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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:04 a.m.

2343. For the Secretary from Lodge.

1. Thank you for your 1851/2/ and 1853./3/ It is good to know of the efforts which we are making to end the bloodshed and bring this war to the conference table. I only hope we are successful.

/2/Dated December 31, 1965, telegram 1851 was a retransmission of telegram 1073 from Warsaw, December 30. For text of telegram 1073, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 751-753.

/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 753-755.

2. However, one thing in your messages is most disturbing. That is the reference to possible independent Viet Cong participation in the talks.

3. Our traditional--and commendable--position on that subject has been that the Viet Cong can then [participate?] as part of the Hanoi delegation or that they would have no difficulties making themselves heard, presumably through the Hanoi delegation or some other indirect means. This position combines firm adherence to principle with a demonstrated desire to be conciliatory and not to let little things stand in our way.

4. Actually inviting the Viet Cong to the table, however, under any formula, would be no little thing. It would have the most serious consequences here in Viet Nam and of our international position, and would be very unwise, for the following reasons:

A. Even if the Viet Cong did not join the talks, our invitation would automatically give an aura of legitimacy to the apparatus of terror and intimidation which the Viet Cong have set up in South Viet Nam. Viet Cong cells and agents would immediately stand up and claim to represent the true government. They would initiate an even more ruthless campaign of terror in the country and would also rapidly take over administrative functions. The population would be at their mercy. Nobody would dare to resist them because they would be able to claim that they are no longer bandits but members of a legitimate organization whose claim to speak for the people of South Viet Nam has been recognized by the United States. The result is that we would find the country literally swept out from under us.

B. Affirming the position of GVN as sole legitimate government of South Viet Nam will be pretty empty talk if we have accepted a Viet Cong regime competitive with it. We should realize that such a blow is one which the present [government?] cannot survive. It would produce political chaos among democratic elements in South Viet Nam, and would prompt fence-sitting elements to go neutralist quickly and pave the way for a Communist take-over. It would thus undercut our military effort.

C. The formula suggested by Rapacki is even more dangerous. If the Soviets invite the Viet Cong to sit at the table, and we invite the GVN and the Buddhists, Catholics, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and others, then the Viet Cong, which claim to represent all South Viet Nam political, religious, and minority groups, would be unaffected by the other invitations. Only the power and influence of the GVN (if it could even consent to such an arrangement) would suffer from such a situation. The Viet Cong, having been legitimized by our invitation to the conference table, would claim to represent the wave of the future. Other groups would try to make their peace with them, and we would have no choice but to accept defeat and to leave Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, equating the Viet Cong, which is a rebel murder group, with peaceful law abiding organizations, in particular the great and noble Roman Catholic Church can only make sense to a Communist. It strikes at the heart of our moral position in Viet Nam. If "world opinion" believes otherwise, it is up to us to educate world opinion rather than yield to it. We cannot in good conscience ignore the facts.

D. We appear politically and morally unaware when we take at face value and unquestioningly accept the Viet Cong description of themselves as a "National Liberation Front" or Hanoi's description of itself as the "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." Actually, the Viet Cong is an "enslavement front," and the Hanoi regime is not only not democratic nor republican but dictatorial and Communist.

E. In attaching importance to the role of the Viet Cong we are focusing on a question which does not concern Hanoi very much but which does concern Saigon and our position vitally. Hanoi has often told us that it does not consider the presence of the Viet Cong at the bargaining table to be as important an issue as several other questions. Therefore, if we cave in on the Viet Cong representation question, we are not going to get much in return from Hanoi but we will have struck a deadly blow at the non-Communists in South Viet Nam.

F. By offering recognition and a direct voice to the Viet Cong, we would be making another concession in an effort to bring about talks, whereas Hanoi so far has made none. Hanoi would assume that we are anxious for talks, that we would make further concessions, and they would toughen their attitude rather than soften it. We would therefore be strengthening the voice of those elements in Hanoi which claim that America is a paper tiger and that we cannot maintain our determination in a long struggle.

5. I cannot help but be reminded of the Communist effort in 1953 to get the Soviet Union seated as a neutral at the Korean peace conference. It was a particularly outrageous and thoroughly impotent attempt inasmuch as the Soviet Union had actively sided and abetted the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. But Krishna Menon and others were able to wrap it up in the cotton wool of sophistry and some of our "enlightened" press and politicians discussed it more solemnly and respectfully than they did most State Department proposals. We had to work hard for several months to get rid of it. To propose treating these murderous Viet Cong dragon's teeth in Viet Nam as a respectable government is just as outrageous and it would be wiser to step on it early rather than let it gain currency--and respectability--among the unthinking.

6. I have discussed this issue at great length in this telegram because I believe it is so vital to our position here that we cannot afford to yield on it if we want to keep our position in Southeast Asia and to maintain the integrity of our commitments around the world. It would collapse the GVN, would be regarded as the beginning of a Communist take-over, and would disintegrate virtually everything that we have worked so hard to create. This is not a simple matter of stubborn adherence to meaningless legalism but a crucial issue of substance. I hope that you and our emissaries abroad at this critical juncture will quickly and unequivocally reaffirm our previous stand.

7. If I may comment on 1851, let me submit that para 3 (A) is dangerously unrealistic. All experience shows that "a period of calm and tranquility" is not conducive to Communist cooperation. On the contrary, results can only be expected in negotiations with the Communists by the application of military pressures before the talks begin and while they are in progress. See Panmunjon.

8. The statement in 3 (A) of 1851 that "the U.S. expects that the Vietnam side will reciprocate with a parallel gesture" is an unsound expectation which would only be valid if Hanoi consisted of Americans who value human life and deeply want peace, but, as Hanoi consists of Communists who are contemptuous of human life and want to conquer, the expectation is false. Also, the reference to "mutual desire" is not clear since the Communist side has made none.

9. Para 3 (C) of 1851 states that the U.S. is "flexible" concerning the Viet Cong and "is ready to consider the possibilities of talks in all variations and with different participants including also the National Liberation Front." This is dangerous for the reasons stated above. This is one issue on which flexibility can be fatal./4/

/4/In telegram 1865 to Saigon January 1, Rusk thanked Lodge for telegram 2343 and responded: "Your reasoning is compelling and reflects my own evaluation of problem of Viet Cong representation." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Lodge

2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 3, 1966, 11:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

SUBJECT
The Peace Offensive--where we are today

1. With the Communists

The Communists directly engaged--Moscow, Peking and Hanoi--have made no diplomatic comment and their propaganda continues to be negative. But only Peking takes an absolute position. The most recent semi-official Hanoi statement/2/ should not be taken as final. It is an excellent example of the continuing effort by Hanoi to secure major concessions on the four points,/3/ while seeming to be reasonable. The key word this time is that the U.S. should "acknowledge" the points. Hanoi also asks for a complete and unconditional cessation of all attacks on North Vietnam.

/2/Probably a reference to the commentary by "Observer" in the January 3 issue of Nhan Dan, which was carried by Hanoi radio in English at 12:31 a.m. EST on January 3. (Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives)

/3/The four points were set forth on April 8, 1965, by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, pp. 544-545.

The Communists who are interested in getting negotiations started--the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Yugoslavs--are still at work, and we have no reports back. All three of them have emphasized the need for time--the Hungarians speak of the problem of communicating with the jungle; Tito speaks of the need to let differences ripen in Hanoi.

2. Less direct mediators

These include the British, the Canadians, the Vatican, U Thant and Nasser. The British are simply telling the Russians how serious and sincere we are, and the Canadians have already done likewise. The Vatican is sending Monsignor Rodhain to Saigon, and if possible to Hanoi. The Algerians have agreed to talk to all their Communist contacts, including the NLF. Harriman sees Nasser tomorrow. Here again, the lines are nearly all out, but we have no diplomatic answers back. One additional possibility is Japan.

3. The French

De Gaulle is in a class by himself. He has been fully informed and has expressed his warm appreciation. At the same time, he has made clear his conviction that nothing will happen until we announce that we will definitely withdraw at the end of negotiations./4/ His Foreign Minister emphasizes the importance of a recognized role for the NLF. De Gaulle has sneered at our efforts in a private conversation with the British Ambassador./5/ We have not asked the French for anything. This was wise.

/4/De Gaulle's views on Vietnam were reported in telegram 3701 from Paris, December 31; for text, see ibid., vol. III, pp. 757-760.

/5/Reported in telegram 3709 from Paris, January 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

4. Our Pacific allies

These are more sympathetic to the peace offensive than we might have expected. There was slight nervousness in Taipei and Bangkok, but the Vice President has calmed one and the Secretary of State the other. There is deep understanding and support for our effort in Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. So far we have not sent presidential messages to Menzies and Holyoake, and I have requested drafts today. Their governments have been kept very fully informed and there has been no complaint.

5. The Latin Americans

Here we have had unusually strong response from Diaz Ordaz, Leoni, and others, but no reply yet from Castello Branco. It remains for consideration whether we should follow up one suggestion and have an OAS meeting to reaffirm the need for peace.

6. The Africans

The response to Governor Williams' trip/6/ has been excellent so far. He has been in Morocco, Tunis, Algiers, and Ethiopia, and is in Kenya and Tanzania today. Except for Algiers, there is no active interest so far in joining the diplomatic game, but there is general support.

/6/Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams visited Africa January 3-6. His draft conclusions and recommendations were transmitted in telegram 501 from Dakar, January 7. (Ibid., EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1)

7. The United Nations

This is a special case. Goldberg recommends a letter which would become a Security Council document, and a draft will be at hand at noon./7/ It has also been suggested that U Thant be asked to organize an advisory group of neutrals. I find the strongest opposition to this idea from McNamara and Rusk. Both of them feel that we must not hand over the diplomatic scales to this kind of a third party. Most of the world would like nothing better than to recognize the NLF in ways that would be very damaging in Saigon. This is only one of a number of issues on which we must do our own bargaining, because no one else can be relied on to do it for us.

/7/Goldberg's January 4 letter to U Thant is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 744-745.

Issues for Discussion

1. Immediate tactical steps

a. Harriman to Japan

b. Letters to Menzies and Holyoake

c. Letter to U Thant

2. Public position for this week

Our 14 points/8/ have only begun to get the attention they deserve, and they have had a reaction of affirmative interest from such surprising quarters as Algiers, and even indirectly the New York Times. We should develop and expand them on a background basis, and we should challenge all concerned to say why they are not a perfectly solid basis for discussion. This job will best be done under the direct supervision of the Secretary of State.

/8/Drafted by Secretary Rusk in late December 1965, the fourteen points were included in an "Outline of U.S. Position on Viet-Nam" made available to the press on January 3 by Vice President Humphrey and released separately by the Department of State on January 7 under the title "United States Official Position on Viet-Nam." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 704-707, and Department of State Bulletin, January 24, 1966, p. 116.

We should continue to avoid any discussion of the duration of the pause, and we should continue to bat down any discussion of an ultimatum.

By the end of the week, attention will begin to move toward the State of the Union message./9/ We should have a firm position as to what we do and do not say ahead of time on that subject.

/9/Delivered January 12; see footnote 3, Document 19.

So far we have had almost no public criticism of the pause. But Senator Symington's cable/10/ is a sample of what we will get more of as the days go by. Since it is entirely clear that the diplomatic power of the pause is directly related to its length, we need to study additional ways of maintaining its momentum. Properly orchestrated, the 14 points can help us through this week. Can the State of the Union take us as far as Tet?

/10/Not further identified.

McG. B.

3. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 3, 1966, 12:55-2:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes by hand; they were typed later, apparently shortly after President Johnson left office. The editor has checked this typescript and the typescripts of all subsequent Valenti notes for accuracy against Valenti's handwritten notes and has made minor corrections. (Ibid., Office of the President File, "Valenti, Jack, Notes Taken at Various Meetings During 1965 and 1966") The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

PRESENT
President, Rusk, Bundy, McNamara, Ball, Moyers, Valenti/2/

/2/According to the President's Daily Diary, Vice President Humphrey was also present. (Ibid.)

Rusk: Been in touch with all 113 nations/resp. from 40. Gen. reaction good. DeGaulle unsatis. Question:

President: Did DeG. exp. this to Goldb.

Rusk: Yes, in substance. He says we underestimate Hanoi. They won't give up. FMin of Fr. has not seen Chaval--and won't let our people see Chaval.

President: Chaval made some statements, didn't he.

Rusk: Yes, but it was out of context.

Rusk: In Korea, Formosa, Thailand, there was some worry about their security.

President: How did Ky take it.

Rusk: He took it well when Lodge told him.

President: How about Lodge, any roadblock.

Rusk: Not yet, perhaps later. We got a telegr. from Symington./3/

/3/See footnote 10, Document 2.

President: That prob. comes from Air Force people.

President: You see anything from any of these conversations that would be encouraging?

Rusk: Not yet. But Yugoslavs say we have put Hanoi under tremendous pressure. I take a little encouragement that Hanoi and Peking have not commented directly on the peace offensive. Little too early. Need to wait to see effects of Shelepin trip./4/ Thompson says ought to see Dobrynin about time Shelepin leaves.

/4/Shelepin led a five-man Soviet mission that visited Hanoi January 7-12. For speculation in the Department of State about the purpose of his visit, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 753-754.

Have to watch Brit. a little. They'd be inclined to give away too much. We don't want to lose cards we need to deal with.

We must be clear with Brit.

President: A little amazed that Brit. would be puzzled. I would want to talk to Wilson while at same time, Wilson says he was pleased.

Rusk: A little snafu. Don't think PM was involved.

Next prob. is whether we send Harriman to Japan.

Bundy: We've been playing it that VP was doing this. Perhaps we could say VP wanted him to go.

Rusk: Shall we continue the pause. Do you see any prob.

President: I see lots of problems, but we should continue.

Rusk: Don't think we should resume it while Shelepin is in Hanoi.

McNamara: I told Chiefs I would advise to resume the bombings if Chiefs could show me how we were being hurt in the So. No answer from them, which is very encouraging.

We have re-instituted full reconnaissance of NVN.

Rusk: The Speaker, Hickenlooper seem relaxed. Mrs. Bolton likewise. Ball talked to Mansfield, Dirksen and Fulbright.

McNamara: Talked to Rivers, he is ready to resume bombing. He is in foul mood with me because we have cut back a const. project in S.C.

President: Orig. intended to go to New Yr. After a couple of weeks, intended to go back, now, what do you advise we do--wait until we hear--

Rusk: So far as other side, they've had reasonable assurance, the pause will go to middle of next week.

President: Any significance that on the first pause, they said NUTS. Now they haven't said anything.

Rusk: Yes, that is good.

President: Are all your senior officials asking?

Rusk: Yes.

Bundy: Pres. recollection is precise and right. (reads P. telegram to Lodge which pinpoints the pause continues til middle of this week.)/5/

/5/Telegram 1805 to Saigon, December 28, 1965; for text, see ibid., pp. 717-719.

Rusk: Perhaps we ought to give Lodge a country-by-country rundown on resp. to peace offensive.

President: Anything to be gained by Lodge talking to Harriman. Maybe Harriman can tell him exactly what he has learned. It would give us time.

President: Think we might want to think about it. Though it would appeal to Lodge to want to find out what H. [Harriman] found out.

(Rusk, Ball, McN and B. all agreed this was good idea to send Harriman.)

(Vice Pres. entered the room at this time.)

President: Been talking about how to keep Saigon in with us--before hard liners move in on us. Thinking to send Harriman to Japan, then on to Saigon with Lodge and Westmoreland.

How long will Shelepin stay in Hanoi--(to Rusk).

Answers: 5 days.

Could it be Hanoi is gaining any substantial military adv. while we are pausing.

McNamara: No. We can knock out any bridges they repair. Bombing them has not reduced infiltration.

Bundy: When we will resume bombings and when we lose planes (?) some will blame the pause.

President: Any question that we have to go back to bombings after a pause.

(No objections)

McNamara: I am very encouraged by resp. political leaders Goldb. and H. talked to. You will lose this if you resume bombing on Wednesday.

If we resume, people will say it's a fraud.

President: What do the pause advocates say?

Bundy: For the first time we have made headway with NY Times.

Rusk: I told Reston that no matter how long we stopped bombing it will never be long enough for Times.

Ball: I think this will disarm our critics in the Congress.

President: I believe we'll have to go on over for several days. See no real reasons for starting it now. Conversations with others give me hope and we'll continue. Our big problem will be they'll let us stew in our own juice. Then we'll stew in theirs.

This will be a bad week, a bad month.

What do you do with Goldberg?

I think the "I told you so" boys will say it wasn't handled right. I brought in VP, H., G. [Goldberg] and Williams. Think they will say it wasn't handled properly in the beginning.

Rusk: The resp. from all over the world has converted everyone.

President: I think Alsop and Reston are unhappy because they weren't consulted.

Rusk: 50/50 chance we'll get something back from some Comm. country by Wed.

President: How to get Goldberg to report--without being dramatic, or building up hope. You know how I feel about keeping this at low key.

See nothing wrong with saying they told all the people they saw we were ready to talk instead of fight.

Bundy: I think the resp. from Poland and the Vatican is worth entire expedition.

Rusk: Tomorrow, suggest Goldberg report to you tomorrow, and then report to U Thant. Perhaps later, a letter from Goldberg to U Thant.

Moyers: Goldberg thinks it is time to get out Pope's letter--

President: Does that pump up things--like we are dramatizing it all.

Moyers: No.

Rusk: Another element is timing. Harriman is 74. He needs a day's rest.

President: I agree.

Rusk: Question of OAS resolution--can probably get a resolution. But worried that some like Frei/6/ would feel constrained about saying the pause shouldn't be resumed.

/6/Reference is to President Eduardo Frei of Chile.

President: Counter the suggestion--compliment them--and suggest they talk to other countries on their own. Better way to serve the cause of peace.

Then you will take steps to get in Goldberg tomorrow.

Rusk: Releasing Pope's letter/7/ tomorrow will give good cause for not resuming bombing.

/7/Transmitted in telegram 1661 from Rome, December 30, 1965, the Pope's letter was released on January 4, 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA)

President: Do we want to release Pope's letter?

Rusk: Might put pressures on you to release other messages. I gather the Pope is already putting out this kind of message.

Rusk: Then we'll meet with Goldberg tomorrow. (to B. [Ball], McN) What do you think Hanoi is doing now?

McNamara: Possibly daylight traffic on the roads, and rebuilding bridges. I am concerned over inc. infiltration into SVN. This is not a result of cessation of bombing.

Ball: Also a situation of MIG 21 coming in.

McNamara: I believe that when we resume bombing--in six mo. we'll be in air battles with Hanoi aircraft--and in year we'll battle Chinese aircraft.

Ball: Thais are also worried that we didn't push China to the wall.

(Pres. asked HH to give any views he had on trip)

President: What else can we do--we have dispatched people all over the world. What can we do further?

We know that our bombing resp. has not done the job.

Valenti: Why not direct contact--possibly thru the Frei types?

Bundy: We are doing a great deal of this. We need to do more.

President: If we try to hold too long without backgrounding, to let everyone [know] we are (genuine?), they're going to hammer at us that we over-dramatize.

Let the press know about the shape of responses.

Bundy: Could tell press to go after the Ambassadors and it would be more persuasive to let them say it, not us.

President: All right, we wait to see Goldberg.

4. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, January 3, 1966, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; XYZ. Drafted by Paul Sturm (identified as "Y" in the telegram) and authenticated by Culver Gleysteen. For documentation on earlier contacts of Edmund Gullion ("X") of the United States with Mai Van Bo ("Rupert") of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 312-316, 319, 328-332, 334-337, and 367-371.

3732. Literally Eyes Only Secretary from McBride.

1. Vo van Sung (henceforth referred to as Jean) received Y at 4 afternoon third at 6 Rue Vineuse in apartment double living room of which arranged as office; Jean on one side closed French doors, unidentified French woman secretary remained on other side. Y expressed regret Rupert's illness and hope his early recovery. Jean indicated illness no more than a cold.

2. Y handed over text Rangoon aide-memoire, typed on plain paper, together with hand-written French translation. Y said instructions to Ambassador had been to pass to DRV representation Rangoon./2/ Jean quickly described this as Consulate General. Fast response plus failure indicate any surprise or particular interest suggest he may have had prior knowledge of transmittal, but this is only supposition Y's part. In any case, Jean read document carefully and raised no question about accepting it. Y carefully spelled out what possession this document meant with regard Y's bona fides. Y added he could henceforth be considered authentic spokesman and Paris channel for any USG communications with DRV. Jean registered comprehension. Y said X's role and his hitherto dictated by need maintain entire secrecy of contacts. Jean murmured agreement such need existed. (At end of interview Y said he was seeing no French in Paris and no other Vietnamese.)

/2/For text of the aide-memoire and instructions to Ambassador Byroade, see ibid., pp. 721-722.

3. Thereafter Y handed over French translation X's version of DRV four points,/3/ with explanation of background. He added USG continued ready serious conversations and spoke of amended version of four points as offering good point of departure, since it included what seemed to us as essentials, i.e., eventual US military departure and reunification country in accord freely expressed wishes people of Vietnam north and south. Jean asked why USG unable accept DRV four points as they were published. Y replied USG unable accept proposition South Vietnam could be bound to program of NLF. Jean said, "Then you ignore wishes of the people". Y rejoined NLF was far from constituting all the people, but that they could be consulted like anyone else. He then reminded Jean this was same old ground trodden many times, and perhaps it would be useful pass on to other matters. In conclusion he referred to President Johnson's statement US was putting everything in basket of peace except liberty of people of South Vietnam./4/ Jean snorted at this, saying "You talk of peace and negotiations, but all your actions are warlike. What about McNamara's statement after bombing Haiphong power plant that war would go on?/5/ What about the reinforcements that are pouring in?" Y replied that the business of the military and of defense ministers was to wage war until they were told to wage peace. The same was true of his military as of ours. Ardent wish of President and American people was to find acceptable end to Vietnam war, but until this was found, there was no option but to continue military build up, for our own sake and sake of our friends. Jean queried sourly, "Do you think government of South Vietnam really exists?"

/3/For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97.

/4/This statement appeared in a paper prepared by Rusk on December 27, 1965, for use by U.S. officials sent abroad to promote the peace process; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 704-707.

/5/Reference is presumably to McNamara's statement at a press conference on December 16, 1965; see Public Statements of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 1965, vol. V, p. 2237. (Johnson Library)

4. Y mentioned visits of presidential emissaries to various capitals and explained carefully purpose of missions was to indicate to heads of government that USG intention was to give DRV opportunity make useful response which could be first of series of steps leading to peace talks. While war could and no doubt would be resumed, this was only a fact of life and near certainty of resumption in absence DRV response could not be interpreted as ultimatum.

5. Jean wondered aloud what response would be possible so long as USG refused accept DRV four points. Y said he had always been puzzled by sense and importance DRV attached to four points. Of course we agreed that anybody's four points, assuming the anybody to have a valid interest in the matter, could be considered in negotiations. Was admittance of them to an agenda enough? If so, there was no problem. Jean said, quite clearly, DRV four points must be basis of solution.

6. Jean indicated he would pass papers to Rupert but added that if Y were at any time unable reach Rupert, Y could reach Jean at Trocadero 08-23. Comment: this may indicate Rupert is away from Paris or does not wish personally continue contact. On other hand, it may be evidence of desire maintain contact unbroken. Y told Jean he could be reached at any time at his hotel and that if for any reason he left Paris he would inform Rupert in writing how he could be reached.

7. At no time did Jean indicate he had other than a listening brief, despite comments he made. He was entirely willing to accept papers passed to him. He had no message to transmit. Making polite conversation at end interview, Y asked Jean which part of Vietnam he came from. Jean said he came from the south but had been north since 1955; for this reason he knew what the people of the south were thinking.

McBride

5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, January 4, 1966, 9:42 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Unger and by McGeorge Bundy in substance, and approved by William Bundy.

1889. For Ambassador and David Bell.

1. President is most anxious to show in every possible way our concern for peaceful development and progress of SVN and our emphasis on non-military measures. To this end, we would like to be able to announce on Bell's return constructive and visible initiatives in economic and welfare areas. One such initiative has been proposed by Secy Freeman in the form of visit of agricultural experts who might dramatize what is being done now in SVN, how VC are striking at the chance for peaceful progress, and what could potentially be done in future if VC menace were removed. This might include demonstration of potential for electric power in local areas and demonstrations of such possibilities as timber development using simple equipment.

2. This is one example of kind of public visits by experts that would both assist in present task and dramatize our whole peaceful emphasis. Would greatly appreciate it if Ambassador and Bell could consider other possibilities so that Bell could be prepared consider early initiatives that might be announced by President shortly after his return.

3. We are well aware of great economic burden of current construction and other activity, and are not necessarily considering any immediate dramatic additional action projects. However, technical visits on comparatively small scale might have dramatic impact and show by example what would now be possible but for VC, and what could become possible in future.

Rusk

6. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:20 a.m. and passed to the White House at 9:40. McGeorge Bundy forwarded it to President Johnson at 2:30 p.m. under a covering memorandum that stated: "Here is an important dispatch from Lodge. As you can see, he is still pulling hard for a quick end to the pause." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)

2399. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Bombing Pause

The following are straws in the wind as regards Viet Cong and Vietnamese reaction to the bombing pause:

A. On Christmas day, about 1,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were reliably observed entering South Viet Nam.

B. Incidents during the period December 26 through January 1 total 1,133. This is the highest total of incidents ever recorded in one week since the Communist aggression began. This includes the bombing of an American enlisted men's billet at Dalat.

C. Prime Minister Ky told me Monday that one result of the bombing pause was sharply to reduce the number of returnees coming into the Chieu Hoi camps. He said that when bombing resumed, more people would come into the camps. As you know, we are planning a big Chieu Hoi effort at Tet time for which we have great expectations. I am glad to say that for the week just ended the number of returnees has shown a modest increase in line with the general trend.

D. Vietnamese newspaper Tien Vang saw the bombing pause as an invitation for Hanoi to appraise the United States as weakening in its determination to carry on the war.

E. The Vietnamese newspaper Saigon Daily News carried four column cartoon showing masses of B-52's flying over the Vietnamese countryside with two Vietnamese men standing looking up at them. One of the men says to the other: "Are they going north"? The other says: "No." And the first man says: "Let us move to the north then."

F. The Vietnamese newspaper Tu Do, referring to VC peace gestures, warns: "You can make any concessions you want on your part, but you cannot depart from what has been held dear to us: South Viet Nam must be the place for Vietnamese nationalists only. Under no circumstances can any Communist be allowed to set foot here."

G. Col. Pham Van Lieu, Director of National Police, seemed unhappy with the pause saying that the United States should not try to talk with Hanoi. "You Americans should talk to the Russians and the Chinese, and if there is any talking to be done with Hanoi, we should do it."

H. If resumption of bombing is delayed much longer, you may find that, when you decide to resume the strikes, it will be near the beginning of Tet--a celebration full of meaning for all Vietnamese. Resumption near Tet--say within the week or so immediately preceding it--might subject us to the criticism that while the United States observed the Christian spirit of Christmas, we violated the spirit of Tet. Such criticism could well force you to postpone resumption of the bombing until the very end of January or early February.

2. Letter to Menzies

In telegram transmitting text of your letter to Menzies/2/ you ask for my comments, which are as follows:

/2/Telegram 1882 to Saigon, January 4. President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister Menzies summarized the progress of the peace offensive and discussed the possibility of continuing the bombing pause "at least into next week." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Seen from Saigon, the bombing pause is not only not evoking any reciprocal cessation of Communist military activity, it is marked by a definite increase. It is also interpreted as a sign of weakness, although Vietnamese in the government familiar with American ways understand the motivation behind it.

The presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet Nam added to the increase in VC incidents seems to me to make the bombing indispensable. It creates the need to hit this NVN army wherever we can hit it: in the sources of its power in the north, along its line of communication through Laos, in the high plateau of SVN and, if need be, on the SVN coastal plane. The resumption of bombing is, therefore, necessary from the standpoint of the purely military action against the army of North Viet Nam. It is also highly desirable as regards the psychological war against the Viet Cong, which, until the bombing pause, was definitely going in our favor.

My last talk with General Ky on this subject, other than his casual comment on January 3 repeated above, was on December 29. At that time, I told him, based on Deptel 1805,/3/ that the bombing would probably resume by the middle of this week.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 717-719.

Of course, I have no first hand contact with whatever results the bombing pause may be achieving outside of this area and do not know how widespread the appeal of the pause is as regards American public opinion and Congress. I realize that you must measure results here against results achieved elsewhere. But in this area, the pause has not only done us no good; it has definitely caused losses, as the "straws in the wind" mentioned under paragraph 1 clearly shows. From this vantage point, therefore, it would be well if you followed intentions set forth in Deptel 1805 and resumed bombing now.

3. U.S. opinion re Viet Nam

A. I try to share your worries in the hope that I can produce some helpful advice. In this spirit I cogitate about American public opinion and the attitudes in Congress. I recognize that I am far away from home and yet I see a great many Congressmen and I have quite a lengthy experience in back of me, notably as a U.S. Senator during the Korean war when I was closely in touch with public sentiment in the face of mounting casualties.

B. I will of course, always exert maximum pressure for the speediest possible results. I believe that as prudent men we must also make plans on the basis that the Vietnamese struggle will not be quickly ended. I notice that even Senator Morse admits that we cannot withdraw from Viet Nam. Also, I believe the Communists are determined to drag this thing out until the '68 elections.

C. This raises the question of whether an effort should not be made to get the American people to understand that this Chinese Communist imperialism, which manifests itself in so many subtle and disguised forms, is something with which we are going to have to live year in and year out./4/ I remember in the late 40's and early 50's we thought in terms of "cleaning up" the situation in Europe. I can remember that dates were discussed by which time the situation in Europe should be cleaned up. We were impatient and somewhat petulant. Then we learned how to live with the cold war. I think one of General Eisenhower's contributions as President was educating people to the idea that we had to live with the cold war, year in and year out. In those days when we said cold war, we meant the Soviet Union.

/4/Lodge qualified this comment in telegram 2514, January 13, Document 20.

D. I realize that public opinion will support greater or lesser casualty figures depending on the degree of feeling and conviction which it holds about the war. Also, for some reason, it accepts casualties on the highways for no particular cause more easily than it does casualties on the battlefield for causes that are noble and deserving of sacrifice. Psychologically, the thing is complicated because, concurrently with all these feelings is the view that we must "fish or cut bait or row ashore" and this argues for more drastic measures. And more drastic measures in turn can sometimes mean fewer casualties.

E. I believe it simplifies thinking to have a clear idea in one's own mind of what constitutes a satisfactory outcome. I do not say a "perfect" outcome. I notice one administration spokesman described a satisfactory outcome recently as one in "which the people of South Viet Nam can determine freely their own government in the future." Does this mean elections which are free from intimidation all over the country? If so, I do not think we need to go that far in order to feel that we have achieved a satisfactory result. Neither do I think that we should insist on such goals as utterly destroying the North Vietnamese military potential or seizing the valley of the Mekong in the Laos panhandle. "Satisfactory outcome," as the U.S. Mission tried to define it in Saigon 1377,/5/ still seems one reasonable definition, although undoubtedly not the only one. But even this implies heavier punishment of North Viet Nam.

/5/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 470-473.

F. One conclusion from all this is that if public opinion is accustomed to the idea that we have to live with this dangerous and complicated Chinese Communist aggression year in and year out, it will stand casualties better and will not be as impatient because quick results have not been achieved. Also casualties will probably be fewer. And if we should get a few breaks and things started to go our way rather quickly, success would be especially sweet if it came at a time when no one really expected it.

4. David Bell

I am most grateful to you for sending David Bell. His visit has been a great success because he brought with him from Washington carefully thought out, constructive and concrete measures for the problems which are bothering the GVN most. His recommendations concerning the port of Saigon and the threat of inflation are sure to make a tremendous difference. We can always use visitors like him.

5. Economic

Retail prices in the Saigon area rose slightly in the week ending December [garble], but these increases represented more or less normal market fluctuations. USOM's index of both food and non-food prices remains virtually the same as it was one month ago. Gold and dollar prices receded from last week's high level.

Saigon's power situation was much improved on December 27 when a new plant producing 20 megavolts eliminated almost 50 percent of the power shortage which has prevailed for the last 7-1/2 months. Another big American contribution!

Lodge

7. Summary Notes of the 555th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, January 5, 1966, 5:45-6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

Peace Offensive Regarding Vietnam

The Vice President: reported on a recent trip, to Japan, Korea, Formosa, and the Philippines./2/ (Copies of the Vice President's memoranda are attached.)/3/ He said the theme of his report was expressed in a sentence in Philippine President Marcos' speech: "Those who fight for liberty fight for us." This sentence describes the attitude of the four countries visited.

/2/Humphrey returned to Washington on January 3 from a 5-day tour.

/3/Attached but not printed.

There is recognition by Asian leaders that Asians must do much more about their own problems in the Asian area.

The Japanese are elated over our peace offensive and are supporting it by talking to the Russians.

The Philippinos are prepared to commit additional forces in Vietnam but they welcome the peace offensive.

In Taiwan, skepticism was expressed about the peace offensive. They believe the enemy is Communist China more than North Vietnam.

In Korea, the attitude toward the war is the best of the four countries. If the Koreans are asked to send more troops to Vietnam, they will want assurances covering their security. They doubt that the peace offensive will affect morale. Negotiations do not affect the commitment to South Vietnam.

In general, the peace offensive is supported, but doubts are expressed that it would produce any results.

Ambassador Goldberg reported on his conversations with UN Secretary General U Thant, the Pope, Italian leaders, de Gaulle, and Prime Minister Wilson.

a. UN Secretary General U Thant said the peace offensive would test whether Hanoi was dominated by Communist China.

b. The Pope accepted our sincerity, said he believed we were sincere in seeking peace, adding that he would do everything he could to work for a settlement.

c. Italian leaders favored the bombing lull. They believed our action had been helpful to the Moro government.

d. De Gaulle was polite but expressed his lack of confidence in the peace offensive. For him, the only course of action is U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. Foreign Minister Couve took a slightly different position, arguing that the National Liberation Front should be part of a coalition government before negotiations could be undertaken.

e. Prime Minister Wilson spoke of a new British initiative as ICC co-chairman. He asked that the peace offensive be prolonged long enough for the Soviets to react on the basis of Shelepin's visit.

USIA Director Marks summarized world press reaction to the peace offensive. The USIA summary is attached./4/

/4/Attached but not printed.

In general, the peace initiative is welcomed but doubts are expressed that it will produce results. Some writers think the peace offensive is merely a prelude to further military action.

The Japanese press is not helpful despite the favorable view of its government. In Latin America, the press gives unreserved support. In the Middle East, press reaction is mixed.

Secretary Rusk summarized the scope of the peace offensive.

Of the 113 countries which have been contacted since the offensive was launched December 28, 70 have responded. Of these, 57 countries have responded favorably, six countries received our representations without comment, two countries (Thailand and South Korea) have indicated they think the U.S. suspension of bombing is a mistake. The South Vietnamese are noncommittal, having stated no objection so far.

Special emissaries have been sent to 34 foreign governments. (Further details are contained in a State Department memorandum attached.)/5/

/5/Attached but not printed.

The reaction from the other side is not what it was last May when Hanoi rejected our note,/6/ Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said the note was insulting, and the press from the first day said the pause would not lead to negotiations. This time, none of these things happened.

/6/For text of the note, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, pp. 637-638.

Twenty-five secondary demarches are under way. The Yugoslavs tell us that Hanoi is under great pressure.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation in Southeast Asia began in Vienna with President Kennedy. A serious effort is being made to find a solution and it is generally believed that if this fails, our full military effort in South Vietnam will be renewed. However, if we resume the bombing, we will lose the support of almost all those who now support us. Mr. Shelepin leaves tomorrow but we do not know how long he will stay.

On the political side, we have had a plus for the last ten days, but the situation in South Vietnam has not improved.

Our position will erode here if we wait much longer to resume the bombing but abroad we will lose support if we resume.

Secretary Rusk said he wished to discuss privately with the President on the next moves./7/

/7/The President met in his office at 6:45 p.m. on January 5 with Rusk, Humphrey, McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, and Goldberg to discuss two possible moves: 1) taking the issue to the United Nations, and 2) calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, DRV, GVN, and Communist China. Ball proposed the second alternative in a January 5 memorandum to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) Valenti's brief notes of the meeting are ibid., President's Appointment File.

Secretary McNamara said the problem of timing the resumption of the bombing was serious. The American people looked at the situation soberly. The Administration is speaking with one voice. It is very helpful that divergent views are not being publicized.

The President: We are in a difficult position but it is a much better position than if we had not responded to the urging that we hold off bombing to see whether this would lead to peace. We have made the record clear. We can return to the earlier situation if the pause does not work. We have a better basis to call on the U.S. people not only for their sons, but also their treasure. Americans feel better if they know we have gone the last mile even if we have had grave doubts about doing so. The basis for a supplemental budget to pay the increased costs of the war has been laid. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg will pursue whatever leads they may get.

We don't intend to become weaker in Southeast Asia. We are following a course to unite our people and make possible a follow through. The diplomatic offensive boils down to saying that we are ready to reason this out. One poll shows that 73 percent of the American people wanted us to increase our diplomatic efforts. In the last twelve months, 200 conferences have been held by Secretary Rusk in an attempt to get negotiations going. But his efforts are not known publicly. Tonight, more people in the U.S. and the world think we want peace than thought so two weeks ago. This is an asset.

Bromley Smith

8. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge)/1/

New York, January 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. In a January 7 covering memorandum under which he forwarded the letter to Read for dispatch to Saigon, Sisco noted that it had been requested by the President and read and approved by Rusk and Ball. (Ibid.)

Dear Cabot:

I am writing you from your old hot seat, having just returned from my brief trip to the Vatican, Paris and London, which I undertook at the President's request./2/ From these two vantage points, I thought you might be interested in my own feelings regarding the key decisions ahead--particularly those relating to the resumption of the bombing.

/2/Goldberg returned to Washington on January 2 following his European tour.

First, and of overriding importance: the envoys and messages despatched by the President during the past two weeks, as well as current discussions with foreign diplomats in Washington, have one essential purpose: to enlist the aid of others in finding out whether, as often claimed by both our friends and foes, our bombing of North Vietnam has in fact been a decisive obstacle to Hanoi's agreement either to begin negotiations or to reduce its military activities against South Vietnam.

In my view, it is vital that the initiatives we have thus set in train be allowed a reasonable time to produce a convincing answer to this question. Further, I believe that during this period it is essential the United States avoid any action which would lay us open to charges of insincerity or bad faith in our current peace offensive or, at the minimum, of being too impatient to permit adequate time for a meaningful response from Hanoi. I am convinced that an immediate resumption of the bombings would lay us open to such charges--not only from friend and foe, but also from some of the very parties whose assistance we have sought in the past two weeks. Finally, along this same line of thought, I believe that a resumption of the bombing prior to or during Shelepin's forthcoming trip to North Vietnam would not only be widely considered provocative but would be almost certain to rule out whatever chance there may be of his advising Hanoi that it should react in a forthcoming way to our current peace offensive.

Second: It goes without saying that the Administration is approaching a time of great decision concerning our future actions in Vietnam--decisions which will directly and substantially affect the lives and fortunes of all Americans. While I do not doubt the American people will accept whatever sacrifices are necessary to protect vital national interests, I think it would be a serious political mistake for the Administration to make and carry out these decisions--without first demonstrating beyond any reasonable doubt that no stone has been left unturned in the effort to begin negotiations on Vietnam. To do this, I consider it necessary that the suspension of bombings be continued long enough so that no significant number of Americans will believe or can claim the Administration has not fully tested Hanoi's willingness to negotiate. As you have probably seen, the latest opinion poll shows that over 70% of the American people favor the bombing pause.

In my view, a full test of its impact is even more necessary if, as you suggest, the Communists are determined to drag out the conflict in Vietnam until the 1968 elections./3/ If such is the case, our task at home will not be to convince the American people they must live with a cold war--as in Europe during the late 1940s and early 1950s; rather, it will be to convince them to learn to live with a hot war of growing proportions and costs for three more years.

/3/See paragraphs 3A and 3B of telegram 2399, Document 6. For Lodge's response to Goldberg's comments, see Document 20.

Let me say in conclusion that I would, of course, want to reconsider the position I have outlined above if there were convincing evidence that the political disadvantages, both domestic and international, which I see to an immediate resumption of bombing were outweighed either by the military disadvantages of prolonging the suspension or by the growth of significant dissatisfaction with our actions among South Vietnamese leaders. In all frankness, however, I must say that the information available to me from Washington sources is far from convincing me that such is now the case. I shall of course follow your future reports with the closest attention, particularly in regard to these two points.

Sincerely,
Arthur J. Goldberg

9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, January 6, 1965, 5:07 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Literally Eyes Only; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and in substance by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the White House.

1907. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. We have all read and carefully noted your 2399/2/ concerning the current position and Vietnamese reaction to it. Also your comments on the President's letter to Menzies.

/2/Document 6.

2. As the Menzies letter indicates, we have reaped very considerable dividends from this whole effort in terms of both present and future support. At the same time, the intense activity already evident in the Communist bloc, and particularly Shelepin's visit to Hanoi,/3/ have convinced us that suspension must continue for the present, partly on the slight chance that Hanoi may respond, and also to maintain and solidify domestic and international support. In reaching this decision, we have of course weighed the serious arguments contained in your 2399, but believe that the wider factors must be over-riding for the time being including strongly affirmative response from 40 or 50 nations and widely encountered pleas that we give adequate time for response from Hanoi.

/3/Indian Prime Minister Shastri reported to President Johnson in a January 6 letter that Kosygin had told him that Shelepin's visit was "intended to help the cause of peace." (Telegram 1218 to New Delhi, January 7; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

3. Accordingly, we believe you yourself should now see Ky to get his understanding and concurrence in continuation, and that message should also reach Thieu, Do, and others, as you think best, so that possibilities of misunderstanding are minimized. Following are points you may draw on in your presentation.

a. You may draw fully on account of diplomatic activity in Menzies letter. You may explain that this activity has in itself greatly strengthened worldwide support and understanding for GVN/US position and has created situation in which, if Hanoi fails to respond and we resume, we will do so with very wide and strong worldwide and domestic support. In short, we are clearing the decks for whatever action may be necessary, and GVN should have no doubt that we will in fact do whatever is necessary as we have done in the past.

b. We need the additional time period to drive this point home, particularly in light of Shelepin visit.

c. You should frankly explain, to extent you may not already have done so, that one major purpose of our effort is to exploit differences of view within Communist bloc. While we have no concrete reason to expect that Sovs will in any way be helpful, this suspension may well have sharpened divisions between Sovs and their friends, on one hand, and Chicoms, with favorable implications for the future of a free South Viet-Nam.

d. As stated in Menzies letter, there has been no change in Hanoi position and we have no intention of being taken in by mere gestures. Our military action in the South and our reinforcements have continued and will continue. We believe Hanoi is under no delusion that our action has reflected any change whatever in our determination to see this thing through.

e. Next week President will submit supplemental appropriation for all aspects of effort in Viet-Nam at level presently estimated to be $13 billion. This sum for over-runs in Fiscal 1966 will bring home to Congress and country full magnitude of stakes in Viet-Nam and Congress needs full demonstration that every possible opening for peace is being explored.

f. We of course recognize that suspension of bombing gives other side some temporary military advantages. At same time, Ky well knows that we have continued heavy attacks on infiltration routes in Laos. He should also be aware that resumed bombing can deal fairly quickly with any repairs Hanoi has been able to make in communications routes and other military targets that we would expect to attack promptly upon resumption.

g. There may well be some sort of climax during Shelepin visit. If there should be any sign of a substantive change in Hanoi's position, or on other hand if Hanoi's lack of response becomes clear, we will be in urgent consultation with GVN. They can count absolutely on our maintaining fundamental positions stated in 14 points (which you should give them).

Rusk

10. Memorandum From James Thomson and Donald Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret.

SUBJECT
The New Year in Asia

VIETNAM

The Program Front

Political Dynamics. South Vietnam, under the rule of a ten-man military Directorate, for almost seven months has experienced greater political stability than at any time since early 1963. However, the political rivalries and conflicts within the Vietnamese social fabric have not been resolved nor eliminated. Rather, the absence of serious political turmoil appears in large part a result of the assumption of authority by the one element currently strong enough to wield it--the leaders of the armed forces. Additionally, political improvement is the result of the more concrete U.S. military and political commitment of the past year, which has checked the previous prospect of accelerating internal collapse and Communist takeover.

The present military regime's surface display of unity to date is largely the result of a diffusion of real power among four or five generals. None of these seems so far to have sufficient personal strength or motive to upset the balance. This alliance, however, clearly remains tenuous, and the strains among the ruling generals have resulted, in recent weeks, in renewed rumors of coup plotting. Ky's government is not in imminent danger, but an eventual coup attempt cannot be discounted. Our people in Saigon believe that Ky would step down if so requested by the Directorate, but he displays no obvious signs of discouragement and voices no concern over possible coup attempts.

To date Ky's government has been notably unsuccessful in developing significant popular enthusiasm or positive political support. Ky grasps the country's problems in general, but his ambitious programs of political, social and economic reforms have made only marginal headway. Neither increased security nor government presence have been brought to any significant new portion of the rural population. Still, conditions have not deteriorated. Ky has demonstrated considerable adroitness in balancing competing pressures from Buddhists and Catholics and other factions. Civilian groups at present appear reluctant to take political initiatives without adequate power to assure the outcome. However, a greater test of the government may come as the war intensifies and demands on it increase, particularly in the economic and pacification fields.

Already, the government is under growing pressure from religious and political groups to broaden the area of civilian participation and to provide some legal framework toward the eventual restoration of civilian control. Although some generals, particularly Ky, are reluctant to open up any official channel for disruptive civilian tactics, the Directorate intends to establish early this year a council with some advisory authority. The advisory council will be tasked with drafting a permanent constitution.

Although Embassy surveys have so far uncovered little adverse popular reaction to the U.S. military role--including air-strikes--in intensifying the war, the Embassy has reported considerable public apprehension over growing civilian casualties. There is some danger that prolonged and more intensive fighting will generate resentment against the U.S. or the Saigon government, and pressure for peace-at-any-price by pacifistic elements such as the Buddhists. Currently, Saigon's ruling generals continue to express opposition to any negotiations under conditions of near-stalemate, or to any settlement in which the South Vietnamese would be forced to compete politically with the Viet Cong.

Economic Dynamics. The Economy of South Vietnam operated under considerable inflationary pressure during 1965, and this pressure is expected to intensify during 1966. A large deficit in the GVN budget, the increase in U.S. forces, and the increase of local spending for military and civilian construction placed new demands on the economy during 1965. Supply problems were exacerbated by port bottlenecks, Viet Cong interdiction of transportation routes, and a shortage of labor. The resulting imbalance between demand and supply generated price rises of at least 35 to 40 percent in Saigon and in areas where Viet Cong activity and the U.S. force buildup were intensified.

During 1966, the GVN budget deficit could rise from 15-18 billion piasters estimated for 1965 to 20 billion piasters or more. U.S. and other foreign troops spending and local purchases for construction may jump from about 10 billion piasters in 1965 to an estimated 30 billion piasters in 1966. The total of 50-55 billion piasters for budget deficit and foreign spending (compared to about 29 billion piasters in 1965) is equivalent to about one-third of all goods and services available in Vietnam in 1965 and is substantially more than the present money supply of 42 billion piasters. Since these inflationary pressures will be working against a far smaller stock of idle resources in the economy, their impact will be more severe and more difficult to contain than during 1965.

The major factor restraining inflation has been the supply of AID-financed commercial imports and PL 480 commodities. A second factor has been the willingness of the Vietnamese to hold a part of additional income in the form of money. During 1965, there was some evidence that price rises have begun to discourage money holdings and to increase the demand for goods. This trend poses an added threat during 1966.

Shortages of construction materials and luxury items resulted in sharp price increases during 1965, and specific material resources will continue to be in short supply during 1966. Anticipated increases in 1966 U.S. expenditures for construction in Vietnam will have additional repercussions in the manpower sector of the economy. Wage rates for most categories of skilled construction workers have doubled during the last year. Wages for unskilled labor have not increased as sharply but are estimated to have increased by at least 50 percent in Saigon. With the exception of rural labor in isolated areas, Vietnamese manpower resources are now fully employed.

Control of the inflationary threat to economic (and hence political) stability during 1966 is clearly dependent on U.S. and GVN countermeasures. For example, the U.S. could meet the bulk of the requirements for skilled labor and critical commodities needed to expand port facilities and for military construction, from sources outside of South Vietnam. Additional measures to control in-country spending by foreign personnel are possible. Similarly, new GVN fiscal measures, such as increased taxes, are under consideration to soak up excess purchasing power. But even under the best of circumstances, the problem is to limit inflation to manageable levels in 1966, not to aim for price stability.

Pacification. Pacification on a nationwide basis made very little tangible progress during the past year. The pacification program in the Hop Tac/2/ area around Saigon, which was fairly active until May 1965, was one exception. Overall, however, much of the military manpower necessary to provide security as well as to clear areas in the initial phases of pacification operations was diverted to replace battle losses inflicted by the stepped up pace of Viet Cong military action. Moreover, assets devoted to pacification have been largely diverted to handling the large flow of refugees.

/2/A program initiated in 1964 to pacify six provinces around Saigon.

With the general deterioration of the security situation in many parts of I, II, and III Corps, pacification has largely been confined to areas immediately adjacent to centers of government control such as major urban areas and provincial or district capitals. At best, pacification efforts in these three Corps areas can only be termed minimal. In the IV Corps area, government control expanded somewhat. In this region, however, the Viet Cong still control large amounts of territory which have not experienced any government influence or presence for several years. The pacification effort has also suffered from the successive changes of government that occurred in 1965.

Advances have been difficult to measure. However, plans have been made and initiated which could have a beneficial effect on the pacification effort. The Ky government has decided to institute three high priority programs which will point the way for a greater overall effort in years to come. These areas are the Qui Nhon area of Binh Dinh Province, Quang Nam Province, and a showcase area near Saigon--located in the now dormant Hop Tac area. Other planned improvements include reorganization to effect more direct civilian control down to the province level, and the restructuring and consolidation of the various cadres now existing into a single national pacification cadre corps.

Much of the GVN's thinking is still in the formative stage, and it remains to be seen whether this can be translated into effective action. Some laudable steps have been taken to get the 1966 program underway on time, but many problems remain to be solved before an effective pacification program can be effected.

Land Reform. The Ky government is giving renewed emphasis to the land reform program begun under the Diem regime in 1955, and is making limited progress. The present program is still plagued by the dissatisfaction of expropriated landlords, numbering only about 2,000, and their political backers. The major obstacles to a psychologically and politically productive program, however, continue to be the lack of security in the countryside, which inhibits the work of surveyors and investigators, the slow trickle of funds from Saigon to the provinces, and a shortage of manpower resulting from the stepped-up military draft.

Under the new government policy, permanent titles are being granted to farmers who purchased land under the old ordinance, and the period of payment has been extended to 12 years. Additionally, former French lands, totaling 225,000 hectares, are being subdivided and sold to the farmers who till them. State-owned lands, totaling some 300,000 hec-tares, are also to be distributed to 180,000 farmers now occupying them as squatters. Changes have been made in the terms governing rental of farm lands, with all leases being extended to five-year contracts, and collection of back rentals has been eliminated in newly secured areas. Finally, competitive bidding for the rental of communal land--a procedure devised by the Diem regime to raise national and local taxes--has been eliminated, but new procedures for making this land available to landless farmers have not yet been worked out.

These recent changes are designed as short-term measures. A long-term program contemplates reduced retention of land by landlords, further extension of tenancy contracts, and further distribution of public land. A major unresolved problem is that of conflicting ownership rights resulting from land distribution activities by the Viet Minh during the Indochina War and by the Viet Cong more recently in areas under their control. The problem is under study, but the government program, with its provisions for farmer payments for the purchase of expropriated land and its collection of land rentals, has long been at some disadvantage vis-a-vis the Viet Cong program. Increasingly harsh Viet Cong taxation policies of the past two years, and increased Communist requisition of rice from the peasants, will probably help the government in this problem area.

The Refugee Problem. This has expanded to tremendous proportions during the past year, particularly since July. At latest report, a cumulative total of 745,800 persons has been processed by the government. More than half of the present refugee population--463,000--is still living in temporary refugee shelter areas at what is little more than a subsistence level of existence.

The large influx of refugees has been caused by a combination of circumstances: natural disaster, a decline in security which has resulted in mass movement of people to safer areas, and the increased level of large-scale friendly operations. At the present time over ninety percent of the current refugee population is concentrated in the coastal lowlands area of I, II, and III Corps zones and is a serious strain on the refugee relief machinery.

Although the refugee situation remains serious, it had not reached the proportions by the end of 1965 that GVN and U.S. officials had anticipated. However, most of the effort that would have been devoted to pacifying and developing the countryside has had to be diverted to care for refugees. This situation will prevail until refugees can either be relocated to permanent settlements or returned to their home areas. Moreover, the large refugee population remaining in temporary shelters is fertile ground for the Viet Cong to sow discord. It may be expected that the refugee problem will intensify if the tempo of military operations, particularly in the central coastal lowlands, continues to increase.

Chieu Hoi./3/ The Chieu Hoi program has shown signs of improvement in techniques of exploitation and programming in the past several months with several significant and successful psychological warfare operations being mounted against the Viet Cong. This has been especially true in rapid follow-up action to ground operations. However, the program still has several glaring weaknesses, especially in processing and providing for the Chieu Hoi returnee. Crowded returnee centers, a shortage of administrative personnel, and a lack of facilities to rehabilitate the returnee have hampered the total effectiveness of the effort. Some first steps have been taken by the government to correct these inadequacies, but much work remains to be done.

/3/The Government of South Vietnam's amnesty program designed to win back the allegiance of Viet Cong.

During 1965, according to government reports, a total of 42,552 persons returned to the government side. Although the majority were civilians, there were a total of 10,391 military personnel who also "rallied" to the government cause. In 1964, there was a total of 14,465 returnees, of whom only 1,903 were military defectors.

The Montagnards. Although an uprising by dissident tribesmen in the central highlands area in mid-December was promptly quashed, there is little prospect of an early resolution of the problem of tribal unrest and loyalty. Mutual antipathy and distrust between ethnic Vietnamese and the approximately 500,000 ethnic Malayan tribesmen inhabiting the highlands has deep historic roots.

The appeal among the Montagnards of FULRO, the tribal autonomy movement, is traceable not only to long-standing tribal aspirations for autonomy and preservation of tribal customs, but to a series of grievances with the Vietnamese governments of the past 10 years. These grievances range from ethnic Vietnamese encroachment on their communal lands during the Diem regime, to lack of fulfillment by Diem's successors of promises of increased aid and political representation in Saigon. Although the current Saigon officials apparently plan to deal leniently with most of the rank-and-file FULRO sympathizers, the execution of four FULRO leaders, and the sentencing of about 30 others, have probably stirred new tribal resentment and anticipation of harsh government treatment. There is evidence that Montagnard leaders previously supporting the government are increasingly sympathetic to FULRO.

There is no evidence to date that FULRO leader Y-Bham Enoul or his top lieutenants are cooperating with the Viet Cong. On the contrary, reports indicate that propaganda attacks, and a few minor clashes, have occurred between FULRO and the Communists, who have long sponsored their own tribal autonomy movement. There are nevertheless reports of some Communist penetration of FULRO's second-level hierarchy. Such elements may be deliberately seeking to harden FULRO's demands and force a final break with the government.

At present, even a renewed government determination to carry out reforms and aid programs for the Montagnards seems likely to have little prospect of banishing tribal suspicions--or Vietnamese snobbery--in the early future. The reliability and effectiveness of the numerous tribal paramilitary units will thus probably remain uncertain for the next year or so, and the opportunities for the Viet Cong to exploit the situation, or to win increasing cooperation from the tribes, may be enhanced.

[Here follows discussion of Northeast Asia, the "two Chinas," the Southwest Pacific, and Southeast Asia.]

11. Memorandum From Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Fortas to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075, Vietnam, 1966. Secret. The source text is stamped: "Sec Def has seen, 8 Jan 1966."

RE
Viet Nam

Suggestion:

The U.S. by formal note, perhaps to U Thant, would state that:

1. We will commence withdrawal from Viet Nam as soon as a cease-fire is agreed to and we will complete withdrawal within the shortest reasonable time, not later than 3(?) years thereafter. (We might express the hope or "assumption" that appropriate provision for U.N. inspection or other implementation will be made.)

2. We have no interest in acquiring, establishing or maintaining any military bases in Southeast Asia (with such restrictions or qualifications as need be made).

3. I would hope that we could go further and say that we would accept a cease-fire on terms acceptable to a representative group of states. This could be defined in various ways: The Geneva Conference group as reconstituted; a group designated by the Secretary General or elected by the Assembly; etc.

Appraisal of Present Situation:

1. There persists widespread doubt as to the integrity of our intentions--despite all that has been done. The articulate doubts are principally based upon (1) the ambiguity of our statements as to the time of withdrawal, and the interpretation that we will not withdraw until a non-Communist Government is established for South Vietnam; and (2) our continued silence as to whether we will "deal with" the NLF.

2. I anticipate that the Soviet Mission will result in a Soviet bomber and missile buildup in North Vietnam. The net effect may be a substantial Soviet "presence" in North Vietnam. This is a threat, but it may have advantages as follows:

(1) It will accentuate the Soviet-Chinese confrontation.

(2) It may reduce the disadvantages of U.S. withdrawal and result in a positive benefit, perhaps confined to the short-range. Substantial Soviet "presence" in North Vietnam would mean that (a) the Chinese route to domination of Southeast Asia would be in check by the Soviet Union; (b) the two great Communist powers would be in potential conflict at a new and critical point; (c) the Soviet Union would have an additional and vexatious burden. It is necessary to realize that, long-range, this, or anything short of our military victory in the theatre may underline the danger of Communist (Soviet or Chinese) domination of Southeast Asia. But it is possible that we can deal with the long-range, with future problems, more advantageously if we are out of Viet Nam than if we are there, engaged in what appears to be a long war of dubious extent and debatable outcome.

A.F./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State/1/

Tokyo, January 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:18 a.m. and passed to the White House at 10. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this telegram to President Johnson at 1:30 p.m. on January 8 under cover of a memorandum stating: "Harriman fires all his arguments at us on keeping the Pause going." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)

2391. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman.

1. Having found myself with my first relatively free day here in Tokyo, I feel that it might be useful to summarize my reactions to my trip so far./2/

/2/Between December 29 and January 7, Harriman met with foreign leaders in Poland, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Republic, Thailand, and Japan.

2. Reischauer tells me that the reaction here during the first several days of what everyone now calls President Johnson's peace offensive was tinged with a certain amount of skepticism. The government in Japan has supported our efforts in Vietnam, but even in Foreign Ministry circles, I am told, there was some feeling that the bombing pause and the peace offensive might be aimed more at justifying to the American people a subsequent expansion of military action than at a real desire and expectation that peace might be attained. As the facts have come out about what we have done and are doing to bring about negotiations and a peaceful settlement, there has been a steadily growing acceptance of the President's effort. This is being accompanied by a willingness on the part of the Japanese Government to seek ways in which they can help to bring influence to bear on Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps on Peiping, to reduce the tempo of fighting and move towards a peaceful solution.

3. This experience in Japan is generally similar to what I have observed at other stops along the way. All the government leaders I have seen have agreed to use their influence where they considered useful but have said time was necessary to achieve results and they urged patience.

4. I do feel the tide of support and understanding for our position in Vietnam is rising. During the past two weeks, I believe, the seeds of the President's peace offensive have been planted and are showing promising signs of healthy growth.

5. It is too early, however, to expect a real harvest either in the form of consolidating world opinion on our side or of bringing North Vietnam to the conference table. If we were to cut short our efforts at this time and resume the bombing we would end up with few if any gains. In fact those leaders who had started to take actions on behalf of the peace offensive would feel let down and there might be such general disillusionment as to leave us in no better position in world opinion and perhaps worse in some countries than we were before.

6. On the other hand enough progress has been made in world public opinion to justify continuation of the pause long enough to allow this opinion to solidify on our side. This in turn would increase pressures on Hanoi that might produce some favorable response now or in the future.

7. I hope very much, therefore, that, barring a major provocation clearly attributable to the initiative of Hanoi, the pause in the bombing will be continued until the end of the Vietnamese new year period (Tet, which I understand ends January 23) particularly since there are, I hear, proposals for a cease-fire during the Tet period. Reischauer strongly agrees with me, pointing out that we are making more progress with Japanese public opinion during this period than in the whole of the preceding twelve months. I believe that all the other U.S. Ambassadors I have visited would also be in agreement. I realize the pause is being bought at the cost of certain military disadvantages but I feel that these are definitely outweighed by the importance of gaining the support of governments and worldwide public opinion.

Reischauer

13. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-16-66

Washington, January 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. McNamara forwarded the memorandum to Rusk on January 19. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U)

1. (C) This memorandum provides the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on air strikes against North Vietnam (NVN). It reflects their conviction that continuation of the stand-down is placing our forces under serious and progressively increasing military disadvantage.

2. (S) Air strikes against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) are an essential complement to US/Free World military operations in South Vietnam (SVN). The direct pressure of these air strikes is a principal means of persuading the DRV to cease its support and direction of the insurgency in SVN. The present stand-down contravenes that purpose and greatly weakens US negotiating leverage. Increased military actions in Laos or in SVN do not compensate for the loss of this leverage on the DRV nor for cessation of interference with the lines of communication (LOCs) in the DRV.

3. (S) There is increasing evidence that considerable effort to repair damaged LOCs in NVN is now underway. Air defense capabilities are being improved, and a general recovery program is underway. While intelligence is lacking, DRV self-interest dictates that an increased flow of personnel and war material is moving to SVN. On the basis of past experience, confirming evidence may not become available until personnel and material are identified in SVN or until new units make contact with friendly forces. Of additional concern is the growing ability of the DRV, through reconstitution of its LOCs, to support overt aggression in the south. Thus, the results of our costly air effort against the north will have been negated unless operations of expanded scope are soon resumed. The decision to resume air strikes should be based on enemy capabilities to improve their posture. It should not be contingent upon obtaining hard evidence of infiltration and build-up in SVN.

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the merits of peace offensives, especially with respect to their impact on US and world opinion. However, experience cautions against the substantial risk in an all-out effort for negotiations during a stand-down. As time passes, it will become increasingly difficult to disengage from the stand-down. Protracted negotiations under these circumstances may, as in the Korean case, prove costly in American lives.

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the early resumption of offensive air operations essential if we are to avoid a misinterpretation of US resolve in Southeast Asia, redress advantages accruing to the DRV from the stand-down, and enter into meaningful negotiations from a position of strength.

6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommended that a policy decision be taken now to terminate the stand-down of offensive air operations against the DRV 48 hours subsequent to Shelepin's return to Moscow from Hanoi, by which time the Soviets would have had opportunity to communicate to us any substantive results of his visit.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/2/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.

[end of document]

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