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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
108. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Southeast Asia Task Force (Steeves) to the President/1/
Washington, July 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-General 7/25/61-7/28/61. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. A typewritten, undated, and unsigned note attached to the source text reads as follows: "This was brought to the meeting by Mr. Steeves, and discussed with the President by Mr. Steeves and Mr. Johnson." The meeting under reference is apparently the one recorded in the memorandum of discussion, Document 109.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia Task Force Interim ReportYour Task Force on Southeast Asia is engaged in a preliminary review of our policy for the Southeast Asia peninsula which includes Thailand, Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The object of our study is to devise a course of action to arrest communist encroachment into that area. The consensus, on a preliminary examination of the problem, brings us to the following conclusions:
1. It is essential to our policy interests in Asia, and indeed globally, to ensure the security of Southeast Asia against further communist advancement, whether communist strategy takes the form of political take-over or whether they intend to accomplish the task by covert or overt military means.
2. We should make the basic decision now to resist this encroachment by appropriate military means, if necessary, with or without unanimous SEATO support. The loss of Southeast Asia to the free world would be highly inimical to our future strategy and interest.
3. Any approach to the solution of this problem must entail a coordinated package approach involving the entire peninsula if the action is to be effective. It must encompass appropriate political, economic, psychological and military measures.
4. We recognize the DRV as the immediate focal point of the threat to the peninsula and whatever action is taken should bear on this objective if both Laos and Viet-Nam are to be secured and the approaches to the rest of the peninsula blocked.
5. A strategy and concept to accomplish our purposes contains the following ingredients:
a. At Geneva, our delegation should be instructed that the "sticking point" in our negotiations be our insistence on an effective, well-equipped ICC with adequate terms of reference as the minimum price we will demand for our military disengagement in Laos. This must not be made dependent on the uncertain effectiveness of any future RLG for the security of the entire peninsula must not be left dependent on the traditionally weak RLG, incapable of stemming communist aggression after the pattern of the past twelve years.
b. In Laos, our policy will be to keep a steady rein on the RLG, simultaneously encouraging it not to agree to the formation of a coalition government that would merely be a prelude to communist take-over.
c. Training and support of the FAL in and out of Laos will continue in a moderately increasing tempo to place that force in as good a posture as possible to resist any possible breach of the cease-fire or contain the Pathet Lao offensive.
d. While we will continue to encourage negotiation for a genuinely neutral Laos under proper safeguards, we will be prepared to support a divided Laos under a non-communist government rather than accept a so-called unified Laos under a communist-oriented government with an inadequate control commission resulting from failure to arrive at a suitable agreement in Geneva.
e. Give early indication to Thailand that we stand ready to take appropriate measures diplomatically, militarily and economically to strengthen her position. In Thailand's present disillusioned and somewhat discouraged state, it is essential that her cooperation be insured. Thailand's strategic position, quite apart from other considerations, makes her a key to any adequate Southeast Asia position.
f. In Viet-Nam we accept as general guidance the outline of the Staley report for improving the economic and military situation in Viet-Nam.
g. In carrying out our programs based in Viet-Nam covert action be conducted to interdict North Vietnamese pressure on South Viet-Nam and, if these contacts do not prove successful, eventually give overt indication that the continuation of DRV aggressive policy towards Laos and Viet-Nam may result in direct retaliatory action against her.
h. Inasmuch as existing military plans have concentrated on the SEATO Plan Five type of operation in Laos [and?] do not seem adequate for this present strategy, a military plan be devised with or without SEATO concurrence but obviously include as many members of SEATO as possible to coordinate military action in Viet-Nam and Laos directed at the reduction of the threat based in the DRV should all efforts at a Deacefu1 settlement fail.
109. Memorandum of a Discussion/1/
Washington, July 28, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-General. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the White House.
PRESENT
The President, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McConaughy, Mr. Steeves, Mr. Cottrell, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Rostow, Mr. BallThe meeting was opened by Mr. Johnson, who explained that Southeast Asia, in the current context, meant Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia.
Summarizing the current situation, Mr. Johnson remarked that the Communists show no sign of wanting a neutral Laos. Our estimate is that they are very confident about the current military situation and see no reason for concessions. Thus, the question for us is whether we can introduce a new element which will change their estimate of the situation. Without such a change, it is most unlikely that there will be any agreement in Geneva.
Our position is that two elements are required for a satisfactory Laotian settlement: a strong ICC and a government which gives real promise of avoiding Communist domination. Without these two conditions, Laos will pose an increasing threat to South Vietnam. Our situation in that country is not improving. The Vietnamese are killing members of the Viet-Cong in significant numbers, but as these losses are inflicted, more are introduced, and we are on a sort of treadmill there.
The question then is whether we can make a coordinated approach to the problem of Southeast Asia. It is not easy, because Southeast Asia is an American geographical expression rather than a political reality. Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have complex relations one with another, and while their present interests are much alike, there are rivalries and differences which make cooperation difficult.
Turning to the political situation in Laos itself, Mr. Johnson reported a lack of progress in negotiations among the three Princes. His Washington visit has apparently stiffened Phoumi's back. (Mr. Johnson thought the stiffening was about right, but the President later expressed reservations.) Meanwhile, SEATO Plan 5 is ready if the cease-fire is broken, . . . .
The new element which is now being considered, in working discussions in the U.S. Government, is the creation of a plan to take and hold the southern part of Laos with combined forces of the Royal Laotian Government, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. The proposal is that we would press in Geneva for a strong ICC, making plain that unless such an arrangement is established, the U.S. will not give up its current position in Laos in support of the RLG. At the same time, we would support Phoumi in refusing to accept any government which would be likely to slip under Communist control. If these conditions are not met, and if the cease-fire is broken, we would then go, not for a re-establishment of the status quo, but for a strong new position, as described, in Southern Laos.
In response to a question from the Secretary of State, Mr. Johnson stated that his proposal did not exclude a Laotian Government with some members of the Pathet Lao in it. The point was, rather, how many, and in what Cabinet positions, and later there was agreement to a suggestion from Mr. Steeves that it is time now to begin discussing particular names in particular posts. Mr. Johnson continued that whatever the Government, the character and powers of the ICC are of central importance.
It was further made clear that if we were unable to agree to proposals made in Geneva and if we should support the Lao Government in a parallel position, we would nevertheless continue to talk and would not ourselves be the agents to break up the conference.
[Here follows a paragraph on the internal political situation in Laos.]
It was evident from this same gloomy view that the working party had turned to a consideration of a new military alternative. One part of this alternative plan, as explained above, is the notion of a capture of Southern Laos. The second part, Mr. Johnson explained, is the possibility of responding in a new way to any substantial intervention by the Viet-minh. The force proposed for Southern Laos would probably be able to cope with any Pathet Lao force that might be placed against it. Previously it had been supposed that if the Viet-minh should intervene, any additional action would have to be located in Laos. Now there was discussion of the possibility of meeting any such substantial intervention by the Vietminh with a direct air and naval operation at Haiphong or Hanoi. And possibly you can deter any such attack in Laos by making clear that there are circumstances in which you would take this more energetic course. Questions from the President showed that the detailed aspects of this military plan had not been developed. It was not clear how great an effect action against Haiphong or Hanoi would have on Northern Viet-nam, nor whether it would be easy to hold what had been taken in a single attack. Similarly, no careful plan has yet been developed for an operation to take and hold Southern Laos. Planning is proceeding, and General Taylor is in close touch with General Lemnitzer. But the President made clear his own deep concern with the need for realism and accuracy in such military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false in the event. He was not persuaded that the airfields and the existing situation in Southern Laos would permit any real operation to save that part of the country, and he emphasized the reluctance of the American people and of many distinguished military leaders to see any direct involvement of U.S. troops in that part of the world. In reply it was urged that with a proper plan, with outside support, and above all with a clear and open American commitment, the results would be very different from anything that had happened before. But the President remarked that General de Gaulle, out of painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of fighting in this part of the world.
A relevant element in military planning of any sort is the financial stringency which is pressing the British to reduce their military commitments east of Suez. The current Cabinet order is that this reduction be on the order of 35 million pounds a year. The British, in any event, will be most reluctant to participate in any broader scheme of the kind which is now under discussion.
Another related element is the problem of international opinion with respect to the situation in Viet-nam. It would greatly improve our position if the world could understand more clearly what in fact is happening there. In particular, any landing operations in Northern Viet-nam would be much more likely to escape from international condemnation if world opinion understands the character of the attack which is now being mounted from the north against Diem. One grave question here is whether certain kinds of information available to the United States should on balance be brought to the surface and placed before the United Nations. This matter is still under study.
Mr. Johnson made it plain that no decision was being sought at this meeting, but that it would be most helpful in planning if it could be understood that the President would at some future time have a willingness to decide to intervene if the situation seemed to him to require it.
The President in reply offered no decision, but he made it very plain that he himself is at present very reluctant to make a decision to go into Laos. He believed that the negotiations in Geneva should be pressed forward, that we should not get ourselves badly separated from the British, that the American people were not eager to get into Laos, that nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in this area, and that he did not yet have confidence in the military practicability of the proposal which had been put before him; though he was eager to have it studied more carefully. The Secretary of State then turned the discussion to the economics of the situation. He thought it important not ever to tell the President that any active military intervention would be cheap, and he pointed out that by comparison other instruments were very inexpensive indeed, and that we ought to examine what we might do in Southeast Asia if there were no budgetary limitation upon the use of such other instruments. Saving Southeast Asia would be worth a lot of money and doing it without U.S. forces would be worth a lot more. Discussion then turned to the Staley report on Vietnam, and the President agreed to the general line of argument presented by Mr. Ball. (Mr. Ball's argument was drawn from a memorandum of the Secretary of State to the President, which is attached to this record.)/2/ Mr. Ball also discussed briefly a plan for a line of credit to Thailand proposed by Ambassador Young, and the President emphasized that long-term credits of this sort should not be publicly discussed during the debate on foreign aid.
/2/This memorandum, dated July 28, summarizes the Staley Report recommendations and their probable costs and concludes:
"It is recognized that Congress has cut aid funds at a time when additional demands are increasing. Cuts are particularly acute in Supporting Assistance ($131 million cut in Senate and $100 million in House) and the Contingency Fund ($200 million cut in each House) from which the bulk of the Viet-Nam program and additions thereto will derive. Nevertheless I believe that the critical situation in Southeast Asia warrants priority in proceeding with the program in the report. It will promote the internal and external security of Viet-Nam. It will strengthen the Government, especially in its relations with the rural population. It will bring this larger part of the population more securely within the nation. It will help Viet-Nam move toward a self-sustaining economy. Finally, it will demonstrate our own solidarity with South East Asia."
Returning to the military problems, the President emphasized the need for more accurate assessment of the situation in the future. He indicated that it would be wise for anyone making current military recommendations to examine the fate of earlier assessments. He indicated his hope that someone well known to him could go out and look at the situation directly, and while there might be arguments against having General Taylor in Laos, it emerged in the discussion that it might be good for him to go to Vietnam and to learn what he could about the whole situation from that area. General Taylor proposed to look first at the problem itself to make clear what facts need to be checked.
In summary, the President proposed the following five courses of action:
1. We should be closely on top of the conference in Geneva. He would like a weekly report of progress on that front.
2. There would be continued effort to frame a satisfactory government. If we could get an arrangement with the King in the lead, so much the better. Actual names and numbers of the players would now be discussed.
3. He was willing to accept the recommendations of the Staley report, but without a present commitment of precise amounts of money over a precise period of time.
4. The military proposals put forward by the working group will be closely examined, in the light of the criticisms and reservations expressed above. One particular aspect of these proposals is whether they would have an impact upon Vietnamese force ceilings.
5. The President hopes to have a recommendation soon as to who might go out and check the important points of fact relevant to these plans on the ground.
McGeorge Bundy
110. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/
Washington, July 29, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-General. Top Secret.
General Taylor and I have put our heads together and agreed the following list of questions a military mission to Southeast Asia might answer.
1. At the present time are the Vietnamese losing ground, holding their ground, or gaining ground in the war against the Viet Cong?
2. When are the Vietnamese likely to produce a plan for the systematic elimination of the Viet Cong-they are allegedly now at work on such a plan; and what ideas, if any, does our MAAG have about what such a systematic plan should look like?
3. How far forward is the administration of the Viet-Nam army on general staff lines?
4. How far forward is the organization of a central intelligence system capable of acquiring and using information from the villages?
5. Does the present disposition of Vietnamese forces and the planned disposition of the extra 20,000 and the extra 30,000 make sense?
6. What are the possibilities of offensive action by Diem's forces against North Viet-Nam:
(1) By air drops?
(2) By coastal raids?
What would be Diem's attitude to such a program supported by U.S.?
7. What would be the effect upon Viet-Nam troop requirements if Diem were encouraged to push out into Laos in order to control infiltration routes? Would Diem be willing to join in a cooperative action with Laos and Thailand to clean up the panhandle of Laos?
8. What are the bottlenecks which retard the increase in the strength of the Vietnamese Army? Is everything being done to eliminate them?
9. Is the counter-guerrilla training adequate which is being conducted? Do we have the necessary U.S. Special Forces personnel on the job?
10. Is the MAAG adequate in size, quality of personnel and leadership to meet the requirements implicit in the programmed expansion of the Vietnamese Army?
11. In view of the area approach which is being taken at the planning level here, I would think that any military mission to Viet-Nam should include a visit to Laos and Thailand. What we are trying to determine are the realities in the military situation. In particular, we want to know whether the necessary cooperative military action between Laos, Viet-Nam and Thailand can be put together in time to control the situation on the ground. We are inclined to think that it would be a good rather than a bad diplomatic move for an American military mission to visit Southeast Asia.
Until we are farther along in our present area planning we think it premature to send a mission. Undoubtedly new questions will be arising which we do not think of now. On the other hand the rainy season will soon be over; and our ducks should then be in a row.
111. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
JCSM-518-61
Washington, August 3, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Forces for Vietnam 1961. Top Secret. Printed also in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 239-240.
SUBJECT
Increase of GVN Armed Forces to 270,0001. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 10 July 1961,/2/ subject as above, requesting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit recommendations on increasing the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to 270,000.
/2/Not found.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that an ultimate force of 270,000 would be required to enable the RVNAF to conduct counterinsurgency operations and concurrently be prepared to meet overt aggression.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that for the foreseeable future the force objectives for Vietnam of a nine division equivalent force (200,000) is adequate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to assess the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and RVNAF capabilities and will be prepared to recommend increases in the force objectives for Vietnam should circumstances indicate there is a requirement.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a. The strategic force objectives for Vietnam remain at the nine division equivalent force level (200,000), subject to future assessment.
b. Priority efforts be continued to enhance the capabilities of the already authorized 20,000 RVNAF augmentation, 68,000 Civil Guard (CG), 48,000-52,000 Self Defense Corps (SDC) and the rotation and retraining of existing forces.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer/3/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
112. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/
Washington, August 4, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret.
The staff work in Washington has now been completed on the response to the Report of the Special Financial Group on Viet-Nam (Staley Group)/2/ and a letter from you to President Diem has been forwarded for your approval by the attached memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State./3/ I have a few comments on the report itself and on the response to it.
/2/See Document 93.
/3/Neither found attached to the source text. The Acting Secretary's memorandum is apparently the same described in footnote 2, Document 109. The letter from President Kennedy to President Diem is Document 114.
Dr. Staley's group has several achievements to its credit. It contributed to the continuing effort to create a more cooperative atmosphere in our relations; it obtained Diem's agreement in principle to de facto devaluation and a single exchange rate for imports of U.S. aid; it reached agreement with the Vietnamese on criteria to govern imports under the U.S.-financed commercial import program; it obtained acceptance by Diem of the desirability of short-range economic impact programs; it obtained some acceptance of the fact that U.S. aid is not the solution to Viet-Nam's local currency financing problems; it laid the basis for continuing consultation on economic matters through parallel committees; and it pressed on Diem the need for long-range economic planning.
But the group was unable to come up with firm estimates or programs and much work remains to be done on the estimates and programs in the report; it did not re-examine the total U.S. aid effort or even the relationship between its own proposals and the existing aid program; it did not get very clear commitments as to the extent and character of the Vietnamese contribution to the total effort. On balance then, the Staley group made an important contribution, but much remains to be done.
The deficiencies of the report have been a source of some difficulty in developing the U.S. response to it. But behind the differences that developed within the Executive Branch over our response was a more basic issue which is a source of continuing debate on various Vietnamese problems. Some agencies (notably State and Defense) are of the view that we can best achieve Vietnamese action on needed political, military and economic reforms, not by specific conditions on our aid, but by creating a general atmosphere of cooperation and confidence. They believe that the application of this approach during the last six months has produced a significant improvement in Vietnamese performance. They recognize the difficulties with the estimates in the Staley Report, but believe that for psychological reasons we should endorse the report as far as we can now and then get on quickly with the refinement of the estimates and programs.
Other agencies (e.g., Budget and ICA staff levels) stress the need for Vietnamese action if the proposed programs are to succeed and believe that such action is much more likely to be forthcoming if our aid is specifically conditioned upon Vietnamese performance with respect to particular needed reforms. On the basis of past experience they are inclined to be skeptical of the prospects for getting action out of Diem on the basis of an approach which places primary emphasis upon developing a spirit of mutual cooperation. The letter to President Diem represents something of a compromise between these two views, but in general tends toward the first and goes about as far as we reasonably can go in endorsing the Staley Report. The success of the compromise will depend notably on the success of the joint committees in making the criteria stick.
The Letter to President Diem.
The most important single commitment in the letter to President Diem is the endorsement of a 30,000 man increase in Vietnamese forces. The Staley Report itself made no recommendation on this subject which was outside its terms of reference. The rationale for this increase is contained on page 4 of the Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State. (The Ambassador's case on political grounds for the increase is contained in the attached telegram.)/4/ Despite persistent efforts we have made, the State Department's statement of rationale does not cover such important subjects as the extent to which these forces are intended to meet a threat of overt attack from the North as contrasted with the internal threat;/5/ how they will be deployed; the kind of training that they will receive; and the specific effects of such a buildup on the civilian economy. We lack in Washington the specific information and plans necessary to answer these questions. In particular, we shall need a mutually agreed, geographically-phased strategic plan for dealing with the Viet Cong before we can answer them with assurance. The difficulty in getting this town to answer these questions is one reason I advocate sending the ablest military mission we can muster to the field.
/4/No telegram was found attached to the source text, but this is apparently a reference to Document 92.
/5/The Staley Report contains a Vietnamese estimate that 90 percent of the existing Vietnamese armed forces are committed to the counter-insurgency effort. It is difficult to evaluate this estimate. The U.S. military are inclined to give it general credence. My view is that it involves a somewhat generous definition of "counter-insurgency effort"; but I am not prepared from this distance to challenge the present disposition of the Vietnamese order of battle. [Footnote in the source text.]
In the light of these ambiguities the letter to Diem suggests the need for a plan and for an understanding on the training and use of the 30,000 additional men before the buildup begins. It was not considered desirable, however, specifically to condition the increase upon such understandings.
The letter contains a general commitment to provide the commercial import program that will be required-provided it can be justified under the seven criteria contained in the report (page 3 of the telegram). The instructions to Ambassador Nolting/6/ that follow the text of the letter would authorize him to say that the increased generation of piasters under the new effective exchange rate will not serve to reduce the U.S. share of the aid effort (last page of the telegram). Since the FY 1962 Congressional presentation provides less than we provided under the FY 1961 program ($95 million v. $115 million), this statement could involve a minimum commitment of $20 million aid beyond that contained in the Congressional presentation. The cost table in the memorandum from the Secretary (page 2) uses such a $20 million addition as the bottom end of the range for this program. On the other hand, the commitment might be met through PL 480 or by drawing down the pipeline.
/6/The instructions were transmitted in telegram 140, Document 113.
The telegram states that you are directing Mr. Labouisse to conduct through the USOM in Viet-Nam a thorough and expeditious review of the short-range economic program contained in the Staley Report and of related existing U.S. aid projects. The parallel committees are to develop specific longer range development projects.
An important part of the letter and the instructions to the Ambassador is the emphasis upon economic development planning and the related emphasis upon seeking to get Diem to use our new joint economic efforts as a means of projecting to Viet-Nam, its friends and its enemies, an image of a nation confident in its long-range future.
Finally, in accordance with your wishes, the instructions to the Ambassador would have him give added emphasis to the importance we attach to Vietnamese adherence to the seven criteria governing imports and to its commitment to a higher piaster rate of exchange.
113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, August 4, 1961, 7:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/7-3161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood, Silver, and other members of the Vietnam Task Force; cleared with various other officers in the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, as well as with the Bureau of the Budget, the International Cooperation Administration, and the President (per Rostow); repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd; and pouched to Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, and Tokyo.
140. Task Force VN 22. This telegram constitutes the President's instructions for Ambassador Nolting and Task Force Saigon.
The following letter from President Kennedy to President Diem incorporates Task Force Saigon's suggestions in Embtel 145./2/
/2/In telegram 145, July 31, the Embassy reported that it considered the draft letter to Diem "excellent in tone and substance" and offered suggestions for minor changes and some additions. (Ibid.)
Ambassador Nolting is requested to transmit the letter to President Diem at once.
[Here follows the text of the letter from President Kennedy to President Diem, which Nolting delivered to Diem on August 6, Document 114.]
An essential part of Ambassador Nolting's presentation of the President's letter should refer to planning. In order to derive long-range benefits from our joint efforts to win in the present emergency, Viet-Nam needs long-range planning. To develop and carry out a long-range plan, Viet-Nam needs its own planners and the help of experts from outside. In the context of a long-range plan and considering the limitations that the agreed criteria place upon imports, the capital goods component of the commodity aid program can be expanded. It should be made clear that long-range planning and the increase in capacity to absorb capital goods will facilitate the flow of American development assistance. In focusing on such a Plan as an urgent item of current business, the nation can be inspired and consolidated. The U.S. is willing to help the long-range development effort with men and resources, and without diminishing in any way the U.S. support for the present counter-insurgency effort. We hope that one consequence of our new joint efforts will be an effective projection to the nation, its friends and its enemies, of our confidence in a long-range future for an independent Viet-Nam. In this connection, the Ambassador should seek discreetly to impress upon President Diem that he should use the total U.S. program for the greatest political effect in his achievement of maximum appreciation of his government by the people of Viet-Nam and the people of the world. (It is hoped that the Ambassador will continue his efforts to persuade President Diem to engage more fully in his civic action program non-Communist elements now in political opposition.) This is, of course, part of a continuing effort that must be made with President Diem and his government generally.
Ambassador Nolting should make clear in his presentation that, if this is to be a truly joint effective effort, action by each country must be related to that by the other. In particular we attach great importance to the reasonable implementation of the agreed criteria governing imports; we also consider the raising of the effective piaster rate applicable to U.S. commodity aid, to which it is understood President Diem has already agreed, an indispensable part of our effort. Action by the GVN on both of these matters will be very closely related to the U.S. contribution to the overall effort. The Ambassador may assure President Diem that increased piaster realization per dollar's worth of imports will not be used as a reason for reducing the American share of our joint efforts.
President Diem and his government need to be reminded of adverse criticism that our Viet-Nam program has experienced in the Congress and in the American press generally favorable to his cause, and to be discreetly warned that the program cannot profit from further attack. In the avoidance of such attack, the GVN itself plays the essential role.
Ball
114. Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem/1/
Washington, August 5, 1961.
/1/Source Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files; FRC 66 A 878, 350 GVN-TF-SFG. Attached to the source text is a copy of the letter of transmittal, dated August 6, from Nolting to Diem.
Dear Mr. President: Dr. Eugene Staley has told me personally of the mission which he and his special financial group undertook to Viet-Nam at my request. He has told me of the courteous and understanding welcome he received from you and from the members of your government, and has described to me the progress you have already made despite the great difficulties of Communist subversion which you face. I was pleased to hear of the cooperative and friendly spirit which animated the meetings of the Vietnamese and American experts. It is particularly encouraging to me that this spirit of cooperation, which was embodied in the joint undertakings of the counter-insurgency plan and which was so evident during the visit of Vice President Johnson, will now be carried on through the very practical medium of parallel Vietnamese and American committees.
I have examined the joint action program which the Vietnamese and American experts propose/2/ and I heartily agree with the three basic tenets on which their recommendations are based, namely:
/2/See Document 93.
1. Security requirements must, for the present, be given first priority.
2. Military operations will not achieve lasting results unless economic and social programs are continued and accelerated.
3. It is in our joint interest to accelerate measures to achieve a self-sustaining economy and a free and peaceful society in Viet-Nam.
I also agree that we are more likely to succeed if both of our countries take adequate action now than if we react to the Communist threat by slow and insufficient measures.
I consider that the joint action program put before us by our expert groups offers a sound foundation on which our two governments can build rapidly and successfully. Therefore, having in mind your letter of June 9/3/ and the strong recommendation of Ambassador Nolting, I should like to inform you that the United States will provide equipment and assistance in training as needed for an increase in the armed forces of Viet-Nam from 170,000 to 200,000 men. In order to make such an increase as effective as possible I suggest that before the time when the level of 170,000 is reached our governments should satisfy themselves on the following points: (1) That there then exists a mutually agreed upon, geographically phased strategic plan for bringing Viet-Cong subversion in the Republic of Viet-Nam under control; (2) That on the basis of such a plan there exists an understanding on the training and use of these 30,000 additional men; (3) That the rate of increase from 170,000 to 200,000 will be regulated to permit the most efficient absorption and utilization of additional personnel and material in the Vietnamese armed forces with due regard to Viet-Nam's resources.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 69.
I also suggest, in view of the fact that the force level of 200,000 will probably not be reached until late in 1962, that decision regarding a further increase above 200,000 be postponed until next year when the question can be re-examined on the basis of the situation which we shall then be facing. Meanwhile, the buildup in equipment and training of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps within already agreed levels should be expedited.
Returning to the joint action program, I am most encouraged to learn of the large measure of agreement reached by our expert groups on the steps required to meet the piaster financing problems posed by the joint action program. It seems to me that in the light of these recommendations we can move forward simultaneously on measures to solve this problem by a combination of actions by the two governments: by the Government of the United States, within the limits of available funds, to provide the external resources which are required, including commodity imports which can be justified and absorbed under the seven criteria of the joint action program; and by the Government of Viet-Nam, to generate the piasters to direct the resources of Viet-Nam to the highest priority requirements. The several means to acquire such piasters are spelled out in the joint action program. I hope that our parallel committees can immediately cooperate in working out target estimates for an import program which will give both our governments a basis for planning.
The early implementation of the joint recommendation of the expert groups regarding tax reform and the principle of a single and realistic rate of exchange, using methods which take into account the political and psychological factors which I know you have to weigh, will certainly increase the effectiveness of American aid to Viet-Nam. I hope this recommendation can be implemented soon. Within the limits of funds to be made available by the Congress and within the agreed criteria, my policy shall be to help you as much as possible to achieve a break-through in your efforts to bring security to your people and to build toward economic independence.
Turning to the experts' joint recommendations for emergency social action and to the direct aid programs already under way, I am asking Mr. Labouisse, Director of International Cooperation, to conduct through USOM Viet-Nam a thorough and expeditious review with your experts of the new proposals and of other programs which these proposals were intended to supplement. Among these I mention as of special interest the fields of communications, including television and radio; agrovilles, land development, agricultural credit and agricultural extension; extended assistance to road building; continued efforts to expand education, particularly primary and elementary education in the villages; training for rural administration; and plans to assure more and better equipped and trained officials, adequately compensated, especially in rural areas and in the villages. Our basic premise is that these programs be designed with your government to meet your needs and conditions, and that they be carried out by your people, with our assistance where required. I especially wish USOM to offer whatever help you think will be most effective to strengthen the vital ties of loyalty between the people of Free Viet-Nam and their government.
As an integral part of our efforts to meet the current crises, I believe it is essential that we continue and expand the progress which has already been made toward the long range development of Viet-Nam. The emergency measures which we undertake should be solidly anchored-as soon as possible-in a comprehensive long range planning process to determine the best uses which can be made of available resources on a time-phased basis. Only in this way can we adequately meet the long and short term requirements which interact in the problems which our two countries must solve together. This will require the creation of more effective planning machinery as recommended in the joint report of our experts. In addition to development of a long range plan, the training of staff to carry on planning activities (covering such matters as the use of medical manpower and teachers for which Viet-Nam has competing civilian-military requirements) might be expedited. I urge that our parallel committees develop specific projects in line with the general recommendations of the report.
In the face of competing and urgent demands for aid and assistance from countries throughout the world we shall make our contribution to the future of Viet-Nam. Our support of Viet-Nam's independence and development will, as I have assured you in the past, remain among the highest priorities of American foreign policy. As indicated above, we are prepared to commit, within the limits of our available aid funds, substantial resources to assist you in carrying out the military and economic and social components of the special action program. In order to speed the action during this emergency period and to permit greater flexibility I should like to emphasize that the chief responsibility for the planning and execution of the American share of the program will, more than ever, rest with Ambassador Nolting and, under his direction, with MAAG and USOM. In this connection I hope that, with the delegation of maximum authority to the parallel committees as recommended by our experts, the committees will assure follow-up action, approve modifications of the program and "recommend measures to improve and adapt the special action program as the situation changes."
In conclusion I believe that we have now agreed on sound ways to strengthen the Vietnamese economy and Vietnamese security in the face of the mounting Communist threat. Now we can proceed to develop additional concrete plans and carry them out rapidly and effectively.
I firmly believe that if our countries continue to work so effectively together, the Almighty will grant us the strength and the will to succeed.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
115. Memorandum of a Conversation, Quai d'Orsay/1/
US/MC/9
Paris, August 7, 1961, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, August 1961. Secret. Drafted by Usher on August 7, edited and approved by Steeves, and approved in S on August 8. This discussion took place during the Ministerial Consultations on Berlin, August 4-9.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Gavin
Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Steeves
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. UsherUnited Kingdom
Lord Home
Mr. Malcolm MacDonald
Mr. Edward Peck
Mr. Michael Butler
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. J. W. RussellFrance
M. Couve de Murville
M. Jacques Roux
M. Charles Lucet
M. M. Richer
Ambassador Falaize
Mr. BaraducSUBJECT
Viet-NamCouve de Murville asked the Secretary whether he wished to say something on Viet-Nam.
The Secretary said he would be glad to do so and that he would appreciate any comments which his British and French colleagues would like to make.
He said we have been working with Diem in bringing about improvements in the economic and military field. We have been working in conformity with the counter-insurgency plan and on economic plans which might help to bring the situation in Viet Nam under control.
Vietnamese military forces have had some successes with their counter-insurgency tactics. We are also prepared to put in larger resources to strengthen the civil situation. All of these efforts encounter the problem of intimidation by the communist insurgency throughout the country. One of our great concerns is the flow of fresh elements from North Viet-Nam through Laos.
The Secretary said we plan to make a very substantial investment of effort in South Viet-Nam. There are advantages in Viet Nam as compared with Laos-a better army with a will to fight, a better economy and in fact a situation in general far in advance of conditions in Laos.
Couve said that the United States is doing the maximum amount to help the Vietnamese. On the military side, he understood that the Secretary thought the situation not too bad. The Secretary interposed that he thought it was not too bad and not too good. Couve went on to say that the real problem is always the same, namely, the domestic political problem. He said the difficulty is to change the present government, which is a strong government, into a popular government. He thought we had all more or less failed in our efforts.
Couve went on to say Diem and the people around him are from the central part of Viet-Nam around Hue, and that it has been impossible up to now to give more positions in the government to the Cochin-Chinese. Couve said he had talked to Sihanouk about this, and that Sihanouk had said he thought this was the heart of the problem. The elite of the Cochin-Chinese south has the feeling that it is excluded from the government and is therefore in the opposition.
Lord Home said the British think the situation in Viet-Nam has gotten a little worse./2/ He said that the British have made arrangements to send Colonel Thompson to Viet Nam with rather a small mission. There is nothing that Thompson doesn't know about counter-insurgency methods, and he should be able to be of help. Lord Home said that he didn't know how the government could be made more popular.
/2/According to a memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Lord Home on August 6, Home implied that British reports indicated that many considered Diem "hopeless." Rusk replied that Diem was improving but that he feared "it would be a long drawn-out matter." Rusk expressed his hope that the countries in the area-Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and others-could form a regional organization which countries like India could support, thus permitting the demise of SEATO. (Ibid.)
Lord Home remarked that the problem is Diem, who continues to exhibit his well-known defects, but there is no alternative but to try to help him improve.
The Secretary thanked Couve for his observations about the Cochin-Chinese, and said he thought we might do something about trying to get more of them into the government. He said it might be helpful if the French could give us some suggestions regarding able Cochin-Chinese who might be brought into the government. Couve agreed to do this./3/
/3/No paper from the French Government along these lines has been found.
116. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, August 8, 1961, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/8-861. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, CINCPAC for PolAd, Paris, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Phnom Penh.
192. Department telegram 140./2/ Task force Saigon greatly encouraged by President's letter contained reftel. Letter, with minor changes as per Deptel 146,/3/ was delivered to Thuan for President Diem early August 7, followed by hour and one-half discussion with Pres Diem and Thuan after letter had been studied. Following is report of that conversation:
/2/ Document 113.
/3/Dated August 5. (Department of State, Central Files 751 K.5-MSP/8-561)
I greeted President Diem with remark that I hoped he was as pleased by the tone and content of President Kennedy's letter as were the members of our task force here in Saigon, as it appeared to us to represent another major landmark in US resolve to help his country. To my surprise and annoyance, he responded that he had found in it no "figures about the amount of US aid". I said that we would get to that later, but first I would like with his permission to underline certain points in connection with the President's message. We then proceeded to review the letter and in the course of discussion, I made the following points:
(A) In adopting the major recommendations of the joint Vietnamese-American experts' report, the United States had not only re-enforced its already large commitment to Vietnam but had also adopted a new "break-through" philosophy of action which we are prepared to follow up to the extent that the necessary decisions and actions by the GVN make possible. I said that in my opinion progress already made by cooperative action had been remarkable The Tempo and efficiency of programs in many fields in order to put the Viet Cong definitely on the defensive military politically and psychologically [sic]. We shared President Diem's feelings that it is not enough to win a few battles and score successes here and there, but that we had to systematize our joint efforts and mount an increasing, broad, systematic offensive in all fields.
(B) In this connection we attached particular importance to President Kennedy's point (1) in connection with the increase of GVN armed forces by 30,000. I said that we were gratified by the recent successes of the Vietnamese forces, but there still seemed to be lacking an over-all strategic plan to be carried out by phases in predetermined geographic areas, to liberate those areas and to secure permanently their pacification and allegiance to the government. I said that Gen. McGarr had been working on this constantly, and only recently I had seen another memorandum/4/ which he had sent to the President urging the development and adoption of such a plan. I realized the extreme sensitivity of such a plan, but we wished to be assured that one existed or would exist just as soon as possible.
/4/Not further identified.
(C) With regard to the financing of the joint action program, it was clear that a part of the additional costs would be in piasters, which only the GVN could produce. The seven criteria developed by the joint experts group as guidelines to regulate the type and volume of US commercial imports/5/ were designed, not to conserve US aid dollars, but to protect the Vietnamese economy and to assure a program of US aid which could be justified before our Congress and people as contributing to the kind of economic and social development of Vietnam which we both desire. At the beginning of our conversation, President Diem had inquired about an aid figure. I thought frankly that we could best arrive at a constructive solution if we approached the matter from a different point of view. I asked the President to accept my assurance that we would be willing, within the limits of appropriated funds and the agreed criteria, to set high targets for the importation of US commercial aid goods. We would then see what amount could in fact be absorbed within the agreed criteria. Thuan interjected that he hoped we would not be rigid in determining the type of goods which could be imported under the criteria, and said that GVN's long-range planning could not go forward without assurances for the future. I replied that we expected the criteria to be maintained, but that I saw no reason why we could not agree on the types of goods to be imported. A part of the problem is obviously the number of piasters generated by each dollar's worth of imports. My government hoped and expected that a definite decision would be taken promptly by the GVN to increase substantially the piaster yield. This is necessary if the joint program is to be accomplished.
/5/See Document 93.
(D) There followed a discussion of the need promptly to organize parallel committees for planning and implementation. I reminded Diem that the first time we had had a conversation together, at Dalat several months ago,/6/ he had mentioned the desirability of developing an over-all plan. I said we warmly welcomed this idea, and the experts' report stressed the need of committees to plan systematically, establish priorities, and follow through on implementation. As President Kennedy's letter had said, the US was prepared, in this special crisis situation in Viet Nam, to give maximum flexibility to its representatives in Viet Nam; by the same token, it was necessary to the Vietnamese Govt to set itself up in a manner which would delegate authority and make possible close and rapid coordination of effort.
/6/Not further identified.
Again reverting to the piaster question, I said that it would be necessary promptly to establish a higher piaster yield on dollar imports, on the understanding that the US would not use increased piaster yield as a reason for diminishing its own contribution. The whole purpose was to increase our joint effort. To arrive at definite results, it was necessary promptly to sit down in a committee and to reach definite decisions. At this point I had the opportunity to emphasize the value of long-range economic planning and programs which could stimulate the sale of US imports in the private sector. Diem, catching the point, said he thought that certain of this [his?] road building projects, as well as city development projects might be done through private Vietnamese-Chinese enterprise, which would expand the market for US imports and generate piasters.
(E) Turning to action in the political and psychological fields, I said my govt felt that the new decisions embodied in President Kennedy's letter were sufficiently great and far-reaching to warrant their use by Pres Diem in a major campaign to inspire the nation and to build broader and more solid political support for his regime. I mentioned the fact that in the US and in the world press generally, while sympathetic understanding of Viet Nam and its govt had increased, there was still room for improvement and that President Diem himself could contribute greatly to this. I said that certain members of our congress think that more can and should be done in the direction of social and political consolidation and progress, and that we wished to establish an aid program on a solid basis of congressional support which would assure its continuance. Thuan picked up this point and suggested that a joint communiqué should be issued. He said he thought this might be the occasion for a "psychological shock" campaign, to rally the country. I said I felt that President Diem should seriously consider launching a drive to gain Vietnamese public confidence in its govt, using the adoption of the experts' report, plus perhaps speeches by radio in which Pres Diem could make an appeal for national unity and offer opportunity within the new program to Vietnamese who had for one reason or another stood aside from govt activity. I suggested that Thuan and I might come up with some ideas for the Pres on this, and he seemed to agree, but added that he might use the occasion again to explain the need for self-sacrifice under the doctrine of "personalism".
While Diem did not commit himself to anything specific during this conversation, he warmed up considerably to the opportunities offered by Pres Kennedy's letter. Certainly the discussion ended more hopefully than it began, although I tried unsuccessfully to pin him down on fiscal reform. His attitude did not seem unappreciative or evasive; but he has a habit of thinking in terms of a series of immediate things to be done, to get wound up in details, and to neglect to develop a broad pattern of systematic action. I returned to the question of systematic planning by committee on several occasions, and while he gave a generally favorable response, it was clear that he was worried by the feeling that any such delegation of responsibility might take out of his hands the detailed planning and direction for which he has such an appetite. Nevertheless, I think we have made some real headway. It was agreed that Thuan and I should get together promptly to sort out matters and determine where we go from here. At Thuan's suggestion, we agreed that the first thing to be considered would be a possible communiqué (or some other method of "choc psychologique"), to be followed promptly by a designation of parallel committees for planning and implementation.
Before departing, I asked Diem whether there was any special word he wanted me to get back to Pres Kennedy. He said please to express his sincere appreciation for the message, to which he would like to give further study and thought. To my suggestion that we should immediately proceed to organize committees for planning, to estimate costs, and to solve the financial problems, he agreed and left it to Thuan and me to pursue. We shall do so and report further.
Nolting
117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, August 8, 1961, 10:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8 861. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cottrell, cleared with S/S, initialed by U. Alexis Johnson for the Acting Secretary, and repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.
160. Task Force VN. High level interest exists in answers to following questions. Task Force Washington has partial answers given in various past Saigon messages but would appreciate your current answers by August 14.
1. What is your assessment of the likely scale and character of the Viet Cong effort over coming months?
2. When are the Vietnamese likely to produce a plan for the systematic elimination of the Viet Cong; and what ideas does Task Force Saigon have about what such a systematic plan should look like?
3. What are the possibilities of further action by Diem's forces against North Viet-Nam: (1) by air drops? (2) by coastal raids? What would be Diem's attitude to an enlarged program supported by U.S.?
4. Is the counter-guerrilla training adequate which is being conducted? Do we have the necessary U.S. Special Forces personnel on the job?
5. What would be the effect upon Viet-Nam troop requirements if Diem were encouraged to push out into Laos in order to control infiltration routes? Would Diem be willing to join in a cooperative action with Laos and Thailand to clean up the panhandle of Laos? What is your assessment in Saigon of the likelihood that Sarit and Phoumi would cooperate in such an effort?
Ball
118. Editorial Note
On August 11, 1961, McGeorge Bundy transmitted a memorandum to Secretary Rusk which constituted National Security Action Memorandum No. 65 setting forth the President's decisions following review of the Joint Action Program submitted on July 14 (see Document 93). For text of NSAM No. 65, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pages 241-244.
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