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Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment Department of State Washington, DC

Founding of the National Intelligence Structure
August 1945 through January 1946

                           

60. Memorandum From the Chief of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff (Craig) to Secretary of War Patterson

Washington, December 24, 1945.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-135. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Central Intelligence Agency

It is proposed that the War Department accept the State Department proposal subject to the following amendments:

a. The statements of functions of the National Intelligence Authority to provide that synthesis and evaluation on a national level and direct procurement of intelligence are recognized as functions of the National Intelligence Authority, subject to the right of the Authority to direct that any of such operations be decentralized when and if that course appears more appropriate at any time.

b. A provision to be inserted that the Executive Secretary shall consider and explore the advisability of legislation establishing an independent Central Intelligence Agency under the direction of the Authority, with an independent budget, and shall make recommendations thereon to the Authority prior to June 30, 1946.

c. That paragraph 12 of the McCormack proposal, dealing with Advisory Groups, be changed to provide only one such group having generally the composition and functions of the National Intelligence Board outlined in the War Department plan. This modification is thought necessary to insure that the Chiefs of the intelligence agencies of the service departments will actively support the Authority.

H.A. Craig/1/
Major General, USA

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Craig signed the original.

61. Minutes of Meeting

Washington, December 26, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Branch Reference File, Minutes of Meetings of the Committee of Three 1944-1947. Top Secret.

PARTICIPANTS

State Department: Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State

War Department: Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, Howard Petersen, Col. Charles W. McCarthy

Navy Department: John Sullivan, Acting Secretary of the Navy, Lt. Col. Mathias F. Correa

RECORDER
John Hickerson

[Here follows material unrelated to intelligence.]

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Patterson brought up the question of the proposed Central Intelligence Agency. He said that he did not wish to discuss this matter in any detail because of the absence of Mr. Forrestal who has a keen personal interest in the whole subject. He did wish to point out, however, that it is urgently necessary to reach an early decision on the whole subject. The President's directive to the three Secretaries was "getting stale."/1/ Mr. Patterson said that some progress has been made in the subcommittee/2/ but there remained for decision really only one major question; that is, should there be a separate agency under the direction of the three Departments or should the intelligence agency be geared into the State Department. Mr. Patterson went on to say he favors a separate agency but he added that his own attitude on the subject would be influenced somewhat by the nature of the State Department's intelligence organization. Mr. Patterson said that one of the principal reasons why he favors a separate central intelligence agency, outside all three Departments, is that he feels strongly that the collection of intelligence must be divorced from policy making. He added that a decentralization of intelligence activities in the State Department would make it more difficult for him to agree to having the Central Intelligence Agency meshed into the State Department. There was a general discussion of this point including the thesis that the State Department is itself primarily an intelligence agency. There was general agreement that it would be desirable that the whole question of the Central Intelligence Agency be settled, if possible, upon Secretary Byrnes' return from Moscow and prior to his departure for the United Nations meeting in London.

/1/Document 44.

/2/The working group appointed by the three Secretaries at their November 14 meeting, see Document 45. For minutes of the November 19 meeting of the working group, see Document 47.

[Here follows material unrelated to intelligence.]

62. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 27, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers. No classification marking.

Judge Patterson called me this afternoon following the meeting of the Committee of Three,/1/ with reference to the State Department proposal for a National Intelligence Unit. He said that the State Department was not united behind the McCormack plan and there was a strong feeling on the part of many people in the State Department that this intelligence activity should be integrated or scattered through the different divisions of that Department. He stated that any such proposal was totally unacceptable to him and that while he did not object to a State Department official heading the organization that he would insist on a straight line separate organization. While he recognized that the State Department was engaged in widespread intelligence activities, he felt that it was wrong to parcel out this new organization among the various desks, divisions and committees of the State Department or to get it involved in the State Department system in any way. Nor would he favor, he said, the multiplicity of committees which are proposed in the State Department plan. He felt that this method of working would not produce the results desired.

/1/See the first paragraph to Document 65.

If Colonel McCormack is to be the man to head up the new organization, he did not believe he should be the head of the State Department intelligence activity although he had no objection to him being employed as an official of the State Department. The head of the new agency should work with the State Department intelligence organization in the same manner as he works with War and Navy Department organizations. He also objected to any Board which would have members from Treasury, FBI, etc.

He instructed me to get together with Colonel McCormack and Mr. Correa of the Navy Department to see if we could produce an agreed plan by the time Mr. Byrnes returns from Moscow.

H.A.C./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

63. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy's Special Assistant (Correa) to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal

Washington, December 27, 1945.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Records of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 1940-1947, General Correspondence 1944-1947, Box 129, 80-1-19. No classification marking.

Today with Admiral Souers I attended a meeting at the War Department to discuss the subject of a Central Intelligence Agency. Present were Generals Craig, Fortier, Brownell and Irwin representing the War Department and Messrs. Alfred McCormack and L.L. Montagne representing the State Department.

General Fortier introduced in the meeting the annexed papers headed respectively, "Proposed Functions" and "Organization."/1/ There was considerable discussion as to the proposed functions of the central intelligence body. The discussion was in the main general. Insofar as it can be summarized in specific terms, it may be said that Mr. McCormack placed particular emphasis upon the planning functions of the proposed agency and, while he conceded that it might ultimately be found desirable as a result of the agency planning to give it certain operating functions, he did not feel that the initial charter of the agency should specify any operating functions for it. The War Department representatives, on the other hand, with the concurrence of the Navy representatives, felt that the agency should be given an operating mission as well as a planning and coordinating mission ab initio.

/1/Not attached and not found.

There was some discussion of the organization of the proposed agency although the discussion was not had with reference to the annexed War Department outline. The War Department representatives made the point that while they preferred a plan under which the Central Intelligence Agency would be independent of any of the Executive Departments, they would be inclined to compromise on a plan that would place the agency under the State Department, provided that the Executive Secretary who would direct the agency would have no other functions within the State Department, and particularly would not be the executive head of the State Department's own intelligence agency. Mr. McCormack indicated that such a provision would be unacceptable to him. On behalf of the Navy it was stated that the Navy favored an independent Central Intelligence Agency whose director would not be identified with any of the departments concerned. It was pointed out that the Navy recognizes the undesirability of an independent appropriation for such an agency, but felt that this would not overcome the disadvantage of having the coordinating agency identified with one of the interested departments. It was further pointed out by the Navy representatives that under the applicable law an independent agency could be set up for a year without being required to receive its operating funds from an independent appropriation fund.

Mr. McCormack indicated that he was not prepared to accept either the Navy's suggestion that an independent central agency be set up or the Army's proposal that the agency be set up within the State Department but that its director have no other duties. Mr. McCormack further indicated that he felt matters were at an impasse, and that he felt the question would have to be decided by the three Secretaries and by the President.

Respectfully,

M.F. Correa/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

64. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (Souers) to Clark M. Clifford

Washington, December 27, 1945.

//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, National Military Establishment: CIA. Top Secret; Personal. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 17-19. On another copy of this memorandum a marginal notation written by Souers reads: "Comdr. Clifford asked for my recommendation at the request of the President." (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-135) Clifford was appointed Naval Aide to the President in early 1946 and then Special Counsel to the President on June 27, 1946. Apparently he was not formally a Presidential appointee at this time.

SUBJECT
Central Intelligence Agency

1. As you have requested, I am attaching:

(a) Copy of the State Department Plan./1/
(b) Copy of draft of directive proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff./2/

/1/Document 56.

/2/The undated draft directive was a slight modification of the appendix to Document 13. It included in paragraph 1 a representative of the JCS as a member of the proposed National Intelligence Authority. A handwritten revision, apparently by Clifford, changed the language of the JCS to read "and an additional representative of the President of the United States." (Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford) See the Supplement.

(c) Detailed comparison of Plans (a) and (b)./3/

/3/See the Supplement.

2. Differences between the two plans are far greater, and more fundamental, than they appear to be on the surface.

3. Mr. McCormack, author of the State Department plan, advocates that the Secretary of State should control America's intelligence effort. The Secretary of State or his representative, Mr. McCormack feels, should determine the character of the intelligence furnished the President. He made this point clear not only in his published plan, but also in his talk to the public over the radio,/4/ and in various addresses to Army and Naval officers intended to sell the State Department plan.

/4/For McCormack's remarks in a December 22 radio talk, see Department of State Bulletin, December 23, 1945, pp. 987-993 and 1006.

4. There are three serious objections to Mr. McCormack's proposal:

(a) Recent experience has shown all too clearly that as long as the Army and Navy may be called upon in the last analysis to support the nation's foreign policy, the Services should have a voice reaching the President as unmistakable as that of the State Department.

(b) The evaluation of information is not an exact science and every safeguard should be imposed to prevent any one department from having the opportunity to interpret information in such a way as to make it seem to support previously accepted policies or preconceived opinions.

(c) Should the McCormack plan be adopted, it is inevitable that it would be looked upon in time as a State Department intelligence system, not an inter-governmental system. The Army and Navy meanwhile would be maintaining their own complete intelligence systems.

5. The plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff seems more likely to provide the President with unbiased intelligence, derived from all available sources, and approved by all three departments of the Government primarily concerned with foreign policy--State, War and Navy. Under the JCS Plan, the interest of the President would seem to be better protected than under the McCormack plan for the following reasons:

(a) The Authority would be set up under the President, and therefore on a level higher than that of any single department. As a result, no one department could influence unduly the type of intelligence produced. Furthermore, more balanced control could be expected, as no single department would be dominant.

(b) The President would appoint the Director, making it possible to procure a man of outstanding ability and integrity.

(c) Through the pooling of expert personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency, many functions now performed by various intelligence agencies could be carried out more efficiently, expeditiously, and economically than could be expected under the McCormack plan. (Mr. McCormack has indicated in interviews that he is not in favor of a central intelligence agency.)

(d) The JCS Plan provides for the preparation of summaries and estimates approved by the participating agencies for the use of those who need them most: the President, those on a Cabinet level responsible for advising the President, and the Joint Planners.

(e) The JCS Plan contemplates a full partnership between the three departments, created and operated in the spirit of free consideration, and with a feeling of a full share of responsibility for its success. The whole-hearted cooperation of participating agencies would be assured inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency is designed to operate on a reciprocal basis.

6. The JCS Plan has the further advantage of having been under consideration for many months. It was prepared after long consideration by the technical staff of the J.I.C. and unanimously approved by the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which included the heads of the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments. It was then approved, with minor changes, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff comprising Fleet Admirals Leahy and King, Generals of the Army Marshall and Arnold. The recommendations of the JCS were concurred in at that time by the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

7. I recommend that a directive substantially in line with the draft attached (JCS Plan) be issued by the President as I believe it will provide a program which will best serve him and the national interest.

8. As you know, my interest in this subject is wholly objective as I am not a candidate for the job of Director and couldn't accept even if it were offered me.

Sidney W. Souers

Continue with Document 65