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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence

                           

325. National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 11

Washington, September 16, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132. Confidential.

ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

The following policies and objectives are established by the National Intelligence Authority governing action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on matters submitted to that Authority:

1) All recommendations envisaged by paragraph 3 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 (Section 102 d of the National Security Act of 1947) will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Board in writing, accompanied by copies of such papers or statements as the Director of Central Intelligence may contemplate accompanying the recommendations upon presentation to the National Intelligence Authority (NSC). These recommendations will have attached a voting slip providing opportunity for:

a. Concurrence or non-concurrence;
b. Comment;
c. Request for an IAB meeting.

Voting slips will be acted upon and returned to the Secretary, NIA, within seven working days after receipt. Substance of the statement of the non-concurrence shall accompany the statement to the NIA (NSC). If any Intelligence Advisory Board member so requests, an Intelligence Advisory Board meeting shall be called by the Director of Central Intelligence. If the IAB proposes to refer any such recommendation to a special study group or otherwise to delay the presentation of the recommendation to the NIA (NSC), but the Director of Central Intelligence considers such delay inadvisable, the IAB members shall have seven working days, after receipt of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding such delay, for the submission of any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the NIA (NSC).

2) The Secretary, NIA, shall circulate to the IAB members any recommendations, proposed directives, papers, etc., which an IAB member may originate for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board. Each shall be accompanied by a voting slip providing opportunity for:

a. Concurrence or non-concurrence;
b. Comment;
c. Request for an IAB meeting.

3) Any recommendation two or more IAB members believe should be submitted to the NIA (NSC) will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence in such form as to set forth his recommendation and the comments of the IAB members.

4) Unless otherwise directed by the NIA, the Secretary, NIA, shall circulate to the IAB copies of all agenda, minutes, decisions, and directives approved or issued by, or in the name of, the NIA.

For the National Intelligence Authority:
J. S. Earman
Secretary, N.I.A.

326. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Acting Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett

Washington, October 28, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, JIS, JIC, JCS. Restricted.

SUBJECT
Withdrawal of State representation from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS)

As I indicated orally several weeks ago, the reorganization of the Staff of the Joint Chiefs was expected to provide for representation on the JIC of the armed services only. On October 22, 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the organization and functions which had been proposed by General Gruenther, the Director (Designate) of the Joint Staff, and which limit the membership of the JIC as anticipated.

Inasmuch as the National Security Act of 1947 establishes duties and responsibilities for the Director of Central Intelligence substantially analogous to those heretofore performed by State representatives on the JIC and the JIS, it appears appropriate for the Department to look to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as the channel for communicating the civilian intelligence viewpoint to the armed services and, reciprocally, for obtaining from them the military intelligence viewpoint as required. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Department now withdraw from the JIC and the JIS. This step has been discussed with Admiral Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, and with Admiral Hillenkoetter, the Director of Central Intelligence, both of whom concur in the proposed action.

The Department's representatives on the JIC and the JIS will hold themselves available for informal liaison and coordination with the JIC and the JIS until such time as channels through the CIA are in full operation. An announcement of these arrangements will be made to the interested officers of the Department as soon as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had an opportunity to acknowledge the notification of withdrawal, which is appended for your signature.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/2/

/2/Restricted.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Lovett to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

Washington, October 31, 1947.

The Department of State has noted the organization and functions of the Joint Staff described in the Memorandum of the Director (Designate), Joint Staff (JCS 1794/4), approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 22, 1947 (JCS 1794/6)./3/ Further, the National Security Act of 1947 established a Central Intelligence Agency headed by a Director of Central Intelligence whose duties, under the direction of the National Security Council as provided for in Section 102(d) of the said Act, are believed, among other things, to supersede the duties heretofore delegated to Department of State representatives on the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Intelligence Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director of Central Intelligence took the oath of office on September 26, 1947, and the Central Intelligence Agency has been activated under the law.

/3/Neither found.

The Department of State, therefore, herewith withdraws its formal representation from the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Intelligence Staff. Pending the establishment of other channels, the Department's representatives will continue to perform such liaison and coordinating activities as may be desired.

Robert A. Lovett/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.

327. Letter From the Secretary of State's Acting Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, October 29, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-806, Item 9. Secret.

Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter: The following suggestions for the revision of current NIA directives are offered in response to paragraph 3 of your memorandum of 9 October 1947, subject: Initial National Security Council Directive to CIA./1/

/1/Not found.

a. Those provisions of NIA Directives 1-11, inclusive, and of IAB 1/2 which are not specifically included in the National Security Act and which have not become unnecessary through being overtaken by events, should be repeated in the new National Security Council directive or directives.

b. The NSC directives should contain a definition of intelligence relating to or affecting the national security, which should conform to the definition of national intelligence as approved by the NIA.

c. The subject of inspection should be clarified in detail. The provisions now contained in paragraph 2 of NIA #5 should be eliminated and substitution made as follows:

The Director of Central Intelligence is authorized and directed, in connection with his responsibilities for coordination, to survey the operations of the Federal intelligence agencies in order to ascertain what necessary intelligence functions relating to the national security are not being presently performed or are not being adequately performed or involve wasteful duplication of effort. Such a survey shall include a determination of the causes of any omissions, inadequacies or duplications. The conclusions of the survey shall serve as the basis of recommendations to the National Security Council for corrective measures. In his coordinating capacity the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for insuring that existing facilities are adequate to meet the fair requirements both of the departments and of the National Security Council as determined by their several responsibilities. Normally, therefore, such corrective recommendations will be designed to strengthen the base of the overall intelligence structure by recognizing primary departmental needs and supporting the agencies directly serving them. Centralization of functions will be recommended only in cases when, by agreement among the departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, such functions are essential and are most beneficially and effectively accomplished on a centralized basis.

d. The provisions of NIA #6 should be revised to accord with the recommendation of the Interdepartmental Committee already submitted to NIA, and those of NIA #8 should not be included in the new directives.

e. The new National Security Council directives should make provision for clear recognition of the general principle that departmental intelligence agencies produce finished intelligence in the fields of their dominant interests and, as far as possible, CIA bases production of national intelligence upon utilization of finished departmental intelligence obtained from the agencies rather than upon CIA processing of source materials.

f. The new NSC directives should provide for coordination of maintenance and servicing of intelligence document collections.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

328. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, November 5, 1947.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Records of the National Security Council. Confidential.

Dear Admiral Souers: Following the conversation which Colonel Booth and I had with you on October 24th the Department notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the withdrawal of its representation on the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Intelligence Staff. I enclose a copy of that memorandum for your information./1/

/1/See the attachment to Document 326.

I am also enclosing a copy of a letter to Admiral Hillenkoetter, asking him to establish relations with the Joint Intelligence Committee which will provide for continuing cooperation and joint activity between the Department and the Joint Chiefs on intelligence matters.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Enclosure

Letter From the Acting Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, November 5, 1947.

Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter: Under date of October 31, 1947 the Department of State notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum/2/ of the withdrawal of its representation on the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), at the same time offering to maintain such liaison and coordinating activities as may be necessary until other channels are established (copy of memorandum enclosed). The Department indicated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it believes the proper channel for joint action in intelligence matters between itself and the Joint Chiefs is through the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Department therefore requests the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA to establish liaison and coordinating relations with the JIC and JIS as soon as feasible to the end that no gap shall exist between the Department and the intelligence organization of the Joint Chiefs.

/2/See footnote 1 above.

In considering the character and scope of the liaison and coordinating activities to be established, the following matters, among others, are of immediate concern: (a) policy with respect to the distribution of JIC and JIS papers to the CIA and, in turn, to the Department; (b) the forwarding of and responding to requests for intelligence contributions between the JIC and the JIS on the one hand, and the Department on the other, and (c) procedures whereby concurrence of the Department is obtained in respect to estimates or papers based in whole or in part upon contributions by the Department, or which are recognized to involve important conclusions in its fields of primary interest and, reciprocally, that concurrences may be obtained by the Department on intelligence matters within the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs.

A number of possible methods for handling the liaison and coordinating activities described above will undoubtedly suggest themselves to you. The following alternative procedures, however, are proposed for your consideration:

(1) Joint action on intelligence matters might be accomplished in the IAC assisted by a sub-staff appointed by the IAC representatives, the service members of which correspond to the JIS, as was suggested in the JIC 364 series of papers.

(2) Joint action might be accomplished by enlarging the assignment of the present departmental representatives to ORE (i.e., Mr. M. B. Booth for the Department of State, Colonel R. F. Ennis for the Department of the Army, etc.), so that these officers represent their departments with CIA for the purpose of dealing with problems requiring joint action and the obtaining of concurrences, rather than, as at present, being limited to such activities in respect to ORE papers only.

(3) The proposed "Standing Committee" of the IAC could be designated as the agency to assist the IAC in processing all problems involving joint action.

Of the above alternatives, it seems to us that the third offers the more direct and satisfactory solution to the problem, although it might require redefinition of the functions and responsibilities of the proposed "Standing Committee." It is suggested, however, that the foregoing proposals, together with any others which may seem desirable to you, be placed before ICAPS in order that an acceptable solution may be presented to the JIC and the IAC as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

329. Memorandum From the Chief of the Global Survey Group, Central Intelligence Agency (Montague) to the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates (Babbit)

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-450, Item 24. Confidential.

Washington, November 12, 1947.

SUBJECT
Production of a "World Situation Estimate"

1. The Global Survey Group is charged with the production of "World Situation Estimates." The content and frequency of these Estimates are not specified. I understand that ORE undertook to produce them on its own initiative, and suppose the content and timing are left to the discretion of ORE. Presumably the Estimates would consist of a more extended exposition of those matters presented in current and summary form in the CIA Series. It has been anticipated that Estimates would be produced semi-annually, the first by the end of the current year.

2. A prerequisite to the preparation of a World Situation Estimate, as herein envisaged, is the existence of a body of staff intelligence prepared by the several Branches with reference to their particular concerns but affording coverage of all situations of global significance. This is not to say that the World Situation Estimate would be merely a miscellany of Branch estimates collected under one cover. On the contrary, it must be a coherent analysis of the world situation from a global point of view. The Branch estimates from which it is derived will presumably have to be reworked by the Global Survey Group to meet this requirement. The prerequisite staff intelligence must be provided, however, before the Global Survey Group can proceed with its task.

3. On my return from leave in early September it was my intention to initiate a series of projects designed to close the gaps in our staff intelligence coverage and to permit the completion of the first World Situation Estimate on about 1 December. During September and early October, however, the Global Group was preoccupied with meeting the unanticipated and urgent requirements of the National Security Council and its Staff Group. Thereafter I was unwell and had to defer specific planning for the World Situation Estimate until about 1 November.

4. On canvassing the situation I now find that the available staff intelligence is generally adequate with respect to the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America, but that it is decidedly inadequate with respect to the U.S.S.R., the U.K., France, and Germany. Those four countries, however, constitute the very crux of the world situation as we have analyzed it in CIA 1. ORE should have produced a complete and thoroughly analytical coverage of them on general grounds, apart from the requirements of a World Situation Estimate. The actual state of ORE coverage with respect to each is as follows:

a. The U.S.S.R.: ORE has produced no general analysis of Soviet objectives and strategy since ORE 1 (23 July 1946). That part of ORE 1 relating to the basic policy of the U.S.S.R. is still generally valid (as it should be). But ORE 1 was produced by one man over the weekend to meet an unanticipated and urgent requirement. It has always been subject to improvement with more time for deliberation and, at the age of sixteen months could also be improved in the light of subsequent developments. As regards current Soviet strategy for the accomplishment of basic objectives (see Special Evaluation No. 22), it is of course far out of date.

b. The U.K.: An analysis of British capabilities and policies corresponding to ORE 1 has been projected since July, as ORE 26. At last report, however, its early completion was not to be expected.

c. France: ORE coverage of France has been exclusively in the form of current intelligence; no thorough analysis of the French situation has ever been attempted or projected. Yet France is the key to the situation in Western Europe. There is presently in preparation an estimate of the current political situation in that country, but on form it is more likely to run as current than as staff intelligence. A thorough analysis of all factors in the French situation is definitely required.

d. Germany: ORE has produced no staff intelligence on Germany except ORE 11/1 (8 April 1947). That paper, as its title implies, was a summary review of the objectives and policies of the occupying powers rather than a thorough analysis of the German situation. Such an analysis should have been produced ere now in anticipation of the C.F.M. meeting a fortnight hence. A report on Germany is in preparation, but its original version was current rather than staff intelligence and it is still too slight and superficial to provide the thorough analysis of the German situation that is required.

5. Personnel of the present Global Survey Group produced both ORE 1 and ORE 11/1, the first singlehanded, the second with some assistance from the Branch. The Group, however, is not the proper body to prepare any one of the four estimates specifically required and certainly cannot produce all of them and a World Situation Estimate simultaneously.

6. Under the existing organization of ORE it is an implicit function of the Global Survey Group to propose projects designed to correct deficiencies in ORE coverage as the Group perceives them. The procedure for giving effect to such proposals is unclear, however. The Group itself lacks authority to direct the Branches to take appropriate action or to see to it that any action taken actually satisfies the requirement indicated. Moreover, three requirements indicated herein result from the consistent inability or disinclination of two Branches to perform the primary function of ORE (thorough intelligence analysis, as distinguished from current intelligence reporting). This is a matter too fundamental to be dealt with through the routine functioning of the Global Survey Group and the Estimates Group. Both in theory and as a practical matter, it appears that only the Assistant Director himself has the requisite authority to give the direction and the instruction needed in these circumstances.

7. Recommendations:

a. That the Eastern European-U.S.S.R. Branch be directed to prepare, as a matter of priority, an analysis of basic Soviet objectives and of current Soviet strategy, on the order of ORE 1.

b. That the Western European Branch be directed to prepare, as a matter of priority, thorough analyses of the situation in France and the situation in Germany.

c. That the Northern Branch be directed to complete ORE 26 as a matter of priority.

d. That each Branch be instructed that in each case the desideratum is a thoughtful analysis of the fundamental situation rather than a superficial account of current events.

e. That the preparation of a World Situation Report be deferred until the estimates referred to above are available at least in final draft.

Ludwell L. Montague/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

330. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

Washington, November 18, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files, 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Box 10, Intelligence. No classification marking. The Policy Planning Staff minutes for November 18 indicate that Kennan would recommend to Lovett that the Policy Planning Staff go over the draft NIA directives sent to the Department for comment. (Ibid., Box 32)

The National Security Council has instructed Hillenkoetter to pre-sent by November 26 a draft of a permanent directive for the CIA./1/

/1/Reference is to NSC Action No. 3, taken at the Council's first meeting on September 26, instructing the Director of Central Intelligence to submit within 60 days "proposed authorizations supplanting the former directives of the National Intelligence Authority and specifying his functions and those of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947." (National Security Council, Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the National Security, vol. 1, 1947-48, p. 53)

He has prepared such a draft and has sent it for comment to Arm-strong, who heads up these activities in this Department.

Armstrong has rather important objections to it. He has brought it to me and inquired whether he could state these objections in the name of the Department. I told him that I would wish to have the Staff study the matter carefully and that I would then submit my recommendations to you as to the position the Department should take. It is a complicated matter, involving the whole pattern of relations between the various departments and the CIA in intelligence matters.

Provided you have no objections, we will make this the subject of a Staff study./2/

/2/In the margin next to this paragraph there is a handwritten "OK" with Lovett's initial. On November 20 the Policy Planning Staff suspended work on the study until an interagency working group had revised the draft directives. (Minutes of the 88th meeting, November 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files, 1947-1953: Lot 64 D 563, Box 32) This presumably was the result of action taken by the IAB at its meeting on November 20; see Document 332.

George F. Kennan

331. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett

Washington, November 20, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, Drafts of NSC Directives to Replace NIA Directives. Top Secret.

The attached memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence, dated November 10, 1947, on the subject of new NSC Intelligence Directives, drafts of which were enclosed,/1/ has been given careful study in the light of the changes required by the enactment of the National Security Act and the passage of time. Our analysis of the proposed new Directives leads us to the tentative conclusions that (a) in a number of important respects they fail to include certain basic principles, embraced in the NIA Directives, which are of continuing validity, and (b) in other respects they are at variance with certain of those principles and with the intent of the National Security Act.

/1/All attachments are in the Supplement except the draft directives submitted with Hillenkoetter's memorandum, which were not found.

Since the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group under authority contained in the President's letter of January 22, 1946, there has been continued effort to establish a practical system by which the Director of Central Intelligence can meet his responsibilities toward over-all coordination of the intelligence activities of the several intelligence agencies of the Government, and, at the same time, those agencies can fulfill their departmental and interdepartmental responsibilities. As a result of this effort the NIA Directives, including the proposed Directive advanced in IAB 1/2, were progressively evolved. Although those Directives are not considered perfect or complete, I believe that, with certain modifications, they could be used as a satisfactory basis from which to proceed toward accomplishing the desired coordination. I further believe that the omissions from the proposed new NSC Directives, coupled with the parts at variance with the old Directives, not only nullify much of the progress already made toward the solution of the problem, but raise the issue of establishing complete control of all intelligence activity of the Government in a single authority under the NSC. I believe that it was not the intent of the Congress, as expressed in the National Security Act, to establish a single head for all Federal intelligence agencies.

In addition to the proposed new Directives going, in my opinion, beyond the intent of the Congress, I submit further that to establish a single head for all Governmental intelligence agencies would not be a desirable method for coordinating the intelligence activities of the Government, so long as departmental intelligence activities are to continue, because (a) it would necessarily impede the direct and immediate response of departmental intelligence organizations to the operational requirements of their department heads; (b) it would place the chiefs of departmental intelligence organizations in the impractical situation of facing two lines of authority, and (c) it identifies the principle of coordination with command and control functions rather than with those functions of initiative, clarification, and cooperative action among equals which form the true meaning of the term.

I cannot, therefore, concur in the proposed NSC Directives pre-sented with the memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence. Specific objections, which call attention to the omissions and variations between the principles contained in the NIA Directives (including the proposed Directive contained in IAB 1/2), and the proposed NSC Directives, are set forth in the attached Tab A.

In lieu of the proposed NSC Directives forwarded with the memorandum of November 10, 1947, we submit herewith, as Tab B through H, recommended draft proposals for NSC Directives to establish policies for the coordination of Governmental intelligence activities and the production of national intelligence.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

332. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Washington, November 20, 1947, 2 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-657. Secret. The meeting was held in the North Interior Building. The minutes themselves do not identify this as an IAB meeting and there was some debate on the subject at the table (see especially Hillenkoetter's exchange with Admiral Inglis and General Chamberlin at the end of the meeting). Darling describes this as an IAB meeting, pointing out that the IAB did not go out of existence when the National Security Act came into force because the NSC extended the validity of National Intelligence Authority Directives for 60 days. (Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 211-212)

PARTICIPANTS

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

Present

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Major General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, GSUSA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Major General George C. McDonald, Director of Intelligence, Hdq., US Air Force
Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, Director of Intelligence and Security, Atomic Energy Commission
Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, JIS
Mr. Prescott Childs, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel
Colonel Merritt B. Booth, Department of State
Colonel Riley F. Ennis, GSUSA
Captain R. K. Davis, USN
Mr. William C. Trueheart, AEC
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Colonel E. J. Treacy, GSUSA
Colonel E. P. Mussett, Air Force
Captain H. C. Doan, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel John B. Sherman, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel William J. Clinch, Central Intelligence Agency
General Cabell, Air Force

Director: I have a couple of corrections I would like to make before we start on this. In the last three lines at the bottom of page 2 of the covering memorandum/1/ change "paragraph 6 from paragraph 2" to "paragraph 1f." "Paragraph 7 from paragraph 3" to "paragraph 1g." And "paragraph 8 is derived from parts of CIG 18 and the National Security Act." At the first meeting of the National Security Council on September 26, they said we would continue the NIA Directives for 60 days. We will have to submit some new ones on the 26th of this month. That is the limit. We sent a memorandum to the agencies on October 9/2/ asking for any suggestions and to please let us know. We got a little help from the State Department. They came through with some suggestions. Today I don't know how long it will take to get an agreement on the four NSC directives. We will try to finish those at least so we can send those in. Is that all right?

/1/Dated November 10. (Memorandum, Hillenkoetter to Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, and others; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776)

/2/Not found.

Mr. Armstrong: I would like to say, Admiral, that the Department of State has not been able in the time available to arrive at a firm position on these directives. The matter is before Mr. Lovett at the present time. Due to the Secretary's departure for London today, he has not been able to pass on the directives themselves and the proposed changes that we have felt were essential. So while I am prepared to discuss the directives today, I can't speak for the Department. It cannot be committed as yet.

Director: I don't think it should be the Departments, the intelligence heads are to give their opinions.

Mr. Armstrong: Yes, but if it is coming before the National Security Council, the heads of each of the intelligence organizations, I feel, must have the Department's position firm before we can speak finally.

Director: Let's try and get through these first four if we can. If we can't, we will have to tell them we can't do it.

Adm. Inglis: I understand, in any case, these papers, before they are finally approved by the National Security Council, will have another processing in the respective departments.

Director: Yes.

Adm. Inglis: I want to make it quite clear that anything I say is my own opinion--

Director: They will all go back again.

Adm. Inglis: As the Chief of Naval Intelligence and not as a mouthpiece of the Secretary. I have not gone to him and I have no intention of doing it--

Director: We will have to do it.

Adm. Inglis: On something in which I am in doubt. There will be another processing of this.

Director: The National Security Council will send them out again.

Adm. Inglis: I would like to make this comment. You got a little help from the participating agencies something over a month ago. I feel a lot of time and controversy and time--especially time--on the part of the intelligence agencies, who are quite busy, if matters of this kind could be handled in a committee on the working level so that these differences, and there are numerous differences in all of these papers, could be reconciled before they were ever brought up to our level. I realize the Central Intelligence Agency has gone through a process of reorganization because of the passage of legislation and the position of the Intelligence Advisory Board, or Committee, is not yet quite clear, so I am speaking more for the future than the past. But I think in the future if they can be coordinated by a working committee and all of these differences are aired and ironed out, and as possible reconciled, it will save time and ruffled tempers and will come out with a better job. Out of the 60 days, 45 days had been used before it came up to us. Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency, on its own initiative and own authority, produced these papers with 15 days left to consider them. I think they should be considered as they are formulated rather than have a finished product to take it or leave it.

Director: I don't think it is taking it or leaving it, but you did have a time limit. I agree we ought to try and get it worked out beforehand, but we had to rewrite the things and clear them all around.

Gen. Chamberlin: I would like to add to Admiral Inglis' remark that the system used here is quite difficult for us. I am head of the intelligence department and I have many administrative responsibilities and I can't turn it off and on at somebody else's command. I have to seek my own time for these things because I have other things to do. As far as I am concerned, I came out unprepared to discuss these papers. My people have worked on them and they find many things that they want to challenge. There are important differences of principle involved in these papers that have never been approached nor are they included in past directives. I have not been able to take those things up with even my own military chiefs and I think that the problem has been approached in a way that is quite disadvantageous to the contributing agencies of intelligence.

Director: I think there ought to be the least difference of opinion in the National Security Council directives.

Gen. McDonald: I would like to make a statement. Analysis of these proposed directives revealed it is going to be necessary for me to recommend many changes. In view of this, I consider it would be impossible to cover these directives this afternoon, and there should be, therefore, no attempt here to go into either the philosophy or the composition of these directives. I recommend that an ad hoc committee to be formed immediately to examine our recommendations and those which any of the other members have for the purpose of reconciling views. I am afraid, for the short time available, for our people to study these things and get together. That right now, on this level, we are doing it. We can't be expected to do the work of an ad hoc committee. I don't think it is quite right or productive of a cordial overall workable product.

Director: How long do you think it would take this committee to do it?

Gen. McDonald: Two or three days.

Adm. Inglis: I estimate ten days minimum.

Gen. McDonald: That is working extra time of course. Non-union hours.

Adm. Gingrich: It seems to me we would make faster progress if it were handled in that way. As far as I am concerned, all I could do here is discuss the matter and any product that would be turned up here I would have to take back and get approval from the Commission. We do have some rather fundamental exceptions to take to the directives from AEC's point of view.

Director: Let's get a committee appointed and try and get them working this afternoon. If that is the opinion of everyone.

Mr. Armstrong: I might say, Admiral, our analysis of the directives led us to the conclusion, in a number of important respects, they failed to include basic principles embraced in the NIA directives which should have a continuing validity, and in certain other respects there was a variance with certain of those principles and intent of the National Security Act. We think a very considerable revision of the directives would be necessary as they now stand and we have ourselves prepared a series of substitutes and proposals. We would be glad to present them to you or an ad hoc committee for consideration, along with the directives drafted here.

Director: Does everybody agree to have this ad hoc committee?

Gen. Chamberlin: I wonder how far we should go into this subject. I'm confident you are going to find a great deal of differences of opinion on principle, especially on this first directive--the one I had a chance to read thoroughly. Is it necessary that the CIA directives themselves have such a high degree of precedence here? Wouldn't it be advisable to settle the principles in which the National Security Council is involved expeditiously by an ad hoc committee and then give them an additional job when they complete those to go into the DCI directives.

Director: The first four directives have to be in by the 26th. The others can wait.

Gen. Chamberlin: I don't know whether you can meet that date. If you can define the duties of this, the four principle directives, to the ad hoc committee they will go much faster than the others--rather than take the whole field for the moment.

Director: The others can wait, but these first four have to be in.

Gen. McDonald: In the meantime, how would it be to request an additional time period beyond the 60 days limitation, which is practically over. And you would get a much better product.

Mr. Armstrong: I have a number of reasons why I think there would be no opposition.

Gen. Chamberlin: If we don't get our own departments lined up before they go to it thoroughly in agreement, then we are going to run into a time-consuming period that will be--I won't say disastrous--disadvantageous.

Director: We would like to get them in, it would be much better. Let's knock off this meeting and appoint members right now.

Gen. McDonald: I have Colonel Mussett.

Adm. Inglis: Captain Davis.

Mr. Armstrong: Mr. Booth.

Adm. Gingrich: Mr. Truehart.

Gen. Chamberlin: Is there any objection to having two? Both Colonel Ennis and Colonel Treacy. The thing caught us so short we had to make two individual studies and neither one have reached me, so I don't know what they are going to say, but I can get it within the next day or two.

Director: We can make a limitation of time for this committee here.

Gen. Chamberlin: I should think they could report their findings and differences rather expeditiously if they confine themselves to the four directives. However, I noted as I scanned these that there is material in the DCI directives--

Director: There are no origins for those.

Gen. Chamberlin: Which formerly appeared in the NIA directives and incorporated into the DCI directives. My opinion is so broad and fundamental, but shouldn't it be in the NSC directives. They may have to scan them to find out what should be picked out and put in the higher order directive, I might say, but I don't think they would have to go into the detail of the DCI directives. I may be wrong because I haven't made any detailed study myself.

Director: That is up to the committee. Let's call off our meeting and let the committee start.

Adm. Gingrich: One point I might mention, Hilly, there doesn't appear to be any provision in these first two directives here for an Intelligence Advisory Committee, or Board, such as is executed under our old setup. While there is no specific provision in the National Security Act for such a committee, I think you indicated there would be such a group. And it would seem to me important that that be provided for in this basic directive, something that is to operate, etc. Can it be defined?

Director: You have your ad hoc committee. In the law here it has very definitely said who will appoint committees. The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Resources Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence have the authority to appoint such committees, etc. On that, my legal people say their interpretation is that since the other people were not mentioned they are not authorized to appoint committees. I am not a lawyer.

Adm. Gingrich: I wasn't thinking of anyone else, but your committee is not indicated or laid down here.

Mr. Childs: They are coming out from the National Security Council as their directives and they cannot appoint committees.

Mr. Armstrong: They can direct the Director to appoint one.

Adm. Inglis: There isn't any law which says the National Security Council cannot appoint one.

Mr. Childs: But none saying they can.

Adm. Inglis: You know they are going to appoint committees.

Gen. McDonald: Those men are not shrinking violets--they have the authority.

Director: They haven't yet.

Adm. Inglis: We have a paper that is controversial. Again it was sent directly to the departments for a take it or leave it proposition. It got bogged down because there were dissents and controversy and people hesitated to act. These things can be ironed out on the working level and the way greased for much prompter action and less irritation.

Gen. Chamberlin: I would like to bring out one feature--to me it is a rather dangerous one. I know I would seriously object to it myself as a matter of principle. Maybe it should be considered by this group that we have. Whether it was intended or not, but when this paper was written, there is, undoubtedly, a strain in here which is to drive a wedge between the chief of the intelligence departments and his superior; because they say we can come up here and if we agree on any paper, the chiefs of the intelligence divisions, unanimously it becomes effective. If they haven't, then the Central Intelligence chief has the right of appeal to go over their head to their own Secretary. I would like to make it most emphatic when I come up here I speak for the Secretary and if I have doubts in the matter it is up to me to go to the Secretary to find out whether I am on the track and I personally object to seeing that wedge driving because it destroys completely command principles.

Director: There was no intention of that. If it is military it goes to the Secretary of Defense before it goes to the Council.

Gen. Chamberlin: The Secretary of Defense is all right, but it says the Secretary of the departments and that principle, I think, is a very dangerous thing from a military viewpoint and I would hate to see it included as a principle in the procedures of which I have anything to do.

Adm. Gingrich: Those things will come out in the ad hoc committee.

Gen. Chamberlin: I wanted to call it to the attention of the people here.

Gen. McDonald: This kind of activity recalls to mind some of the nasty features of the old NIA Directive No. 9, which you so kindly rescinded.

Director: I didn't, the NIA did.

Gen. McDonald: You instigated it. This is the reviving of it.

Gen. Chamberlin: I would be inclined to keep quiet at all times because I would be very much afraid it would be appealed over my head.

Director: Let's get our boys started here. Air Force--Colonel Mussett; Army--Colonel Ennis and Colonel Treacy; Navy--Captain Davis; State--Colonel Booth and Mr. Evans; AEC--Mr. Truehart. Can they start here now? We planned for the afternoon anyway.

Gen. Chamberlin: Are they to concern themselves only with the first four?

Director: General Todd, do you want to appoint anybody?

Gen. Todd: I'm hardly in a position to designate anyone. If you want General Gruenther--I think he would be just as happy if he wasn't called upon to do it.

Mr. Armstrong: I would suggest that the discussion only be confined to the first four, because our view is that some of those designated as DCI directives should be NSC.

Director: The first four have to have a priority because they have to go in.

Adm. Inglis: As a middle ground between those two thoughts, let us consider the first four NSC directives with the addition of anything in the DCI directives which the committee feels should be transposed to the NSC directives.

Director: No, because the NSC directives theoretically have to be in next Wednesday. I mean there is no time limitation to the others. You can have four or fourteen days.

Mr. Armstrong: I didn't mean that I didn't want the others to be included mechanically.

Adm. Gingrich: The question before this committee--would they discuss No. 2 in connection with these directives?

Director: I think that ought to wait until we see what comes out of this committee.

Adm. Gingrich: I think it has a bearing on the basic directive--whether you appoint it, or how.

Director: Let the committee discuss it. That, I think, can wait until after these others have gone in.

Adm. Inglis: At the moment we are operating under the blanket authority of the National Security Council because they approved for 60 days the directives of its predecessor the National Intelligence Authority and in turn authorized the Intelligence Advisory Board. So we have that authority to set and appoint our representatives. And I think that is proper at the moment. Is that right?

Director: I think that is debatable. No, I don't think you can stand up and say it is right. Among other things the NIA went out of existence.

Adm. Inglis: Didn't the National Security Council pick up the directives and say they would remain in effect for 60 days?

Director: I don't remember the exact words. That point has come up here and I think you can make a good argument either way.

Gen. Chamberlin: The National Intelligence Authority created an IAB. So if the National Intelligence Authority directives are in effect for 60 days there is automatically an IAB until the termination of that period.

Director: But on the other hand Congress cut off all of those in the Act.

Adm. Inglis: Without an extra legal man./3/

/3/Inglis' statement has been crossed out in the source text.

Director: Not extra legal, but one on this one. One thing you are sure of among other things is that there will be no NIA. The IAB reported to the NIA. The NIA doesn't exist, who can they report to?

Adm. Inglis: By virtue of the National Security Council approving the old NIA directives.

Director: It is not clear at all on that. We are losing time, let this committee get started.

333. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Research and Development Board (Bush) to Secretary of Defense Forrestal

Washington, December 5, 1947.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-806, Item 10. Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on July 3, 1953.

SUBJECT
Central Intelligence Agency

It became evident this morning when you and I were before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, that that Committee is going to delve into the intelligence situation vigorously. I indicated, and I judge that you agreed, that in this connection they should turn to the Central Intelligence Agency, and I believe they will do so soon.

Now I fear the CIA is not yet in a good position to meet this call. They have been studying the situation of directives, and particularly their relationships with the Atomic Energy Commission. In this connection, they have an Intelligence Advisory Committee which meets next Monday, but it seems to be quite divided. As to the question of whether CIA should be a small coordinating body or should be itself operating widely, I attach two memoranda from my staff which indicate to me that there is a considerable amount of confusion present as things now stand.

The CIA takes its instructions from the National Security Council. In view of what occurred this morning and the imminence of vigorous inquiry, I believe that Mr. Souers probably should be alerted and that the Security Council ought soon to pass on some of the policy questions involved. If you agree, then I suggest that it might be well to pass this memo on to him with your comments. Of course, I shall be glad to aid in any way that the Research and Development Board may be involved in this whole matter.

V. Bush/1/

Enclosure 1/2/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

/2/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-806, Item 11. Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on July 3, 1953.

Memorandum From the Director of the Programs Division (Clark) to the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, Department of Defense (Bush)

Washington, December 3, 1947.

SUBJECT
CIA Situation

1. With further reference to attached memorandum, Mr. Beckler, Dr. Brode,/3/ and I had lunch with Mr. Evans of the State Department to discuss this subject.

/3/Dr. Wallace R. Brode, Chief of the Scientific Branch, Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Another meeting of the IAC is to be held on Monday, 8 December, to discuss these directives and indications are that no agreement will be reached. The difficulty seems to be fundamental differences in philosophy between the two groups in that the heads of the intelligence operating agencies feel that CIA should be a small, high-level, strategic intelligence integrating organization, evolving what they call "national intelligence" from information supplied by the operating agencies, while CIA proposes to be a conglomerate of operating and evaluating functions with considerable authority over the other operating intelligence agencies.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee mentioned in Mr. Beckler's memorandum is, of course, not provided for by law, but in the original draft directives prepared by CIA it was proposed to have the Director of CIA reconstitute it as an advisory committee to the Director of CIA. The committee proposed by the present IAC would be established by Executive Order almost in the form of a governing committee for CIA. An Executive Order would be required as it is contended that the Security Council has no authority to establish such boards or committees. The Intelligence Advisory Committee proposed by the heads of the operating agencies would possess a great deal of power to influence the actions of the Director of CIA.

4. Someone at the highest level should define the objection of CIA in relation to the production of strategic intelligence in support of the activities of the Security Council and delineate relationships between CIA and the operating agencies in such manner that the work of producing information, detailed intelligence, and integrated strategic intelligence can proceed.

5. The situation has Dr. Brode completely stymied. It is blocking his attempts to recruit and organize his staff, and preventing RDB from obtaining any useful intelligence from CIA.

Ralph L. Clark/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Clark signed the original.

Enclosure 2/5/

/5/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-806, Item 12. Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on July 3, 1953.

Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Section (Beckler) to the Director of the Programs Division, Research and Development Board, Department of Defense (Bush)

Washington, December 2, 1947.

SUBJECT
The Critical Situation with Regard to Atomic Energy Intelligence

Explanation: The information contained in this memo is based on conversations with responsible members of the Atomic Energy Commission Intelligence Division. It points out the present awkward position of AEC in the field of atomic energy intelligence, which at present is handled almost exclusively by CIA.

1. The Central Intelligence Agency has been directed by the National Security Council to prepare suitable NSC directives to implement the National Security Act of 1947. Four basic directives and a number of Implementing Supplements thereto have been prepared by the CIA Planning Staff and were submitted by the Director of Intelligence to his Intelligence Advisory Committee/6/ at a meeting held on 30 November 1947./7/

/6/A footnote in the source text at this point gives the names of the IAC members.

/7/No record of this meeting has been found. The reference may be to Hillenkoetter's meeting with the departmental intelligence chiefs on November 20; see Document 332.

2. The proposed basic directives have not been submitted to RDB for comment. However, the tenor of Implementing Supplement IAC/4 (which was submitted to the Board) indicates that the directives place considerable authority and responsibility in the hands of the Director of CIA at the expense of the Departmental Intelligence Agencies as well as the AEC and RDB. The IAC members strongly opposed these directives and an ad hoc committee was formed to draft a new set for IAC consideration.

3. The ad hoc committee, under State Department leadership, prepared a set of revised directives which placed considerably more authority in the IAC and less in the Director of CIA than was proposed in the earlier directives. According to the revised directives, major recommendations of the Director to the NSC must be accompanied by the concurrence or dissent of the IAC. Further, under revised Directive No. 1, CIA would not engage in basic intelligence research in those fields in which the Departmental Intelligence Agencies are engaged. In short, the original and revised directives embody totally different philosophies. Under one, CIA would be almost completely self-sufficient. Under the other, CIA would be a small coordinating body surrounded by strong Departmental Intelligence Agencies.

4. Regardless of the merits of one set of directives vs. the other--the present confusion is causing considerable embarrassment to the newly created Intelligence Division of the AEC, and greatly impedes its operations. Since the directives as finally decided upon may affect the nature and scope of AEC intelligence operations, the Army, Navy, and Air Departments as well as CIA--while agreeing in principle to cooperation with AEC--are deferring actual exchange of information until the AEC-CIA relationship is crystallized. Considering the conflicting directives which have been proposed--this may take considerable time.

5. Dr. Brode has not been officially advised with respect to these negotiations and has not been consulted in connection with the problem of AEC-CIA cooperation.

6. Conclusions:

(a) There is considerable difference of opinion as to the type of CIA organization that would be best suited to implement the provisions and spirit of the National Security Act. Until CIA specifically delineates its objectives and responsibilities and defines its terms and mission, it is doubtful that the best organizational pattern can be decided upon.

(b) RDB is greatly concerned with the present attempts to formulate directives. It is completely dependent upon CIA for strategic as well as scientific intelligence which are the sine qua non for carrying out Board responsibilities under the Act. The extent of CIA's ability to produce such intelligence will largely be determined by the outcome of the present negotiations.

(c) Atomic Energy Intelligence is in a critical situation.

7. Recommendations:

(a) That RDB determine the nature and type of intelligence it requires from CIA.

(b) That RDB suggest directives to CIA that are best calculated to effect (a).

(c) That RDB request CIA to keep the Board informed as to the status of directives under consideration with the view of commenting thereon.

334. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council

Washington, December 10, 1947.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence Directives. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Proposed National Security Council Directives to the Central Intelligence Agency

REFERENCE
NSC Action No. 3

1. In its first meeting the National Security Council agreed that:

a. All directives of the National Intelligence Authority to the Central Intelligence Group be continued in full force and effect until specifically repealed, altered or augmented by the National Security Council, or changed in accordance with paragraph b below.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence should submit to the Council within sixty days proposed authorizations supplanting the former directives of the National Intelligence Authority and specifying his functions and those of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947.

2. Pursuant to 1-b above, the proposed National Security Council Intelligence Directives enclosed herewith,/1/ which have been prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence and coordinated with the intelligence chiefs of the participating departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff), are submitted herewith for consideration by the Council at its third meeting at 3:00 p.m. on Friday, December 12. The enclosed Directives, which have been generally agreed to by the above intelligence chiefs, are under final consideration by them, and any non-concurrences will be submitted to the Council tomorrow./2/

/1/Copies of draft NSC Intelligence Directives Nos. 1-6 were enclosed. For texts as approved by the NSC, see Documents 422-426 and 432.

/2/The documentation on the preparation of the first set of National Security Council Intelligence Directives is sketchy and incomplete. The only account is in Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 214-217, who appears to have had access to some materials that have not been located. According to Darling's account, the ad hoc committee established at Hillenkoetter's November 20 meeting with the departmental intelligence chiefs (Document 332) brought in a set of draft directives that were unacceptable to Hillenkoetter, or at least unacceptable in part. At about the same time, Darling records, Hillenkoetter received a copy of Secretary of the Army Royall's memorandum of November 26 (Document 230) opposing Hillenkoetter's concept of an Intelligence Advisory Committee. Hillenkoetter thereupon appealed to Forrestal, who called a meeting of the Service Secretaries and Service Intelligence Chiefs and rebuked General Chamberlin and Admiral Inglis for their opposition to Hillenkoetter's proposals. Hillenkoetter then had his follow-on meeting with the departmental intelligence chiefs on December 8, at which there was general agreement on the directives to be submitted to the NSC. A verbatim record of the December 8 meeting, which apparently was not circulated at the time but was subsequently located by Darling, is not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-657)

3. One additional NSC Intelligence Directive will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence at a future date, and this will complete action pursuant to paragraph 1-b above.

Sidney W. Souers/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

335. Minutes of the 3d Meeting of the National Security Council

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Washington, December 12, 1947.

PARTICIPANTS

Members Present
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, presiding
George F. Kennan, representing the Secretary of State
Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army
John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy
W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force
Arthur M. Hill, Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, Research and Development Board (invited but unable to attend)

Others Present
Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence
Cornelius V. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Department of the Navy
Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Department of the Air Force
Major General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Department of the Navy
John H. Ohly, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
W. Park Armstrong, Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Robert Blum, office of the Secretary of Defense

Secretariat
Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary

ACTIONS

1. Organization, Activities and Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency

Admiral Hillenkoetter gave an oral report on the organization, activities and plans of the Central Intelligence Agency. All Council members asked questions and made suggestions on this subject.

Specifically, Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that there was a difference of opinion as to whether he had coordinating authority over the departmental intelligence agencies or whether the chiefs of such departmental agencies constituted a board of management over the Director of Central Intelligence.

Secretary Forrestal said, and the other members agreed, that there was no question as to the coordinating authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. Secretary Forrestal said that Admiral Hillenkoetter tells the Departments what he needs for collation and evaluation and the Departments are required to provide it.

Admiral Hillenkoetter answered various criticisms made in an article in magazine "Armed Forces" by Hanson Baldwin.

Secretary Forrestal said that he was not so concerned about such criticisms. The real test of the success of CIA, in his opinion, will be two years hence.

Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that the average annual pay of CIA personnel in grades equivalent to officer rank is $4000.

Secretary Forrestal expressed the belief, and other members agreed, that this appeared to be a low average. He said that he would rather have a few good men in CIA than many mediocre.

Admiral Hillenkoetter reported that the turnover in CIA as a result of loyalty screening was one per cent per year, while the turnover resulting from efficiency screening was eight per cent per year.

The National Security Council:/1/

/1/The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

Noted and commented upon the oral report on the organization, activities and plans of the Central Intelligence Agency by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Proposed National Security Council Directives to the Central Intelligence Agency (Reference: Memo for the NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 10, 1947)/2/

/2/Document 334.

The Council amended and approved the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1./3/

/3/For text of this and other National Security Council Intelligence Directives, see Documents 422-435.

Secretary Symington felt that NSCID Nos. 2 and 3 were designed to avoid duplication while at the same time meeting the secondary needs of the various Departments. He said that if the Council would not assign primary responsibility for air intelligence to the Department of the Air Force, these papers would mean nothing.

Secretary Sullivan felt that such an assignment would mean that the Navy would lose all its naval air attachés and naval air intelligence. He said that the interests of the Air Force do not include all matters of interest to naval air intelligence.

Secretary Symington said that this was not necessarily the case and that the Air Force would use naval air attaches where they appeared to be appropriate.

Secretary Forrestal asked that Council action on NSCID Nos. 2 and 3 be deferred so that he might reconcile the diversion of views of the Navy and the Air Force.

Mr. Kennan urged that the assignment of responsibilities in NSCID No. 2 really be carried out in overseas missions, since it would eliminate costly duplication and lack of coordination.

The Council then amended and approved NSCID Nos. 4 and 5, and approved NSCID No. 6.

The National Security Council:/4/

/4/Paragraphs a-e constitute NSC Action No. 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)

a. Approved National Security Intelligence Directive No. 1 (NSCID 1) subject to the following amendments:

(1) Revised paragraph 2 thereof to read:

"2. To the extent authorized by Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspections of the departmental intelligence material of the various Federal Departments and Agencies relating to the national security as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and to make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities."

(2) In paragraph 4, second line, delete the words "and national policy."

(3) In paragraph 6, line 2, add the words "Federal Bureau of Investigation and" between "disseminate to the" and "other Departments".

b. Deferred action on the proposed NSCID Nos. 2 and 3, pending reconciliation within the national military establishment of the divergent views of the Secretaries of the Navy and of the Air Force.

c. Approved NSCID No. 4, subject to the addition of the word "Staff" after "NSC" in the third line of paragraph 2. (The Council also noted the remarks of the Executive Secretary that, for this purpose, the NSC Staff shall consist of the Executive Secretary and the departmental representatives designated by Council members to advise and assist the Executive Secretary, and that any cases of disagreement within this group will be referred to the National Security Council for decision.)

d. Approved NSCID No. 5, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Delete the asterisk in paragraph 1 and the footnote.

(2) Revise paragraph 2 to read:

"2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authority shall not be construed to preclude the counter-intelligence activities of any army, navy or air command or installation and certain agreed activities by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations.

e. Approved NSCID No. 6 without change.

336. National Security Council Resolution

Washington, January 13, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Box 1555. Top Secret. The source text is Annex 1 to the Intelligence Survey Group Report to the NSC, January 1, 1949. The full text is in the Supplement. The resolution was approved by the NSC at its 5th meeting January 13. A brief entry in the minutes records that Souers presented the resolution and the NSC approved it and forwarded the names of Allen Dulles, Mathias Correa, and William H. Jackson for the President's consideration as members of the survey group. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Minutes, Fifth Meeting) The resolution was approved as NSC Action No. 25. (Ibid., Record of Actions, Box 55)

The National Security Council has agreed that a group of two or three specially qualified individuals not in the Government service should make a comprehensive, impartial, and objective survey of the organization, activities, and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. As a result of this survey this group should report to the Council its findings and recommendations on the following matters:

a. The adequacy and effectiveness of the present organizational structure of CIA.

b. The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.

c. The relationship of these activities to those of other Departments and Agencies.

d. The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.

The National Security Council also authorized and directed the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Chiefs of the Departments represented on the Council to give the above group access to all information and facilities required for their survey, except details concerning intelligence sources and methods.

337. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Intelligence Advisory Committee

Washington, January 27, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-54. Confidential. Sent to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, Army General Staff; the Chief of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Air Force Intelligence; and for information to the Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff.

SUBJECT
Interdepartmental Intelligence Production Program

1. The program for the production of intelligence contained in National Security Council Intelligence Directive 3 can be considered as no more than a statement of overall policies and objectives for the Central Intelligence Agency and the several intelligence agencies of the National Security Council departments. It defines the several types of intelligence and indicates which departments have dominant interest in certain fields of intelligence. It leaves the highly important scientific, technological and economic fields of intelligence unallocated except as to the individual needs of each department. The paper does not, nor was it intended to, provide a definite intelligence production schedule. However, such a schedule is highly desirable and procedures should be perfect now to insure that all fields are properly and adequately covered and that each department receives the material outside its field of dominant interest, which it requires for intelligence purposes.

2. It is the opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence that a prompt and positive approach must be made to a solution of this problem and that he must advise and make recommendations in this field to the National Security Council in fulfillment of his statutory duty as set forth in Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947.

3. It is proposed that the Central Intelligence Agency prepare an interagency intelligence production program, that the preparation be carried out in close cooperation with the intelligence agencies represented on the National Security Council, that it be submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for concurrence or comment prior to issuance for implementation.

4. As a first step in the development of this plan, the Director of Central Intelligence requests that each department intelligence chief submit a comprehensive and detailed statement of the intelligence production program of his department, clearly defining (a) the intelligence requirements of his department; (b) the internal production schedule of his agency to meet these requirements; (c) the existing interagency agreements to augment (1) the internal production with external material and (2) the external requirements with internal production; and (d) the requirements not adequately or satisfactorily met by (b) and (c).

5. The Central Intelligence Agency will attempt to correlate these departmental programs and prepare an integrated plan, with full regard to the existing basic intelligence program, for study, comment and possible revision by the Standing Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee for subsequent presentation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

6. With a view toward eliminating undesirable duplication of effort in the production of intelligence, particularly in regard to publications, consideration is being given to the proposal previously made by the JIC that the Central Intelligence Agency assume the functions of the Publication Review Subcommittee.

7. It is requested that each recipient of this memorandum inform the Director of Central Intelligence promptly as to the date by which he will be able to comply with 4 above.

R. H. Hillenkoetter/1/
Rear Admiral, USN

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

338. Letter From the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant (McNeil) to Mathias F. Correa

Washington, February 2, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Personal and Secret.

Dear Mat: When you were in Secretary Forrestal's office early last week I mentioned that I had a paper that I thought might be helpful in your study of the Central Intelligence Agency.

This paper is unsigned but for your information was written by Stephen Penrose, who has been with me here for about three months but who is leaving to become President of Beirut University. Penrose was with OSS during the war--in charge of their Middle East Division and later came to Washington in one of their divisions. He left C.I.A. because he felt that there were too many Captains and Colonels placed in charge of divisions who did not have background for the Intelligence type of work. Hillenkoetter told me he thought Penrose was an extremely able person but it had been reported to him that Penrose did not get along with some of his subordinates. I don't know whether that is true or not but in the short time he has been here I haven't found that to be the case.

To my mind there is little question that his statements might be colored to a degree because of his leaving C.I.A., but I have found him to be a "solid citizen"--everything he has told me has a basis in fact.

Sincerely,

W. J. McNeil

Enclosure/1/

/1/Secret.

Memorandum by Stephen Penrose

Washington, January 2, 1948.

REPORT ON CIA

Special Operations is continuing to lose its experienced officers with four and five years of wartime experience. It is on the point of losing its foreign exchange expert, who learned his business with the Navy in World War I, and who, in the last war provided funds for secret operations in OSS so successfully that not a single operation was ever blown through improper use of money. His record was not duplicated even by the British service. With him goes all capacity of SO for fiscal counter-intelligence. With him also is lost the agent cashier most widely trusted by the Treasury.

SO is also probably losing a branch chief who was closely connected in OSS with the advance preparations for the Africa landings and acquired there and later a knowledge of handling undercover work which is not now equalled in the organization since the previous departure of other similarly experienced men.

One of the most experienced and effective field mission chiefs in the organization has just returned to this country and there is strong likelihood that he will decide to leave the work. This man is the author of a recent report on the situation in Austria, prepared at the request of USFA, which has made a very great impression on the State Department.

None of these losses is necessary, for all three men had considered intelligence as their profession. They are simply fed up with what they consider to be the inept and unimaginative policies of SO, and have lost confidence in its leadership.

Special Operations is headed by an officer known among his Army friends as "Wrong-Way" Galloway. Their doubtful esteem of him is more than matched by that of his associates and subordinates within his office and by that of the heads of other branches within CIA. He is hardly on speaking terms with General Sibert of OO. He has permitted the State Department SO to hamper and control the nature of most SO field operations and has secured so little support for his major liaison officer that the latter, another man of considerable experience, is also looking elsewhere for work. Colonel Galloway has little comprehension of the real nature of secret operations, and is so irascible and dogmatic that he discourages any efforts to discuss technical details with him. For his technical and organizational advice he is accustomed to call upon subordinates like William Tharp, Chadbourne Gilpatrick, or Harry Rositzke, who although they have been in the organization for some time, have had practically no real operational experience. Their freely offered operational theories appear to be acceptable to Colonel Galloway at the same time that they are the despair of their more experienced associates. Gilpatrick has just become the major deputy to the Chief of Operations Staff, who has been persuaded to assign elsewhere the only technically experienced assistant he possessed on his immediate staff. As a result of this development apprehension has increased on the operating levels, and new withdrawals are being contemplated.

In the face of the losses of experience, Colonel Galloway is bringing back into his office the Colonel Dabney whose unwise and uninformed suggestions as regards organizational structure are in part responsible for the ineffectiveness of operation which has so discouraged the older men. The policy of bringing in newcomers to occupy key posts without giving them operational seasoning results in keeping the organization constantly off balance through the varying and uncertain direction which it receives. Colonel Galloway's deputy is a Captain McCracken (Navy) whose interest in the work is not matched by any intelligence experience, and his complete subordination to Colonel Galloway gives him little opportunity to serve as anything but a "yes-man". Captain McCracken replaced Captain Goggins who was only too happy to return to active Navy duty in Panama after serving a term as Colonel Galloway's deputy.

In spite of this situation within SO it is still the one branch of CIA which has the respect of outside agencies. OIR in State prefers to receive raw intelligence direct from SO rather than in processed form from OR&E, not only for the sake of speed but because the type of processing now given by OR&E detracts from rather than adds to the value of the reports. With rare exceptions the studies put out by OR&E are such as might be written by any fairly well-informed person, and they command little respect from the users of such reports in State, Army or Navy. The Strategic Intelligence Division of the Army recently pointed out that it had received no useful additions to its files since the R & A Branch of OSS had been broken up. It considers its conferences with CIA to be largely a waste of time, particularly as regards Russian matters. Captain Frankel (Navy) of the OR&E Russian division seems content to rest upon his short visits to Russia as sufficient qualification of him as a Russian expert.

A report on an aviation subject was recently prepared for OR&E by the Library of Congress. The research people of the Library developed a rather low opinion of the OR&E men with whom they had contact who seemed to be astonished at the quality of the report, which they felt was beyond their capacity. On a later report in the same field the Library furnished to a research man from OR&E a complete bibliography for his research, covering European materials in the main. They were told by him to omit anything which was not in English since he could not handle any foreign language. This eliminated at least 80 percent of the material. Naturally the Aeronautics Division of the Library was not favorably impressed by the capacity of the research man or of those who directed him and had presumably planned his work.

An unduly large proportion of the effort of OR&E is devoted to put-ting out the daily intelligence summary. This publication, containing chiefly State Department materials, could be put together in short order by a small unit of editorial analysts instead of requiring half the day of the majority of branch heads and their staffs, as appears now often to be the case.

OR&E, which should be the top research and analysis office in the government, is headed by a former assistant military attaché in Turkey who was never distinguished either for research or administrative ability during his pre-war stay on the Yale faculty. His stature is not such as to attract highly qualified research experts. One of the ablest men in OR&E, the head of the scientific branch, is there more because of the influence of Dr. Bush than of anyone in CIA, and he is very critical of the inflexible and unimaginative organizational and personnel policies of CIA as interpreted by Col. Shannon, with whom he has already come into conflict.

Dr. Wallace Brode, the distinguished scientist mentioned, has not been permitted to organize his own branch according to his own ideas, although his organizational views were proved by experience at Inyokern during the war. When his plans were finally forwarded they were accompanied by a set of contrasting plans drawn by Col. Babbitt and Col. Shannon, in the drafting of which Dr. Brode was not consulted. Such action was contrary to the written agreement made between Dr. Bush and General Vandenberg.

Contacts between CIA and outside scientific agencies are channeled, as are most CIA liaisons with other agencies, through the Office of Collection and Dissemination or the Office of Operations. The former is controlled by Col. Sands, a former CIC head in Germany under Gen. Sibert, who heads OO. Contact with AEC is supposedly maintained by Col. Seaman of OCD, formerly an officer with Manhattan District but possessing no scientific stature approaching that of Dr. Brode through whom AEC would greatly prefer to channel their relations with CIA. Dr. Brode is a member of the National Research Council, relations with which are supposed to be carefully channelled through OCD to some secretary of the Council. Dr. Brode is thus supposed to handle relations with himself through the devious intermediation of a chain of uninformed contacts.

In short, OCD, which should be vitally concerned with expediting and facilitating contacts with outside agencies for operational or informational purposes, interposes a mechanical and inflexible channelling procedure which can and does block such contacts and bottleneck the interchange of information which should flow freely through them. Without question a system of approving outside contacts is essential but it must be administered imaginatively and not in the mechanical fashion which is apt to be typical of military procedure.

With regard to the Office of Operations, it has brought CIA into considerable disrepute among a number of large business concerns and notably Standard Oil of N.J., because of the ineptitude with which contacts were established and handled. As a result CIA is effectively blocked off from such potential sources of valuable intelligence, which Operations Office was set up to tap.

Partly because of the bad relations existent between the heads of OO and SO and partly because of the ineffectiveness of the former office practically no leads have been provided to SO for long range undercover operations or personnel. OO, because of its expected wide connections with business firms and educational institutions, was supposed to unearth numerous opportunities which SO could be counted on to exploit, or to acquaint SO with personnel who might be utilized in SO's operations. Neither service for SO has developed in practice.

In the direct line of its own responsibility for briefing and debriefing competent Americans travelling abroad OO has shown little alertness to respond to cases brought directly to its attention. Recently the impending voyage abroad of a well-qualified observer was brought to OO's notice, but no contact was made before the man's departure and none has occurred since his return. Because of the lack of contact it was not possible to judge OO's competence at briefing and debriefing, but the indications are that relations with the geographic experts of OR&E or SO are not sufficiently close or frequently developed to permit the manning on short notice of a qualified briefing panel or the preparation of a professional brief.

The disturbing situation which has been described is the more alarming because it occurs at a time when, as almost never before, the government needs an effective, expanding, professional intelligence service. On the contrary, CIA is losing its professionals, and is not acquiring competent new personnel who might gain experience in the only rapid way possible, namely by close association with those professionals. It is dependent in most working branches for imaginative and energetic direction upon career military men of a type which is not apt to be either imaginative or energetic as regards non-military intelligence or procedures. As a direct result, CIA has failed to win the confidence of the military services or the State Department and is rapidly losing what confidence they had had in its predecessor organizations. Yet effective cooperation with these departments is a sine qua non of CIA success. Under present conditions such cooperation does not exist to any practical degree. Other departments feel no assurance that they can rely upon CIA to perform intelligence functions which they will privately admit could and probably should be performed centrally. Without that assurance they will continue, as they are continuing, to operate their individual intelligence services in a manner which cannot but nullify the principles of coordination and centralization which were implicit in the establishment of CIA.

339. Letter From Sherman Kent to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, February 9, 1948.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-808, Item 4. Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on March 9, 1953. Kent had been invited by Hillenkoetter in December 1947 to survey the Office of Reports and Estimates. (Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 301-302)

Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter: Herewith a memo on some of ORE's problems. As I note in the introductory paragraph, I have confined myself to those few things in which the shortness of my visit was not too heavy a handicap to my judgment.

I have hesitated to have this manuscript typed in New Haven. It is confidential enough in character so that I would not like to see it in the morning paper. You will thus perhaps pardon my sending it to you in long hand. (On the chance that Miss Brian will type it, I have noted a couple of spots where I have asked her to perform minor editorial services.)

Seeing the ORE organization was a great pleasure. I am honored to have had the invitation.

Kindest regards, yours sincerely

Sherman Kent/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Kent signed the original.

Enclosure/2/

/2/Confidential. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on March 9, 1953.

Memorandum From Sherman Kent to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, February 9, 1948.

Summary

1. A problem of first magnitude is the matter of the mission of CIA and especially its ORE. At the present ORE is not a coordinator of departmental intelligence. ORE much more resembles a fifth departmental intelligence organization. As such it faces two grave disadvantages:

a. It has no direct consumer within its own organization as ID has its P&O and hence is likely to feel the lack of guidance and direction.

b. It is excluded from overt collection (abroad).

2. There are three problems of a second magnitude. They deal with ORE and the outside.

a. ORE is not close enough to the consumers it does serve to know precisely their requirements, nor is it close enough to carry to the consumers a knowledge of ORE's capabilities.

b. The collection and dissemination function now allocated to OCD should be assigned to ORE.

c. ORE and OO should be brought closer together if ORE is to get the full benefit of OO's outside contacts.

3. There is one problem of a third magnitude. It concerns ORE and its management of its own substantive program.

I incline to the belief that a higher centralization of substantive control would improve ORE's performance. In noting the above I hope it will be appreciated that I do not consider that my short visit to ORE (three days) makes me an expert adviser on this point.

Sherman Kent/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

INTRODUCTORY

In the following pages I confine myself to a limited number of problems of CIA and ORE. The problems which I have singled out are those upon which I feel my comments will be most valid although based upon no more than three days study and interview. I recognize three magnitudes of importance in the problems which I have chosen:

1st magnitude--the mission of CIA and ORE
2nd magnitude--ORE and its outside activities
3rd magnitude--ORE and its internal organization.

I. The Mission of CIA and ORE.

The National Security Act defines the mission of CIA as a twofold mission:

(a) coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security . . . ; and

(b) performing certain intelligence operations which can be more advantageously performed centrally; or other operations . . . .

With respect to (b): No comment.

With respect to (a): In the nature of things, the coordinating function of CIA will be performed by its ORE plus perhaps CIA's top level administrative staff. The most important share (that is, the substantive share) of the work of coordination would naturally fall to ORE. But ORE will have greatest difficulty--if not insuperable difficulty--in performing this function. Its difficulties inhere in both (1) the NSC Intelligence Directives, especially #1 (which appears to me to afford departmental intelligence the weapons and strategic position to resist any intrusive coordinative activities by ORE) and (2) the fact of ORE's present size, administrative organization, and personnel. The present ORE could not do the large coordinating job if by chance it were given clear mandate by new NSC directives.

In my view this leads to the conclusion that the present ORE is the equivalent of a fifth departmental intelligence arm. As such it is in competition with the other four and disadvantageously so. Of the many disadvantages it confronts I cite two:

(1) Since it has no direct policy, planning, or operating consumer to service within its own organization (as ID services P&O, for example), it is likely to suffer from a lack of feeling of immediacy, and more importantly, to suffer from a want of close, confidential, and friendly guidance. The consumers outside CIA which ORE in fact presently services can never provide the same sharp and demanding guidance which a departmental intelligence unit may expect from the department's own policy, planning, and operating units. As to ORE's present consumers and the guidance they afford, more in the next section (i.e. #II.).

(2) Since ORE's formal mission is the coordination of departmental intelligence, NSC Intelligence Directive #2 allocates to ORE no overt collecting functions. If ORE were in fact a coordinating mechanism--pure and simple--this denial of the function would be exactly right. But inasmuch as ORE performs most of the duties performed by departmental intelligence, and very few not cognate with these duties, ORE should have its continuous flow of foreign publications and reports by overt U.S. observers. But for these publications and reports it must rely upon the collecting activities of the four "Security" departments. This arrangement will, in one sense, merely inconvenience ORE to the extent that all departmental units are inconvenienced by another's slow service. But in another sense, and one of utmost importance, it can virtually destroy ORE. For whatever intelligence doctrine may say to the contrary, the collecting phase of research is not separable from the other phases: a man who is working on a theory of, say, the overthrow of France must be able directly or indirectly to procure for himself data, the need for which he could not foresee when he began his work; he must have on the Madrid end of the wire, so to speak, a professional friend and equal who understands his problem from the ground up, and who will collect or observe what he requires and that immediately.

The intelligence unit which is closely bound to its own high grade foreign collecting force is likely to be the best; the intelligence unit which has no collecting force of its own is at a prodigious disadvantage.

It is not impossible that departmental policy with respect to intelligence may contrive the virtual destruction of departmental intelligence. There are already signs of this. Should such occur, and should CIA (and its ORE) gain what might be called a monopoly in the field of national intelligence, the intelligence situation would be grave. In these circumstances CIA could service its high level consumers with complete adequacy, but I do not think it could service its lower level departmental consumers. In the first place the task would be so large that the necessary organization would be almost impossible to build, if not administer. In the second place no matter how well built and administered, it would always have trouble getting appropriate guidance from the departmental consumers. In the third place the departments themselves, even though reduced in funds for intelligence, would establish all manner of small black-market intelligence organizations under cover names. The effect of this would be to furnish the immediate departmental consumer with a less good product, but preferred by him because it was his own, and to dissipate what was left of the department's intelligence resources throughout a number of small uncoordinated cells.

You will perhaps pardon the above excursion into a remote and uncertain future. I would not have taken it if I had not heard responsible government people seriously advocate a central intelligence monopoly.

II. ORE and its outside activities.

Under this heading I will discuss three problems:

First is the problem of ORE and its high level consumers. To the extent possible ORE should be brought into closest and most direct contact with consumers such as the NSC, SANACC, and JIG. Contact such as having an ORE officer represent CIA (or participate in CIA's representation) at NSC staff discussions would have two great benefits: (a) It would assure ORE of knowing the precise nature of the consumer's requirements; and (b) it would enable ORE to convey to the consumer the precise dimensions of its (ORE's) capabilities. It is to be noted that these two matters interlock: when the consumer knows ORE's capabilities, he may change the dimensions of this requirement (add to it, lessen it, or reorient it), and, when ORE knows the precise dimensions of the requirement, it may deploy its resources in such a fashion as to enlarge its capabilities. So long as liaison between consumer and ORE is maintained by someone not possessed of the highest professional competence in matters of substance and firsthand knowledge of ORE's resources, that liaison is almost certain to be inadequate for the purposes of both ORE and the consumer.

Second is the problem of ORE and OCD. It is my understanding that you intend to merge these offices when occasion presents itself. To do so, in my view, is a matter of the very highest importance. As an outsider I may not be considered presumptuous to reinforce your decision with arguments (which may also be your own) which I consider unanswerable.

A. Re Collection

1. The collecting phase of research is inseparable from the other phases. It must always be conducted under the guidance and supervision of the substantive expert who uses the materials; and in some cases it must be conducted by the professional himself. The greatest disfavor that can be done a substantive expert is to deny him the right to commune with his opposite numbers and to forbid him to swap information and documents with them. To allocate the collecting function to persons of non-professional stature and give them a monopoly of the function is to hamstring the expert.

2. Should you see fit to set up a library or central repository of materials, (which I heartily endorse) this library staff can be useful in collecting on its own hook and without repeated requests from the professionals several types of material (eg): State Department cables, attache reports, studies by other intelligence outfits, etc. But the library staff must not get the notion that it has exclusive rights to collection. It must realize that its function is a modest service function. It must realize that it may collect only where, in so doing, it lightens the burden of the professionals.

B. Re Dissemination

1. The dissemination function should be attached to the office of the Director of ORE. He is the man most concerned to know where his product is going and most concerned about consumer reaction.

Third is the problem of ORE, OO and the outer world which OO deals with. In my experience an OO can be of highest usefulness to an ORE, but only on the following terms:

A. ORE must cultivate the OO field personnel. It must send its experts to their field offices. It must see to it that OO personnel are thoroughly briefed on subjects under ORE scrutiny, on where ORE's knowledge is rich and where poor, on ORE's general program of research and its continuing responsibilities.

B. OO must reciprocate. It must send its field personnel to Washington. They should know the ORE personnel, administrative organization, substantive problems, etc. They will do their best work when they feel themselves almost a part of ORE.

If this relationship can be built the OO-ORE team will be a powerful affair.

A note on the Daily Summary.

The Daily Summary is probably as good a document as can be brought to the attention of its most important half dozen readers. So long as they have no complaints, the Daily can be regarded as making contract. Complaints however may be registered by readers lower on the distribution list whose positions in the government permit them a high degree of technical expertise in certain substantive matters. That they should complain of omissions, overemphasis, superficial comment is to be expected. The Daily which would best serve their purposes would be a much longer and far more technical document. ORE could probably write it, but in so doing, ORE would almost automatically lose its present most important readers.

Because of the importance of the Daily's top half-dozen readers, its snob-appeal will be enormous. Many officers of the government will want to be on the distribution list for the sake of the company they will be keeping, or out of idle but pardonable curiosity. Those with least reason to be on the list are likely to be the ones worst served by the document and most critical of its fancied shortcomings.

III. ORE and its management of its substantive program.

I incline to the belief that a higher degree of centralization in the control of ORE's substantive program would be beneficial. On the basis of my very short visit, it seemed to me that control of planning and programming the output was dispersed among three or four small units. If this should be the fact, there are several possible penalties. Two of these I regard as of high importance.

A. Loose or dispersed control permits the performance and completion of work with something less than the totality of the Office's resources having been brought to bear upon it. (A Western European section can do a job on the Communist Party in France without being forced to collaborate with the USSR section, the Economists, etc.)

B. Loose or dispersed control is not able to keep up standards of research across the board. Tight centralized control which forces the less good units to collaborate on joint projects with the best units has an easy and telling device to set uniform and high standards of performance.

Continue with Document 325