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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
350. Memorandum From Robert G. Barnes to William J. McWilliams of the Executive Secretariat
Washington, August 25, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.5/8-2548. Top Secret; For State Department Officers Only. The date is from the Executive Secretariat receipt stamp on the source text.
SUBJECT
State Material for CIAThere is attached a draft memorandum covering the question of the transmission to the Central Intelligence Agency of State Department telegrams and the use which CIA makes of these telegrams.
I have discussed this problem at some length with Mr. Armstrong. He agrees that this is a vital question which urgently needs to be settled, and he shares my view that we probably cannot reach any agreement on it short of taking the question to the National Security Council. However, he feels that State should first raise this question with Admiral Hillenkoetter, in the presence of representatives of the Jackson-Dulles-Correa Committee. Should this approach fail to achieve agreement, we would then be in a better position to refer the matter to the NSC.
I agree entirely with the course of action suggested above. My recommendation is that, after you have gone over the attached draft and in the light of these suggestions, you might refer this paper to Mr. Arm-strong for his specific comments. Whatever line of action we decide to take, I think it is important that we have very clearly in mind all aspects of the problem, the points which are essential to our position, and the counteroffers which might be proposed by CIA.
Mr. Armstrong is also of the opinion that we will encounter considerable resistance to any proposed limitation on the right of CIA to pre-sent State policy questions until such time as we publish, for dissemination at least to NSC members, a daily review of policy questions somewhat along the lines of our present top secret Daily Staff Summary. I have considerable reservations as to whether we can and should get into such an operation or whether it is not better to allow CIA to continue to operate to a limited extent in this field with a far more restricted distribution.
Attachment/1/
Draft Memorandum
Washington, undated.
/1/Top Secret; For State Department Officers Only. Drafted by R.G. Barnes.
Problem: To determine appropriate Departmental policy for the distribution of policy information to the Central Intelligence Agency and the use to which the CIA may put this information.
Background: Ever since the establishment of the original Central Intelligence Group the State Department has been making available to that agency most of its daily telegrams, which are now supplied to the CIA through two channels:
1. Routine intelligence reports, press telegrams and the less sensitive policy matters are automatically distributed to CIA by the Division of Communications and Records. Exclusive of administrative and personnel matters, this distribution includes the major portion of our traffic. These telegrams are made available to all sections and divisions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. High level policy telegrams, top secret material and other sensitive matters are screened in S/S and, where appropriate, released to CIA. The majority of the telegrams falling into this category are released to CIA, though distribution of these within CIA is restricted to the office of the Director and to the research group.
The Unification Act makes the following provision with respect to the supplying of information to the Central Intelligence Agency:
"To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government . . . relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government . . . shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination."
Although this issue has never specifically been raised in the National Security Council, the Department has always placed a very broad interpretation on this provision. We now supply CIA with all appropriate intelligence material and with most policy material, for the background information and guidance of the research analysts. It is not only difficult to draw a clear distinction between political and economic policy and intelligence matters, but the extensive use of cross references in our telegrams makes it difficult to withhold any considerable body of material without inviting charges that we are withholding it. The material actually withheld from CIA at present is limited to strictly personal matters and certain high policy questions which have not been fully resolved or are transmitted on an "eyes only" basis./2/
/2/We have consistently taken the position with CIA that we are supplying them with all State Department material. In other words, CIA is not allowed to secure references or other direct evidence that material, other than personal communications, is ever being withheld from that agency. This should be clearly kept in mind in any discussions with CIA, since an admission that we are withholding material would allow them to shift the attack against us. As the record now stands, the performance of State is so much better than of Army or Navy that the best cards are in our hands for any possible negotiations. [Footnote in the source text.]
It should be noted that the Departments of the Army and Navy have consistently placed a different interpretation on their obligations to CIA. In general they make available only such material as is available to their own intelligence divisions. This excludes almost all policy or operational questions and, in the case of the Army, most of the material handled by the Civil Affairs Division. The position of the Department of the Air Force, which is just beginning to set up its own cable channels, is not known.
Discussion: All of the material made available by the State Department to CIA is used in the preparation of their daily top secret summary, whether it is of a policy or of an intelligence nature. This leads to several distinct but closely related problems:
1. CIA frankly publishes their daily summary as an "operational" rather than as an "intelligence" publication. This means that while over 80 percent of all their material is derived from State Department sources, the emphasis in their daily summary is also heavy in the direction of State Department policy decisions and reports. There are some issues in which practically every item is the report of a State Department policy position (Tab A)./3/
/3/None of the tabs is printed.
2. CIA frequently attaches their own comment to items which appear in the daily summary. This occasionally tends to discredit the intelligence reporting of some of our missions and also leads to the situation where CIA comments (without the full benefit of all the policy considerations) on a State policy position. If the desired goal is the publication of a document revealing current State Department policy, it would seem more appropriate that this be published within State in close coordination with the policy offices; if the goal is a daily intelligence digest, CIA should not publish State policy positions.
3. The CIA daily receives too broad a circulation for a document reporting on top level State policy decisions. The current distribution list is attached (Tab B). In addition to the points of distribution, which have been set in consultation with Admiral Souers, CIA has reserved the right to give each recipient as many copies as he desires. On this basis the Chief of Naval Intelligence is currently receiving three copies, the Army Intelligence Division two, and so forth. State Department policy positions are thus being given a much wider circulation throughout the Government than was our original intention, and material which we deliberately do not make available to the various service intelligence agencies receives in this form a very wide distribution among them.
4. Furthermore, the CIA summary is receiving very wide distribution in the office of each recipient. There have been instances recently where outside agencies have requested that certain telegrams, identified in terms of items in the daily CIA summary, be made available to them. There is also some evidence that both the Army and the Air Force intelligence agencies have made further dissemination of State policy items available to them only through the CIA summary.
Recommendations: That we refer this whole question to the National Security Council with a view to:
1. Securing a uniform interpretation of the provision of the Unification Act relative to supplying material to CIA which would be equally applicable on all Departments.
2. Securing an NSC ruling on the type of daily summary to be published by the CIA, which ruling should stipulate either:
a. an operational summary, as at present, with the distribution limited to one copy only for each member of the National Security Council;
b. an intelligence summary only, with distribution maintained at the present level and any changes referred to the NSC.
351. Statement by Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, undated.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 2, Folder 3. Secret. The remarks were prepared for presentation before the Committee on National Security Organization (informally known as the Eberstadt Committee) of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). The date on which the statement was delivered has not been found, since this presentation was not recorded in the summary of testimony prepared by the committee staff, but it appears to have been in September 1948. (Truman Library, McCloy Manuscript, Box 17, Folder 119) See the Supplement under date of September 7.
SUGGESTED REMARKS REFERENCE CLANDESTINEOPERATIONS TO THE HOOVER COMMISSION
I know the Commission is concerned with the status of our foreign information collection activities conducted by clandestine or semi-clandestine means.
There has been entirely too much publicity in this regard, favorably and unfavorably. The public has come to regard the collection of all intelligence information as a sinister and dangerous operation by strictly illegal methods. Without discounting certain actual dangers which do exist in the collection of information, particularly by clandestine means, I would like to stress the point that it is mostly a "pick and shovel" job supervised by able intelligence operators.
Approximately 75% of all intelligence information is gathered by strictly open methods, that is--through military, naval, commercial, and other attaches; through the study of readily available books, magazines, newspapers, radio broadcasts, photographs, conferences; and through interrogation of travellers, students, employees of American concerns active in foreign fields, and selected foreigners. About 10% of all intelligence information is collected by clandestine or semi-clandestine means. But, while the quantity is lower than that collected by overt methods, often the quality of such information far outweighs the other. About 10% of the potential collectible information defies all methods of collection and about 5% exists only in the knowledge of top leaders in the target country.
Your interest is in whether the job is being well done. Let me remind you that we are building up a system, under pressure and many years behind, that the British, for example, have been efficiently operating since the days of the first Queen Elizabeth. It is not a system which can be perfected in a short space of time. Our junior mission case officers, for example, can seldom be put in the field in less than fourteen months. You may be interested in this timing. Having selected a candidate who appears to have the proper academic, cultural, moral, and physical requirements, it takes us approximately four months to thoroughly check his past life, habits, discretion, loyalty, and other necessary attributes. Having accepted the candidate he is put through a training period of from six to ten months. Upon completion of his training it requires another three to four months to arrange his cover and to place him in the area concerned. We can expect little from him until he has firmly established himself and opened up his communications channels. This may take several months.
You may be interested in the type of individual who best fits our requirements for assignment as a station chief. Let me assure you he is not the publicized police or detective type. First he must have an intense desire to further the interest of his country, by any means if necessary and directed. His academic training must be unquestioned and he must be dignified, calm, intelligent--and able to discuss a broad range of subjects with individuals of any stature. You may be further interested in knowing the general background of some of our station chiefs occupying positions in current hot spots:
One is a former professor of history at one of our oldest universities and an authority on world economics. He has been a successful operator in the clandestine collection of intelligence for over five years. He is 41 years old.
One is a former consultant to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is internationally famous, under another name, in the field of electronics. He has been an extremely efficient operator in the clandestine intelligence field for over six years.
These are the type men we strive to place in foreign fields and as our branch chiefs here in Washington. We have, we feel, been very successful in this regard.
As to our success to date. Let me assure you that the nation has just cause to be proud of the operations of our comparatively young espionage and counter-espionage system. Unfortunately we cannot tell the world about our successes--we can only bow to the criticism of our failures.
Espionage is a most delicate as well as a most dangerous operation. It is competitive in a field in which no holds are barred. The men who control these operations are naturally secretive and aloof to the casual approach--for they are dealing in the lives of fellow Americans and proven agents regardless of nationality.
Success in clandestine operations is not based on the absence of failures. It is based on the knowledge of "those who need to know" that the successful operations exceed the failures. There will always be "flaps" and they will always, unfortunately, be referred to as "intelligence fiascoes" by the ever present second guesser.
One commentator recently stated:
"The fiascoes--they might be called intelligence 'catastrophes'--have occurred in Rumania, Hungary, Finland and elsewhere."
I am sure that, as time goes on, many other countries will be added to this list. But if we are going to judge the efficiency and coverage of our clandestine intelligence system by the fact that we do have failures--then we should get out of the business!
It is hard to be a hero in one's own home town, particularly in a town where so many people are expert in so many fields. That certainly applies to the conduct, by this country, of an espionage system. You will be interested in proof that our people in this field are competent and that we are better appreciated away from home than we are here. Further, there are many individuals here at home who understand our efforts but who, for security reasons, can say little about it. Fortunately we do have some records along the lines of commendation and I have taken the liberty of bringing along a few miscellaneous items. If you desire, and will permit me to eliminate names and places, I will be glad to discuss a few of them. For security reasons they cannot be released but we have no objection to either Mr. Bross or Mr. Sutherland/1/ screening them.
/1/Members of the staff of the Eberstadt Committee.
(Here suggest Bross or Sutherland pick 4 or 5 papers at random and then paraphrase them.)
It is vital for you to know that our centralized operation of clandestine intelligence collection is a "service" to all governmental intelligence activities and is not an operation for the interests of CIA alone. During the build-up of our clandestine system over the past three years of CIA operation, we have been guided by the experience, the successes, and the failures of the clandestine systems of other powers. Many of our operations follow a pattern which has been international practice for hundreds of years. Yet we feel that American ingenuity and efficiency have provided us with new methods that have placed us very high in the field of clandestine intelligence.
There have been statements that our operating personnel are inexperienced in this field. If security would permit, I could prove that our operating personnel, on any basis desired, are more experienced in the espionage field than any other group of American nationals.
There have been statements that clandestine intelligence collection should not be centralized. The voice of experience challenges such statements from so many angles that I will not take the time to discuss them unless the Committee particularly desires a discussion along those lines.
One of our primary tasks in this field is a constant search for new information relative Communist activity in the foreign areas. Naturally these matters tie in with over-all Soviet activities in the field. Because of security restrictions, I cannot show this document (display ST-22) to the Committee as a whole but I can tell you it is dated as of 1 August 1948 and contains the names, official designations, and certain cover activities of approximately 15,000 Soviet officials abroad. We have no objection, if the Committee desires, to permit closer study of this document by either Mr. Bross or Mr. Sutherland.
It is obvious, of course, that we cannot completely divorce our foreign activities with regard to world communism from our own domestic worries along the same lines. They must be tied together with close collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation--and I can assure you that cooperation in this regard is of the highest. Further, we have our own experts in domestic communism, each highly qualified and experienced. In the event you desire to pursue this problem further I have asked two of our experts, both former members of the FBI, to be with us here to answer any questions which can be answered within security restrictions.
To sum up. We feel the nation has due cause to be proud of its young but increasingly successful clandestine intelligence system. The continued growth and ability of the system depends upon a full realization of the sensitive nature of such activities and the need for ever-improving security. The system needs time for full fruition and it needs the maximum of freedom from publicity and inquiry. The personnel involved are, we believe, selected and screened as no other governmental group has been selected and screened. There will always be failures in the field--but I ask you again to realize that such failures are the hazards of a very dangerous game. Our successes must remain comparatively unknown.
This is but a very general review of our clandestine intelligence activities. There are no doubt many questions still in your mind regarding this work. Where I can, with due regard to security restrictions, I will frankly and honestly try to answer any questions you desire to ask.
352. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, September 13, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 2, Folder 3. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Appearance Before Eberstadt Subcommittee of the Hoover Committee1. Pursuant to the clearance which I obtained in advance from General Wright and Admiral Souers, I appeared before the Eberstadt Subcommittee of the Hoover Committee in response to the request communicated to me by Mr. Eberstadt via Admiral Souers. I was called at 5:00 p.m., 10 September 1948, and was questioned extensively by various members of the committee for approximately 40 minutes.
2. It was evident from Mr. Eberstadt's introductory remarks that he and various members of his committee were already quite familiar with the establishment of my new activity. Mr. Eberstadt cautioned the members of his committee concerning the highly classified character by statements but beyond that he did nothing to restrict the course of the inquiry. However, I was able to adhere very closely to the pattern of presentation which had been rehearsed in advance in conversations with Admiral Souers and General Wright. That is, I concentrated upon the fact that the members of the National Security Council regarded the new activity as being of the greatest importance and urgency, and that various of the most prominent members of that body had personally assured me of the importance which they attached to the activity and of their intention to give it their full support. In regard to the character of my activities, I stressed the planned aspects and refrained from indicating that we are now engaged in or presently contemplating actual operations.
3. The most inquisitive members of the subcommittee were Mr. Eberstadt himself, Mr. John McCloy and Mr. Hanson Baldwin. They were particularly curious to know how the new activity ties in with the structure of government; whether it might not better be placed under the National Military Establishment; whether, in the event of war, it would be necessary to create a new "OSS type" organization for sabotage and guerrilla activities, etc. To this line of questioning, I replied generally that I had not as yet devoted sufficient consideration to these problems to have a definitive view and that I was operating pursuant to a directive which had been carefully considered by the National Security Council in accordance with which my activity has been placed within the framework of the CIA organization.
4. Notwithstanding the fact, as indicated above, that I managed to adhere very closely to the predetermined pattern of presentation, I should like to register for the record my concern about the security aspects of this appearance before the committee. It may well be that most if not all of the members of the committee have some form of security clearance, and I am duly aware of the fact that a substantial proportion of the committee members are important and responsible individuals who well understand and will respect Mr. Eberstadt's admonitions on the score of security. The fact remains, however, that as a result of this appearance, some 15 individuals who are not directly connected with the intelligence organization of this government are now aware of the exist-ence and much of the significance of the Office of Policy Coordination. I consider it unlikely that all of these people have been fully indoctrinated in the principles of security and it is, therefore, reasonable to assume that some disclosure of the activity of this office may result from this appearance. Should a leak occur, it would be my recommendation that we continue to maintain the position that our activity is one of "planning and coordinating policy."
353. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to Allen W. Dulles
Washington, November 17, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. Confidential.
DEAR MR. DULLES: Thank you very much for your letter of 12 November, advising that the Survey Group will be in Washington on 22 and 23 November and will be available for any suggestions or recommendations which the Central Intelligence Agency may wish to make. I have discussed this question with all of our people, and we feel that there are no suggestions or recommendations that the Central Intelligence Agency wishes to make. However, if the Survey Group desires to ask any questions or to receive further clarification on any points, any or all of us will be most happy to appear before the Survey Group at the convenience of the Survey Group.
In view of the shortness of time remaining, I am delivering this personally to Mr. Robert Blum.
Very sincerely yours,
R.H. Hillenkoetter/1/
Rear Admiral, USN/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
354. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Intelligence Survey Group
Washington, November 22, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 62 D 42, Box 7385, Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report and NSC 50. Secret. According to a covering note, "The final hearing for the Department to give its views was held on Monday, November 22, at which time the attached memorandum was submitted." (Memorandum from Armstrong to Daniels et al., November 22; ibid.) See the Supplement.
The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to present a brief statement on the intelligence activities of the Government, and in particular on the Central Intelligence Agency and the relations of that Agency to the Department. It is hoped that this statement summarizes the discussions which members of the Department have had with the Group and its staff over the past months.
In general, the Department believes that the experience of the past year has shown that the principles and concepts of the National Security Act of 1947 relating to intelligence are sound. The Department is in fact encouraged and hopeful that with further effort and cooperation an eminently successful governmental intelligence organization will evolve. It is, therefore, in the light of this fundamental position that the Department makes its comments on certain aspects of the working arrangements.
In making its comments, the Department wishes to have it clearly understood that in most areas of intelligence operations it feels that an excellent effort is being made by the Central Intelligence Agency and that the relationship with the Department is wholly satisfactory. The comments which follow, therefore, are directed at those areas of the CIA-State Department relationship which the Department feels are in need of attention.
1. With respect to the Research and Evaluation functions:
The Department agrees completely with the basic philosophy set forth in the National Security Council Intelligence Directives which deal with the production of intelligence. The Department believes, therefore, that relations between CIA/ORE and the Department could, under existing basic directives, be satisfactory. Those directives divide up among the Departmental intelligence agencies basic responsibilities for production within a number of generally recognized fields of intelligence while allocating to CIA the responsibility for producing "national" intelligence, which is defined as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment." CIA is directed, furthermore, in preparing such national intelligence, to draw upon Departmental facilities as much as possible, which must mean a maximum effort to compose national intelligence by combining mutually agreed contributions from the Departments interested in any national intelligence problem.
The Department would construe these directives to mean that CIA/ORE should participate in, indeed should be an essential element in, the coordinating responsibilities of CIA as a whole. Thus CIA/ORE should, with respect to the other agencies:
(1) constitute a center of information concerning all intelligence activities in all fields, by means of surveys of departmental agencies;
(2) be responsible for allocating projects among the agencies in accord with their assigned responsibilities;
(3) stimulate in other agencies programs and procedures which appear desirable;
(4) assist the agencies in developing means and facilities to meet their responsibilities.
The Department finds, however, that in actual practice, CIA/ORE acts in few or none of the above ways. It appears to the Department that, rather than confining its activities to the foregoing and to the production of national intelligence, CIA/ORE has tended to develop a maximum production capacity for departmental intelligence which, in turn, tends to duplicate the work of other agencies. CIA/ORE, the Department finds, has not as a rule voluntarily forwarded requests received by it to appropriate agencies, but has rather endeavored whenever possible to fill such requests itself. The "national" or inter-agency participation is then achieved through the procedure of "concurrences" which is, in the first place, after the fact of planning and composition, and, in the second place, difficult of accomplishment and generally unsatisfactory.
A notable exception to this tendency is found in the planning and execution of the NIS program.
The Department should point out also that the unbalance described is particularly evident in the fields of political, sociological and certain economic intelligence, which are the fields allocated to the State Department. It does not appear that duplication to the same degree occurs in the various military fields. The result has been, for the Department, both a conspicuous expenditure of time and effort in avoiding duplication where possible and preventing deleterious discrepancies in the finished, coordinated intelligence, and also an absence of those forms of assistance and support which it feels the directives give it a right to expect.
While desiring not to exaggerate, the Department feels that this situation is serious and arises from an erroneous interpretation of the basic philosophy of the NSC directives and from the resulting series of policies adopted by CIA in implementation of that philosophy. In the opinion of the Department, CIA/ORE should treat Departmental intelligence agencies more as the base of the intelligence production pyramid of which it is itself the apex. It should seek to strengthen the base, in the knowledge that upon it rests the whole structure. It should conceive its coordination mission in broad terms, suggesting coverage, gaps and projects of national interest. It should concentrate on a national mission rather than on fields effectively allocated to Departments. Finally, while the Department is not aware of the exact size of CIA/ORE, it cannot help but feel that the obviously growing staff represents a duplicative effort; that CIA/ORE should, therefore, emphasize quality rather than numbers in its own staffing.
[4 paragraphs (34 lines of source text) not declassified]
3. With respect to the CIA "Daily Summary":
The Department believes firmly that adjustment is needed in the CIA Daily Summary. As presently issued, the Summary is composed almost exclusively of briefs of State Department cables. Furthermore, no distinction is made between cables dealing with intelligence and those presenting policy matters (some of which are not crystallized and fully formulated) so that the Summary is at once an operational and intelligence publication.
It is admittedly difficult, when dealing with foreign affairs, to separate clearly intelligence, as such, from policy or "operational" matters. This is particularly true because in some instances telegrams from the field contain elements of both. Nevertheless the Summary has over the past months been composed, in almost half of its entries, of items which are clearly and entirely policy and have no intelligence aspects at all. Policy instructions to the field, position papers, and recommendations on courses of action fall into this category. This tendency has even reached the point where CIA in its comment upon items has over-stepped the boundaries of the field of intelligence by agreeing or disagreeing with policy or operational determinations. The Department recognizes that policy matters are of concern to members of the National Security Council and should be conveyed in appropriate channels to them, but the Department feels quite firmly that dissemination of this information along with intelligence, and to officers not necessarily concerned with policy formulation, is not the appropriate method. This is all the more true since the information on policy already is being distributed by the Department to the proper levels of the other agencies of the government who have need for it. The inclusion of these items therefore represents a serious duplication of effort as well as, in the opinion of the Department, an inappropriate activity for CIA.
Treating the Summary as an intelligence organ, and apart from policy matters, the Department believes that the source of information is almost exclusively the Department itself and that this one-sided aspect tends to destroy the purpose for which the Summary was instituted. Moreover, the intelligence materials are also separately distributed by the Department to the several agencies. Unless comparable contributions from the other agencies are included, the Department itself derives no benefit, nor, would it seem, do the other agencies, since they are already receiving the State Department material.
The Department therefore suggests:
(a) That the Daily Summary not contain any matters of policy; that the dissemination of information on policy to other agencies and, for that matter, to the President, is the responsibility of each Department and cannot be considered a suitable subject for centralized distribution or for an intelligence publication.
(b) That the Daily Summary can serve no useful purpose for intelligence dissemination unless a comparable contribution is made by the other agencies which serve as a source of "national" intelligence.
For the Secretary of State:/1/
/1/Printed from an unsigned copy.
355. Verbatim Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
Washington, December 3, 1948, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-657. Secret. The meeting was held in the Federal Works Building.
PARTICIPANTS
Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the chair
Members Present
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Major General Stafford L. Irwin, Director, GSUSA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Colonel E.P. Mussett, acting for Director of Intelligence, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAF
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Chief, Office of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Major General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, JCSAlso Present
Mr. Prescott Childs, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel Merritt B. Booth, Department of State
Mr. Philip Strong, Department of State
Lt. Col. Edgar J. Treacy, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN
Major W.C. Baird, Department of Air
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Atomic Energy Commission
Colonel Wendell G. Johnson, Joint Intelligence Group
Captain Henry C. Doan, USN, CIA
Mr. Shane MacCarthy, CIA
Colonel Charles C. Blakeney, CIADirector: The paper we had on the agenda today was the Scientific Attaché./1/ You know that went around and was approved by the IAC then Mr. Forrestal disapproved it in the Security Council. We tried to get earlier a proposed directive/2/ from the Research and Development Board, but it didn't come around until the 1st of December. Copies were handcarried to everybody. I don't know whether you have had time to consider it or not. If not, we had better leave it until the next meeting.
/1/Not found.
/2/Not found, but apparently a draft of NSCID No. 10, Document 429.
Mr. Armstrong: We are ready to discuss it.
Director: This was made by Mr. Beckler of the Research and Development Board. He said he thought Mr. Forrestal would approve it, but did not assure us he would.
Adm. Inglis: Did it require the approval of Mr. Forrestal only?
Director: I don't know.
Adm. Inglis: He only has one vote.
Director: What are State's comments on this Proposed Directive here?
Mr. Armstrong: We don't find that the changes proposed are objectionable in a substantive way. In fact we don't feel they change the intent and the spirit of the Directive as it had been approved by the IAC to any considerable extent. There are one or two minor corrections that I propose for clarity, but the Department would be willing to accept the Directive as revised by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Director: What are the changes? We have a few changes too.
Mr. Armstrong: In paragraph c, page 2, unless you read that with great care you wouldn't get the full significance of that phrase "for exchange purposes" and you wouldn't relate that to the word "unclassified." So change it to read as follows: "for the purpose of inducing exchanges with other countries."
Director: Yes.
Mr. Armstrong: That makes the word "unclassified" fall into the context, where before it is of gratuitous significance. That is the only language change we propose.
Director: Tommy?
Adm. Inglis: The Navy agrees in principle with the paper. We have a few editorial suggestions we would like to make eventually when we get around to it, and one which would possibly have substantive matter.
Director: Dr. Colby?
Dr. Colby: Seems quite all right. I would say a little verbose.
Director: W.E.?
Gen.Todd: No.
Col. Mussett: Except one thing. We understood we were to discuss this thing but not commit ourselves to the final paper.
Director: We will have a discussion here.
Gen. Irwin: We agree with the principle.
Director: We agree with the principle. It seems much the same as the other one. I think they should put in mostly, it is an editorial change, I think Navy has the same thing for the last paragraph. "The National Military Establishment will assign specially qualified scientific personnel" there should be a qualifying clause in there. "As practicable," or something. You may ask them to do an impossible thing.
Mr. Armstrong: That is in paragraph e.
Director: Paragraph e.
Adm. Inglis: We have one in d and one in e and then we have a change in f all along the same line.
Director: That one there is saying they must do something and whether it can be done is another thing. What are your changes, Tommy?
Adm. Inglis: In subparagraph a the sentence: "The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will collect scientific and technological information" insert after "information," "including basic research when necessary." Our Office of Naval Research would like to have the right to collect its own information concerning basic research, where and when this agency that is being set up here is unable to satisfy our requirements, as well as the applied research. That was the reason for that. Then I had another suggestion which parallels Mr. Armstrong's in subparagraph c. Just to clarify the language by "the Department of State with available unclassified information pertaining to the basic sciences." We didn't think much of the grammar and construction of that paragraph c. ". . . with available unclassified information pertaining to the basic sciences," and then delete the rest, from that through the rest of the sentence.
Director: c will read then: "The National Military Establishment shall, for the purpose of inducing exchanges with other countries, provide the Department of State with available unclassified information pertaining to the basic sciences." And then delete the rest of it?
Adm. Inglis: Yes. And down in paragraph d after the word "will"--"or from the agencies served, other than the National Military Establishment"; after "will" insert "as practicable." ". . . will, as practicable, appoint specially qualified scientific or technical personnel."
Director: I think that is a good addition there.
Adm. Inglis: And the same thing in paragraph e. ". . . appropriate measures to obtain the necessary funds from the Congress and will"; then insert "as practicable," "assign specially qualified scientific" and change "or" to "and" "technical personnel." Then we had a change that might be more substantive in paragraph f. "The Department of State shall call upon agencies of the Government which require scientific or technological information for advice and assistance" and then cross out the rest and substitute "for advice and assistance as may be necessary in connection with the requirements of this directive." Now the reason, that was given to me, for that suggestion was to broaden it out beyond the advice and assistance of organizing and staffing offices in Washington and abroad. It was felt possibly advice and assistance as to collection and dissemination might be helpful also.
Director: Anybody got any comments on those changes? Park?
Mr. Armstrong: I am not certain I got it.
Adm. Inglis: The suggestion is that the entire paragraph read: "The Department of State shall call upon agencies of the Government which require scientific or technological information for advice and assistance as may be necessary in connection with the requirements of this directive." That broadens it out rather than restricts it.
Dr. Colby: May I inquire about an early change. Technical information also includes basic science?
Adm. Inglis: Including basic when necessary. "The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will collect scientific and technological information, including basic research when necessary, to meet the requirements of the National Military Establishment."
Gen. Todd: I would like to comment on paragraph e, if I may. The closing part of that sentence seems to me should be qualified. That is, "will, as practicable, assign specially qualified scientific or technical personnel to the staffs of their respective attaches" and "at selected" or "appropriate" "United States Missions." You wouldn't want them in many countries where we do have Missions. "Selected United States Missions for this collection responsibility."
Adm. Inglis: I certainly agree with the sense of that. It shouldn't be a requirement. How would you like "will, as practicable and necessary, assign specially qualified"? "Will, as they find practicable and necessary."
Director: I would rather have General Todd's "selected" on that.
Mr. Armstrong: That ties in with paragraph b where the DCI is given the responsibility.
Adm. Inglis: O.K.
Col. Mussett: Who does the selecting? Each individual's responsibility?
Director: Yes.
Adm. Inglis: "The Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall take measures." There too, who is going to do the selecting?
Col. Mussett: "Appropriate" might be better.
Director: I don't think it makes much difference.
Col. Mussett: Since this is by way of a directive that they shall do so and so.
Director: Make it "appropriate" U.S. Missions.
Adm. Inglis: Who is going to decide what is appropriate?
Col. Mussett: If we used your version "as practicable and necessary" it puts it on the Department concerned up here. We will put it as you suggest.
Adm. Inglis: It is tightening it up to say "as they may find practicable and necessary."
Col. Mussett: It seems to make it a little plainer if you put it in up here.
Adm. Inglis: See, you have got a subparagraph b "The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with pertinent agencies, shall determine those countries."
Gen. Todd: "Such U.S. Missions as may be required for this collection responsibility." You are charging it definitely or at those U.S. Missions as required for this collection responsibility.
Adm. Inglis: Your suggestion is after "U.S. Missions" insert "as may be required"?
Gen. Todd: "At such U.S. Missions as may be required for this collection responsibility." "As required."
Director: Will you give us your comments, Dr. Colby?
Dr. Colby: I am worried about the comment I asked about at first. You mean on those occasions where there are no scientific attaches?
Adm. Inglis: The idea was where the mechanism set up by this paper didn't fulfill the requirements. In my case, in the Navy, in the field of basic research that we would reserve the privilege of getting that ourselves if we couldn't get it through the machinery that there is, as necessary.
Dr. Colby: Where the machinery was not necessary, it doesn't make the collection responsibility lacking.
Adm. Inglis: In a sense it gives a threshold area there. It does--we might consider it wasn't satisfactory for our purposes where you or State Department might insist that it was.
Gen. Todd: There might be periods of time when the scientific attaches were not on station or present and wouldn't want to.
Dr. Colby: Or where they were not assigned?
Adm. Inglis: Or where given priority to a particular field of research which overrode something we thought was of a higher priority. That was the reason for putting it in. If there is a rather serious objection from the other members of the Committee, I wouldn't want to have a split of the paper over that. It is not that important to us.
Dr. Colby: It struck me there would be occasions when basic research collection was immediately assumed by the other attaches so the other man became by-passed.
Adm. Inglis: The thought was only that this clause would only be implemented when our requirements were not satisfied by the State Department machinery that is set up here.
Dr. Colby: There is no machinery to direct an attaché, being instructed by other agencies, toward items which are being neglected, because attachés, of course, are appointed by their users.
Adm. Inglis: He might not even be qualified in that particular field. The priority of his targets might place the priority so far down the list he wouldn't get around to doing it in time to satisfy our needs.
Mr. Armstrong: I presume, of course, by the preceding sentence that the Navy would ask that its requirements be satisfied only after finding that couldn't be the case.
Director: In the following sentence there are "utilizing whenever practicable the facilities." It has a cover clause that seems to me it doesn't take anything away, but it may add to it. I mean to get a thing done. Have you any other comments?
Dr. Colby: "When requested." That means it will be requested?
Director: W.E.?
Gen. Todd: No.
Director: Colonel Mussett?
Col. Mussett: No.
Director: General Irwin?
Gen. Irwin: No.
Director: Since this thing just came around and we know it was a very short notice for you people here in the Committee, we will now write it up and send it around for formal approval.
Mr. Childs: And send it back to the Security Council as a substitute proposal for the other one.
Director: I don't know what we will do if they don't approve this one.
Mr. Childs: We shall request in a letter to Mr. Souers that he submit it to the Security Council since it had been reconsidered by the IAC and the enclosed proposal is suggested as a substitute.
Director: This one says practically the same thing.
Adm. Inglis: Since the representative of the R&D Board has agreed to this one, it will be helpful.
Director: He is going to be there. That is the last item of the formal agenda.
We have some semi-formal ones we would like to bring up. One is the meetings. We haven't had them very often and I would like to know--shall we have them at fixed times?
Mr. Armstrong: I think it is a good idea, Hilly, even if the interval is fairly large. My experience has been that a machinery of this kind tends to get rusty and the weeds grow over it if it isn't used and there is a tendency to bring more problems before a Committee of this kind if there is a scheduled meeting.
Director: I agree with you on that myself. Any other? The Navy?
Adm. Inglis: I agree with Mr. Armstrong and will add another to show for the record that we are alive to our responsibilities and do meet once in awhile. If you allow five or six months in between, the record doesn't look very good.
Dr. Colby: I agree.
Gen. Todd: I agree wholeheartedly.
Col. Mussett: I agree.
Director: Every two weeks, maybe?
Adm. Inglis: Not less than once a month.
Mr. Armstrong: Yes.
Director: Not less than once a month?
Adm. Inglis: Regular, monthly, routine meetings, and have them in between when some matter arises which requires immediate attention.
Col. Mussett: I would like them once a month.
Director: The next thing is what day of the month? I would like to suggest this, it may be a help, I would like to suggest, since it is once a month, the third Friday. The Security Council has a meeting the day before and there may be things you can bring up here the next day.
Gen. Todd: That is good as far as JCS is concerned.
Director: Morning or afternoon?
Mr. Armstrong: It doesn't make any difference on Friday. The third Friday.
Gen. Irwin: I would prefer the afternoons.
Director: The third Friday of each month at this time. Sometimes, when there is a lot to be done, we can get started earlier.
Col. Mussett: I am fairly sure I can accept that for General Cabell.
Director: Do we want another one this month? Let's have one, if it is agreeable, there is not much to be done but just get out in the open air. December 17 will be the next one. Unless you are otherwise notified.
Let me get your views on a subject here that has come up. Admiral Inglis and I are rather more familiar with it because it came up through the Navy. We have a letter/3/ addressed here from Commodore Greenman, Director of the Naval Petroleum Reserves. The firm is a civilian firm of DeGolyer and MacNaughton and they are making various estimates and other researches into petroleum. He wrote to me that he wanted an exceptionally large report on the availability of crude oil on a world-wide basis and the information he asked me for in this letter he would turn over to this civilian firm. He asked if we would turn over to him all the Naval Attaché reports on that. We wrote back that we could not supply intelligence material to any civilian firm or organization and that they could get those through the Navy. He then came over to see me about it and said his letter had been a little confusing and that he really didn't want Navy Attaché reports alone, but our dope on crude oil reserves in the world. And I told him in that case we would give it after taking it up with the Security Council members, about it going to a civilian firm, and he assured me it had always been very discrete in its dealing. Then we sent our man over to get the details of it and Commodore Greenman came up then and said his objective was to obtain all available raw intelligence material, particularly statistics on exploration, discoveries of new fields, development and production of crude petroleum. This on a continuing basis as reports come in. Primarily MA, NA, AA, State, OO, and OSO reports. That was the first we had heard about that. I talked to Admiral Inglis about it and our opinion is that such reports should not be given to a civilian firm. We will make him up a survey on the information which we have on crude oil reserves and tell him that is our estimate. I want to get your opinion. Do you want your reports going out like that? We would much prefer not to give them. If you say give--I would like to ask Admiral Inglis to fill out on that because he was first approached on this.
/1/Not found.
Adm. Inglis: I can't add much to what you said. What was represented to me by Commodore Greenman that they are the outstanding experts in this country and possibly in the world. They are consulting engineers on the subject of oil reserves. In fact, not only proven reserves, but unproven reserves. It was represented to me that this firm was entirely unbiased and unprejudiced. That it wasn't obligated in any way to a particular oil company. It is a high-principled firm so that we need not fear that any one company was going to obtain any unfair competition over any other firm. It was also represented as being discreet, American, patriotic citizens. And the thing that bothers me about it is that they have a reputation which probably no Government agency, even ICA, could compete with. That is, a professional reputation as consulting engineers. So I think we may have a chestnut in our hands that is going to have to be cracked along that line. A case will be made if we refuse to give these reports over. We can't hope to be able to evaluate them as his company could and if it would be to the advantage of the country and the departments interested in petroleum to allow them to do this work, as an alternative possibly the Army-Navy Petroleum Board would swallow this pill more readily if it were represented that CIA would enter directly into a contract with this company. But still CIA could not retain control of this whole proposition. Then if CIA wanted to give them five thousand dollars, or ten thousand dollars for their advice the end product is a joint effort of CIA and this very fine firm of consulting engineers without losing control of the source material. But I don't think this is a simple problem and I don't think any solution which will be entirely acceptable to you will be acceptable by the users without argument. Commodore Greenman is only acting for the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, and I might also add that Commodore Greenman told me this was initiated a year or a year and a half ago by Secretary Forrestal when he was Secretary of the Navy. So there is a little pride of authorship involved.
Director: All I can say on that same thing is that this firm unquestionably must be very good, but if we give them all our information they can make a re-estimate and come out with a report of all the crude oil in the world. Our own people can come out with an estimate and when you are dealing with two or three hundred billion barrels, whether you are ten billion barrels off or not, or twenty billion, when you are dealing with up to two hundred billion barrels it wouldn't make much difference. When you get up there to where this thing is, like in geometry, instead of taking the circle, you use the sine of the circle. Any evaluation is going to be of not much import because both of them are going to be estimates.
Gen. Todd: If that error occurred in one particular area, it would be of considerable significance.
Director: It may be of significance but none of us around here would ever know about it and whether it would be an exact error or not, an error that actually occurred, for the world petroleum is going to last for another 25 years.
Adm. Inglis: I think "Wee" has a point though that the strategical importance of the area might have a great significance as compared to the estimated oil that is in the ground in that area. In other words, if we overestimate the oil in Venezuela, an overestimate might make a tremendous difference.
Director: It might, but I think if he is using the same raw materials as we are it is not going to be that much greater. We take the Middle East and make an estimate from the raw material which we have, and we have a petroleum engineer fairly high in the oil business who makes an estimate. We estimate there is in that area one hundred billion barrels of oil, and this boy comes out and says you have yours way up there--there are only seventy-five billion barrels.
Gen. Todd: I was thinking of areas such as Brazil, who have been given encouragement to develop that which is believed to be there. When our estimate is wrong and Brazil goes ahead and develops it, it is expensive.
Adm. Inglis: You might have United States capital and the Petroleum Board puts a lot of Uncle Sam's money down there. I wonder if we have all the raw material that is available. I wonder if this consulting firm has some more? I think they would say they have whether they have or not.
Gen. Irwin: Are you going to take these people's estimates in preference to our own?
Director: No, add them to our own. What we want to do is know whether you want us to give them your raw material reports on it.
Adm. Inglis: I don't like to establish that precedent. Next it will be the consulting engineers in chemistry or biology that are going to demand the same thing.
Gen. Todd: Would it be practicable for them to put in an integrated working group or have access to the material?
Gen. Irwin: They could assist your evaluators.
Director: We may be able to do that.
Adm. Inglis: That is the idea I had.
Gen. Irwin: I think that is a lot better.
Adm. Inglis: As an alternative to a flat turndown.
Gen. Irwin: Then you feed them what you think they could use?
Adm. Inglis: Hilly would work with them much as you are working with the University of Maryland.
Gen. Irwin: They do research jobs for us. That is fair enough.
Director: I prefer it much better that way. We have very good relations with a number of the big oil companies, only in the past it has worked that we wouldn't communicate what we get from one company to another. This may be one place where the slip came and you would be licked on it. We will go ahead then on that basis and suggest we hire this guy to do the research.
Mr. Childs: He would want to keep that for his own company.
Director: He would keep a copy of it. We can go ahead on that. There is another proposal and this is one that touches us all very much. Admiral Inglis suggested it and it has been taken up indirectly with Admiral Souers who thinks it would be a fine idea and approved it. That is, getting a request from us to the Security Council to get out a directive that there will be no more publicity and no more talking about intelligence. The Navy sent this paper/4/ today, and we will go through it.
/4/Not found, but from the ensuing discussion it appears that this may have been an early version of NSCID No. 12, Document 431.
"The current publicity concerning intelligence is of such a character and volume as to defeat the efforts of all responsible agencies. Articles are appearing in publications which deal entirely with intelligence as a subject."
A lot of them have come out--radio shows--they come out and talk about it whether it is right or wrong. It doesn't help the country.
"Publicity concerning intelligence is definitely undesirable for many reasons, some of which are as follows:
"Basically, the success of any intelligence system depends upon effective security.
"Sources, methods, and degrees of success are highly classified and publicity of any kind pertaining thereto defeats the purposes of intelligence.
"Publicity serves to alert our potential enemies to intelligence activities and increases the difficulty of collecting information by focusing attention thereto. Favorable publicity is especially detrimental."
I think that is true.
"Failures and indiscretions in the matter of protecting intelligence can, all too easily, be paid for with American lives.
"Although certain intelligence publicity is fictional, the connection between the fact and fiction remains and can be analyzed by trained foreign intelligence agents. Intelligence experience on the part of certain writers nullifies to a major degree attempts to fictionalize, as the background of any individual unconsciously colors his statements and actions. The general public will often accept fictionalized material as being reliable and are thereby misled.
"Virtually all persons who are engaged in intelligence work have a fund of information which if organized into a narrative is saleable. This applies to unclassified as well as classified information. Those who have engaged in intelligence publicity have set a bad example for others. Consequently the volume of publicity will grow."
The directive that is proposed to be sent in to the National Security Council, title, "Control of Publicity Concerning Intelligence."
"1. Any publicity concerning intelligence factual or fictional is potentially detrimental to the effectiveness of an intelligence activity and to the national security. Accordingly, the following policy of the National Security Council is announced.
"(a) Departments and agencies of the United States Government shall not permit the disclosure for publication of any information concerning intelligence or intelligence activities.
"(b) Departments and agencies of the United States Government shall use every effort to inform the management of all privately owned media of publicity of the danger to the National Security of any publicity concerning intelligence and shall attempt to dissuade them from permitting such publicity through their respective media."
None of us have had time to look that over. I would like to turn that over to the Committee and have them draw it up. I would like to have one thing. The heads of the departments or agencies will not permit disclosure for publication of any information, except by individuals indicated by the head of the department or agency. There may be a time when you would want to do it and that will be more acceptable if the Secretary of the Navy says I will indicate Admiral Inglis to give out information. That wouldn't do any harm. If it is agreeable we will turn this over to our working boys and let them draw something up. Maybe we can get it through, and maybe not. I don't see any harm, do you?
Dr. Colby: I agree completely that we move in that direction.
Director: That is from the civilian standpoint.
Mr. Armstrong: Do we still have in force that directive of the testifying before Congressional Committees?
Director: Yes, each department head can give his orders like that. The Attorney General rules on that. Each department head can forbid it; we took that up and the Attorney General said that worked for each department head, he didn't have to testify.
Adm. Inglis: It wasn't necessary to have a Security Council directive, but haven't got a department.
Director: The Congress can call on that department head and he doesn't have to testify, but as far as CIA's head is concerned, he would have to stand and go to jail. Dr. Colby will be the same way.
356. Verbatim Minutes of Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
Washington, December 17, 1948, 2:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-657. Secret. The meeting was held in the Federal Works Building.
PARTICIPANTS
Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, in the chair
Members Present
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Major General Stafford L. Irwin, Director, General Staff, United States Army
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Colonel Wendell G. Johnson, acting for Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, JCSAlso Present
Mr. Prescott Childs, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel Merritt B. Booth, USA(R), Department of State
Lieut. Col. Edgar J. Treacy, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Major W.C. Baird, Department of Air
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. Shane MacCarthy, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel Charles C. Blakeney, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Fisher Howe, Department of State
Lieut. Col. James H. Skinner, Department of the Army
Lieut. Col. C.J. Stattler, Department of AirDirector: We do not have any formal things to take up. ICAPS is moving Monday up to the Administration Building and I am moving the following Monday. The telephone numbers will be the same. What is the status of the Scientific Attaché paper?/1/
/1/See footnotes 1 and 2, Document 355.
Mr. Childs: It is going to the Security Council saying it has been reconsidered by the IAC and their staffs and the Research and Development Board and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The other one has been withdrawn and the new proposal is enclosed.
Adm. Inglis: Does the R&D Board and Secretary Forrestal's Offices accept the changes?
Mr. Childs: As far as we know. They do not rate a formal voting slip from this group.
Col. Johnson: I saw Mr. Beckler yesterday and I asked him about it and he said they were going to. There were minor changes.
Director: Dr. Hafstad told me the same thing for the Research and Development Board. That should take care of Mr. Forrestal's objections. Do we have anything else to bring up? Do you have anything, Park?
Mr. Armstrong: I haven't anything very pressing. You might allude to the incorrect impression, I might call it, that the Department of Justice may have created about the Department of State's position on the question of defectors in this country, when they sent around a memo/2/ to the Service Agencies saying the Department of State had seen and concurred in the proposal they presented. We have circulated to each of the agencies a copy of our correspondence to Justice on the subject and I hope that serves to correct the misunderstanding because we had never concurred in the proposal. That leaves me to wonder whether this Committee might discuss the question of refugees and defectors of all kinds as intelligence targets. I know this is a matter that the Army is concerned with and General Bolling has given his attention to it. I know it is in the hands of a working group under Kirkpatrick of your Office with representatives from each of the offices, including Justice Department. We have been speculating, or wondering, in our shop, as to whether that isn't a problem that has the natural factors that would perhaps make it worthwhile to consider reviving the SANACC 395 Committee,/3/ since it has already dealt with some phases of that particular series of questions. We don't have any question at all as to the working committee that is at present engaged on it, but wonder whether they are bringing into play all of the experience and considerations that developed during the SANACC 395 sessions; whether the membership of the present committee, at the working level, should not include for its purposes some of the members of the SANACC Committee which I don't believe at present is the case. I have raised this question to see if anyone here wants to discuss it. If the feeling is that it should go on under the present group, that is entirely agreeable to us, but we feel that the problem is an urgent one requiring an early solution and that it is a very broad one and would like to see the greatest possible talent put to work on it.
/2/Not found.
/3/SANACC 395 was a designation for papers on Soviet refugees prepared by a working group of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee.
Gen. Irwin: Is that the Committee General Bolling is on?
Mr. Armstrong: I think it is Mr. Todd of your organization.
Col. Treacy: That is right, and Lieut. Col. Edwin L. Clark is on the other.
Gen. Irwin: Is that about the questioning? That is an important one.
Mr. Armstrong: It is very important. It is not only a domestic problem of getting proper intelligence handling for foreign intelligence out of the defectors in this country, but it has been broadened to include the related problem of defectors abroad and refugees.
Director: I saw Kirkpatrick and the two FBI people and they claim they are practically finished with a solution everybody is agreed to, including the FBI. I think you had better wait to see that and if we don't like that, refer it to the SANACC 395 Committee.
Mr. Armstrong: It is perfectly agreeable with me and it is not a reflection of the working committee, but to raise the question whether all past experience has been brought to bear on it.
Director: This tentative thing looks like it ought to be all right.
Mr. Armstrong: On the domestic only or also considering the foreign?
Director: The foreign too.
Adm. Inglis: Who is my man on that?
Director: You have one, but I don't know who.
Adm. Inglis: Was the 395 series that on broad civil defense?
Mr. Armstrong: The refugees, displaced persons, and bringing in the Voice of America.
Director: This committee is so close to an answer we will see what they have before we drag in someone entirely new on it.
Mr. Armstrong: It is entirely agreeable to me.
Director: They ought to get the answer within a week or two unless Christmas interferes and we will get it after Christmas. Tommy, do you have anything?
Adm. Inglis: I don't know whether anyone wants to discuss the intelligence about China or not, but it is of interest to us. We have seen General Barr's (Chief JUSMAG) estimate of the situation in China and we are inclined to agree with that, but I would be reassured if I felt that the other members of the Committee had the same appraisal of his estimate. Have you seen that?
Mr. Armstrong: I don't recognize it by that name.
Adm. Inglis: The gist of it is they think that the situation north of the Yangtze is hopeless and is just a matter of days or weeks before the whole thing folds up. What happens after that, of course, is a matter of terrible concern and conjecture. Do you feel that this Li that is Vice President is going to be successful in forming some kind of a coalition cabinet and if so just how much Communist influence will be exerted in that? My people say they have checked on the working level with Army, State and the rest and they say that they believe he will be successful and in the beginning the Communists will be in the minor position, but as time goes on will it grow as it did in Czechoslovakia.
Gen. Irwin: I am not particularly briefed on the problem, but from what you said I don't think you would find a disagreement.
Gen. Cabell: I don't think you will find a disagreement among us, except I personally am confident that Li will do that.
Adm. Inglis: We question that very closely. Do you think the Communists would be satisfied with what followed down from the Chiang regime? It might be the Communists would feel it to their advantage to set up a coalition Government because it would give them a certain prestige in international trade with the USA.
Director: I think our people got the same answer. They said the Communists would come into the government because they would be a recognized government in the United Nations and, as a purely personal thing, that the United States and the West could supply them with articles of trade that they couldn't possibly get from Russia. They would want that for a while.
Adm. Inglis: The United States would be hard pressed for an excuse not to recognize it.
Gen. Irwin: You think the reason is they would not dominate with ease?
Director: I think they could. The opinion our people got from Barr's report is that they are not going to force the issue now. Maybe in six months.
Mr. Armstrong: We can gain much more by moving slowly.
Adm. Inglis: Do you have any ideas on that?
Gen. Irwin: No. I think we could accept the Communists taking all to the North of the Yangtze, but I doubt whether they go South for some time.
Adm. Inglis: For some time?
Mr. Armstrong: Although they have the capability?
Gen. Irwin: Yes.
Adm. Inglis: One thing that puzzles us is the superiority and the strategic direction of the Chinese Communists and their ability to support themselves logistically and in communications. It just doesn't seem Chinese.
Gen. Irwin: I don't think it is.
Adm. Inglis: We wonder where the beans and bullets are coming from.
Director: I think a lot of that strategic direction is--the fact that they look so good--because they do not have any good fast opposition against them. But it does not explain the beans and bullets; probably the captured U.S. things that were turned over to the Nationalists. Perhaps you can justify the strategic direction by some Russian influence, but even so they would have to work through a lot of Chinese then. The thing certainly has me stopped.
Gen. Irwin: They must have good communications. There was a report that I saw today that said they were running rather low on supplies and that their morale was low.
Adm. Inglis: My people didn't believe that particular report because it was in conflict with other reports.
Gen. Irwin: The Nationalists don't have the will to fight.
Adm. Inglis: And another thing, turning our attention to the condition in Formosa. Does anyone know a strong man in Formosa who we would do well to back instead of carpet baggers from China or Chiang Kai-shek.
Gen. Irwin: Didn't we have a report that the Formosans were very bitter against any movement of the Chinese? Someone must have fronted for them.
Adm. Inglis: Park, do you know of any Formosan who is capable of leadership?
Mr. Armstrong: No, the Formosans are quite leaderless.
Director: There was a name on this Formosan People's Political Committee. That report said they didn't want the Chinese there and intimated they might like the United States to come in and take over those people. They seem to have the thing in hand. But I don't remember the name.
Adm. Inglis: You think you have some information?
Director: Yes. One thing I do remember is that this outfit, the Communists, did start some kind of violence and they put it down with a very heavy hand. It did not go to the grand jury, they just cut off their heads. It is the same outfit that wanted a free and independent Formosa under the United States. I know we have something on that.
Gen. Cabell: That would indicate some kind of strong leadership--that quick and positive degree of action.
Mr. Armstrong: Wasn't that the Chinese Government?
Adm. Inglis: They assassinated the first person that came over.
Mr. Armstrong: The second one was run out.
Adm. Inglis: He wasn't quite as brutal as the first one. He came over with a group of soldiers.
Gen. Irwin: There was some discussion about shipments to China, of diverting one to Formosa. That would head it up and put the stuff in the hands of the Chinese. Maybe we decided to do it for the benefit of the Chinese.
Adm. Inglis: That has been suspended for the time being.
Gen. Irwin: It was discussed.
Mr. Armstrong: Has the Chinese Navy moved over there yet?
Adm. Inglis: Some have moved over from Tsingtao and the naval training school is to go to Amoy. We had a report that the move was now in progress, but there was no indication of how long it would take.
Gen. Irwin: I wonder whether Chiang has surrendered yet?
Director: He hadn't yesterday afternoon and when we got our message from there this morning.
Adm. Inglis: I had one other thing that has no connection with China. I guess the newspapers last night and this morning have been full of the Eberstadt subcommittee's report. And another thing he mentioned was the lack of medical intelligence. We had a paper which was prepared currently by an ad hoc committee of the three Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force that they had some idea of setting up a medical intelligence agency in the Armed Services separate from the present departmental agencies. We didn't think much of that idea. I think it was stopped, but I was wondering if CIA was going to interest itself in medical intelligence.
Director: It has been under way since about the 10th. The new head of our Scientific Branch, Dr. Machle, has talked about that to some of the people in the Medical Corps in the Army and Navy. I don't know whether it was Swanson or not. We got him through Dr. Compton and he talked to him about it--medical intelligence, BW intelligence and I think he will get around to that as soon as he gets settled down. Public Health is in on this too.
Adm. Inglis: I hope you will include the agencies which are represented by the members of the body here in the spade work. We didn't know anything about this until we got this big thing. It was about cooked and ready to go.
Director: He would do that because he knows Henderson and some of those people that were working on it.
Gen. Cabell: I understand these medical people prepared it. My people are not very much in favor of it. The idea was suggested by somebody and it just grew to some length. We could see no sense to it.
Adm. Inglis: A great deal of unnecessary work could have been saved if they had just had a ten minute talk between the three of us respectively and those who produced this tremendous tome.
Gen. Irwin: You are currently getting medical intelligence from your medical people?
Adm. Inglis: Yes. Apparently they are unhappy about the quantity and the quality. I don't know that they are unhappy, but I inferred they were unhappy or they wouldn't have taken 400 pages to recommend something else.
Mr. Armstrong: The Foreign Service is a regular contributor to medical intelligence and is supposed to make an annual report on health and sanitation on its territories. Every foreign post has to send in quarterly reports on health, sanitation, diseases, and living conditions.
Gen. Irwin: We have medical and technical attaches. Speaking about the Eberstadt Committee statement, I don't know what backs that statement. I have heard no growls about our medical intelligence.
Adm. Inglis: I hadn't either until this paper confronted me. I have had some growls from the medicos on the Doctor over in Moscow. That is purely a personal affair.
Gen. Cabell: My medicos didn't feel sufficiently strong on it when we non-concurred in it to come around and talk about it.
Adm. Inglis: That is all I had.
Director: Doctor Colby?
Dr. Colby: No.
Director: General Cabell?
Gen. Cabell: No.
Director: Colonel Johnson?
Col. Johnson: No.
Director: General Irwin?
Gen. Irwin: We are getting out a good deal of political stuff in our Weekly magazine. Things we think CIA or State Department ought to put out. A weekly for general theaters and things like that. Do you put any out?
Director: No.
Mr. Armstrong: We don't either.
Gen. Irwin: It seems to me we are a little out of our field. If we could get the material--I don't know how you would feel if that field were taken over by either State or CIA and we could confine ourselves to military intelligence. I know we are getting out a very expensive weekly digest which is not cultural reading and not enough intelligence in my opinion.
Mr. Armstrong: Is it classified?
Gen. Irwin: Yes, secret.
Director: Ours is secret.
Gen. Cabell: I wonder if we don't have to put out such a publication. We put out one monthly which started within the last four months. We don't produce the basic material, we go to the CIA publications and take some from yours (to DCI) and some from yours (to D/I, Army) but we try to tailor it to fit the recipient.
Gen. Irwin: I thought the Admiral would pay for it and we would buy him off.
Director: How many copies have you got?
Gen. Irwin: I will have to look that up.
Adm. Inglis: It seems to me that is a job for ICAPS. I have often wondered why ICAPS didn't interest itself in more things of that kind.
Mr. Armstrong: I think it is a very important question.
Director: You let me know how many copies and we will see.
Col. Blakeney: Between 600 and 700 a week are put out.
Gen. Irwin: At about $1.50 a piece.
Director: It is on slick paper.
Gen. Cabell: Might we not do this--standardize a monthly publication and look to CIA to prepare section (a) of our respective publications so that in other words it would be a custom-built job for them for this purpose then we put in our section (b), or whatever section we had, for that publication?
Adm. Inglis: There are two things you have to worry about. One is the departmental intelligence, the other is the classification. We have a sufficient variety of publications to meet both of those requirements. It is rather complicated.
Gen. Cabell: We couldn't turn over the job for preparing it. We still have a message to get across to our recipients.
Gen. Irwin: So have we.
Gen. Cabell: We could do it on a monthly basis and it would save us work and we could lean upon you (CIA) to prepare a certain section.
Adm. Inglis: Or perhaps have CIA put out a basic publication and each department come out with its own publication or call particular attention to that which is of general interest to all the departments.
Mr. Armstrong: Would that mean CIA would be putting out the political and economic, and sociological? That is in the bailiwick of the Department of State.
Adm. Inglis: I again say this is a job for ICAPS, we can't settle the details.
Gen. Irwin: Then State would be the best person to put that out.
Adm. Inglis: If State wants to give us the dope through CIA at $1.50 a piece for 700 copies.
Mr. Armstrong: I am interested in getting at a method to solve this. It would cure one problem we have of overlap between CIA and ourselves, and we haven't readily grappled with the problem yet. I would like to suggest that the Director assign that to ICAPS or any appropriate committee for study.
Director: It is assigned to ICAPS.
Gen. Irwin: It has a particular interest to our attaches and would be of interest if they got the State Department's material as the basis.
Adm. Inglis: I don't think our people, that is, the commanding officers of ships, and our naval attaches, the customers, are getting the information they would like to have and should have under the subjects that are State Department stuff.
Mr. Armstrong: We are not getting out a journal of any kind that can be distributed beyond the departmental borders.
Adm. Inglis: I think there is a little gap there which we try to fill in a very amateurish way, but it also seems to me that the material that CIA puts out should supply several different needs. The Top Secret business as it is now, it is all right, but the distribution is so limited that its usefulness is impaired. The Top Secret goes to 20 people, maybe 30. Another set of customers may include 200 people and maybe another set of customers 2,000 people. Adopt the classification for the size of the body. There seems to be a lack in the publications which is useful to a wider distribution.
Gen. Irwin: I would like something with this political section and then the military section.
Director: ICAPS, you have a job. You get that out every week?
Gen. Irwin: It is a weekly. It is a pretty expensive operation and for that they should get more. It ought to be the best we can furnish.
Mr. Childs: The Navy has a weekly too?
Adm. Inglis: We have a daily, weekly, and monthly. They are several different classifications.
Mr. Childs: I mean a similar publication to that.
Adm. Inglis: No, the only slick paper publication we get out is monthly and classified confidential.
Director: Well, we can go into that and see what we can do.
Adm. Inglis: We also get out a quarterly classified restricted for reserve officers on inactive duty. That is a quarterly.
Director: You get one out monthly?
Gen. Cabell: Yes.
Col. Treacy: Ours is the only one for distribution outside of the Division.
Gen. Cabell: It is pretty ambitious to have that weekly, isn't it?
Gen. Irwin: By the time it is distributed and all it is a little on the cold side. Therefore, I would like to put more basic material in and the military items in it that are of interest to field people.
Mr. Childs: You would rather stick to the weekly?
Gen. Irwin: I would rather go into it more.
Director: A weekly comes around very quickly.
Adm. Inglis: We get out one, a dispatch, and I think you do too; and we get out a weekly mimeograph sheet of about eight pages.
Director: When you try to fill it up for the weekly you have to start padding.
Gen. Irwin: It could be cut back to monthly and have it mimeographed. It would be cheaper with the cooperation of State and so it could be more or less uniform on the State Department material.
Adm. Inglis: That sounds as though it is just what we are looking for.
Director: I think it should work out because in some of these you can see the boys have to fill out on some of it. You can't help it when you do a weekly.
Gen. Irwin: I was a customer of this before I came here.
Director: We will go into that and see if we can't do something about it.
Mr. Childs: There are several State publications.
Mr. Armstrong: We put out a weekly summary that is SECRET level, but is distributed only in the Department and to Ambassadors. Now, it is entirely possible that a lot of that material can be written more as an operational summary. It is entirely possible that a lot of that material can be readily adopted to be used by the Services. I am very anxious and glad to look into this.
Director: I think it would be a good idea to do it. Any other subjects?
Mr. Childs: The attaches see that which goes out to the field.
Mr. Armstrong: They probably do.
Mr. Childs: That which goes to the embassies.
Col. Johnson: They do some places.
Director: They do most places.
Mr. Armstrong: It depends on the Ambassador.
Gen. Irwin: They really should see them, shouldn't they? It would be a means of getting the information into their hands.
Director: Anybody have anything else? I wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, and we will see you after the first of the year.
357. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the Intelligence Survey Group (Blum) to Mathias F. Correa
Washington, December 18, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. No classification marking. The source text is dated December 18, 1949, but from the context this is clearly a typographical error.
DEAR MAT: This is merely to tell you that twenty copies of the Survey Group Report were delivered to Mr. Souers this afternoon./1/ I spoke with him yesterday to ask him whether he had decided how to handle the report. He said that he had not yet done so, as he wanted first to see what the report looked like.
/1/Presumably these were advance copies. The report as finally issued is dated January 1, 1949, on the cover sheet and included a formal letter of transmittal to the NSC dated January 15, 1949. See the source note, Document 358.
I have not yet shown the report to the Secretary,/2/ but will do so shortly. I am sure that the question which still preoccupies him is that of "the man."/3/ In this connection, Souers said yesterday that in his conversations with the President, he (Souers) was taking the position that no move should be made for a change until a suitable successor had been found.
/2/Secretary of Defense Forrestal.
/3/Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Hillenkoetter.
The report seems to be in good shape and I will keep my ears close to the ground awaiting reactions.
Sincerely yours,
Bob
358. Report From the Intelligence Survey Group to the National Security Council
Washington, January 1, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Box 1555. Top Secret. The report includes a January 15 letter transmittal to the Executive Secretary of the NSC from the members of the Survey Group, Allen W. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson; see the Supplement for the full text of the report.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE
Summary
The primary object of this survey has been the Central Intelligence Agency, its organization and activities, and the relationship of these activities to the intelligence work of other Government agencies. Examination has been made of these other intelligence agencies only to the extent that their activities bear upon the carrying out by the Central Intelligence Agency of its assigned functions.
Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 creates the Central Intelligence Agency as an independent agency under the direction of the National Security Council. It gives to the Council broad powers in the assignment of functions to the Central Intelligence Agency and creates a framework upon which a sound intelligence system can be built. The Central Intelligence Agency has been properly placed under the National Security Council for the effective carrying out of its assigned function. It should, however, be empowered and encouraged to establish, through its Director, closer liaison with the two members of the National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends and who should be the main recipients of its product--the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
The National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the National Security Council, imposes upon the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility for carrying out three essential functions:
(1) The coordination of intelligence activities;
(2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, which has been interpreted by directive as meaning the production of national intelligence;
(3) The performance centrally of certain intelligence services of common concern. These include services of a static nature, such as research in fields of common usefulness, and operational services such as the collection through the central agency of secret intelligence.
These three functions constitute the basis of an integrated system of intelligence and they have been used as the frame of reference for the examination of the Central Intelligence Agency and the related activities of other intelligence agencies of the Government represented on the National Security Council, particularly the Department of State and the Departments in the National Military Establishment.
No amendment to the provision of the Act relating to intelligence is required at this time. What is needed is action to give effect to its true intent.
The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for Coordinating Intelligence Activities
Under the statute, the Central Intelligence Agency has broad responsibility to coordinate intelligence activities relating to the national security. In the discharge of this responsibility, the Central Intelligence Agency should review the intelligence field and ascertain where there are gaps or overlaps. The agency best equipped to do a particular job should fill any gaps. Where two or more agencies are doing similar work, the one best equipped ought to carry on the job and the others drop out or their efforts be coordinated.
This vitally important responsibility for coordination is to be exercised by recommending directives for approval by the National Security Council. The Central Intelligence Agency has the duty of planning for coordination and, in consultation with the other intelligence agencies, of taking the initiative in seeking directives to effect it. Today this coordinating function of the Central Intelligence Agency is not being adequately exercised.
To assist it in carrying out this task the Central Intelligence Agency has available the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This group includes the Director of Central Intelligence as chairman, the heads of the intelligence staffs of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
A number of formal directives for the coordination of intelligence activities have been issued by the National Security Council upon the recommendation of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee. These directives, except those specifically assigning to the Central Intelligence Agency the carrying out of certain common services described below, have not gone far enough in defining the scope and limits of departmental intelligence activities. These activities continue to present many of the same jurisdictional conflicts and duplication which the National Security Act was intended to eliminate. Consequently, the absence of coordinated intelligence planning, as between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service agencies and the State Department, remains serious. What is needed is continuing and effective coordinating action under existing directives and also directives establishing more precisely the responsibility of the various intelligence agencies.
The field of scientific and technological intelligence is an example of lack of coordination. Responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts are uncoordinated, atomic energy intelligence is divorced from scientific intelligence generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at authoritative intelligence estimates in the scientific field, with the possible exception of atomic energy matters.
Another important example of lack of coordination is in the field of domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating to the national security. Jurisdiction over counter-intelligence and counter-espionage activities is assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency abroad. However, fifth column activities and espionage do not begin or end at our geographical frontiers, and our intelligence to counter them cannot be sharply divided on any such geographical basis. In order to meet the specific problem presented by the need for coordination of activities in the field of domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating to the national security, it is recommended that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation be made a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee so far has had little impact on the solution of the problem of coordination, except in formally approving proposed directives. It should be re-activated and called upon to play an important role.
To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his duties to plan for the coordination of intelligence, the staff in the Central Intelligence Agency known as the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff should be reconstituted and strengthened. It should be composed of personnel definitely assigned to, and responsible to, the Director of Central Intelligence and charged, on a full-time basis, with carrying on continuous planning for the coordination of specific intelligence activities. This staff, which might be called the "Coordination Division," should support the Director in fulfilling one of his most important and difficult duties under the National Security Act.
In concluding the consideration of this most vital problem of coordination of intelligence activities, it should be emphasized that coordination can most effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies. With the right measure of leadership on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency, a major degree of coordination can be accomplished in that manner.
The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for the Production of Intelligence Relating to the National Security
A long-felt need for the coordination, on the highest level, of intelligence opinion relating to broad aspects of national policy and national security was probably the principal moving factor in bringing about the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. The lack of any provision for the prompt production of coordinated national intelligence of this kind was one of the most significant causes of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure.
This type of national intelligence, expressed in the form of coordinated national estimates, transcends in scope and breadth the interest and competence of any single intelligence agency. Hence, such estimates should be fully participated in by all of the principal intelligence agencies. All jointly should share in the responsibility for them.
With one or two significant exceptions, whose occurrence was largely fortuitous, the Central Intelligence Agency has not as yet effectively carried out this most important function.
The Office of Reports and Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency was given responsibility for production of national intelligence. It has, however, been concerned with a wide variety of activities and with the production of miscellaneous reports and summaries which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimates.
Where the Office of Reports and Estimates produces estimates, it usually does so on the basis of its own research and analysis and offers its product as competitive with the similar product of other agencies, rather than as the coordinated result of the best intelligence product which each of the interested agencies is able to contribute.
The failure of this type of intelligence product to meet the requirements of a coordinated national estimate is not substantially mitigated by the existing procedure whereby the Office of Reports and Estimates circulates its estimates to the intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and obtains a formal notation of dissent or concurrence. Under this procedure, none of the agencies regards itself as a full participant contributing to a truly national estimate and accepting a share in the responsibility for it.
It is believed that this situation can be remedied if the Central Intelligence Agency recognizes the responsibility which it has under the statute and assumes the leadership in organizing its own work and in drawing upon that of the other intelligence agencies of Government for the production of coordinated intelligence. Thus, within its own organization, the Central Intelligence Agency should have, in lieu of the present Office of Reports and Estimates, a small group of specialists, which might appropriately be called "Estimates Division." It would be the task of this group to review the intelligence products of other intelligence agencies and of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to prepare drafts of national intelligence estimates for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
The final process of coordination should take place in the Intelligence Advisory Committee which would review and discuss the proposed estimates. The finished estimate should be clearly established as the product of all of the contributing agencies in which all share and for which all take responsibility. It should be recognized as the most authoritative estimate available to the policy-makers.
Where particular scientific or technical intelligence matters are involved, the Intelligence Advisory Committee should secure the views of the best qualified technical experts available to them, including experts from the Research and Development Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.
There should also be provision for the prompt handling of major emergency situations so that, as a matter of course, when quick estimates are required, there is immediate consultation and collective appraisal by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on the basis of all available information.
The inclusion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a permanent member should assure that intelligence estimates will be made in the light of domestic as well as foreign intelligence. Provision should be made for the representation on the Intelligence Advisory Committee of other agencies of the Government when matters within their competence are under discussion.
Performance Centrally of Services of Common Concern
Under the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency should perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as may be assigned to it by the National Security Council.
These services, as now being performed by the Central Intelligence Agency, can be broken down into (1) static services, consisting of intelligence research and production on certain assigned subjects which do not fall exclusively within the function of any one existing intelligence agency, and (2) operating services, consisting of certain types of intelligence collection and related secret operations.
Static Services of Common Concern
At the present time the static services of intelligence research and reporting are carried out in the Office of Reports and Estimates. If the duties of this Office in relation to the production of national intelligence are assigned to a newly constituted Estimates Division, the miscellaneous reporting functions presently carried out by the Office of Reports and Estimates and a part at least of the personnel engaged in them could be reconstituted as the nucleus of a separate division of the Central Intelligence Agency to be known as the "Research and Reports Division." This Division would also include the Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations and the various reference and library functions now carried on in the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
The economic, scientific and technological fields are ones in which all of our intelligence agencies have varying degrees of interest. At the present time there is serious duplication in these fields of common concern. Central production and coordination by the proposed Research and Reports Division would result in great economy of effort and improvement of the product. For example, the organization within this division of a scientific branch, staffed by highly qualified personnel and empowered to draw upon the scientific personnel of such organizations of Government as the Research and Development Board and the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of dealing with specialized scientific problems, is a project which should have the highest priority.
This division of the Central Intelligence Agency should be staffed in part by representatives of the departmental intelligence services so that the reports produced would represent authoritative and coordinated opinion and can be accepted as such by the various consumer agencies.
The Director's planning staff for coordination of activities, the proposed Coordination Division, should review the question as to what subjects might appropriately be assigned to the new Research and Reports Division for central research and report and what services now centrally performed in the Central Intelligence Agency might be eliminated. The Intelligence Advisory Committee would be the agency to determine the allocation of work, and in case of any failure to agree the matter would be referred to the National Security Council.
Operating Services of Common Concern
The operating services of common concern presently performed by the Central Intelligence Agency consist of the collection, through the Office of Operations, of certain types of intelligence in the United States--i.e., intelligence from private individuals, firms, educational and scientific institutions, etc.; the collection of secret intelligence abroad through the Office of Special Operations; and the conduct of secret operations abroad through the Office of Policy Coordination.
All of these services are appropriately allocated to the Central Intelligence Agency. These operating functions are so inter-related and inter-dependent that they should have common direction at some point below the Director of Central Intelligence.
The general administrative problems of these operating offices are unique because of their secrecy and the consequent security requirements. They differ importantly from that part of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency which is concerned with the coordination of activities and the production of intelligence. Accordingly, these three operating offices should have common administrative services, separate from those of the balance of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The three activities, with the possible addition of the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, should be responsible to one official charged with their direction. The new "Operations Division" would be self-sufficient as to administration and semi-autonomous. This would, to a large extent, meet the criticism frequently voiced, and with a good deal of merit, that it is essentially unsound to combine in a single intelligence agency both secret operations and over-all coordinating and estimating functions.
In its secret intelligence work, the Office of Special Operations requires a closer liaison with the other intelligence agencies, especially those of the military services and of the State Department which are its chief consumers and which should be able to guide its collection efforts more effectively than they do at present. The counter-intelligence function of the Office of Special Operations requires more emphasis and there is need for better coordination of all its activities with the military, particularly in the occupied areas.
The Organization and Direction of the Central Intelligence Agency
The principal defect of the Central Intelligence Agency is that its direction, administrative organization and performance do not show sufficient appreciation of the Agency's assigned functions, particularly in the fields of intelligence coordination and the production of intelligence estimates. The result has been that the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to become just one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in competition with older established agencies of the Government departments.
Since it is the task of the Director to see that the Agency carries out its assigned functions, the failure to do so is necessarily a reflection of inadequacies of direction.
There is one over-all point to be made with respect to the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency. The organization is over-administered in the sense that administrative considerations have been allowed to guide and, on occasion, even control intelligence policy to the detriment of the latter. Under the arrangements proposed in this report, the heads of the newly constituted Coordination, Estimates, Research and Reports, and Operations Divisions would be included in the immediate staff of the Director. In this way the Director, who at present relies chiefly on his administrative staff, would be brought into intimate contact with the day-to-day operations of his agency and be able to give policy guidance to them.
In commenting on administration, the question of security should also be stressed. The Director is charged under the law with protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. One of the best methods of achieving this is to correct the present situation where the Agency is viewed and generally publicized as the collector of secret intelligence and to bury its secret functions within a Central Intelligence Agency whose chief recognized activities are the coordination of intelligence and the production of intelligence estimates.
In reviewing the work of the directorate, consideration has been given to the question whether or not the Director should be a civilian. The work of the Agency, from its very nature, requires continuity in that office which is not likely to be achieved if a military man holds the post on a "tour of duty" basis. For this reason, as well as because freedom from Service ties is desirable, the Director should be a civilian. This recommendation does not exclude the possibility that the post might be held by a military man who has severed his connection with the Service by retirement.
The Service Intelligence Agencies and the Intelligence Functions of the State Department
The Service intelligence agencies and the intelligence organization of the State Department have been reviewed from the point of view of the over-all coordination of intelligence and of the contribution which these agencies should make to the assembly and production of national intelligence.
As regards the Service intelligence agencies, the active exercise by the Central Intelligence Agency of its coordinating functions should result in a more efficient allocation of effort than is presently the case. The Service agencies should concern themselves principally with military intelligence questions, leaving the Central Intelligence Agency to perform agreed central services of common interest. In addition, continuing responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for coordination should be exercised with respect to certain Service activities, for example, espionage and counter-espionage in occupied areas. The Joint Intelligence Committee would continue to operate with its membership unchanged and would concern itself exclusively with military and strategic questions as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Services would participate in the formulation of national intelligence estimates through their membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee and would share in the collective responsibility for these estimates.
In the case of the Research and Intelligence staff of the State Department, the conclusion has been reached that this staff, as at present constituted, is not sufficiently close to operation and policy matters in the Department to furnish the necessary liaison or the political intelligence estimates required by the Central Intelligence Agency for the preparation of national estimates. Accordingly, it is desirable that a high official of the State Department be designated as its Intelligence Officer to coordinate these activities, to act as the Department's representative on the Intelligence Advisory Committee and, in general, to act as liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the intelligence and related activities of the two agencies and to develop close working relations between them.
Conclusion
While organization charts can never replace individual initiative and ability, the Central Intelligence Agency, reorganized along the functional lines indicated in this report, should be able more effectively to carry out the duties assigned it by law and thus bring our over-all intelligence system closer to that point of efficiency which the national security demands.
The foregoing summary is only a brief outline of the main points of the report and does not take the place of the detailed discussion in the report and the various conclusions and recommendations at the close of the respective chapters.
[Here follows the remainder of the report.]
359. Letter From Robert Blum of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Allen W. Dulles
Washington, January 19, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 80-M01009A, Box 1, Folder 12. No classification marking.
DEAR ALLEN: Twenty copies of the report were given to Mr. Souers yesterday, along with the signed letter of transmittal.
As of this morning, it was Souers' intention to send one copy to each Member of the NSC and one copy to Hillenkoetter with a request for his comments. Because of the nature of the report, it is pretty difficult for the NSC to take any simple action on it and the intelligent handling of the report may prove to be rather difficult unless the single question of personalities is faced immediately.
Souers told me yesterday that in his conversations with the President, he (Souers) took the view that nothing should be done to bring about a change of Director until a qualified successor had been found. At a meeting this morning, Hillenkoetter suggested that the Eberstadt Committee material on intelligence should be circulated at the same time as the Survey Group Report. He mentioned in particular that whereas the Eberstadt Committee recommended simplification of administration in the interest of efficiency, he understood from his conversation with you that the Survey Group would recommend decentralization (Hillenkoetter had not yet seen a copy of the report). However, this suggestion was not accepted by Souers, who said that Hillenkoetter, in his comments on the Survey Group Report--the only report officially before the NSC--could, if he wished, refer to the Eberstadt Committee Report.
Forrestal has not yet seen the report, but I hope to have him read it over the weekend.
I will keep you informed of any further developments.
Sincerely yours,
Bob
Continue with Document 360
