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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

201. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, October 31, 1961, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-3161. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Manila for General Taylor, Bangkok, Geneva for FECON, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, London, Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, and Hue.

575. Task Force VN. Our conversations over past ten days with Vietnamese in various walks of life show virtually unanimous desire for introduction US forces into Viet-Nam. This based on unsolicited remarks from Cabinet Ministers, National Assembly Deputies, university professors, students, shopkeepers, and oppositionists. Dr. Tran Dinh De, level-headed Minister of Health, told Embassy officer Oct 29 that while GVN could continue resist Communists for while longer if US troops not introduced, it could not win alone against Commies. National Assembly members, according to . . . unanimously in favor entry US forces. Diem told us while Gen Taylor was here that he had consulted National Assembly committee on this question and had received favorable response. Even an oppositionist like ex-Foreign Minister Tran Van Do has told us US forces are needed and is apparently so strongly convinced of this that he did not suggest any condition precedent about political changes by Diem. AmConsul Hue reports that opinion among intellectuals and government officials in that city is also almost unanimously in favor of introduction of American combat troops. MAAG believes on basis private conversations and general attitude Vietnamese military personnel toward US that Vietnamese armed forces would likewise welcome introduction US forces.

General Vietnamese desire for introduction US forces arises from serious morale decline among populace during recent weeks because of deterioration in security and horrible death through torture and mutilation to which Col Nam subjected. Expanded VC infiltration has brought fully home to Vietnamese that fact that US has not intervened militarily in Laos to come to rescue of anti-Communists. Now that they see Viet-Nam approaching its own crucial period, paramount question in their minds is whether US will give armed support to anti-Communist GVN or whether it will back down when chips are down. Vietnamese thus want US forces introduced in order to demonstrate US determination to stick it out with them against Communists. They do not want to be victims of political settlement with Communists. This is especially true of those publicly identified as anti-Communist like Dean Vu Quoc Thuc who collaborated with Dr. Eugene Staley on joint experts report./2/

/2/See Document 93.

Most Vietnamese whose thoughts on this subject have been developed are not thinking in terms of US troops to fight guerrillas but rather of a reassuring presence of US forces in Viet-Nam. These persons undoubtedly feel, however that if war in Viet-Nam continues to move toward overt conventional aggression as opposed to its guerrilla character, combat role for US troops could eventually arise.

Nolting

 

202. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 31, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow, Smith, Ewell, and Parrott.

SUBJECT
Planning for Viet Nam

I have prepared this memorandum to give you the current picture of Washington planning relating to Viet Nam and to deal more specifically with the matters General Taylor mentioned in his 626 from Bangkok./2/

/2/Document 197.

I. The State of Washington Planning

Military Planning

As part of the preparation for General Taylor's trip a series of papers were prepared in Defense/3/ briefly discussing twenty different military measures, short of the introduction of large U.S. combat troop units, that might be undertaken in Viet Nam. At the same time that General Taylor left, the Joint Staff began its own analysis of these twenty proposals. The results of the Joint Staff's work were to be submitted to the JCS on Monday./4/ Some of this work has a bearing on certain of General Taylor's recommendations. In particular, as indicated below, the question of lift, including helicopters, has been caught up in this study.

/3/Document 168.

/4/Apparently a reference to October 30.

Turning now to General Taylor's recommendations, much of the staff work involved is being done in the field. General Taylor's message No. 625 from Bangkok/5/ outlined the work that was to be done by him and by the Country Team in South Viet Nam. Apart from the Joint Staff exercise already mentioned Washington planning has concentrated primarily on General Taylor's principal proposal-a military flood relief task force. The Pentagon is engaged in a review of a troop list for such an operation prepared by the MAAG in Viet Nam. It generally agrees with the MAAG's proposals which envisage engineering construction units (including road-building units), a hospital task force, two helicopter companies, small boat units, etc. It has also examined such questions as the problem of the Geneva Accords and the need for a status of forces agreement.

/5/Printed as telegram 146, Document 196.

There are two interrelated questions that seem to be causing some considerable difficulty to Washington agencies in thinking about General Taylor's concept:

a. General Taylor has stated that combat troops would be included in the task force for protection of relief operations. He also envisages that the flood relief task force would constitute a military reserve in the event of a heightened crisis. He has stated in addition however, that the flood relief task force concept is not intended as a cover for introduction of combat troops. Many in Washington are convinced that the longer the forces remained in Viet Nam, the more they would come under attack and the more they would become involved in combat. If we do not intend to be forced out of SEA altogether, there is real doubt as to whether. once we committed forces, we could withdraw them until reasonable security had been restored in Viet Nam.

b. There is some question as to whether General Taylor intends that the task force will remain in Viet Nam only long enough to do the immediate relief and rehabilitation job or whether it will stay on to engage in reconstruction activities. There is some evidence that suggests that General Taylor's intention is the latter for he refers in various messages to their staying for "an extended period" and for "a matter at least of months".

This question is related to the one above for, as has been stated the longer the troops remain, the more they are likely to become involved in combat operations. This uncertainty also poses problems for the AID aspects of such a relief program. The estimates from the USOM that are still awaited will apparently cover only immediate relief and rehabilitation needs and will not cover reconstruction requirements.

Political Planning

A political and diplomatic plan developed by Ben Wood, the Deputy Task Force Director, for Alexis Johnson has attempted to solve these two problems by approaching the operation on a two stage basis./6/ Wood's paper suggests that, for the immediate purpose of dealing with the flood, a U.S. force of 1500 made up of two helicopter companies, a 500-man Navy landing craft unit and a 500man logistic support unit be sent to Viet Nam. These units would be entirely for flood relief operations, would have no combat-unit support, would be prepared to defend themselves, but would move out of an area if attacked. We would justify their introduction entirely on the basis of relief needs. We would temporarily hold back the Jorden report on North Viet Nam's activities in South Viet Nam since it would not be relevant to the justification of this operation. We would also argue that as a relief operation, our activities did not constitute a breach of the Geneva Accords.

/6/Document 195.

The paper argues that the introduction of a large force-say 10,000-would require a prior decision that we were prepared if necessary to go on to a much larger, presumably SEATO, operation. The paper proposes that the President send a letter to Diem in which he would say that the commitment of U.S. troops to security operations would be conditional upon GVN performance on a whole series of measures on which we have been long attempting to obtain action.

This approach is designed in part to solve some of the timing dilemmas by which we are now faced. It would simplify the problem for the Nehru visit by temporarily by-passing the Geneva Accords question and would permit immediate action to deal with the flood while giving more time to consider the tougher questions involved in sending larger military units. By sorting out the two elements involved in General Taylor's proposal, it does tend to weaken one of the principal advantages of that proposal. General Taylor's recommendation would permit creation of a base for a subsequent direct U.S. military contribution to the handling of the security problem while temporarily avoiding some of the political disadvantages of intervention and giving us at least some continuing freedom of action on commitment to combat operations.

I do agree, however, that in making a decision on the Taylor proposal we need to face and to decide in principle the question of whether we are prepared, if necessary, to step up very considerably our military commitment in Viet Nam. If we commit 6-8000 troops and then pull them out when the going got rough we will be finished in Viet Nam and probably in all of Southeast Asia.

Economic Planning and Financing

A final area to which some thought has been given is the financing of a relief and rehabilitation operation. I attended a meeting in State on Monday on this subject./7/ Some action was taken a week or more ago to provide immediate rice supplies, to offer additional such supplies and to provide medicine. Washington, however, is still waiting for the Country Team's long-promised list of other requirements. The list should be received within the next few days; as a result of my suggestion a message will be sent to Saigon to ensure that we have at least some preliminary estimates by the end of the week so that something will be available when General Taylor's recommendations are considered.

/7/No other record of this meeting has been found.

Since the Country Team estimates are expected to cover only relief and rehabilitation, it is believed that they will present no serious funding problems. A reconstruction program could be much more expensive and would probably pose real problems, including the possible necessity for some kind of supplemental aid appropriation. The recommendation to the President will probably take the form of a proposal that he simply decide in principle that this is a priority operation and that necessary funds will be provided to finance it.

I have been assured by both State and Defense and they are keeping informed of each other's planning. I also raised at the meeting Monday the question of whether we could be sure that USOM's planning of flood relief requirements would be carefully related to the composition of the military task force that the MAAG had proposed; if we were going to send highway engineers we would, for example, need also to provide for road and bridge repair materials. Although there was some indication that some others present considered this a potential problem, the general view seemed to be that we must assume that the different parts of the Country Team would coordinate their work.

II. General Taylor's Recommendations for Immediate Action

The first of General Taylor's recommendations for immediate action in his message of last Friday/8/ was for a survey of the flood problem, perhaps by a team of experts from the U.S. As I have told you, before this message was received State had prepared a message suggesting that George Tanham head a MAAG-USOM group to make this study. That proposal was killed on Saturday by Alexis Johnson. Instead a more general message asking Saigon whether they needed any help on this problem was apparently sent. The answer, we are told, was that no help was required; that the Country Team could do the job./9/ However, these messages are not available outside of the State Department and it was not clear whether they referred specifically to General Taylor's proposal. At the meeting on Monday morning I was assured by State and Defense representatives that the MAAG and USOM did indeed have all the experts required. However, with some difficulty I did obtain the apparent agreement of State people on Monday afternoon that they would send a message to Saigon which would refer specifically to General Taylor's proposal and request embassy views.

/8/Apparently a reference to Document 196.

/9/The messages under reference are telegram 509 to Saigon, October 28, and telegram 563 from Saigon, October 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2861 and 751K.00/10-2961)

The situation with respect to the 64 helicopters is rather complex. As indicated earlier, the entire question of requirements for short-take-off-and-landing (STOL) aircraft and helicopters is being studied by the Joint Staff as a single problem. An estimate of two companies (44 helicopters), furnished earlier by CINCPAC, is included in this study. These 44 helicopters were intended solely for the purpose of providing greater mobility to the Vietnamese army. General Taylor's concept envisaged use of helicopters for flood relief purposes as well. It is not clear to DoD how the new MAAG estimate of 64 helicopters to which General Taylor referred in his Friday message is related to the previous requirement for 44. Since there are already nineteen helicopters in Viet Nam, it was considered possible that no further addition was intended. At the other extreme, the entire 64 might be intended as a separate flood relief requirement. At my urging the Pentagon has agreed to send a message to MAAG seeking clarification.

Supplying these helicopters is going to require a Presidential decision for at least two reasons: (a) it will involve a judgment that the risks involved in taking them from other units in the continental U.S. or in the Pacific are acceptable; and (b) if they are to be used in support of GVN army operations, a clear-cut violation of the Geneva Accords will be involved. DoD apparently has decided in principle that the 44 can be provided, but the Services and overseas commands are going to scream when helicopters are taken away from them. I have urged that a decision be sought to get the helicopters earmarked and pre-positioned. I will pursue this aspect of the matter further today.

As the above indicates, it is very difficult for Washington to get into the act very effectively until it has been exposed in much more detail to General Taylor's thinking. He has promised specific recommendations on November 1.

If you have an opportunity at the Planning Lunch today/10/ you might wish to pursue the following questions with Alexis Johnson: (a) The need for help from outside the MAAG and USOM in surveying the flood problem and actions to deal with it; (b) Whether the President must not address himself to the broader question of how far we intend to go in providing military support to Viet Nam when he considers the Taylor recommendation for a flood relief task force; and (c) How we deal with Nehru on the question of the Geneva Accords. I just don't see how we can by-pass this last problem if we intend to accept the Taylor recommendations as we now understand them. (No reference should be made to the Wood paper. The copy I have is a bootleg copy and is still being considered by A. Johnson.)

/10/No record of the Planning Group luncheon meeting on October 31 was found.

RHJ

 

203. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/

CM-414-61

Washington, October 31, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam 092 Jan.-Oct. 1961. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Support for Vietnam

1. Reference is made to CINCPAC message, DTG 180444Z October 1961,/2/ wherein Admiral Felt recommended several U.S. military actions that should be taken at once in Vietnam short of introducing combat troops. Of the four air support actions (photo reconnaissance, T-28 augmentation, Jungle Jim, and helicopter support), implementing measures have been initiated except for the deployment of two U.S. Army Helicopter Companies.

/2/Dated October 18. (Ibid., RG 319, HQDA Message Center Microfilm, Reel 10584)

2. In view of the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, a general increase in mobility capabilities is an urgent requirement. As an immediate measure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the deployment of two U.S. Army Helicopter Companies with maintenance detachments should be accomplished without delay. Specifically, two companies of H-21 type helicopters were approved in conference with Admiral Felt on 27 October./3/ With timely authorization for this action, the units could be transported by the U.S. carrier now expected to depart from the West Coast about 15 November with the T-28 aircraft augmentation for Vietnam.

/3/No record was found of this conference.

3. U.S. Army personnel for these units would total 412, with 40 H-21 and 4 H-13 helicopters. Preferably, these units should operate as U.S. military units, with U.S. aircraft markings and the personnel in military uniforms. Operations would be conducted as directed by the Chief, MAAG, Vietnam.

4. In view of a favorable reaction by Mr. U. Alexis Johnson in discussing this proposal with Admiral Felt on 26 October,/4/ a draft implementing message has been made available to your office and Mr. Johnson's office./5/

/4/No record was found of this discussion.

/5/Attached to the source text, but not printed.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend urgent consideration and approval for deployment of the two helicopter companies so that the movement to Vietnam can be accomplished by the carrier departing about 15 November 1961./6/

/6/In a memorandum of October 31 to Lemnitzer, Brigadier General George S. Brown, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, wrote that McNamara had suggested that "maximum advantage be taken of the time between now and a decision on this and other actions incident to Vietnam, following General Taylor's report to the President" and that such advantage should be gained "through initiation of all actions possible on the assumption that the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be approved." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam 092 Jan.-Oct. 1961)

L.L. Lemnitzer/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

 

204. Telegram From the United States Delegation at Hakone to the Department of State/1/

Hakone, November 1, 1961, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-161. Secret; Limit Distribution. Another copy of the telegram indicates that Rusk was the sole drafter. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1984) Printed also in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. II, p. 105. The Secretary was in Hakone, along with other Cabinet members, to take part in the first meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, November 2-4.

Secto 6. Since General Taylor may give first full report prior my return, believe special attention should be given to critical question whether Diem is prepared take necessary measures to give us something worth supporting. If Diem unwilling trust military commanders to get job done and take steps to consolidate non-Communist elements into serious national effort, difficult to see how relative handful American troops can have decisive influence. While attaching greatest possible importance to security in Southeast Asia, I would be reluctant see US make major additional commitment American prestige to a losing horse. Suggest Department carefully review all measures we expect from Diem if our assistance forces us to assume de facto direction Vietnamese affairs./2/

/2/The following draft handwritten reply is written at the bottom of the source text: "Dept will make suggested review as precondition committing US troops to Vietnam. CBW UAJ."

 

205. Editorial Note

In telegrams 5 and 6 from Baguio, November 1, 1961, Taylor presented to the President a summary of the conclusions of his mission and his reasons for recommending the introduction of a United States military force of approximately 8,000 into South Vietnam. These telegrams are printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pages 331-342.

 

206. Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Honolulu, November 2, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-015-69. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were also sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Pacific commands. The Taylor Mission stopped briefly at CINCPAC headquarters on November 2 en route to Washington.

1. This is in response to your questions concerning interdiction of North Vietnam capabilities for aggression./2/

/2/See Document 170.

2. An intelligence appreciation is contained in enclosure (1)./3/ From this kind of appreciation we derive our target criteria and lists which are worked out in detail for use by strike forces.

/3/This 15-page untitled and undated paper is not printed.

3. Strike operations which we have in mind can be graduated dependent on the politico/military objectives which are determined for us. We pay particular attention to DRV military forces, their operational bases, support and control installations and lines of communications. We are prepared also to take out selected industrial-economic targets. We have selected areas for mining so as to shut off the sea approaches to Haiphong and the mouth of the Red River. Target lists are comprehensive, thus permitting specific objectives for several modes of attack.

4. Here are some of the possibilities for which we are prepared:

a. Air

(1) Conduct air reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam.

(2) Conduct fighter sweeps along roads and railroads in North Vietnam to destroy military supplies destined to support Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam.

(3) Harass DRV communist aircraft supplying communist insurgent forces in Vietnam by U.S. fighter aircraft.

(4) Destroy DRV communist aircraft flying supplies to Viet Cong insurgents.

(5) Attack singly but progressively key military targets in North Vietnam.

(6) Drop raiding parties for sabotage, and to disrupt LOC's.

(7) Conduct aerial mine laying operations.

b. Sea

(1) Mine approaches to Haiphong.

(2) Sink large ship in Haiphong Channel.

(3) Blockade DRV shipping and fishing vessels. Degree and areas of blockade to progress from less severe to more severe.

(4) Destroy DRV military naval craft which oppose U.S. maritime action.

(5) Conduct small amphibious raids.

(6) Conduct naval gunfire on key coastal targets.

(7) Conduct underwater demolition team raids (UDT) from surface ships or submarines for beach reconnaissance and beach attacks along the coast of North Vietnam.

c. Land

(1) Introduce raiding parties into North Vietnam overland by infiltration by sea or air drop. Missions to include:

(a) Raids to destroy command posts, bridges, facilities, etc.

(b) Ambushes to harass and/or destroy vehicles, patrols, and supply columns.

Resp'y

H.D. Felt

 

207. Memorandum From Senator Mansfield to the President/1/

Washington, November 2, 1961.

/1/Source: University of Montana, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 103, Folder 16. Confidential.

SUBJECT
The Vietnamese and Southeast Asian Situation

In view of the fact that General Maxwell Taylor is due to report to you shortly and also because of the type of stories which are beginning to appear in the press and based on interviews, speculations, etc., I thought that with all respect, I should make my views known to you on this most important, delicate and dangerous situation. Hence, this memorandum.

The question of the possibility of sending American troops to Viet Nam has occurred a number of times in the past. First, in 1954, at the time of the battle of Dienbienphu, then last May, when the Vice President made his visit to Southeast Asia, and most recently, on the occasion of General Maxwell Taylor's visit to Viet Nam. In my opinion, this is a matter which should be approached with the greatest caution.

On several occasions we have made commitments to use our own troops, while the Russians have carefully avoided using theirs. The sending of American armed forces to Viet Nam may be the wrong way and probably would be, in present circumstances. In the first place, we would be engaged without the support of significant allies. Our troops would be engaged by third-string communist forces (North Vietnamese). Then, they could very well become engaged against the second-string-the Chinese Communists, who might be drawn into the fray and could out-match us and our Asian allies many times in manpower. If American combat units land in Viet Nam, it is conceivable that the Chinese Communists would do the same. With shorter lines of communication and transportation, with much more manpower available, South Viet Nam, on that basis, could become a quicksand for us. Where does an involvement of this kind end even if we can bring it to a successful conclusion? In the environs of Saigon? At the 17th parallel? At Hanoi? At Canton? At Peking? Any involvement on the mainland of Asia would seem to me to weaken our military capability in Berlin and Germany and, again, leave the Russians uncommitted.

It appears to me that the presence of American combat troops in South Viet Nam could be misinterpreted in the minds of millions of Southeast Asians and could well be considered as a revival of colonial force. Moreover, we must be extremely wary of any seemingly simple solution that would have Asian SEATO nations do the intervening at our behest to avoid this appearance. If we give them the go-ahead, then there is every likelihood that we shall have to follow militarily or if we do not, we will suffer disastrous repercussions throughout all of Asia and we will indeed become the laughing stock of the world.

While Viet Nam is very important, we cannot hope to substitute armed power for the kind of political and economic social changes that offer the best resistance to communism. If the necessary reforms have not been forthcoming over the past seven years to stop communist subversion and rebellion, then I do not see how American combat troops can do it today. I would wholeheartedly favor, if necessary and feasible, a substantial increase of American military and economic aid to Viet Nam, but leave the responsibility of carrying the physical burden of meeting communist infiltration, subversion, and attack on the shoulders of the South Vietnamese, whose country it is and whose future is their chief responsibility.

It seems to me that Ngo Dinh Diem has seen the situation in this light in the past. He had almost an obsession with getting the French military out of Viet Nam and I find it somewhat difficult to believe that he is now anxious for American combat forces as a base for his continuance in power. This point, it seems to me, should be clarified before we commit combat forces or even underwrite a commitment of Asian SEATO forces. And it should be clarified in direct conversations between you and President Diem, not through intermediaries who might, from talks with lesser officials, reach the erroneous conclusion that it is Diem's view that such forces should be sent.

Our problem now is little different than it was in World War II and the years after: to minimize our involvement, particularly military, on the Asian mainland not to maximize it. In this connection, I must say that the antagonism towards Cambodia is most incomprehensible. That is our point of minimum involvement and cost in Southeast Asia and with a tolerable situation instead of alienating that country we ought to be seeking to create through diplomacy comparable situations of minimum involvement and cost.

Within the framework of the problem of minimizing rather than maximizing our involvement, I am convinced that we can do far more than we have done, by a judicious diplomacy and more effective aid in Viet Nam. I would repeat the recommendations which I made in an earlier memorandum, dated September 20, 1961:/2/

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

(1) A Vietnamese foreign policy and propaganda program which hold out some hope of a unification of Viet Nam by means other than the sword;

(2) A vast, coordinated effort in the field of economic development which bears a Vietnamese hallmark and our name in small print no matter how much we may contribute to it

(3) A rapid introduction of democratic practices at the village and provincial level;

(4) A dramatic and sincere effort to enlist Vietnamese intellectuals in all aspects of the government's activities, primarily by the lifting of the shroud of fear which hangs over political life in Saigon and by acceptance of a genuine opposition in the National Assembly;

(5) A campaign by Diem and his officials to develop close personal ties with the people by a continuous Johnson-like shirtsleeve campaign from one end of the country to the other.

It is readily apparent that the changes listed above are preponderantly those which must be initiated and pursued by Diem and the Vietnamese government. The U.S. mission in Saigon, however, will be a most significant factor in the situation. The following suggestions may be useful in extracting from the mission its greatest possible contributions to the making of these changes:

(1) Appoint an Ambassador who is not a career-man but who is nevertheless knowledgeable in the affairs of the region. The post is one of high career risk and a scope of activity far broader than that normally associated with diplomatic relations. It is not the kind of job that can best be done by a regular foreign service officer or other careerist.

(2) Shake-up the entire U.S. establishment in Saigon and try to cut its size as rapidly as possible. It would be wise to bring fresh blood not only to the heads but to the bodies of the Embassy, the I.C.A., U.S.I.S., MAAG and the C.I.A. and get them out of Saigon and into the field.

(3) Establish a special unit in the State Department, responsible to you through the Secretary of State as the sole channel for the issuance of directives and the receipt of reports on Viet Nam for as long as the crisis continues. This would apply to directives and reports whether they involve the Embassy, MAAG, I.C.A., U.S.I.S. or whatever. This unit should be a planning and action body under your close control which supersedes the Far Eastern division of the Department insofar as Viet Nam is concerned. It should use that division rather than be used by it.

(4) In Saigon, the Ambassador should have full control over all activities of all agencies in fact as well as in theory. This means that he must be the sole channel for the receipt of directives and the dispatch of reports. Most of all, it means that he must have firm control over all contact with the Vietnamese government.

I would add, only, that in present circumstances, I would suggest the greatest reticence in the commitment of U.S. combat forces to Viet Nam or any commitment to underwrite, with our military forces as a last resort, a military action throughout Southeast Asia by Asian SEATO forces. In present circumstances, it seems to me we must exercise every caution to avoid another Korean-type involvement on the Asian mainland. Such an involvement would appear to me to play completely into the hands of the Soviet Union, since it will get them off their present Chinese ideological hook and open all sorts of new prospects in the really decisive area of Germany and Europe. An involvement on our part can lead to four possible adverse results:

(1) A fan-fare and then a retreat.
(2) An indecisive and costly conflict along the Korean lines.
(3) A major war with China while Russia stands aside.
(4) A total world conflict.

Against these four adverse possible consequences, there is the bare possibility of one salutary outcome. U.S. combat forces (not SEATO allied forces) might provide that bare margin of effectiveness which would permit a solution of the guerrilla problem in South Viet Nam or prevent further encroachments southward-assuming of course that the Chinese Communists, let alone the Russians, do not become involved. Even then, we will have achieved a "victory" whose fruits, if we would conserve them, will cost us billions of dollars in military and aid expenditures over the years into the future.

 

208. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/

Saigon, November 2, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated for information to General Decker. No time of transmission is given on the source text.

SGN 766. As views are expressed on military matters in recent cables as result of visit Taylor group, specifically Saigon Emtels to State 516, 540, 541, 545, 558,/2/ wish to give MAAG comments on certain points of military significance. This is considered desirable as except for conference reported Emtel 541, no MAAG personnel attended subject meetings and as MAAG received info copies only after dispatch referenced cables. However, I was given short preview of the 6 points in Emtel 540/3/ and commented on two of them. Although MAAG has no concern about reporting of statements by various GVN officials concerned, feel strongly MAAG opinions should have been solicited and included in the comment and resume sections of these cables as they, of necessity, precondition at high level decision and policy making levels. Also, although MAAG positions were restated by my staff and me during General Taylor's personal question period/4/ as well as in answers to lists of questions submitted by various teams of the Taylor group,/5/ they will be subject to overall evaluation and combination in the final report and may well not completely cover the questions highlighted in reference cables.

/2/Telegrams 516, 541, 545, and 558 are printed as Documents 178, 192, 193, and 199, respectively; regarding telegram 540, see footnote 2, Document 190.

/3/The six points under reference here are essentially the same as points A-F under Section 2, Document 190.

/4/Not further identified.

/5/Apparently a reference to Document 173.

As the Washington Task Force on Vietnam and the Taylor Fact-Finding Group are well briefed on the situation here, I shall only cover few major points. Most have been questioned over past year and MAAG within its capabilities has taken action. As background MAAG has for the past year predicated its actions on conviction that the insurgency, then in its next to last stage, could only be defeated by the following actions:

A. Development of national plan to counter insurgency.

B. Formation of a viable responsive centrally directed intelligence organization.

C. A coordination and control "Framework" for implementing national plan which has authority and ability to integrate at successive levels down to village and hamlet the political, military, psychological and economic arms of governmental power.

D. A politico-military approach to sealing the porous land and sea borders of South Vietnam against VC infiltration, thus eliminating foreign VC "safe havens."

E. Winning the people back from behind Bamboo Curtain to militant not passive-neutralist support of the government against VC blandishment and terror.

F. Additional manpower (recently approved) to allow "rotational training base" so that elements ARVN could be disengaged from operational commitment and trained on phased basis to improve its dangerously low level of training.

G. Additional trained manpower determined by increasing enemy infiltration and capabilities to improve logistic, intelligence and support elements as well as furnish needed fighting replacements and units.

H. Reorganization and retraining of military establishment to make it more responsive to counterinsurgency operations plus institution single chain of command.

I. Development of single military operations plan under single chain of command to be integrated into overall national plan, when developed by GVN, to counter the insurgency. These requirements were written into country team U.S. counterinsurgency plan/6/ handed to Diem by Ambassador Durbrow last February. Many of military elements of plan have been approved or are in process. The "Province Chief" problem as it affects the chain of command is the major military element not yet resolved in the implementation phase, although some better cooperation has been gained.

/6/Document 1. Durbrow presented Diem an abridged version of the plan on February 13; see Document 11.

MAAG will continue to press for continuing military progress but some months ago the time was reached when GVN must be guided into supporting political, social and economic actions as a matter of urgency if the military contribution can be meaningful and permanent. Reported Taylor-Diem-Thuan talks indicate possibility of break-through in this field similar to that in military field. However, recommended that U.S. not make firm commitments unless conditioned at least in part on GVN performance. In Saigon Emtel to State limited distribution 558 Thuan appears definite on questioning if 3,000 Special Forces was to be in addition to Ranger Border Forces mentioned by Taylor with Thuan's estimate of GVN capability to organize and deploy 4-5,000 Rangers. If more Ranger Units are to be organized this will further dangerously dilute ARVN leadership and manpower capability and should be critically examined. If currently organized Rangers are to be used this will take over half of units now in being for "Border Ranger Force" which are now assigned elsewhere and will need replacing. Mobility for these Rangers raises problem of command. Close coordination and agreement between GVN commanders and MAAG "can be made to work" only if MAAG commands this transportation. Although I have made written representation Diem, Thuan and Ty, under my "advisory role" I have not in over a year gotten really adequate cooperation on joint operational planning. I feel prior command authority for MAAG is imperative. This same applies, any American Units or individuals which may be assigned here. There are also other military factors such as terrain that need considering in any analysis of this plan and of course current significant operations and MAAG plans need consideration. General Lansdale's special capabilities would be most acceptable for this "Command" as long as the operation is under MAAG command. I am under the impression that General Taylor was thinking in the direction of placing the entire border force under military command. I feel this should be the case.

In respect to Saigon Emtel State 541, the "Politico-Psychological Point," mentioning the offensive MAAG will of course continue to press for military action and "a genuine and important victory over the VC" (Saigon Emtel to State 545), by the GVN and RVNAF. I have made it known to Thuan and general officers that there must be no let up in hot war and that offensive spirit is of the essence. MAAG messages to CINCPAC info JCS MAGAR-TD-OP3020 and MAG-AR-OP3041/7/ show offensive spirit continues. This offense is of course, realistically determined. The strength and training of RVNAF which except for better organization and within limits determined by operational commitments, improved counter-guerrilla training, has not yet felt any significant impact combat capability wise from the approval of additional 50,000. Induction and training time must be kept in mind.

/7/These messages, dated October 31 (311901Z) and November 1 (011459Z), respectively, reported on recent ARVN operations against the Viet Cong. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center Microfilm, Reel 10605)

In respect to Thuan's request for American instructors for the Thu Duc Reserve Officers School, this again opens the question of so-called "face to face" training-use of advisors as instructors. I invited Mr. Thuan and the Ambassador to SSNG Mao to inspect MAAG worldwide concept of training indigenous personnel to train their own forces. In my considered opinion this is only way VN armed forces will ever be taught to carry their own load-and am concerned at change from Diem's previous attitude to "give me the material and I will do the job" to what appears to be "you do it for me." This war can and will be won only by the Vietnamese themselves; we should consider the danger of "over helping" to the point of dulling their own determination and resolve. The specific officers Thuan mentioned as "not very good" are top graduates of last class who, following the U.S. OCS concept, remain to instruct the new students-and then only in School of Soldier. MAAG senior advisor reports other VN instructors adequately qualified. MAAG advisors assigned can and will do job well and in time.

In conclusion we most hopeful that Joint Survey of situation at Province level will result in timely and significant improvement in all areas bearing on problem. Am confident survey group will find MAAG Detachments in good order and training fully oriented on counter-guerrilla operations. Fully recognize that due advanced state of insurgency, Taylor Group of necessity gave heavy emphasis to military matters here and we naturally glad to have benefit their thinking and assistance. Will continue to press all possible on military side but need help in interlocking political-economic-psychological areas which have highest hopes Joint Survey will provide.

 

209. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to India (Galbraith)/1/

Washington, November 3, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Vietnam Country Series, Security 1961. Secret. The source text was attached to a signed letter of November 3 from Galbraith to the President, which reads in full: "You asked for my views on Vietnam. They are set forth in this paper. I might add that they are shared by Abe Chayes, who has collaborated with me in preparing the paper." Galbraith was in Washington for the State visit of Prime Minister Nehru.

A PLAN FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

The situation in South Vietnam is perilously close to the point of no return. Serious thought is being given to a military operation in South Vietnam which would entail all the risks of the operation in Korea of ten years ago, without the justification of a surprise attack across the boundary, without the support of the United Nations, and without a population determined to fight for independence. This paper suggests a United States program which would entail neither abandonment of South Vietnam nor a major military involvement on our part.

The proposal assumes that our long-run objective in South Vietnam should be the creation of an independent, economically viable and politically neutral state, rather than a limping American satellite. As a beginning, we would want an end to the fighting in South Vietnam, and a United Nations presence to supervise the keeping of the peace. We would also hope that a start could be made towards a strong, responsive and popularly based government in South Vietnam.

Certain circumstances seem to make this a propitious time for an approach along the lines suggested here. The Geneva Conference on Laos appears to be reaching its climax. The split between the Soviet Union and Communist China has come into the open, and seems to be at an acute stage. Prime Minister Nehru will be in position to transmit in both directions the thoughts of the President, and of India and others at the United Nations. The Taylor Mission and some of the accompanying press reports have given credibility to possible United States military intervention, and have thus probably increased our bargaining position vis-a-vis the Russians, the Chinese Communists and the neutrals.

I would recommend:

1. Replacement of Ambassador Nolting by an ambassador of the character and prominence of Governor Harriman. We need someone who can hold his own with both Diem and the United States military, who will insist once and for all on government reform, and who will understand the United States political implications of developments there. If Harriman himself is unavailable, I would suggest David Lilienthal or George McGhee.

2. A United Nations resolution confirming the independence of the Republic of Vietnam, and calling for immediate dispatch of United Nations observer groups to Vietnam.

The proposal for such a resolution should come, if possible, from a country not directly associated with the United States, and the program for an observer team, as in Lebanon, or a UNEF as in the Gaza Strip, should be in response to an invitation from the Government of Vietnam. The observers should be drawn primarily from the national forces of United Nations members other than the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States should make it clear, however, that it stands ready to supply personnel and equipment for a United Nations contingent in Vietnam as needed, and that any American personnel sent to Vietnam would share the functions of other United Nations personnel and would be subject to the control of the United Nations command. (This would presumably not affect the present MAAG in Vietnam.)

The scope of the observer group would be to report not only on infiltration into Vietnam from outside, but also on any activity within the country dangerous to the peace. The United Nations observer group would be assembled and dispatched under arrangements made by the Acting Secretary General, and its operations would be supervised by him in consultation with a small advisory committee. The theory of the authorizing resolution would, of course, be that the Viet Cong activity against the present Government of Vietnam is directed from outside of South Vietnam and therefore constitutes external aggression.

This proposal should be presented to Prime Minister Nehru now. Since India is the chairman of the present ICC in Vietnam and since the object of the United Nations presence is in part to replace the ICC and to perform more effectively the job of keeping the peace, Nehru's agreement to the proposal would be most important.

3. Prompt agreement at Geneva on a neutral Laos, including an understanding that Laos is not to be used as a corridor or staging point for operations in South Vietnam. If possible, Ambassador Harriman might approach the Russians on the subject of the mutual interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in cessation of fighting in South Vietnam as well as in Laos.

4. In any event, the Prime Minister might be sounded out on his approaching Ho Chi Minh along the following lines:

a. Achieving a cease fire in South Vietnam.

b. An indication that the long-range United States goal is an independent South Vietnam not necessarily allied with us.

c. Improvement of economic conditions in the country, with increased trade between North and South Vietnam along the lines of interzonal trade in Germany, when peaceful conditions make this possible.

d. Possible reciprocal recognition by the Western and Soviet Blocs of both North and South Vietnam and ultimate admission of both countries to the United Nations.

5. In talking with Nehru, we should make clear that the United States stands ready both to continue its present program of economic assistance to Vietnam, and to contribute to possible programs of the United Nations Special Fund in the area.

The program recommended here avoids the high risk and limited promise alternative of armed intervention. Its long-range hopes are that South Vietnam would become a viable independent state, North Vietnam would become less dependent on Communist China, daily life in both countries would become safer and more prosperous, and the Sino-Soviet struggle for dominance in Southeast Asia might abate.

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