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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
III. Creation of the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam and the Drafting of a Program of Action on Vietnam
April-May 1961
31. Editorial Note
At the Cabinet meeting at 11 a.m. on April 20, 1961, President Kennedy directed that Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, personally head a Presidential Task Force on Vietnam. Secretary of Defense McNamara so informed Gilpatric later that day, and during the afternoon of April 20 sent a memorandum to the President stating that he had arranged for the preparation of:
''A program of action to prevent Communist domination of South Viet-Nam. Mr. Gilpatric will personally direct the preparation of this plan. We expect to have it ready for your review on Friday, April 28.'' (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)
Membership in the Task Force consisted of Gilpatric; Lansdale (Operations); Colonel Edwin F. Black, Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Executive Secretary and Defense Department Representative); Rostow (White House Representative); Major General Charles H. Bonesteel III, Secretary of the General Staff, United States Army (JCS Representative); Thomas C. Sorensen, Deputy Director, USIA; U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State; and for the CIA, Desmond FitzGerald. For a record of the first meeting of the Task Force, see Document 33.
32. Program for the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam/1/
Washington, April 22, 1961.
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C)(A) Files: FRC 77-131, VN Task Force 1961 (Folder 1). Secret; Sensitive. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. The program was circulated at the first meeting of the Task Force on April 24. Regarding this meeting, see infra.
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE PROGRAM
A. Goal: To counter the Communist influence and pressure upon the development and maintenance of a strong, free South Vietnam.
B. National Plan
I. Political
a. Continue current operations of the Country Team to achieve the above goal, with review by the Director of the Task Force to determine changes and emphasis to fit Task Force actions.
b. To lessen the danger of a coup and to strengthen political administration, the U.S. should take measures to bring about a healthy non-Communist political party structure. Parties should be surfaced. The formation of two major parties should be encouraged.
c. To help in stronger U.S. actions, eliminate U.S. restrictions upon the number of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, as necessary.
d. Assist the Vietnamese government with special ideas to make it more responsive to the needs of its people. Introduce philosophy and means, such as a Presidential Complaints and Action Commission in Vietnamese terms.
e. Other nations, as a factor in achieving political objectives of the Task Force goal, must be considered in terms of the Communists, the Neutralists, and the Allies. For example, Cambodia. Effective measures are needed to deny the use of Cambodian territory for the transit or safehaven of Communist armed forces operating in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel (political and military) from the U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh, should visit Svayrieng and other border areas to obtain facts for U.S. actions with the Cambodian government. If necessary a team of Free World journalists could visit the areas and turn the light of world publicity on the situation.
Assist the Vietnamese to become a polarizing spirit against Communism in the Southeast Asia region. Encourage closer working liaison with anti-Communist Asian nations. Visits of political, cultural, civic, military, veterans, youth, and labor groups should be exchanged on a stepped-up scale between Vietnam and her neighbors. Existing exchanges of information on Communist agents, couriers, and activists between national policy officials should be increased.
II. Military
a. Continue current operations to achieve the stated goal, with review by the Task Force Director to determine changes and emphasis to fit into special Task Force objectives.
b. Take actions for prompt additional U.S. support, including necessary funding, of military projects deemed to be needed immediately. In this category is the question of pay and allowances for the additional 20,000 troops for the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
c. Introduce selected personnel, most highly-qualified in counter-guerrilla combat, into Vietnam to assist in making the Vietnamese effort more effective promptly. Such personnel can assist in selected combat operations, as close-up advisors and assure best possible support. Also, an R&D section of RVNAF could be established, with the help of a small group of practical Americans, to develop and apply new techniques for use against the Communist Viet-Cong.
III. Economic
a. Continue existing operations to achieve the stated goal, with review by the Task Force Director to determine changes and emphasis to fit into Task Force actions.
b. Sponsor the visit of a practical U.S. economic team, drawing heavily on U.S. private industry, to South Vietnam to work out with the Vietnamese effective plans to speed up national development, give Vietnam a better tax structure, and establish a sound basis for foreign investment. The U.S. and other economic plans for Vietnam should be re-examined for sound ideas to be incorporated into a firm new plan, with special attention to early impact upon agricultural areas now vulnerable to Communist take-over.
c. Make certain that transport facilities in Vietnam are expanded rapidly to permit fullest possible use of the small cadre of capable government executives, freeing them to leave the capital, get to a trouble spot promptly, and return to pressing duties in the capital with the least loss of time, as well as freeing the movement of security forces to enable them to concentrate forces where necessary in timely fashion. Light aircraft, for economy, should be considered as one of the means for achieving mobility of government personnel.
IV. Psychological
a. Continue existing operations to achieve the stated goal, with review by the Task Force Director to determine changes and emphasis to fit into Task Force actions.
b. Develop an agricultural area just south of the 17th Parallel Demarcation Line as a "show-place" of democratic action, for its psychological effect on the Communists via the "bamboo telegraph." This project should be accomplished by a combined team of Vietnamese (Civic Action personnel), Americans (Peace Corps), and Filipinos (Operation Brotherhood). Similar projects will be initiated in areas now dominated by insurgents, immediately following troop actions to secure the areas, to boost the morale of the people.
c. Psychologically exploit the rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners now held in South Vietnam. Rehabilitated prisoners will testify to the errors of Communism in a psychological campaign to Communist-held areas, including North Vietnam, to induce defections. Sound implementation of the rehabilitation program will be assisted by U.S. personnel; this requires a team of U.S. Army (Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Counter-Intelligence), USIS, and USOM personnel.
d. To support maximum U.S. impact prominent Americans who make news should appear in Vietnam during this emergency period in the role of Presidential representatives to participate in selected political and economic activities. For example, Vice President Johnson could make a good-will visit, (or, as alternate, Eisenhower or Nixon could undertake such an assignment for President Kennedy). On the economic side, a prominent personality such as James Landis/2/ or George Meany/3/ could appear in Vietnam for President Kennedy.
/2/Special Assistant to the President.
/3/President of the AFL-CIO.
d. [e.] Provide U.S. assistance to the Vietnamese government to carry out an effective psychological campaign against Communist targets, as well as a campaign to gain more active support of non-Communists, both inside Vietnam and in surrounding countries. More effective programming, increased signal strength (the South lags far behind the 100 kilowatt transmitters of the North), and better coverage of target areas are indicated as immediate needs. Available U.S. mobile transmitters and staffs should be put on these targets.
33. Draft Notes on the First Meeting of the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam, the Pentagon/1/
Washington, April 24, 1961, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 20. General Lansdale. V-N 1961. Secret. The drafter is not identified.
I accompanied Deputy Under Secretary Johnson and Assistant Secretary McConaughy to this meeting which was under the Chairmanship of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric. Among those present were Mr. Nitze, RAdm. Heinz, General Lansdale, Col. Black and Col. Flesch from the Defense Department. Messrs. Fitzgerald and Colby, CIA; Ambassador Young and General McGarr, Chief MAAG, Viet-Nam./2/
/2/Colby and McGarr were in Washington for consultations.
Mr. Gilpatric said that General Lansdale would accompany the Vice President on his coming trip to Viet-Nam and that this week he would be working on a major plan for Viet-Nam to be ready by Friday for presentation to the President./3/
/3/Gilpatric spoke from a two-page set of remarks which reviewed the purpose and importance of the Task Force and summarized the Presidential Task Force Program, Document 32. A copy of the remarks is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3078, Vietnam.
General Lansdale said that he would be making side visit to Viet-Nam and would do his best to support the Task Force efforts in the field. He emphasized the need for security to prevent leaks and speculation about this new activity. Mr. Gilpatric said that the President wanted one document similar to that which had been prepared on "Millpond."/4/ He then called on General McGarr for a report.
/4/Operation Millpond, approved by the President on March 9, was a 17-point program to prepare or improve the U.S. military posture with respect to Laos.
General McGarr said that President Diem wanted to see General Lansdale and would like him to stay in Viet-Nam as long as possible. The General then gave a briefing/5/ on the situation stressing that the war in Viet-Nam was vicious and brutal and that casualties were high. The Communists were trying to establish secure areas in the countryside and during 1960 Viet Cong incidents averaged about 505 per month and were highest in September. This year they have been as high as 650 in March but the incidents themselves had not been on quite as large a scale and the GVN now has the initiative. In 1960 the GVN suffered 3000 casualties. The figures all came from Viet-Nam sources but were considered fairly accurate. At present it was estimated that 42% of the country was under firm GVN control with the rest uncertain degree under Communist control. He felt that the military problem must first be solved before we can move ahead in the psychological, economic and other areas.
/5/For an outline of McGarr's briefing, see Declassified Documents, 1978, p. 361B. Two days later, at 9 a.m. on April 26, McGarr also briefed General Taylor. For a summary of the briefing, see Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, New York, 1972, p. 221. No other record of the briefing has been found.
In describing pare-military operations in Viet-Nam the General spoke of the country team headed by the Ambassador but stressed that all Americans there were merely advisers. He mentioned the Presidential order giving the Ambassador policy coordination control/6/ and pointed out that the Ambassador had insisted that MAAG might send its position to CINCPAC only after coordinated by the Ambassador. This procedure had delayed for as much as 13 days his getting his own views across to his superiors.
/6/For text of Executive Order 10893, November 8, 1960, which, inter alia, defined the coordination and supervision of functions in diplomatic missions abroad, see Code of Federal Regulations, Title 3--The President--1959-1963 Compilation, Washington, pp. 420-424.
As for the CIP, we were now trying to get full agreement from the Vietnamese. There was no doubt for the need for 20,000 more troops. The Ambassador had finally withdrawn his objection for this increase because of the situation in Laos.
From the military point of view there was a need for a phased and planned operation under a firm chain of command. MAAG now had full control of the training of the civil guard 32,000 of whom were financed under MAP with the remaining 38,000 to get MAP equipment.
MAAG was developing a counterinsurgency doctrine which contained the seeds of an operational plan. As for the ARVN there were 125 battalion equivalents 90 of which were fully committed and some had been in operation continuously for one and one-half to two years without training. The additional 20,000 were needed for rotation and to permit training. 65 ranger units and s5 ranger cadres had been trained. By the end of 1965 six ranger groups would have been trained.
Mr. Gilpatric asked about pay and allowances for the additional 20,000. The General pointed out that the President was annoyed that defense support [which] had been at the rate of $155 million was to be reduced to $90 million based on a balance of payment justification. He pointed out that Diem and Thuan said that they can pay for the additional 20,000; in his opinion they could do so to a certain extent.
The General said that the situation although dangerous could be dealt with. If the VC substantially stepped up their activity and they have the capability, the situation could become highly critical. He mentioned the covert introduction at Kun Tum of some 1000 Viet Minh as well as the strikes that were launched across the Cambodian frontier. He referred to the Khmer problem and to the long standing friction between Diem and Sihanouk as well as the Ambassador's efforts to get these two together. The best arrangement would be to a military seal along the Cambodian frontier but this could not be done because of vast jungles and swamps. He explained how the problem was more serious and how it differed from those in Malaya and in the Philippines. Obviously if the Communists should get control in southern Laos they could outflank Viet-Nam and for this reason the coming conference will have dangerous possibilities. He did not see any solution with the partitioning of Laos so the southern part could be sealed off.
Mr. Gilpatric said we must do what we can to preserve internal security but must assume that we cannot do too much about the Cambodian and Lao problems. The General said that it was difficult to get the team to work together and that we are unable to get coordinated action in Laos. There was much to do in the paramilitary areas, but nothing would take the place of military force.
Mr. Nitze said he hoped we could resolve the balance of payments issue as applied to the additional force level.
The General said that 170,000 would be enough troops and perhaps more than could be taken care of because of lack of officers for the additional 20,000. He said we could hold and mop up with what we have but that it would take 30,000 to keep the border area secure. As for the chain of command, the General pointed out that Big Minh was to be the top commander.
There was then a discussion of the MAAG ceiling during which the General pointed out that if MAAG is to take over other duties there would have to be some increase.
Ambassador Young was called on to comment which he did along the following general lines:/7/
/7/A summary of Young's remarks, attached to a note from him to Gilpatric, April 25, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Viet-1. Young subsequently incorporated his views into a four-page paper which, at the suggestion of Bowles, he sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rostow. For text of this paper, see Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 317C.
1. Need to re-establish a working dialogue with Diem,
2. Concept of defending the entire area of Southeast Asia,
3. The need to eradicate the Viet Cong,
4. A new political program, and
5. Maximum on the DRV.Mr. Gilpatric said that what we had in mind would not supersede the CIP and Mr. Johnson observed that we need to concentrate on specifics and price out any additional actions in terms of dollars and Vietnamese personnel. Mr. Gilpatric said we need to come up with a program for action in concrete terms.
It was agreed that the Task Force would meet again on Wednesday to go over the draft plan on which Messrs. Lansdale and Hand would be working with various representatives of the Departments beginning this afternoon.
34. Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem/1/
Washington, April 26, 1961.
/1/Source Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files FRC 66 A 878, 350 GVN Elections. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. Attached to the source text was a brief covering note from Durbrow to Diem dated April 29. The text of the letter was transmitted to Saigon in telegram 1306, April 26. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence Lot 66 D 476)
Dear Mr. President: I wish on the occasion of your second inauguration to offer to you and to the Vietnamese people my personal congratulations and those of the American people. We have watched with sympathy your courageous leadership during your country's struggle to perfect its independence and its efforts to create a better life for its people. The United States stands firmly with you in this struggle and in these efforts. The recent treaty of amity and economic relations/2/ and the inauguration of the Saigon-Bien Hoa highway are symbols of the cooperation between our countries.
/2/For text of this treaty, signed at Saigon April 3, 1961, see 5 UST 2400.
The progress made under your leadership has caused the Communists to step up their campaign of hatred, terror and destruction by which they seek to further their purposes in Asia. I am encouraged that the Communist-instigated guerrilla war failed to disrupt the elections and that in the midst of a perilous struggle your country was able to conduct a political campaign with frank exchange of opinion. Your leadership has again been nourished and strengthened by the mandate of your people. This augurs well.
I look toward a future in which Viet-Nam will be able to pursue the aspirations of its people in peace and freedom. I do not minimize the difficulties your country must pass through, but I am confident because I know that as always in history the cooperation of free men will ultimately triumph over tyranny.
It is fitting that Ambassador Durbrow should be present on this occasion to deliver my message to you, for he has worked tirelessly and with understanding for the common good of our countries. I look forward to his return, when I shall have opportunity to hear from him first hand of his services in your country.
Sincerely yours,
John F. Kennedy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
35. Editorial Note
By April 26, 1961, drafts of A Program of Action To Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam were under consideration. One version, without an annex, is printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pages 42-57. Another apparently later draft, but also dated April 26 with an annex, was forwarded to the President on April 27 under cover of a memorandum from Gilpatric; see Declassified Documents, 1978, page 147A.
36. Memorandum for the Record by the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)/1/
Washington, April 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers. Top Secret; Hold Closely.
SUBJ
NSC meeting on South Viet Nam, 27 April 1961REF
Mr. Gilpatric's memo for the President on program of action for Viet Nam, 27 April 1961/2//2/See Document 35.
1. Mr. Gilpatric summarized the referenced report.
2. Mr. Dulles, in answer to a question, suggested that the outcome of the elections did not truly represent the popularity of President Diem, and that in essence, the elections were rigged.
3. General McGarr did not believe they were rigged although there was no other candidate. The people, in general, were for Diem. The elections were free. The Viet Cong did try to oppose the election. They bombed polling booths and prevented people from voting but were unsuccessful.
4. It was recommended that there be an increase in the military forces in Viet Nam and the United States pay for it. He stated that the psychological and political actions of the Viet Cong were not being countered adequately.
5. The question was asked how do we get $50m required for the increased costs growing out of the recommendations in Mr. Gilpatric's study. The answer was to take it from the $1.6B MAP worldwide and ask for supplemental later.
6. Mr. Bowles stated that there is great danger in this area and the situation will get worse. There is a strong need for military measures. Although the State Department received Mr. Gilpatric's paper late and were consequently not familiar with it, their first glance indicated that it was a good paper. Still we have made many mistakes in Southeast Asia-one of them in trying to turn Laotians into Turks. We need to delay in acting on the paper in order to study the problem even though from a superficial look at it the paper appears to be good.
7. The President stated that there would be an NSC meeting on Saturday/3/ on Mr. Gilpatric's paper./4/
/3/April 29.
/4/Following agreement to delay consideration of the paper, the President directed that the U.S. public and other nations be informed of the situation in Vietnam. (NSC Action No. 2411, April 27; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 65 D 95)
Comment. Op-61 and Op-004 please prepare any data that I will need for the above NSC conference.
Op-06 inform Op-03 and BuShips of the substance of paragraph 3.e. on page 6 of Mr. Gilpatric's paper. We must get going on boats which will be suitable for guerrilla operations in swamps.
8. There was considerable discussion on corruption in Southeast Asia and it was brought out that the South Viet Nam Government is the least corrupt of all governments in Southeast Asia. Still, the United States must protect itself from malfeasance in office.
9. Mr. Dillon stated that we should use material, that is, United States goods, as much as possible rather than money because the balance of payments problem is still with us.
10. Mr. Murrow is helping Ambassador Durbrow hold a press conference and perhaps put on a national TV hookup such as the Chinese communists are doing in South Viet Nam. The Vice President is going to South Viet Nam May 9-16.
11. The DoD and other departments may have to go to Congress for additional MAP funds as well as increased funds for United States military-particularly for limited war capability.
Comment. We must have prepared material which we will need in limited war, i.e. material that we do not now have. Op-90 please prepare.
Arleigh Burke/5/
R.L. Fowler
By direction/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.
37. Memorandum From the President's Special Counsel (Sorensen) to the President /1/
Washington, April 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3078, Vietnam. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.
Re
Plan for VietnamMr. Bundy, Mr. Bell and I urge approval at Saturday's N.S.C. meeting of only the basic concept of an all-out internal security effort to save Vietnam, indicating that the Task Force Report/2/ is only a first draft to be reviewed, reshaped and then carried personally by the Vice President on his trip.
/2/See Document 35.
1. We need a more realistic look.
To the extent that this plan depends on the communists being tied down in Laos or lacking further forces, on our blocking land corridors through which communist support flows, or on our obtaining effective anti-infiltration action from Laos, Cambodia and the Laotian negotiations, the outcome is highly doubtful.
To the extent that it depends on wider popular support among the Vietnamese, tax and foreign exchange reforms by Diem, and his agreement to the military and governmental reorganizations required, the outcome is speculative at best.
There is no timetable-no clear division of field authority between our new Ambassador and the military, or between U.S. and G.V.N.--and no realistic estimate of long-run costs and effect, with many estimates being omitted altogether. Many miscellaneous ideas are vaguely thrown in without any consideration comparable to that given the military and intelligence build-ups (e.g., a U.N. appeal, a 5-year economic plan, "a long-range plan for the economic development of Southeast Asia on a regional basis," etc.).
2. More importantly, it may be necessary to recast this in terms of a joint plan to be implemented by both countries only after the Vice President and Diem have come to a firm agreement.
There is no clearer example of a country that cannot be saved unless it saves itself-through increased popular support; governmental, economic and military reforms and reorganizations; and the encouragement of new political leaders. We do not want Vietnam to fall-we do not want to add to Diem's burdens-and the chief purpose of insisting upon such conditions should not be saving of American dollars but the saving of Vietnam.
A White House officer (e.g. Rostow) should prepare such a proposal for the Vice President, in consultation with Ros Gilpatric, General Lansdale and the Ambassador.
Theodore C. Sorensen/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
38. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, April 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. On April 28, Robert H. Johnson also sent a memorandum to Rostow commenting on the program for Vietnam. Johnson prefaced his remarks by saying that it seemed to lack a clear plan of political action for South Vietnam. For text of his memorandum, see Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 277C.
SUBJECT
Comments on Program of Action for VietnamThis looks like a sensible putting together of most of the ideas floating around on how to cope with the internal security threat to the GVN. Except for the Presidential task force, I notice nothing particularly novel; however, the combined impact of these measures should be substantial, if actually carried out.
As usual in such outline plans, there is far more emphasis on what we ought to do than on the really gut questions-how to do so:
(a) How do we get Diem's indispensable cooperation, or to put it another way, how do we properly motivate Diem? We have not done too well on selling him those aspects of the CIP which call on him to do something instead of us to spend money.
(b) How do we gain the cooperation of other free nations in the area especially Cambodia and Laos, in sealing off the borders. This is a lot easier said than done. What quid pro quos do we offer for Sihanouk's cooperation?
(c) If we are bailing Diem out, why aren't we entitled to insist (Page 6) that he overhaul tax system, halt waste of foreign exchange and devalue currency to a realistic rate? To my mind one of the flaws of our Korean operation has been that we always gave and never demanded. This is war for Diem too, he's got to understand that continued procrastination on his part will be fatal.
I question whether task force directorship should be in Defense rather than State, although I grant that the instrumentalities to be employed are largely military. We must also remember the face we present to the world, and the precedent we would set.
I miss any attention to how we tell the other side that we mean business. It is terribly important, of course, to convince the Communists of this, and to attempt to forestall a parallel intensification of their effort. Here's a field for quiet diplomacy and even a few private threats.
How do we demonstrate our determination in unmistakable terms? At a minimum, why not give Diem now a public commitment that if things get to the stage of overt fighting, we will come to his support. (Like we had to do with Sarit). We should consider ways and means of putting token US forces in South Vietnam as further evidence (if this is possible under Geneva Accords). I know you are already on top of UN angle.
One purpose of an explicit US commitment along above lines would be to guarantee GVN border so that RVNAF's 170,000 men can be more effectively deployed against Viet Cong. To me, MAAG is not yet on top of problem, but still regards internal threat as secondary. We should have a showdown on this, and if necessary replace MAAG chief.
Before we get into expensive radar surveillance (Page 5), do we have any evidence of extensive clandestine overflights? I had thought most VC support came in by land or sea. And don't we need more than a "Junk force" to meet latter?
One big headache in Laos has been that our boys won't fight. Should we consider putting MAAG advisers into operations down to battalion, etc. level? This might be more important than anything else. On this score, I can't over-emphasize importance of having the best American personnel; the average MAAG officer is simply not suited for the type of war we're going to have to fight (Lansdale is well aware of this). Instead of just adding on to 685 now there, we must insist on careful screening process!
Finally, while immediate focus must be on VC problem, we cannot neglect longer-range objective of a viable GVN. Our purpose is not just to conduct a holding action, but to use the time gained to build a structure which will last. Let's not have another Korea, where prolongation of primarily military focus long after hostilities were over leaves us (eight years later) with the job of building a viable ROK still in front of us.
RWK
39. Memorandum From the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Nolting) to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, April 29, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-2961. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Nolting and Cottrell. Also sent to Under Secretary Bowles.
SUBJECT
Program for Viet-NamUnderstanding with Defense
At the Under Secretary's request, Ken Young and I saw Mr. Gilpatric yesterday afternoon. There was a meeting of minds, I think, on the major points which had bothered us in substance, procedure and form of the Task Force Report on Viet-Nam. Mr. Gilpatric said that he would introduce the Task Force paper for discussion at the NSC meeting, making the following points:
1. The recommendations for action in the Task Force Report should not be taken as the Law of the Medes and Persians but as authority to a Task Force to carry out, after recommendation from the Ambassador in the field, a series of accelerated measures along the lines of, and for the purpose stated in the Task Force Report.
2. The Task Force program may well have to be altered, either to provide greater US support or to modify the measures therein in one way or another, especially in light of the unfolding Lao situation.
3. Any regional program for Southeast Asia might also cause modifications in the program for Viet-Nam.
The President should therefore authorize in general the undertaking of such a program, on the understanding that there would be further NSC consideration of the situation as it evolves.
In discussion, the following points emerged:
1. That the principle of a Task Force organization in Washington should be continued, but that for Mr. Gilpatric's part, he felt that the Task Force should be located in, and receive its major guidance from, the State Department.
2. As regards organization in the field, he felt that the Ambassador and the Country Team should control the timing of the actions recommended, should have authority to recommend changes and should negotiate the steps. The Defense member of the Task Force, if he visited the country, would be subject to the authority of the Ambassador and would not visit the country unless asked for by the Ambassador.
3. Having read the substitute paper which was prepared in the State Department,/2/ Mr. Gilpatric thought it watered down too much the emphasis on anti-subversion activity and linked too tightly anti subversive measures to the political-social reforms which we have been trying to achieve. In discussing this point, Gilpatric agreed that persuasion towards such reforms should continue, but he was leery of making them a condition of our aid against guerrillas.
/2/Presumably a reference to an early draft of the attachment to Document 42.
4. While agreeing that the Counterinsurgency Plan should be promptly negotiated to a conclusion and carried out, he felt that authority along the lines of the Task Force recommendation to accelerate and enlarge this Plan and to shift its emphasis towards greater anti-guerrilla activity should be requested now. The other measures proposed in the State paper should be considered by the Task Force as the situation progresses.
Recommended Tactics for the NSC Meeting
In light of the above, which seems to me satisfactory both in substance and procedure, I would recommend that you agree to the Task Force report, making clear that while some of the analyses might be more accurately done and some of the measures should be further considered, you too feel that a general approval of the accelerated program of action for Viet-Nam is warranted. If in fact the above points do not come out in Mr. Gilpatric's presentation, I think they should be made by you in order that the President will know the type of action which he is requested to take.
Although this point was not made specifically by Mr. Gilpatric, it would follow from our understanding that the next to the last paragraph of the covering note of his Memorandum to the President dated April 27 would be omitted and that the paragraph on organization (Para 9) would also be changed.
40. Editorial Note
At its meeting at 10 a.m. on April 29, 1961, the National Security Council discussed the Program of Action for Vietnam (see Document 35) and approved paragraphs 3a-3e. The NSC also agreed that the task force should revise the program for further consideration of the Council. (NSC Action No. 2416; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95) No record of the discussion at the Council meeting has been found.
41. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)/1/
Saigon, May 6, 1961, 5:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SGN(61)12--Laos Consolidated. Top Secret; Priority.
MAGCH-LO 670. 1. While in Saigon 2 May General Lemnitzer held discussions with Country Team, MAAG, Ambassador Harriman, Ty, Thuan, and Diem in that order./2/ Following are highlights with emphasis on Lemnitzer's statements and questions without repetition of info previously transmitted or known to you.
/2/Lemnitzer visited Saigon as part of a tour of the Far East following the CENTO Council meeting at Ankara, April 27-28. Harriman visited Saigon on his way to New Delhi for a meeting with Nehru on May 5 about the situation in Laos. Harriman transmitted his account of these conversations in telegram 1473 from Bangkok, May 4. (Ibid.; printed in Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 318B)
2. Country Team meeting (Durbrow, McGarr, Mendenhall, Gardiner, and others present):
a. At Durbrow's request I reviewed my trip to Washington/3/ noting that: Vice President Johnson plans visit Vietnam in May; President Kennedy indicated if Geneva accords limit capacity to save Vietnam we should work outside them; MAAG ceiling could be increased as necessary; MAP support for 68,000 Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps would be authorized; increase in MAP funding for GVN up to 209 million . . . had been proposed; MAP support for Junk Force had not yet been approved when I left Washington; the emphasis President Kennedy and administration are placing on Vietnam and possible willingness to place U.S. forces in Laos and SVN; and my impression that many in Washington were out of date on Vietnam situation and felt election had been rigged (which I tried to dispel).
/3/McGarr returned to Washington on April 24 for consultations.
b. Durbrow cited recent discussions with Diem stating Diem has not yet given three things most needed in Counterinsurgency Plan: A single chain of command, a central intelligence organization, and economic and political reforms. In reply to Lemnitzer, Durbrow stated single chain of command is first priority. Durbrow felt Diem must get more rapport with the people and more protection for the people or he could not defeat Viet Cong. Gardiner outlined Vietnam economic aid situation stating last year 22% economic aid funds spent in U.S; next year under Buy American Act about 65% will be U.S. spent. (In response to question, I had stated in Washington that Sec Thuan had said the Buy American policy will hurt Vietnam budgeteers did not agree.)
c. Lemnitzer stated when he left Washington President Kennedy was ready to do anything within reason to save Southeast Asia. We had worked on a shoe string in Laos under a MAP ceiling and had in effect lost time in Laos since last August. There is still time to act in SVN. Lemnitzer would like for once to have more strength and equipment than is needed rather than too little too late. Lemnitzer questioned delay in building up 20,000 force increase while striving for simultaneous political and economic reforms; why not get force increase soonest, save country, and then strive for other reforms. Mendenhall felt other reforms, at least those pertaining to reorganization of government and actions in the military and intelligence fields, equally necessary to defeat Viet Cong. Lemnitzer asked if more helicopters could be used. Affirmative reply given but problems of maintenance and pilot training time cited. Lemnitzer cited possibility of U.S. maintenance teams and pilots in a non-combat role. Durbrow had to depart early; Lemnitzer closed meeting repeating timely military action, training, and equipment (not held up while other things are done) may be only way of saving situation.
3. At MAAG, discussions were held in four principal areas: current military and intelligence situation in SVN, outline of and status of Counterinsurgency Plan, status of operations and training, summary of increasing logistic requirements with increased forces and support of the Civil Guard. Lemnitzer inquired on validity of election and seemed surprised that Diem received only 65% of vote in Saigon-Cholon as opposed to 95% in country as a whole which he considered as evidence of non-rigged elections. He again reiterated that U.S. must save SVN and with the present situation it could be saved primarily by military means. We must express our requirements clearly, immediately, not fettered by ICC, funds, or other limitations, in fact use an over-kill factor. He again referred to possible use of U.S. units in training, logistics, and combat support such as helicopter units. He inquired on intelligence at all levels, RVNAF and Viet Cong communications, source of VC supplies, and VC activity in Cambodia. He seemed impressed most RVNAF units are on operations against VC and not sitting inactive below 17th parallel as some in Washington seem to think.
4. In separate discussions with Ty and Thuan, Lemnitzer stressed time and the lesson to be learned from Laos was the loss of time. While U.S. support in Laos was limited to provision equipment and minimum non-tactical training Pathet Lao-Viet Minh forces were organizing, training, equipping, and moving. He urged required GVN decisions on command structure, intelligence, force increase, and other facets of Counterinsurgency Plan. Thuan cited GVN financial problems in paying increased forces. He also noted Diem had stated need 20,000 more in 1957. Both Ty and Thuan expressed grave concern on Tchepone situation with its threat to SVN. Lemnitzer inquired of Ty, Thuan, and later Diem of GVN counter operations in NVN. Ty said to defeat the VC it was necessary to go outside Vietnam.
5. In almost two hour session with Diem (Harriman, Durbrow, and myself also present) Diem again covered weakness of French, having requested 20,000 increase in 1957, border infiltration, and necessity of protecting roads, agrovilles, and installations (see my cite 1579 of 150927Z Dec 60/4/).
/4/Not found.
a. Lemnitzer asked what could the U.S. best do to aid GVN from a military standpoint. Diem said Laos must be saved at all costs, otherwise situation in SVN will become untenable. Loss of Laos will open all doors to mass infiltration or invasion of SVN. Diem attributed lack of FAL effectiveness to French who in effect sabotaged Laos and are plotting against GVN. Diem claims Asians should be used to fight Asians and advocates using ChiNats in SE Asia with U.S. Air Force and 7th Fleet bolstering depleted ChiNat forces remaining in Formosa. Diem cited captured documents which show 2,000 VC have infiltrated into SVN since December and stated need for more troops and Navy craft to protect long open frontiers and coast line.
b. Lemnitzer queried whether SVN was infiltrating guerrillas into NVN. Diem replied efforts had been made without much success because of tight VC and police controls. He cited one recent infiltration by sea of small group which is now in radio contact with SVN.
c. On Lemnitzer query of relative calm during election, Diem outlined VC efforts, counter RVNAF operations, and summed up large vote turnout and overwhelming majority for him as manifestation of will of people without force or coercion other than that of the VC which boomeranged.
d. Lemnitzer asked about the reservists being recalled as part of the 20,000 force increase. Diem said he had already recalled 6,000 but though reservists they still needed two or three months training. Diem raised the question of paying additional troops saying SVN economy does not permit paying additional troops.
e. In concluding, Lemnitzer stated he had been well briefed and he and Washington were fully aware of the seriousness of situation. He again emphasized time and decisions, assured Diem the U.S. was sending its most capable officers to advise and assist RVNAF, underlined the importance of training, and stated the U.S. would do everything in its power to assist SVN in its fight against the VC.
6. This message has been coordinated with the Embassy. However, rather than a Country Team document it represents my impressions of Lemnitzer's discussions for use in your forthcoming discussions with him
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