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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

127. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 27, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret. Rostow forwarded this memorandum to President Johnson on April 27 under a covering memorandum asking whether he could pass the memorandum to William Bundy and urge that the Department of State be prepared to present its views during the Lodge discussions in May. The President gave his approval and wrote on Rostow's memorandum: "I think we should have public statement if all agree." (Ibid.) On April 28 Rostow forwarded Taylor's memorandum to Rusk, highlighting in his covering memorandum "one critical question" raised by Taylor: "do you trade a cessation of bombing in the north for a cessation of infiltration or for an end to terrorism in the south. It hinges substantially on whether a cessation of infiltration could be monitored." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) For William Bundy's response, see Document 129. For Lodge's comments, see Document 158.

SUBJECT
Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips

While favoring all efforts to open discussions on Viet-Nam with the Communist leadership, I have always been afraid of certain pitfalls which will beset the path of negotiations. For example, there is the danger that, from all the public discussion of our desire for negotiations, our people will assume that the initiation of negotiations is the advent of peace and will expect a cessation of all hostilities as soon as talks begin. You will remember that, during the long negotiations at Panmunjom, we remained on a passive defensive to avoid casualties with peace just around the corner, while the enemy attacked us at will and probably inflicted more U.S. and allied casualties than would have been lost had we retained the military initiative.

One of the reasons that the Panmunjom negotiations dragged was that our adversary had no incentive to come to a prompt settlement. If we are to avoid this pitfall under present conditions, it will be essential to bring the Communists to the peace table this time convinced of the need for a prompt, negotiated settlement and, furthermore, to keep the military pressure on them until a settlement is reached.

Another pitfall is one which is always an imminent danger. Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness to negotiate provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the north. In this case, our Government would be under great pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas to do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsequent negotiations.

A somewhat similar pitfall is the appealing quality of a "cease-fire" to all peace-lovers and the attraction of a slogan such as: "Stop shooting and start talking." Some of our best friends indulge in this kind of language and need to be put straight as to the significance of a cease-fire in a situation of guerrilla war such as we have in South Viet-Nam.

Obviously under such conditions, a cease-fire can not mean literally a cessation of the use of fire-arms by both sides. The principal activities of the Viet Cong--sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, impressment of recruits, collection of taxes, infiltration from the north, etc.--do not depend on the use of fire-arms and could go on to the great advantage of the guerrillas if the government forces were deprived of the use of their weapons. While it might be possible to agree to a cessation of military activities by formed bodies of Viet Cong and by government units, we can never accept an unqualified cease-fire which would prevent the use of weapons by the forces of law and order and allow Viet Cong depredations to go unchecked and unpunished.

To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will want from the Communist side and what they will want from us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final settlement. What are our negotiating assets, what is their value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the following are the blue chips in our pile representing what Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider giving under certain conditions:

a. Cessation of bombing North Viet-Nam.

b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units.

c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam.

d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam.

e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong.

f. Economic aid to North Viet-Nam.

The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing actions we would like from them:

a. Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam.

b. Cessation of guerrilla military operations.

c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam.

d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres.

e. Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong.

If these are the chips, how should we play ours to get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d, the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; their big ones are c and e, the stopping of infiltration and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading even, our a and d for their c and e except for the fact that all will require a certain amount of verification and inspection except our bombing which is an overt, visible fact. Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so elusive that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined to accept as an absolute minimum a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are readily verifiable in exchange for the stopping of our bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet Cong units (our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action. This is not a particularly good deal since we give up one of our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoi's two big ones. However, it would achieve a cease-fire under conditions which are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable. We would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons in protection of the civil population outside of Viet Cong-controlled territory.

After a cease-fire on the foregoing basis, we should seek the necessary additional agreements for a final settlement, undertaking to stop increasing U.S. forces (our c) for a cessation of infiltration (Hanoi c) and, thereafter, to withdraw our forces (our d) in phase with a similar, inspected withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres (Hanoi d). The final step (and perhaps the most important) would be to obtain the dissolution or repatriation of the remaining Viet Cong (Hanoi e) in exchange for some combination of our e (amnesty and civic rights for the Viet Cong) and f (economic aid to North Viet-Nam). The latter is an overall "sweetener" which can be used to facilitate any step in the negotiations.

Such a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their purchasing power emphasizes the folly of giving up any one in advance as a precondition for negotiations. Thus, if we gave up bombing in order to start discussions, we would not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions required for a satisfactory terminal settlement. My estimate of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is important for us to go through some such exercise and make up our collective minds as to the value of our holdings and how to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own thoughts and actions and possibly for communication to some of the third parties who, from time to time, try to get negotiations started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some country like India should express the view to Hanoi that the Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions started and then have Hanoi pick up the proposal as a formal offer. To prepare our own people as well as to guide our friends, we need to make public explanation of some of the points discussed above. Particularly, we need to make clear that, to the Communists, the negotiating table is simply an extension of the battlefield and the start of negotiations does not mean by any means that peace is at hand.

I would suggest that a discussion of the foregoing matters be put on the agenda of the meetings with Cabot Lodge when he returns next month.

Maxwell D. Taylor

128. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, April 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Prepared in the CIA at Desmond FitzGerald's request and forwarded to Rostow on April 30.

1. In considering the role of CIA in the elections to be held for the Constituent Assembly,/2/ we started from the following premises:

/2/In an 8-page memorandum to Rostow, dated April 25, Ropa analyzed the upcoming electoral process and projected the following timetable: "May 1: Electoral commission convenes; May 20: Electoral law completed; May 30: GVN promulgates electoral law; Aug 1: Electoral campaign begins; Aug 15: Voting; Sept 1: Convening of constituent assembly." (Ibid.)

a. It will be unwise to attempt either the creation of a broadly based political party or to give support to the Directorate, to the exclusion of others, before the Constituent Assembly elections: time is against one and the danger of driving the Buddhists again into the streets is against the other.

b. It would be impossible to engage in a truly covert operation of large-scale support to a political movement. In the goldfish bowl atmos-phere inherent in the present situation and under constant examination by the large press corps present, any large campaign support effort would probably be exposed with resulting damage to the U.S. Government and particularly the CIA, exceeding any hoped-for benefits.

c. The best action for the U.S. is in the direction of selecting a limited number (perhaps five or six) Vietnamese to run for the Assembly, assisting their individual campaign efforts on a limited and clandestine basis, as and if necessary./3/ The selection would be made on the basis of (1) the individual's known following and ability to organize and (2) his stated or known willingness to cooperate in the Constituent Assembly after it is convened. During the course of the Assembly the five or six could commence the organization of a broadly based national political movement activated by close cooperation in the Constituent Assembly and leading to the presentation of candidates in the elections to be held after the new constitution is promulgated.

/3/In an April 26 memorandum to Rostow, Ropa recounted the first meeting on April 25 of the Political Development Working Group, chaired by Unger, at which Colby suggested supporting "individual prominent persons" for election to the constituent assembly rather than working through "a broad political front." Ropa faulted Colby's view and expressed support for Rostow's position that the electoral process be used to "further the coalescence of a broad political front to include significant elements of the Buddhists." (Ibid.) Summary records of several Political Development Working Group meetings during 1966 are in Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, Political Development Working Group.

2. The CIA role under Ambassador Lodge's direct supervision would be limited to:

a. Providing immediately an expert on election laws to advise the Embassy and Station, said expert to visit Saigon under natural cover as a community development specialist who can consult with Embassy officers without arousing press interest.

b. Making a concerted effort to provide soundings and assessments on individuals under consideration for selection to the group of five or six (1 c, above), and providing limited financial and other support to those selected as candidates.

c. Providing soundings and assessments on all or most other candidates.

d. Providing such other limited assistance as the Ambassador may direct.

3. In support of the over-all effort it is suggested that during the campaign for the Constituent Assembly:

a. MACV's cooperation be sought to concentrate on providing security for as many places as possible in order to permit the largest possible number of Vietnamese to vote free from coercion.

b. A behind-the-scene election advisor such as Mr. Richard Scammon be made available to Ambassador Lodge, and through him to such Vietnamese as may be desirable./4/

/4/In telegram 3268 to Saigon, April 30, the Department of State transmitted guidelines that restricted the U.S. role to non-partisan advice on political processes but did not rule out "special covert support." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) In telegram 4352 from Saigon, May 3, Lodge responded that the proposed guidelines were "so restrictive as to inhibit effective exercise of U.S. influence on political development process." (Ibid., POL US VIET S)

129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Papers, McNTN II. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT

General Taylor's Memorandum of April 27 on Negotiation Blue Chips

General Taylor's memorandum/2/ is an excellent summary of the problems of a negotiating sequence and particularly of the problem of determining what we would accept in return for a cessation of bombing the North. You may recall that this issue was extensively reviewed last March and April, when Max Taylor himself was here on consultation and we had a fairly thorough discussion of the problem.

/2/Document 127.

Essentially, the issue has always been whether we would trade a cessation of bombing in the North for some degree of reduction or elimination of Viet Cong and now North Vietnamese activity in the South or a cessation of filtration from the North, or a combination of both.

In his memorandum, Max argues for combining cessation of bombing and GVN/US offensive military operations in the South, as a trade for a complete cessation of VC/NVA incidents and military operations in the South. He would then trade cessation of infiltration against our stopping any further increases in our forces, and move thereafter to reciprocal withdrawals and finally to the necessary solutions, somehow absorbing the remaining Viet Cong into the life of the South on some amnesty basis.

The present Taylor proposal has the great virtue of simplicity and ready verification. At the same time, it might permit the VC/NVA forces to form solid hunks of territory in the South and reinforce them so that they became major bargaining counters for an NLF explicit role in government. Moveover, it would be most difficult under these circumstances to define exactly what the GVN was free to do about extending its writ in the countryside.

For these reasons, I have myself been more inclined to an asking price, at least, that would include both a declared cessation of infiltration and a sharp reduction in VC/NVA military operations in the South. Even though we could not truly verify the cessation of infiltration, the present volume and routes are such that we could readily ascertain whether there was any significant movement, using our own air. Moreover, DRV action concerning infiltration would be a tremendous psychological blow to the VC and would constitute an admission which they have always declined really to make.

Whichever form of trade might be pursued if the issue ever arose--as it conceivably might through such nibbles as the present Ronning effort--I fully agree with General Taylor that we should do all we can to avoid the pitfalls of ceasing bombing in return simply for a willingness to talk. Yet we must recall that during our long pause in January, we pretty much agreed among ourselves that as a practical matter, if Hanoi started to play negotiating games that even seemed to be serious, we would have great difficulty in resuming bombing for some time. This was and is a built-in weakness of the "pause" approach. It does not apply to informal talks with the DRV, directly or indirectly, on the conditions under which we would stop bombing, nor does it apply to possible third country suggestions. As to the latter, I myself believe that our past record sufficiently stresses that we could stop the bombing only if the other did something in response. Thus, I would not at this moment favor any additional public statement by us, which might simply highlight the issue and bring about the very pressures we seek to avoid.

As you can see, these reactions are tentative as to the form of the trade, but quite firm that there must in fact be a trade and that we should not consider another "pause" under existing circumstances. If we agree merely to these points, I think we will have made some progress. But it may also be highly useful to get Ambassador Lodge's thinking on the Taylor form of trade versus some alternative such as I have suggested. I agree with Max that this would be a useful topic to discuss with Lodge while he is here, and we should at the same time inform him fully on the Ronning effort, which directly involves this issue.

I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Walt Rostow for his personal use, and also to Mr. Ball and Ambassador Johnson.

William P. Bundy/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 7, 1966, 6:32 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Miller and approved by Unger.

3343. Ref. Embtel 4453./2/

/2/Dated May 7. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

1. Press here giving wide play to Ky's blunt remarks to journalists in Cantho, particularly his statement that he expects his government to stay in power for another year, until national assembly elected in 1967. Ky's plain talk in this regard, and his statement that constituent assembly will not be transformed into national assembly but kept only for drafting constitution, touch on two key issues with Buddhist militants. We can understand that Ky may wish to take strong position privately for negotiating purposes to counter Buddhist militant pressure. However, his placing it on public record cannot but be red flag to latter and will undoubtedly render their truce with GVN even more fragile than it already is. His comments to Buu (Embtel 4412, para D)/3/ reinforce our concern on this score. Moreover, such statements by Ky get wide international play and add to existing skepticism in international circles regarding Ky's intentions to carry through with elections.

/3/Dated May 6. Paragraph D reported that Ky confided to Tran Quoc Buu that he now realized that the Buddhists were the "'dirtiest of all' and that their actions 'lead to Communist takeover' and he intends to crush them." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII)

2. You should get these points across to Ky, making it clear that we are not taking any position regarding life of his government or of constituent assembly, but simply arguing for his not complicating political picture by ill-advised public statements.

3. We are also concerned at Mission spokesman's comment on Ky's statement to effect it not unexpected, plus background elaboration (Embtel 4449, paragraph 3)./4/ Spokesman should not comment on matters which are clearly sensitive issues in way suggesting U.S. has taken position on them. If queried on Ky's statements, Department spokesman will reply: "GVN and representatives from leading political and religious groups in Viet-Nam outlined a program on April 15 for a return to civilian government. We assume that as they proceed step by step a schedule will be worked out which will include, among other things, the matter of governmental succession. Obviously, this is a matter for decision by the Vietnamese."

/4/Dated May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, PPB 9-5 VIET S)

Rusk

131. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, May 9, 1966, 1515Z./2/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables Between Porter & Komer, May-June 1966. Secret. The President was at the LBJ Ranch.

/2/Z refers to Greenwich Mean Time.

CAP 66279. Before this next week's Vietnam meetings and discussions with Lodge, here are my own private views on the uphill task of galvanizing the civil side. If I have not been much in evidence, it is because I have been trying to operate full tilt--as a flood of traffic and resulting anguished screams will attest.

This job badly needs doing,/3/ because in a word the civil side is a mess. The reasons are illuminating. First and foremost, our emergency military buildup simply pre-empted most of the port space, resources, and manpower in Vietnam, Westy has the big battalions and the top priority, while the civil side makes do with what is left.

/3/Komer's new job is described in NSAM No. 343, Document 102.

Second, unlike our largely self-contained US military effort, the civil side has to work through a weak and apathetic GVN. Nor would I urge otherwise. Suggestions that we just take over Vietnam miss the very purpose of the exercise, though a lot more can be done behind the scenes. But we have to recognize the limits of the possible in a country divided and torn by war, where the Government's writ is ignored in over half the countryside.

Third, our US civilian agencies (unlike our military) are just not geared up to wartime emergency operations. Soldiers go where they are told, but about three key civilians turn us down (funny how they develop physical disabilities) for every one who accepts. Our best FSO candidate for Economic Counselor in Saigon suddenly turns out to have diabetes. AID, which has the biggest job, is in the worst shape--it was never set up to handle emergencies of this sort.

Fourth and least, Lodge is no manager, and has little interest in or knowledge of the civilian side. He has failed to arbitrate civil US military operations. Let me warn candidly that his grandiose proposals--e.g. a whole PX/commissary system for ARVN officers and civil servants--just won't fly. If I sound bitter, I just pushed the town hard on the new land reform program Lodge so enthusiastically endorsed till I found it so vague and half-formed that it will require complete redoing.

This is not a tale of woe. Porter and I can and will bring order out of chaos on the civil side--and maintain good relations with Lodge in the process. But as your man on Vietnam, I owe you a candid picture of what I've discovered in a month on the job.

As I see it, our continuing military buildup will prevent disaster but cannot guarantee a win in a largely "political" war. It buys us time, and it may convince Hanoi that it can't win and better negotiate. But at present the enemy is just about matching our own buildup.

Meanwhile our military buildup is generating some quite dangerous side effects. First is the inevitable anti-Americanism induced by an ever more visible US presence. Adding to this is the growing pressure of inflation, created primarily by our own buildup. We could end up sinking this feeble country under our weight.

I am 100 per cent behind the decisions we have taken. There was no other sensible option in 1964-1966. But what I see as needed is a better balance between a military effort of $15 billion (added cost only) and a civil effort of only $500 million odd in FY 1966. You emphasized this "second war" at Honolulu, but Porter and I can point to mighty little progress as yet. Of course the recent political unrest--which will continue--got in the way. But it only points up the need for measures to generate more popular commitment to our side.

The papers coming to you via Walt Rustow contain my recommendations. But they naturally lack the real flavor of my private view.

A. Lodge must be told to insist on a better balance between military and civil needs. He must back Porter in getting port space, cadging MACV resources, and competing for a bigger share of GVN manpower.

B. We must borrow heavily from our own military till we get the civil side rolling under its own steam. Crudely put, borrowing five percent of Westy's resources might beef up Porter's effectiveness by 50 percent. McNamara is eager to help, but the gun-shy civilians in Saigon are reluctant to ask (here is where Lodge comes in). And it must be effective help. In February MACV agreed to provide aid with 1800 tons a month of in-country airlift, but less than a third was used because it wasn't available when USAID wanted it.

C. We must come to grips with inflation before it undermines our whole effort. I am trying to overscare everyone in town right now, because we've lost six months in grasping this nettle and I know that it will take months more in lead time before results will show.

D. To flood the country with goods requires that we get them in through the ports, warehoused, and delivered in-country. McNamara licked his port congestion problem partly by giving military cargo priority and preempting port space. He was right, but it didn't make the civil side any easier.

E. As you well know, I'm cast in a role where I'll have lots of friendly fights with McNamara to cadge resources and elbow the military. Unless we can further limit the inflationary impact of the military buildup, I may have to argue for limiting it. There is a legitimate case that we may be robbing Peter to pay Paul.

F. Finally, given all the limits within which the civil side must operate, we must do first things first and do them more effectively before building monuments. I have on my desk many imaginative ideas for urban reconstruction, industrial development, people-to-people projects, educational schemes. These make sense in time, but not until we control inflation and pacify more of the countryside. At present a lot of our aid is servicing the VC. So while keeping a sharp eye out for dramatic initiatives and imaginative ideas, Porter and I feel that we must stress the basic building blocks. If we can't get pacification going in the villages and contain inflation, the rest won't help much. Nor can we overload the GVN--it can't yet do the minimum we've already asked. So bold ideas that can't be carried out have little lasting value.

I earnestly hope that you'll press these points on Lodge and back my hand in the inevitable fights with the Pentagon.

I also have some thoughts on the political side. We badly need a strategy to optimize the chances of coping with the open campaign season now upon us. Above all, we must take "the American issue" out of this campaign, so that we can live with whatever regime emerges. I am convinced that few Vietnamese want us to leave. This simply would mean that the VC would take over. Rather both the Directory and the factions are using the American issue to pressure us to favor them. In return for insisting on genuine elections, and proclaiming our willingness to work with whatever government emerges, we should be able to get all sides to lay off agitation. We should tell them privately that if they insist on making our presence an issue in the elections, nothing would be more likely to convince US opinion we ought to leave. There are risks in this approach, but even greater risks if we don't move.

132. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive/Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, Vietnam 1966 (May-Dec.). Secret. Forwarded to Rostow by Helms on May 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: "Here is the study you requested." Copies were sent to Taylor, Rusk, McNamara, and Komer under covering memoranda indicating that Rostow had asked that the copies be provided in preparation for the NSC meeting on May 10. (Ibid.)

SOUTH VIETNAM: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS

Summary

Under goading political pressures by the Buddhist leadership, dominated by Tri Quang, the military government in South Vietnam has been forced unwillingly into commitments and actions which, at this reading, seem destined to produce a new constitution and civilian government, certainly within a year's time. These political pressures, spawned in an environment of heightened armed conflict and effective Viet Cong political agitation, have created new tensions and fragilities in the Vietnamese military establishment. The clear Communist content of the propaganda lines used by the Struggle Groups in the I Corps area symptomize the continuing gravity of the turmoil there, in spite of a seeming easing of tensions there in recent weeks. General Dinh's command and leadership have brought about this superficial easing, but have not yet dominated the more fundamentally divisive forces at work in the area. His own objectives and motivations remain unclear as well.

Odds would seem to favor the military establishment's observing their present political commitments and going along with the constituent assembly and the subsequent formation of a civil government. Real risk remains, however, that military elements, not yet coalesced, may unite in action against suspect Buddhist motives. This risk is increased if a civil government begins to move toward a neutralist position of disengagement.

The other religious sects and groupings appear at this time to have no decisive political impact. The contest is essentially one between the military establishment and the Tri Quang hierarchy. It appears that the U.S. does not have any significant leverage at its disposal in this contest. The imperative factors now at work in the social structure of Vietnam are deeply indigenous in their character and roots. If a Buddhist-dominated civil government emerges, and does not provoke military reaction by moving to the left we may indeed witness the forging of a new and intrinsically more natural Vietnamese national character, a development which could strengthen the national fabric in our joint endeavor. If a new government does move to the left, additional and greater political convulsions can be expected.

[Here follows the main body of the paper.]

133. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 10, 1966, 3:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF BOMBING POL

The Situation

Secretary Rusk believes that our launching of POL attacks in the North will greatly heighten international tensions. Although this is debatable (Gen. Taylor, for example, disagrees), the Secretary is probably correct if for no other reason than the Communists will, at the minimum, pull out their propaganda stops on a worldwide basis.

Some of us believe systematic oil attacks could have a major effect on the military and economic position of North Vietnam. Although this is also debatable, it is a contingency worth taking into account.

Taken together we may, therefore, be in a position where we:

a) need a softening political-diplomatic track to reduce the noise level;

b) have a better chance than ever before of inducing a serious negotiation with Hanoi.

There is a third element: U.S. domestic politics.

The polls show that something more than 30% of our people want a tougher policy: about the same percentage want a harder try for peace.

Bombing POL will look like an Administration move to the hard side--giving in to the JCS, etc.

We need something new on the dove side to balance our account.

Recommendations

Taking all these elements into account, here are the elements we need for a political-diplomatic scenario.

1. A first-class television briefing by Secretary McNamara on:

a) the Laos logistical build-up;

b) the location of targets and low expected civilian casualties.

2. Secretary McNamara and I believe you should override the inhibitions of the intelligence people and permit publication of the communications net controlling operations in the South from Hanoi. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. A lucid statement of what the Geneva Accords of 1962 said about transitting Laos by Secretary Rusk.

4. Prior notification of the U.K., Australia, Korea, and New Zealand of our intentions and the reasons for them.

5. A Pen-Pal note to Kosygin of the kind I drafted./2/

/2/Not further identified.

6. Possibly a similar communication to the Chinese Communists indicating our intentions remain limited.

7. Possibly an open offer along the lines which Myrdal evolved from my prodding:/3/ to stop bombing the North if infiltration stops and stoppage is effectively monitored--perhaps by the Swedes; plus a parley of the four fighting elements to bring this about as a preliminary to more general peace talks. Any formula for talking with the VC--even on a limited military basis--would be complex to arrange in Saigon; but it would also have a political wallop at home and abroad. I like the commitment to enter into talks because some infiltration is not via Laos but through Cambodia and even (a little) over the 17th Parallel. It only really makes sense to stop the bombing in the North if the war is going to stop. We need to hinge our commitment on a general intent of the four fighting parties to stop the killing.

/3/On May 8 Rostow forwarded to the President a memorandum of his conversation with Gunnar Myrdal on May 6, during which the two men discussed Myrdal's ideas about how to end the war in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII)

8. Although we shall have to return to the key oil targets after repair and mop-up smaller ones--including some underground storage--we would do better, I think, to hit the major ones hard in a short space of time--for political as well as military reasons--rather than space them out.

Walt

P.S. I have started some more detailed work on a political scenario in my shop; but you may wish to ask Secretary Rusk for his suggestions.

134. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon/1/

Washington, May 10, 1966, 2210Z.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DOD/EA Files, Job 92-00428R, File 137-6-72/3, TUBRACE, Buddhist Operations. Secret.

DIR 03194. 1. There still remains considerable concern here with regard to real intentions of Buddhists as they jostle for and acquire political power in South Vietnam. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has done several studies on this subject, most recent pouched to you under [document number not declassified]./2/ For most part, studies conclude that Buddhists, while desiring to lessen American impact on Vietnam society, would probably realize that American presence is necessary to defend South Vietnam against DRV aggression. At same time, studies caution that Buddhists, while grasping for political power, may make certain deals with DRV or VC, find themselves hopelessly entangled with opposition and, therefore, became involved in a neutralist movement/request our departure/make deal with NLF, etc.

/2/Not found.

2. All this being said, we still do not really know what real intentions of Buddhists are. Request Station pay particular attention to acquiring necessary information through Buddhist assets so that a more definitive assessment of Buddhist intentions will become possible./3/ Would be most helpful if current requirements levied [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would include acquiring information on specific intentions of Buddhists should they achieve a dominant position in a civil govt or should they fail in their bid for power. Perhaps if we hammer away in a concentrated manner for next several weeks we can clarify this murky picture.

/3/A CIA report on its religious project in South Vietnam dated May 1966, [text not declassified]. The objectives of the project included obtaining "information on the organizations, including factional differences, personalities, activities, and intentions" and channeling their energies "toward social, educational, and anti-communist political activities." Buddhist operations included past successes at moderating the attitudes of the "radical factions in the Buddhist leadership." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 92-00428R, File 137-6-72/3, TUBRACE, Buddhist Operations)

135. Summary Notes of the 557th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, May 10, 1966, 5:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting, which ended at 7:32 p.m., was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

Vietnam

General Wheeler gave a briefing on the military situation in Vietnam. The tempo of ground operations will continue at a low level until the monsoon arrives in two or three weeks in the south, at which time the tempo will step up.

In response to the President's questions, General Wheeler gave these answers:

a. Infiltration from North to South Vietnam is estimated at about 4,500 men per month.

b. Air operations in the north have hurt the North Vietnamese. They are having transportation difficulties and are using at least 80,000 men to repair their LOCs. They are calling for more trucks and have stepped up their imports of POL.

c. Some 7,000 men have defected from the South Vietnamese forces since January 1. The rate has been high, but is now lower.

d. During the pause, the North Vietnamese repaired the damage to their LOCs which we did during earlier bombing, expanded their infiltration routes, and improved their road nets.

e. Morale is down in Viet Cong ranks and is uncertain in the North Vietnamese army. It is not yet at the breaking point.

Secretary McNamara read from a Rand report/2/ on the extensive damage done to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam during the past three months.

/2/Not further identified.

General Wheeler: The effect of political events on U.S. troops is small, but the effect on the South Vietnamese forces is large.

We have no supply problems.

The President asked for a special report from General Westmoreland on Senator Mansfield's allegations concerning drinking and irregular activities of our forces.

Ambassador Lodge/3/ praised the decision to deploy U.S. troops to Vietnam. The recent overthrow of the Communists in Indonesia is a direct result of our having taken a firm stand in Vietnam./4/

/3/Lodge returned to Washington in early May for consultations and departed on May 17. In a May 3 memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, Rostow forwarded an agenda of 19 Vietnam items for possible discussion with Lodge during his visit and requested briefing papers on each item. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Walt Rostow) Copies of the briefing papers are ibid., Meeting Notes File.

/4/Responding to a Presidential request stemming from this statement, CIA produced an intelligence memorandum, May 25, on the "Relationship of US Stand in South Vietnam to Stability in Southeast Asia," which found a direct relationship between U.S. firmness in Vietnam and the relative stability of some Southeast Asian countries, but not Indonesia. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV)

Analyzing the situation in the past few months, he said the events of March were really a counterattack on U.S. successes. The Saigon Government is now almost paralyzed but we will have to learn to work in this atmosphere. Military activity can go ahead and pacification can proceed, apart from developments in Saigon. Complicated things cannot be undertaken now by the Saigon Government. The word for the future is evolution rather than stability.

Secretary Rusk: We base our support of South Vietnam on their desire not to have the Viet Cong take them over by force. A broad-based constituent Assembly is now required. It would be a real setback for us if this Assembly does not come out of the present political activity in Saigon. In order to ensure that Saigon will act, we may have to go so far as to use the threat to get out of Vietnam.

Our military assistance to Vietnam is based on the SEATO treaty and the Tonkin Gulf resolution of August. We must oppose the serious effort which is being made to downgrade these two commitments. We must staunchly support the SEATO treaty commitment. If they get us out from under these two commitments, then they get us out of our basic Southeast Asian policy.

The President: To those who are testifying on the Hill, we should give a summary of the speeches and Congressional reports issued at the time of the approval of the SEATO treaty and of the August resolution.

Secretary McNamara: Political events in Saigon are causing trouble in the military area. There are fewer Vietnamese casualties. We hope that heavy pressure by U.S. forces will carry us over the present period.

The President reviewed three years of involvement in the Vietnam problem, expressing doubt that an unusually large amount of time was spent considering new proposals or changes in policy. Our strategy has been the same for three years. There are island hoppers who jump from issue to issue and there are those who would put a bag of cement on the back of the man running the race. We are committed and we will not be deterred. We must accept the fact that some will always oppose, dissent and criticize. We want results.

It is acceptable that we referee some of the fights between General Ky and others in the Saigon government.

Robert Komer: There are three harmful effects arising out of our military effort in Vietnam.

a. Anti-Americanism.

b. Inflation caused by the military buildup of both the U.S. and South Vietnam.

c. Our pacification program has been out-run by our search and destroy capability.

If the United States is blamed for these effects, real harm will be done to us during the forthcoming election period in Vietnam. We must have a program to avoid runaway inflation, and we must limit the inflationary effect of our military buildup at once. We must double the number of those in the Rural Development cadres. The manpower needed a small claim on military resources.

Bill Moyers: Current press speculation is harmful. No comment should be made to the press until Ambassador Lodge completes his consultation here.

The President: There are 26 men in this room. There must be no comment to the press about our discussions. Don't make it more difficult for me to make a decision.

Bromley Smith

136. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Harry McPherson. No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

For the President:

I was disturbed by the speech last night in the Armory./2/ I felt it was harsh, uncompromising, over-militant. It seemed you were trying to beat Fulbright's ears down before an audience of Democrats who, I am told, had earlier applauded him strongly.

/2/The President spoke to 6,000 Democrats at a fundraising dinner on May 12 at the National Guard Armory in Washington. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 502-505.

The speech does not read as bad as it sounded. The combination of tone, emphasis and frequent glances down at Fulbright made it (for me) wrong. There was nothing of Baltimore/3/ or subsequent assurances that we want to negotiate an honorable way out.

/3/Reference is to the President's Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965. For text, see ibid., 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.

If the purpose was only to tell Democrats that the policy line is hard, that is one thing. But most of them know it. Those who agree can only holler yes when it is reiterated. Those who disagree feel further estranged by high-powered shouting. Even in the first group there are those who think Fulbright is a luminary of our Party, although wrong on this issue. I talked to couple of these who were embarrassed to see him gored like that.

Lastly, there was nothing perceptive or careful or restrained in it. Even a political speech by the President ought in my judgment to make some distinctions. I am sure we are not going to fight Uganda if she attacks Rwanda and "oppresses her freedom." Yet the speech sounded that way. Wherever it touched on foreign policy it was militant--if not in language, then in delivery. Nothing about the U.N. Nothing about food or education or health. Nothing about the willingness to talk without conditions. Standing in Viet Nam is the only issue for America.

Mr. President, I am one who believes we are right to stand in Viet Nam. I abhor the kind of vapid sophomoric bitching Fulbright is producing nowadays. But there are questions about Viet Nam, and about our appropriate role in the world, that are extremely difficult for me to resolve--difficult for anyone, I think, who gives them serious attention. They cannot be shouted out of existence.

Churchill rallying Britain in 1940 is not the only posture a wise and strong leader can assume today, especially an American leader with half of the world's power at his disposal. The speeches you make, even on the stump, ought to pay some attention to the complexity and diversity of the questions America faces. To stand or not to stand is simple. After that nothing is. I hope what you say, and indeed, sir, how you say it, will reflect that; for you set the tone for all who follow your banner.

Harry

137. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/

Washington, May 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S. Personal & Secret; Absolutely No One Else To See. Prepared by Harriman.

Bob McNamara believes the Government in Saigon will become weaker and weaker as time goes on. On the other hand, the Viet Cong are showing signs of poor morale and also the bombing seems to have caused more difficulties in the North.

Under these circumstances, he feels we should get in touch direct with the NLF, also the North Vietnamese, but particularly the NLF, and begin to try to work up a deal for a coalition government.

I brought up the question of Moscow, and he said, "Well, can't we get Moscow to go along if we make it plain we are willing to take all of our troops out if the North Vietnamese do the same?" I said, "But can we trust them?" He said, "We have to get international guaranteeing machinery. What about Swedish division?" I didn't have the occasion to comment on the latter, but pointed out that in Laos the North Vietnamese didn't respect their agreement for a single day.

He agreed with me that we must have some way of forcing the South Vietnamese government to avoid taking these disastrous actions, such as firing Thi or Ky's recent press conference./2/ He is satisfied that the Buddhists expect the Ky Government to be finished when the Constituent Assembly convenes, not simply to draft a constitution, but to be responsible for forming a civilian government, although not continuing in the function of a National Assembly for which, of course, elections would have to be held.

/2/See Document 130.

I asked him why we shouldn't get the military committee to put someone else in as Prime Minister, rather than Ky, and he at first seemed to agree, and then said perhaps we better wait until after September 15 when the elections are held.

On bombing, I impressed on him the desirability of postponing a decision on bombing the oil storage at Haiphong and showed him my memo of May 10 to Secretary Rusk./3/ I maintained that it would adversely affect our position in the world. It was a mistake to escalate as dramatically in the North and get ourselves more committed when things were so weak in the South. He admitted that it was a dramatic step and didn't argue against my position, but did indicate that he felt it would create further difficulties for the North Vietnamese government.

/3/Not found.

I told him that I had not been satisfied with the political actions in Vietnam, that I couldn't understand why Lodge hadn't prevented the firing of Thi, and it certainly was a mistake to carry Ky's troops to the North. He agreed. He said he would be quite willing to tell Ky we would take our troops out if we really meant it. I suggested we devise sanctions, tough, but less complete than that. He stated that the First Corps was completely out of control, and the Fourth Corps was very much more in Viet Cong hands than we admitted, and that in the Fourth Corps deals were being made to send rice to the Northern area to support the Viet Cong operations there. There were a lot more dealings with the Viet Cong in the South than we would accept.

WAH

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 15, 1966, 1:29 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk.

3448. Personal for Porter from the Secretary.

1. It is intolerable that Ky should take such far reaching move as that against DaNang/2/ without consultation with us.

/2/In Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973, p. 136, Jeffrey Clarke summarizes the situation as follows: "Government forces, commanded by Vien, seized Da Nang in the early morning hours of Sunday, 15 May [early evening hours of May 14, EST]. Two South Vietnamese Marine Corps battalions, supported by tanks of the South Vietnamese Army and covered by planes of the South Vietnamese Air Force, moved quickly into the city and secured the mayor's office, the radio station, the I Corps headquarters and other military installations, and the police stations. Two airborne battalions under the command of General Dong provided reinforcements. Little fighting transpired, as most of the dissidents fell back inside several Buddhist pagodas, which the troops refrained from attacking. Ky and Co later joined Vien, and during the next four days an uneasy truce prevailed inside the city."

2. However, immediate problem is how to pick up pieces and prevent a major debacle. Most urgent need is to insist that principal figures in DaNang area (such as Ky, Vien, Dinh, Lam, Nhuan and Thi) agree at once to prevent further fighting among SVN elements pending further discussion of more lasting solution. This may require rough talk with several of them but United States can not accept this insane bickering. I recognize this is tall order but you, MACV, General Walt, Thomsen and others must do your best in next few hours.

3. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the disarray among South Vietnamese leaders has been rapidly undermining support of American people for war effort. The question "what are we being asked to support?" is becoming insistent and is becoming more and more difficult to answer.

4. We must rely heavily upon you at this moment and assure you of our full confidence./3/

/3/In telegram 4613 from Saigon, May 15, Porter reported on his meeting that evening with Thieu and Ky, during which he stated that the U.S. Government was "extremely annoyed that they would carry out operation of this importance without in any way consulting or informing us." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII)

Rusk

139. List Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, May 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. The source text is handwritten. The President's Daily Diary indicates that at 2:35 p.m. on May 15 he met in his office "re recent developments in Danang" with Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Unger, Habib, Raborn, Helms, Taylor, Rostow, Komer, and Jorden. The meeting ended no later than 3:02 p.m., when the President went to the Mansion in the White House. (Ibid.)

MEETING ON VIET NAM, MAY 15, 1966

Action Items

1. Do everything possible to discourage any move against DaNang by the dissidents.

2. Minimal comment on situation by U.S., here and in Saigon.

3. Encourage all Vietnamese elements to settle differences without resort to force.

4. Do what is possible to keep Tri Quang in main stream of political development.

5. Work toward bringing Thi and others into the GVN fold.

6. Get out press guidance (draft approved with minor modifications).

7. Convey our thinking to Tri Quang;/2/ no Presidential message.

/2/Responding to a message from Tri Quang contained in telegram 4610 from Saigon, May 15, the Department proposed in telegram 3453 to Saigon, May 15, that Tri Quang be told orally that the U.S. Government fully supported the elections for a Constitutional Assembly announced in mid-April and would use its influence to establish unity in South Vietnam and persuade all groups to resolve their difficulties. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII)

8. Play it cool!

140. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, May 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. Prepared by Jorden and sent to Rostow. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 12:20 to 1:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) On May 12 and again on May 14 Rostow forwarded briefing papers to the President for the meeting, one by Komer on coping with inflation and a second by Unger on "Principles Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional Assembly in South Viet-Nam." (Ibid., Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 2)

SUBJECT
Meeting with the President on Viet-Nam, May 16, 1966

ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Lodge
Mr. Moyers
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Komer
General Taylor
Mr. Bell
Admiral Raborn
Mr. Helms
Mr. Bundy
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Leonhart
Mr. Jorden

Secretary Rusk described current situation. Main new item was report of formation of revolutionary committee including Generals Thi, Dinh, Nhuan and Don. Emphasis was on need to work on all elements to encourage Vietnamese political solidarity.

Ambassador Lodge's schedule:

House Committee on Foreign Affairs--3:00 pm

Backgrounder for press--5:00 pm

Dinner with President--8:15 pm

Depart for Seoul and Saigon Tuesday/2/

/2/May 17.

Bill Moyers read proposed statement for the press./3/ Approved with minor changes.

/3/Not further identified.

Discussion of non-military programs:

Komer outlined major problems.

General agreement on overall approach.

Defense has agreed to take steps to reduce the impact of military outlays.

Port congestion is major headache, particularly Saigon. Ambassador Porter has come in with negative reaction. MACV says it does not have necessary manpower.

Two steps were agreed: get coordinated position from Mission in Saigon, and get report from MACV on what kinds and numbers of manpower and other materiel would be needed for U.S. military operation of port.

President said we should "get recommendation and let's move."

Short discussion of package on monetary and fiscal policy. Need for effective sanctions stressed.

Ambassador Lodge stressed need for care in kinds of pressure and for our willingness to carry through. He also pointed out his desire to combine granting help for GVN's desired programs with putting pressure on for reforms.

Three programs noted as GVN preferences: wage increases, supply stores for military and others, and land reform.

Ambassador Lodge also expressed desire to get increased American control over expenditures and programs, perhaps through requirement for "one American signature" on all such items along with Vietnamese.

Mr. Bell also underlined inflation problem and need for corrective action but also firm decision by U.S. on how far it willing to go in exerting pressure.

Need for manpower controls agreed with Defense.

Land reform planning moving forward but we are waiting for results of a study on this matter from Mission in Saigon.

WJJ

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 19, 1966, 1:46 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text received from the White House; cleared by Bell, William Bundy, and McNaughton; and approved by Unger. Repeated to CINCPAC.

3531. For Porter from Komer. Non-military programs reviewed at highest level with Ambassador Lodge present 16 May./2/ The following measures were decided upon:

/2/See Document 140.

1. Make urgent three-pronged attack on inflation.

a. DOD and AID will each make all-out effort to reduce to minimum inflationary impact of further US buildup. DOD is analyzing possibility of keeping demands on local economy and manpower at FY 1966 rate, despite increase in deployments and construction program--the analysis and a plan for accomplishing an agreed-upon goal will be completed about 1 June (breakdown of FY 66 target ceilings explained in JCS 2227, 17 May, para 1a.)./3/

/3/Not found.

b. US will make all-out effort to eliminate bottlenecks to massive flow of aid commodities, especially port and in-country transport congestion. US military will assist in providing shipping, port aid, and in-country lift as required. US will insist that GVN take essential steps speed flow of goods, if necessary using leverage of suspension aid shipments and/or new aid tranches till bottlenecks removed. DOD will make prompt contingency study of US military takeover Saigon port and deliveries to importers. Instructions are being sent Embassy and MACV (septels)/4/ for coordinated mission council recommendations by 31 May.

/4/Not further identified.

c. As soon as IMF recommendations available, US will present to GVN revised Honolulu package of maximum realizable fiscal measures designed to sop up at least 10 billion piasters during the last six months of CY 1966.

d. Negotiating strategy will be planned in light of IMF recommendations as reviewed Saigon and Washington, with appropriate consideration desirable carrots as well as sticks. Possible carrots might include US approval of wage increase, US financial support of new GVN land reform initiative, and help in establishment GVN PX system if current analyses establish their feasibility in time. FYI. Though not discussed, US provision of CIP security stockpile might be an added carrot. End FYI. Sticks to provide leverage might include withholding approval further CIP tranches or other means to be studied promptly.

2. We will increase annual rate of RD Cadre output from 19,000 to 39,000 as fast as instructors are available to maintain quality. DOD will provide construction resources as needed to construct new training center. Komer will resolve with appropriate agencies issue of how added cost is apportioned.

3. We will expedite expansion police forces to 72,000 end CY 1966 goal, and promptly study further expansion of police as the preferred longer term internal security instrument.

4. Aside from RD Cadres, SecDef and Komer will defer approval of any FY 1967 GVN manpower increases until overall agreement is reached on civil/military allocation. This means in effect a temporary freeze on all force ceilings at end FY 1966 approved levels until manpower budget can be worked out.

5. Foregoing FYI and should be closely held.

Rusk

142. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 19, 1966, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, POL 7, Bui Diem Visit. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Miller and cleared by Unger. A memorandum of Bui Diem's conversation with Rostow on May 20 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII.

SUBJECT
Current Political Crisis in Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Bui Diem, GVN Deputy Foreign Minister
Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE
Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Robert H. Miller, Director, FE/VN

Bui Diem opened the conversation with a long apologia for the recent GVN action against Da Nang and with an assessment of future prospects which overplayed the positive and underplayed the negative. Bui Diem minimized the threat of civil war between I Corps and the GVN, but recognized that finding a political solution would take some time. He said the GVN had shown its good will in respecting the date set by the National Political Congress for elections and by cooperating in the preparations for those elections. He said that the election law drafting committee had worked reasonably well for two weeks and in fact better than the GVN had expected. The GVN felt that the committee's conclusions so far were reasonable and that if it continued in this fashion the GVN could accept the committee's conclusions without change. Diem emphasized that the GVN was not trying to delay elections and that Thieu and Ky recognized that elections must be carried out as promised.

However, Bui Diem stated the GVN was faced with the problem of how to carry out the elections when its authority was not respected in I Corps. Diem pointed out that the GVN had to take into account not only the militant Buddhists' views but also the views of Catholic elements and of young military officers who are getting impatient with the militant Buddhists. Diem noted that many elements were displeased that the GVN had agreed to proceed with the elections and that these elements were very concerned at developments in Central Viet-Nam. In view of this situation, General Dinh had been taking too long to restore the GVN's authority in I Corps; the 11th Ranger battalion had asked for GVN assistance in restoring the Central government's authority in Da Nang; and the GVN had no choice but to back the 11th Rangers even though it was well aware of the risks involved. At the same time, Bui Diem said, Ky had asked the election law drafting committee to finish its work by the end of the month, while the militant Buddhist representatives were trying to influence the committee to stop its work.

Bui Diem emphasized repeatedly that the GVN intended to keep its promise to hold elections and its intention to deal with the I Corps problem as a local military problem. He emphasized also that a lack of confidence had unfortunately been created between the government and the militant Buddhists. He cited Ky's remarks to the press in Cantho, and observed that one issue undermining confidence between the government and the struggle forces was the question of whether or not the constituent assembly would be transformed into a legislative assembly. The GVN says that it is too soon to decide this issue, and the Buddhists use this position to charge the GVN with being insincere.

Diem said that the GVN still felt that it had handled the situation correctly, that the Directorate and military establishment generally were still basically unified and that the problem in I Corps was created by a small group of 20 to 25 officers close to General Thi who had gone too far and could not pull back from an extreme position.

Mr. Bundy expressed the belief that the situation was more serious than as described by Bui Diem. He cited several explosive elements in the situation, in particular the GVN siege of the main pagoda in Da Nang. Mr. Bundy noted that we had already expressed to the GVN our concern that we had not been consulted or informed in advance of the GVN's plan to move against Da Nang. He stressed that we understood the GVN's dilemma in agreeing to elections and working for their realization without being able to guarantee its authority of I Corps, but said that we could not understand why the GVN chose to move against Da Nang when the election law drafting committee was working well in Saigon and might have resolved these problems itself.

Bui Diem explained that, from a military point of view, the GVN was dragged into the affair in Da Nang by the actions of some younger officers. According to Diem, the GVN had planned to replace the marine battalion in Quang Ngai with one from Saigon but that the latter was diverted to Da Nang when the GVN learned that the 11th Rangers, probably at Col. Loan's instigation, was plotting to move to re-establish GVN authority in Da Nang. Bui Diem said that the GVN had no choice but to back the Rangers at the last minute and that this was why Ambassador Porter was informed of the operation so late on Sunday morning.

In response to Mr. Bundy's query, Bui Diem pointed out that Col. Loan had been furious when he was not allowed to crush the struggle movement with the three marine battalions in the earlier crisis. Diem also claimed that the battalion commanders themselves reacted very emotionally when they were held back from occupying Da Nang. He claimed that in a ceremony the commanders mingled their blood, drank it, and swore that they would return to Da Nang. Bui Diem noted that Ky had to take this kind of thinking and acting into account.

Mr. Bundy asked what ideas Ky and Diem had to resolve the present situation and to make progress toward elections. He pointed out that, although the elections drafting committee was still carrying on its deliberations, it would be immensely difficult to arrive at conclusions on some of the difficult election issues unless arrangements were made in some fashion for Tri Quang's representatives to participate.

Diem said that Ky did not plan to reoccupy Hue and that he was only trying to establish a position in Da Nang which would permit him to bargain with Hue. In response to Mr. Bundy's question, Bui Diem said that in resolving the political problem Ky would have to deal solely with Tri Quang in Hue and Thien Minh in Saigon. (Diem did not mention General Thi at all.) Diem said that contacts with these leaders had not been completely broken. For example, he said, the day before he had left Saigon Thien Minh had asked Tam Giac to see Ky. Ky, who had for some time refused to see Minh, said that he would be willing to see Minh at this time. Diem dined with Tam Giac and told him that it was up to him to get Thien Minh to talk to Ky. Tam Giac promised to do so. (Bui Diem left Saigon before any such meeting materialized.) In this connection, Bui Diem noted that U.S. influence could act as a catalyst to get the different sides together since the U.S. presence had to be taken into account by all sides, both by elements which accepted U.S. influence and by those which did not like to accept it.

At the end of the conversation Mr. Unger noted that U.S. officials would like to discuss the serious economic situation with Bui Diem and that it would be discussed with him later that evening.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. Diem agreed that, in response to press queries, it would be noted that Diem's trip had been long planned and that it was both for the purpose of visiting Vietnamese Embassies abroad and for discussing Vietnamese problems with foreign governments such as the U.S., and that the current situation in Viet-Nam made it even more important that the trip be carried out.

143. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/

Washington, May 20, 1966, 2158Z.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp.

CJCS 2837-66. 1. I believe that both of you should have my reading of the effect here in the United States of the continuing political turmoil and backing and filling of the several contending parties in RVN. We have had adverse reactions here in the past arising from the numerous political imbroglios in that country; however, in my judgment, the effect of the present situation on the public and in the press and in the Congress (both of the latter in this instance reflecting early and muted public opinion) is far more adverse than heretofore. There are a number of reasons for this but the principal reasons, I think, are the facts that we have committed a quarter of a million men to combat in South Vietnam; the prestige of the United States is at stake; and U.S. casualties are mounting. I note that, for the third successive week, our casualties have exceeded those of Vietnamese forces. Rightly or wrongly, this latter fact is taken by the American people as proof positive of assertions continuously made by those in opposition to our Vietnamese policy that United States forces are fighting the war against VC/NVA forces while the South Vietnamese, whose freedom and country are at stake, squabble pettily among themselves to achieve political advantage.

2. To illustrate my point, I made an Armed Forces Day address yesterday in Houston, Texas, to an overflow luncheon audience of the Houston Rotary Club and the Military Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of Houston. As you would expect, the audience and the local press rather unanimously support an American policy of strength and opposition to Communist initiatives. Nevertheless, I was impressed during my conversations with civic leaders and during the following press conference by the dissatisfaction and uneasiness of all as to our future in Vietnam. For example, I was questioned sharply as to whether, in view of the Vietnam situation, we were reducing or would cease our deployments to RVN. To widen the field a bit, Senator Javits yesterday expressed the view that we should stand down our military efforts in both North and South Vietnam. In brief, he advocated that we should stop our air campaign against North Vietnam and should, in agreement with the GVN, instruct our ground combat forces to desist offensive operations and fight only to defend themselves against attack. The demerits of Senator Javits' proposal from the military point of view are so obvious that I will not discuss it further. You should be aware, however, that, as farfetched as this proposal to abandon the initiative to the enemy may seem to us in the military, it will have a distinct appeal to all flocks of doves and, even more importantly, to the relatives of our men in South Vietnam whose lives are at risk. The rationale of this latter group (for whom I have much sympathy) will be why should my son or brother or husband be killed fighting against the VC/NVA while the South Vietnamese whose country and freedom are at stake engage themselves in political bickering to the detriment of the effort against the enemy.

3. As I read the cables from Embassy Saigon and from Headquarters MACV reporting upon the actions, the statements and the proposals of the two sides, I get two distinct impressions: (a) all parties to the controversy appear to be convinced that the United States is so firmly hooked in Vietnam that nothing they do, or any circumstance arising therefrom, will cause us to disengage from our commitments; and (b) both parties to the confrontation are acting in bad faith, are cemented in fixed positions which they will not undertake to modify by compromise and that the GVN, at least, is proceeding without having a clear-cut objective in mind.

4. A further item in this devil's stew is Colonel Loan who, if the cables are reasonably correct, is a continuing troublemaker. I note that at last he has departed the Da Nang area for Saigon; based on the past, I wonder how long he will remain absent from the scene. Moreover, I recall that in response to an earlier query from me, you stated that the Directorate continued to be a cohesive body. Do you judge that cohesiveness continues? I note that General Thi at first agreed to, and has now backed out of, a meeting with General Ky at Chu Lai for reasons which at best seem specious. I note also the public statements of General Dinh calling for the ouster of Thieu and Ky. Does this reflect personal outrage or political conviction?

5. I really do not expect that either of you have answers to the questions I have posed or any reassurance of the early resolution of this mess. My purpose in addressing you is to convey my own deep distress and concern that the lives, the resources, and the political capital we have expended in our effort to preserve South Vietnam as a part of the free world approach the point of having been in vain. Very frankly, I am greatly worried, the more so because in all logic one cannot expect the American people to suffer indefinitely the continuation of this truly sickening situation.

6. As you know, I am usually pretty much of an optimist; but always, I hope, on the realistic side. This time, however, I think I can feel the first gusts of the whirlwind generated by the wind sown by the Vietnamese. Westy, I know that you will exert to the full your influence to set things once more on a proper course. If any of the above views will be of use to you, you have my full permission to use them as and how you think best. Even so, even if we get some semblance of solidarity and common purpose among the contending factions, we must all recognize that we have lost irretrievably and for all time some of the support which until now we have received from the American people. In other words, regardless of what happens of a favorable nature, many people will never again believe that the effort and the sacrifices are worthwhile. Warm regards./2/

/2/In telegram MAC 4070, May 22, Westmoreland responded that he believed the situation in Vietnam had been "blown out of perspective" by the press. While it was "serious," it was "not desperate," and the GVN seemed "to be making positive headway in restoring government authority in the I Corps area." In a telegram transmitted to Wheeler at 0929Z on May 23, Sharp concurred with Westmoreland's assessment. (Ibid.)

144. Editorial Note

In a briefing memorandum dated 8 a.m., May 21, 1966, Special Assistant Walt Rostow advised President Johnson that in Danang "heavy exchanges of fire between GVN and struggle forces [had] led to VNAF bombing of the latter" and that mortar fire, "possibly from struggle forces," had injured 13 U.S. servicemen. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII) In its lead story that morning, datelined Danang, May 21, The New York Times reported that "government marines today took over one of the pagodas used as a refuge by dissidents here after four hours of bitter fighting in which two Buddhist monks were killed." The Times stated that "dissident soldiers and Buddhists were still holding out in two other pagodas."

At 10:10 a.m. on May 21, White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers telephoned Secretary of State Rusk and indicated that the President was "deeply disturbed" about Vietnam. "It seems to him that internally we cannot permit this thing to go on, it will tear us to pieces and [he] thinks time has come for us to try to push whatever buttons we have to push." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)

In telegram 3575 to Saigon, transmitted at 6:29 p.m. on May 21, the Department of State advised Ambassador Lodge that the press was giving the events in Danang "full play with pictures of GVN tanks trained on pagodas." The Department stated that the "situation now appears to American public to be getting out of hand with US in helpless position. While we should not be driven to actions not wise in themselves by these attitudes, fact is that they make resolution of crisis matter of drastic urgency from any standpoint. FYI: Gallup Poll being published tomorrow will indicate 54% saying US should withdraw from SVN if internal squabbling continues." The Department then outlined a series of issues for Lodge to raise with Prime Minister Ky and concluded by asking Lodge whether he thought the United States should assert its power "forcefully and drastically" to end the crisis. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII) Lodge replied in telegram 4829 from Saigon, May 22. He summarized his lengthy discussion with Ky earlier that day, noting that Ky claimed that his government "had virtually complete control over the city of Danang." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

In a Vietnam Situation Report summarizing events in the Struggle crisis dating from May 22 to June 7, the Department of State reported that "the main Struggle base, the Tinh Hoi pagoda, fell to GVN troops on May 23 without a fight, and the GVN reasserted its authority over the city. Those dissidents who were not captured or who did not surrender either left the city or went underground. The total number of Vietnamese dead in the battle for Danang was between 60 and 75 although Struggle forces in Hue claimed the figure to be much higher." (Ibid., EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Viet-Nam Situation Reports, 1966) In Advice and Support: The Final Years, page 141, Jeffrey Clarke states that "according to rough U.S. estimates, casualties for both sides included 150 South Vietnamese dead and 700 wounded, and another 23 American soldiers wounded."

145. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret.

Curbing Inflation in Vietnam. Now that Ky has Danang at least temporarily under control, I am pushing for quick GVN action on anti-inflationary measures. The IMF mission, there now, is manfully pushing the GVN toward at least modest devaluation, plus related measures. It is just possible that Ky might bite the bullet in the next week or so.

I have been taking a hard line, because without someone pushing neither Lodge nor Ky will face up to the inflationary threat. We have authorized the use of both carrots and sticks. One carrot would be to tell the GVN that we will increase FY 1967 economic aid enough to help cover any loss to it of foreign exchange from devaluation (estimated at $30 million). This is not a new add-on since we are already programming such increased aid anyway to help flood Vietnam with goods. But we haven't told the GVN yet.

The only credible stick we have is to withhold disbursement of economic aid till the GVN acts. This can be done discreetly, I believe, if it becomes necessary.

I am also pushing a set of major reforms in our chief aid instrument, the Commercial Import Program (CIP), to meet the rising tide of criticism over loose administration, windfall profits, corruption and the like. We hope to face down the GVN by simply telling it that from now on our aid will have to be handled according to the new rules. If not, new allocations may somehow get held up till the GVN complies.

R.W. Komer/2/

/2/To the left of Komer's signature the President wrote: "Bob, I applaud you, good. Keep it up & Keep it Hot." In telegram CAP 66323 to Porter, May 23, Komer stated that the President was "eager to put positive face on our VN effort and balance press horror stories by publicizing progress on civil side. We will probably have to produce some headline-catchers by mid-June." (Ibid., Back Channel Cables between Porter and Komer, May-July 1966)

146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, May 25, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to President Johnson at noon on May 25 under cover of a memorandum stating: "This is Ambassador Lodge at his best. There is a good deal to be said for the approach he suggests for a fireside chat." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6)

4952. For the President from Lodge. We are in such a fast moving situation here that I had just about decided not to send you a weekly telegram at all. On the other hand, I wrote what follows and thought it might interest you in the hopes that you would make allowances for the turmoil we are in.

A. Crisis

1. Following is an effort to put things here in proportion:

2. The troubles centering on Danang and Hue seem to be stabilizing with regard to the former city with fair prospects of reestablishing government authority in the second, although not without considerable uproar. Contrary to the press portrayals which I have seen, the rest of the country has been relatively quiet. The Buddhist inspired demonstrations in Saigon have not yet assumed political importance. I try to be alert to opportunities to bring the government and the "Strugglers" together by talks, and General Westmoreland has in fact, talked with General Thi, with no apparent result./2/ The "Strugglers", in characteristic Southeast Asian fashion, having apparently been unsuccessful, seem now to be turning toward fanaticism. They evidently realize that the most influential segments of the U.S. press take all their fanatic actions--riots, stone throwings, fires, signs telling Americans to go home, and self-immolation--at face value, however cynical these same journalists may be about the U.S. Government. But if we assume that the government establishes its sway in Hue and Danang and then maintains order in Saigon and the rest of the country, the following could be in prospect during the next few months:

/2/Lodge reported on Westmoreland's conversation with Thi in telegram 4966 from Saigon, May 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)2

B. Military

3. Westmoreland and his Vietnamese colleagues may well inflict heavy losses on the North Vietnamese Army and the big units of the Viet Cong. He is extremely alert to the possibilities.

4. We have put it out to the press, but they have apparently taken no interest in the fact, that throughout this period of crisis, combat troops of the 1st Vietnamese Division in the Hue area have not behaved badly. I refer particularly to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and the 2nd Troop (Company) of the 7th Cavalry Squadron, an armored personnel carrier unit. The logistic and headquarters troops which have been demoralized by the Buddhist chaplains have behaved badly, but that does not justify the unmitigated gloom of recent days.

5. As far as chaplains are concerned, the government has put out an order that they shall cease and desist from talking politics and engaging in political activity. If they disobey the order, they are to be transferred. The government is talking about abolishing the Chaplains' Corps, but I do not believe this will happen. There are about 70 Buddhist and 60 Catholic chaplains in the Vietnamese Army today.

C. Casualties

6. The following has been prepared by the staff regarding casualties:

"While U.S. casualties have exceeded those of the GVN for 9 of the past 16 weeks, not counting this week (U.S. figures are incomplete), in only two of those weeks have more Americans than Vietnamese soldiers been killed, and in those two weeks the total killed was very low compared to normal weeks. One reason why our casualties have been higher than Vietnamese is that we are much more thorough in counting wounded, with even small scratches being included in the totals, while the Vietnamese only include those who have to leave their units to be treated. We count all the 'band-aid' cases; they count only the 'hospital' ones. Over the long term, Vietnamese casualties have far exceeded our own. For instance, since the beginning of August 1965, when our forces began heavy involvement in combat, the Vietnamese have suffered 29,973 casualties, including 8,151 killed, while our soldiers have had 16,267 casualties, including 2,574 killed. When one compares the loss of life on the Vietnamese side to South Viet-Nam's total population of about 15 million, including the Viet Cong, their suffering is seen to be far greater proportionately than ours. Roughly speaking, for each family in the U.S. which lost a son in the fighting in Viet-Nam in 1965, there were 200 Vietnamese families who suffered such a loss. And this leaves aside all those who suffered the loss of loved ones who were not soldiers through V.C. terrorism or by being caught in the cross-fires of this war. Thus there can be little doubt that the Vietnamese are carrying the major burden of suffering in this struggle, in both absolute terms and proportionate to our respective situations."

D. Elections

8. The elections which should take place in September, assuming that this rickety government can hold together, may finally produce something which we can support on the basis that it represents the popular will, although it could be denounced as null and void by the Army or the Buddhists or by some other group. By no stretch of the imagination could it end the political uproar which can be expected to go on as long as Viet-Nam evolves into a modern nation-state. But it might establish a "standard to which the wise and honest may repair"--in short, something to show them where north is. This is a good thing to do--even if they don't always steer straight course.

E. Revolutionary Development

9. As regards revolutionary development, Porter reports that 90 more teams are now being inserted into the villages and hamlets and that these should be followed about September 1 by 100 more. This infusion of personnel is concurrent with the insertion of the first police field force units who will work in the areas between the villages and hamlets, thus complementing the work of the revolutionary development teams inside those places. Together with the self-help programs, which are now functioning on a wide scale, it appears that by mid-September, we may, with luck, have some interesting progress to report. This is all brand new and highly creative. In fact, if it actually happens, it would not be too much to say that nothing more imaginative than this would be going on in the entire field of government.

F. U.S. Opinion

10. I have been mulling over the state of American opinion as I observed it when I was at home. I have also been reading the recent Gallup polls. As I commented in my Embtel 4880,/3/ I am quite certain that the number of those who want us to leave Viet-Nam because of current "internal squabbling" does not reflect deep conviction but a superficial impulse based on inadequate information.

/3/Dated May 23. (Ibid.)

11. In fact, I think one television fireside chat by you personally--with all your intelligence and compassion--could tip that figure over in one evening. I am thinking of a speech, the general tenor of which would be: "We are involved in a vital struggle of great difficulty and complexity on which much depends. I need your help."

12. I am sure you would get much help from the very people in the Gallup poll who said we ought to leave Viet-Nam--as soon as they understood what you want them to support.

13. You and the administration have done big things in educating public opinion. When I consider the degree of information today compared to what it was a year or two years ago, I applaud. But there is still more to be done--and only you can do certain parts of it. Of course, I am glad to help in any way I can.

14. Your own statement to the press about Viet-Nam was excellent in tone and substance./4/

/4/Presumably a reference to the President's remarks on Vietnam at his press conference on May 21. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 531-539.

G. Vietnamese Notes

15. Chieu Hoi returnees are up from the April slump but below the average during February and March. There was an increase in the number of veterans which were returned.

16. The newspapers Dan Chung and Thoi Su Mien Nam take issue with Fulbright's brothel statement/5/ and write that though thankful for American help, we don't have to tolerate such inconsiderate remarks by a politician like Mr. Fulbright--remarks that no self-respecting Vietnamese can forget. Many papers carried the wire story that Senator Fulbright "regrets" his statement.

/5/At a speech delivered on May 4 at Johns Hopkins University, Fulbright stated that "both literally and figuratively, Saigon has become an American brothel." (The New York Times, May 6, 1966) Fulbright publicly expressed his regrets about the statement on May 17. (Ibid., May 18, 1966)

H. Economic

17. Retail prices in Saigon continued to rise, especially foodstuffs. The index is up 5 per cent from a month ago. These price increases are evidently due to not only the political unrest but also to rumors of devaluation of the currency.

18. The Saigon free market rate for U.S. currency and gold rose to an all-time high.

19. On May 19, General Ky and Porter signed a memorandum of understanding concerning the use of counterpart funds. This agreement should give us control over the use of part of these funds and increase our ability to exert badly needed influence.

20. One disturbing note is that the Saigon Special Court sentenced to death an iron and steel importer of Chinese origin whom it convicted of selling above official prices. If the sentence is carried out, it would have a seriously adverse affect on the business climate, which is greatly affected by the Chinese merchants. I plan to urge GVN to grant clemency in this case.

21. The Minister of Economy has announced that the GVN will make sure that sufficient personnel are available to operate the port 18 hours a day. This decision should help alleviate the problems we have had in moving cargoes through the port.

Lodge

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 25, 1966, 1:09 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Helble, cleared by Miller, and approved by Unger.

3626. During recent consultations in Washington of Ambassador Lodge following outline was basis for highest level discussions of elections and political development and its contents generally agreed upon. Outline, entitled "Principles Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional Assembly in South Viet-Nam," is transmitted herewith FYI and for your general guidance.

Begin Text:

A. General Principles of U.S. Action

The U.S. Mission should seek to exert maximum influence toward the achievement of the substantive objectives stated in B below. At the same time, this must be done with recognition that a key objective is to avoid anti-Americanism becoming a major issue; we shall be accused of interference in any event, but it is vitally important not to give potential anti-American elements (or the press and outside observers) any clear handle to hit us with.

B. Objectives

1. Elections should be held as announced by GVN on April 15th, that is by September 15 of this year.

2. The issue of anti-Americanism should be kept out of the election campaign as far as possible.

3. The question as to whether the constitutional assembly will only have the role of drafting the constitution or will have some further function should not be allowed to become an active pre-election issue and the U.S. should take no position on this question.

4. The elections should be conducted so as to produce a constitutional assembly fairly representing the various regions and groups within South Viet-Nam (except those actively participating with the Viet Cong), including the Army, Montagnards, Khmer minorities, et al.

5. The elections should be conducted so as to gain a maximum improvement in the image of the GVN in the United States and internationally; this calls for a wide turnout, scrupulously correct conduct of the voting and counting process, as little political limitation on voter eligibility as possible and vigorous efforts to avoid voter intimidation from any quarter. Ideas to be explored are a brief election period ceasefire, international observation of the elections, students participating as poll watchers, etc.

6. The emphasis in the campaign should be on the selection of good men to draft the constitution; political parties are not expected to play a major role although the campaign may provide the occasion for laying foundations for future party organization. We will wish to work quietly with selected promising candidates all across the political spectrum in the expectation that some will be elected to the assembly and provide useful continuing contacts.

7. Unless new developments change our assessment, major efforts should be devoted not to stimulating the formation of a large nationalist party but rather to the adoption of the concept that these elections bring together all non-communist groups who are pledged, among other things, to their country's independence and the continuing need to defend it with American help. Specifically, efforts should not be made to split the Buddhists or isolate the militant Buddhist faction.

8. The election process should be a vehicle for educating and engaging the population in the democratic process and it should be used to launch political and psychological initiatives with youth groups, students, labor, etc.

9. Restore as far as possible the unity of the Directorate and promote a reconciliation between Generals Ky and Thi. However, discourage efforts by the Directorate to form a government party designed purely to perpetuate the Directorate in power to the exclusion of other significant political groups. End Text.

Rusk

148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/

Washington, May 28, 1966.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S. Secret; Personal. Prepared by Harriman on May 30.

I saw Bob McNamara Saturday morning, May 28. He said he had spoken to the President about my going to Moscow and was very keen that I should go.

He hopes for some settlement, and gave me the impression he didn't see any value in escalation. He said he thought a good settlement would be: if North Vietnam would pull its troops out, we should do the same; and establishment of an expanded ICC to assure no evasion.

From the Russian standpoint, they would not want to have escalation which eventually might affect them, and he thought I should underline the dangers.

On the plus side, he thought we could agree to a parallel reduction in the Defense budget, which he was sure the Kremlin wanted. He said he thought it might be a good idea for me to tell Kosygin that whereas on June 30, 1965 we had in the Army 968,000 men, this year we would have 1,217,000, and in June 1967, 1,600,000. We could certainly agree with the Kremlin to reduce our troop level.

On interim steps, we might stop bombing if the North Vietnamese stopped infiltration of men and perhaps supplies.

We should agree, he thought, to let the South Vietnamese decide their own future even if it meant a coalition government with the Viet Cong, which might or might not take over.

WAH

149. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV. Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow and Taylor. Leonhart was Komer's deputy in the White House office established by NSAM No. 343 (Document 102) to oversee pacification and other non-military programs in Vietnam.

SUBJECT
Report on Visit to Vietnam: May 17-29, 1966

1. I returned yesterday from a ten-day visit--my first in fourteen years since a 1950-52 tour of duty in the Saigon Embassy.

2. Three general impressions from this quick trip:

a. Our key programs have not been materially hampered by the recent political disorders. These programs may not be bounding forward but they are moving ahead--in revolutionary development, nationwide self help projects, and politico-military coordination. On the military side, the recent ARVN disaffections have largely involved rear support troops and headquarters units. The combat forces, even in I Corps, have kept up far better than press reporting from Saigon indicates.

b. Ky's ability to cope with the intestinal discords of Vietnam remains in doubt, but since his original political blundering against Thi, his touch has improved. There are additionally strong possibilities that Vietnam will look considerably brighter by late September. The controlling factors: (1) a reasonable chance for substantial progress in our arms, on which all else chiefly depends, if Westmoreland finds, as he expects to do, the new VC regiments and their built-up supplies; (2) better prospects for healthier politics that the September Constitutional Assembly elections should bring; and (3) the political impact of the completion of the first village assignments by the 100 new RD cardre teams which grad-uated on May 25.

c. To increase the new momentum in RD programs and to exploit these favoring possibilities, we have much to do over the next few months.

3. The original Komer priorities, as seen on the ground in Vietnam, seem sound and essential. Immediate requirements are:

a. Anti-inflation. The problem is as bad as--or worse--than we had thought it. Retail prices continue to rise at 5% per month. In one year local construction materials have skyrocketed: lumber up 600%, rock 500%, sand 300% (USAID is now letting a 610,000 ton tender for sand to Taiwan--61 unbudgeted Liberty ships). Last week in Saigon the black market in US $10 bills reached an all-time high at 182 piasters. We should hit hard, and early. The GVN is now softened up by the visit of the IMF team. Delay in devaluation will only involve it more in the elections. We can try for the deeper range of devaluation around 120 or the lesser around 80 with special exchange surcharges. The IMF appears to favor the latter and it is important to keep it out in front. But a deeper devaluation would be cleaner, simpler to administer, and less subject to subsequent unravelling. My own view is that the door should be held open for a negotiating entry at about 110 and an exit at about 100.

b. Port Congestion. At the end of May the number of non-military ships waiting off Saigon for their turn at unloading was 36. Average waiting time was 26 days. Civilian cargo clearances have been overstated through errors in reporting methods by about 20% or 50,000 tons a month. Westmoreland now seems to favor military operation of the Saigon port jointly with ARVN units which will provide some cushion for political sensitivities while letting the US do the real work. He will need full authority over US civil employees at the port, improved arrangements to remove warehoused goods, and a system to schedule and control outbound cargo from the States. Lack of such control is one of the basic deficiencies of the present AID system. He should be given what he needs to make the port function.

c. Cadres. The new 59-man RD cadres are the most promising element in the country. The first 100 teams were graduated at the end of May. A second class of 115 teams will graduate in September. The decision to double the cadre this year was of basic importance. By June 1967, if the program goes well, 10,000 cadre will be trained each thirteen weeks. Westmoreland is now prepared to convert PF troops into cadre providing no villages are left uncovered in the process and CIA auspices can be reasonably concealed. We must work to insulate the cadre from changes in GVN regimes; hold the existing training facilities at Vung Tau at least until the new camp at Long Hai is fully operational and its surrounding area secured; improve our infiltration security as numbers increase rapidly; and keep a close cross-check on our training methods against cadre performance and experience. But if there had been imagination enough to form these teams fourteen years ago, Vietnam would be much different today.

4. The next steps are well understood as between Washington and the Saigon mission. We should aim for next-phase decisions in June on:

a. A manpower survey, decently done, as a basis for overdue judgments on new allocations of increasingly scarce Vietnamese manpower. The Mission will need help, and we should get a manpower team out to Saigon soonest.

b. Priorities guidelines for the pacification and developmental phases of rural reconstruction based on NSAM 343.

c. Redefinitions of roles and missions to rationalize the hodgepodge of present security forces. The critical area is the 350,000 man agglomeration of RF, PF, Police, Police Field Forces, CIDG, special force units, and RD cadres now competing for money, manpower and material.

d. Land Reform. A mission interagency group is now working on feasibility, but will probably favor a selective and gradual approach.

5. Ahead lie further priority actions. The most important of these seem to me:

a. Urban Programs. We have tended to ignore urban areas and then find time and again that our political difficulties arise from the cities. Each of the eight districts of Saigon increased in population by 60-70,000 last year. Another 500,000 will probably be added in the next twelve months. Some form of political action team or an extension of the RD cadres to urban areas may be useful. Measures to repair the breakdown in urban services--particularly public health and refuse disposal--are urgently required. This is one of the few areas susceptible of visible results before the September elections.

b. USAID Vacancies. Of a total of 3931 approved positions, USAID has 2991 on board. In its field operations staff, it is authorized 203 positions and had 128 present on May 23. Obviously recruitment programs need to be pressed, and there is an urgent need to fill certain vacancies at once--in auditors and commodity analysts, where weaknesses in control procedures are attracting adverse comment. In general, the USAID personnel structure needs reexamination (Lodge would favor a 25% cut). My own view is that reform and slenderizing should be undertaken against the new decisions on revised priorities.

c. Joint Operations. We may need to move more toward joint boards and commissions with the GVN. In the period immediately ahead, the GVN seems unlikely to improve administratively quickly and sufficiently enough to carry out its programs with only liaison guidance. In the military area, we need to find a more effective means for advance consultation on plans and political actions. Westmoreland's project for joint operations of the ports and storage facilities seems promising. For the cadres, some adaptation of the JCRR, which did effective work on Taiwan, may be useful. Its key provisions were a direct appropriation of Congressional funds and the appointment of its members (three Chinese, two Americans) by the respective Presidents for fixed terms. Independence of tenure and funds may be needed to insulate the cadres--and to preserve the present dynamic chief, General Thang--from GVN politics.

6. Finally, press relations. The resident Saigon press corps by and large is young, inexperienced, and sensationalist minded. It will be a difficult group to work with at best, but I am convinced that more can be done. Barry Zorthian, the head of JUSPAO, will be in Washington for two weeks in mid-June. I strongly recommend that Mr. Moyers and Mr. Komer meet with him and that we work out an informational strategy and operational plan for the next several months on story lines, press treatment, and greater emphasis on third country programs in behalf of Vietnamese freedom and development.

William Leonhart/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Leonhart signed the original.

150. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Saigon, June 2, 1966, 1135Z.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp.

MAC 4508. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Ky between 1600 hours and 1655 hours, this date, in his office at VNAF Headquarters.

1. Ky reflected his usual self-confidence and was obviously pleased with the success with the Buddhists yesterday./2/ The Buddhists now realize that their position is very weak since they have no issue, have gone too far, lost control over the demonstrators, have little public sympathy, and no real support from the press or international Buddhist groups./3/ The Buddhists have admitted penetration by the VC. Today Ky received an official letter from a Buddhist leader asking the government to provide security to protect pagodas (Ky viewed this as a significant development). Most of the Buddhists are moderate people but there are a few "hawks" who have caused the trouble. Ky believes these "hawks", led by Tri Quang and Thien Minh, are in the process of being isolated by the moderate monks who are in the majority. At the meeting yesterday the monks stated that Tri Quang would go along with their decision. The Buddhist chaplain problem is being handled according to plan and field commanders have been alert in dealing with the matter.

/2/In telegram 5178 from Saigon, June 1, Lodge reported that Ky had reached an understanding with the Buddhist leaders at their meeting on May 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Buddhist and Directorate leaders, including Ky, met again on June 1 to complete their agreement. (Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, p. 330)

/3/In telegram 5124 from Saigon, May 30, Lodge indicated that Ky was "embarked on a campaign to isolate the extreme Buddhists and their supporters," whose "current cynical campaign of hunger strikes, letters in blood and suicide" Lodge viewed as a "desperate effort to bring maximum pressure on the U.S. to force the Government of Vietnam into conceding to Tri Quang." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)

2. Enlargement of the Directorate to include 10 civilians for total of 20 has served to save face for the Buddhists. When Ky saw a Catholic leader this morning he was greeted with hostility since the Catholic was of the opinion that the government had again given in to Buddhist pressure. After Ky explained the situation, the Catholic leader's attitude changed. The 10 civilians to join the Directorate will be as follows: one from the South, one from Central Vietnam, and one from the Northern refugee group, one from each of the four religious groups (Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai), and three from the intellectual/professional group. The Buddhists have accepted this arrangement./4/

/4/In its Viet-Nam Situation Report, 0630, June 6, 1966, the Department of State reported that the enlarged Directorate had its first meeting on June 6. (Department of State, EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Viet-Nam Situation Reports)

3. General Tri, who now commands III Corps, is to replace General Chieu as Secretary General of the Directorate. It is planned for Tri also to take over as Minister of Information and Director of Political Warfare for the Armed Forces. Chieu will devote his full attention to political matters as leader of the Veterans Party. We discussed Tri's replacement inconclusively.

4. The surprise movement of troops into Hue this morning did not go according to plan because it was compromised by Nhuan. Nhuan drove last night by jeep from Quang Tri to Hue and informed Tri Quang of the operation. Nhuan is afraid of Tri Quang. Colonel Toan who was all set to command the operation, on the assumption that Nhuan would stay in Quang Tri, had the rug pulled out from under him. When I inquired about Dinh, Ky classified Dinh as crazy and said that he was not worried about him.

5. Ky made the point that the big problem with senior officers was corruption and that temptations were great. He himself had been offered sizeable sums by many parties in return for requested favors. He had resisted these overtures realizing that once he had compromised himself there would be no turning back. He has recently talked to Thieu, Co, and Vien about selecting a number of promising young officers and grooming them for higher responsibilities with emphasis on leadership development and resistance to self aggrandizement.

6. As I left, Ky said he was going to the afternoon briefing at the 7th Air Force. I explained that we were particularly interested in showing him the results of the big strike at Yen Bay.

7. General Wheeler please pass to State at Embassy request.

151. Editorial Note

During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell that began at 8:05 p.m. on June 2, 1966, the following exchange took place:

"President: We got a pretty disastrous poll coming up on Vietnam. About 35-36% want to get out. About 40% approve of what we're doing--the way I'm handling it. About 41% approve of the way I'm doing it and about 36% disapprove.

"Russell: Well, you're going have to do something different out there. If you don't you're going eventually get in trouble. McNamara gave you some good advice on that.

"President: What's that?

"Russell: About pushing it a little bit harder.

"President: Well, he's not advising that now. We got until we get a government; until we get'em propped up, nobody really--

"Russell: I think the government's straightened itself out pretty well out there.

"President: Well, not yet. Not yet. It's on its way to doing it, but it's not--.

"Russell: Well, I don't think it ever will be clamped down and be a real government any more than I think we're gonna have one in Santo Domingo." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Russell, Tape F66.16, PNO 1)

152. Editorial Note

In JCS telegram 3086-66, June 2, 1966, General Wheeler notified General Westmoreland that he thought the time for decision on expanding the air campaign against North Vietnam was approaching. "It is quite clear authority to attack the POL system was within our grasp when the political turmoil in SVN rose to a height which caused many people here to take a second look." Wheeler suggested that if the political situation remained stable Westmoreland submit a proposal the following week for attacks on POL targets. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)

That same day a U.S. military officer, under arrangements made by Secretary McNamara, briefed Prime Minister Wilson at 10 Downing Street on pending air strikes against POL storage installations near Hanoi and Haiphong. Wilson responded in a message to President Johnson the next day that he would have to dissociate himself from such a move, which he believed would make settlement of the conflict more difficult, but he would continue his overall support for Johnson's policy in Vietnam. (Telegram 7266 to London, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

In telegram 19218 to Admiral Sharp, June 5, General Westmoreland proposed strikes on eight POL targets. (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Rolling Thunder 50-A Extended) Secretary McNamara told Under Secretary Ball in a telephone conversation the next day, Monday, that he was having an operational order for POL strikes drafted, since the President wanted McNamara prepared to move later in the week. (Telcon, June 6; Johnson Library, Ball Papers) In telegram 107 to Brussels, June 7, Ball passed this information on to Rusk, who was attending a NATO Ministerial Meeting. Ball pointed out several reasons for delay, among them Rusk's meeting with Prime Minister Wilson, scheduled for June 10, and Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning's peace mission to Hanoi starting June 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

In two memoranda dated June 8, Special Assistant Walt Rostow informed the President that Secretary Rusk was "firmly for postponement until we know the results of Ronning's mission," while Secretary McNamara preferred to go ahead immediately. McNamara, however, felt that Rusk's request for postponement should be honored. Rostow estimated that a postponement would mean a 2-week delay, which he regarded "as unfortunate, but not necessarily a disaster." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:15 p.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11:45 a.m. on June 9 under cover of a memorandum stating that it was "worth reading through to the end" and had "much more good news than bad." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)

5378. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram.

A. Military Prospects

1. I have been hoping that we could get decisive military results within a year. I had based this hope on our considerable military accomplishments in overcoming the main force units of the Viet Cong and large units of the Army of North Viet-Nam, and in destroying the redoubts in the jungles. But MACV does not think that it can do anything decisive in a year. Their operational plans for the next year, if carried out, would mean that good progress had been achieved, but nothing decisive. The best estimate also is that 20,000 men of the Army of North Viet-Nam have come into South Viet-Nam since January and, as far as I can learn, we can't find them.

2. If we are now going as hard and as fast as we can go in South Viet-Nam militarily and cannot get a decisive military result in a year, the question arises as to whether we should not intensify the air attack on North Viet-Nam--whether we cannot thus bring about strains which will neutralize their army in South Viet-Nam, in spite of our inability to do it in South Viet-Nam on the ground within a year.

3. The reports I get are certainly consistent with the proposition that the Hanoi regime is feeling real pain because of our bombing. If there is this change of feeling in Hanoi--as seems likely--I believe the bombing has had a lot to do with it, although ground casualties, of course, play a part. This being true, an intensification of the bombing would be the most effective step we could take to get Hanoi to the negotiating table or--better still--to start "fading away."

B. Weekly Military Highlights

4. The highlights of last week's military activity were two heavy battles won by U.S. and Korean forces and a sparkling performance by the Vietnamese Second Division which surprised a large Viet Cong force with a midnight assault on its bivouac in Quang Tin Province. After making the initial assault, the attacking force deliberately withdrew and then re-attacked at 3:00 in the morning, catching the Viet Cong survivors in the process of evacuating their dead and wounded. As a result, the Viet Cong lost 100 killed and 56 weapons, while the Vietnamese troops lost only two missing.

5. For the week ended last Sunday, the "killed in action" were: Vietnamese 135; U.S. 69; Viet Cong 902. These figures fluctuate from week to week as relative missions change, and we must expect weeks when there will be more Americans. This is undoubtedly still less than would be the case if we did not make a stand in Viet-Nam and were thus constrained to make it elsewhere. Our choice is not between casualties in Viet-Nam on the one hand or no casualties at all on the other. In the present state of the world, the choice probably is between casualties in Viet-Nam on the one hand and more casualties somewhere else if we were to leave Viet-Nam.

C. Vietnamese Catholics and Elections

6. D'Orlandi, the Italian Ambassador, and dean of the diplomatic corps, has a wide knowledge of Viet-Nam. He is an accurate reporter, and his opinions are stimulating, although I often disagree. He makes a business of keeping in touch with the different factions among the Vietnamese Catholics, and I have found him particularly well informed about them. He sums up the prevailing Vietnamese Catholic views as follows:

7. While they do not enthuse about holding elections, they probably will not boycott elections if they take place . A commonly expressed attitude early last week was that they should try to get Ky out of office, and then the elections would not take place. But as the Institute Buddhists have more and more turned against Ky, the Catholic desire to force Ky out has moderated. Also elections appear inevitable.

8. They do, however, fear that once the elections are held, the United States will pronounce them to have been good, thereby committing ourselves to what the Assembly may subsequently decide. They also think the Assembly will be the first and only national body ever to have been elected by the people , and will, therefore, at once try to take over from the GVN. They also fear that this Assembly will be badly intimidated by the Viet Cong, and, will in a very short space of time, ask the United States to leave. All this would happen even before the Constitution was drafted.

9. These Vietnamese Catholics believe that there are some who would think that for the U.S. to be thus invited to leave would be a very subtle and clever "out" for the United States. But actually, they believe, with the conditions as they are, it would be a resounding defeat, and the invitation to leave would be a device which would not, in their opinion, fool anybody.

10. They believe that it would immediately lead to the slaughter and enslavement of the Catholics and others in South Viet-Nam; it would turn Indonesia back to the Communists; and have catastrophic results in Southeast Asia.

11. My comment on this is as follows:

12. There are a great many elements here having doubts about the wisdom of having elections. To the Catholics must now be added the Tri Quang Buddhists who were frantically insisting on elections a while ago. A week ago, I would have said that it was totally impractical to think of not having elections. Now, I am not so sure, although the odds are still strongly that the elections will take place as scheduled in September.

13. My guess is that the Assembly to be elected at that time will undoubtedly consider itself more legitimate than the GVN, and that there will be a real row about that. Most of the members of the present electoral commission will probably be candidates and if their attitude is any guide--and I believe it is--I would feel confident that, if not intimidated, they would not invite us to leave.

14. But we must assume that many of them will be intimidated because that is a traditional way of doing things here. I realize this will be hard to explain in the United States where Congressmen and Senators are not influenced to vote a certain way by having their life threatened, and who will naturally think of the Vietnamese Assembly as a counterpart of the U.S. Congress.

D. Paraplegic Veterans

15. This war has caused many Vietnamese to lose arms and legs, and until recently, the facilities for helping these victims were very limited. The National Institute for Rehabilitation had been painfully turning out a very few limbs and braces every month, using primitive hand methods. Mr. Juan Monros, of the World Rehabilitation Fund, who was brought here by Howard Rusk, has held a 4-month training course which 43 student technicians completed on May 27 on the techniques of producing plastic limbs and braces. He expects that the Institute will now be able to turn out some 500 limbs and braces a month, which will be a great help in solving what has been a serious human problem. I recall your personal interest in making this possible.

E. Economic

16. The sharp rise in retail prices over the previous two weeks halted last week, as did the Saigon free market rates for U.S. currency and gold. The price of rice was stable and those of wheat, flour and sugar were down, as were those of most imported commodities.

17. The economic situation in Danang has improved somewhat. The airlift of meat and wheat flour into the city brought down their prices as much as 25 percent. The port of Danang is now operating satisfactorily.

F. Success in Binh Thuan

18. Mission Coordinator Wilson spent last night in Binh Thuan Province, southernmost coastal province of II Corps. Population is roughly a quarter of a million, with more than 75 percent of the people estimated to be under GVN control as contrasted with about 20 percent of the physical territory being controlled by the government.

19. According to the Province Chief and his U.S. advisors on the ground, the people of Binh Thuan sense that the Nationalist side is going to win and thus are shifting their allegiance and support to province and district officials. These officials feel that this in no sense signifies a political conversion, ideological shift or endorsement of the present government. It is merely a pragmatic recognition that the Viet Cong is taking a beating and that it is better to get with the winning side.

20. Province Chief also attributes much of this shift in attitude to the leadership of General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, who has spent some time visiting personally in hamlets and villages of the province and to new sense of urgency Thang has succeeded in imparting to provincial officials. Highly successful operation in the province several months ago by the 101st Airborne Brigade which resulted in a large number of Viet Cong casualties is also reported to have had a dramatic effect on peasant attitudes.

21. Wilson reports: A quick evaluation of such indicators as the number of VC defectors, number of refugees, willingness of people to provide intelligence on the Viet Cong, and the general rate of progress on the pacification front tends to substantiate the conclusion that a positive trend has indeed begun in this one province.

22. Comment: This seems to show all elements of our program working together as we have always hoped they would and that when they do work together the desired result is achieved.

G. Education

23. By the end of May of this year we had completed 43 percent of our program of distributing fourteen million elementary school textbooks throughout Viet-Nam. This program, which we began in mid-1965, will be concluded in second half 1967. The books are distributed to the schools and lent to the students for the school year. We hope to get three years' use out of each book.

24. The significance of this program and its impact on the system of primary education is worth special note: for the first time, Vietnamese children have textbooks which they can take home and read and show to their parents. Content and illustrations have been carefully worked out with leading Vietnamese educators and cover such subjects as Viet-Nam's history and geography, along with other standard subjects as arithmetic and personal hygiene and sanitation. I am providing a sample packet of these books separately, including brief descriptive comments, as an item of possible interest.

25. Next to safety of life and limb, there is probably nothing more highly prized in Viet-Nam than education--perhaps greater even than land reform.

H. Chieu Hoi

26. The number of returnees during the period May 28 to June 3 increased slightly to 257, as compared to 247 for the previous period, for a total of 1,237 for May. This compared with a total of 1,620 for April and 2,294 for March.

27. This reduction is due in part to the political crisis, in part to the diminution of combat (combat tends to drive people into the camps) and in part to the fact that there are as yet no reports from I Corps.

28. It is to be noted that since early March, the number of so-called "high quality" defectors has increased to rate of one or two per week, contrasted to a rate of one or less per month before March. "High quality" defector is defined as meaning squad or platoon leaders from Viet Cong main force units.

Lodge

[end of document]

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