Security Council.

b. Any modifications agreed to in specific instances between the Department and CIA. (For example, at this time, the presence of additional conventional American equipment in China and on the Greek frontier would create no security risk.)

3. It would appear that the best hope for the smooth, prompt, and, where necessary, flexible implementation of the arrangements you detail lies in the creation of the "military organization to work with the CIA on covert operations," to which you refer in the next to the last paragraph on page 4 of the reference memorandum. I, therefore, urge that this organization be brought into being as soon as possible and recommend that it be vested with such discretionary power as will contribute to smooth relations between CIA and the Department of Defense.

R.H. Hillenkoetter/2/
Rear Admiral, USN

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

316. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Mr. Miller of His Staff

Washington, June 21, 1950.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2066, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 12. Secret.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Mr. Averell Harriman

1. In my conversation of recent date with Mr. Harriman (which took place immediately following your talk with him) he made a number of points which I considered to be worth recording, and I believe that the appropriate members of your staff should know about it.

[2 paragraphs (19-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. Mr. Harriman expressed concern about the American position at the moment in the cold war and strongly emphasized the fact that it is essential for this Government to recapture the peace mantle from the Russians. The emphasis in official statements of all kinds as well as our unofficial activities should be concentrated on the theme "Peace-Peace-Peace" even though we get tired of hearing ourselves say it. He does not feel that the situation in France at the moment is quite as serious as reported by Mr. Bruce, although he does acknowledge that unless we can change our apparent position, it may become so. He considers that it would be difficult to overcome the pacifism and neutrality of the editors of Le Monde by any ordinary efforts. He stated that Messrs. Bruce and Bohlen have been working on certain of these people, but without noticeable success. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

F.G.W./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Continue with Introduction:
Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence