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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

109. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 2, 1966, 1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the family dining room on the second floor of the White House.

PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Moyers, Valenti

President wanted the following done:

1. Invite publishers and editors to state dinners--and have them in earlier to lunch with the President and Rusk and McNamara.

Perhaps Rusk and McNamara could fly out and meet with various editorial boards--Louisville Courier Journal Times--the night newspapers--St. Louis Post Dispatch--Providence Journal.

Wants research done: in other emergency periods--isn't our position much better overall, economic, etc., than in other such periods.

On Vietnam:

1. Make every effort to keep Ky. But be ready to make terrible choice. Perhaps take a stand in Thailand--or take someone else other than Ky.

2. McNamara said what happens to I Corps is not as important as to what happens to other corps. Thinks we ought to get rid of Tri Quang.

President said there are two basic things we need to do:

1. What do we do to preserve Ky? Thinks we ought to preserve him if possible.

2. Prepare fallback position. Involves talking to Buddhists and if necessary, get out of I Corps area and even Vietnam.

McNamara said Lodge ought to have it out with Tri Quang. Quang needs to know what situation is and how prepared we are to clear out of I Corps area. We need to know if Quang really wants us out--for if he does, we better get out now. But McNamara thinks that Quang believes that we are committed.

President said to send Lodge a cable telling him to get in touch with Quang now and get tough with him./2/

/2/Telegram 2950 to Saigon, April 2, passed on the "suggestions" that came out of this 1:30 meeting. Rusk asked Lodge to consider meeting again with Tri Quang "to disabuse him of idea that the American commitment will tolerate division or discord from within or will permit Communist leaders or sympathizers to achieve their purposes through our leniency." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3)

[Here follows discussion of Indira Gandhi.]

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:50 a.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, and Department of Defense.

3698 1. I called on Prime Minister Ky at his request at 1:00 pm, Monday, and, as I entered, thanked him for his friendly words about American aid. He said that at the meeting yesterday, two resolutions were adopted: 1) for a political convention and 2) for taking strong meas-ures. After this, General Vinh Loc said that he thought they ought to say something showing appreciation for American aid. Ky suggested that Vinh Loc make a motion which he did, so it was the third resolution of the day.

2. He then turned to me with a very serious expression on his face and, looking somewhat shaken, said:

3. "We have waited too long. Now we must be very firm. How can I describe this situation? All these different groups and minorities and sects make an infernal combination". He used the French work for "infernal".

4. "I told the Directorate today: either I resign or we all stay together, and we have decided to stay together. Thieu will speak to the nation tonight. We have decided to declare an 'etat de siege' (state of siege) in the whole country. Before that we were in an 'etat de guerre'. A state of siege means that we are authorized to have a curfew all day long all over the country if we want to. We plan temporarily to close all schools and universities."

5. He asked me whether I had heard that the Dalat radio had been burned, which I had.

6. I said that some thought that Tri Quang was a Communist, but I remembered that Prime Minister Ky had said he was a "visionary" (un illumine). Ky said that he now thought he was a Communist and that undoubtedly we face a great Communist conspiracy to take over the government, ask the Americans to leave, and turn the country over to Hanoi.

7. Ky said he realized now that he had had too much faith in the value of making concessions to the Buddhists. He had been talking with Thich Thien Minh all day and night. He said you can't satisfy them. Minh had asked him for two things: one a job for Thi, to which Ky said he was not opposed; secondly that Thieu would reply to the Buddhists agreeing with everything that they ask for. Ky then said:

8. "I have given Minh until [garble] tonight to issue orders to all the Buddhists to sit down and discuss a way to achieve our common goal. I wanted him to prove his good will. I did this using the Secretary of Health, Kha, as an intermediary.

9. "The Directorate meeting today was a very good meeting--thoroughly military and professional--with everything staffed out. We have plans for psychological warfare, leaflets, mobile radio. I want to move three battalions to Danang and bring up one division from the Fourth Corps for security in Saigon.

10. "I, myself, will go to Danang and be at the command post tonight with General Vien who will stay after I come back to Saigon, presumably tomorrow. I would like to have more aircraft to reinforce Danang. We have not enough Vietnamese Air Force planes. I know that MACV is ready and that they need an order from you. Will you give it?"

11. I said that I would and I notified General Westmoreland to that effect at 1:30./2/

/2/At 1135Z on April 4, Westmoreland informed General Walt that two Vietnamese Marine battalions, field police and military security elements, psywar teams, and a command group would move to Danang under cover of darkness that evening and that Lodge had agreed to Ky's request for airlift. (MAC 2667; Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) Subsequent events during April 4-10 and the role of U.S. forces can be followed in Jeffrey Clarke's Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973 (Washington, DC, 1988) pp. 131-133.

12. Ky said he had received members of the VNQDD who wanted to help and asked what is the government going to do.

13. Ky looks for a "mass effect", quickly and simultaneously. The strategy for the nation is to have a big success in Danang first and then the people in the other communities in Viet-Nam will see it. For the time being he will isolate Hue, but believes he will have no trouble with Hue once Danang is disposed of.

14. If necessary he will move M-113s from Quang Nam. All Saigon troops are 100 percent restricted to their camps.

15. General Thieu will send invitations to representatives of all the different groups in Viet-Nam to organize meeting to be held "the day after tomorrow". There will be two to three hundred people and everybody will be given a chance to talk. He believes he has put the Buddhists on the defensive.

16. There is now no doubt in his mind that the Communists are striving for a "soulevement", that is a general uprising. He said:

17. "If I am weak they will succeed, but if I am strong they will not. History will judge whether I have done well or not, but I am ready to make the supreme sacrifice."

18. He was deeply moved and so was I.

Lodge

111. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 4, 1966, 8:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. No classification marking. In his April 4 covering memorandum to the President, Valenti noted that there was one vital piece of information that he had not yet seen concerning the "so-called mutiny of SVN troops." (Ibid.)

You are being counseled by those far wiser than I, but I pass along these thoughts to you for whatever value, if any, they may have. These are troubling times for you and I am only trying to help clear the dark alternatives that seem to be available.

Where are we?

1. The Ky government will hold on or

2. The Ky government will fall and

a) Either another government takes over that will choose to continue both the fight and the peaceful reconstruction

or

b) Another government will determine to strike a bargain with the Viet Cong.

Two questions present themselves:

1. How can we help preserve Ky?

and

2. What do we do if Ky falls?

I. Preserve Ky:

1. We can help with the use of United States force. This would be dangerous. It would erode our moral, even our treaty obligations. It would smack of colonialism.

Thus, the decision is how to preserve Ky without the deployment of United States force.

A. Elections Now.

This is hazardous. The Viet Cong may win in the heat of the anti-government demonstrations; a public whipped up to march against the government is likelier than not to vote against that government.

But if Ky were to set a date--say June 1--for a national election it may take the starch out of the demonstrations. At least it would give Ky some breathing room to present the case for a unified central government whose objective is to defeat the Viet Cong, not commit suicide.

B. Bring in four to five Buddhist-Catholic leaders as part of the directorate.

This might ease the pressures, if this move were coupled with a definite election date.

C. Surface Viet Cong agents as provocateurs--and link them to the demonstration leadership.

The drawback to this is the lack of time available to make the case. Communicating with the Vietnam public is not as easy as in this country.

But suppose we airlifted 100 soundtrucks to Vietnam (or sound gear to put in South Vietnamese trucks) and the government put on a campaign (U.S. style) to convince the people the Viet Cong were inciting the demonstrations? Suppose we didn't indict the Buddhist leadership, but focused on a known enemy (the VC), and the perils that would come if the VC intrigue won (i.e. if the central government fell). It is a long shot, but it might work.

D. Split the Buddhist leadership.

This has possibilities. There is no durable cohesion in the Buddhist leadership. Can we pit some of the leaders against Tri Quang? Can we use the Dalai Lama and Buddhists outside Saigon, Hue and Da Nang to our advantage?

As a corollary to this--why can't Ky ask that all the Buddhist factions--indeed all religious factions--gather together for a meeting to discuss the future of the government. Perhaps Ed Lansdale and his group could be useful in getting this meeting together. Object of the meeting: To try to drive a wedge between the leadership groups--and to bring to bear the argument that the real enemy is the Viet Cong and if the leaders would allow the government to have an orderly free election all groups would benefit. It might be worth a try.

E. Urge Ky to use force.

Only those on the scene can assess the value of this. It looks like this would not work for the demonstrators have seemingly gathered too much momentum. Before it would work, Ky must restore the usefulness of the 1st. Corps soldiers.

Is it possible to restore Thi--and back him in efforts to retrieve the sagging loyalties of the 1st Corps? This is admittedly dangerous, but as a final, totally last resort it could be tolerated.

II. If Ky Falls:

1. We could wait and see what a new government would bring. Past history indicates it would have the same durability as Quat--or even worse.

A new government will

a) Be a weak reed, but insist that we stay. At least we retain our credentials as an invited guest rather than an interloper.

b) Demand that we leave--which is unlikely since the Buddhists have an irrational goal of destroying central governments but under our over-all security.

c) Be satisfactory to us for the moment, but leave a sour taste in the domestic mouth. Our antagonists would seize this change-in-government as final evidence we are fighting windmills and pour the steam on for us to get out. It would be a cheerless several months in the White House.

2. We could announce we were going to leave Vietnam because of a lack of national will to secure stability and freedom./2/

/2/At 9:30 p.m. on April 3, Valenti drafted a personal note to the President that began, "I truly believe we need to find some way out of Vietnam. All that you strive for and believe in and are accomplishing is in danger, as long as this war goes on. If there were a way out, some hint of the end with honor, I would believe it best to stay there til the bitter conclusion. But there is no reasonable hope. All your military advisors insist you must double your force, and still they give you no prophecy of victory, however shapeless, however mild." No record has been found that Valenti sent the note to Johnson. (Ibid., Office of the President File, Jack Valenti)

If we did this, our reasons are, as follows:

a) We adhere to our beliefs in self-determination--and in our resolve to protect a small country from being chewed up by its neighbors, but we cannot force anyone to choose stability and liberty. We can only aid when the people are determined to help protect themselves.

b) We would, if the Thais invited us, assist them, for as long as they chose to have our aid, to help them resist intrusions on their national sovereignty.

Thus, we should withdraw from Vietnam, not because our resolve or our objectives are shaken, but because there existed no longer a central authority with a desire to remain free of aggression.

This would have the following effects:

1. The Vietnamese might be so shocked it would cause even the erratic Buddhist leaders to sober up. Perhaps a really stable government could then be formed. Thus, we could turn political catastrophe into a hopeful direction.

Or

2. We could rid ourselves of the Vietnamese- bone-in-our-throat and at the same time give sustenance to those allies and friends where a truly nationalistic spirit and tradition exists.

At the same time, we would call for a neutral zone along the Mekong to get on with the development of that region. United Nations authority would be asked for--with our troops supporting much of the force. In this way, we get rid of the South Vietnamese albatross, secure the rich Mekong, and hold the Thai resolve to resist. We would have demonstrated that we will stick with an ally and a commitment until the one becomes insane and the other no longer has real meaning.

Jack Valenti/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

112. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 4, 1966, 7:10-8:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Liberary, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President returned to the Oval Office from the Cabinet Room at 8:42 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, General Taylor, Bill Bundy, Justice Fortas, J. Valenti

President said Westmoreland thinks [there is] "prospect of success in Danang." Said he didn't think so. McNamara and Rusk agree with President.

President thinks it important to keep our troop and equipment out of riot area. We don't want to become involved.

President approved telegram (first one)/2/ on what posture our Vietnam people should take--hands off.

/2/Telegram 2965 to Lodge and Westmoreland, transmitted at 9:03 p.m. on April 4, stated that "US forces should not be used in any way within Da Nang or Hue or against dissident GVN forces." Nor should any endorsement be given to the GVN claim that the Struggle Movement was "Communist-dominated," a claim "contrary to any evidence we have." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS , vol. 3)

President wonders about (second telegram)/3/ on political situation. Says appeasement never wins. Worried about a constitutional assembly--rather have someone we can control rather than a communist takeover at the Assembly.

/3/Not found.

Rostow: Government has not been credible.

President: Why and how?

Rostow: Ky was going to call a group to draft a constitution--and hasn't done so.

President: What are problems in calling it?

Rostow: Not getting agreement on total list.

Bundy: Working on a list since January.

When I was in Saigon four weeks after Honolulu, difficulty in getting groups organized to take part. Now we urge something to get the government off dead center.

Vice President: Who is in touch with Thi?

Bundy: No one, really.

What about Cochran, Consul General at Danang?

President gave approval for second telegram to go out (Now he looked at third telegram on alternative governments)./4/

/4/Telegram 2966 to Saigon, transmitted at 9:05 p.m. on April 4, discussed "Possible Alternative Governments," stating that "if worst comes to worst, our first choice would be the one you suggest, keeping the Directory united and bringing in someone else to replace Ky," with "Chieu at top of tentative list for this purpose." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3)

General Taylor: Worried about Thi. Tri Quang is back of him and we cannot take a Tri Quang government. He will tear down everything.

(President said to insert this caveat in the telegram.)

Rusk: Alternatives are less desirable than what we have now, so we are trying to save what we have.

President: Need to do more planning on how to pick a man before he takes over so we won't have to get out when the wrong man gets in.

Time has come when the alternative is to get out--or do what we need to do to get the government shored up--move in with power and stay there.

Vice President wanted to know more about Thi. Taylor says he is flamboyant, rash, and an associate of Tri Quang--but a brave commander--troops like him.

Vice President: Thi is pleasant, Buddhist and clever. Ky is jealous of Thi. Some of our Mission people think Thi is able. Sam Wilson thinks he is competent.

President: Isn't he out of our hands now?

Vice President: I don't know. But we ought not let him get out of our hands. We need to know more about the Buddhists.

President: We need a Garcia-Godoy type--with an advisor by his side.

McNamara: We need a Bunker in Vietnam.

President: Don't rely on polls on D.R. (Dominican Republic). They're not very accurate 60 days from now. Keep Camano in London. Don't let him out. Camano could win. Keep that poll going. Know every week what is happening. Don't lose an hour's contact.

The way I see it, Ky is gone, the last gasp. Doubt he can pull it off. When he goes, there'll be hell in this country. Let's get a government we can appoint and support. We need a tough advisor.

President: What do we tell the world?

General Taylor: We can minimize our losses if Ky goes and the Directory stays. We have to take sides this time.

President: Thought Ky made bad judgment in saying the Mayor of Danang ought to be shot./5/ Any other bad judgment we know about?

/5/While speaking at a news conference in Saigon on April 3, Ky threatened to shoot the Mayor of Danang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man. (New York Times April 4, 1966)

Taylor: The Hitler statement/6/--but I thought he had matured.

/6/Not further identified.

113. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, April 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-VN Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Mar-Aug '66. Secret. Drafted by J.J. Helble of FE/VN.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam Sitrep as of 1000 April 5

1. General Situation:

Saigon--The situation in Saigon is apparently quiet although press ticker this morning indicates a demonstration was broken up near the Buddhist Institute by Vietnamese troops which employed rifle fire over the heads of the demonstrators. Curfew has been extended from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.

Danang--ARVN troops which are unidentified, regional and popular forces, and "Struggle Forces" and civilians are reported manning roadblocks from the air base into the city of Danang. No estimate of the number of these forces has been received. Three Marine battalions have been air lifted from Saigon and are presently located on the Danang air base. There is no indication that these forces have attempted to leave the area of the air base. I Corps commander General Chuan reportedly made two trips to the air base to confer with Prime Minister Ky during the day of April 5. Late ticker items state that Ky has now returned to Saigon, after broadcasting in Danang that he was now convinced the city was not in Communist hands. General Chuan has told newsmen that Prime Minister Ky, prior to his departure for Saigon had assured him that his forces would not attempt to leave the air base, and as a result General Chuan had ordered a Ranger battalion, which had been deployed to defend Danang, back to its post. Posters have been put up in Danang signed by General Chuan stating that the situation is in hand, that troops are to return to their camps, and civilian demonstrators should stay home.

Hue--A small demonstration of about 600 students took place in front of MACV billets in Hue April 5 demanding the removal of barbed wire barricades which were impeding traffic on a main route. The barbed wire was removed and the demonstration quietly dispersed. On the orders of the commanding general of the III MAF, the MACV senior advisor to the I Division has ordered the removal of all advisors to the I Division and has informed the Division commander General Nhuan that he is withdrawing all American fixed wing and rotary air craft support for the Division. Consul General Corcoran in Hue has stated that the removal of the MACV advisors may provoke hostile action on the part of the Struggle Forces toward American civilans in Hue and Quang Tri and is, therefore, ordering all American civilians with the exception of Consulate and CAS staff to be evacuated.

Nha Trang--Press ticker items report the USIS library and adjoining Vietnamese Information Services offices have been sacked and burned in Nha Trang. No confirmation has been received from the Embassy.

Dalat--The situation in Dalat remains uncertain, although late press ticker indicates that the Government has regained control of the Dalat radio station.

2. Ky-Buddhist Negotiations:

Embassy Saigon reports that Ky has been actively negotiating with the top Buddhists including Tri Quang and Thien Minh. Ky reportedly gave Minh a letter with a GVN promise to convene an immediate political conference to consider: a) the establishement of a constitution-drafting council, or b) the establishment of a constitutional assembly./2/ The Buddhists stated that with this letter they would try to calm the situation.

/2/In telegram 3746, April 5, Lodge reported that Thieu had shown him a statement he was issuing that announced the convening within 1 week or 10 days of a National Political Congress. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

3. Over-all Outlook:

The negotiations which Ky has been engaged in with General Chuan and with the Buddhists, together with the avoidance so far of any armed engagements in the Danang area, give rise to some cautious optimism that a settlement satisfactory to the Government and the Struggle Forces may emerge. Agreement allegedly reached between Ky and the Buddhists would appear to represent substantial compromise on the part of the Buddhists. At the same time, it is clear that tensions have not been substantially reduced and the possibility for an outbreak of violence either between military units or between the GVN and civilian demonstrators remains very real./3/

/3/Bundy forwarded this memorandum to Rusk on April 5 under a covering note in which he stated: "My net judgment is that the worst possible outcomes have been avoided, but that Ky essentially capitulated to the combination of local Buddhist sentiment represented by General Chuan. I would guess that this would seriously damage his position." (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)

114. Draft Scenario Prepared in the Department of Defense/1/

Washington, April 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075, Vietnam, 1966. Top Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted in OASD/ISA. The source text is stamped: "Sec Def has seen, 9 Apr 1966." Attached to the source text is a 14-page draft paper, "Some Thoughts About Vietnam," dated April 4. Referring to the paper printed here as "a possible scenario," the paper concludes: "All factors taken into account, we should seriously consider seizing the opportunity offered by the I Corps crisis to change our policy with respect to Vietnam and to disengage from the war there."

POSSIBLE "FALL BACK" PLAN

1. Most Important: Change objectives from do-what-it-takes-to-make-the-North-stop-it to do-what-it-takes-to-force-a-GVN/VC-compromise.

2. Recognize that we are on a losing wicket in Vietnam. While the military situation is not going badly, the political situation is in "terminal sickness" and even the military prognosis is of an escalating stalemate.

3. Make private Presidential decision to seize upon the I Corps troubles as the vehicle for disengagement by the United States. Success will require secrecy and completely loyal execution. (Query how to bring Lodge on board and how to deal with Congressional leaders.)

4. Choose between two approaches: (a) Fast ("fed up") withdrawal, and (b) slow ("patch up but squeeze the GVN") approach. The former would be wise only if GVN left-footedness or anti-Americanism becomes extreme./2/

/2/At their meeting on April 15, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took note of a report, JCS 2343/805-1, April 14, "Assessment of Political Unrest in SVN As It Affects US Military Efforts," which concluded: "The United States should continue to prosecute the war in Vietnam as long as requested by the South Vietnam Government and confront the prospect that a regime could come to power which would seek to end the war and request the withdrawal of US forces. The United States should plan accordingly." The Chiefs then agreed to direct the Joint Staff to draw up terms of reference for a study on how to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam, if required. (Note by the Secretaries, April 20, and attached report; Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3. (30 Mar 66) IR 6091)

5. While a new Saigon government is being formed (now), deliver a US "ultimatum" to all interested parties (including Buddhists) that they must shape up or we will ship out. We could either (a) insist now that they compromise with the VC or (b) assume that they will be be able to shape up, so that compromise with the VC would come later.

6. Ensure that US civilian and military personnel in Vietnam can be protected.

7. Initiate an effort to re-educate US and world opinion:

a. That our commitment is to support a representative government and a people who help themselves (and that the GVN has now shown itself not to be representative and that the people of South Vietnam have demonstrated that they will not help themselves).

b. That the South Vietnamese case is unique--unlike the case of our other "clients" (giving the reasons in detail).

c. That we have more than delivered the goods in blood and treasure in Vietnam--enough to honor our guarantee and enough to cause any aggressor to pause lest an equivalent amount be delivered against him in another case.

8. Consult with key allies--ROKs, Australians, New Zealanders, Japanese, etc.

9. Continue US aid and deployments to and actions in "cooperative" areas and continue strikes against North Vietnam and Laos if and only if solid efforts are being made toward working out a compromise with the VC. (Of course, if we were surprised by the appearance of a Magsaysay, we could change our strategy.) If no such efforts toward compromise are made, stop new deployments, move into a unilateral US ceasefire, and withdraw into enclaves preparatory to departure from Vietnam.

10. Press for an international conference, moves in the UN and an election.

11. Be prepared for serious deterioration in Vietnam, shock in Asia, damage to our influence throughout the world, gloating by the Communists, and political back-lash at home.

12. Take initiatives in Asia and elsewhere to offset and diffuse the issue.

115. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 5, 1966, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Moyers and Valenti.

I drafted the attached comment on Sunday,/2/ in the midst of the worst of the Vietnam political crisis.

/2/April 3. Rostow gave his April 3 draft memorandum to Taylor, who commented on it in a memorandum of April 4 to Rostow. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor)

As a little light--only a little--breaks through,/3/ I would summarize its conclusions as follows:

/3/Valenti's notes for the President's meeting with his advisers at 1 p.m. on April 5 include the following brief discussion of Vietnam: "Information from Vietnam seems unclear. Taylor thinks situation in Danang is better, but what will Buddhists do? Rostow feels this morning is much better than we anticipated last night." The meeting mainly dealt with foreign policy issues other than Vietnam. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File)

1. If the Vietnamese work their way out of this--and a civil constitution-drafting group is born--we will have passed a great turning point; although there will be plenty of trouble before they actually find their political feet.

2. The Communists are serious and understand the importance of politics: they will take it as a major defeat.

3. Then will be the time to pour it on and see if we can't force, in the months ahead, a resolution of the conflict. The strain on our political and economic life and the strain on the South Vietnamese is all but intolerable. Specifically, as the memo suggests, we should on the military side:

--continue maximum effort to impose attrition on VC and PAVN forces in South Vietnam;

--work more effectively from the air on the supply routes from the North;

--increase the costs to Hanoi of continuing the war by going for oil or other precision target systems that hurt without killing an excessive number of civilians.

4. On the diplomatic side we should:

--keep close to the Russians, but not hope for too much until Hanoi and the VC are persuaded by the situation itself that the jig is up;

--keep lines open to Hanoi;

--begin to get word to the VC that their destiny is: to sit on the Hanoi delegation at the international conference; and to talk to Saigon about how to end the war and get back into the national life of South Vietnam.

--request Mr. Rusk to conduct a high level review of negotiating papers developed at the working level.

5. On the side of the Honolulu program the memo argues that the most critical dimension is political.

--We should, of course, continue our present program of concentrated effort in four areas of rural reconstruction--full blast;

--but we should concentrate more effort, once they hire a hall and begin to talk, on political development; how to keep the Directorate together; the political party clause in the constitution; how to balance majority and minority interests; the formation of a national wide-ranging party, etc.

Walt

Attachment

Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson

Washington, April 5, 1966.

You ask for comments on the attached./4/ They follow:

/4/Attached but not printed are: 1) Valenti's memorandum to Komer, March 28, outlining four "non-military" questions, which Valenti had asked the President and which the President wanted Komer to comment on; and 2) Komer's March 29 memordandum to Valenti in reply, which the President asked Rostow to comment on.

1. The USSR and Negotiations./5/

/5/Valenti's first question was: "Are we pursuing the one key to settlement in Vietnam--the Soviet Union?"

I believe Russian leverage on Hanoi depends mainly on our persuading Hanoi that negotiation is the best course. Aside from what we do militarily and politically in Vietnam, the Russians have little leverage.

They can keep a presence by assisting with arms--notably arms to defend Hanoi from the air.

Hanoi wants them as a presence: to balance Peking; to supply arms; and as an insurance policy, should negotiations be undertaken.

But only we--not Moscow--can push them over the hump into negotiations.

That means, in my view, that we must push harder on the second and third elements in the military equation.

The first element, which is going quite well, is to impose heavy attrition on the VC and PAVN main force units.

The second element is harassment of their supply lines from the North. Here I would be prepared to take the risks of B-52 bombing of Mu Gia pass and other elements of that supply route in North Vietnam and Laos. I would press to the maximum production and use of special interdiction weapons.

The third military element is making the war more expensive in the North to Hanoi. There I prefer oil to bombing the Northeast supply lines. The latter justifies more and more Chinese engineering and logistical forces. Oil hits the over-all military logistical capacity in the North, as well as industrial and civil operations. I'm certainly not the last word on this; but I do believe we should lean harder on Hanoi, on a precision bombing basis.

It is not, Mr. President, that I'm bloody-minded or a hawk. But the strain of trying to do the job principally by attrition of main force units places almost intolerable burdens on the political life of our country and on the war-weary South Vietnamese. We've got to try to shorten this war without doing unwise or desperate things.

I believe the Russians would fully understand and accept this course; although they are keeping their oar in Hanoi as a contingency whether we succeed (for negotiations) or whether we fail (to balance the Chinese).

In short, I would suggest that, if we survive the present political crisis, we do more about the supply line from the North and we increase Hanoi's costs for continuing the conflict.

Meanwhile, we should remain close to the Russians; because none of us is so smart--certainly not me--to be absolutely sure they won't help end this earlier rather than later.

2. Peace Talks./6/

/6/Valenti's second question was: "Have we really sorted out the sticky problems and issues of peace talks--so that we are absolutely clear on our objectives and trading points?"

The negotiating papers are pretty good./7/ They move toward what I have called a "two-track" negotiating plan: an international negotiation, involving the Geneva Accord powers, with the NLF on the Hanoi delegation, dealing with the restoration and strengthening of the 1954 and 1962 agreements; an internal negotiation, between Saigon and NLF to end the war and create the conditions for absorbing the South Vietnamese now caught up in the VC insurrection into the life of the Country.

/7/Presumably a reference to negotiating papers drafted during late 1965 and 1966 by the Vietnam Planning Group, chaired by Unger, and in particular to the group's paper on "A Settlement in Vietnam," to which Komer referred in his memorandum of March 29. A copy of the paper, together with Unger's discussion of it in a memorandum to Ball, March 15, is in Department of State, EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Vietnam Coordinating Committee and Working Group, 1964-66.

There is some fuzziness about this high in the government. Some of our public talk suggests we might settle internal South Vietnam affairs at an international conference; some suggests no one would ever talk to the VC--ever. The surfacing of a two-track policy is a delicate matter. But in the meanwhile what we say should be consistent with it. Incidentally, the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique was consistent with a two-track negotiation.

The reason for the fuzziness is that the preliminary papers have been developed at the working level; and you may wish Mr. Rusk to render you a personal judgment on existing plans, negotiating concepts, and ways of talking about the problem.

It follows from this line of thought that it may be wise to find some way of suggesting to the NLF that we think they ought to be talking with the government in Saigon.

3. Political Tutelage and Organization./8/

/8/Valenti's third question was: "Why shouldn't we organize in Vietnam a highly skilled group of political professionals to work with the current government in teaching them how to become democratic leaders--and build a durable democratic party?"

Organization comes first. If there is one thing I regret about Honolulu it is that we didn't nail Ky down harder on a date for implementing the political side of his January 15th speech.

The unrest in Vietnam doesn't come from hungry people. The folks carrying banners and organizing all this eat regularly. And that's the way it is in most political disruptions in developing countries--and even in our race troubles.

What they want is either personal power (Tri Quang and Thi) or participation in politics, which is the application of power. And the Communists are, of course, in there trying to make the most of it.

The most urgent non-military business is to cut the radicals out of the herd by getting the literate, urban leaders--and others--into a hall and around tables talking about the political future. Some force may well be necessary in this crisis; but essentially we're trying--and the Directorate is trying--to get the moderates off the streets and into a position where they have to think and talk responsibly about the future of their country.

Once they are there, we have a number of ways we can help them think along the right lines; Washington and Saigon are in pretty good shape, if and when we get over that historic hurdle which is what today's crisis is about.

There may be ways of beefing up Saigon's adminstrative capacity through a relatively few first-rate advisers working for the Vietnamese and acceptable to them; but we need a government with a bit of a future first.

4. The Four Key Areas./9/

/9/Valenti's fourth question was: "Are we keeping close tabs on the Lodge plan for pacifying four key areas in SVN?"

Bob Komer will report.

I don't need to tell you that I support increased economic and social development in South Vietnam as elsewhere.

And I'm sure that something like the Lodge Plan--and the four key areas--is the right way to proceed; by concentration of effort.

But I don't think this war is going to end by pacification of most of the country.

It will end--if we win it--when some combination of the following four things leads Hanoi to knock it off:

--sufficient attrition on the main force units to break up structures, produce a marked deterioration of morale, and an enlarged flow of defectors--to our side and back home to their VC-controlled areas;

--sufficient obstruction to the supply lines to make replacements expensive and, if possible, less than attrition of men, equipment, and ammunition;

--sufficient cost to military, civil and economic life in the North to help tip the attrition-supply equation further in our direction;

--sufficient order, unity, and stability in the South to rule out a Communist political takeover in the midst of chaos.

If this view is right, the war will not end when we have pacified every district, village, and province. When it ends there will still be a hell of a mess in South Vietnam--as there was in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines.

There will probably still be some last-ditch VC to mop up; but, if other guerrilla wars carry any lesson, it is that when the organizational structure cracks, it cracks pretty well down the line. And the VC is the most tightly organized guerrilla structure we've seen except that of the Chinese Communists. For example, they are now feeding local guerrillas up to the main force units, in order to keep them up to strength. The main force and local guerrilla units are interlocked; if the main forces go, it will have a profound effect on the local forces.

In short, we should carry forward rural reconstruction on orderly concentrated lines; but we should not measure the probable length of the war by the rate of successful pacification.

The real job of rural reconstruction will be post-war.

Walt

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, April 6, 1966, 7:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Rostow and McNamara, and approved by Rusk.

3001. For Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Embtels 3755/2/ and 3761./3/ Over-all situation has been reviewed at highest levels today and I wish to give you clear flavor of our thinking./4/

/2/In telegram 3755 from Saigon, April 6, Lodge reported that if negotiations then underway with Struggle committees in Hue and Danang did not bring immediate results, Ky planned to return to Danang that afternoon, move into town with tanks at midnight, install a new mayor, and "reoccupy" the major public buildings. (Ibid.)

/3/In telegram 3761, April 6, Lodge reported that the GVN had decided to seek a political solution before a military one and had accepted the Buddhist proposal offered to Ky the previous evening to hold a constitutional convention within 6 months. (Ibid.)

/4/According to Valenti's brief notes of the President's meeting from 5:20 to 6:20 p.m., April 6, McNamara stated: "Struggle movement may be too strong to throw off. We don't know much about their objectives. They obviously have strength we didn't know about, and I don't want to go to war against them." Humphrey agreed, stating that it was "too uncertain to judge who will line up on top." (Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File)

1. Basic decision GVN faces is as stated in para 2 your 3761, whether to seek "over-all political soultion before attempting local military solution in Da Nang." Our own strong view here is that in existing situation this is right course for GVN to follow and that we should not seek to turn them from it in the direction of an immediate showdown in Da Nang. While we recognize there may be Communist influence at work in Da Nang, our overall reading is that Ky's charges of Communist domination and his announced intent to take over Da Nang and shoot the Mayor made it almost inevitable that Chuan would act as he did./5/ From previous reporting it had been apparent that large numbers of 1st Division troops were in sympathy with Struggle Movement and that significant elements in Da Nang and major sentiment in Hue were likewise. Whether Chuan was a weak man or not our reading is he would have forfeited his position and probably been unable to get the support of his troops if he had tried to carry out the original plan. We also note that the use of pro-GVN demonstrators, envisaged in the original plan, was tried on the morning of April 5 and clearly failed. Accordingly, under present changed circumstances our overall reading is that Da Nang operation would be unwise unless and until GVN has prepared the way by visible political moves and hopefully by obtaining agreement at least of moderate Buddhist elements led by Tam Chau to such moves. We reach this conclusion simply on our assessment of all available information from Embassy, CAS, and MACV reporting. But we must also bear in mind that our action in supporting Da Nang operation through airlift, including the decision to send tanks during April 6,/6/ have heavily involved USG so that if Da Nang operation were undertaken and failed--as we believe overwhelmingly likely under present circumstances--it would result not merely in tremendous criticism of USG here and elsewhere but could mean that our whole position within SVN would be gravely damaged and we might be virtually unable to resume any kind of cooperative relation with major elements particularly in I Corps area.

/5/In telegrams 3755 and 3761, Lodge passed on reports that General Chuan, ARVN Commander of I Crops, had lost control, did not follow orders, and had come under Communist domination.

/6/In telegram 3755, Lodge reported that Ky had thanked him for U.S. support, "especially the tanks which he said were of the greatest psychological value in awing the crowds."

2. Accordingly, we believe you should not urge immediate Da Nang operation at present, but rather that entire focus of your efforts at all levels should be to get political process started. Your offer to Thieu to sit down quietly with Directory and to help in lining up any recalcitrant groups struck the right note, and we believe you should be proceeding in these directions in every useful way. We share your doubts whether Tam Chau and much less Tri Quang can in fact make or stick to a bargain, but the only way to find out and to put Tri Quang in the wrong is for GVN to get ahead urgently with its projected national political moves. It appears possible that these moves may satisfy Tam Chau at least without any dangerous acceleration of the Constitutional timetable. GVN appears to be in position where by convening visible group immediately to work toward Constitution-making body it can satisfy at least moderate Buddhist elements while in fact it is merely fulfilling its earlier commitments. Whether, as national political script unfolds, GVN may have to accelerate timetable is something that we will both have to assess as occasion arises. But for time being at least we see no alternative but maximum support of immediate measures.

3. We recognize of course that situation in I Corps must be faced as soon as possible. However, visible political measures and, we hope, endorsement and possible participation by some or all Buddhist elements offer at least the hope that much of the wind would be taken out of the sails of the Struggle Movement. This could create entirely different environment in I Corps, both aiding and justifying any eventual use of force GVN may feel compelled to take.

4. As to our involvement in supporting GVN build-up in Da Nang, we still believe that our justification for this must be that GVN was and is entitled to defend country and thus to restore its authority over intolerable and unreasonable regionalistic opposition movement which cannot be tolerated in critical wartime situation. But, as I have indicated at the outset, it is our strong feeling that any showdown in I Corps should now await further national political measures, and that latter should be the focus of our immediate efforts./7/

/7/At the President's 5:20 p.m. meeting on April 6, it was also discussed "whether Lodge should say struggle movement is infested with communists." (Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File) In telegram 3759 from Saigon, April 6, Lodge had proposed telling the press that Communists "had a good deal of influence" in the opposition movement. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L) In telegram 2996, transmitted to Saigon following the meeting, Rusk urged Lodge not to "underwrite personally the extent of communist involvement in the struggle movement," due both to the lack of convincing evidence and the likelihood that such charges would prove counter-productive. (Ibid., NODIS, vol. 3) In a telephone conversation with McNamara at 7:45 a.m. on April 7, the President said that it looked to him like "there's a very serious danger that there's been a complete infiltration of the [dissidents'] power base by the Communists." McNamara responded that he felt the same danger, "particularly in that first corps area." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.14, Side A, PNO 3)

Rusk

117. Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson/1/

April 8, 1966, 1757Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. Secret. The source text does not indicate where Vance's telegram originated.

DEPSECDEF 1886-66. The principal conclusions which I reached as a result of my recent visit to South Vietnam are as follows:

1. We are doing well militarily and are continuing to impose heavy losses on both the VC and North Vietnamese. We are putting heavy pressure on their base areas and on the movement of men and supplies within South Vietnam. The campaign is going best in the 2nd and 3rd Corps areas.

2. The North Vietnamese are making a massive effort to move the maximum number of men and equipment into South Vietnam before the rainy season. They have even resorted to moving on the roads in North Vietnam during the daytime. We are taking a substantial toll, but the North Vietnamese will be able to move in more men and supplies than they require for the present level of operations.

3. The political situation is confused and chaotic. It is not clear whether Ky will survive. There is a division within the Directorate as to whether military force should be used in Danang. Both Co and Chuan are against using military force at this time, while Ky leans in favor of doing so. Thi continues to be a thorn in our side in the 1st Corps area, and I received varying reports from the Mission as to his power base and influence on the situation in that area. The political situation has not yet affected our military operations except unloading munitions at Danang, but may well do so in the future.

4. The civilian reconstruction program is lagging [behind] the military effort. South Vietnamese manpower is limited, and in my judgement priority on manpower should be given to the civil program. I was much impressed by the PAT program and feel that we must make sure that they get the required manpower, even if this means failing to meet the South Vietnamese military force goals.

5. The logistics situation is continuing to improve daily. Officers from the top down to the battalion level all told me that they had not been impeded in carrying out their mission in any way by the shortage of any item. There have been shortages of air munitions during the last four days due to Danang disturbances. Action is being taken to correct the situation. There are, of course, some internal distribution problems with respect to supplies, but these are being met by ingenuity and hard work. The situation will continue to improve as the new ports are completed and we begin to open up the roads.

6. The morale of our forces is magnificent. Even the men in the hospitals are in good spirits. They have a sense of dedication and display a professional competence which makes one proud to be an American. In addition, the morale and competence of our Korean, Australian and New Zealand allies are outstanding. They are proud to be fighting with us in the common cause.

118. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, April 9, 1966, 7 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN II. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance, U. Alexis Johnson, Helms, McNaughton, William Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti.

SUBJECT
Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum

1. We are a nation that cannot use force to shoot people apparently demanding a constitution and free elections; and we cannot support for long governments that do this.

2. But we can use force to suppress disorder designed to disrupt or pressure a Constituent Assembly, if it is decently representative; and we can support a government that is protecting such an Assembly.

3. It follows that it may be better to accept a constitutional gathering heavily weighted with provincial and municipal officials, as the Buddhists claim they want, than it is to try first to suppress the disorder in the streets. There is, in any case, no evidence that the present Directorate commands the unity, will, or force capable of achieving the latter result.

4. This means:

--substantial concessions to the Buddhist formula for a constitutional gathering;

--maintenance of the unity of the Directorate;

--probably--but not necessarily--the replacement of Ky, who has shown guts and some political sensitivity;

--then, at the right moment, a countrywide curfew, backed, if necessary, by U.S. forces, to permit the constitutional group to work.

5. Right now, with the latest Buddhist communique,/2/ we are faced with a classic revolutionary situation--like Paris in 1789 and St. Petersburg in 1917. What we desperately need is a pause in its violence and momentum. So long as a constitutional gathering is not in place, we can neither achieve that pause nor try, politically, to separate the sheep from the goats.

/2/Not further identified.

6. Tri Quang's tactics at the moment seem clear. He smells the indecision of the Directorate and its weakness. He sees the Directorate has managed to place in the hands of his organization the northern regional interests, idealistic students interested in democracy, even a part of the military itself. He is going for the jugular through the tactics of street agitation he knows best. Assuming he is not a VC himself, the VC obviously regard him as as a potential Kerensky.

7. I see no power capapble of stopping, by force alone, the revolution he has organized; the Vietnamese military cannot; and we are immobilized by the nature of our deepest commitments. We are on a road to disaster unless we can get a pause and create a situation where we can bring counterforce and counter politics to bear.

8. It is evident that Tri Quang and his men--for example, the rector of Hue University (Saigon's 3846)/3/--have some ideas about the tactics they will use in a constitutional gathering. Both Lodge and we are under no illusion that we will be in the clear once the clan can be gathered--if it can be. But it's my hunch that Tri Quang will have less leverage and we will have more in those circumstances than either of us now imagine. And, as I say, the alternative is sleep-walking into disaster.

/3/Dated April 9. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI)

9. The gut of the issue is to get enough Buddhists into the convention to give the Directorate--and perhaps us--a credible basis for suppress-ing disorder. To that end, we should be prepared to make compromises that do not leave us without a Directorate. Some deal with Thi may be a critical element.

10. There is no major literate struggle leader--let alone the VC leadership--who is not now thinking in terms of the Russian revolution: a war-weary people; an unrepresentative government; the beginnings of disintegration in the armed forces; the issue of a constituent assembly; etc. If we are to prove Marx's dictum--that "history never repeats itself except as farce"--we have to bring into play the factor in the equation that was not present in Russia in 1917: the presence of U.S. force. (I believe Khoa is right in Saigon's 3842 from Thomsen,/4/ that the VC would have long since taken over Hue if the U.S. Marines were not there.) The problem is for Lodge and Ky to create the political setting in which this factor can be brought into play. The only way I can perceive this can be done is if we take considerable risks in assembling a constituent group and then unite with the Directorate in creating around it an environment of order.

/4/Dated April 9. (Ibid.)

11. If I rightly remember, the Russian Constituent Assembly gathered in June 1917; in July Lenin's first coup aborted; in the face of defeat in the field and Kerensky's weakness, Lenin took over in November. This is about what would happen in Saigon if we were not there; but we are there. And right now we have to try to find the ways to make that fact count.

W

119. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 12, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and McNamara. Attached to the source text is a note indicating that the President told his secretary on April 13: "I want reactions right away. See what they are doing to carry out the suggestions made--as soon as possible." Unger commented on Taylor's memorandum in a memorandum to Rostow, April 15. (Ibid.) Rostow jotted his own reactions on a copy of the memorandum located ibid., vol. LI.

SUBJECT
Current Situation in South Viet-Nam

1. Over the weekend, I reviewed the available information on the current sitution in South Viet-Nam and developed the following thoughts which I am passing to you for what they are worth. I am always aware of the danger that an idea derived from cables may look well in Washington but be wide of the actual mark on the ground.

2. The pertinent facts as known here.

The factors which have dominated the situation from the outset remain the same: the Tri Quang-Tam Chau Buddhist Institute, the Center malcontents in Danang-Hue, General Thi and his friends, and the Viet Cong. These remain the sources of our troubles but we must not forget two other national elements of vast importance though presently quiescent, namely, the Armed Forces and the other minority groups which are watching with intent concern the Buddhist maneuvering.

3. At this stage, the most impressive fact is that Tri Quang and his associates have united all their resources to pull down the Ky Government and to replace it with one which they can control pending the creation of a constitutional successor equally subservient to Buddhist interests./2/ They have formed their own political party for the first time and are in open revolt against Ky and the Directorate under the guise of supporting the "popular demand" for an immediate change to civilian government. With the support of General Thi and the Center malcontents, they are in de facto control of the I Corps area north of Danang and seem to have subverted at least a part of the 1st Division. Any attempt by force to restore government control of this region is likely to result in bloodshed (although there are lots of rabbits among the Vietnamese who will run from force).

/2/In a 12-page memorandum to Rostow, April 11, which was requested at a White House meeting on April 8, Carver analyzed what South Vietnam's Government might look like if the current cirsis ended with a complete Buddhist victory. (Ibid.)

4. Ky has had no success in placating or buying off his enemies. The Buddhists are out to win big and will not be placated by anything short of capitulation--at least, that seems to be their present mood. I do not find evidence in the cables that Ky has made any atttempt to contact Thi directly and to find out what his price really is. On his recent visit to Danang last week, Ky talked only to General Chuan and apparently did not try to see Thi.

5. Ky has shown good judgment in refusing to be rushed into general elections as the Buddhists desire. He knows the risks the country would run in its present state of political unpreparedness and foresees the political turmoil which elections with their attendant factional struggles would generate in South Viet-Nam, probably to the detriment of the conduct of the war.

6. The Ky Government has not yet used any real force to restore order, hence, its ruggedness as well as that of its opponents remains untested. While Ky has won good marks for prudence, he has appeared vacillating on occasion and has certainly not yet shown himself capable of ordering the "whiff of grapeshot" which may be necessary some day if his government is to survive. He may be influenced (as General Khanh was when challenged by the Buddhists) by a recollection of the American reaction in 1963 to Diem's strong actions against these same Buddhists.

7. We know very little about the attitudes within the Armed Forces toward the current situation. We do not know the degree of unity within the Directorate--how do the Generals view the Buddhist revolt? What about the younger officers? There has always been considerable resentment among them toward the senior generals and present conditions with indiscipline in the air might favor a new "Young Turk" outbreak. (Ky presumably is now regarded as an "Old Turk.") My point is that we can not take the solid support of the Armed Forces for granted in this resistance to the Tri Quang challenge. We need to take recurrent sensings of military attitudes, using the far-flung U.S. advisor net as a source of on-the-spot reports. I am not aware of use being presently made of this system.

8. In summary, the Ky Government is in real danger as are American interests. We can not work with anarchy or, in my judgment, with the kind of government which Tri Quang is likely to install. The problem is to restore order in South Viet-Nam under a cooperative government capable of an effective prosecution of the war, while progressing toward a constitutional, freely elected government. The ideal would be an indigenous Vietnamese solution without visible U.S. participation. This does not mean U.S. neutrality toward the issues involved--we have too much at stake. But we can do little in the open other than support the principle of an eventual constitutional government without incurring the charge of intervention and the blame for Vietnamese governmental failures.

Possible Courses of Action

9. After considering the facts as known here, I conclude that, acting from the wings and using all available leverage, we must prevent Tri Quang from overthrowing the Directorate (with or without Ky who personally is expendable) and support a conservative, feasible schedule for a transition to constitutional government. In execution of such a program, the GVN (Ky, for the present) should be encouraged to use the necessary force to restore and maintain order, short of attempting to reimpose government rule by bayonets on Danang-Hue which, for the time being, should be merely contained and isolated.

10. More specifically, the following measures should be considered and those which appeal to you should be referred to Saigon for comment and, in appropriate cases, for subsequent implementation.

a. With regard to the Buddhists

(1) The government should first make clear what attitude it intends to take toward further politcal demonstrations and toward the harboring of illegal demonstrators. I am not sure now what the law is but it should be strengthened as need be to meet the current situation, then be thoroughly publicized, and afterwards rigorously enforced. To get strict enforcement, Saigon will have to give clear, specific orders to police and military commanders (something rarely done in the past) and then punish ineffective performance by responsible officers.

(2) If rioters and suspect characters continue to seek sanctuary in the pagodas, after due warning the police should raid them, looking not only for malefactors but also for evidence linking the Buddhists to the Viet Cong. I strongly suspect such evidence would be found.

(3) If Tri Quang, Tam Chau et al. violate the law, they should be arrested and tried.

(4) At home, we are allowing ourselves to be trapped by the unqualified use of the term, "the Buddhists." Our spokesmen should reiterate that we are confronted by a power grab by a small group of political bonzes who constitute a sort of Tammany Hall which speaks for only a minority of one wing of the Buddhists.

b. With regard to the Center

(1) If the Center leaders continue to resist, the dissident area should be isolated and brought to terms by withholding various kinds of government assistance. For example, the area of the I Corps could be reduced in size to those provinces north of Danang and all troops, except perhaps the 1st Division, withdrawn south into a special zone created out of the southern part of the I Corps. The command of this zone might be given to be 2nd Division commander who appears to be loyal. There would be Homeric justice in giving the reduced I Corps with its problems to General Thi or to General Nhuan of the 1st Division in order to fix responsibility on them for the security and welfare of the area which they have led into trouble. Then, by controlling troop reinforcements, air support and economic aid, the government could bring increasing pressures to bear on this area. Such a program should, of course, be accompanied by a public explanation of the reasons why the people in the Center are suffering for the misdeeds of their leaders. Meanwhile, in the procedures for setting up a new government, great pains should be taken to give evidence of sincere consideration for the legitimate interests of the Center.

(2) Once the present crisis is settled, we should urge the GVN to change the practice of having military units in the Hue-Danang area composed of officers and men from that region. It is always going to be a center of political unrest and needs to be guarded by military forces without local ties.

c. With regard to General Thi

(1) I would like to see a final effort made to placate Thi who may be retrievable (whereas Tri Quang is not). The government could also give some assurance to his friends with regard to jobs and physical security. If this effort fails, we might try the proposal contained in subparagraph b above of putting him in charge of the mess in the North.

d. With regard to the Armed Forces

(1) I should think it very important to get an advisors' report on the attitudes in the principal military units toward this situation. Such a report would probably suggest actions which should be taken with regard to the Armed Forces. I suspect it would show that the troop information provided has not been enough to keep the Armed Forces properly informed and hence properly oriented toward current events.

(2) A few senior American officers should take a similar reading of attitudes within the Directorate.

e. With regard to the U.S. position

(1) We know that the motives of the United States Government are being misstated and misinterpreted by many elements involved in this struggle. The question is whether we can or should try to say something useful, addressed both to the Vietnamese and to our own public. I would think it desirable to try a draft to see what might be said. Points for possible inclusion are such things as our attitude toward the establishment of constitutional government, our concern over current disorders, our feeling for the heavy responsibility devolving upon the Armed Forces and our confidence in their continued loyalty and devotion to duty. More difficult to decide would be the inclusion of words of warning about the impossibility of our assisting South Viet-Nam in conditions of political chaos and the futility of continuing to introduce additional means if these disorderly conditions continue.

11. As I said at the outset, the foregoing observations have the fault of being formulated far from the scene of action and without personal contact with the principal actors. The suggestions are moderate because I feel it in my bones that over-reaction at this time either in Washington or Saigon is more dangerous than a continuation of restraint. Hence, I would recommend a prudent use of force within the law against the Buddhists, and an effective isolation of the dissident part of the Center while trying to buy off Thi and urging the military to close ranks. In Washington, we should continue to reject the slogan "take over or get out" which, unfortunately, will gain in advocates if the political situation does not soon stabilize.

12. Meanwhile, I feel that we should pursue with increased vigor the military campaign on the ground in the south and in the air in the north. If we are suffering a reverse on the political front, we need to seek compensations on the military front.

Maxwell D. Taylor

120. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 13, 1966, 1813Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Komer dated his message April 12, but it was not sent to the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas until April 13.

CAP 66187. Herewith my preliminary Vietnam views,/2/ to be taken with grain of salt as coming from a one-week expert. Even so, the insights from a full speed week on the ground were invaluable. To do the job you want done there is no substitute for periodic base touching in Saigon. McNamara told me so before I left, and Porter redoubled in spades.

/2/Komer sent the President his full report on his Saigon trip, together with a Special Annex, on April 19. (Ibid.)

I. To report first on my primary mission--backing up pacification/rural construction--have established close working relationship with Lodge/Porter/Westmoreland and return confident can build effective non-military effort to complement military push. Porter doing outstanding job in starting to pull together loose, uncoordinated civil programs in way simply not done before.

As Vance reported,/3/ "the civil reconstruction program is lagging [behind] the military effort." A key reason is that military effort got underway last summer and fall, and got top priority, while a coordinated civil program really dates from Honolulu. So I quite agree with him that it must now be given priority, especially in the competition for ever tighter manpower. Westy is naturally less eager (though agreed in principle), but I think it can be demonstrated that PATs can largely replace popular forces (local defense) which are the last remaining big manpower pool. We need to help GVN rationalize its manpower structure in manner which will meet essential civil as well as military needs.

/3/Document 117.

Other major area of civil/military competition is for clogged port space. Since US military port operations more efficient than AID/GVN, Lodge thinks draconian solution of former taking over whole Saigon port might be necessary as crucial anti-inflation measure. But civil port operations are improving and this may not be necessary.

Basic reason why Vance, Porter and I are convinced that key elements of civil program must have priority is that without a coordinated pacification effort to secure and energize the rural areas which the military sweep, either the military will get bogged down holding terrain or the VC will come back in again once the military move out. Thus military and civil efforts must be closely coordinated and move in tandem--better coordination of forward planning may be needed here.

Next problem--and perhaps the greatest bottleneck of all--is the sheer weakness of the GVN. It can do only so much at one time. In sharp contrast to our largely self-contained military effort, civil program necessarily must be operated through GVN. We must try to build up a stable progressive GVN--not take it over, and this imposes severe restraints. Instead of overloading the circuit, we need to focus it as well as ourselves on first things first and plan rationally for doing other desirable things only after the essential base has been laid.

Indeed my key conclusion is that we may be trying to do too many things on civil side and not yet doing anything well. One gut problem is that we have a scattergun rather than a rifle approach. Porter and I see the answer as a system of priorities designed to put first things first. If we don't pacify the countryside and control inflation all our other grand enterprises will go for naught. So certain basic programs--cadres, police, and anti-inflation--need to be promptly and sharply stepped up. Others may need to be postponed until there is more of base on which to build.

Porter and I will submit--after checking out with Lodge and Cabinet level--a directive aimed at giving effect to the above principles./4/ We also have detailed recommendations on new program emphases. This job can be done--if we have a halfway decent GVN to work with.

/4/A draft of the directive on Civil Reconstruction in Vietnam was sent in Porter's back channel telegram to Komer, 1944 from Saigon, April 19. Komer wrote "'Draft NSAM" on the telegram, but no such NSAM was issued. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966)

II. On the military side, our effort is magnificent. It is like trying to kill mosquitoes with an elephant gun, but the thing is that we're doing it. The trend is still clearly upward. However, I would gently caution against undue optimism about the quality of the ARVN or about how much of the countryside is really cleared of VC. Statistics--especially GVN statistics--can be notoriously unreliable. So we have established a new province reporting system--direct to Porter--which will give us a better line.

III. On the third factor critical to our success in Vietnam--a GVN which functions at least quasi-efficiently and generates enough popular commitment to be regarded as preferable to the VC--the outlook is naturally less encouraging. Lodge and the Mission believe the present regime--perhaps with some reshuffling--is far more effective militarily and is administering the country better than any likely successor. They are deeply pessimistic about being able to work with the Buddhists, whom they mistrust from direct experience.

Lodge asked me to tell you personally that he foresees a period of painful jockeying, leading probably to "elections" and a weak civilian government, but then doubtless culminating in another military coup ( if it does not happen earlier). But Lodge also says that we can--and must--live through this cycle and can still achieve our aims if we stick it. He insists he is of good heart (but Porter worries about this--I'll report orally).

We cannot just take over from the Vietnamese--the growing US presence is already creating its own problems. Yet with 230,000 Americans in Vietnam and more coming, nor can we afford to sit by and let the Vietnamese foul their own nest without a greater effort to keep them on the right track. Thus--despite the risks--there is a growing case for discreet exertion of greater leverage on the GVN, perhaps using the power of the purse more boldly.

IV. Personnel. Over half the top people on the civil side are due to come home over the next few months. This talent drain would be a real setback. Some of them might be prevailed on to stay. I am looking into the matter.

Finally, I claim at least one accomplishment--getting into and out of Saigon with almost no press notice, as proof that I can operate quietly.

Though this report is eyes only at your request, may I send copies to Rusk, McNamara and Bell?

121. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, April 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Copies were sent to McNaughton, Komer, Carver, William Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers.

HEADINGS FOR DECISION AND ACTION:VIETNAM, APRIL 14, 1966

With the apparent sorting out of the political crisis in Vietnam, the following appear to be the headings under which we ought to consider our strategy for the next phase.

1. A high-level U.S. statement.

We should consider a statement which would express satisfaction at the forward movement toward constitutional democratic government; link that movement to Ky's January 15 speech and the Honolulu Declaration; but also indicate that our capacity to assist South Vietnam is dependent upon the demonstration of unity and responsibility in the widening circle of those who will now engage in politics, including the maintenance of order; the effective prosecution of the war; the vigorous prosecution of revolutionary development. The statement might include a passage suggesting that the historic problems which now confront South Vietnam in making a constitution and democratic political parties is like that which other nations have faced in their history, including the U.S. at the end of the 18th century, and many contemporary developing nations. It might be wise for the South Vietnamese, as they make arrangements suitable to their unique situation and history, to examine some of the successful experiences of developing nations in the contemporary world.

2. Bombing the North.

a. Was the Mu Gia pass operation sufficiently successful to make it a milk run?

b. Is this the time for oil?

3. Accelerating the campaign against main force units.

Is a step-up desirable and possible? When and how can we get the I Corps back fully into the game? Could the GVN in general do more?

4. Stabilization.

From all evidence, inflation is the most corrosive immediate factor on the domestic front. We need a vigorous and imaginative program urgently.

5. Revolutionary construction.

We need to accelerate the whole track on the principle of concentration of effort. Are we prepared to let the South Vietnamese put more of their manpower into all dimensions of pacification (including PAT teams and police) while we continue our build-up?

6. Vietnamese politics.

There are at least three major dimensions:

a. Intelligence.

As the political process widens out, we need to use all our resources in the cities and in the provinces (including military advisers, AID, etc.) to understand better the personalities and interests that will be reflected in the members of the constituent assembly. We should crank up a systematic effort which would yield us the same kind of knowledge of the local interests and personalities as we would for a U.S. national political convention.

b. Political education.

We must use every device that is not counter-productive to get the Vietnamese to examine other nations' solutions to the constitutional and political party problems they now face. The notion of a junket for a group of representative leaders to Korea, Japan, Mexico, etc., should be now seriously considered. In addition, we might see if some part of the local press might be willing to run a series of articles for discussion on the constitutions and political party organization of such countries. Seminars in the universities might be helpful. What the Vietnamese need are their own Federalist Papers.

c. Constitution-making.

As in the case of Korea, we should try to get, in the most discreet way possible, some professional outside (preferably U.S.) experts to help.

7. Negotiation.

Following on from the appeal to the VC in the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique, we should consider whether, when, and how we might suggest to the government that they try to open a covert dialogue with the VC and perhaps, when the constitution and party-making process is firmed up, an open invitation to the VC to stop their terror attacks and join in making a democratic nation, including a willingness to have them take part in constitution-making. This would be a political warfare measure, unless there are some unexpected results from Saigon/VC contacts. Nevertheless, it might be useful to get some captured or defected VC into the constitution-making game.

WR

122. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/

Washington, April 14, 1966, 7:33 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by D.A. Engel in FE/VN, cleared by Miller, and approved by Unger. Sent for action to 26 posts and repeated to Saigon.

2014. Ref: Dep Cir Tel 1995 (Notal)./2/

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

1. This is second Viet-Nam sitrep for use as appropriate with host government officials.

2. Chief of State Thieu appeared morning April 14 before National Political Congress, convened by GVN to determine form of body to draft constitution,/3/ and signed decree providing that free, universal elections for a constitutional convention be held within three to five months. Details as to election date, number of delegates and election regulations to be subject of later decree. Delegates to Congress greeted Thieu's action with enthusiastic cheers.

/3/The Congress convened on April 12. The GVN's decision to convene the National Political Congress was reported in telegram 3746 from Saigon, April 5. (Ibid.)

3. Before adjourning, Political Congress produced 10-point declaration, representing areas of agreement reached among delegates (attend-ance grew to almost 120 out of 168 invited), including: that present government agree to resign as soon as constitutional convention formed; that government issue decree providing for elected constitutional convention within 4 months (this subject of Thieu's decree); that communist and neutralist elements not be allowed to join constitutional convention; that GVN promise amnesty for those who participated in struggle movement; and that agitation and disturbances stop.

4. Reaction of militant Buddhist opposition to these developments not yet clear. Moderate Buddhist leaders reported to be satisfied for time being, and large planned demonstration in Saigon took place in somewhat abbreviated fashion, in good order and discipline. However, question in fore at moment is nature of government to hold power in interim until permanent institutions established. Buddhists still demanding immediate change in government on grounds present GVN cannot be trusted to carry out promises. This attitude stated in Congress by Buddhist Institute observer, who had been persuaded to attend final sessions of Congress by other members./4/ Ky himself had opened floodgates to discussion by addressing Congress to effect that form of interim government up to Congress. Congress tackled this problem inconclusively during final session. Chairman termed Congress very successful.

/4/The Buddhist Institute boycotted the Congress. Lodge summarized the observer's comments in his report on the Congress' morning session on April 14. (Telegram 3968 from Saigon, April 14; ibid.)

5. Hue and Danang radios, in hands of "struggle forces," continued attacks on GVN and Political Congress. Situation in those cities and elsewhere in country generally calm.

Rusk

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 16, 1966, 1140Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:25 p.m. on April 18 under cover of a memorandum stating: "This is a first class stock-taking by Saigon which I commend to you for reading at your first relatively easy moment. It underlies the discussions we will be having later in the day and over the next week." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1) Also passed to Defense, CIA, USIA, and NSA.

4033. 1. The results of the National Political Congress make the political situation in Viet-Nam calmer than it has been for several weeks. We can look a little farther ahead than was true a week ago. But there is still much uncertainty. There are many pitfalls. Explosive forces still exist particularly in the Hue-Danang area where the anti-government "struggle forces" remain in control.

2. The Political Congress appears to have been a success and well justified our faith in it. The government came out of it rather better than could have been expected, given the Buddhist boycott for the first two days. The issues between the Buddhist Institute and the government appear to be fewer in number and less angry in tone. The Congress changed the bilateral--and the dangerous--nature of the conflict and, by involving other groups, seems to have given the government a chance to develop some political allies to help it contain Buddhist demands.

3. The Buddhists find themselves, for the first time in the current crisis, unable to call the shots exclusively. The government gained time and it spared itself damage by using the shield of the Congress to deflect the direct impact of Buddhist demands.

4. While not yet certain, it appears tonight as though the danger of a complete turnover of the government has been averted. The Buddhists may be in the process of modifying, if not abandoning, their move to get rid of the Directorate and the military regime which flowed from it. Whether this probability will be sustained will emerge more clearly within a few days. It is still not clear what line Tri Quang will take and he could upset arrangements which have been laboriously and precariously achieved.

5. There are a series of factors which should operate to sustain a shaky, weakened, but nevertheless substantially unchanged regime for a transitional period. The Buddhists were not able to whip up a mass reaction in Saigon against the government. The Saigon demonstration did not get rolling as might have been hoped by their instigators. In fact, there was a visible reaction against agitation and violence, not only in the expected quarters, but among many Buddhists not associated with the Vien Hoa Dao.

6. Moreover, a reasonable solution has been agreed upon and is being put into effect, so that the government can defend itself against charges of unwillingness to work towards constitutional democracy.

7. A base of military power for political support for the government has been preserved outside of the Hue-Danang area. It is undoubtedly true that Ky's ability to count on a substantial military force in the Saigon area gave the Buddhists considerable pause. In addition, the relative solidity of the government's authority in II, III and IV Corps undoubtedly served to contain its adversaries. The government's control over the major military formations south of Danang is intact.

8. Finally, the arousing of Catholic fears of the Buddhists, and the support derived from the sects, minorities, and political party remnants, added momentarily to the government's ability to maneuver. There was also a Southern reaction, although unorganized and ill-defined, against what had become identified as a struggle dominated by Buddhist leadership from the so-called central provinces around Hue and Danang.

9. The government now faces a set of problems deriving from the events of the past month. These are:

A. How to bring Hue and Danang back under control now that the first steps towards a generally acceptable political solution at the national level have been agreed to and begun. The situation in I Corps is not good and it will take considerable time to correct it. Military involvement in the Struggle forces is extensive, as is participation by police and civil servants. The writ of the GVN in Saigon definitely does not run.

B. How to exercise authority in the transitional period while continuing to execute utterly vital military, economic and social programs.

C. How to develop political institutions which can canalize normal political disagreements in an orderly way and produce a rational constitutional convention free from intimidation which is able to do its assigned task.

D. How to find a way in which the present military leadership can play its most useful role in the political future of the nation.

E. How to mollify a potent reaction among younger officers (the so-called Baby Turks) who are on the verge of a radical revolt against civilian political ambitions./2/

/2/On April 14 Raborn forwarded to Rostow a message received that day through CIA channels from Saigon summarizing Colonel Loan's description of the "Young Turks'" plans and intentions. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI)

F. How to settle differences which have caused strains within the ruling Directorate, while fending off possible further threats to continuity of the government.

10. Attempts must be made to solve each of these problems. Their solution is going to keep this country in a state of sustained political ferment for months to come.

11. It now looks as if the elections for the constitutional assembly will be held in August, barring any sudden upsets. Fortunately, the fact that a total change, or even a major change, in the government has not occurred will make it less difficult to get through the process. If the Directorate and the Ky government had fallen (or will fall), the situation would have been (will be) much worse.

12. With all the above considerations and circumstances in mind we suggest the following as sagacious ideas for the immediate future:

A. We should work through the Ky government as much as we can--not in the sense that we are opposing its opponents and entering into domestic political contests, but because it is the established government.

B. We should continue to persuade the GVN to be calm, patient and persistent in its task of re-establishing its authority in Hue and Danang. A military campaign against that area should not be mounted. But should not mean supine acquiescence. Clever police-type steps should be taken to shrink, whittle and subdivide. We should also consider what political and possibly economic measures can be safely used. First moves should be in I Corps area of Hue-Danang. This could involve non-Struggle forces in the countryside, and should be part of the process of isolating Hue and Danang, reserving them for later action. There are signs of a difference between extreme Struggle forces and their less radical supporters, which can perhaps be exploited by the government. The problem of General Thi should be solved, probably by finding him a place in the government but removed from his base in I Corps. Little by little the gas should be let out.

C. We should divert the energies of the "Baby Turks" away from radical solutions to more normal political pursuits (see para H below), and continue to advise Ky to avoid recourse to their emotional support. It appears that Ky can control these elements, and needs to be influenced to do so. Given their temperament they will need to be watched very closely.

D. We should look for further and sustained involvement of various civilian elements with the government in the process of political evolution. The government would be wise to enlist their participation in the preparations for elections, using well-known methods of political organization, with specific allocation of a large number of small tasks to a large number of workers. This could be the nucleus of the presidential campaign to follow under the constitution.

E. If the situation looks as though it were becoming unglued again, we should immediately consider reconvening of the Political Congress in the hope that it can once again exert a moderating influence.

F. If possible, there should be little or no change in the Directorate. Whatever changes in the Directorate or cabinet may come about should be gradual and selected so as not to prevent the re-establishment of equilibrium. Every addition or subtraction must be worked out in sharp focus on its individual merits, be it military or civil. If a proposed change seems to threaten a chain reaction it should be dropped at once.

G. Political energies outside the government should be channeled into preparation for politics before and after the constitutional convention. They should not be focused on upsetting the transitional framework, but on working within it and gearing up for a longer term role.

H. We should consider what form of political organization could be fostered involving an alliance between civil and military elements, to include the "Baby Turks". This could hopefully form the basis for a political successor to military government which would act as a check on any tendency to military coups. A political role for the military probably cannot be avoided. Nor should it be, seeing that the military is the only major group in Viet-Nam thoroughly imbued with a national spirit. Perhaps a combination of military leaders, veterans, cooperating political leaders and groups of certain sects and minorities will emerge with a national organization based on rural construction cadre. The purpose would be to build a strong pro-government party before the end of 1966. We would seek the emergence of a unifying political group made up of nationalist elements. We will need to examine this in some detail before a clear-cut answer can be given as to its feasibility. There should be an election law to encourage development of a two party system.

I. Finally, we should maintain the closest possible contact with all shades of political opinion, leadership, and groupings. Our ability to influence events needs to be strengthened and then exercised with prudence. Our contacts with unofficial Vietnamese must grow.

13. We are now faced with the prospect that political forces will be at work in Viet-Nam in great variety and without clear direction. The uncertainties are apparent. The consequences are not so visible. We must, as always, be pragmatic on method, while steadfast on the need to ward off the VC aggressors and to build an independent modern state.

14. We will undoubtedly not be able to control events but we should be able to influence them. We must expect that civil administration will suffer, particularly in the fields of economics and revolutionary development although there will be some progress. We do not believe that we need to suffer from lack of military progress where our own role is more definitive and where our influence can be brought to bear more directly.

Lodge

124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington April 18, 1966, 8:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

1. Force ceilings.

Secretary McNamara will wish to ask that you raise our force ceiling in Vietnam from 260,000 to 325,000 men. That would take us to September on the present schedule. Although he could raise the ceiling less at this time and meet requirements, this would mean his coming back to you again before September.

2. Your decision on force levels in Vietnam relates to the policy you wish to pursue over coming months. We have a good appraisal from Lodge in Saigon's 4033./2/ Briefly, the situation is much better; although the Danang/Hue problem is not solved, we are working to bring Thi and Ky together.

/2/Document 123.

3. By Thursday/3/ the special group under George Ball will be prepared to present to you the alternatives open to us as they see them./4/

/3/April 21.

/4/In an April 14 memorandum, Rostow informed the President that "the contingency planning exercise you directed inside the government is now underway. With George Ball as chairman, it will examine four policy options." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI) Rusk reported the results of the exercise in an April 24 memorandum, Document 126.

4. Briefly, what will emerge is roughly this: in the months ahead, as the political transition takes place, we face, say, a 10 to 15% chance of chaos and total paralysis; a lower percentage possibility that a government might emerge that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would ask us to leave; a 50% probability that the government continues somewhat weakened and in no position to prosecute with full vigor the non-military programs; and a modest, perhaps 25% possibility, that with the political process going forward quietly and the First Corps brought back into the game, we will have an even better situation than in the past.

5. On these possibilities, you should know that there are relative optimists and relative pessimists. George Ball and John McNaughton, for example, are relatively pessimistic. George Carver is relatively optimistic; Bill Bundy and Len Unger fall somewhere in between.

6. The question is what shall our policy be in the face of this situation where there is a possibility of moving toward constitutional government, which has many attractions in Vietnam and abroad, but considerable dangers as well.

7. Into this situation must be introduced the assessment that we are likely to have a Viet Cong offensive in May, when the monsoon takes hold, and they bring to bear the supplies and forces they have been accumulating down the trails in Laos.

8. The Ball group paper will examine several options:

Option A would continue along present lines; protect the political transition with vigorous military action; and look relatively hopefully to the future. It might involve measures that would increase our forces in Vietnam; increase the weight of our attack on North Vietnam, including oil; and increase our effort to limit supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail, including the further use of B52's. Economically, we would move forward as far as we can, exploiting the fact that we can work in the provinces quite well even if the central government is weak. Politically, we would do everything we could to maximize the cohesion of the moderates in South Vietnam and help them emerge with a good constitution and a sensible party structure. A part of this track would be to convey the message to all political groups that the maintenance of this track requires that they conduct their political differences without disorder and while permitting the transitional government to operate.

Option B would consist of Option A plus a purposeful effort to encourage the South Vietnamese to explore the possibilities of opening negotiations on a settlement with the Viet Cong.

There are several versions of this option. Secretary McNamara, for example, believes that while putting maximum military pressure on the Viet Cong and on the North, we should try to start a Viet Cong/Saigon dialogue while not committing ourselves to exactly how tough or hard our terms would be until we see if that track could be opened up. Others would recommend our pressing Saigon to open a dialogue even if there were some risk that our pressure might fragment and weaken the non-Communist South Vietnamese political groups. All groups recognize the danger that a negotiation and a negotiated settlement between Saigon and the Viet Cong may not pass successfully between the upper millstone of excessively dangerous concessions to the Viet Cong (NLF) and the nether millstone of being insufficiently attractive to make the Viet Cong consider it worthwhile to negotiate.

Option C, which George Ball will draft, would begin by deciding that the chances of bringing about an independent non-Communist South Vietnam have shrunk to the point, on an overall basis, that the U.S. effort is no longer warranted. It would purposefully set about to begin setting the stage for U.S. disengagement and withdrawal irrespective of whether any negotiation would work or not.

9. Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk are, I believe, supporters of Option B, with, perhaps, Secretary Rusk more cautious about the possibilities of starting now a Viet Cong/Saigon dialogue that would be consistent with our stated objectives; but you will wish to hear from them directly.

W.W. Rostow/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

125. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 21, 1966, 11:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret.

SUBJECT
Vietnam--The Critical Issues

In Vietnam we face an enemy whose main hope is that American political life cannot stand the strains of protracted war and of baffling political turbulence in Vietnam.

They are playing us as they did the French in 1953. They know we are militarily stronger than the French. They are not yet convinced we have more stamina.

They do not believe they can defeat us in the field.

They do not believe they command majority support in Vietnam.

They are counting, like all the Communists before them, on the power a determined, disciplined minority can wield against a split and distracted majority.

Our task is to convince them at the earliest possible moment that they are wrong; and that time is their enemy, not their friend.

Our tasks break down into two groups:

--those things we must do to avoid defeat;

--those things that might help them decide to end the war sooner rather than later.

Minimum Essentials.

--to maintain present relatively favorable casualty rates with respect to VC and PAVN main force units;

--to keep supplies through Laos down to a level that prevents a major build-up of VC/PAVN forces;

--to keep sufficient Vietnamese military unity to maintain the ARVN as a reasonably effective force in the field;

--to avoid political violence and chaos during the transitional phase through which we are now passing;

--to keep inflation (and the weight of U.S. military and civilian personnel and expenditures) from tearing South Vietnamese society apart.

If we do these things we can stay in the game; but war-weariness in Vietnam and the domestic strains of the whole affair might well cause a break in Saigon or in Washington at some point, if it appears endless. We must, therefore, look to measures which will force a favorable decision in Hanoi soon rather than later.

To Force a Decision to Negotiate on Terms Relatively Favorable to Us.

1. Increase the cost to Hanoi of continuing the war by hurting them badly around Hanoi-Haiphong.

2. Find a way to block or radically to inhibit the supply roads through Laos.

3. Increase sharply the attrition rates against VC-PAVN main force units to the point where they begin to disintegrate.

4. Produce a relatively stable consolidation of anti-Communist political groups.

5. Get inflation under control and steadily build up rural reconstruction in the provinces.

4 and 5 (counter-inflation; stable politics) we must obviously try to do; but, unless we are extremely lucky, they will proceed at a pace not likely in themselves to impress the VC and Hanoi that they should give up their effort.

3 (higher attrition of VC-PAVN) could happen, if our build-up proceeds and we are extremely successful in finding, fixing, and destroying VC/PAVN main force units. But it depends on their not evading us and also on their rate of replacement and supply flows through Laos.

We are, therefore, brought back to look afresh at the Laos supply line and the Hanoi-Haiphong targets.

It is right that we should look hard at these. The Communists have obviously made an assessment much like this one. They have invested great military resources and diplomatic vigor in trying to keep us out of Hanoi-Haiphong; and, with Souvanna both incapable of closing the corridor and nervous about our moving troops into the corridor, Hanoi has felt free to build roads and mount a formidable truck-based supply line.

Hanoi-Haiphong Targets.

I am conscious of the international issues these raise; and there can be only one target officer in this government. I would only recommend a fresh look, bearing in mind that many of the targets can be attacked with relatively few planes: it took two aircraft to take out the Haiphong power plant the other night. They bombed at night on radar and were lucky. But for precision targets small well-planned operations often do better than big ones, due to smoke and dust obscuring the target.

The Laos Trail.

Here I'm sure we ought to concentrate our best brains and efforts. The VC are now dependent on that trail for ammunition. Since manpower reserves are low in VC-controlled areas, they are also dependent on the trail for fighting men. It is a true jugular. But it's tough to cut and hold cut. Roads can be repaired overnight. Trucks are hard to find. Nevertheless, we are improving due to spotter teams; small spotter aircraft; more sorties; more experience. The number of trucks shot up is increasing. The number of trucks seen coming down the road decreased in the past month rather sharply. We should push the new denial weapons program to the hilt.

The equation of victory in Vietnam is as complex as anything this nation has ever faced. No element in the equation can safely be neglected. But the key to shortening the war lies not merely in trying harder on items 3-5; but focussing sharply on Hanoi-Haiphong and, especially, the Laos Trail.

Against this background we could go to work to stimulate VC-Saigon contacts, dialogue, and, ultimately, negotiation.

Now a word about the home front. At some stage the moment will come for you to speak again on Vietnam. The theme might be: We are all being tested by this crisis.

--The Vietnamese by their desire to move towards constitutional government despite the war. We support this; but it will require great restraint and mutual accommodation, as democracy always requires. Our support can only be effective against the background of such restraint and mutual accommodation.

--The Vietnamese military, ourselves, and other fighting allies: to maintain military unity and effectiveness in the face of a difficult, thoroughly professional form of aggression. We're doing well. Pride should be expressed in U.S., as well as Korean, Australian, and Vietnamese forces.

--The Vietnamese and ourselves in carrying forward the Honolulu program for the people, despite the war. Again the Vietnamese have a great responsibility to improve the quality and vigor of their administration.

--Finally, the American people: we are being tested to understand the nature of the war; to understand the confusing but essentially constructive struggle of a democratic nation to be born; and, above all, by the fact the Communists are counting on us to despair and give up.

After such a statement we would need to follow up by a systematic campaign to make clear the constructive--if precarious--process of political development going forward in Vietnam. If our people really understood, I believe they would be quite tolerant of the birth pangs.

Walt

126. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

SUBJECT
Basic Choices in Viet-Nam

At your direction, an informal working group chaired by Mr. Ball has analyzed our basic choices in Viet-Nam and has prepared the enclosed report.

Three principal choices are discussed.

(A) To continue roughly along present lines;

(B) To continue along present lines but possibly reducing the rate of entry of United States troops and stimulating contact between the Saigon Government and the Viet Cong, and

(C) To cut our losses.

I should point out that option C is based upon the possible emergence of a factual situation outlined in the statement on the basic assumption. I do not believe that we are faced with that factual situation and neither Secretary McNamara nor I recommend option C.

I do believe that we should discuss with Lodge upon his return the possibility of probing individuals or groups in the Viet Cong in an effort to create divisions among them. Such efforts have been attempted in the past but have not produced results. Otherwise, my recommendation would be that we stay on option A.

We see some advantage in broadening the international base for what may be difficult decisions lying ahead. I believe we should consider a Ministerial meeting of those having combat troops in Korea soon after the Philippine Senate concludes action on the Philippine contribution. Such a meeting would include South Viet-Nam, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United States. The purpose of such a meeting would be to make four points clear:

(1) The reaffirmation of the commitment to fend off aggression;

(2) The continued interest in moving the problem from the battlefield to the conference table;

(3) A clear signal to the South Vietnamese that we expect them to show maximum solidarity in resisting the Viet Cong, and

(4) To stimulate and emphasize once again the non-military programs.

We can discuss these matters further at our meeting on Monday./2/

/2/April 25. In a memorandum for the record, April 26, Rostow noted that "at a meeting April 25, 1966, starting at 6:30 p.m. in the Cabinet Room, the President made the following decisions: 1. We shall stay on course and explore with Lodge a cautious Track B." (Ibid.)

Dean Rusk

Attachment/3/

Washington, April 25, 1966.

/3/Drafted by William Bundy. His second draft, April 19, is in Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam (Reference Papers).

BASIC CHOICES IN VIET-NAM

Assessment of the Situation

The political crisis in South Viet-Nam has avoided outright disaster up to this point, but the temporary equilibrium appears to be uneasy and the crisis has meant a setback to the essential non-military programs. The Embassy's cable of April 16, Saigon 4033,/4/ is a highly competent summary of the present situation and of the more immediate problems we face.

/4/Document 123.

Most basically, the mere fact that such crisis could come as close as it already has (and may again) to disastrous civil strife and chaos or could raise, as it also has, the spectre of a government's coming to power which would ask us to leave forces us to look hard at our basic position and policy in South Viet-Nam. We must now recognize that three contingencies of the utmost gravity are, in some degree, more likely than our previous planning has recognized:

1. There may be a state of chaos and total paralysis. This is what was threatened if the GVN had moved forcibly in Da Nang. It might still come about if the political Buddhists push in an extreme fashion, which in turn would probably trigger counteraction by Catholic and other groups. Even without continued extreme "Buddhist" pressures (i.e., Tri Quang), the vehement elements in the Vietnamese armed forces--the so-called baby Turks--could attempt a military coup against a continuing situation of moderate political unrest and confusion. In short, the situation is still precarious, and there is a chance of some action that would produce chaos and total paralysis at some time in the next several months.

2. There could emerge a government that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would ask us to leave, with such broadly based support that we would virtually have to accept or take what seems to most of us the practically impossible alternative of continuing the struggle on our own. This nightmare appeared quite vivid in the early April activity of the struggle movement in Hue and Da Nang. Subsequently, the anti-American element appeared to die down, partly in response to the sobering effect of the withdrawal of our people from Da Nang. Our present assessment here (which we should check out with the Embassy) is that even a Buddhist (i.e., Tri Quang dominated) government would probably acknowledge the need for continued US cooperation and support. We believe this is Tri Quang's personal position; but even if it is not, the center of gravity of the broader groups whose support he would need to hold (if not obtain) true power does not now advocate ending the war or asking us to leave. However, the inevitable continued frictions of a major US presence, the continued moderate political unrest and confusion which must be expected in any event, and the possibility that there may be specific military or other setbacks and reverses--all these mean that the nightmare cannot now be excluded to the degree that we would have done six weeks ago.

The members of the working group generally believe that the chances of the first contingency are not high but cannot be disregarded (i.e., perhaps 10-15%), and that the chances of the second contingency are less. Mr. Ball would place the chances of the first contingency substantially higher than the percentage indicated. All members of the group agree that if either of these contingencies should materialize, we would have virtually no choice but to start withdrawing, and that in these circumstances we would have little bargaining leverage in connection with our presence or withdrawal.

3. The government continues weak and ineffective, especially in its prosecution of the non-military programs that are crucial to eventual success. The present crisis has somewhat weakened the already inadequate cohesion and drive of the GVN in carrying out these programs. While the III and IV Corps areas have been only slightly affected, there has been a real setback in I Corps. Even if the Directory government stays in power it will take some time to get the machinery in I Corps properly cranked up again. If the present Directory government should be replaced the dislocation could last longer. In any event the accelerated timetable for elections will almost necessarily mean a continued state of moderate political unrest and confusion. Thus, even in the absence of the first and second contingencies described above, we face a high probability that the GVN will be less effective than we had hoped for many months to come, particularly in programs that depend heavily on central government leadership, such as the taking of essential measures to meet inflation. And we face a significant chance, perhaps 50 percent, that this state of weakness will persist for a longer time even if the political process is carried on without disruption. A countervailing possibility--that the political process will produce greater maturity, a more broadly based government and wider popular appeal--does exist, and we should do all we can to further it. But it is unlikely that this countervailing trend could begin to take major effect within the next six months.

Basic Policy Alternatives

Faced with these prospects, we have tried in this exercise to assess three possible lines of action:

Option A: To continue roughly along present lines, in the hope that the setback is temporary.

Option B: To continue roughly along present lines, perhaps with a decrease in the rate of entry of US troops, but moving more actively to stimulate contact between the Saigon government and elements in the Viet Cong. Such contact could either begin with a public call for negotiations by the GVN or with covert tentative feelers. After the rough outlines of the VC position had been determined, the US would then decide on whether to press the GVN to continue negotiations or to support the GVN in its reluctance to accept difficult terms.

Option C: To decide now that the chances of bringing about an independent and non-Communist South Viet-Nam have shrunk to the point where, on an over-all basis, the US effort is no longer warranted. This would mean setting the stage where, at the proper moment, steps can be taken that would probably lead to a disengagement and withdrawal.

The specific elements of Option A, Option B, and Option C have now been spelled out in supporting papers attached to this paper./5/

/5/Attached but not printed.

It should be noted that in varying degrees all Options include indicating more clearly than in the past that our continued support is contingent upon adequate unity and effectiveness on the part of the Vietnamese.

Broader Factors

In approaching a decision on which line of action to follow, the framework for decision plainly includes broader elements that would have been present in the situation with or without the political difficulties that have now produced an increased likelihood of the conditions described earlier in this paper. These broader elements cut, as they always have, in deeply contradictory directions. Nonetheless, it may assist to have at least a checklist of them as follows:

1. Within the US popular and Congressional support for the conflict had been at adequate levels prior to the recent difficulties. This support has certainly been shaken, how much we cannot yet tell. The contingencies of "chaos" and "being asked to leave" would certainly reduce domestic support to the unacceptable level. Moreover, the contingency of continued GVN weakness and moderate political unrest is itself bound to cut down support. As we look a year or two ahead, with a military program that would require major further budget costs--with all their implications for taxes and domestic programs--and with steady or probably rising casualties, the war could well become an albatross around the Administration's neck, at least equal to what Korea was for President Truman in 1952. It does not seem likely that the American people will wish to quit under pressure, as the French did, but the scars of a war conducted in an atmosphere of growing malaise and backbiting could be very serious indeed.

2. Among our key allies--notably Britain and Japan--the present general level of acceptance could degenerate into a predominantly critical attitude that could seriously affect our ability to work with these countries in wider projects.

3. Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, we would face a continuation of the present inhibiting effect of Viet-Nam on any move toward agreements in the disarmament area and in other fields. However, this consequence probably attaches to any continuation of the war, and is not materially affected by the internal contingencies that may make the war much harder to handle.

4. Vis-a-vis Hanoi and Peiping the continuing political difficulties will almost certainly prevent any moderating influences from becoming effective in Hanoi. However, this is inherent in the over-all assessment that these political difficulties make an ultimate reasonably good outcome less likely. As to Communist China, the continuation of the war is the essential fact, and we could not in any event have anticipated any significant change in Communist Chinese attitudes in the next few years. As to the question of Chinese representation in the UN, it is hard to see that continuing the war under more difficult circumstances would have an impact, one way or the other, that would materially differ from the consequences of continuing the war in the circumstances we had hoped were developing. If we were to end the war on some basis, or withdraw, there might well be an immediate rush to admit Communist China to the UN.

5. Vis-a-vis the threatened nations of Asia, we must ask ourselves whether failure in Viet-Nam because of clearly visible political difficulties not under our control would be any less serious than failure without this factor. The question comes down, as it always has, to whether there is any tenable line of defense in Southeast Asia if Viet-Nam falls. Here we must recognize that the anti-Communist regime in Indonesia has been a tremendous "break" for us, both in removing the possibility of a Communist pincer movement, which appeared almost certain a year ago, and in opening up the possibility that over a period of some years Indonesia may become a constructive force. But for the next year or two any chance of holding the rest of Southeast Asia hinges on the same factors assessed a year ago, whether Thailand and Laos in the first instance and Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma close behind, would--in the face of a US failure for any reason in Viet-Nam--have any significant remaining will to resist the Chinese Communist pressures that would probably then be applied. Taking the case of Thailand as the next key point, it must be our present conclusion that--even if sophisticated leaders understood the Vietnamese political weaknesses and our inability to control them--to the mass of the Thai people the failure would remain a US failure and a proof that Communism from the north was the decisive force in the area. Faced with this reaction, we must still conclude that Thailand simply could not be held in these circumstances, and that the rest of Southeast Asia would probably follow in due course. In other words, the strategic stakes in Southeast Asia are fundamentally unchanged by the political nature of the causes for failure in Viet-Nam. The same is almost certainly true of the shockwaves that would arise against other free nations--Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines--in the wider area of East Asia. Perhaps these shockwaves can be countered, but they would not be mitigated by the fact that the failure arose from internal political causes rather than any US major error or omission.

[end of document]

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