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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Founding of the National Intelligence Structure
August 1945 through January 1946

                           

50. Minutes of the 170th Meeting of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee

Washington, November 27, 1945, 9:30 a.m.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee 1944-47. Top Secret. Drafted by James H. Lewis. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

PARTICIPANTS

Present
The Secretary (presiding)
The Under Secretary
The Counselor
Mr. Benton
Mr. Braden
Mr. Hackworth
Mr. Labouisse (for Mr. Clayton)
Mr. McCormack
Mr. Pasvolsky
Mr. Russell
Mr. Gange
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Rothwell

Absent
Mr. Clayton
Mr. Dunn

The Committee met at 9:30 a.m.

Agenda Items

Development of a National Intelligence Program (Document SC-172,/1/ Agenda Item 1)

/1/Document 46.

Mr. McCormack presented document SC-172 making recommendations regarding the development of a national intelligence program. He called attention in particular to Annex V,/2/ in which were outlined the principal differences between the recommendations in the document and the plans drawn up by the War Department/3/ for the coordination of foreign intelligence.

/2/Document 49.

/3/Document 42.

The Secretary said this was a matter in which the President was very much interested. He had assigned responsibility for it to Admiral Leahy, and about three weeks ago he had informed the Secretary that he thought some action should be taken on the matter. The Secretary said he had informed the President that not much could be done at the present time. He pointed out that the reorganization bill was being considered and Congress might resent action prior to passage of the bill. About a week ago, the Secretary said, the President had asked the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and himself to meet on November 28 to discuss the subject. On November 26, the Secretary asked the President to postpone this meeting in order that the Department might have more time to consider all problems involved. The Secretary informed the President that the reorganization bill would probably not be signed for about two weeks, and he thought that by that time the Department would have its plan ready./4/

/4/No other records have been found of the conversations with Truman that Byrnes mentioned. The proposed November 28 meeting presumably is the one referred to in Document 44. Later on November 27, at a meeting with the Secretaries of War and Navy, Byrnes asked for a postponement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Branch Reference File, Minutes of Meetings of the Committee of Three 1944-47) See the Supplement. There is no indication the postponed meeting with the President was ever held. The "reorganization bill" referred to became law as the Reorganization Act of 1945 (P.L. 263, December 20, 1945), giving the President certain powers to restructure government agencies.

The Secretary said that in trying to arrive at some compromise, it was necessary to bear in mind that whatever we propose will have to be "sold" to the President. It will be turned over by the President to Admiral Leahy, who has strong views on the matter and the Secretary said we must, therefore, seek to avoid unnecessary questions of jurisdictional conflict with the Army and the Navy. The Secretary said the plan should also be as simple as possible. He said if the military services present a plan which is not complicated, while our plan is complicated, the military plan will have a much better chance of being adopted.

The Secretary said the division at the top, proposed in the paper (between Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Authority and Interdepartmental Security Coordinating Authority) had certain advantages, but he wondered whether considering all factors it would be desirable particularly in view of the President's desire to concentrate intelligence service in one agency. Mr. McCormack informed the Secretary that his latest proposal called for a single top organization.

The Secretary said that in his discussion with the President and Admiral Leahy, a question had been raised regarding the participation of the Budget Bureau in making plans for the intelligence organization. Mr. McCormack said that during the war all the intelligence agencies had had difficulties of various sorts. In the case of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Admiral King had requested the Budget Bureau to advise on its reorganization. The Budget Bureau had also supervised the organization of G2 in the Army and had done much work for OSS. The Budget Bureau was, in fact, the only agency familiar with all the intelligence agencies in the Government, and was, therefore, in a position to offer much helpful advice.

Mr. McCormack also outlined the origin of the War Department's plan for coordinating foreign intelligence. He said that General Donovan had always been a strong advocate of a unified intelligence service. Late in 1944 word got around that President Roosevelt was favorably impressed with the idea, and the Army decided some action should be taken. An Army-Navy Committee had then been set up under the direction of General Nichols to prepare a plan for a central agency for use in the event such a plan was necessary. The plan was prepared and submitted to the Joint Intelligence Committee and in essence it is the present War Department plan.

Mr. McCormack said the War Department plan does not answer a number of serious questions, for example, how to bring together the many agencies of the Government working on various problems. As an example, he referred to the problem of meteorological intelligence which was now divided among the Weather Bureau, the Navy, the Army, civil airlines, and other bodies. The Secretary asked how this would be handled under the plan proposed by Mr. McCormack. Mr. McCormack said an interdepartmental committee would be established, composed of all agencies concerned, which would be charged with establishing a program and responsibility for reviewing its adequacy.

Mr. McCormack said the idea of establishing one central intelligence agency imposed on all other agencies was very much over-simplified. He said that such an agency would have to be a very large one. However, he thought there was no question of the need for a central coordinating authority.

Mr. McCormack said that in connection with the establishment of the top organization, the question arises as to where the State Department fits into the picture. On the assumption that the President wished the Department to take the lead in the matter, the plan before the Committee proposed that the Secretary should be Chairman of the authority; that the executive officer should be appointed from the State Department; and that the preparation of strategic estimates should be entrusted to the State Department. Secret intelligence operations would be the responsibility of the central agency. The main functions of the agency, Mr. McCormack said, would be to harness the resources of the Government to get the most information out of all agencies and to get the best job done in each case.

The Secretary said he was sure the President had never gone into the question in much detail. He said he had probably viewed the problem only as one of centralizing intelligence operations abroad. This was the aspect of the question which General Donovan had discussed with the President. The Secretary said that at the time of General Donovan's discussion, he [the Secretary]/5/ had not liked the proposal too well but General Donovan had been suggesting that the central agency should be under the President's direction. The Secretary said he now saw the wisdom of the plan proposed by the Budget Bureau and Mr. McCormack, but he said there was still the problem of convincing the President. He also said that when the Department is ready to make a recommendation with regard to the appointment of an executive office, its case must be well prepared and presented. He said he felt that it would be better if the agency were not made directly responsible to the President.

/5/Brackets in the source text.

The Counselor expressed agreement with the Secretary and pointed out that even if the President took the most active interest in the agency in peacetime, it would be unlikely that he could do this in wartime. He also expressed his opinion that a central operating agency, such as that proposed by the War Department, could not avoid important duties of coordination, and that if it were an agency of this type doing its own work, it would be unable to achieve such coordination effectively.

The Secretary raised the question as to how the desired coordination could best be obtained. He said the War and Navy Departments had had much more experience with intelligence problems than the State Department, and he asked whether they would be disposed to cooperate with the Department as well as they would with an independent central agency. Mr. McCormack said that in peacetime the State Department has certain intelligence functions which Army and Navy recognize, and he thought that the State Department's primary responsibility in foreign affairs could be so presented that Army and Navy would recognize it. He emphasized his opinion that the central agency proposed by the War Department would be a pretext like the Joint Intelligence Committee, or else it would become so large that Congress would raise difficulties regarding appropriations.

The Secretary asked whether the plan was to ask for secret appropriations. Mr. Russell said it might as well be recognized at the outset that this would be impossible. The Secretary agreed and said Congress would want to know the cost of intelligence operations, and there would probably also be difficulty in convincing Congress of the necessity for appropriations for intelligence operations carried on by each of the several departments concerned. Mr. McCormack said he did not minimize the difficulties involved in this connection. He said he hoped, however, that much of the work would be paid for by the individual departments out of regular appropriations. He suggested that the need for large appropriations could be avoided by the extensive use of working personnel in the several departments.

(The Secretary and Mr. Russell left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. Braden said he agreed with Mr. McCormack that the War Department plan was unsatisfactory but he asked whether the plan proposed by Mr. McCormack was not getting away from the real function of the State Department and the Foreign Service. He said that in the field, intelligence was the function of the Department's Foreign Service, and of the associated services represented by military, naval, and legal attaches. The information obtained by these representatives should be calibrated by the Chief of Mission and should then flow back to the Department to the people who know how to judge its reliability and usefulness. These officers should then be able to give the Secretary all the information that is necessary. He said he thought that under the President's directive a very simple coordinating set-up could be established with very little extra personnel.

Mr. Braden also referred to the proposed withdrawal of FBI personnel from Latin America as outlined in Annex IV to document SC-172./6/ He emphasized again the importance of attempting to work out some arrangement for retaining the FBI representatives in other American republics.

/6/Dated November 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartment Committees--State Department, Lot No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee, 1944-49, Box 88F) See the Supplement.

Mr. McCormack said he was in general agreement with Mr. Braden's viewpoint, but he thought that everyone's experience with intelligence services in Washington had not been as happy as Mr. Braden's. He cited examples of delays in obtaining information and of the unavailability of full and up-to-date information needed during the course of the war. He said it was in his opinion very important to set up an organization which will ascertain in advance the deficiencies in our information and take the necessary steps to correct them. Mr. Braden said his idea was that the State Department should be so organized that it would be able to do this job rather than to have it made the responsibility of an interdepartmental committee. He said what coordination was necessary could be effected by meetings of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy.

The Counselor said the plan proposed by Mr. McCormack seemed to him to go farther in the direction desired by Mr. Braden than the other plan proposed by the War Department, and he suggested that if the Secretary should, in accordance with Mr. Braden's suggestion, inform the President that the Department now sees no need for any new organization, the War and Navy Departments' viewpoint will be considerably strengthened. The Counselor and other members indicated they agreed with Mr. Braden that intelligence operations abroad should be under the control of the Chief of Mission. In this connection, Mr. McCormack pointed out that the State Department was not now staffed to do the job as suggested by Mr. Braden. He also pointed out that for various reasons the State Department's representatives abroad frequently do not wish to become involved in the type of work which is necessary to obtain certain types of intelligence. He referred, in this connection to a recent request for information regarding the Belgian Communist Party, which our Embassy in Belgium had been reluctant to undertake, and which had been turned over to OSS. Mr. Braden said work of this kind had been done by FBI personnel at his Latin American posts but he said he had always known what was going on and had had an opportunity to see all reports before they were transmitted to Washington. If he then disagreed with those reports, he submitted his own views regarding them. He thought any conflicting views of this sort should then be reconciled in Washington. The Counselor asked how this could be done. Mr. Braden said it should be done by the working officers of the interested departments as a routine operation. The Counselor said it seemed to him that in this connection some machinery such as that proposed by Mr. McCormack would be advantageous.

(The Under Secretary joined the meeting at this point.)

Mr. McCormack said he wished to emphasize that setting up the organization outlined in the document would not do the job in itself but would be merely the start. He said there must be responsible people appointed to see to it that somebody does each of the jobs involved and does it adequately. He emphasized that the total amount of information sent in by the Department's Foreign Service was only a small part of the inflow. Other sources included foreign broadcasts and private information. He pointed out that at the outset of the war we had in this country practically all of the information needed to bomb Japan, but it required 2-1/2 years to assemble this in usable form. This information was not in the State Department, he said. The task of making it available was much more than one of mere coordination.

Mr. Pasvolsky said he would be wary of the appointment of a coordinator of departments appointed by the President, and that in place of an executive director, he would rather see a committee secretary. He also said he would not, at the present time, raise the question of who should prepare strategic estimates. He said the departments now having intelligence agencies were not going to give them up, and suggested that the question of strategic estimates be allowed to work itself out--as it would in a matter of a few months.

Mr. McCormack said he had no objection to leaving open the question of strategic estimates. He said the principal reason for making a recommendation in this connection was that the matter was included specifically in the War Department plan.

In discussing a chart of the organization, presented by Mr. McCormack, Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the top committee (in the chart consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy) should be broadened to include other cabinet members in order to avoid jurisdictional conflicts. Mr. Benton and other members expressed agreement with Mr. Pasvolsky's suggestion, especially if the top committee were to meet only once or twice a year.

The Committee agreed that the discussion of the document should be continued at the next meeting.

The meeting adjourned at 11:20 a.m.

51. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Smith) to President Truman

Washington, November 28, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 51, Records of the Office of Management and Budget, Director's Files, Series 39.27, Intelligence. No classification marking. Drafted by L.W. Hoelscher on November 28 and cleared by Schwarzwalder and Miles. Hoelscher sent an accompanying memorandum to Smith that concludes that proposals for an intelligence system are still confused with secret intelligence operations and that the Department of State should be the leader in efforts to develop a postwar intelligence program. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

Smith's diary for November 28 gives an account of the meeting with the President at which he handed over the memorandum. (Roosevelt Library, Papers of Harold Smith, Box No. 4, Conferences with President Truman, 1945) See the Supplement.

SUBJECT
Developments in Intelligence Field

The development of the government-wide intelligence system envisioned in your letter of September 20 to the Secretary of State needs further personal assistance from you.

As you recall, there have been some half dozen proposals made by General Donovan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Gibson and the Secretary of the Navy (Mr. Eberstadt), in addition to the plan which you approved. All of these proposals arrived at findings and conclusions very similar to those which formed the basis of the plan which you have ordered. Among these plans there is no essential difference of opinion as to what our weaknesses were before and during the war, or as to what our objectives should be in the postwar period.

There is, however, some difference as to the methods for achieving these objectives. Under the plan which you have approved, first priority is given to the development of a coordinated government-wide system and such secret intelligence operations as may be undertaken are operated on as adjunct. In this way secret operations are placed in their proper relationship to a general and much more comprehensive system of intelligence. Further, they would be confined to these activities which the State, War and Navy Departments mutually agree are needed from time to time. Under the various other proposals, centralized secret operations are made the backbone, with other intelligence neglected or subordinated to it.

The State Department's efforts to proceed along the line of your letter of September 20 have been hampered by the continued advocacy of the alternative central agency proposals. In my opinion, it is desirable for you to discuss with the Secretary of State the progress made in the creation of suitable permanent interdepartmental machinery, heading up to the State Department. You might also ask him to propose such additional action by you as may be necessary at this time to supplement your letter of September 20.

Harold D. Smith/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

52. Minutes of the 171st Meeting of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee

Washington, November 29, 1945, 9:30 a.m.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee, 1944-47, Box 88H. Top Secret. Drafted by Lewis. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

PARTICIPANTS

Present
The Secretary (presiding)
The Under Secretary
The Counselor
Mr. Benton
Mr. Braden
Mr. Hackworth
Mr. McCormack
Mr. Pasvolsky
Mr. Russell
Mr. Thorp (for M. Clayton)
Mr. Gange
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Rothwell

Absent
Mr. Clayton
Mr. Dunn

[Here follows discussion of two agenda items: "North American Regional Broadcasting Conference" and "Continuance of FBI Program in Other American Republics.]

Development of a National Intelligence Program (Document SC-172, Agenda Item 1)

Mr. McCormack referred to the discussion at the previous meeting/1/ regarding document SC-172 recommending the establishment of a national intelligence authority and the development of a national intelligence program. He called the Committee's attention again to Annex V,/2/ in which he had defined the areas of disagreement between the State Department and War Department plans. Mr. McCormack said the main issue was the type of organization to be established. He said he believed his plan for setting up a working group at the top, directly under the coordinating authority, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, with power to plan and carry out an intelligence coordination program, would best meet the requirements of the President's letter of September 20, 1945 directing the Secretary of State to "take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity". Mr. McCormack said both the War and Navy Departments have indicated that his plan was generally acceptable but they also wish the central authority to be from the outset a producing and disseminating agency. Mr. McCormack's plan proposed that the central authority should be merely a programming and planning agency.

/1/See Document 50.

/2/Document 49.

Mr. Russell asked how big a staff would be contemplated. Mr. McCormack said probably 45 or 50 persons would be required.

In discussing Annex I, Revised,/3/ in which the plan for the establishment of the national intelligence authority was outlined, Mr. Russell suggested a rewording of numbered paragraph 5 on page 1. He suggested that the provision that the Secretariat staff would be appointed by the Secretary "either from personnel of the Department of State or by detail from other participating agencies" implied that only personnel of the State Department would be appointed to the staff, and he thought the other agencies might not be willing to cooperate in furnishing personnel to the staff on this basis. Mr. McCormack said the only hidden meaning, if any, of this provision was to give the Executive Secretary a veto over appointments from other agencies. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the provision should be revised to provide that the Secretariat staff would be "detailed from participating agencies at the request of the Executive Secretary." The Committee approved this suggested change.

/3/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary's Staff Committee 1944-47, Box 88F) See the Supplement.

Mr. Russell also proposed changes in paragraphs 11 (a) and (b) on page 4 of Annex I to indicate that the Authority rather than the Secretariat was responsible for planning the Authority's program. The Committee agreed these two paragraphs should be revised.

The Secretary asked Mr. McCormack whether he had discussed with the Army the question of the type of organization. Mr. McCormack said he had discussed the matter with General Brownell, but had not obtained a definite expression of the Army's viewpoint. However, there were clear indications that the Army wished the central agency to be an operating agency. He said he had sent copies of his plan to both Army and Navy. Mr. Pasvolsky said one of the dangers of making the authority an operating agency was that there would be a tendency for it to establish a foreign service of its own. He said that had been the experience with the Office of Inter-American Affairs and other agencies. The Counselor agreed with Mr. Pasvolsky, but said he thought the strongest argument against establishing an operating agency was that the more the central agency engaged in operations, the less effective it could be in coordination. The Secretary asked whether the War and Navy Departments would continue to carry on their own intelligence activities even if the central operating agencies were established. Mr. McCormack said they would, as would other agencies which now carry on intelligence activities. The Secretary said in that event establishment of the central agency would merely add another intelligence agency to those already in operation. He said this would not meet the President's request that duplication be eliminated.

Mr. McCormack said that under his plan he thought a considerable amount of combined operations could be effected, and he thought joint operations in the field of geographic intelligence should certainly be arranged. Mr. McCormack said the operating personnel in Army and Navy with whom he had discussed his plan had been favorably impressed with it and thought that it would work. The Secretary asked whether if the Army and Navy are unified there would be any need for this coordinating agency. Mr. McCormack said there would be since the plan went below department levels. He said such agencies in the War Department as G2 Service Forces and G2 Ground Forces would remain independent from similar units in the Navy, and there would still be a need to coordinate the activities of all these units.

Mr. Russell said there appeared to be two questions involved: (1) who should designate the executive secretary; and (2) whether the central agency should be a coordinating or operating authority. He said that as far as the second question was concerned, he did not see that there was much argument. He said most of the necessary intelligence information was now available in all the agencies in the Government, and the principal need was to coordinate this information.

With regard to the question of the appointment of the executive secretary, Mr. Russell suggested that this officer be appointed by the Secretary of State with the approval of the Secretaries of War and the Navy. He said he did not think the Army and Navy would indicate much opposition to this proposal, and he pointed out that the Department would in any event not wish to appoint an executive secretary who was not acceptable to the War and Navy Departments. The Committee approved this suggestion.

In discussing the chart of the proposed organization (see copy attached to these Minutes),/4/ Mr. Hackworth suggested that some of the Committees shown on the chart might be combined. The Secretary said that anything which could be done to simplify the structure of the organization would be desirable, and would make presentation of the proposal to the President much easier. He agreed, however, that the present chart would show how extensive the problem is. Mr. McCormack pointed out that all the structure on the chart below the level of executive secretary was very tentative. The Secretary suggested that the chart might indicate the tentative nature of the structure.

/4/Not printed; see the Supplement.

Mr. Benton suggested that consideration be given to the possibility of showing in the chart the role of the Foreign Service which would in effect be the field organization of the central authority.

The Committee approved the proposal as outlined in Annex I Revised, with the changes suggested in the course of the foregoing discussion. The Secretary undertook to discuss the proposal with the Secretaries of War and the Navy at his next meeting with them on December 4, and Mr. McCormack undertook to have the revised draft plan and chart ready for the Secretary's use at that time.

The meeting adjourned at 10:45 a.m.

53. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Intelligence (Inglis) to the Chief of Naval Operations (King)

Washington, November 30, 1945.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-135. Top Secret.

1. There is set out below a summary of the developments in connection with the proposed Central Intelligence Agency.

2. In a letter dated 20 September, the President directed Secretary Byrnes to take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated intelligence program through the creation of an interdepartmental group headed up under the State Department to formulate plans for his approval. This task was delegated by Secretary Byrnes to Mr. McCormack, formerly a Colonel in G-2, War Department.

3. Up to 18 October the Navy had not been consulted by the State Department and became apprehensive that our interests might not be considered if Mr. McCormack proceeded unilaterally to develop the plan. Secretary Forrestal arranged a meeting on that date between me and Mr. Russell, Asst. SecState, the results of which I reported to you and SecNav./1/ Thereafter the Navy continued to press State for action.

/1/No record of the meeting between Inglis and Russell has been found.

4. At a meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy held 14 November,/2/ Secretary Forrestal brought up the subject of the proposed Central Intelligence Agency. Secretary Patterson also presented a report prepared by a special board he had appointed in which a Central Intelligence Agency was recommended. Mr. Byrnes stated that he thought all were in favor of a Central Agency and proposed the appointment of a working committee.

/2/See Document 45.

5. The following committee was appointed: Rear Admiral Souers and Major Correa representing SecNav; Mr. Lovett and Brigadier General Brownell representing SecWar; and Mr. Russell and Mr. McCormack representing SecState.

6. The committee immediately became deadlocked./3/ The repre-sentatives of the Navy and Army were in agreement that the plan recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was sound and should be adopted in principle. Mr. McCormack, as spokesman of the State Department, was strongly opposed and maintained that while there should be coordinating committees the State Department should control the Agency. He insisted also that all intelligence estimates should be prepared by the State Department on the theory that SecState was responsible for national policy.

/3/See Document 47.

7. It is understood the President has been pressing Secretary Byrnes to submit his plan. To bring the matter to a conclusion, the President asked the three Secretaries to meet with him Thursday, 29 November, to discuss the subject.

8. At the regular meeting of the three Secretaries, held Tuesday, 27 November,/4/ at which they planned to unite on a program to submit to the President, Mr. Byrnes explained that he had not had time to resolve the differences of opinion within the State Department with respect to the several plans under consideration and could not discuss the matter for the present. He stated also that he would have to ask the President to give him a little more time. The meeting with the President was not held on Thursday, 29 November. I have no information as to when it will be held.

/4/See footnote 4, Document 50.

9. Secretary Forrestal is familiar with the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan which he is strongly advocating.

Very respectfully,

Thos. B. Inglis/5/
Rear Admiral, USN

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

54. Memorandum From Secretary of State Byrnes to Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal

Washington, December 10, 1945.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, National Intelligence Authority. Confidential. The date is handwritten on another copy of the source text. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
National Intelligence Authority

By letter of September 20, 1945, the President gave me the following instructions:

"I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity. This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my approval. This procedure will permit the planning of complete coverage of the foreign intelligence field and the assigning and controlling of operations in such manner that the needs of both the individual agencies and the Government as a whole will be met with maximum effectiveness."

Attached is a Plan for carrying out the President's directive./1/ It has been recommended to me by my Staff Committee after several weeks of discussion and study, and I now recommend it for your favorable consideration.

/1/Entitled Establishment of a National Intelligence Authority, December 3, 1945. See the Supplement.

Attention is invited especially to the following points:

a. The Plan sets up a National Intelligence Authority consisting of the Secretary of State as Chairman and the Secretaries of War and Navy, but authorizes the Chairman to call in the heads of other Departments and agencies on matters of special interest to them.

b. The Plan is designed to make fullest use of the intelligence resources of all agencies of the Government, by coordinating their efforts under a comprehensive, Government-wide program. The proposed machinery is an interdepartmental organization under the Authority, with personnel drawn from existing agencies, rather than an independent agency with a separate budget. This is considered advantageous because it tends (1) to avoid publicity and (2) to reduce competition and duplication between the central agency and the intelligence organizations of existing departments and agencies.

c. Executive direction of the central agency is put in the hands of an official of the Department of State, but it is provided that the Secretaries of War and Navy must approve the person selected. In that manner the coordinating responsibility of the State Department for matters involving foreign affairs is recognized, but the executive is made a representative of the Authority as a whole, and not merely of a single Department.

d. The central Secretariat is envisaged as a working staff of personnel contributed primarily by the State, War and Navy Departments.

e. The Plan does not preclude any centralized intelligence operations (either under the central agency or outside of it) which may prove feasible and desirable as the program of the Authority is developed. It provides planning mechanisms that may well lead to centralization of intelligence responsibilities in many of the specialized fields, either (1) by vesting responsibility for a particular field in a single existing agency or (2) by bringing together the working units of several agencies on a subject into a joint unit under direction of the Authority.

f. With respect to clandestine activities ("secret intelligence" and "counter-espionage") I understand the prevailing opinion to be that such operations, if they are to be conducted, might well be under a central agency; and the Plan sets up machinery for study of that problem in detail and for development of specific operating plans in those fields.

The central agency is conceived in the first instance as a coordinating and planning mechanism, whose mission is to develop the comprehensive program envisaged by the President; to determine foreign intelligence requirements on a Government-wide basis, and to recommend means and methods for meeting those requirements, making use of all the intelligence resources of the Government. Many agencies, in addition to the State, War and Navy Departments, are engaged in collection and analysis of foreign information, including the Treasury, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, the Tariff and Maritime Commissions, the Federal Reserve Board and numerous others. Such agencies can make important contributions to foreign intelligence if they work under a coordinated program, so that, within their special fields, they may serve the needs of other Government agencies as well as their own.

Under the Plan as proposed, the primary coordinating mechanism is a group of interdepartmental Committees for the various fields of intelligence, which, in addition to their planning functions, will "Serve as a continuing group responsible for maintaining a coordinated program and for reviewing the adequacy and efficiency of all operations involved in the carrying out of such a program." Tentative suggestions for the principal Committees to be formed are shown on the chart annexed hereto./2/

/2/Not printed; see the Supplement.

Foreign intelligence is a vast and complicated subject, touching upon almost all fields of human knowledge. The problems that it involves do not lend themselves to quick and easy solutions. They must be attacked in detail, and from a long-range standpoint, and on a comprehensive basis. It is believed that the annexed Plan permits that kind of an approach to the subject and gives promise of good results if the execution of the Plan is put in competent hands.

James F. Byrnes/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Byrnes signed the original.

Continue with Document 55