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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
XI. The Secretary of Defense's First Conference on Vietnam, Held at Honolulu, December 16, 1961, and Its Aftermath
324. Editorial Note
On December 16, 1961, a conference called by the Secretary of Defense to discuss Vietnam was held at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, at Camp H.M. Smith, Honolulu, Hawaii. The principal participants in the meeting were Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer; Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral H.D. Felt; Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting; and Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam General Lionel C. McGarr.
The agenda for the conference included the following items: (1) Review of Viet Cong operations since October 1, 1961, and forecast of their probable moves during the next 90 days and the next 180 days; (2) Description of SVN operations against the Viet Cong since October 1 and statement of the plan of operations for the next 90 days and the next 180 days; whether the position of the Viet Cong had on balance become stronger or weaker since October 1; what the forecast was for the next 90 and the next 180 days; (3) The major SVN weaknesses and what must be corrected if the Viet Cong were to be defeated; (4) The status of plans to achieve United States objectives in South Vietnam, including CINCPAC's concept of the campaign plan for defeating the Viet Cong and the prospects for the development of a GVN overall plan; (5) Command relationships in the event United States Forces (USFV) were established; (6) The number of United States and GVN troops required to ensure the achievement of the established objectives; (7) Implementation of changes within the RVNAF agreed to by President Diem; and (8) A series of specific military measures, including provision to the RVNAF of additional helicopters, the improvement of air-ground support capability, and surveillance and control of costar waters and inland waterways. Copies of the list of the participants and the agenda, with progress to date and actions required on each agenda item, are in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SGN (62) 19-GVN-DEFSECCINCPAC.
A restricted group of participants met at 8 a.m. to discuss procedures for conducting the conference and to approve the agenda. During this discussion it was decided to remove item 5 from the agenda. The meeting was then opened to a larger group of officers from the staffs present. The conference adjourned at 6:15 p.m. A 54page summary record of the conference and the decisions reached was attached to a memorandum of December 18 from Felt to McNamara. (Ibid.) A 10-page memorandum for the record, prepared by Admiral Heinz, dated December 20 and designated I-19504/61, also recorded the highlights and the actions required as a result of the decisions by the Secretary of Defense during the conference. A copy of Heinz's memorandum is ibid., RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam 1961-2 Dec. For shorter, less formal accounts of the discussion at the conference, see infra and Document 326.
325. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Special Assistant (Parker) to the Chairman (Lemnitzer)/1/
Washington, December 18, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-1141-71. Secret. Attached to the source text are 10 pages of handwritten notes on the discussion at the Honolulu meeting. The drafter of the notes may have been Parker, but this is not indicated on the source text.
The following are selected items of interest discussed at the Honolulu meeting. They are arranged in chronological order and generally follow the agenda/2/ item by item.
/2/Regarding the agenda for the meeting, see Document 324.
1. SecDef announced intention to have such a meeting each month for the next three months, possibly in Hawaii but probably farther West.
2. Secretary of Defense outlined mission of his visit as:
a. What can we do to improve the situation.
b. What do our people in the field need.
c. We have great authority from the President.
d. Money is no object.
e. The one restriction is what combat troops will not be introduced.3. It was the general consensus agreed to by SecDef that there is not likely to be any gimmick which will win the war for us. While air and naval action contribute it's mainly the ground force problem.
4. After considerable discussion all hands seemed to have come around to General Lemnitzer's view that we needed teams of 5 or 6 advisors down to and including battalion level.
5. Doubt was cast on the wisdom of mounting the campaign to clear out Zone D. The plan was considered highly sophisticated for a first campaign, also it seemed to rest too heavily on the success of defoliant operations. MAAG is to re-study the plan and determine an alternate.
6. After discussion of the pros and cons of Diem, SecDef pointed out that we are stuck with him and must make the best of it; we cannot expect to change him much; what we must do is present him with specifics and get his agreement on them rather than on broad general plans.
7. We have to train at the same time and on an expedited schedule enough regular forces to make sweeps of areas, and enough pare-military forces to then hold them.
8. When we speak of reorganization of the Vietnamese forces we are speaking basically of two aspects:
a. Taking the Air Force and Navy into the JCS setup to further the team spirit all down the line.
b. Give authority to field commanders. Diem says he has done this, the field commanders say he has not.9. After considerable discussion on use of Jungle Jim, General Lemnitzer cleared up all doubts by saying that they could use for many missions they wished in South Vietnam by putting one Vietnamese aboard.
10. The Vietnamese navy capability border, coastal and inland waterway and particularly the latter is better than we thought back here.
11. The training program for the civil guard and Self-Defense Corps extends to 1963. SecDef thinks this is a crucial problem that we can't wait until 1963 and that we must find some other solution.
12. SecDef gave approval on the spot for certain program to improve communications.
13. SecDef approved going ahead with three construction projects.
14. While Diem has agreed to making 5,000 rangers available for border patrol the implementation slow. General Lemnitzer pointed out that implementation should start on the Laos-Vietnam border leaving Cambodia border to the end.
15. SecDef refused to discuss Laos indicating that Government decisions had been taken there and there was nothing further we could do for the moment. In Vietnam however there are many things we can and must do quickly.
T.W. Parker/3/
Major General, USA
Spec. Asst. to the Chairman
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
326. Letter From the Political Adviser (Martin) of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)/1/
Honolulu, December 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/12-1861. Top Secret; Official-Informal.
Dear Cot: By the time you receive this letter you will probably have received information on the Secretary of Defense conference here last Saturday/2/ from one or more of the participants from Washington, e.g., Bill Bundy, Joe Wellings, "Pickles" Heinz. If you can get a copy of the agenda which was prepared at this headquarters, and of the record of the conference prepared here,/3/ you will have a thorough coverage of the topics discussed, decisions made, and actions to be taken. In your capacity as Director of Task Force-Viet Nam I would think it important for you to have access to these documents.
/2/December 16.
/3/See Document 324.
The purpose of this letter is to sort out what seemed to me significant aspects of the conference from the policy viewpoint. First I might say that thanks to a great deal of hard and careful work by Admiral Felt and members of his staff the conference moved along rapidly, covering a great deal of ground during the nine hours of meetings. As far as I know Washington and Saigon participants, as well as those of us here, feel that the conference was well worthwhile; it produced not only greater mutual understanding of the problems facing us in South Viet Nam but also a number of important decisions by the Secretary of Defense.
The Secretary and General Lemnitzer brought a sense of immediacy to the conference, emphasizing they wanted concrete actions that would begin to show results in 30 days. They were not interested in projects to be completed in 1963. The Secretary at the outset stressed that the primary effort of the U.S. military establishment was behind South Viet Nam and that we could have practically anything we wanted short of combat troops. In closing the conference he said our job was to win in South Viet Nam, and if we weren't winning to tell him what was needed to win. The Secretary was interested in specifics such as the number and types of personnel, kinds and amounts of equipment, the costs and specific plans to accomplish specific objectives. The Secretary clearly had little faith in gimmicks such as defoliants. He was leery of overemphasizing naval and air actions, although he recognized their importance as supporting elements. He warned against the danger of sitting in Washington and checking off lists of junks, aircraft delivered, etc., figuring we were winning the war by this process.
During the course of a discussion on how to get Diem to follow U.S. advice Ambassador Nolting observed that we are unlikely to get Diem to carry out his recent commitments to us to the degree or as rapidly as we would expect or like. There would be no automatic fruition of these agreements from the Vietnamese side. This is something we had to live with. The Secretary commented that Diem was the only man we had, that he had some basis for being suspicious because of all the coup talk, and that if we concentrated on fundamental military specifics he thought we could get Diem to cooperate. We had to work with him; we couldn't expect to change people. He felt that while reforms were necessary, they take a long time and we need some specific action within the next 30 days. Ambassador Nolting agreed with the "specifics approach", saying that we couldn't remodel the overall structure of the GVN or change characters.
The Secretary evinced strong interest in building up the Civil Guard and self-defense corps. He reasoned that past experience has shown that after the ARVN sweeps through an area the Viet Cong filters back in and there is nothing to show for it. He guaranteed the money and equipment to strengthen the Civil Guard provided a specific plan was worked out. He suggested as a starter, taking one province, doubling or tripling the Civil Guard as necessary, sweeping the province with the ARVN and consolidating control with the Civil Guard. The Secretary did not object to increasing the ARVN ceiling above 200,000 provided good justification could be furnished him, but he raised the question whether the resources couldn't better be used to increase the Civil Guard. He tended to brush aside Ambassador Nolting's worries about raising the necessary piastres to meet the costs of expanding force levels./4/
/4/This sentence is underlined on the source text, apparently by Cottrell, and an exclamation point is written in the margin.
One subject on the agenda but not discussed in the meetings was command relationships in the event U.S. forces Viet Nam (USFV) were established. However, Ambassador Nolting discussed this subject with Admiral Felt and Secretary McNamara separately, indicating his lack of agreement with the JCS-CINCPAC concept. In general his thinking coincided with that contained in the draft message from Ball to Rusk,/5/ a copy of which Joe Wellings had brought with him. Nolting feels that the eradication of the Viet Cong is not simply a military problem but one involving economic, psychological, political and social actions. Although in the next six months the military might need an overriding priority, if ultimate success is to be obtained, there must be a parallel action in these other fields. We must beef them up as we are now beefing up the military. He also feels that creation of a USFV command would encourage the GVN in its present tendency to overemphasize military action and regard it as a cure-all. He fears, too, that it would tempt the GVN to play off the commander USFV and the Ambassador against each other. He therefore wants to stick to a task force concept. As far as I am aware this is the only agenda subject upon which there was a significant divergence of views between the Ambassador and the military side.
/5/See Document 317.
There were three more subjects of broad policy interest which I will just mention briefly: 1) U.S. transport aircraft such as the C-123's and the helicopter companies are being sent to SVN for combat support activities, not for "taxi service." 2) No seabee or Army Engineer battalions are to be used in SVN for construction projects since use of U.S. combat troops for their protection is ruled out at this time; use civilian contractors instead. 3) U.S. manned ships or boats are not to be used in SVN inland waters despite the apparent offer in paragraph 1(c) Deptel 619 to Saigon./6/ Ambassador Nolting will have to try to straighten this out with Diem.
/6/See footnote 2, Document 287.
The foregoing is, of course, highly restricted information. Moreover, it is frankly a subjective interpretation of what is important. I hope you can see the "agenda" and the "record" for a complete fill in.
With every good wish for you and your family for the coming year./7/
/7/Written in the top margin of the first page by Cottrell was the following draft reply: "Dear Ed: Many thanks for your letter of Dec. 18. I've seen the 'record' made up here, but not the agenda. Mele Kolekekoma. Cot. P.S. I drafted the Ball-Rusk telegram." No copy of Cottrell's reply as actually sent has been found.
Sincerely,
Ed
327. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Secretary of State/1/
Washington, December 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 3-C Military Assistance General Oct.-Dec. 1961. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to William Bundy. Printed also in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 426. That version, the text of which is identical to the source text, indicates that copies were sent to Nitze and Gilpatric in addition to William Bundy.
This will confirm our discussion of this morning/2/ in which we agreed that:
/2/Presumably either a reference to a meeting at 11 a.m. attended by Rusk and McNamara as well as officials from other agencies to discuss the question of nuclear sharing with the British Government or a personal meeting between Rusk and McNamara at 12:11 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) No other record of either of these meetings has been found.
1. The Senior U.S. Military Commander in South Vietnam will have the direct responsibility for all U.S. military operations in that country, and the authority to discuss both the U.S. and Vietnamese operations directly with Diem and the leaders of his government.
2. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have the title "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Forces-Vietnam".
3. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have direct access to CINCPAC and through him to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense on all military matters.
4. The U.S. Ambassador in Vietnam will be responsible for political and basic policy matters.
5. The two U.S. representatives will keep each other informed of the operations within their respective spheres.
Robert S. McNamara
328. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/
Washington, December 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1861. Secret. Drafted by Rusk and cleared with Harriman and U. Alexis Johnson.
Dear Bob: There are two comments I should like to make on your memorandum of December 18/2/ about the military organization in Vietnam.
/2/Document 327.
First, it was my recollection that you had agreed to the designation suggested in my letter,/3/ namely, "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command--Vietnam." The use of the term "forces: gives the impression of organized military units considerably beyond those we presently have in mind.
/3/See Document 317.
Second, in our talk today we did not get very far into the relationship between our Ambassador and the U.S. Military Commander. I agree with respect to the direct operational contact between the Commander and the Vietnamese officials, including President Diem. I also agree that the Ambassador and the Commander should keep each other fully informed. My own view of the relations between the two is covered in the next to the last paragraph of the letter I handed you in Paris.
Perhaps one of your colleagues could follow up on this with Averell Harriman in the event there are any dangling points which need attention. Even though they might be minor in the total context, there is great advantage in our having complete clarity in the interest of harmonious and efficient operations in the field.
Cordially yours,
Dean/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
329. Editorial Note
At the National Security Council meeting on December 19, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer briefly reported on the Secretary of Defense Conference at Honolulu. According to minutes of the meeting, apparently prepared by the Vice President's military aide Howard Burris:
"Lemnitzer reported certain details of the meeting which he and Secretary McNamara had at Honolulu with Nolting, McGarr and Felt. He termed the meeting very successful. (He did not mention Secretary McNamara's principal statement at the meeting to the effect that the United States had made the decision to pursue the Viet Nam affair with vigor and that all reasonable amounts of resources could be placed at the disposal of the commanders in the area.)" (Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, National Security Council II)
The President's log indicates that the National Security Council met from 4:10 to 5:10 p.m. (Kennedy Library, JFK Logs)
330. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 19, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1961. Top Secret; Priority.
819. Eyes only Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson from Nolting. Embtel 801./2/ Deptel 772./3/ I had opportunity in Honolulu last week-end to discuss with SecDef McNamara, Bundy, and Admiral Felt the question of US military organization and command for expanded US military support to SVN. Bundy showed me copy draft message from SecState to SecDef/4/ commenting on latter's letter of December 7./5/ It may be useful to have my further views following these conversations.
/2/Document 318.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 318.
/4/See Document 317.
/5/Document 312.
I am more convinced than ever that, in circumstances existing now in VN, division of US authority and responsibility would be a grave error and would jeopardize accomplishment of US objectives. I agree in general with points made in draft message from SecState to SecDef, but I do not think that draft is precise enough in defining responsibilities and command and inter-agency relationships in Viet Nam.
In considering how best to organize, we should realize that our organizational arrangement will have a direct effect on: (a) What US does; (b) What GVN does; and (c) What the enemy does.
If we organize in manner proposed by Defense, we will, I think: (a) Put a disproportionate emphasis, in planning and allocation of US resources and manpower, on military means; (b) Encourage GVN to do likewise and thus neglect other measures essential to winning the allegiance of South Vietnamese people (there has always existed a strong tendency in GVN towards this error, e.g., recent demand for saturation bombing); (c) Play into hands of enemy, who is organized differently, for a different kind of war; or [(d)] Invite a military reaction from outside.
While I welcome vigorous planning and action by Defense in this situation, which was vividly demonstrated at recent Honolulu meeting, and regard more effective military measures as having highest priority in turning tide of VC insurgency, I do not believe that US organizational arrangements should, or need, be fundamentally changed to accommodate introduction of three to four thousand additional US military personnel. On the contrary, I think task force concept is still valid, needing only such modification as is required to satisfy sound requirement that US operational units shall have purely military chain of command. Vis-à-vis GVN, however, there should clearly be one US spokesman in VN; otherwise we shall get the run-around. This spokesman should be chairman and coordinator of US task force as at present, but should not, of course, interfere in command of US military forces.
Thus, I would envisage a top US military man here who would be a member of our task force; who would have two deputies (one for military assistance and advisory duties and the other for command of US operational forces). The top military man would be responsible for coordinating within the TF the military segment of the total US effort, and thereafter he would be responsible for carrying it out through one or the other of his two deputies. He would, of course, speak frequently with President Diem and other high GVN officials as at present, in discharge of the military elements of the US program. It should, however, be clearly understood that the chairman of the US task force, i.e., the Ambassador, has the responsibility and accompanying authority for the total US effort to sustain in Viet Nam.
If this were an active theater of warfare in the traditional sense, with US combat forces directly involved, the recommendation above would not be made. The fact that we have not put combat forces into this country, and intend to win without doing so, demonstrates to my mind that US relationships with GVN, and US organizational arrangements, should clearly correspond to our stated intention, which is to help the GVN to mount effective countermeasures in all fields to the VC insurgency. This is still essentially a political job in the broadest sense, and should be organized and run as such.
As a corollary, I should like to add that, no matter what the command arrangements, the vigor of the Dept of Defense in this situation needs to be matched by equal vigor in the non-military aspects if the proper proportions are to be maintained in our total effort here.
Nolting
331. Telegram From the Commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Saigon, December 20, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to General Decker. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen also by General Wheeler. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text.
SGN 901. My sensing on certain aspects 16 December conference are furnished for such use as you see fit. From my viewpoint, conference was helpful. Expect next meeting, which recommend be held Baguio, to be more productive for you and Secretary as hope MAAG will be permitted carry ball to greater degree on those items affecting problems and operations here. Am also hopeful be given more reasonable advance notice on agenda.
In addition other actions directed and suggested, we now reviewing plans for Zone D, and feel defoliant portion properly integrated into military portion of the plan, can be effective and am convinced ARVN will need all possible assistance. Would not favor its deletion as GVN and RVNAF inserted this in the basic plan given them "under the table" by MAAG. U.S. reluctance follow through on help promised at higher level could well have adverse psychological reactions.
As mentioned in letter today,/2/ consider it unfortunate that reorganization and proposed changes in command structure here, plus expanded terms of reference, were not discussed at meeting. Was most gratified when learned this item on agenda and was appreciative of my superiors' recognition that "man on firing line" should be allowed to participate in these discussions. Regret that circumstances did not permit. This naturally of extreme importance to me both from operational and personal viewpoint.
/2/Not found.
Due greatly expanded mission here over and above normal MAAG type operation, have long recognized we doing job of small theatre headquarters with staff and authority for MAAG Mission alone. Therefore, have made number specific recommendations to CINCPAC over period of time which designed match resources and terms of references with actual duties and responsibilities. Meanwhile have accepted these additional duties, mainly by default, and attempting discharge to best of capability. This currently made additionally difficult by failure State get more than promise by Diem nor "much closer relationship than the present one of acting in an advisory capacity only."
On personal side, know you understand that particularly in dealing with orientals, my value could be depreciated should a Senior man be brought in to take over top spot. Such action could well react unfavorably on my present working relationship with GVN and RVNAF officials and adversely affect their present trust and confidence.
Regarding above, would appreciate any "straws in the wind" you feel able to give me and would naturally treat as personal and confidential.
332. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 21, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-2161. Secret, Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Bangkok, Phnom Penh. and Vientiane.
834. I saw Thuan yesterday (December 20) on many matters:
1. Honolulu meeting: reviewed with Thuan purpose and results this meeting, stressing US determination, vigorous planning and action under new partnership. Emphasized obvious fact that increased and accelerated US assistance imposes obligations and burdens on GVN as well as US task force to make effective use, and puts premium on GVN's undertakings and plans to increase efficiency and expedite action from top to bottom in all branches. I reviewed in general major points covered in Honolulu meeting, saying that these would be taken up by General McGarr with Minister Thuan in more detail (McGarr has already begun this)./2/
/2/Copies of McGarr's two memoranda of December 18 to Thuan, one entitled "Training of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps" and the other "Civil Government Paramilitary Infrastructure (Organization) Required as Integrated Part of Military Phase of Pacification Effort," were attached to McGarr's memorandum of the same date to Nolting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961)
I bore down on necessity including Viet-Nam Navy representative and Viet-Nam Air Force representative on Joint General Staff, as important element in achieving necessary GVN military coordination at top.
As agreed Honolulu meeting, I told Thuan we did not see necessity of, and had decided against, sending US uniformed personnel to man small boats for inland waterway patrol (a point which was subject to misinterpretation in US negotiating instructions.) He understands our position, but was disappointed; said this would require additional GVN naval personnel and training in handling US-furnished boats. I said I thought that, along with the boats, we would consider sympathetically any necessary increase in GVN naval personnel and training for them. He will send us a note with his specific ideas on this.
On joint provincial surveys, we agreed that Thuan would call first team together for final briefing this Saturday,/3/ with view to having them in field next week. In this connection, US press stories (especially articles in two recent issues of Time), emphasizing "concessions" which US has, or should, extract from GVN in exchange for increased aid, came up. Thuan pointing out how difficult such stories make our joint effort for improvement in GVN organization and personnel, in view of sensitivities and national pride involved. I told him I agreed 100 per cent; that I deplored such stories; that they had not originated with us here; and that I had done everything that I could to prevent our recent discussions and agreements from being reflected in this manner. (Comment: I cannot overstress disservice which certain press stories and obvious leaks have done, and are doing, to our cause here.)
/3/December 23.
2. GVN-Cambodian relations: I left with Thuan for info (we will follow up with Foreign Office) a memo suggesting steps to achieve GVN-Cambodian border liaison along lines suggested Phnom Penh's 234./4/ Thuan seemed sympathetic to this approach.
/4/Not found.
3. I asked Thuan how new GVN organizational arrangements are working, especially National Internal Security Council. He said NISC had met last week; next week they expected to start regular twice-weekly meetings, with agendas and with Secretariat headed by General "Little" Minh, who is already installed. I stressed importance of orderly and rapid decisions based on agenda items and passed to Secretariat for implementation action; only thus could we hope to keep pace with the many matters requiring rapid decisions and follow-through action.
4. Montagnards: Thuan reported that Montagnard population is "coming our way" in increasing numbers. This substantiated by other reports we have, and is encouraging.
5. VC strategy: Thuan, agreeing with President Diem switch to General McGarr and me last week,/5/ said that evidence available to GVN (particularly recent VC officer prior testimony) led him to conclusion that VC trying to group in larger units, up to divisional strength, with military and that he expected major VC attacks to be mounted within a couple of months we agreed that this analysis, if correct, makes it all the more necessary that our forces move promptly to the offensive to disrupt and destroy VC ability to concentrate.
/5/See footnote 3, Document 323.
6. Border Ranger Force: I mentioned to Thuan my disappointment at inference in President Diem's last conversation with McGarr and me on this matter. I had asked him direct question of when 5,000-man Ranger Striking Force for Border Patrol would be organized in order, among other things, to use our helicopters. Thuan had replied somewhat evasively to two direct questions on this. Thuan said that this would be done as agreed; but that it would be great help if Chief MAAG could come up with a joint recommendation with ARVN field command on Ranger units which could best be spared from present duties. If [He] could then, he felt persuade Diem to release them. General McGarr is working on this. I made it clear to Thuan, and he understands that US cannot afford, in terms its own public opinion, to send to Viet-Nam supporting forces and material only to have them stand idle, waiting for GVN plans and actions. I was frank in telling him that such a situation would soon reflect itself in US press and no doubt in congressional questions; and that we counted heavily on GVN's recognition of this fact and accelerated vigorous action on their part.
Nolting
333. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief. Pacific (Felt)/1/
Saigon, December 21, 1961, 5:57 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/12-2161. Secret; Priority. Also identified as MAGGHGACH 4587 and repeated to the Joint Chiefs, JACK, AJCC at Fort Ritchie, State, and the White House. Received in the Department at 12:51 a.m., December 22. The source text is the Department of State copy.
210957Z. Acting on MAAG advice, Big Minh on 14 December briefed Diem on concept of employment of task forces as outlined in CINCPAC military campaign plan./2/ Minh reported Diem immediately became most suspicious and demanded to know why such task forces should operate directly under field command. Minh explained purpose was to assist Corps Commanders who are heavily involved in overall pacification their CTZ. Task force needed conduct specific operations against heavy Viet Cong concentrations. President emphatically disapproved.
/2/Not further identified.
Minh further reports this [that?] on several occasions following weekend, senior officers reported by Minh to be close to brother Nhu approached Minh and asked why he wanted task force-is it for purpose of a coup?
Minh also presented border control plan to Diem (which is basically MAAG plan as modified by field command) and was instructed to "hold off" as he now studying British border plan. (Note: This first mention of British border plan. Will check and report.) On 18 December, Minh discussed Zone D plan with Ty plus formation of previously reported "special battalions." Ty said ARVN was leaning toward formation of special companies instead.
As result, Minh states he feels like "officer without portfolio." He claims he is followed by armed agents. Further says his guards picked up two armed men lingering vicinity his house and check uncovered them as Secretary Thuan's "private detectives."
Source of above is Minh himself who as previously reported has at times appeared bitter and frustrated but report is considered serious as could well slow down progress on present plans. MAAG will continue to make every effort to ensure this does not occur. Will keep you advised.
334. Telegram From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President, at Bermuda/1/
Washington, December 21, 1961, 11:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The President was in Bermuda where he was meeting with British Prime Minister Macmillan.
CAP 5466-61. The weekly Vietnam status report/2/ contains the following items of interest:
/2/Dated December 21, not printed. (Ibid.)
A. Ambassador Nolting intends to come to Washington in early January and, in the meantime, will follow up agreed items with Diem for early action in Saigon.
B. The following U.S. units will soon enter into active operations:
(1) Jungle Jim aircraft on combat missions with combined U.S.-GVN crews aboard as part of combat crew training requirements. The aircraft will bear SVN markings./3/
/3/In a memorandum of December 19 to Taylor, Bagley wrote that the Embassy in Saigon was being told to delay the start of Jungle Jim operations with US-GVN crews until December 22. In the meantime the Department of State, in transmitting the December 21 status report on Vietnam to the President, would inform him that the combined crew operations in Jungle Jim aircraft would begin soon. According to Bagley, "If there is no reaction from the White House, Saigon will be given an affirmative answer. Mr. Bundy is aware of this procedure which I gather is an agreed approach to avoid pinning down the President." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69)
(2) Two U.S. helicopter companies, which will be operational on 25 December and 5 January.
(3) U.S. Navy minesweepers to participate in coastal patrols independent of but supplementing the SVN Navy commencing on 22 December. U.S. ships will remain south of the seventeenth parallel and outside the three-mile territorial limits, passing information on, but not boarding, VC or DRV ships or junks.
335. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, December 22, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-2261. Secret. Drafted by Rice and initialed by Rostow. The source text bears two handwritten notations. One reads: "Shown to & discussed w/Nolting week Jan. 8-12. He says he thinks Diem may, in effect, have such an arrangement, de facto, now. E[dmund] R[ice]" The other reads: "Mr. Rice. Should we get back of this? Walt".
SUBJECT
Diem's Fears of a Coup and Command ArrangementsREFERENCE
Telegram from Chief of MAAG, Saigon 210957Z/2//2/Document 333.
You will recall discussing with a member of my staff the bearing on the campaign in South Viet-Nam of Diem's fear of a coup. In brief, Diem is hobbling the ability of the armed forces to fight the Viet Cong in order to minimize the chances of a coup against himself. He does this by a variety of means including interference in the chain of command and tight control of field units.
At the local level, counter-guerrilla operations require an extraordinary degree of tactical initiative if units are to react fast to dangers and to opportunities. This requires more decentralization than Diem allows. At the national level, the Government is unlikely to make progress in bringing the country under its control unless it follows an over-all plan for doing so. This would seem to require, inter alia, unity of command in respect of overall planning and general direction of operations. But a unit commander is unlikely to obey the order of his superiors in the chain of command if he anticipates other and different orders from the Chief of State.
Diem's practices, intended to guard him against a military coup, thus help create frustrations driving the military to stage one. The vicious circle needs to be broken. It could be broken by a successful coup against Diem, but for us to encourage one would involve grave risks. The alternative is to provide Diem with more personal security.
Diem's sense of security would be promoted if the capital city area were placed under the protection of units to be hand-picked by Diem himself, with their officers subject only to his direction. We have broached this idea to Cottrell who says Thompson has already suggested this to Diem who likes it, but that our military are horrified. This seems to be a situation, however, in which political considerations are clearly overriding.
336. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/1/
Washington, December 22, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam 1961-Taylor Recommendations, Command. Secret. At the bottom of the source text the President signed his name (under the place designated) "Approved."
SUBJECT
Military Command in South VietnamI have consulted with Secretary Rusk concerning necessary changes in the U.S. military command structure for Vietnam. We have agreed on the attached terms of reference to increase the authority of the military commander./2/
/2/Not found attached.
I recommend that you designate the position of the senior U.S. Commander in Vietnam as one warranting the grade of General. I further recommend the assignment of Lt. General Harkins to this position and his recess appointment to the grade of General. Although General Harkins is 57 years old, he is physically active, has been trained as the Field Force Commander for the SEATO forces and is thoroughly familiar with Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider him an imaginative officer, fully qualified to fill what I consider to be the most difficult job in the U.S. Army. General Harkins' picture and a brief biographical sketch are attached./3/
/3/Not found attached.
May I have your approval of this nomination?
Robert S. McNamara/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
337. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr)/1/
Honolulu, December 23, 1961, 11:35 a.m.
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 12/ 19/61-12/23/61. Top Secret. Repeated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JACK AJCC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and PACAF. A notation in the margin of the source text indicates that it was a copy furnished to Bromley Smith and McGeorge Bundy.
232135Z. Military Operations in SVN. A. My 060247Z. B. Your 140914Z. C. Your 210957Z. D. Your 190651Z./2/
/2/Reference A, Felt's telegram 060247Z, December 6, contained an outline of a campaign plan for systematic armed action against the Viet Cong, with instructions to McGarr that unless he saw deficiencies in the plan, he should "sell it to General Minh as a plan he can use as his own." (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center Microfilm, Reel 10714) Reference B has not been found. Reference C is Document 333. Reference D, McGarr's telegram 190651Z, December 19, described the revised estimate of the Viet Cong threat in the area from the 17th parallel to Zone D which Diem had given McGarr and Nolting in their talk on December 14. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center Microfilm. Reel 10718).
1. Your recommended modifications of ref A contained in ref B are approved for inclusion in plan.
2. I note in ref C that Gen Minh has not been able to convey purpose and intent of ref A, which has resulted in backfire for Minh. I still believe ref A necessary instrument for bringing about effective coordinate RVNAF action against Viet Cong. In this premise, I feel you should discuss with Amb Nolting a personal approach to Diem, possibly in company, to attempt to overcome Diem's objection to our plan. It should be explained to Diem that the plan and command arrangements therein were designed by me to fulfill requirements for efficient control of military operations. He should be reassured in most earnest terms that we have no motive other than to counsel a military campaign plan and control arrangements therefore designed to attain the objective of mutual interest to his government and ours to lick the Viet Cong.
3. Unless effective command arrangements based on a clear-cut delegation of authority as set forth in ref A are established for military operations in South Vietnam, it is doubtful that US/GVN military goals for defeating Viet Cong can be realized in foreseeable time frame. Para 3 of ref D provides additional ammunition for our case in selling Diem on a campaign plan that puts mobile, hard-hitting forces, efficiently organized and commanded, against VC at proper time and place. Concerning this plan, and other important military policies and operations, I cannot overemphasize the necessity for personal contact and discussion- with Diem in lieu of letters or memoranda. I have distinct impression that at times the written word is misinterpreted and takes on erroneous connotations. Therefore, suggest in this type negotiation you rely primarily on personal discussion attempting to insure that Diem and his principals clearly understand your purpose and intent.
4. Discussion during SecDef meeting 16 Dec desirability of getting on with a smaller, more readily-accomplished operation was emphasized because of possible delay in developing and implementing GVN version of ref A. There is vital need for early GVN victory, both for military and psychological reasons. Therefore, while continuing to press for our campaign plan and for zone D operations, we should devote immediate effort toward mounting a smaller operation that has a chance for early success and will contribute to zone "D" problem. Further, that for such operation a single province should be selected for clearing and holding. Plan should not be developed on basis that operations will depend on defoliation. Further, zone "D" plan itself should be modified to de-emphasize reliance on defoliants.
5. My staff has been working to provide you an assist on plan for securing a single province. Outline plan quoted below is in line with decision made by SecDef. Unless you have a better plan, request you use your influence to get it implemented. Use soft sell as indicated above.
6. Begin province plan:
[Here follow four pages describing in outline form a plan for "a timely, aggressive, coordinated military operation to secure early GVN control of Binh Duong Province in II Corps Tactical Zone."]
338. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr)/1/
Washington, December 23, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-21071. Top Secret; Priority. No transmission time is given on the source text.
[JCS 2027-61.] 1. The question of proposed reorganization and ultimate command arrangements which you raise in your Eyes Only message (SGN 901)/2/ and your letter of 18 December/3/ is one of utmost importance and one to which I have been devoting much personal attention here.
/2/Document 331
/3/Not found.
2. I had planned to have a few moments with you alone after the 16 December meeting to discuss the question with you, but as you know, our party left almost immediately for take-off and there was no possibility for such a get-together.
3. Although the subject was listed in our agenda for the 16 December meeting, it was passed over without discussion because the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State had already initiated joint consideration of the problem here in Washington and had agreed that they personally (and not their staffs) would work out a final recommendation for submission to the President. Therefore, as you noted at the meeting, Secretary McNamara simply skipped the item when we came to it on the agenda. Near the end of the meeting Amb Nolting handed me a note to pass to Secy McNamara in which he said he would like to discuss the subject personally with Sec Def after the meeting. Sec Def agreed although it was his intention not to discuss it with anyone at Honolulu. From what Sec Def told me I gather that they did in fact have a brief discussion on the subject of proposed organizational changes. I understand that Amb Nolting asked Sec McNamara what his and other thinking in Washington was in this regard and Sec Def gave him his general views. From information available to me they did not have a meeting of minds on the subject. (Note: Foregoing is for your eyes only and should not be revealed to any other person.)
4. I would like to give some flavor of my personal thinking and of JCS views on this sensitive question. We have been completely satisfied with the manner in which you have discharged your duties out there and we have consistently made this point in interdepartmental discussions here. With the decision not to introduce combat troops into Vietnam we have had serious doubts about the desirability of a fundamental change in the U.S. organization there. In view of information we had regarding thinking at higher levels in U.S. Govt, the JCS response to a request for recommendations for a new U.S. command structure in Vietnam is qualified by the words "if it is decided to change the command structure in Vietnam." Nevertheless although final decision has not yet been made by the President it now appears that a change in U.S. organization will be made. The primary object of the change is to impress Diem that we are entering a new era in U.S.-Vietnamese relationships in which the U.S. will be giving him increased support and be expecting him to pay increased heed to our advice and suggestions. Generally speaking, the new terms of reference will provide for a U.S. military assistance command, rather than an advisory group, and will insure that the senior U.S. military representative in Vietnam has the controlling voice, both on the U.S. side and with Vietnam officials, on military matters. Another factor which is involved is the possibility of broadening whatever organization is decided for Vietnam into a U.S. military organization for all of SE Asia, and possibly ultimately expanding into a SEATO command if the situation continues to deteriorate in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.
5. Also, for the purpose of increasing the impact on Diem that the U.S. looks to a new and increased counter-insurgency effort on his part, it now appears that a four-star U.S. commander will be named to operate under the new terms of reference and that you and your MAAG will come under his over-all command. I fully appreciate what your feelings may be if this proposal is implemented. That is why I want personally to emphasize to you that the JCS and I have complete confidence in you and have been thoroughly satisfied with the results you have achieved in the face of great handicaps, obstacles and frustrations. From my conversations with Adm Felt I am convinced he feels the same way. We recognize the burden of personal adjustment necessary to fit into the new command structure, if and when it is created, but are certain that you will take this in your stride, as you have so many other difficulties during your fifteen months in Saigon. I know you'll appreciate that the new man will have to lean heavily on you and will need every bit of help he can get from you.
6. I will keep you further informed as developments take place here. All of this, I know, adds up to something less than a Christmas present for you, but you are too good a soldier to let it bother you for long. Therefore I'll close with a personal expression of the Season's Greetings for you and the members of your command and the hope that the New Year in Vietnam will see the results of some of the training and planning you have so patiently and thoroughly accomplished during 1960 [1961].
339. Memorandum From the Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in Vietnam (Anspacher) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/
Saigon. December 23, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 33s, Program Direction. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Conversations with USIA (Mr. Murrow) in WashingtonAs suggested earlier, here is a brief list of topics which should occupy whatever time you find you can spend with Mr. Murrow during your stay in Washington.
1. Foremost, if not most important is, of course, the question of unauthorized "leaks" in Washington. I am assuming that the leaks are not authorized-that some individuals are simply talking too much. It may well be that the Department of State feels it is important to broach certain ideas to the American people, but it would be most helpful if they would notify us too. My own feeling of course is that we should go as far as possible with the press both here and in Washington on an agree-upon basis-within the ICC limitations. It would seem to me most appropriate to go back to what was laid down in the original guidance cables and work up from there on a "non-attributable" basis. We should be able to deal with almost any subject that comes along if we all observe those clearly stated principles.
2. Although I can describe ideas as to what USIS can do in the present situation in Viet-Nam, I think some exploration along those lines with Mr. Murrow would be helpful. For example, there is much that needs to be done for and with the GVN which basically lies in the USOM bailiwick. However, the fact of the matter is-and USOM would be the first to admit it-that the talents are not always available there. We are solving part of the problem through the Psychological Operations Committee, of course. But I am concerned that effective psychological/information operations (as part of the war effort) require more and closer professional advisory assistance to the GVN at a coordinated Presidency level. I am thinking also in terms of provincial "information officers" who might pass as administrative advisors to provincial councils, let us say, or even as teachers. Ordinarily USOM would provide such personnel, I presume, but I am not sure that USOM is prepared to do so. On the other hand, the kind of people we need are those who are ordinarily allied with USIA. Perhaps of Peace Corps type technicians, under whatever name (IVS, for example), might suggest how we can put our talents and our resources together in terms of field operations, as well as professional advisory assistance at the Saigon level.
In this connexion, I talked with the British Counselor (J.A. Burrows) today about just such matters. As an old BIS hand, he is not only interested but anxious to contribute BIS help wherever possible, with our concurrence. He is drafting a letter to the FO about the critical weaknesses in the information/propaganda effort, suggesting that his people and ours (such as Ed Murrow) consider this as seriously as we do and prepare to do something about it. A sample proposal: a week-long Murrow visit here to "survey" the GVN's needs and offer ideas to satisfy them, such as an advisor to the "program planning board" at the Presidency referred to earlier, and professional personnel to advise (if not do) in the provinces. According to Burrows, the British might be in a position to help in this, . . ., when it's operational.
. . . . . . .
4. Since you have indicated you are probably going to discuss at least the Newsweek story/2/ in Washington, this is perhaps an appropriate context in which to inject my comments, albeit belatedly:
/2/Not further identified.
It seems to me we are extending ourselves in the interest of the GVN into an area of complaint and protest against activities in the U.S. over which we have always maintained we have no control, and little influence. Would it not seem more logical for the GVN Ambassador in Washington to raise such issues, rather we [than us?]? This could apply equally to the VOA broadcast, although the question of "control" obviously does not apply in the same way here. My own impression is that by eliminating brief news reports of events which are likely to attract both U.S. and foreign attention anyway, VOA would find it almost impossible to maintain its role as a news medium, especially for those populations cut off, for one reason or another, from normal mass media communications.
We appear to be in danger of getting caught in the web of somewhat conflicting principles. We cannot do more with the image of the GVN than is made available by the GVN itself; in other words, unless we rely on distortion, whatever we mirror will be a reflection of the face the GVN presents to the world. I would imagine that this conviction has prompted USIA's suggestion that we take up the censorship question with the GVN for the umpteenth time. If we were to do this while at the same time we are more or less assuring the GVN that the U.S. will try to "discourage" some elements of the American press, it seems to me we would appear to be talking out of both sides of our mouths at the same time. I don't mind trying to discourage Newsweek, for example, but I don't think we need to put ourselves in this position, more or less, with various GVN officials.
5. The question of TV may arise during your conversations with Mr. Murrow since, as you remember, his Deputy, Don Wilson, spent two hours talking to President Diem about it./3/ In reviewing the recommendations of the Trueheart committee on this subject,/4/ you might want to amplify what we had agreed upon beyond the terms of the recommendation made to you. To set the record straight, USIS is intensely anxious to encourage the development of more and better communications with the village populations. TV seems, at first glance, to be an ideal way of doing this but the logistic and technical problems, if not the financial factor, justifiably suggest postponement of such a project. Since the need still exists, however, it would seem logical to press forward urgently with the proposed alternative calling for the distribution of 16mm film projectors and screens in those areas where the communication problem is most critical. I should like to add that at some date in the future, when the existing problems re TV can be solved, it would still appear to me, as it does now in principle, as a most effective communications technique.
/3/Wilson apparently visited Vietnam in late September or early October 1961, but no record of his meeting with Diem has been found.
/4/Not further identified.
6. Finally, could you persuade President Kennedy to broadcast a message via VOA (translated into Vietnamese using the fade-over technique) to ALL the Vietnamese people on the occasion of Tey [Tet?], 1962? We could use this locally, of course, but it would also reach some audience in North Vietnam. A greeting in French in the President's own voice would help start it off. too.
340. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Washington, December 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam 1961-2 Dec. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were also sent to McNamara, Gilpatric, and Heinz. Printed also in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 427.
SUBJECT
Vietnamese Command ProblemCINCPAC's message to you, 232137Z [232135Z] December 1961,/2/ outlines the problem of President Diem giving control authority to Big Minh as his military field commander, when Diem is apprehensive of a coup. CINCPAC then solicited your help to get State to direct Ambassador Nolting to make a concerted approach to Diem with General McGarr.
/2/Document 337.
In CINCPAC's proposal, as in other comments on this problem, I have yet to note anyone come up with an answer to Diem's apprehension. It is the basis for his real reluctance to do what the Americans want him to do, and this basic point needs resolving. How are Nolting and McGarr to reassure him on this point?
U.S. policy is to support Diem and he has been so informed by the President. We know that Big Minh has been outspoken about a coup. Diem certainly knows about the way Big Minh has been talking, also. Now we ask Diem to give practical control of his military force to a man who has talked about a coup. What realistic assurances can we give Diem that the action he fears won't take place?
It would seem that the increased U.S. military stake in Vietnam should afford some means for stabilizing the political relationships within the Vietnamese Armed Forces long enough for all concerned to get on with the war. Armed with facts about such a political stability, Nolting and McGarr should have little trouble in getting Diem to play ball.
E.G. Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
341. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Saigon, December 27, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Top Secret; Eyes Only. No transmission time is given on the source text.
SGN 919. Appreciate information your JCS 2027-61/2/ but of course am professionally and personally disappointed, as had hoped for recognition my position here. Evident from 16 December conference my frank periodic reports have failed to apprise top civilian policy makers of crux situation here, as they thinking of solving very unconventional situation in a basically conventional manner. Demand for speed of solution based on large scale military victories without comparable strong demand for equally important political-economic-psychological advances largely forces unilateral military action which will not give permanent results and which will prove counter productive. Permanent results require long range coordinated action on all fronts and defeat of insurgencies historically take years. Thompson, British Advisory Group now estimates at least five years required here.
/2/Document 338.
Failure of recent governmental level negotiations to obtain any semblance of mutual US-GVN decision making authority in any field continues give GVN actual veto power over valid U.S. proposed measures required to win. This participation in decision making reference spelled out in your cable.
However, decision to form a higher level command structure as a means of further impressing Diem with U.S. desire to help so that he will then cooperate by actions, not merely promises, disregards the basic nature of the man which our SecDef stated we could not change. Therefore, feel strongly fully adequate terms of reference for new Senior Military Commander need to be spelled out in detail and agreement in concrete be obtained from GVN prior to establishment top command slot. If SVN to be saved U.S. needs to receive real cooperation spelled out in action. This will not be gotten if we continue to give on all bargaining points in fear of charges of violation of sovereignty, which action increasingly "Fronts" military in near impossible unilateral role.
342. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/
[Palm Beach], December 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Series, Memos to the President. Secret. The President was in Palm Beach, Florida, where his father was ill and in the hospital, since December 19.
SUBJECT
Military Command in South VietnamI notice with some alarm that Secretary McNamara does not seem to have a personal judgment of General Harkins. I myself think it would be little more than a lucky accident if in fact the officer designated for SEATO duty some months ago should be just the right man for the extraordinarily difficult job in Vietnam. Moreover, it is my strong impression that the Joint Chiefs have wanted a 4-star officer because this gives them an unembarrassing way of relieving General McGarr. This desire to avoid embarrassment automatically limits to a very small number of officers the possible choice of a commander.
I have repeatedly heard it said, by General Taylor, by the civilian staff at the Pentagon, and by Secretary McNamara himself that the only way of getting a really new look in the Army is to reach into the age group of men between 35 and 45. This recommendation moves in the opposite direction.
I wonder if it would not be wise for you or Secretary McNamara, or perhaps both, to have a careful talk with Harkins, before this appointment is made. The history of our affairs in the Far East-Stilwell and Wedemeyer in China, Walker in Korea, McGarr in Vietnam, suggests that it is a matter of critical importance to get the right man on the first try in cases like this one.
McG. B./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
P.S. Because General Taylor is on holiday, I have not checked this matter with him, and you may want to get him over for a few minutes-he is in the Palm Beach area and the switchboard can reach him.
343. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr)/1/
Honolulu, December 28, 1961, 12:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, GVN Jan.-June 1962. Top Secret. Repeated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JACK AJCC, PACAF, and Navy GRNC.
282245Z. Defoliant operations. A. CHMAAG Vietnam 160451Z. B. CHMAAG Vietnam 220359Z. C. CINCPAC 232135Z./2/
/2/Reference C is printed as Document 337. References A and B have not been found.
1. In order to respond to decision made at SecDef meeting 16 Dec, a defoliant plan is required which clearly sets forth the objective of the operation and specific areas for the initial operation. Refs A and B contain basic data but are not selective enough. Our concept is that a defoliant operation should be developed with the following purposes in mind:
A. To assist the counter-insurgency operation by clearing lines of communication in support of current or projected campaigns.
B. To enhance capabilities for aerial observation of selected areas in Viet Cong controlled territory.
C. To assist in clearing fields of fire and to increase observation in order to decrease the likelihood of close-in ambushes.
2. The initial defoliant operation should be designed with above purposes in mind, but with limited specific objectives in order to provide us with an opportunity to evaluate its success and thereby to determine advisability of further operations.
3. With foregoing in mind, I have developed following plan for initial limited objective defoliating operations:
"1. Situation: The RVNAF is preparing to implement a campaign to eliminate the Viet Cong in specified provinces throughout South Vietnam. To assist these operations, action has been taken to provide for the initial employment of chemical defoliants to clear vegetation along key lines of communication (LOC) to be used in the counter-insurgency operations. This plan provides for the conduct of an initial defoliant operation.
2. Mission: to clear vegetation to a distance of 200 meters on both sides of key LOC by means of aerial and ground spray operations in support of current AC projected counter-insurgency campaigns and to determine the success of such operations.
3. Operations: (map ref: Indochina and Thailand 1:250,000 AMS series L-, sheets NC 48-3, 48-4, 48-7 and 48-8).
A. Concept:
(1) The operation will involve the systematic clearance of vegetation along key highways and access roads to be used as LOCS by SVN forces conducting counter-insurgency operations. Priority will be given to clearing vegetation along lines of communication (LOC) between seat of government and key cities to include roads peripheral to zone D. Defoliant operations will be conducted with both U.S. and SVN forces using ground and aerial spray equipment. Aerial spray operations will be conducted by U.S. aircraft, w/USAF markings, manned by U.S. personnel under PACAF control and with Vietnamese-manned H-34 helicopters equipped with Hidal spraying rig. Ground spray equipment will be manned and operated by RVANF personnel.
(2) USAF transport aircraft with aerial spray equipment will operate from Tan Son Nhut. USAF aircraft will be crewed by USAF personnel except that Commander 2nd ADVON will ensure that crews are augmented with RVNAF personnel to assist in identification of target areas. Commander 2nd ADVON will control air defoliant operations conducted by U.S. aircraft and coordinate the SVN helicopter operations through K AOC established in the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut.
(3) Specific missions, method of spraying and the time of execution will be determined by CHMAAG based upon the needs of Commanders responsible for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. CHMAAG will submit air mission requirements to Commander 2nd ADVON who will determine the feasibility of the mission in view of available resources, weather and other limiting factors. CHMAAG will determine the feasibility and coordinate the execution of spraying operations conducted by the RVNAF with vehicle mounted spray equipment. Where feasible, target areas will be designated and adequately marked by GVN personnel using colored markers, balloons helicopters or other means that will be readily identified by forces, air or ground, conducting the defoliant operation. Vietnamese personnel will be utilized to the maximum extent possible in the handling of chemicals for the defoliant operation to include delivery of defoliants to the spray aircraft under control of Commander 2nd ADVON.
(4) This phase of the operation will not include spraying of food crops, and action will be taken to ensure that such areas are avoided. In addition, cover [for] the deception operations designed to deny the Communists propaganda material will be conducted. These operations should provide for a logical explanation on the use of defoliant as a non-military venture for improvement and maintenance of transportation networks.
B. Conduct of operations when directed, defoliant operations will be conducted in the following areas in the priority indiceed [indicated]:
[Here follows a list of five areas as first priority and three areas as second priority.]"[end of document]
Volume I, Vietnam, 1961 Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State
