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Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence EstablishmentDepartment of State
Washington, DC
Hillenkoetter's Tenure as Director of Central Intelligence
400. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, October 7, 1949.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC under an October 10 memorandum from Souers. See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
Progress Report to NSC on NSC 50, Section 6 "Organization of CIA"/1//1/Not found.
REFERENCE
(a) Memorandum of 8 July 1949 from Executive Secretary of the NSC/2//2/See Document 385.
1. Paragraph 2 of the above mentioned reference/3/ and Section 6 of NSC 50 call for a report to the NSC in 90 days on progress toward implementation of the recommendations on Organization in Section 6 of NSC 50.
/3/Memo for the Director of Central Intelligence, transmitting NSC Action No. 231. [Footnote in the source text; see footnote 2, Document 385.]
2. I am now able to report on these recommendations as follows:
(1) A plan for integrating OSO, OPC, and Contact Branch of OO under single overall direction in an Operations Division has already been drawn up and submitted for review to the Departments of Defense and State, prior to submission to the NSC. Due to the changes entailed in NSC 10/2, the State Department has requested some time to study this matter before implementation.
(2) With reference to the second factor in the organization about creating a small Estimates Division and a Research and Reports Division for recognized fields of common interest, it is believed that other methods of organization will accomplish the same concept and objectives. It is thought that good estimates can be obtained only when closely tied in with research. Plans for some reorganization within ORE are now being drawn up with this view in mind.
(3) When the plans for a Combined Operations Division (paragraph (1) above) are approved, the Foreign Documents Branch will be relocated in an appropriate place in the Agency.
(4) As recommended in the NSC 50 report, the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch will not be included in the proposed Operations Division.
(5) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff is a joint staff responsible only to the Director of Central Intelligence devoted to the interdepartmental coordination of intelligence activities. I plan to strengthen it by giving it more internal CIA duties to better enable it to plan and coordinate intelligence activities on the policy level. The Office of Collection and Dissemination, however, will remain an independent "housekeeping" office performing many centralized services for the various sections of CIA with regard to collection and dissemination. It is thought to be neither necessary nor desirable to combine such operations with policy planning.
R.H. Hillenkoetter/4/
Rear Admiral, USN/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
401. Letter From Secretary of Defense Johnson to Secretary of State Acheson
Washington, October 7, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/10-749. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Reply drafted S: W.J. Sheppard 10/18/49." No copy of a reply has been found.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At our luncheon on September 23, 1949, we discussed the location and various aspects of certain special activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I expressed to you my very great concern at the present situation, and we both agreed that on an interim basis we should make special and direct arrangements to provide policy guidance for these activities.
I am familiar with your arrangements in the State Department whereby Mr. Kennan serves as your adviser on these activities, and in accordance with our understanding I am designating Brigadier General John Magruder, U.S. Army (Retired), as my special adviser on these activities. He will be particularly concerned with the subject contained in NSC 10/2, but in addition, and for the purpose of providing the necessary integration of other interrelated matters, he will concern himself on my behalf with NSC 4 and NSC 43 series. Your Department and mine under this arrangement can then proceed to guide these activities in a direction that we deem mutually desirable, and likewise to seek agreement respecting an appropriate organizational setting for the activities comprised in NSC 10/2.
The designation of General Magruder as my policy representative does not alter the previous arrangements for the Joint Chiefs of Staff representation in NSC 10/2 and NSC 43 matters.
I am also informing the three Secretaries of the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, of my action.
Sincerely yours,
Louis Johnson
402. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Howe) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Sheppard)
Washington, October 17, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, Office of Policy Coordination. Top Secret.
The agenda, as I understand it, for the meeting with Mr. Webb and Hilly tomorrow afternoon, is concerned with the plans for cooperation with NAP countries. If this includes intelligence, as I understand it does, as well as OPC work, I think that both you and Mr. Webb should be aware that it is a new departure for these meetings. They have in the past been confined to OPC work.
As I have also discussed with you, Park and I would welcome the broadening of the scope of these meetings, so that they include the overall guidance through discussions on OSO (intelligence) as well as OPC. We feel this for two basic reasons:
1. The organizational set up, both within CIA and within the Department, and the personality situation within CIA, has led us, over the past few months, to raising to Mr. Webb's level and specifically at these meetings, the general solution to CIA-State problems and the discussion of plans. This would have equally beneficial results for intelligence as for OPC.
2. Probably more important is the fact that while the objectives of intelligence and operations may be different and even conflicting, the method and procedures are so much alike and so much in common that the guidance and direction given to one should be with the full knowledge of the other, at least at the top level. This is somewhat achieved in the single person of Hilly. It is not, however, achieved in the Department to date, except in the person of Mr. Webb. Thus, Messrs. Kennan and Joyce are not able to be kept as fully informed on intelligence matters pertaining to CIA as they must be to handle the operational liaison with CIA and conversely we in R have not been able to handle as efficiently as perhaps we might, the intelligence matters, for lack of information on OPC.
I can think of examples, both substantive and procedural, which bear this out. Our lack of knowledge of any efforts in Albania has, I think, limited our usefulness, whereas we have been useful and will undoubtedly be more so with respect to China as a result of these meetings. Procedurally we are not able to deal in the full interest of the Department with the OSO cover policies when we are wholly unfamiliar with the OPC cover policy.
In sum then, I would want you to be aware that the meeting tomorrow apparently will deal with intelligence for the first time, rather than simply OPC operations, and that R welcomes this innovation.
If you agree with the above, I suggest that you and Mr. Webb give consideration to asking Admiral Hillenkoetter to bring Colonel Schow, Director of OSO, to the meeting tomorrow, as well as Mr. Wisner.
Fisher Howe/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and typed initials below.
P.S. I think an excellent example of where intelligence and operations must be carried on with the full knowledge of each other, namely in our policies of cooperation and collaboration with the British. It is my understanding that the cooperative arrangements with the British have been worked out almost entirely under the auspices of the Department, whereas no attempt has been made to give the intelligence effort of CIA guidance on this matter. S/P and R are apparently unfamiliar with the policies of the Department with respect to these two phases of a very similar problem.
F.H.
403. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Intelligence Advisory Committee
Washington, November 1, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86-B00269R, Box 5. No classification marking. Addressed to the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Department of State; the Director of Intelligence, Army General Staff; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Air Force Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff; and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
SUBJECT
State Department's Four ProblemsREFERENCE
Circular Memo to IAC, August 5, 1949/1//1/See the source note, Document 393.
1. Subsequent to the IAC meeting which decided that the Standing Committee should give consideration to the Four Problems presented by Mr. Armstrong in connection with the implementation of NSC 50 (Dulles Report Recommendations), two meetings were held to discuss the recommendations in the four papers/2/ which were submitted.
/2/See the enclosures to Document 393.
2. All members of the Standing Committee, except the State Member, are in agreement with the report. (Encl. A) The report preferred by the State Member is also enclosed. (Encl. B)
3. If the IAC Members wish to have the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff (formerly ICAPS) prepare a report on the Four Problems as presented by State, I shall be glad to have this done.
R.H. Hillenkoetter/3/
Rear Admiral, USN/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
Enclosure A/4/
Washington, September 23, 1949.
/4/Secret.
REPORT ON STATE'S FOUR PROBLEMS, FROM ALLSTANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS EXCEPT STATE'S
Problem I--Coordination of Intelligence Activities
1. In general, all Standing Committee members are in agreement with Mr. Armstrong's Recommendations I-1, 2, and 3 pertaining to ICAPS and the Standing Committee.
2. The Department of Defense members of the Standing Committee, however, consider that the functions, responsibilities, and membership of ICAPS, and the Standing Committee should be as follows:
ICAPS
a. Should be composed of full-time members contributed by the agencies represented on the IAC.
b. Should be under the direction of and responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence.
c. Should have, as one of its primary responsibilities, the accomplishment of staff work in connection with the development and presentation of policies and procedures for the production and coordination of intelligence by the various agencies represented on the IAC. In matters of this sort the objective of ICAPS should be the production of an unbiased, comprehensive presentation or report covering all aspects of a subject. This it should be able to do because of the wide variety in training, experience, and general background of its members.
d. Should function as a secretariat for the IAC and the Standing Committee of the IAC.
e. Should perform such other functions as the Director of Central Intelligence may direct.
The Standing Committee of the IAC
a. Should be composed of at least one representative from each IAC agency.
b. Should review, on behalf of the IAC, such matters as may be referred to it for action by the IAC or the IAC Secretariat (ICAPS). Normally all staff work on such matters would be accomplished by ICAPS prior to submission of items to the SC/IAC or the IAC.
c. Could then direct its action primarily toward the following objectives:
(1) Presentation and discussion of revisions which SC/IAC members might consider desirable, from the standpoint of the agencies they represent.
(2) Thorough indoctrination of all SC/IAC members in all aspects of the matter under consideration including the views of other SC/IAC members and hence the probable recommendations they will make to their respective Directors when the matter comes up for consideration by the IAC itself. (There should be no formal voting by the SC/IAC and it should be clearly understood that the views expressed by SC/IAC members will not necessarily be the same on any particular subject as those presented by their Directors when action is taken at the IAC level.)
3. The Department of Defense members of the Standing Committee recommend that the IAC approve the substance of the above paragraphs and recommend to the DCI that it be published in appropriate form for the information and guidance of all concerned.
4. Department of Defense members of the Standing Committee also recommend that the remainder (I-4, II, III, and IV) of the Department of State proposals be referred, as a first step, to ICAPS for appropriate staff action.
5. Nevertheless the remainder of Mr. Armstrong's four problems were discussed. The Standing Committee agreed that the wording of Recommendation I-4 was confusing and that it should be separated into two paragraphs to read: "4. That CIA establish an Estimates Division in accordance with the recommendations of the Dulles Report," and that there be a new paragraph 5 reading: "5. That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibilities in respect to intelligence production in accordance with the following principles:--."
6. However, only State wishes to have established an Estimates Division (new paragraph I-4), as the Department of Defense Agencies dissented and proposed that the subject be referred to ICAPS for further study. The CIA representative also dissented on the ground that the Director does not desire to have a new, separate "Estimates Division." AEC and the FBI abstained. The Department of Defense Agencies, in regard to the new paragraph I-5 mentioned above, recommended that the principles (a) to (f) in Mr. Armstrong's recommendations be referred to ICAPS for further study. State and AEC approved of all of these principles and FBI abstained. The CIA position at the meeting, with regard to paragraph (e), was that the obligations of this agency would not permit it to adjust its production in accordance with the departments' "existing programs;" nor could CIA agree that the assignment of personnel to IAC agencies from CIA, reference (f), was a part of its coordinating responsibilities.
Problem II--Production of National Intelligence
The Department of Defense Agencies and the AEC accepted in principle State's recommendations for Problem II. The FBI abstained, and CIA rejected the principles expressed in Recommendation 1 (a) and 1 (c).
Problem III--Research and Reports
It was agreed that Recommendation III-1 should have deleted the last clause and be changed to read: "That, aside from National Intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern," and that Recommendation III-2 should have added to it "for further approval by the NSC." With these changes included, the State and Defense members agreed to the recommendations, FBI abstaining. CIA maintained it performs "services" of common concern (FBIB, etc.) but found Recommendation 1, as written, too restrictive.
Problem IV--Political Summaries
The members of the Standing Committee agreed to this recommendation. FBI abstained.
Recommendations by the Standing Committee
1. As the result of its considerations of Mr. Armstrong's four papers, the concensus of opinion of the Standing Committee was:
a. That Recommendations 1, 2, and 3 of Paper I be accepted in principle as elaborated by the Defense Department members.
b. That new Recommendations 4 and 5 (see paragraph 5 above) of Paper I and all recommendations of Papers II, III, and IV be referred to ICAPS for appropriate action.
Enclosure B/5/
Washington, October 25, 1949.
/5/Secret.
REPORT ON STATE'S FOUR PROBLEMS FROM THESTATE MEMBER OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
It is our view that all four papers should be referred to COAPS for further study, inasmuch as the points at issue have not been sufficiently clarified to permit IAC action. I would suggest that a report to the IAC along the following lines be substituted for the draft included in your memorandum.
1. The Standing Committee has met twice to consider the four papers submitted with Mr. Armstrong's letter of August 2, 1949. Although agreement was reached on a number of the recommendations made in these papers, it is believed that the divergent views on the remainder cannot be clarified without further staff work.
2. The Standing Committee therefore recommends:
a. That the papers be referred to COAPS for preparation of a staff study which will clearly indicate the areas of agreement and isolate and define the issues and areas on which there is disagreement, marshalling the arguments on each side;
b. That the study be completed in time for action at the November meeting of the IAC.
404. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council
Washington, December 14, 1949.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Hillenkoetter.
SUBJECT
The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for IntelligenceREFERENCES
A. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 10, 1949, with enclosed Progress Report by the Director of Central Intelligence/1/
B. NSC 50/2/
C. NSC Actions Nos. 237 and 231/3//1/See Document 400 and the source note thereto.
/2/Document 384.
/3/Regarding NSC Action No. 231, see footnote 2, Document 385. NSC Action No. 237 is not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
The enclosed memorandum by the Under Secretary of State with respect to the reference Progress Report by the Director of Central Intelligence on the implementation of paragraph 6 of NSC 50 is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council.
In accord with the suggestion in the last paragraph of the enclosure the Director of Central Intelligence is being requested to submit a further report on the organization he plans to adopt in furtherance of paragraph 6 of NSC 50 when that has been determined, including a review of other steps contemplated to achieve the objectives outlined in paragraph 5 of NSC 50.
James S. Lay, Jr.
Enclosure/4/
/4/Top Secret.
Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, December 13, 1949.
SUBJECT
The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence, NSC 50 and Progress Report on NSC 50, October 7, 1949The receipt of the Progress Report of the CIA is acknowledged./5/ Although it is noted that no action has been requested by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of State makes the following comment on the report, specifically with reference to paragraph 2 (2).
/5/Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 10, 1949. [Footnote in the source text; see footnote 1 above.]
In paragraph 6 of NSC 50, the Council approved the recommendation of the Survey Group that out of the present Office of Reports and Estimates of CIA "there should be created (a) a small estimates division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates and (b) a research and reports division to accomplish central research in, and coordinated production of, intelligence in recognized fields of common interest." The purpose of this organizational change was to facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives set forth in paragraph 5 of NSC 50, dealing with the production of national intelligence. The Council recognized, however, that there might be other methods of organization which would accomplish the same objectives.
The report indicates that the Director has elected to adopt an alternative method of organization to accomplish the objectives outlined in paragraph 5, but that the exact nature of this reorganization has not been fully determined.
In view of the responsibility of the National Security Council for the implementation of NSC 50, perhaps it would be helpful to all concerned if the Director reported further on the organization he plans to adopt in furtherance of paragraph 6 when that has been determined. Such a report might extend to a review of other steps contemplated to achieve the objectives outlined in paragraph 5.
James E. Webb/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original.
405. Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum
Washington, December 21, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-80. Secret.
STATE'S FOUR PAPERS
("COAPS" is substituted for "ICAPS" throughout
this paper after 1 October 1949)Background Statement
1. On 2 August 1949, Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence four papers/1/ containing recommendations for implementation "at the earliest feasible time," which he wished to have considered by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The DCI submitted copies of these papers to the IAC members by circular memorandum dated 5 August 1949./2/
/1/Document 393.
/2/See the source note, Document 393.
2. A preliminary examination of the State proposals was made within CIA prior to the Intelligence Advisory Committee meeting of 19 August 1949 at which it was decided "to pass (the four papers) on to the Standing Committee to see what can be worked out and refer them back to the IAC members."
3. On 24 August 1949, the State Department member of ICAPS met with Mr. Allen Evans to clarify certain aspects of the presentation made by the State Department./3/
/3/See Document 395.
4. On 30 August 1949 the IAC Standing Committee met to consider the State Department proposals. The goal of this meeting, which was not realized, was to evaluate the State recommendations and express Standing Committee endorsement or lack of endorsement on each one. Much discussion of substantially differing viewpoints dissipated progress at this meeting.
5. On 8 September 1949 the IAC Standing Committee met again, to consider a draft of a report to the Intelligence Advisory Committee on State Department's Problem I.--Coordination. At the outset of this meeting the Department of Defense members submitted for the first time a prepared paper expressing their views on the Department of State proposals. Basically the Defense paper supported many of the State recommendations and asked that the entire series of problems be examined and suggested solutions be offered by ICAPS.
6. A report on these Four Problems was prepared as a result of these discussions, and on 1 November 1949 the Director of Central Intelligence sent to the IAC two reports/4/--one of which was concurred in by all of the Standing Committee except the State member, who recommended in the second separate short report that the proposals of the Department of State be referred to COAPS "for preparation of a staff study which will:
/4/See Document 403 and enclosures.
a. "clearly indicate the areas of agreement and
b. "isolate and define the issues and areas on which there is disagreement."
7. A staff report by COAPS on the Four Problems of State met with the endorsement of most of the IAC members in response to the DCI memorandum of 1 November 1949.
Paper I
PROBLEM I--COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
State Recommendation 1:
"That COAPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of, and responsible to, the DCI, be composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not 'representing' the agency, and be headed by a chief who will also be the Executive Secretary of the IAC."
Discussion:
This recommendation describes the present situation as regards the Chief of Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff and the member from the Department of State. The "joint staff" concept has not been clearly established in the case of the members contributed by the military departments. The words "Executive Secretary" should be changed, however, to "Secretariat" to cover the staff work essential for promoting efficiency at the IAC meetings and at the same time to prevent conflict with the concept of single responsibility in operations to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Conclusion:
The functions of COAPS, as part of the CIA organization, have been established and clearly enumerated by the Director of Central Intelligence. These duties cover the viewpoints expressed by the Department of State.
Recommendation:
That a memorandum from the DCI to the IAC members indicate that COAPS, as his staff, will, among other duties, accomplish the staff work on all problems being brought to the attention of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
State Recommendation 2:
"That matters of coordination be referred to COAPS for study and recommendation by the DCI, or through the DCI by the IAC, but that COAPS itself may submit to the DCI, or through the DCI to the IAC, recommendations which it considers appropriate for consideration."
Discussion:
This recommendation describes accurately a relationship whereby the Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff serves the DCI as a staff unit, recognizing that problems may be referred to the unit for staff study and that COAPS may itself initiate action when required.
Inherent in the wording of this recommendation, however, is the "Board of Directors" philosophy--giving little or no recognition to the principle of "forthright initiative and leadership" of the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of intelligence activities. NSC 50 has confirmed that the IAC is to function as an advisory committee.
Conclusions:
1. Although COAPS works as a staff unit of the DCI, the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies must recognize, if progress is to be achieved,
a. that COAPS is the only permanently established unit of organization available for staff analysis and formulation of appropriate recommendations;
b. that the DCI is not looking to COAPS for only favorable answers on any problems under examination and that the agencies should not require similar partiality;
c. that COAPS, composed of individuals contributed by the participating agencies, can and does achieve objectivity in its evaluation of problems.
2. COAPS should assume more progressive initiative in exploring areas of difficulty in the coordination process and in preparing adequately items for Intelligence Advisory Committee consideration.
Recommendations:
1. That a memorandum be sent by the DCI to the IAC members notifying them that COAPS will be available to help appraise and recommend solutions to problems of intelligence coordination.
2. That COAPS assume responsibility for preparation of the items which are to be placed on the agenda of the Intelligence Advisory Committee meetings and in so doing COAPS be guided by the principle that with adequate prior staff study it is not necessary that all such items be first referred to the Standing Committee before consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee itself.
State Recommendation 3:
"That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee serve as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC."
Discussion:
From a practical standpoint the Intelligence Advisory Committee Standing Committee cannot serve the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a "staff committee" since it has no permanent continuous working status. The main advantage of the existence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee Standing Committee is the element of time-saving to CIA in securing departmental viewpoints in round-table discussions on interdepartmental problems. Thus, in producing staff studies for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, COAPS is enabled to get agency reaction on these studies before putting them in final form for IAC action. Hence, the Standing Committee is the proving ground for testing the Staff Study, but in this process the Standing Committee should not be considered a barrier or layer between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Accordingly, formality of procedure, demanding official actions such as motions and votes are nonessential in Standing Committee meetings. The adoption of parliamentary procedures in such meetings would serve no purpose since the Standing Committee, representatives of an advisory committee, can formulate no binding decisions.
Since meetings of any committee are non-productive unless some prior analysis is made of the problems to be discussed, the only items which the IAC should refer to the IAC Standing Committee "to consider on an interagency basis" are those upon which some staff work is already performed to clearly define the issue involved. This may have been done by the IAC agency introducing a particular problem. In most instances, however, problems requiring consideration "on an interagency basis," being beyond the pale of interest of any one department fall within the coordinating responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, and, as such, should be referred to him for adequate and proper consideration. In such "consideration" he will, of course, test his tentative findings with the Intelligence Advisory Committee before arriving at a decision.
The wording in the recommendation limits the kind of problems, that the Standing Committee may consider, to those "referred to it by the IAC." This restriction serves no useful purpose.
Recommendation:
That the Recommendation of the Department of State be accepted if changed to read as follows:
"That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and that the Standing Committee consider all problems referred to it on an interagency basis so as to speed up the attainment of departmental views on interdepartmental issues."
State Recommendation 4:
"That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research programs primarily through the Estimates Division, whose primary function should be such coordination, in accordance with the following principles:"
Discussion:
The primary function of any "Estimates Division" is to prepare intelligence estimates. Efficient work in this field will bring about a certain degree of coordination as a by-product. However, whether or not CIA establishes an organizational unit to be known as the "Estimates Division" is an internal decision to be made by the Director of Central Intelligence.
"Research," as such, is an undertaking very essential in producing an intelligence estimate and "research program" at the most is a segment of the total production function. CIA's coordinating responsibility goes far beyond the purview of just "research," embracing also coordination in many other fields; e.g., collection, dissemination.
How CIA carries on its coordinating responsibility is to be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence, and hence these "principles" of conduct are at the most suggestions for DCI to consider.
Conclusion:
Since the general subject being considered in State's first "Problem" is "Coordination of Intelligence Activities," the lead paragraph of Recommendation 4 should be reworded to express more accurately CIA's position.
Recommendations:
1. That it be recognized that the following principles are not all-inclusive.
2. That State Recommendation 4 be reworded to read:
"That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility in accordance with the following primary principles;"
First Principle
State Recommendation 4a:
"CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, including current research intelligence projects;"
Discussion:
The word "activities" places a false limitation on the scope of CIA functions. Knowledge of "all U.S. foreign intelligence" is sufficiently general to include information on activities.
As a central producer of national intelligence and as a coordinator of all intelligence in the federal structure, CIA should be the recognized repository of all information pertaining to intelligence undertakings planned, in progress, and completed in the IAC agencies.
To achieve this objective the IAC agencies themselves must take the initiative in maintaining strong world-wide collection facilities and in guaranteeing the free flow of raw information, finished departmental products, and other pertinent data to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Conclusion:
To comply with the mission of CIA, this statement of principle should be reworded so as to be more inclusive of CIA's total responsibility.
Recommendation:
That this statement of principle be accepted if reworded to read:
"CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all U.S. foreign intelligence matters, including agency programs, projects, reports, and activities of all types, and also on the nature and scope of the basic supporting data."
Second Principle
State Recommendation 4b:
"CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall departmental regulation;"
Discussion:
CIA's authority to comprehend fully the agency intelligence activities and functions is circumscribed seriously by the present wording of NSCID 1, wherein it is specified that CIA may see only "intelligence materials" and these with the express permission of the department.
The last phase of the principle, "subject to overall departmental regulation," could hamper progress if it were applied too generally. There is no objection to its usage if meant to cover only the security regulations of each department and agency.
Conclusions:
1. The general acceptance of this principle by all IAC agencies would strengthen and facilitate the responsibility of CIA in the field of interdepartmental coordination.
2. The principle might well be clarified so that there will be no misunderstanding regarding the kind of departmental regulations which are meant to apply.
Recommendations:
1. That this principle be adopted by CIA for IAC application.
2. That the IAC members instruct their organizations in adequate detail regarding full recognition of this principle at all levels throughout each agency.
Third Principle
State Recommendation 4c:
"CIA will recognize that it should have active liaison responsibility to other agencies as well as receiving liaison from those agencies;"
Discussion:
The goal expressed by this recommendation is practical and worthwhile, and is a responsibility concomitant with the "free access" thoughts expressed in the last proposed principle. The "free flow" idea should be a two-way endeavor applicable to persons as well as materials and information. This interagency liaison should exist at policy levels as well as at working levels.
Conclusion:
The efficiency of present liaison functions between the IAC agencies and CIA is a subject worthy of proper examination.
Recommendations:
1. That CIA examine the condition of present liaison activities between CIA and the IAC agencies, and
2. Based upon the findings of such examination, issue the necessary operating instructions.
Fourth Principle
State Recommendation 4d:
"CIA will effect coordination as much by positive action in stimulating appropriate intelligence effort as by negative action in preventing undesirable duplications;"
Discussion:
This principle ties in with the "forthright initiative and leadership" concept of the Dulles Report and NSC 50. Its adoption by CIA and its unqualified recognition and acceptance by the IAC agencies would strengthen the administrative role of the Director of Central Intelligence in effecting coordination.
Conclusions:
1. The "positive action" approach is undoubtedly the more acceptable method for stronger coordination efforts.
2. To work properly, this principle must be accepted fully by the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies so as not to raise a question of "interference" with departmental undertaking when the DCI takes action in overall planning to stimulate "appropriate intelligence" efforts in the agencies.
Recommendation:
That this principle be adopted to guide CIA's actions in all fields of coordination, after receiving agency guarantees of full cooperation.
Fifth Principle
State Recommendation 4e:
"CIA will recognize that requests for intelligence other than national intelligence, as defined, shall be forwarded for action to the agencies in accordance with established allocations and existing programs;"
Discussion:
Requests coming to CIA are for intelligence relating to the national security, and, as such, are not earmarked "national," "departmental," or any other category. Neither does the requestor specify that the desired intelligence estimate must be prepared initially by any IAC department or agency. Accordingly, even though the request on CIA may ask for an intelligence product which is very largely political, this does not mean that CIA's responsibility to the requestor is fully discharged by merely calling upon the Department of State for the production of the estimate.
Usually a departmental intelligence estimate will not be allowed to go beyond the limits of the department unless the findings agree with policy. Hence all departmental intelligence products are framed in departmental policy viewpoints, and, as such, lose their objectivity when judged by intelligence standards.
Regardless of this deficiency, however, CIA utilizes departmental intelligence products and seeks departmental concurrences in the task of producing national intelligence estimates. The urgency of the request will determine whether the work thereunder falls into the category of "normal," "urgent," or "exceptional" as specified in DCI 3/1.
Conclusions:
1. "National Intelligence, as defined" being the basis for this recommendation by the Department of State, we should give consideration to improving the definition of National Intelligence.
2. The IAC agencies should realize:
a. That CIA was so constituted, and so placed in the Executive Structure to enable it to prepare national intelligence estimates in a completely objective manner, without necessity for reference to, or deference to, established policy.
b. Because of this important factor, CIA, in producing national intelligence estimates, has per se production responsibility even in the fields of dominant interest which are allocated by directive to the departments.
Recommendations:
1. That NSCID 3 be amended to include a new definition of National Intelligence as indicated in this report.
2. That DCI 3/1 and DCI 3/2 then be scrutinized in the light of an amended NSCID 3 for proper emphasis and meaning.
Sixth Principle
State Recommendation 4f:
"CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in some cases the temporary assignments of personnel to the agencies."
Discussion:
The suggested norm that "coordination also implies assistance" is an unsound thought for general application. There may be, and have been exceptional instances, when it was expedient to give the departments and agencies some personnel or financial aid. The NIS program is an example of this type. However, it must be recognized clearly that this help was not to be considered a precedent for other undertakings, but was rather an exception to the normal operating practices of CIA.
Conclusion:
This principle should be rejected as a substantially unsound interpretation of the function of coordination.
Recommendations:
1. That CIA non-concur in this principle and,
2. Whenever an IAC agency is given financial or other assistance by CIA it should be understood clearly that a particular purpose is to be served by such act, and that CIA does not prepare, and could not properly prepare, a budget to take care of anything except "contingency" cases of this nature.
Paper II
Problem II--Production of National Intelligence
State Recommendation 1a:
"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:
"a. That national intelligence applies only to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;"
Discussion:
This recommendation expresses the State viewpoint on the fundamental differences between State and CIA regarding the production of national intelligence. CIA feels that national intelligence cannot be defined exclusively in terms of being interdepartmental in substance, but that the definition must embrace also the thought (based on the National Security Act of 1947) that any intelligence (regardless of category) "relating to the national security" is national intelligence, for which the Director of Central Intelligence, as the sole objective producer of intelligence in the federal government, not hemmed in by departmental policy prejudices, must assume full production responsibility.
In examining the present definition of National Intelligence in NSCID 3 many are prone to overlook the second and shorter definition of National Intelligence appearing in paragraph 4 of NSCID 1, wherein it is stated:
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence."
Conclusions:
1. The viewpoint expressed in this recommendation is too narrow to cover the essential components of National Intelligence, and
2. The Director of Central Intelligence should not concur in the concept that this recommendation be placed before the IAC for agreement.
Recommendation:
1. That this State recommendation be rejected as inapplicable and inappropriate as it fails to recognize the responsibilities imposed by law.
State Recommendation 1b:
"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:
"b. That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities;"
Discussion:
This recommendation completely overlooks the fact that much of the "duplication of departmental intelligence activities" exists between departmental agencies themselves. Though "duplication," as construed generally, is a wasteful endeavor, the thought should never be used when applied to intelligence production without being modified by the word "undesirable." Though each agency of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, including the Central Intelligence Agency, has had allocated to it by National Security Council Directive a field of dominant interest, "it is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of the departments must be broader in scope (underscoring supplied) than any allocation of collection responsibility or recognition of dominant interest might indicate."
A second grave weakness in the recommendation is that the words "maximum use of departmental facilities" convey the erroneous notion that each department should prepare "its" section of a national intelligence estimate, or that national intelligence is merely the combining or stapling together of departmental intelligence products.
The principle that CIA should recognize the departmental facilities and should look to them for assistance whenever possible is worthwhile as long as this is done in a realistic manner.
Conclusions:
1. This recommendation should not be accepted as written until the IAC agencies understand and accept uniformly the meaning of "National Intelligence."
2. The IAC agencies should recognize that National Intelligence is not merely the editing and joining of departmental products, neither is it just the blending and merging of departmental viewpoints but rather is an overall objective evaluation analysis which transcends the competency, capacity, and policies of any department of government.
3. CIA should never subscribe to any recommendation or principle which overlooks the reality that "duplication" in the intelligence field, when within reasonable bounds, is more a blessing than a curse because of the adage that "Two minds are better than one."
Recommendations:
1. That CIA not accept this recommendation until the basic problem of definition of "National Intelligence" is solved.
2. That even then this recommendation be rewritten before accept-ance so that:
a. "Duplication" be modified to read "undesirable duplication," and
b. The "undesirable duplication" concept be understood to apply among the IAC agencies themselves as well as to the relationship between CIA and the agencies.
3. That the IAC agencies understand clearly that any such recommendation as this lays a positive burden on the agencies themselves to expedite an efficient and complete "free flow" of departmental raw information and finished departmental intelligence products to the Central Intelligence Agency.
State Recommendation 1c:
"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:
"c. That except in crisis situations no step be taken in the preparation of national estimates before consultation with appropriate agencies."
Discussion:
This recommendation misplaces the emphasis of the basic fact that the Central Intelligence Agency is the sole unit of government charged with the production of National Intelligence. In carrying out this function CIA cannot seek direct or indirect prior permission or approval from any of the IAC agencies. CIA assumes full responsibility for the content and format of all national intelligence estimates, and hence CIA has to determine the mode to follow in the production of each such estimate.
However, CIA acknowledges the benefit to be achieved by tapping agency facilities. DCI 3/1 establishes clearly what shall be done in "normal," "urgent" and "exceptional" circumstances to seek agency participation in the production of national intelligence estimates. Agency participation even in crisis situations is now in the process of being formalized.
Conclusions:
1. To follow this recommendation would put fetters on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, by subordinating the function of producing National Intelligence to the policies and procedures of the departmental activities.
2. In showing the proper spirit of cooperation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, CIA has already gone further than the exception called for in this recommendation by asking for departmental comments even in "crisis situations."
3. To meet its deadline for furnishing a national intelligence estimate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, the Central Intelligence Agency cannot be dependent upon departmental promises of completion which are subject to the determination of departmental policy officials.
Recommendations:
1. That this State recommendation be rejected as being at variance with the mission and objectives of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. That after "National Intelligence" has been understood, the IAC agencies recognize fully their position in the development of the national intelligence products.
State Recommendation 2:
"That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member."
Discussion:
This recommendation has two major weaknesses:
a. The IAC is looked upon as a Board of Directors to assume ultimate responsibility for the content of CIA's products--i.e., National Intelligence estimates, and
b. The recommendation is contrary to the conclusions of the NSC with respect to the Dulles Report. NSC 50 stated that the Director and the IAC should not be bound by the concept of collective responsibility because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned.
Furthermore, there is no cogent reason why it should always be necessary to discuss dissents at IAC Meetings. The controlling factor for discussing national intelligence estimates at IAC Meetings should be the importance attached to the need for such discussion by any member of the IAC, rather than the mere existence of a difference of opinion as to the conclusions of the estimate.
We must recognize, however, that our present system on agency concurrences does not achieve the same end as would be derived by simultaneous collective discussion. Thus, some sympathetic consideration should be given to the fact that collective discussion, rather than bringing out a weak "common denominator" of thought, might, if adequately staffed, add to the potency of the majority findings, might eliminate minority dissents without weakening the major conclusions, or might evolve new and even strengthened judgments on the premise under consideration.
Conclusions:
1. The recommended action is too broad and sweeping in calling for Intelligence Advisory Committee discussion on "all national intelligence estimates upon which there is substantial disagreement . . . ."
2. IAC discussion should not be discouraged, but should be premised on the need as desired by any one member rather than on the exist-ence of a substantial dissenting opinion.
Recommendations:
1. That the State recommendation be reworded to read:
"That the IAC discuss estimates upon the request of a member; provided that, in the opinion of the requesting member, there is a substantive and important fault in the estimate to be discussed."
2. That the recommendation as reworded be accepted.
State Recommendation 3:
"That COAPS review and make recommendations for any revision of procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis situations, such procedures to be, as far as possible, in accordance with the principles outlined in existing NSCID's, NSC 50 and Recommendation 1 above.
Discussion:
COAPS studied the need for a formal procedure to govern in crisis situations, and drafted and sent to the IAC agencies a proposed DCI on this subject. The Army and some other members wished to have the Army's phraseology as an amendment to NSCID No. 1, so the agreed-upon substance has been referred to the NSC to determine the method of issuance.
Conclusion:
It is thought that the objective of the State recommendation has now been reached.
Recommendation:
No further action is required until a reply is received from the NSC.
Paper III
Problem III--Research and Reports
State Recommendation 1:
"That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC."
Discussion:
This recommendation conflicts with the view contained in 4e of State Paper I, which says that CIA will accomplish nothing beyond what is known as "National Intelligence." If "National Intelligence" is redefined in adequate fashion this State recommendation would apparently cause no restrictive limitation on the production responsibility of CIA. However, appearances are sometimes deceptive and such would be the case in this instance. The Director of Central Intelligence does not have authority to prescribe fields of common concern, nor does the IAC. The National Security Act is most specific in stating that CIA shall "perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;" and furthermore that CIA shall "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." (Underscoring supplied/5/) The recommendation also restates the "Board of Directors'" philosophy that the Central Intelligence Agency shall undertake what is prescribed by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
/5/Printed here in italics.
Conclusions:
1. This State recommendation is too restrictive as the Director of Central Intelligence must comply with requests from the President, the National Security Council, and others.
2. This State recommendation is erroneous in content by ascribing a responsibility to the DCI and the Intelligence Advisory Committee which belongs, by law, to the National Security Council.
Recommendation:
1. That the State recommendation be rejected.
State Recommendation 2:
"That, on a priority basis, COAPS prepare for consideration in IAC recommendations on the delineations of fields of common concern."
Discussion:
The "fields of common concern" are those areas of production which do not fall wholly into the allocated responsibility of any one department or agency. Thus under NSCID 3 "Economic, Scientific, and Technological Intelligence" are assigned to "Each agency in accordance with its respective needs."
Since the issuance of NSCID 3, a permanent interdepartmental Scientific Intelligence Committee has been established after long delays under DCI 3/3 "to plan, support and coordinate the production of scientific intelligence as it affects the national security." By this action the scientific and technological "fields of common concern" have not only been delineated, but have also been put under coordination control.
Conclusions:
1. Best coordination in fields of common concern is not achieved by mere "delineation" of the fields.
2. Continuous problems of coordination exist in those fields.
3. The precedent of establishing the Scientific Intelligence Committee should carry much weight in considering problems in the economic intelligence field.
4. Because of vaster scope and more complexities in the economic field there is even greater justification for establishing an Economic Intelligence Committee.
Recommendations:
1. That the State recommendation be rejected as not affording a true solution in the Economic Intelligence field.
2. That there be established by the Director of Central Intelligence a permanent interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of a representative of CIA, to plan, support and coordinate the production of economic intelligence as it affects the national security and that such committee be known as "The Economic Intelligence Committee."
Paper IV
Problem IV--Political Summaries
State Recommendation 1:
"That COAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly."
Discussion:
As the intelligence facility of the National Security Council and the President, the Central Intelligence Agency must continually and systematically report all developments, political, economic, military, and otherwise, which materially affect or have a bearing upon United States national security and objectives abroad.
While CIA's Daily and Weekly Summaries are based to a considerable degree upon Department of State materials, the major cause for this situation derives from the fact that the Department of State makes its highest level intelligence and operational materials, which have utility for intelligence purposes, available to the Central Intelligence Agency whereas the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force normally do not provide operational details. It is hoped that this situation will be improved. Moreover, in periods of relative peace, the bulk of intelligence is of a political and economic, rather than military, nature.
The Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence summaries are the only ones designed primarily for the President and the National Security Council. Each departmental intelligence agency is authorized to produce such current publications as are required to meet its own departmental needs.
Conclusion:
The CIA Daily Summary and Weekly Summary are not designed to be only "political summaries." They are issued as current intelligence under Paragraph 1 of DCI 3/1.
Recommendation:
1. That the State recommendation be rejected.
406. Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)
Washington, December 23, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, National Intelligence Staff Study. Secret.
SUBJECT
Production of National IntelligenceThe enclosed staff study/1/ presents an analysis of the nature of national intelligence and the major problems connected with its production. It represents a considered statement of the major unresolved questions which prompted your memorandum of December 13 to Mr. Souers,/2/ suggesting that CIA make a further progress report on the matters discussed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of NSC 50. In view of that memorandum and of Mr. Lay's memorandum of December 14 to the National Security Council,/3/ which reported that the DCI is being asked to submit a further report, I have felt it inappropriate to recommend further positive action at this time.
/1/The staff study referred to is the enclosure to the transmittal note from Evans to Trueheart, December 16. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. No evidence has been found to indicate whether this memorandum and its intended enclosure were sent to Webb at the time. In any case, the study was put in final form in January 1950, although that final version was not sent to Webb until May; see Document 420.
/2/See the enclosure to Document 404.
/3/Document 404.
My recommendations, therefore, as presented at p/4/ of the attachment, request your approval of the study as an expression of the Department's views on the issues discussed. I am quite sure that the DCI's further progress report will not show that there has been any real resolution of those issues and I am prepared, if you approve this study, to pre-sent a similar thesis at the appropriate time for possible NSC action.
/4/Omission in the source text.
407. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, December 27, 1949.
//Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50. Top Secret. Souers transmitted Hillenkoetter's report to the members of the NSC under cover of a December 28 memorandum. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
Particular Intelligence Questions Requiring Coordination or AttentionREFERENCE
(a) Section 4c(2) of NSC 50
(b) Memorandum to Director, 8 July 1949 from Executive Secretary, NSC/1/
(c) Memorandum to Director, 14 December 1949 from Acting Executive Secretary, NSC/2//1/Not found.
/2/Document 404.
The following report is submitted in accordance with Section 4 of NSC 50 which lists particular intelligence questions requiring coordination or attention, and requests the Director of Central Intelligence to submit to the Council within six months a report of progress in these matters.
1. Scientific Intelligence. On 1 January 1949 an Office of Scientific Intelligence was established as one of the major offices in the Central Intelligence Agency. This office is being well staffed and is now devoting its time to matters of scientific intelligence in conjunction with other offices of the Government interested in this subject. DCI Directive 3/3, based on NSCID 3, was issued with IAC concurrence on 28 October 1949 establishing an interdepartmental Scientific Intelligence Committee to plan, support, and coordinate production of scientific intelligence as it affects the National Security.
2. Domestic Intelligence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is now a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee so that domestic intelligence and related matters will be coordinated with foreign intelligence matters. The Office of Special Operations in the Central Intelligence Agency is working closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on matters where their respective interests are related.
3. Crisis Situations. On 2 February 1949, at a regular meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, it was agreed to expedite the handling of intelligence matters when there were crisis situations. To confirm this agreement in writing, it is hoped that a directive on this subject may be issued this month, after agreement has been reached on the method of issuing it. This was referred to the NSC on 19 December 1949/3/ after an IAC meeting, at which agreement on the method was not reached.
/3/Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Crisis Situations," dated December 22, 1949. [Footnote in the source text. The memorandum has not been found.]
4. Political Summaries. As the intelligence facility of the National Security Council and the President, the Central Intelligence Agency must continually and systematically report all developments, political, economic, military, and otherwise, which materially affect or have a bearing upon United States national security and objectives abroad. While CIA's Daily and Weekly Summaries are based to a considerable degree upon Department of State materials, the major cause for this situation derives from the fact that the Department of State makes its highest level intelligence and operational materials, which have utility for intelligence purposes, available to the Central Intelligence Agency whereas the Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force normally do not provide operational details. It is hoped that this situation will be improved. Moreover, in periods of relative peace, the bulk of intelligence is of a political and economic, rather than military, nature. The Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence summaries are the only ones designed primarily for the President and the National Security Council. Each departmental intelligence agency is authorized to produce such current publications as are required to meet its own departmental needs.
5. Exploitation of Foreign Nationality Groups and Individuals. This work is being undertaken as follows:
a. Foreign Radio Broadcasts Within the U.S.: A recent survey shows that 131 radio stations in the U.S. broadcast to Foreign Nationality Groups in 39 languages. Authorized transmitter power is so low that only 5% of these stations, covering 10 languages, can be monitored with present FBID facilities. The foreign intelligence potential of these stations is considered of such little value that the diversion of effort from foreign broadcasts is considered uneconomical and unwarranted.
b. Foreign Language Publications Within the U.S.: Whereas the foreign intelligence potential of the 733 publications was considered negligible during the war years, a continuing survey shows an increasing tendency to employ foreign correspondents which enhances their intelligence potential. At present six publications of this type receive regular screening.
c. Foreign Nationality Groups: These Groups are being exploited in the large cities of the U.S. by CIA's 14 regional field offices for foreign intelligence information and for assistance in identifying aliens of high intelligence potential among the recently arrived DP's and other immigrants. Close coordination with the FBI is in effect.
d. Individual Aliens: The exploitation of these sources is performed under the provisions of NSCID No. 7 and carried out on behalf of all of the IAC agencies. After clearance with the covert offices of CIA and FBI, the regional field offices fulfill their joint intelligence information requirements either by arrangement of interviews or by means of responsive information reports.
6. Covert Intelligence in Occupied Areas. Action has been taken with the Intelligence Division, GSUSA, to effect a closer coordination of such activity, which has resulted in appreciable improvement in the situation and a substantial increase of coordination in both the Far Eastern and European areas.
7. Defectors. For over a year, this subject has been under consideration by the interested agencies. After much discussion and revision, a proposed NSCID was compiled on "Exploitation of Defectors and Other Aliens Within the United States" and circulated in December to the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies for the usual approval before submitting it to the National Security Council. A corollary proposal on the "Exploitation of Soviet and Satellite Defectors Outside the United States" was also submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies./4/ It is hoped that both proposals will soon be approved by the IAC so that they may be submitted to the NSC as proposed NSCIDs for early issuance.
/4/Subsequently submitted for consideration by the National Security Council; memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Exploitation of Soviet and Satellite Defectors Outside the United States," dated December 20, 1949. [Footnote in the source text. The memorandum has not been found.]
Until these over-all policy directives are established and put in operation, there is functioning a Pro Tem Interdepartmental Working Committee to handle problems on the important cases of defectors which arise and which have accumulated to date. It is hoped that before long the over-all directives will be approved and issued, so that the pro tem work of this nature may be discontinued and this work placed on a firmer and more regular basis. The chief difficulty with regard to this problem is the ultimate disposal of defectors and the costs entailed therein. [4 lines of the source text not declassified]
8. Counter-espionage Activities Abroad, and Closer Liaison With the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Special Operations has placed increased stress on its counter-espionage functions and on counter-espionage activity abroad on a continuing basis.
The Office of Special Operations' liaison and cooperation attendant thereon with the Federal Bureau of Investigation have increased effectively over a considerable period of time. Obviously, the closest possible working relationship is not only highly desirable but also necessary to developing the closest possible counter-espionage liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Central Intelligence Agency feels that this liaison relationship at the present time is close, effective, and mutually advantageous.
9. With regard to Sections 5 and 6 of NSC 50, mentioned in the memorandum of 14 December 1949 from the Acting Executive Secretary of NSC, transmitting a copy of the memorandum dated 13 December from the Under Secretary of State, the following organizational realignment of the Office of Reports and Estimates in CIA was approved some weeks ago and is to a large extent now in operation, relating to Section 6a(2) of NSC 50, in addition to the plan already compiled in compliance with Section 6a(1):
a. An Estimates Production Board, under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, has been established, composed primarily of the Chiefs of the regional and functional divisions of the Office of Reports and Estimates. Among other duties it is responsible for recommending the scope and terms of reference of national intelligence estimates; participation in production and final substantive review of such estimates prior to transmittal to the IAC for coordination; and advising the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates on the adoption of proposed intelligence production programs to ensure that adequate priorities are given at all times to the production of high level estimates.
b. Each regional division of the Office of Reports and Estimates has been realigned to provide (1) an Estimate Staff, and (2) three or more regional, analytical, and research branches. They afford separate facilities for high level estimates, and other reports and research studies required for production of estimates but which are not available from the departmental intelligence agencies. This realignment permits the retention of centralized substantive and production controls under each division chief and provides separate allocation of manpower for each category of production.
(1) The Estimates Staff of each regional division produces national intelligence estimates within its area in accordance with DCI 3/1 procedures and is of sufficient size to ensure adequate production in this category.
(2) The analytical and research branches retain their present geographic responsibilities and are continuing systematically to examine, identify and analyze the significance of emergent trends within their areas of responsibility in order to provide the regional Estimates Staff with processed intelligence data. These data are for use in the production of national intelligence estimates, as well as reports and estimates in those fields of common concern which are appropriate to regional, as distinguished from purely functional, treatment.
c. A Central Research Group has been established consisting initially of the Map Division, the National Intelligence Survey Division (Basic Intelligence Group, redesignated), and the General Division (formerly the General Division, Plans and Policy Staff). At such time as it is determined to conduct additional intelligence research in fields of common concern, additional facilities for this purpose will be added to the Central Research Group.
10. Further organizational realignment of the Office of Reports and Estimates may be required if changes are made within the IAC agencies.
11. With specific reference to paragraph 5 of NSC 50, the Central Intelligence Agency has undertaken the problem of intelligence production planning on a long-range and interdepartmental basis. It is believed that such planning will afford CIA and the IAC agencies a sound basis upon which to reach agreement regarding what intelligence needs to be produced and what departmental support can be provided to national intelligence production.
R.H. Hillenkoetter/5/
Rear Admiral, USN/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
408. Memorandum From Brigadier General John Magruder to Secretary of Defense Johnson
Washington, December 22, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2434, Job 83-00764R, Box 3, Folder 8. Top Secret. Magruder was a consultant on intelligence to the Secretary of Defense.
This study presents some background discussion and suggests several alternative solutions for the organizational setting of Mr. Wisner's OPC.
I recommend alternative 6 on page 5. Generals Burns and McNarney concur.
While I do not know State Department's final position, the alternative recommended would furnish the basis of discussion which I think would lead to a solution satisfactory to you and Mr. Webb.
I should be glad to explain any points which might be clarified.
John Magruder/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Magruder signed the original.
Enclosure
SUBJECT
Reorganization of Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)The Problem
To establish an appropriate relationship between the agencies of CIA responsible for clandestine collection of intelligence and conduct of covert operations; and to fit them into the structure of CIA in a manner to insure their coordinated control.
Assumptions
1. That suggested changes shall be possible without new legislation.
2. That responsibility for these operations be not susceptible to public or direct attribution to the President or to individual cabinet members.
3. That authoritative controls exist to insure that in peace or war covert operations shall be restricted to projects which are clearly and directly in furtherance of national policy.
4. That clear differentiation be made between:
a. Covert operations of a political, economic and psychological character, which by their nature remain truly covert and which are employed abroad to influence developments favorable to the United States, and
b. Operations which, while initially covert, are by their nature designed to create physical manifestations which cease to be covert, such as, sabotage, support of underground and guerilla movements and para-military activities.
Discussion
The principles governing the functions and general composition of CIA as reflected in the National Security Act of 1947 had been the subject of long debate. It was not casual that to one directorate was given such widely different responsibilities as the production of national intelligence and the collection of foreign intelligence by clandestine methods. When the need for instituting covert operations in peacetime became apparent, again it was not casual that they should have been assigned to CIA and placed alongside their related activities, espionage and counter-espionage. To avoid the creation of a floating agency operationally inappropriate to any department and which was so directly dependent upon clandestine intelligence, it was natural to incorporate covert operations in CIA.
Thus, CIA became a basket of widely differing eggs. But eggs they are, nevertheless, and a basket they must have. This copious basket called Central Intelligence is uniquely an American concept. The arrangement has historic validity which includes our wartime experiences, our intimate observation of foreign practices in wartime and, last and most important, our governmental structure which dictates its being as it is. The more you try to change the composition of CIA the more obstinately do conditions force you back to the original concept of the CIA carry-all.
While I do not advocate it, the only major organizational change in our national intelligence system which logically suggests itself is the separation of the central organization for producing national estimates and studies from the clandestine organizations for collecting intelligence. The functions of these two agencies are not analogous. However, their separation would create another splinter agency with the obvious disadvantages involved and, furthermore, would deprive the clandestine organizations of a valuable smoke screen. While functionally CIA could thus rationally be divided, no good purposes would thereby be served.
On the other hand, the complete separation of the several activities in the clandestine field, such as are truly covert, presents numerous disadvantages./2/ Clandestine intelligence and covert operations are characterized by both functional affinity and operational inter-dependence. They must be at least under the same general direction if ineffectiveness and even dangerous confusions are to be avoided. It is almost impossible to operate individuals, groups or chains of underground agents in the same area without their uncovering each other--unless they are very skillfully controlled by a central direction.
/2/The first 4 words of this sentence are crossed out by hand on the source text.
While separate direction of strictly covert operations in the same area is hazardous, it is also true that attempts to operate merged activities of widely differing character may be self-defeating. If it is difficult to see how intricate methods of espionage and subtle manipulations of political subversion can succeed except under single direction, it is highly improbable that the merger of all types of subversive activities can be employed in a given area, even by a single head, without the physical operations ceasing to be truly covert and blowing wide open the subtle covert apparatus.
These considerations therefore suggest the importance of differentiating between two broad types of covert activities: those which by their nature are truly covert and must remain so if they are to succeed; and a category of so-called covert activities whose development designedly leads to physical manifestations which cease to be covert. This differentiation leads to a possible solution which would permit the merger under a single direction of those covert activities which are clearly related and unquestionably interdependent while retaining under separate direction the more physical or para-military types of operations which rarely remain covert.
With respect to the controls and organizational set-up employed by the British, the information obtained from different official levels is contradictory. It can only be assumed that the British cabinet ministers are employing different terminology from our own in defining integration or separation of covert activities or else have reference to different types of covert activities. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Whatever may be the explanation, it will be evident that the United States Government cannot follow British practice in all details of organization if for no other reason than the constitutional difference in the two governments. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The British constitution permits flexibility of action in these fields by the British Cabinet Members not permitted by existing law in the US. It was only after the creation of the National Security Council that national central direction, other than the President himself, became available as a permanent body to control such activities. This agency seems to be entirely appropriate to control all covert activities of inter-departmental or extra-departmental character unless control of specific types be assigned to a particular department with the concurrence of other interested departments.
Assuming that all existing Central Intelligence Agency responsibilities, including covert operations, are of inter-departmental character, it would seem inappropriate to separate OPC or any of its functions from the general direction of CIA. There remains the decision as to the method of fixing the relationship within CIA between OPC and OSO, the latter of which now is engaged exclusively in the clandestine collection of intelligence.
In view of the initial assumptions and the foregoing general considerations, there are outlined below the several alternative solutions which could be implemented by NSC directive.
Alternatives
1. Leave OPC in status quo ante publication of NSC-50. This arrangement is discarded as being unsatisfactory to all who operate under it, and to all investigators who have studied the problem.
2. While combining under an assistant director of CIA, OPC, OSO, Contact Branch and essential separate covert services, retain the separation of OPC and OSO, with their existing functions, each under a separate head. This arrangement provides for the separation of OSO and OPO while permitting some degree of coordination through an assistant director in charge of both. With common control only at the top, it still leaves parallel but non-integrated organizations whose personnel will inevitably be forced into conflicting activities and unavoidable friction. It perpetuates considerable duplication of personnel and auxiliary services. The truly covert political operations of OPC will be vulnerable to disclosure by the administration at home and abroad of widely differing types of operations within the same organization. This alternative is discarded.
3. Same as alternative 2, except that OPC and OSO be integrated under one head but not merged to the extent of preventing future possible separation. Discarded for reasons given above and additionally because it introduces another echelon of authority.
4. Same as alternative 3, except that OPC and OSO be merged under one head. Discarded as being the merger to which the Secretary of Defense objects and as having the major disadvantages referred to in previous alternatives.
5. If assumption 2 should be disregarded, all covert operations presently assigned to OPC could be lifted from CIA and assigned:
(a) To Department of State--all truly covert operations of political, economic and psychological character.
(b) To Department of Defense--all the more physical types of operations, including sabotage; training, support, and supply of underground resistance; para-military activities.
This plan is discarded as being at variance with American practice of assigning these unorthodox activities as a direct departmental responsibility. Furthermore, the operations would gradually lose all character of security, flexibility and unorthodoxy in the inescapable straitjacket of departmental bureaucracy.
6. Combine under an assistant director of CIA the following activities: OPC, OSO, Contact Branch, and essential separate covert services. Transfer from OPC to OSO responsibility for all truly covert political, economic and psychological operations. OPC, remaining under separate head, would retain responsibility for the physical types of operations which only initially are covert, such as: sabotage; the training, support and supply of resistance movements; para-military activities. This plan avoids a merger of organizations and thus reconciles the objections of the Secretary of Defense. It separates the control over two non-homogeneous types of activities now in OPC, but retains all the essential functions in a logical organizational setting. Clandestine intelligence collection and strictly covert political operations could be conducted under most secure and coordinated conditions. If limited covert operations of a physical character were required in peacetime, they could be conducted under strictly security measures and coordination of OSO. Under this reorganization, OPC would continue the planning and preparation for war of the types of operations of primary interest to the Defense Department. The OPC could thus be transferred to the JCS in wartime, while having its development take place in the atmosphere of unorthodoxy in CIA. In wartime, the covert agencies of CIA and those transferred to military control, having had common background of security and flexibility, could cooperate with a high degree of understanding.
Recommendation--That the Secretary of Defense adopt the plan briefly stated in alternative 6 and informally request the concurrence of the Secretary of State. That if agreement be reached as to adoption of this general plan, the Secretaries instruct their respective consultants, in consultation with the Secretary, National Security Council, to draft an implementing directive to the Director, CIA, for consideration of the NSC.
John Magruder/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Magruder signed the original.
409. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Assistant (Howe) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Armstrong)
Washington, January 5, 1950.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, State-CIA Relationship 1949-1956. Secret.
SUBJECT
Crisis EstimatesIn conversation with General Magruder, he said that he took a very gloomy view of the paper presently before the NSC on Crisis Estimates and he read from a draft of a briefing memo which he proposed to send to Secretary Johnson./1/ The gist of his comment was that the proposed paragraph for NSCID 1 was wholly inadequate to the important problem of crisis estimates and that among other reasons because it diffused the responsibility. He did recommend in the memo, however, that the Secretary agree to the paragraph only on an interim basis, pending the establishment of a group within CIA which could adequately produce national intelligence estimates.
/1/Neither found.
I pointed out to General Magruder the following:
1. That crisis estimates could only be as sound as the whole of the national intelligence estimates procedure; that until we had made the fundamental corrections in national intelligence procedures, probably no useful purpose would be served by trying to adjust crisis estimates.
2. That his recommendation might well offer a risk on which Hilly could throw his hat; namely that CIA already has a facility for producing national estimates, therefore everything is just fine.
3. That the reason that the paragraph is going into the NSC at all is because the Military wanted the lever placed upon top officers to supply critical information to the intelligence arms and to CIA.
4. That the Department had been indifferent on whether the matter was taken up to the NSC and that we had recommended the Under Secretary agree, believing that no useful purpose would be served by trying to adjust crisis estimates until national estimates had been corrected.
General Magruder seemed willing to revise his recommendation to state simply that the Defense agreement was an interim one pending "an adjustment of national intelligence procedures on which crisis estimates must be based." He did think, however, that the record should be kept clear, that crisis estimates and national intelligence estimates as a whole were still not satisfactory, so that an NSC agreement of crisis estimates would not imply that the NSC was satisfied with the procedures as a whole.
Fisher Howe/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and initials.
P.S. Do you think that the fact that Johnson may raise some question on this matter at the NSC meeting indicates that we should prepare to brief the Secretary on it?
F.H.
410. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Deputy Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Howe) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Sheppard)
Washington, January 9, 1950.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, National Intelligence Staff Study. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Status of Miscellaneous Projects1. NSC 50 Progress Report
I call your attention to Admiral Souers' NSC memorandum of December 28,/1/ distributing CIA's further progress report on implementation of NSC 50,/2/ which claims to answer the State Department's request for further amplification of organizational planning for national intelligence. I have discussed this with General Magruder.
/1/Not printed. (Ibid., Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) See the Supplement.
/2/Document 407.
2. National Intelligence
There are three current papers on this subject in various stages of completion. The documentation is, in fact, going to sizeable proportions which, for such a technical subject, I think is unavoidable:
(a) Hillenkoetter's report on "State's Four Papers"/3/ (you will remember that we put into the IAC four papers to implement NSC 50); this memo dated December 30, 1949, I will make available to you. It is tantamount to a unilateral rejection by CIA of the State Department's recommendations which were supposed to have gone to OCAPS for staff work, not for rejection. However, they do indicate more thoroughly than heretofore the basis (and illogic) of CIA's position on national intelligence.
/3/Document 405.
(b) R Staff Paper:/4/ I enclose a stencilled draft of this paper. We omitted recommendations, partly in order to discuss this matter fully before finishing up and because positive action depended to a large extent on CIA's response to the last NSC action asking for further amplification on this subject. The staff paper, we believe, is excellent: it indicates quite clearly the issues involved in national intelligence and the reasons we feel so strongly that national intelligence should be established according to these lines. I have informally left a copy of this with General Magruder. No other distribution has been made.
/4/Dated January 3; see Tab A to Document 420.
(c) General Magruder's draft/5/ is not finished. He read parts of it to me last week. If we straightened out the nomenclature, I think we would find ourselves in almost complete agreement. Furthermore, his paper is on the whole complementary to ours in that he proposes to lay down a specific organization for CIA to fulfill its assignment on national intelligence and to prescribe categorically what each organizational unit is to do. This should be very helpful.
/5/Not found but probably an earlier version of Tab B, Document 420.
3. OPC-OSO Reorganization.
Almost nothing has been done further on this. I have, however, tried another hand at drafting the nature of the problem and for whatever use, I attach it hereto./6/
/6/Not found.
4. CIA Budget.
I did not speak to Magruder about this and I therefore do not know the NME views. This will need to be pursued this week.
5. Tuesday Meetings.
Park handled the meeting last week and he has sent you a minute/6/ on what transpired. I believe the memo also indicates the appropriate subject for next week which arose out of the meeting.
Fisher Howe/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
411. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, January 19, 1950.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, State-CIA Relationship 1949-1956. Confidential. Drafted by Howe. Appended to the source text is a handwritten "Note for file" by Sheppard dated January 27 which reads as follows: "In conversation with Howe and Barnes it was decided: (1) State now has sufficient control over the content of the daily summary. (2) In view of the CIA situation & the President's interest, (3) We should now do nothing to rock the boat. W.S.S."
SUBJECT
CIA Daily Staff Summary (Blue Book)In the course of conversation on other matters, Bill Sheppard, Jim Lay, and I discussed the CIA daily top secret Intelligence Summary.
Lay pointed out among other things that the whole project stems from a considered decision by the old NIA (Committee of the Secretary of State and Service Departments, etc., in charge of Intelligence) whose decision it was, following the desires of the President, that the CIA produce such a summary, that the summary be both operational and intelligence. The NIA also specifically approved the distribution list.
Lay also pointed out that regardless of our views of the merits of the Staff Summary, every indication is that the President likes it and wants it. Furthermore, there is no indication that the President is aware of or disparages the fact that it is duplicative of State Department cables and information summaries sent directly to him from the Department.
Lay also said incidentally that Dennison is the staff officer in the White House who usually shows it to the President without comment and that the CIA encloses the original cable with the staff summary of the cable.
In answer to a question, Lay discounted the possibility that there was any thought the Staff Summary would serve as a "check" upon the flow of information to the President; that by having another source of information, the President could be assured that he received everything. It was pointed out that such a view, if held, was fallacious in any event because the Department controlled the information going to CIA. Lay felt that the CIA was not in the least aware that they may be jeopardizing their flow of State cables by producing a summary which (a) contained large amounts of policy which was the responsibility of the State Department (b) failed to include military intelligence (c) distributed throughout the Government State Department information over which the Department itself should have the control.
Lay saw no reason why constructive suggestions and recommendations might not be made to improve the Staff Summary, but such should be formulated within the framework of the knowledge that the President favors the Staff Summary.
Note: Lay was most cooperative and friendly in discussing this project, and the information and views which he gave should be treated confidentially. F. H.)
412. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, January 31, 1950.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, State-CIA Relationship 1949-1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Howe. The source text indicates that a copy was sent to William J. Sheppard, one of the special assistants to the Secretary.
SUBJECT
OSO-OPC RelationshipIn conversation with Magruder and for part of the time with Joyce and Krentz, considerable discussion of the various facets of the problem was taken up. It was finally decided that both Magruder and Howe would try a hand at a paper which could be used as a modification of NSC 10/2, on the basis of which further discussions on the precise details could go forward not only between NME with State, but also with Hilly and Wisner.
The general principle on which the redraft of 10/2 should be based was that there would be one Assistant Director for Operations. Under the Assistant Director for Operations there would be three divisions:
1. The Contacts Branch.
2. A "rough stuff" branch which would plan sabotage, counter-sabotage, guerrilla activity and logistics for such activity, but would not carry out any operations itself. If operations of this nature were called for, they would be done under the clandestine operations area offices.
3. Clandestine Operations Branch. This would combine the functions of espionage, counter-espionage, and those positive operations in the political, economic and psychological field, short of "rough stuff," which require the agent operation and covert techniques. This branch would in turn be subdivided into area sections, each section having in its complement both intelligence and operations people under a single area operations head.
It was a matter of indifference whether staff arms for plans, services, training and communications would be tied in at the Assistant Director level, or under the Branch Head for Clandestine Operations.
The really difficult point in drafting comes in expressing the degree and nature of control which the Department or the NME will have over the Operations Section. Magruder even had some idea that there should be sealed in the hands of the Executive Secretary, NSC, a secret protocol, pointing out that there would be a degree of autonomy on the part of the Assistant Director, Operations, which would permit him to be directly responsive to foreign policy and military affairs. This problem too is tied in very closely with the individuals who will be placed in controlling positions in CIA, but Magruder says that he felt that Johnson would accept a degree of control by the Department and we both felt that it would be possible to express this control in the revised NSC 10/2 which we would draft.
Fisher Howe/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
413. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Steelman) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, February 2, 1950.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence Requirements, Facilities and Arrangements Related to the National SecurityAs resources mobilization planning progresses, it is increasingly evident to the participating agencies that the full effectiveness of many segments of such planning depends upon the ready availability of adequate, timely and correlated foreign economic intelligence.
This has proved, for example, to be the case in such fields as peace-time procurement and development for stockpiling; wartime procurement and development; foreign manpower; war trade agreements; export and import controls; economic assistance to potential allies and friendly neutrals, and other foreign requirements; preclusive buying; proclaimed listing; the control of foreign assets; economic capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential allies, neutral and enemy nations.
From the experience of the agencies associated in mobilization planning in recent months, it is now feasible to determine more clearly than previously the foreign council intelligence requirements for further planning. Many of the studies completed or under way also provide a better means than previously available for testing the adequacy of current intelligence efforts. In the light of these developments, more effective evaluation of foreign economic intelligence for mobilization planning can now be made.
Another field where foreign economic intelligence is vital is that of the formulation of current policies and programs relating to the national security. Members of the National Security Council will readily appreciate the value of constantly seeking to improve the foreign economic intelligence relating to proposals considered by the council.
Intelligence activities with regard to mobilization planning and to current security policies and programs are intricately interrelated and at many points indistinguishable. Therefore, much can be said for covering both fields in a single undertaking.
Accordingly, the time seems opportune to reappraise our foreign economic intelligence requirements, facilities and arrangements as they relate to the national security, including mobilization planning. Such an appraisal would require central direction with appropriate interagency collaboration.
It is, therefore, proposed that the National Security Council direct the CIA, in collaboration with the Government agencies concerned:
1. To organize and conduct a study of:
a. foreign economic intelligence requirements relating to the national security, including requirements for mobilization planning;
b. facilities and arrangements currently employed for meeting these requirements;
c. the adequacy of such facilities and arrangements; and where appropriate, means for their improvement.
2. Based on the findings of this study, to prepare for Council consideration and action a comprehensive plan for satisfying the foreign economic intelligence requirements of the national security and for a coordinated interagency effort to this end based on a definite allocation of responsibilities among the agencies concerned.
The staff of the NSRB has much information which would be of help in this undertaking, and will be available to assist in liaison and consult-ant capacities.
John Steelman/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Steelman signed the original.
414. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Director of Intelligence of the Army General Staff (Irwin)
Washington, February 15, 1950.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-208, Item 24. Top Secret. Copies were sent to all IAC members.
SUBJECT
Proposed Watch CommitteeREFERENCE
Memorandum of 20 January 1950,/1/ ID/CSUKA to DCI, File CBGID-1 WW 319.26, information copies of which were sent to the other members of the IAC by the Army/1/Not found.
1. As requested in the above reference, I am giving consideration to the several questions raised therein about the production of national intelligence on Soviet intentions with a view towards having further clarifying discussions on them in the near future.
2. It seems to me that there are joined together in your proposal two different functions which should be separate, as pointed out below. There also appears to be a misconception of the duties of CIA and the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies in crisis situations. These three points are listed below and discussed in the comments that follow:
(1) The working level Check List network has been established to provide timely warning, through the use of certain indicators, of impending Soviet military action in the near future--as described in my detailed circular memorandum of December 7th clarified by my letter to Mr. Armstrong dated January 26th; after the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee had appointed their representatives requested in my circular memorandum of September 26th./2/
/2/Not found.
(2) Rounded intelligence estimates of the present Soviet position and future courses of action, i.e., long range estimates for planning and policy making, are produced in the day-to-day work by CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates, coordinated with the other intelligence agencies under NSCID 3 and DCI 3/1 and 3/2, and by the periodic ad hoc interdepartmental committees under the chairmanship of Mr. Van Slyck in CIA which have prepared two or three estimates during the past year or so and are now working on another.
(3) "Furnishing Intelligence Advisory Committee with such crisis intelligence as required by Intelligence Advisory Committee to discharge its responsibility, as set forth in paragraph 6, NSCID 1." The DCI prepares national intelligence not only on crisis situations but on other matters, and not only for the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee but also for the President and the NSC et al. This is his responsibility by law. The responsibility of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is to get intelligence support from their respective agencies and to give it and their advice to the Director of Central Intelligence, not just vice versa. The only change from past procedures in the new paragraph 6 of NSCID 1 is quicker action and on a higher level than is customary.
Comments
3. In consideration of the problem of the production of intelligence on Soviet intentions, I believe that a necessity exists to provide for separate mechanisms (1) for the treatment of "indications of intentions" and the short-range evaluations resulting from a consideration of these indicators, and (2) for the longer-range composite "rounded intelligence estimates" of the present Soviet position and probable future courses of action, which require preparation against the broadest possible terms of reference.
4. With regard to the "Check List," I am inclined to agree that the presently constituted "Check List Group" could be more formally established by action of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee if they wish, and that the name "Check List Group" could be changed to "Watch Committee."
5. It is my firm conviction, however, that this Committee should not be diverted from the important task of focusing the attention of analysts, in CIA and in the agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee members, on certain indicators or actions contained in the Check List by engaging in long-range strategic estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions.
6. There have been numerous difficulties attendant upon the establishment of effective operations of the "Check List Group," some of which will be overcome by the formalization of this Group as a "Watch Committee" but the remainder of which can be overcome only by fullest interdepartmental cooperation and support. It is urgently requested, therefore, that, in this interim period, every effort be made to overcome internal and external obstacles to the effective fulfillment of the "Check List Group" mission. It is important that there be regular Check List meetings and that priority be given within each Department to consideration of Check List operations. With reference to your comments in the introduction to paragraph 2 of your Tab A, Tab A herewith shows the recent activities of the Check List Group.
7. With regard to the rounded intelligence estimates, I should think that most of the intelligence agencies presumably are devoting most of their entire daily efforts to this large subject--"to analyze intelligence information relating to short and long range Soviet intentions to go to war and to produce periodic intelligence estimates on this subject as it affects national security." I should think an additional committee for this purpose would be unnecessary and that the same results could be accomplished by new instructions through the existing machinery of the agencies concerned. However, if the other intelligence agencies think that they can contribute best through another interdepartmental committee, on Soviet intentions, this could be arranged. It would produce the periodic long-range comprehensive estimates of Soviet intentions and probable future courses of action against a regional and global background, and would insure that existing estimates on this subject would be continuously maintained in current status, be published at appropriate intervals, and be responsive to changes in the situation as revealed by the activities of the "Check list" or "Watch Committee."
8. The Army statements in paragraph 2b of its Tab A "Comments" appear to mean that the Army's most capable analysts are not engaged in the ordinary coordination procedures on the national intelligence estimates produced under NSCID 3 and DCI 3/1, but would engage in activities of a permanent committee producing well rounded estimates in lieu of the ad hoc committees which have met two or three times in the past year or so. The Army's other statements in that paragraph 2b appear to be inconsistent with Section 1e of NSCID No. 3.
9. Accordingly, I am preparing for circulation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies at an early date two draft interdepartmental Operating Procedures proposing to formalize the "Watch Committee" and the "Committee on Soviet Intentions" with their respective responsibilities based on the different principles cited above. It is thought best that these matters be discussed further on the working level before they are referred to a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
R.H. Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USNTab A/3/
/3/Top Secret.
CHRONOLOGY OF CIA ACTIVITIES ON
THE CHECK LIST OPERATION
November 1948
Proposal first circulated, for limited use.
19 August 1949
State inquired at IAC meeting re a Watch Committee.
22 August to 9 September 1949
Preparation of draft memorandum issued by DCI 26 September 1949.
12 September 1949
Approval of draft memorandum by DCI.
15 September to 26 September 1949
Interviews with top members of IAC intelligence staffs to explain nature, operations, limitations of Check List.
26 September 1949
DCI issues memorandum to IAG members.
30 September to 13 October 1949
Check List Officers nominated by IAC agencies.
14 October to 1 November 1949
Internal procedures set up in CIA and Check List needs discussed with CIA Offices (OSO, OPC, OSI).
7 November 1949
Request sent to all IAC Check List Officers for summaries of available information bearing on Check List indicators falling logically under their purview. This request had a deadline 18 November, shortly after which a meeting was to be held.
7 November to 15 November 1949
Check List Officers nominated by CIA Offices.
19 November to 29 November 1949
Reports received from Army and Navy; memo from State and Air--in answer to memo of Nov. 7.
5 December 1949
First Check List meeting; basic objectives and informal allocations of primary responsibility discussed, among other things; next meeting set for 11 January 1950.
7 December 1949
Memo to participating agencies.
8 December to 13 December 1949
Interviews with various Check List Officers to discuss possibility of a "Christmas Flap"; all agreed little likelihood.
13 December 1949
Memorandum prepared as consensus of Check List opinion that "no flap" was expected--held for use in case an apparent "flap" began during the holidays.
14 December 1949 to 3 January
Holidays, one or more Check List
1950 Officers were gone during this period.
11 January 1950
Meeting postponed due to non-receipt of scientific indicators from OSI for inclusion in the Check List.
17 January 1950
Meeting again postponed because revised Check List including OSI's contributions not yet completed. At the time of both these postponements all Check List Officers were contacted and some saw a crisis brewing that would have required a meeting without the new Check List.
26 January 1950
Clarifying letter to Mr. Armstrong.
Continue with Document 415
