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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

14. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 10, 1966, 1:10-2:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes.

PRESENT
President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, Helms, Ball, Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti

SUBJECT
Peace Offensive, discussions with Congressional leadership, next steps, diplomatic and military

Rusk: Will brief Congressional leadership. Need to work out some procedures in conjunction with peace. Some hardening of Soviet position since Chicom attacks on them.

President: Have 25 men who advise on foreign policy. Lippmann, Alsop, etc. All these fellows will be speaking their judgment.

A minority will recommend their own too.

535 members have to give their report. Hardest thing is to say: "I don't [know] anything."

Ought to give serious thought not to getting the leaders down here but have the men around this table to appear at as many hearings as possible--and give them something to have to chew on before their mind hardens. To lay our case before them.

We have asked each person who has come back to town (Congressmen). Of the 104 who have been queried, only 8 or 9 have problems economically. What most interests him is Viet Nam; 80 feel we ought to follow current course, 10% want out, 10% want to go on.

Rivers wants us to go on with bombing. Morse wants us to get out. and you'll have this dichotomy. Think Russell will be less likely to comment on his opinions after Rusk testifies.

People will be upset and AP and UPI will provoke them.

Sat down with Dirksen and Mansfield--and if we can get our story over to appropriate committees, it would be better.

McNamara: Supposed to start the 19th.

President: I guess that's all right. They will start talking the Mansfield report/2/ on Friday 14th.

/2/Presumably a reference to a report made by Mansfield and Aiken on a trip that they and three other Senators took to Vietnam in December 1965. Mansfield and Aiken reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in excutive session on January 11. For text, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 3-38. Mansfield sent the President a written report, "Vietnam: The Situation and Outlook," December 17, 1965. (Johnson Library, Confidential File, MC/CO) A modified public version, "The Viet Nam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow," was published as a committee print by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1966.

What better way do we have to tell our story except through the Secretaries and the Committees?

Rusk: Perhaps give a luncheon for official leadership of two Houses--and talk with them.

President: That is excellent:

Speaker

Boggs

Long

Ford

Dirksen

Kuchel

Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations

Mansfield

Albert

Russell

Fulbright

Hayden

Rivers

Morgan

Mahon

Now what about our military and diplomatic situation? When do we announce Harriman's visit to Viet Nam?

Bundy: We'd rather have VN Government announce this.

President: I'd like to get it out today.

Bundy: If we go out there right now, it will be out here this evening.

President: Should we say anything about a proposal in VN in our Soviet message?

Rusk: No, unless we get something concrete today from Goldberg.

President: Can we summarize where we are now?

Rusk: Good deal of activity on the other side. Some statements are aimed at each other as well as us. Some Soviet statements have been aimed at Peiping. Don't have clear answer to what we've been doing. Don't think we are going to get a clear cut answer--probably some complicated answer. 5-10% chance we'll get something less than a harsh rejection.

Will take a few days to get anything. Shelepin will wind up by Wednesday/3/ I believe. Leave SOTU/4/ for revision pretty close to actual delivery in case of Hanoi and Shelepin developments. About 3:00 p.m. will be satisfactory.

/3/January 12.

/4/State of the Union message.

Bundy: You can announce Harriman this afternoon--if you choose.

President: Good.

Rusk: We have word of 600-700 suspects picked up by Koreans--how many are actually guilty?

Wheeler: About 10-15% turn out to be VC or sympathizers. Vietnamese and village chiefs do the interrogating.

President: What do you think about VN, General Taylor?

Taylor: Extension of bombing pause after Christmas was good--if only to show Government sincerity. But now value is wearing off--danger of extending it--and get trapped into premature negotiations. We need to get word of caution out--2 years of negotiating in Korea. Being successful in getting a conference might be a failure.

President: Why can't we get on with bombing after Shelepin leaves?

Rusk: Serious political disadvantages if we break the Christmas through Tet pause. If we start bombing again, we would have to start all over again. There is no political advantage. There may be military advantage to bombing again.

McNamara: Don't think there is a military disadvantage in starting up 3 or 4 days earlier. We are ready to bomb again within 12 hours. We are running all sorties over Laos instead of NVN. Weather.

President: Reconnaissance show anything alarming?

McNamara: Renewing daytime operations--building bridges. Even during bombing they were building up infiltration.

Wheeler: Disagree, Bob. Every day makes a difference. We know both arms of railroad are operational. Assume getting full benefit of supplies. Full scale daylight operations are going on. Every day increases their capability in the South. Chiefs conclude we should make policy decision to resume air operations against Hanoi as soon as Shelepin leaves. They are improving anti-aircraft defenses.

Rusk: We have to keep this on a day-to-day basis. Keep looking.

Bundy: Real problem is we decide on interval basis to bomb again. We need to put out the Wheeler info before we bomb again. While it was right to get the pause going, we need now to be saying all these things to clear the way for bombing resumption. As you pointed out, we have done enough to satisfy the world, but no matter when we start someone will say we should have waited one week longer. At least 30% of our accredited nations will protest bombing resumption.

Taylor: We have 3 blue chips--bombing--large number of troops--withdrawal.

Under what circumstances do we continue cessation of bombing--which means no way of pushing pressure on the other way. No way of proving cease-fire violations.

Wheeler: We simply cannot prove that NVN are there--until we absolutely capture them.

Taylor: We could adjust our bombing to the ratio of incidents.

President: What's the net of your testimony to the Congress, Dean?

Rusk: On VN, run over the summary of diplomatic negotiations. Key question is how much we tell them in so far as sensitive info is concerned. Problems posed by Lynd./5/

/5/Telegram 1947 to Saigon, January 9, reported: "New York Times today carried Moscow story of Lynd interview in which Lynd claims that he and others asked Pham Van Dong whether USG had approached DRV through Ambassadors or directly since Dec. 20. Pham Van Dong is quoted as answering in categorical negative." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Staughton Lynd elaborated on his interview with Pham Van Dong in a debriefing by James Leonard of INR on January 11. (Memorandum of conversation, January 13; ibid.)

Pres: I would answer "No good purpose to be served by going into details. Lynd is uninformed man."

Ball: We have avoided official confirmation of any direct contact in VN.

15. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 11, 1966, 1:05-2:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. In a memorandum written at 1 p.m. on January 11, McGeorge Bundy told President Johnson that the "main point" of the meeting with Bell was "simply to emphasize the importance of the non-military effort by having Bell report on the record to you." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)

PRESENT
The President, McNamara, Bill Bundy, Mac Bundy, David Bell, Alexis Johnson, Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti/2/

/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that Ball was also present. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
David Bell's return/3/

/3/Bell visited Vietnam January 1-5. For his written report to the President, see Document 28.

Bell: Four essentials: 1. Pacification for rural construction. 2. Resources allocation and inflation. 3. Emphasis on non military aspects. 4. Miscellaneous.

Number one problem is rural pacification. Today SVN army can no longer clear any area; must have our troops. But even so can't hold it. Difficult problem. Must restore some kind of government system that serves the people. A new spirit is needed--local security is needed. Is not being done now. Some areas are thoroughly pacified but have always been historically.

We are not yet following up and increasing hold so people can see positive future for themselves. Nothing new--but did find neither the SVN nor Americans are adequately on top of this problem. General Khanh has done a good job to learn this task. His deputy Col. Chon is one of the best--now recruiting and training Vietnamese teams.

Ben de Pugh on our side understands the problem. Col. Sam Wilson also good. Plans to concentrate in 4 limited priority areas. If they accomplish even this, they will have affected 1/20 or 1/10 of rural population but it will be first time this has happened. Key question--can we get even this little done. Will take 80 man teams to go into each hamlet and village and stay for months at a time. Begin to build a political system and root out VC. Takes heavy volume of VN manpower to do this. Strong back-up needed also--(AID, CIA, USIA, etc.).

Disturbed because in general setup of U.S. mission, no one is really in charge of this sort of operation. Tentative conclusion is (agreed to by Westmoreland, Mann, Lodge) to place responsibility on Ambassador Porter, give him small staff, integrate the overall program. Can bring in wholly new man but this has drawbacks.

This is number one objective save for the actual fighting to be undertaken in coming year.

Resource Allocation

VN economy has changed--now in boom situation. Resources over-strained, prices going up. Plans are not made as to how to distribute manpower. Can't do anything about land reform because no men available. Need someone in U.S. mission akin to James Byrnes' job in WW II. Would identify resources and spotlight issues. Requires office and man not now in VN. Checked with Ambassador Lodge but neither of us are sure about this.

Did a lot of work on inflation. Laid out a complete set of measurements to control inflation. Principal one is to limit VN budget expenses. Increase taxes (agreed not yet done). Limit to maximum possible extent the spending by American troops. (Budget deficits, troop spending, military construction program are three big sources of inflation.)

Difficult to really prevent American troop spending.

Think we have the impact of spending and construction as low as possible.

U.S. and VN are agreed on approximate volume of imports required. About double the imports over last year. From $200M to $400M AID. Demand for increased imports are already on us. Already have to transfer funds to get us through January.

Finally, over and above this will be necessary to take monetary action, even to devalue currency. Not now because of volatile situation. Meantime, series of actions suggested--putting some money through black market in Hong Kong. VN wanted to sell gold but told them it was out of the question. Inflation problem is not fully met today.

Ports

Badly jammed. Coastal ports are being worked on and in few months will be able to handle traffic. Saigon is another problem. 500,000 tons by next October. We have man out there from New York Port Authority who is good man.

Through the coming year need to take series of steps which will improve the port. Can't be done now because of administrative set up.

Recommend Ky establish a single-headed Port Authority--put tough guy in charge. Put high ranking military man along side him. Ky accepted recommendation in principle--has not carried it out.

Non military aspects

Satisfied that Lodge, Zorthian, Mann et al. doing all they can in field. American reporters file a good deal of this non military work but little of it gets printed. Lodge says it would be helpful to have series of visits--if they are well prepared and substantive. But there is plenty for such groups to do. Careful preparation can be done.

Recommend such groups go out: Agriculture-Education-Health--in that order. First visit by Freeman be held in February. Other visits later.

Miscellaneous

Checked on refugee camps. Rather pleased at what I found. Refugees being fed, not hungry, reasonably clothed. Housing varies. Some very good, some very bad. Too crowded, dangerous from health view. Refugees relatively static. Coming in, but others re-settled. Around 700,000 now. Can handle that number okay.

Economic Warfare

Diversion of American materials to VC--Committee working on this. Difficult to manage. VC can send purchasing agent to Saigon and buy what they need. It is difficult to get to VC. Easier to block it via transportation rather than marketplace. Long, detailed process to find out about the flow--and to stop it.

AID expanding--1,000 Americans and 200-300 contract people. Bulk of additional people going in the field. All this, of course, has nothing to do with military.

President: Mac, analyze written report and let us find out what we need to do.

Bundy: Most important is pacification./4/ Not clear we can handle resource allocation in as straightforward way as David suggests. Two kinds of civilian leadership problem--pacification and resource allocation.

/4/In a memorandum to the President written at 5:30 p.m. on January 11, Bundy stated: "My basic conviction is that the things Dave Bell was talking about this morning are very much more important than bombing the North. This is why I think the State of the Union should keep attention focused on the effort in the South." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)

President: Gather pacification has gone backwards.

Bell: Possibly--though not much. Asked provincial men how much of their area is reachable--varied--much by day--less by night. Reporters I talked to didn't seem to know much.

AID people (Roy, Wehrle) are worried. Worried about thinness and weakness in VN government. Only 2 or 3 strong men in government. General Thieu and two others.

When you talk as I did for long hours with these men, you find they are not broad gauged. Wehrle is troubled by this. But people in the country side are not worried--high morale and working like dogs. Superb morale. Far better understanding displayed today by VN leaders in the "village campaign." VN men in charge do see the problem, making plans but they are still plans.

McNamara: Don't think there's single area pacified.

President: What about Lansdale?

Bell: Has good effect on VN side--divisive effect in American community. His personality is the reason--Deutsch is real problem. Key question is whether he is worth the cost. Lansdale however is rated valuable above his cost.

President: What is relationship between the American leaders?

Bell: Excellent.

President: Anyone make any contribution to the pause?

Bell: Didn't go into that. Thailand problem is troublesome--corrupt man in charge. Everyone in Thailand is aware of it. Pleased with AID program in N.E. Thailand. Still a long way from a popular based program and government. Still handing down largesse from on high.

Laos not hopeless--real base to build on in terms of development. No Taiwan, but clearly not a sink-hole, hopeless. They can improve in a good many ways.

Ball: Just spent three hours before House Foreign Affairs Committee. And it's not the same committee I knew before.

President: I think it is going to get worse. Viet Nam is number one thing on their mind. But when you get to specifics they wind up doing the same thing. Don't think the polls are far wrong--55-45. Senate will be worse than House. Must ride out the waves created by 100 experts who visited there.

Ball: One question: Why doesn't Adm. allow it to debate? Told them they could debate anytime.

President: Are they critical of pause?

Ball: No, on the whole they rather like it. This has been Gung Ho committee but now they are softer--looking for a way out.

President: What would your conclusion be?

Ball: They have no solutions--just deeply troubled.

Bell: Followed Harriman--and his visits were excellent. Complimentary of what he is doing. Committee not critical of peace effort--worried about where we go.

President: Articles in last few days have spurred them on (Lippmann, etc.).

16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, January 11, 1966, 8:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-XYZ. Drafted by Read, Springsteen, and William Bundy and approved by Ball.

3176. For Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Refs: Your cables 3897, 3912, 3913,/2/ 3914./3/

/2/In telegram 3913, January 11, Bohlen discussed Mai Van Bo's ("Rupert's") considerable interest in encouraging intermediaries other than Sturm ("Y"), including the contacts reported by Bohlen in telegrams 3897 and 3912, January 10 and 11. Bohlen proposed that Sturm seek another appointment with Mai Van Bo. (All ibid.)

/3/In telegram 3914, January 11, Bohlen proposed informing [text not declassified] Paris about the XYZ operation. (Ibid.)

Agree with you it would be timely and useful for Y to seek early appointment with Rupert, even though latter probably lacks definitive instructions pending conclusion Shelepin Hanoi visit. We assume Rupert's "illness"/4/ is over since he met with Manac'h at Quai January 6 and kept other appointments reported by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Gottlieb. If Rupert still claims indisposition, Y should seek appointment with Jean/5/ but from here appears Rupert would be more desirable target.

/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, p. 371, footnote 6.

/5/Vo Van Sung. See Document 4 regarding the designation of Vo Van Sung as "Jean."

At such appointment Y should take following line:

(1) Indicate that USG has received information that Rupert has been receiving a number of American visitors and exchanging messages with them. Among these messages there appeared to be a suggestion that Rupert would be happy to receive a "mandated" US representative./6/

/6/This message was reported in telegram 3897 from Paris, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ)

(2) Y should make clear that he is the "mandated representative of the USG" suggested by Rupert and that none of his other contacts can claim similar credentials. Y should express surprise that Rupert should be talking to Americans who apparently include journalists about this desire, since USG had assumed that if conversations were to have any usefulness they should be private in first instance and not used by other side for propaganda purposes. Y is and has for long time been prepared to discuss in detail situation in Viet-Nam and its people as Rupert has requested.

(3) Y should then repeat what he told Jean earlier/7/ that USG continues ready for serious discussions and remind Rupert that we have had no response to written copy of French translation of 4 points discussed on November 18 and handed to Jean subsequently. Y should ask again whether Rupert and his superiors cannot address themselves to some such formulation which prejudges nothing and emphatically reaffirms such points as USG readiness for ultimate withdrawal and acceptance of principle of reunification resulting from freely expressed will of people in both NVN and SVN.

/7/See Document 4.

(4) Y should note that suspension of bombing of DRV is now in (Blank) day from its origin on December 24 and note the complete absence of private Hanoi responses in words or deeds and reiterated public negative statements issued by DRV during suspension. Taking care to avoid any implication of an ultimatum, Y should note that unilateral restraint by USG cannot continue indefinitely without clear affirmative response of some kind by Hanoi which would give us basis for continuing present suspension or taking further actions leading towards peaceful solution.

(5) Y has been advised that Rupert told recent French visitor (FYI: Director of Center of American Studies (CHEA), who may use story in CHEA newsletter) that DRV is ready to participate in, but not initiate, an international conference taking into consideration 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords and attempting to establish basis for lasting Indo-China peace. Could Rupert confirm whether this is correct statement of his views, which would be of interest to USG?

(6) Y should be aware Rupert also reported in same contact to have insisted negotiations be preceded by complete "cessation of hostilities" though not US troop withdrawal. Since cessation of hostilities involves numerous pitfalls, Y should not refer to that as reported condition of Rupert's but be alert to report any such qualification. If pressed Y could note without amplification US Point 5: "a cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be subject of preliminary discussion."

(7) If Rupert criticizes USG spokesman statement that it is a "safe deduction" that there has been a direct US-DRV contact,/8/ Y should respond that this minimal admission, which USG has been careful not to expand on, was necessitated by Pham Van Dong's flat statement for publication to Professor Lynd in Hanoi earlier this month that there had been no such contact./9/

/8/At a White House press briefing on January 10, Bill Moyers stated that Staughton Lynd and two associates were "incompletely informed" in asserting that the United States had failed to make direct contact with the North Vietnamese Government (see footnote 5, Document 14). Asked whether a conclusion could thus be drawn that there had been direct contact, Moyers stated: "That's a safe deduction." (The New York Times, January 11, 1966)

/9/See footnote 5, Document 14.

Comment: We are concerned by Rupert's increasing contact with French and now US newsmen in preference to contact with Y. We believe he may be building record for use against us in charging openings which we have not taken advantage of following resumption of bombing of DRV./10/

/10/Telegram 3992 from Paris, January 13, reported on Y's meeting on January 13 with Jean (rather than Rupert, who indicated he was "too busy" to receive Y). Y made the points outlined in his instructions, but for the most part the "conversation consisted of little more than dropping letters in mailbox." Nevertheless, "Jean on surface seemed friendly," and "one cannot avoid the thought that this is the end of a very long line leading to Hanoi." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ)

Re your 3914, you are authorized to give [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Chief on purely personal basis minimum knowledge of this operation you think desirable. We have spoken here with Helms who will advise [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Chief that he should discuss with you or McBride knowledge that comes to his attention regarding this operation. You should file his reports directly bearing on XYZ contacts with Rupert through XYZ channel. Other contacts relating to Mai Van Bo he may file through his regular channel, but when in doubt on these types of reports, should consult with you or McBride who will have discretion on deciding on appropriate channel. As practical matter, however, reports on Bo's contacts, such as those relating to "mandated" representative or discussion with CHEA Director, should be filed preferably through XYZ channels only, in order that we can appropriately funnel them promptly into consideration of XYZ operation.

Ball

17. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Honolulu, January 12, 1966, 0205Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV, and passed to the State Department and White House.

JCS 46895. The Relationship of Military Operations Against NVN to the Overall Strategy of the War in SVN (U).

1. One of the key elements of the strategy in Vietnam has been the application of steadily increasing military pressure against North Vietnam to force cessation of support to the VC, and to bring NVN to the negotiating table. Surely a negotiated solution to the problem of peace and security for SVN is infinitely preferable to a long, bitter and costly war. We recognize that the effectiveness of military pressure depends partly on a significant combination of moves toward negotiation which clearly indicates to the DRV our continuing readiness to negotiate. The current pause is such a move, and it is to be hoped that it will be quickly successful.

2. Based on reactions so far, however, Hanoi has shown no inclination to negotiate and may continue to spurn all our efforts unless forced to take some other course. We should plan now to resume effective operations against NVN, as indeed we must if negotiations do not bring an early cease fire.

3. It is essential, therefore, that the vital relationship of military operations against NVN to a coherent overall strategy for Vietnam be recognized. This overall strategy is based on three undertakings. These are:

A. To deny to the Communists in SVN the effective direction and assistance from NVN so vital to their war making capability.

B. To assist the RVN in providing protection of the South Vietnamese people from Communist subversion and oppression, to liberate areas dominated by the VC, and to assist in the establishment of a stable economy and the continuation of an independent non-Communist government.

C. To defeat the VC and PAVN forces and destroy their base areas in the RVN.

Germane to the interdependent nature of these three elements of strategy is the necessity that success be achieved in each and that each of the three undertakings be subject to a simultaneous application of appropriate military force.

4. When we resume operations against NVN, the air campaign should be conducted in the most effective manner to accomplish sub para 3.A. above. This will require operations quite different from the pre-cease fire pattern. The vital external assistance to NVN required to sustain effective internal military operations and external aggression must be denied. Resources already in NVN most needed to support aggression should be destroyed in depth. All known military material and facil-ities should be destroyed and military activities and movements should be continuously harassed and disrupted.

5. It appears that the very foundation of the enemy's morale and resultant tenacity stands squarely on the belief that our patience will run out before his. Hanoi has publicly stated that the enormous costs of long lines of communications and the casualties they intend to inflict on U.S. forces will cause us to negotiate on their terms. We should consider the consequences of NVN secure from attack, supported by both Russia and China, infiltrating into SVN troops equipped with the latest weapons, fully trained, and continuously supplied. Of even greater importance would be the freedom of Hanoi to exercise unhampered direction of operations in SVN and the concomitant beneficial morale effects upon the PAVN/VC forces. Vietnam Communist history and doctrine and current experience lead only to the conclusion that they are willing to expend lives at a rate which we would consider unacceptable to achieve their objectives. Therefore, we must accept as reality that an exorbitant expenditure of lives by the enemy in SVN over a long period of time would be endured as long as success appeared possible. The implications of this fact are enormous. Viewed in this context then, Hanoi may not have been idly boasting when they claimed that Operation Starlite,/2/ near Chu Lai, and the battle of Ia Drang/3/ were actually victories for their side. Unfortunately, this could be true in a strategic sense unless our strategy makes full use of our superior air power to reduce casualties and foreshorten the time required to achieve our limited objectives.

/2/In Operation Starlite, August 1965, U.S. Marines trapped a major portion of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment on a peninsula near Chu Lai, 100 kilometers southeast of Da Nang.

/3/The Battle of Ia Drang took place in November 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley of South Vietnam's Central Highlands.

6. Again, as they did in one phase of the war against the French when faced with superior regular military forces, the Communists are currently avoiding costly engagements at our initiative in SVN and are concentrating on terrorism and destructive attacks on small outposts and garrisons. This technique can be used any time success seems to elude them temporarily. A PAVN/VC force using this strategy and supported as visualized can extend the time period before we gain any real military successes or reconstruction progress. A long stand-down in air attacks against NVN while NVN continues to support PAVN/VC intensive operations in SVN would vitiate U.S. strategy for bringing the war in Vietnam to an acceptable conclusion. For political, economic and psychological reasons of great importance in both the U.S. and SVN there is an urgent need to make rapid progress toward security for the SVN people and the destruction of PAVN/VC forces and base areas. The adverse consequences, both in the U.S. and SVN of very slow progress in the war, could be incalculable.

7. The Communists have a total disregard for the human values held by the Western world. By our standards, they will endure staggering losses of human lives to achieve their objectives. They are keenly aware of our attitudes and have announced that U.S. troop casualties, rather than victory in battle, will govern their strategy in SVN. At the same time, they know that we would choose to exploit full use of air power as a technological alternative to human loss. To prevent this, they have staged a remarkable world-wide political and propaganda campaign. They anticipate that the VC, fully supported by NVN, can inflict sufficient casualties to generate internal U.S. pressures to end the war far short of the objectives we seek. They have correctly determined that a crucial battle of the war is the political battle. They are not fighting to attain a permanent stand-down. We must not permit them to win it.

8. With these thoughts in mind, a review of the changed situation since RT operations began is in order. We began RT with very limited objectives, at a time when PAVN infiltration was of less significance than it is now. Our build up in SVN was visualized as a moderate and sustainable assist to the ARVN in maintaining effective mobile reserve forces and in gaining and maintaining security for reconstruction. It was visualized that such assistance was politically and economically supportable for an indefinite period while the GVN made the required progress.

9. When RT began, there was considerable hope of causing Hanoi to cease aggression through an increasing pressure brought to bear through carefully timed destruction of selected resources, accompanied by threat of greater losses. Presumably this would cause Hanoi to decide to cease support of the VC. But in Feb of last year CINCPAC stated a view substantially as follows: We must face the fact that punitive attacks and the threat of destruction of the capital resources in NVN probably will not bring Hanoi to the conference table. Ho Chi Minh has never doubted ultimate victory. We said that from his point of view the prospect of eventual defeat in SVN would be the unacceptable threat to his long term objectives. Therefore, in order to win in SVN, the immediate objective of RT should be to make it as difficult and as costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and Pathet Lao, thereby contributing directly to our ultimate objective of winning in SVN.

10. However, Rolling Thunder has been conducted with the primary objective of increasing pressure to cause Hanoi to "decide" to cease support of the VC and Pathet Lao and the objective of making it difficult to export aggression has been pursued in a very limited manner. On the credit side, there has been significant disruption upon which we can capitalize when operations are resumed. NVN has had to expend great effort to repair roads and bridges and to prepare defense of urban areas for possible attack. Necessary internal operations have been severely disrupted and military support to the VC and Pathet Lao has been somewhat slowed but not slowed enough. Reconstruction of communication links has been designated as a number one strategic problem and large numbers of people have been organized into repair gangs. The Army has been given supervision of reconstruction in Zone IV, no doubt detracting from their military duties. And as a reflection of the pressure the Vietnam news agency in Hanoi has been increasing the tempo of propaganda relating to U.S. air attacks. These facts and others indicate that Hanoi has felt the pressure and that we were presenting the government with growing internal problems. In light of the limited objectives of the air campaign, RT has done quite well.

11. On the other hand, RT operations have not been conducted in such a manner as to increase the pressure on Hanoi in recent months. Targets vital to effective military operations have not been struck in significant numbers; military and civilian activities have accommodated to the limited operations; and, in fact, the psychological pressure has decreased. But regardless of how RT has been conducted, the important fact now is that the nature of the war has changed since the air campaign began. RT has not forced Hanoi to the decision which we sought. There is now every indication that Ho Chi Minh intends to continue support of the VC until he is denied the capability to do so. He has the unstinting support of the ChiComs which has increased his obligation to that regime. This, together with the pressure from that direction to continue support probably leaves him little alternative. This resolve has caused a significant change in the complexion of NVN support to the VC, while U.S. commitments have dramatically increased. In the light of these greatly increased commitments and the factors already discussed, and with due regard to political realities and current resources, we must do all that we can to make it as difficult and costly as possible for Hanoi to continue direction and support of aggression. In good conscience, we should not long delay resumption of an RT program designed to meet the changed nature of the war.

12. In consonance with the overall concept, military operations against NVN should:

A. Deny to NVN assistance from external sources.

B. Destroy in depth those resources already in NVN that contribute most to the support of aggression; destroy or deny use of all known permanent military facilities; and harass and disrupt dispersed military operations.

C. Harass, disrupt, and impede movement of men and materials through Southern DRV into Laos and SVN.

Denial of external assistance requires interdiction of land LOC's from China and closing of the ports. Occasional attacks against bridges on the LOC's in the northeast quadrant has had only limited success in disrupting the flow. This area must be opened up for armed recce with authority to attack LOC targets as necessary. In initiating action to close the ports, particularly Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pha, it is recognized that political considerations are involved. Highly selective strikes and political action on the international scene to indicate our intentions to continue to deny use of the ports should be undertaken. Reaction of ChiComs while the program gets underway should provide indications of their actual intentions. Nevertheless, if we are to realize our aims, we must take these steps, bold as they may seem. Destruction of resources within NVN should begin with POL. Every known POL facility and distribution activity should be destroyed and harassed until the war is concluded. Denial of electric power facilities should begin at an early date and continue until all plants are out of action. Complete destruction is not required. All large military facilities should be destroyed in Northern NVN as they have been in the Southern area.

13. We should mount an intensified armed reconnaissance program without sortie restriction, to harass, disrupt and attrit the dispersed and hidden military facilities and activities south of 20 deg which have been identified and are continuing to be identified as a result of detailed intelligence analysis. We should concentrate on LOC centers, attacking trans-shipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC exits into Laos on a nite and day basis. The initial effort should be followed by sustained armed recce surveillance and attack against known and predicted traffic flow areas in order to maintain the harassment and disruption desired.

14. Paralleling an increased tempo of RT operations CINCPAC will maintain intensified photo reconnaissance with all available assets. Previous RT operations have forced the enemy to hide, disperse, and camouflage his military support base, and to take maximum advantage of darkness to move personnel, supplies and equipment over the infiltration routes. All available exploitation resources will be applied to detailed readout and analysis of the frequent coverage that must be obtained, but more may be required. When RT operations are resumed, security of our forces should be given the attention required. We must neither accept losses that could be prevented nor interference with operational flexibility. Plans have been drawn up for constant surveillance of the airfields and their destruction when required. Soon they should be authorized for attack. It will be far too costly to an intensive air campaign to permit the enemy to maintain a SAM capability. Operational commanders will require authority to deal with this threat wherever it jeopardizes operations.

15. In summary, we strongly believe that air operations against NVN should be resumed as one of the three main elements of our strategy in Vietnam. We should use all available force, with due regard to the President's intention at this time not to destroy the NVN people and nation, to eliminate Hanoi's capability to support the VC. The complementary course in SVN is to employ the combined in-country military force to better protect the South Vietnamese people, liberate areas dominated by the Viet Cong, institute and maintain a pacification rural construction program, destroy enemy base areas, and defeat regular enemy military forces. Success in all three elements of this strategy promises the most rapid progress toward achieving our objectives. Viewing this prospect from both sides, and in consideration of factors discussed, these three tasks well done will bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from lack of support./4/ The alternative appears to be a long and costly counterinsurgency--costly in U.S. and SVN lives and material resources./5/

/4/In a 12-page paper, "Viet Nam Prospects," also dated January 12, Goldberg sought to convince the President that the "limited though considerable escalation now contemplated" would "probably achieve no significant results except to escalate casualties, destruction, costs, and political liabilities." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075, Vietnam, 1966)

/5/William Bundy responded to Admiral Sharp on January 14, concurring "on the importance of combining political moves toward negotiation with military pressures" but noting that "the key question which always faces us is that of timing." As for denying assistance from the North to the enemy in the South, Bundy felt that the problem was "to find exactly the right combination of military measures and political initiatives to accomplish this result." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 12, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:33 a.m.

2503. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Outlook for 1966.

This is the period before the Vietnamese new year and may be a good time for a backward glance, and a look ahead.

2. The change in the situation here since your decision to commit U.S. troops has been spectacular.

3. Before your decision, we were at a smoldering stalemate which was gradually slipping us over the edge. The GVN was even worrying as to whether it could survive or would be forced to give up. The politically minded Vietnamese, being unsure of our position, were trying to make hedges for their own future, with government instability the result. There was real worry as to whether the Viet Cong would succeed in cutting the country in two and setting up a separate "capital" at some place like Kontum or Pleiku. The VC main force units were absolutely impregnable in their jungle underground redoubts and could be counted upon always to destroy the government's efforts to rebuild the countryside and eliminate terrorism. Underlying all these troubles was the doubt as to whether or not we would stay.

4. Your decision signified an American commitment and, after it, the Vietnamese said to himself in effect, "If the Americans can commit themselves, then I can commit myself." The present government has thus been in power more than six months instead of the three weeks that was predicted (to be sure, no predictions can yet be made about government stability). Our military have learned how to cope with the main force units of the Viet Cong and with the redoubts, which has created an unprecedented opportunity for pacification and rebuilding the countryside. There is ground for some solid satisfaction because of signs of demoralization of the Viet Cong, which is reflected in the highest monthly total of defections on record during November. If the above paragraph were a complete report, we would all be feeling pretty good today.

5. But on the unfavorable side is the entrance of the Army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam. This has transformed the nature of the war. It is in effect a new war. I believe, however, that while this can delay success, it cannot prevent it. The VC main force and the NVN Army, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as of January 6, aggregate about 43,630--about 25 percent of the total Communist manpower. We know much more about how to handle the Communists militarily and we also have made progress on a formula for dealing with Communist subversion/terrorism by means of pacification and rebuilding the countryside. If, therefore, we remain steadfast, I look for fundamental progress in 1966--decisive, perhaps, in the strictly military field and solid achievement as regards pacification.

6. You can thus take tremendous satisfaction from your decision of last summer. Even the bad part--the entrance of the Army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam--is still a direct consequence of the fact that your decision created a favorable balance which they simply could not redress by Viet Cong troops from South Vietnam. Their only chance, therefore, of winning the war was to bring in the soldiers from outside the country. This is a real escalation of the war, and it is grim for us. It richly justifies a new look at the whole scene, as you are wisely doing. But it entails grave risks for them.

7. Hanoi or Peking?

Thich Tam Chau is the head of the Buddhist Institute and by any standard is one of the very top Buddhists in Vietnam. I find him sagacious, well-balanced and politically minded. He comes originally from Hanoi and has many connections there, religious and personal. For various reasons, I have built up a very good footing with him over the years. Last week, he surprised me by saying flatly that the Hanoi regime would like to stop the war, and that it was Peking which is stopping Hanoi from doing so, and that Peking had enough influence to stop Hanoi. He felt we were making a mistake when we thought in terms of Hanoi and did not realize that the real problem was Peking. Nothing would ever be settled until we had solved "the problem of China." He frankly did not know how to solve it but he knew that was where the trouble was. He also published the above in his newspaper.

8. Political.

The government plans to announce policies and programs for rural construction, a constitution, and the budget at a convention of the Armed Forces on the eve of the lunar new year holiday (Tet).

9. There were no overt signs of discontent among the Montagnards but the situation remained highly unsettled and potentially dangerous. The government has privately acknowledged the failure of its previous approach.

10. There has been increasing speculation among Vietnamese as to the basic objectives of the GVN and the US. Bill Moyers' statement referring to a direct US-Hanoi contact has caused concern/hope the visit of Secretary Rusk and Gov. Harriman will clarify the problem. It is potentially a great danger to the war effort./2/

/2/In his memorandum forwarding Lodge's telegram to the President on January 12, McGeorge Bundy commented that paragraph 10 "argues against a direct reference to our contact with Hanoi in the State of the Union." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) Regarding Moyers' statement, see footnote 8, Document 16.

11. American reporters have also begun to speculate about serious differences between the US and the GVN on the issue of negotiations, and I have instructed everyone here not to discuss the subject with the press.

12. Economic.

Retail prices in Saigon rose to their highest level in the week ending January 3. The price increases reflected normal pre-Tet increases plus the consequences of Viet Cong action in cutting the road to Dalot, the center of vegetable production.

13. Dollar and gold prices, which had declined last week, returned to their previous high level.

14. Rice stocks on hand increased, reflecting both imports and increased deliveries from the rice-growing delta area which reached a three-year high in December. It is expected that there will be enough pork for Tet.

15. Military.

The level of Viet Cong activity declined during the week while combined Vietnamese-Free World task forces mounted major assaults in Phu Yen Province of Central Vietnam and in the Plain of Reeds southwest of Saigon. In the Phu Yen area, Republic of Korea forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy while suffering their own first serious losses.

16. Statistically the total of Viet Cong incidents dropped from 1,133 for the preceding week to 973. Of this total 17 were attacks or ambushes while 645 were acts of terrorism. The remainder were acts of sabotage, propaganda or anti-aircraft fire.

17. The total number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program dropped from 705 to 484, a figure which included 285 military and political cadre.

Lodge

19. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, January 12, 1966, 2:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II. No classification marking.

Pres. cited Lodge's Jan. 12 telegram/2/ giving outlook for 1966. Read paragraph 3 as against paragraph 10 and asked if this would cause us to rework our State of the Union message--the portion on direct contact. B felt it was a matter of how we word it. The fact there was a communication is in public domain. Pres. said they had used the language suggested by B this morning. B said he would look at the message and call the Pres. back./3/

/2/Document 18.

/3/In a 2:25 p.m. conversation with President Johnson, Ball indicated that his preference was not to refer to direct contact between the United States and the DRV. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II) In his State of the Union message delivered to a joint session of Congress that evening, President Johnson reviewed the peace offensive but did not mention direct contact. For text of the message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 3-12.

Pres. asked how B got along this morning with the SFRC./4/ B told him he had met with them over 3 hours. He got the feeling it was a serious and honest effort to get to the base of the subject. They are troubled; there is not unfriendliness; they are sympathetic with the President's problems. B said he had mentioned some of the President's thoughts of this morning. B said his testimony was against the background of Mansfield having been with the Committee yesterday in long session. They were aware of the problems and don't see any solution other than the course being followed. Ball said one of the Senators told him the Committee suggested to Mansfield that they would like an opportunity to talk privately with the President--to consult in a friendly and sympathetic way, to give the President their ideas. B didn't think this would be desirable because it would lead to every other committee wanting to do the same thing. Pres. agreed this wouldn't work. B said Mansfield had not promised it to them and B knows he will protect the Pres. on it. So far as the general tone is concerned, B didn't get the same feeling that he had before House Committee of an undercurrent of criticism. Their problem is they don't know how to talk to their constituents. They don't know whether we see the light for a permanent advantage for the US at the end of the road. They are not convinced there is a way out. They are working hard on it and B hadn't heard anything about blowing everything up. Pres. asked about Fulbright; B replied he took his familiar line--he didn't see where we were going and why the commitment.

/4/For text of Ball's testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 39-104.

B continued most questions were on the relationship between the Communist world--the split and what it meant in terms of settlement. They are seeing the whole problem in larger context than they did before. They see it as a serious problem of American policy vis-a-vis Communist effort. There was a much higher level of understanding than in the past and B believes over time we can bring them along on a sympathetic basis. This was true with not only Hickenlooper but Mundt as well.

Pres. said he would hate to rewrite the speech and asked that B look at it and give him his judgment.

20. Telegram From the Embasy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:52 a.m. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to President Johnson at 11 a.m. on January 13 under cover of a memorandum stating that Lodge "is as optimistic as McNamara is pessimistic about the timing and likelihood of straight military success as against pacification. But I think he is right in his notion that the two should be kept separate in our minds." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18)

2514. For the President from Lodge.

1. In my weekly telegram no. 2399 of January 5,/2/ I referred to the idea of the American public learning to live year in and year out with the Communist China style cold war in Asia as we had learned to live with the Soviet style cold war in Europe. I realize that I may have appeared unaware that it is not reasonable to expect American public opinion to live year in and year out with a hot war, in which substantial numbers of casualties are being incurred.

/2/Document 6.

2. Let me therefore add to my telegram of January 5 this thought:

3. The purely military war against the main force units of the Viet Cong and against the units of the North Vietnamese Army must really have its back broken within the year 1966. (I assume we have the military wherewithal to do it.) But the pacification-uplift program to rebuild the countryside, which the Viet Cong have been systematically destroying for five years, necessarily will take longer. This pacification program, however, is a program which cannot involve heavy American casualties. While it does involve violence and killing, it is of a kind which must be done by the Vietnamese, and largely with police type techniques. The American participation is indispensable, but it is in the way of advice, providing the straight economic and social programs and being political catalysts for the whole.

4. I recommend, therefore:

A. That in this new war, which the North Vietnamese have recently inflicted on us and the South Vietnamese by bringing in NVN troops, we take extremely drastic action against everything that pertains to North Viet-Nam, wherever it may be, so as completely and rapidly to neutralize and render harmless their military potential; and

B. In South Viet-Nam, continue to help the pacification-countryside-rebuilding-uplift program (which would not involve substantial American casualties) but which would go on for several years and which, I hope, the American public could learn to live with. Your handling of public opinion is so able--particularly at this difficult time--that I do not doubt your ability to do this.

5. I'm sorry if I was obscure on this point, but I try in all my telegrams to give you the thing that is preoccupying me at the moment--in a way, to think out loud--hoping that this may be suggestive and helpful.

Lodge

21. Report Prepared by the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Porter) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)/1/

Washington, January 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Jan 1966. Secret. Drafted by Unger. The report was addressed to Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Bell, McGeorge Bundy, and Lodge.

SUBJECT
Warrenton Meeting on Viet-Nam, January 8-11, 1966

1. The Warrenton meeting was originally called for mid-December, 1965 in order to bring together senior representatives of the U.S Mission Saigon, the Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee,/2/ Washington, and several other individuals (see Annex A)/3/ to a) review the joint GVN-US pacification/rural construction program and seek to promote its more effective operation and b) address the problem of the increasingly serious shortages and bottlenecks in manpower, materials and transport in Viet-Nam and to designate priorities and machinery for resources control and allocation.

/2/The Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee, chaired by Unger, was a Washington-based interagency group established in 1965 to coordinate non-military programs in Vietnam.

/3/Annexes A-E are attached but not printed. Among the attendees from Saigon were Habib, Jorgensen, Lansdale, Charles Mann, Porter, Zorthian, and Brigadier General James Collins of MACV. Among the attendees from Washington were Colby, Chester Cooper, DeSilva, Alvin Friedman of OSD/ISA, Stanley Marlowe of USIA, Major General William Peers of JCS, and Unger.

2. Before the meeting convened on its postponed date (January 8) it had also been agreed to take advantage of the presence here of the Saigon representatives to hold an additional day of meeting in Warrenton to discuss the problems, inter alia, of Montagnards, Chieu Hoi, land tenure and urban questions such as Labor and Youth and to meet 2 days more in Washington on, inter alia, Prisoners of War, Economic Warfare, Free World Assistance, and Elections and Political Parties. This latter set of Washington meetings is still underway as this report is being written. Meanwhile, Messrs. Bell, Poats and Chester Cooper and Mr. Richard Cooper's group have visited Saigon to develop emergency programs to meet the grave inflationary threat, the problem of port congestion and to review the organization of the U.S. Mission to handle economic problems. For this reason the Warrenton meeting did not address the first two problems at any length.

3. On the basis of the several days' discussion, considerably assisted by numerous reports from the Saigon representatives, the general conclusions were reached that: a) the military situation although not critical nevertheless continues grave in Viet-Nam with a prospect under the present strategy of several years' more fighting at least on the current scale before the GVN will be in a position to exercise effective control over substantially all of South Viet-Nam except over Viet Cong base areas; b) there have been some instances of weakening Viet Cong morale, but the Viet Cong, buttressed by continuing infiltration from the North, continue to be a dangerous and effective fighting force; c) the Ky Government continues in relative stability with its collegial division of responsibility, is willing and in a limited degree able to take certain measures long considered necessary to improve its domestic and international position but remains fragile and is failing to live up to its "revolutionary" billing as originally presented by Prime Minister Ky or to produce a fighting force appreciably larger or more aggressive than earlier.

4. In view of this evaluation in general and, in particular, the inter-dependence of military operations and rural construction, it is recommended that a SNIE be promptly produced on the likely development of the politico-military situation over the next two years, based upon present estimates of enemy capabilities and Vietnamese and allied deployment plans, with particular attention to certain outside factors which could produce unanticipated shortfalls in the execution of present plans (identified at Annex B).

5. The sense of the participants also was that it would be advisable to review the current political-military strategy in Viet-Nam and related areas. Such a study (also see Annex B) should include: a) scope and phasing of force deployment (U.S., Free World and GVN), b) alternative concepts for the employment of forces in South Viet-Nam; against infiltration through Laos and by sea; and related actions against North Viet-Nam. (The projected Honolulu meeting/4/ at the end of this January might serve this purpose among others.)

/4/Reference is to a military conference in Honolulu involving General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp, not to President Johnson's meeting with General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky in Honolulu February 6-8.

6. In its deliberations on rural construction/pacification ("the reconstitution of the social and governmental fabric") the Warrenton meeting noted some encouraging actions by the GVN: a) to develop, in frequent consultation with the U.S. Mission, promising concepts to provide an agreed basis for this effort (see Annex C), b) to issue detailed instructions about the operation of the rural construction program including provision for continuous coordination between the civilian and military branches at national, corps, division and province levels and c) to organize cadre teams and groups designed to see the effort through from the conclusion of large-scale military action to the point where reconstituted governmental and social institutions can resume their functions in cooperation with a receptive population.

7. On this same subject conclusions and recommendations were adopted (see Annex D) on the following aspects:

a. concentration of effort and resources on the four already designated rural construction priority areas for 1966, with lower priorities in turn for the extensive remaining areas where that program is also underway and for other kinds of U.S. programs in rural areas (a report will be submitted to the VNCC by the Mission by March 31 on the prospects for successful execution of the plans for the four priority areas in 1966),

b. continued direct U.S. funding to support the most crucial aspects of the rural construction program (i.e. cadre for the teams in the Rural Construction 80-man Groups),

c. the importance of encouraging the development of representative bodies at the hamlet or village level, as well as the development of non-government institutions such as cooperatives and labor unions,

d. the optimum organization of the U.S. Mission for its support of the rural construction/pacification program--a senior official with a supporting staff with full-time responsibility in this field was considered necessary. (Coordination is also required with Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Bell's conclusions on this point.) It would also be desirable for such an official to have in Washington a high-level point of liaison to assure the expeditious discharge here of urgent Viet-Nam business in this field (See also items 10 and 14 below.),

e. the proper relation of the respective roles and missions of rural construction teams, police and regional and popular forces, and with the missions of the regular forces, and the requirement for a police force of adequate size and charged with an appropriate mission,

f. the collation both in Washington and Saigon of available material on the primary needs and requirements of the rural population (e.g. as reflected in findings of the Census Grievance Teams)--(See Annex D.).

8. The need to be prepared for an expanded role of the police in a situation of ceasefire (and eventual peace) was also noted and Mission Saigon will prepare a contingency plan for the immediate incorporation of some element of the various paramilitary forces into the police in anticipation of such circumstances.

9. On the matter of resource allocation the meeting took note of the grave danger to essential GVN and U.S. programs of insufficiently controlled construction and free bidding for scarce manpower and the contribution of these activities to the inflation problem. In this connection, the Saigon Mission representatives described the setting up of the Deputy Ambassador's committee on construction priorities and the joint GVN-US committees on manpower, construction, logistics, construction material and wages. Measures recently taken to relieve port congestion were also noted.

10. It was the sense of the participants that Ambassador Lodge be invited to consider the appointment as his own direct adviser or assistant of a high-level resource allocation official to devote full time to the anticipation and elimination of resource stringencies; such an official might chair the U.S. side of the joint GVN-US committees mentioned above and serve as principal adviser to the Deputy Ambassador on the construction priorities committee. He should also have a Washington counterpart to follow up such business here (see also paragraphs 7d above and 14 below). For guidance in this field, it was proposed that the Mission regard combat operations, the rural construction program and the logistical support for both of these, and measures for economic stability as having top priority; other GVN-US activities will take second place. Pending the preparation of the strategy paper mentioned in paragraph 13, the meeting did not attempt to agree on any further refinement of priorities for resource allocation.

11. On the other subjects treated at Warrenton the following conclusions, which are elaborated in Annex E, have been drawn:

a. The U.S. should take advantage of General Co's recent invitation (see Embtel 2451)/5/ to submit suggestions on a GVN program for the Montagnards as an opening to press hard for concrete improvements in GVN-Montagnard relations in the economic, social and, as soon as possible, political fields.

/5/Dated January 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

b. At present the Chieu Hoi program most requires effective reception and resettlement of returnees. The Mission will seek to stimulate this through the provincial authorities, perhaps through the occasional direct application of funds; it will also continue to press the GVN for recognition of the importance of the program at national level and continue to urge the designation of an effective head.

c. Studies of land tenure, credit and related programs will be expedited to enhance their use as support of the rural construction program.

d. While rural construction takes priority over urban programs in general, the U.S. Mission will examine how the U.S. might expand its educational and cultural activities directed at youth in urban as well as rural areas.

12. On a number of occasions during the meeting there was discussion of the intensity of pressure the U.S. should seek to exert on the GVN to adopt or vigorously pursue policies or programs which we favor. In principle the U.S., by paying attention to forms, should take care to maintain the full appearance of GVN independence, but in view of the U.S. involvement and commitment in South Viet-Nam, it may be necessary to exert considerable pressure. Ambassador Lodge and the Saigon Mission will have to be the judges of how pressure, persuasion and manipulation are managed in any specific case. (Some of the participants believe that unless this basic issue--the U.S. ability to influence the GVN--is resolved satisfactorily, our already questionable chances of success in South Viet-Nam will be significantly reduced.)

13. Finally, with regard to policies and programs in Viet-Nam, the absence of any recent strategy paper was noted and the Saigon Mission will undertake the preparation of a first draft to cover the coming 3-5 year period. This should correlate political, military, economic and prop-aganda policies and future activities, assure that they are in harmony with each other and best serve U.S. objectives. Such a paper will have to be related to several alternative assumptions provided by Washington.

14. Note was taken also of the inadequacy of present U.S. Government machinery in Washington to handle Viet-Nam problems quickly and decisively. The need for referral of too large a number of problems to the Secretarial level was one of the problems mentioned. While the meeting did not have time to come to any firm conclusions, there was a view that the VNCC because of its coordinating rather than decision-cum-enforcement powers could not perform this task except in part. If endowing the VNCC or its Chairman with larger powers, and with a staff associated with no one agency, is not a feasible solution, it was considered that the required directing position might have to be set up at a higher level, perhaps related to the National Security Council. (See also paragraphs 7d and 10 above.)

22. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 14, 1966, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18. Secret.

SUBJECT
Top Level Reorganization in Saigon

Dave Bell, Bob McNamara, George Ball and I have now had a chance to talk some more about top level organization in Saigon which you asked me to work on at the end of December.

There is fairly general agreement now that the most important gap in Saigon is in the overall command of the pacification effort and establishing real security in a growing number of villages. According to Bell and others this is more critical than the task of resource allocation.

There is also considerable agreement that the right man to run this pacification job is Deputy Ambassador Porter. He has fully lived up to the expectations of his backers, and McNamara and I have both decided that our doubts of last summer are unjustified.

Porter's only trouble is that he has become fully indispensable to Lodge in a lot of day-to-day administration and hand-holding. The pacification job is a full time task, and if we settle on Porter, we shall have to get another senior diplomat type to support Lodge on the things that Porter is doing now. A lot of us lean toward Leonard Unger for this job.

In addition to a pacification chief, we need a stronger requirements planning group in Saigon to deal with the real problem of resource allocation. But we think this could be done by finding the right first-rate bureaucrats. We do not see room in Saigon for a business executive. There is agreement that MACV and AID have plenty of management. What they lack is coordinated planning and control, and we are now inclined to think that this job can be done by Lodge, Westmoreland and Porter with the right staff support.

A pacification chief in the field will need a back-up man here. We are still working on that problem of organization and should have a concerted recommendation for you soon.

To persuade Lodge of the virtue of these changes is likely to mean a trip to Saigon for one of us, and I would like to do this myself. There is a slight problem of timing, however, as I do not think I ought to go to Saigon while the pause is going on because my last trip was so intimately associated with the initiation of the bombing. My current thought, therefore, is that Porter (who is here now) should go out and talk this matter over with Lodge in a preliminary way, and that I might follow early in February.

None of this requires immediate decision, but it is background for the suggestion that you might wish to see Porter briefly before he goes back. He will be here until Monday morning./2/ Quite aside from the organization problem, he has a lot of interesting things to say about the situation in Saigon today, and he will give you good value for a fifteen minute appointment.

/2/January 17.

McG. B.

Arrange an appointment/3/
Let him go back

/3/The President checked this option. He met with Porter from 12:36 to 1:01 p.m. on January 17. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found, but Bundy's briefing memorandum for the President, January 17, on "Possible topics for your talk with Porter" is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18.

23. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Saigon, January 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Prepared by Habib. The meeting was held at the Gia Long Palace in Saigon. A memorandum of Secretary Rusk's conversation with Prime Minister Ky on the same day is ibid. On January 16 Rusk and Ky issued a joint communique, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1966, pp. 155-156. Rusk's stopover in Saigon followed his visit to New Delhi January 12-13 to attend Prime Minister Shastri's funeral and his meeting in Bangkok on January 14 with senior Thai officials. Rusk met with President Marcos in Manila on January 16 and returned to Washington on January 19.

PARTICIPANTS
General Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman, National Leadership Council, Viet-Nam
Lt. General Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary General, National Leadership Council
Tran Van Do, Foreign Minister

Secretary of State Dean Rusk
Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Harriman
Philip C. Habib

The Secretary said that he brought the greetings of President Johnson to General Thieu. The President was pleased that the Secretary would have the opportunity to meet with General Thieu. Such a meeting provided a valuable opportunity for the President and his colleagues to get General Thieu's personal impression of the situation and problems in Viet-Nam. The Secretary asked for General Thieu's assessment of the situation and said he was prepared to express his own views.

General Thieu said he would be frank in his comments. He had been following the recent peace offensive closely. At this time he believes the communists have rejected the offer and he expected that they would continue to be stubborn. If the communists do not accept going to the conference table it is because they will never accept appearing guilty before the world. When one looks at their purpose it would appear that they would not like to negotiate at this time but might rather wait until after the rainy season so as to use at the conference table any gains that they make. They continue to infiltrate more and more troops even during truce periods--whether it is the Christmas truce which had just taken place or the Tet truce which will take place. Since the stopping of the bombing in the North, the enemy has benefited by reorganizing in the rear, moving in troops, and reinforcing troops already infiltrated. In Vietnamese opinion if we decide to bomb again, we will have to be more aggressive.

General Thieu said the Government is in difficulty with public opinion on peace moves or meetings with the communists. The Army and the general public have the feeling the GVN has not been kept informed of all measures the USG has taken in the peace offensive. This has made it difficult for the Government. Viet-Nam has the right to conduct war because it is opposing aggression. If they ask for help it is to give more strength to their struggle. If Vietnamese public opinion or VC propaganda look upon the war as one between the U.S. and the VC it would be bad. While welcoming the moves of the U.S., other allies and the Pope, the GVN calls for a common policy. At any time there are proposals for a truce or negotiations or decisions on bombing, the Vietnamese should be consulted.

Secretary Rusk said he would like to make a few general observations. To look at the matter in its most simple aspect, if Hanoi and Peiping continue to push into Southeast Asia we will have two choices: either get out of their way or meet them. We have decided to meet them. This is not simply amiability or philanthropy. It derives from U.S. national interest. We cannot see Southeast Asia seized by the communists. If one looks at the situation locally we have committed substantial forces, with more on the way. We do not know how much more will be required, but communist aggression will be met and will not succeed. Beyond purely local considerations is the world where one billion communists are opposed primarily by 190 million Americans. If the war in Viet-Nam moves into a larger war, it is the U.S. that will have to take it on. Viet-Nam's resources are occupied in full. The U.S. has the problem of making it clear to one billion communists that they are on the wrong track and cannot succeed. We are interested in dividing the communist world; that is one of the main reasons for the recent move we have taken. While we have not seen the success of these moves there are some signs that the communist world is not solid and this is particularly important when you look at the overall situation. The communists have rejected negotiations. They are afraid that they will not succeed in getting at the table what they have not been able to succeed in getting militarily. They are afraid that they will not be able to get Viet-Nam by negotiations. They are the ones who are afraid to negotiate. We should not be. Unless they are prepared to give up their aggression, they will hesitate to negotiate. We will not negotiate in a way that will impair the independence of Viet-Nam.

The Secretary said that the last three weeks have made it clear the burden for peace lies on Hanoi and Peiping. Throughout the world there is understanding that if peace is to come, Hanoi must change. Neither Viet-Nam nor the United States stands in the way of peace. Even the communist world is subject to international opinion. In 1948 the Soviets brought the Berlin blockade to an end because world opinion went against them. In various crises since 1945, during which the U.S. had suffered 160,000 casualties, we have not given in to the communists' objective to take over people by force. The Secretary cited the cases of Iran, Berlin, Korea and the Cuban Missile crisis. In the post war period, the U.S. has spent $800 billion on peace in aiding nations. The American people will do what is required if they understand that the alternatives have been exhausted. This is important to the President who secures his resources and his men from Congress. American support for the necessary effort is very strong. Viet-Nam need not be concerned about the determination of the U.S. to see it through.

The Secretary commented that there have been elements in the press which have called exaggerated attention to the U.S. effort here. We know the burden Vietnamese forces carry is great. But with U.S. troops here, the U.S. press tends to concentrate on the U.S. effort. This is not to distract from the Vietnamese effort. Ambassador Lodge noted that in President Johnson's State of the Union Message, he made note of the fact that Vietnamese casualties in 1965 were 8 times those of the U.S.

The Secretary said that we will try to keep in close touch with the GVN as the situation develops. There have not been any significant signs from the communist capitals. He agreed with General Thieu that there was no change in the communist intention to pursue their objectives. If Hanoi continues along these lines, it will have to suffer the consequences. Hanoi must stop trying to impose its will on South Viet-Nam by force. That is the essence of the matter; all the rest is decoration on the Christmas tree. The U.S. and Viet-Nam have a common objective and we need to find out how best to get on with the job. The problem of peace is in Hanoi and Peiping; that has been clearly demonstrated to the world.

Governor Harriman said that it would be fair to say that until the peace offensive there had been a feeling that this is a civil war. Now in many countries they recognize the President's sincerity and peace has become Hanoi's problem. Communist China may find it in its interest to keep the war going, hoping that we will tire and get out. One thing that is important is that there has been no sign that our peace offensive has been taken to be a sign of weakness. Secretary Rusk commented that rather than being taken to be a sign of weakness, the Communists have taken it as an ultimatum. Governor Harriman said we were driving a wedge in the communist world. Countries like Poland and Yugoslavia want peace and don't want to see Communist China expand its influence. This is an advantage to our worldwide objectives as well as to Viet-Nam. If Hanoi wants to stop it can; there is no doubt that Eastern Europe would like to see it stop. But Eastern Europeans do not control Hanoi, and Hanoi has given no sign of changing its way.

General Thieu said that all the members of the Leadership Council in the Government are confident of the U.S. determination to support Viet-Nam. He had read President Johnson's State of the Union Message with great interest and this confirmed their understanding. Vietnamese are waiting for the world to condemn the aggression of Communist China and Hanoi. The Vietnamese believe that Hanoi doesn't want negotiations, not only because of military reasons but also because they fear their ability to maintain the morale of their people. If they go to the table, they feel they will not be able to maintain their regime in the North or the confidence of the communists in the South. General Thieu thought that when Hanoi finds it no longer has the ability to take over the South, the most logical way would be for them to just quietly stop. Secretary Rusk commented it was a possibility that they would not make peace at a table but would just stop. General Thieu said there were many points of view in South Viet-Nam. In order to maintain morale, the Government would not offer a soft position. When anyone talks about the four points of Hanoi or about the National Liberation Front, this has an effect on morale, and helps those who wish to weaken the Government or those who wish to offer an easier solution. The Vietnamese Government does not doubt the U.S. commitment but it is concerned with the psychological impact of what is going on.

Secretary Rusk said that in a way this is more a problem for us. Quite frankly the world position of South Viet-Nam is weakened when a sense of disunity is shown. We know that there are differences between various elements in Viet-Nam: Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards and others. But we do know that there is unity in that they all do not want Hanoi. The more one can find fanatical unity in South Viet-Nam, the more will one get support. This sort of fanatical unity of people under attack is important, as has been demonstrated in such places as Berlin and Korea, and anything that can be done to promote it is for the better. General Thieu said that the Government has been trying for seven months to do its best in this regard. The Government is seeking to develop a democratic viewpoint and promote constitutional development in the future. But the basis of unity is a strong national policy. Offers of neutrality or other solutions arise but if the country stays strong it can fight. The position of the Government and the position of its friends must stay strong. Secretary Rusk replied that the Vietnamese people must know that we haven't put in 1/4 million troops to run away. The U.S. is not going to abandon Viet-Nam.

Secretary Rusk said he knew President Johnson would be most interested in General Thieu's remarks. The President spends an enormous amount of time day and night thinking about Viet-Nam. The Secretary noted that a Communist Foreign Minister at the UN recently told him that the single most important question in the world is to require Peiping to turn to peaceful coexistence. The U.S. has commitments all over Asia: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia. Peace in the Pacific is vital to the U.S. and is in no way second to peace in the Atlantic. We need peace in both oceans. The persistent policy of militancy in Peiping will have to change or they would have to pay the price. They must pull back. Governor Harriman commented that in particular Tito had spoken to him of the danger to peace from Peiping, and the need for a buffer between Communist China and the rest of the world. Governor Harriman has asked Nasser if he wanted to turn over Southeast Asia to Communist China. Nasser has said "Oh, no." They all want us to stay here to insure peace.

Secretary Rusk said a major disappointment has been that more nations have not helped. The issues have been confused, the nature of the war which involves movement by infiltration, rather than across the 17th parallel with divisions, has caused many people to believe that South Viet-Nam was not a problem. The issue was now more clear. It concerned Hanoi's willingness to live in peace with its neighbor.

General Thieu said Vietnamese recall the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. They knew that the Communists would not respect them. The Communists have a war all over Indo China. They are now putting in more troops in Laos. One must think of a concept of defending the entire area. We must not only defend Viet-Nam, we must defend Laos and the whole area with a complete strategy. Secretary Rusk added we would have to include Thailand as well.

24. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1966, Prime Minister Ky delivered a state-of-the-nation address to the Second Congress of the Armed Forces. The text of the speech was transmitted in telegram 2544 from Saigon, January 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S) Ky announced three major objectives of his government during 1966: 1) "to win the war" and "to pacify and to reconstruct the rural area"; 2) "to stabilize the economic situation"; and 3) "to build democracy." He declared that a "Democracy Building Council" would be appointed shortly to draft a constitution, which would be reviewed by local groups and then submitted to a national referendum in October 1966. Ky pledged that the constitution would serve as the basis for a democratic regime and promised democratic national elections in 1967.

25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, January 17, 1966, 7:16 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House.

1745. 1. Although we have prodded Sov Embassy here on possible significance Shastri report that Kosygin suggested to him you make direct contact with DRV Ambassador Moscow, we have had no response./2/ In meantime, there are some indications Hanoi may try make propaganda capital by claiming no direct substantive contact was made by US with DRV during current diplomatic activity and pause. On balance, we have therefore concluded that you should seek to make such direct contact and to carry out instructions below.

/2/In telegram 1781 to Moscow, January 20, the Department relayed the Soviet Embassy's response: Kosygin had told Shastri on January 4 that if the United States was sincerely interested in peace it could seek direct contact with DRV representatives, but Kosygin did not recommend any specific place. (Ibid.)

2. You should send message to DRV Ambassador that you wish direct conversations./3/ You should suggest meeting in some inconspicuous location that would not come to notice of press, since you assume that they would not wish contact to become publicly known. (We virtually assume Sovs will learn of it.) We leave to your judgment place of meeting and would not want possibility of meeting to break down on this issue, so that you are authorized to meet at place DRV representative may suggest if he accepts. Please inform us immediately his reaction.

/3/In telegram 2228 from Moscow, January 18, Kohler reported that the DRV Ambassador was not in Moscow and he proposed meeting with the DRV Charge instead. The Department concurred in telegram 1756 to Moscow, January 18. (Both ibid.)

3. In event meeting is arranged, you should conduct substance of conversation along following lines:

a. USG suspended bombing of DRV on December 24 and as DRV knows, notified DRV officially of this in Rangoon on Dec. 29. As was made clear in that message, suspension might continue for limited period in absence of major provocation, and further extension would depend on response and action from DRV. Since suspension X days have elapsed and we have had no indication of Hanoi response.

b. DRV rep may take line that suspension amounts to ultimatum or propaganda prelude to increased US actions. You should counter by saying that it should be considered rather as opportunity and responsive to repeated suggestions by Hanoi itself and others that suspension of bombing might create conditions in which moves could be made toward peaceful solution. This is basic and serious purpose of US in taking suspension action. It is in no sense ultimatum. If pressed as to actions US will take in absence of response, you should say that, in face of continued DRV military actions such as introduction of regular forces, US will of course have to take necessary military actions to continue assisting SVN toward objectives thoroughly defined in our statements of position. This is simple statement of fact, not ultimatum, and does not change basic USG view that suspension constitutes opportunity for responsive action by Hanoi.

c. You should then go on to say that there seemed to you to be two possible purposes to be served by direct conversation between USG and DRV. One would be to explore possibility of reciprocal reductions of hostilities (not cease-fire). As we have repeatedly said, we could continue suspension if there were significant reciprocal actions by DRV. At same time, we have recognized difficulty DRV might see in admitting that it had ceased these actions or that it was responsible for action in South to degree to which we believe it to be the case. Direct contact could provide opportunity for private and confidential indication by DRV of actions it was taking, so that these would be fully understood by USG and appropriate action taken on US and GVN side. Does DRV rep wish to use contact for this purpose?

In making this point, you should initially not indicate what types of actions we have in mind. You should however indicate that since bombing was suspended we have had evidence that supply activity through Laos is continuing at substantial rate and that there has been high incident rate in South but low level of large-scale attacks. In the absence of contrary indication, we must conclude that DRV is continuing infiltration on substantial scale, and that level of activity in South is normal fluctuation. If DRV rep pursues subject, you could indicate that "significant reciprocal actions" could relate to sending of men and equipment from DRV to South, level of military activity and terrorism in South, and withdrawal of regular DRV military units in South in particular. However, we do not wish to get too specific except to leave clearly in record our present reading of military actions, and invite their comment.

d. Unless answer indicates desire to pursue this topic, you should go on to say that second possible purpose in direct contact might be to explore conditions under which more formal negotiation might take place. This would be appropriate point, if you have not already done so, to hand over copies of Viet-Nam portion of State of Union address,/4/ fourteen points/5/ and Goldberg letter of Jan. 4 to U Thant,/6/ which you might run over briefly touching on point relating to economic aid which might include DRV in conditions of peace. You would then go on that, as to conditions for negotiation, USG has repeatedly made clear it would be prepared for negotiations either without conditions or on basis Geneva Accords of 1954. However, USG has interpreted Hanoi position, both public and private, as insisting on prior acceptance by USG of Hanoi four points/7/ as basis for negotiation, and perhaps also even withdrawal of US forces prior to any negotiation. USG has also understood Hanoi to be insisting that NLF be recognized as sole representative of SVN or at least as independent party. USG has interpreted these Hanoi positions as amounting in effect to prior conditions before negotiation. Is this understanding of past Hanoi position correct, and if so, what would DRV rep now suggest to remove obstacles?

/4/See footnote 3, Document 19.

/5/See footnote 8, Document 2.

/6/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 744-746.

/7/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, pp. 544-545.

4. Second point would probably lead to general discussion of Hanoi and US positions, in which you should deal with possible points that might arise as follows:

a. Four points. USG has no serious difficulty with first two points as basis for negotiation, provided it clearly understood that all elements introduced by DRV will be considered as foreign forces in SVN, and subject to withdrawal. As to fourth point concerning reunification, USG has no difficulty in envisaging reunification by peaceful means but would prefer formulation that specifically called for free popular determination (elections) in both North and South under international supervision to be agreed upon by the governments of North and South, as basis for eventual resolution of question of reunification. This we believe to be true meaning of Geneva Accords, as well as consistent with best answer to this and similar problems as in Germany and Korea. In sum, US regards differences as not serious on first, second, and fourth points. Real US problem is and has always been Hanoi's third point, which we interpret to mean insistence on immediate NLF major and probably dominant role in coalition government that would replace present government in Saigon, prior to any election process. This would be imposed and arbitrary solution which we cannot accept in principle as basis of negotiations and for which we see no warrant in Geneva Accords. Of course Hanoi would be free in any negotiations to put forward this, rest of four points, or any proposal it wished, and USG would of course discuss such points if raised, along with its own points. If Hanoi insists that its four points, especially the third, are authentic interpretations of Geneva Accords, then solution might be to base discussions or negotiations on Geneva Accords and argue in negotiations about valid interpretations.

b. NLF representation. USG does not regard NLF as independent entity, but as created and in last analysis controlled by DRV. This point aside, USG cannot regard NLF, even in SVN terms, as representing more than one interest group within SVN. Most basically, whole USG concern in SVN arises from DRV role, and this can only be discussed and negotiated with DRV itself. At same time, USG in President Johnson's State of Union message and statement of July 28/8/ (repeated in point 13) suggested that ways might be found for NLF to be represented and to pre-sent its views. We would be interested in any suggestions DRV might have along these lines.

/8/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, p. 803.

c. Negotiating forum. USG would accept Geneva Conference of those nations represented in 1954, or any appropriate grouping of governments having major concerns with issue.

d. US withdrawal. As indicated in discussion of Hanoi's first point, we are prepared envisage US withdrawal as soon as DRV role itself eliminated. However, any insistence on prior US withdrawal is obviously unrealistic, and we have understood some private Hanoi messages to mean that DRV does not thus insist. Could DRV confirm this or clarify its government's position?

5. If discussion becomes deeply involved in nature and meaning of four points, you could say that there was third possible basis of negotiations in addition to our suggestions of unconditional negotiations or negotiations on basis of Geneva Accords. This would be to frame four-point declaration following subject matter of Hanoi's four points but stating third and fourth points somewhat differently to meet our objections. Acceptance of such formula would be minimum change from apparent present DRV position, and might create acceptable common basis. If DRV rep were interested, we have possible text such formulation which could be subject further discussion.

6. Other than as elaborated above, you should stick closely to State of Union message, fourteen points, Goldberg letter, and related previous US statements. As indicated, you should in any event indicate that you will report Hanoi views promptly to USG and will await further instructions with view to further early contact, if desired.

Ball

26. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, January 17, 1966, 9:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.02, Side A, PNOs 1 and 2. No classification marking. The transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Here follow brief opening comments.]

LBJ: What's your thinking these days. I haven't talked to you. What's happening to our pause? What are our Generals saying?

RSM: I sat with George Ball and Mac Bundy late Saturday/2/ to consider what's happening on the pause and I think we agreed that we still aren't sure and that there are a number of leads that we should follow up so that by the end of this week we'd be in a position to make some kind of a recommendation to you. We should go back to Rangoon and have our Ambassador there approach that Consul and say, "Three or four weeks ago I gave you a note to send to your government. I haven't heard. When will I get an answer?" We should go to Kohler in Moscow and say, "Shastri told us Kosygin said you should contact the North Vietnamese. What does he tell you?" We should go through Rapacki in Poland and say, "You promised to go to North Vietnam. We haven't heard a word from you." And, follow each one of these hot leads or warm leads so that by the end of the week we can tell you that we've checked them off and there's nothing more to expect from them.

/2/January 15.

I think that there's a feeling in some parts of State, particularly George [Ball], that we shouldn't resume bombing at the end of Tet. Of course, over here among the Chiefs, there's a feeling that we should have resumed before this. I think, my own feeling is, and I think Cy's [Vance] as well, that we were well advised to continue to pause through Tet in order to allow an ample period of time to elapse for North Vietnam to respond to any one of these several lines of contact and to establish firmly in the minds of our own public and in the minds of the international public that we gave a reasonable time for them to respond. And that reasonable time, in my incline, will elapse with the end of Tet. I think you'll get some criticism if you resume bombing at that point, but unless something develops between now and then I would certainly urge that you do so. That's a week from today or a day or two later.

I had just gotten the memo you had Jack Valenti send me from Arthur Goldberg./3/ I was just reading it. I'll be prepared to comment on it to you later today.

/3/Entitled "Viet Nam Prospects," January 12, it was forwarded to McNamara by Valenti under cover of a January 15 memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075, Vietnam, 1966)

LBJ: I'm rather amazed at the minimum amount of hell-raising that's come forth on the pause. Aren't you?

RSM: Not really. I think that the Republicans read the same poll the rest of us did that showed the wives and mothers of this country don't want war. And they're just scared as hell to come out and say, "He should have started bombing last week." And I noticed Jerry Ford, this morning and yesterday, was very, very careful on this point simply showing the support you have for it in this country.

LBJ: Do you get anything in your cables from Westmoreland or any of his people?

RSM: Yes. It's clear they would like to see it resumed as promptly as possible, although they're being very quiet and very well disciplined, I think. I talked to a number of members of the press in the last week and over the weekend including yesterday, and they're just not getting any bitching, as far as I can tell, from the military either here or in South Vietnam about the extension of the pause.

LBJ: Jack Sutherland told me that he had been to lunch with a General last Friday. He's US News and World Report. I haven't seen it this week. Said he was raising hell and said we were throwing the war away. I didn't ask him what--

RSM: I'm sure there are many that feel that, Mr. President, but I've noticed very, very little reflection of that view in the press attributed to military personnel.

LBJ: Well, do you think then we're going to have a sentiment that will support our resumption if everybody feels this way about it?

RSM: I think so, Mr. President, particularly among the great majority of the people in this country. I think you'll find some foreign leaders will criticize you if you resume bombing on, let's just say the 26th as an illustration. I think Nasser will feel that it would have been wiser to continue the pause. I think probably Aiken and Mansfield and Church and McGovern certainly will feel that way. But I think the great majority of the people in the country will believe that you gave them a reasonable time, over a month, and there was no movement at all on their part.

As a matter of fact, the intelligence information that we get back doesn't indicate that they're even thinking of moving at this point. We haven't yet had any reflection of Shelepin's visit from Moscow and that might throw a somewhat different light on the statement I just made. But no other intelligence source that I've seen indicates that Hanoi is even considering that--moving toward negotiation in order to lead us to extend the pause. I keep thinking they will give some indication of that. It would just seem smart bargaining on their part to do so. They could get a continuation of the pause with very, very little action. Even if they came in with some questions, we'd almost be forced to extend it. But I haven't seen any evidence that they'll move in that direction.

I was so concerned about it that I had brought over here, Friday or Saturday,/4/ the leading British authority on North Vietnam, a man named Honey, Professor Honey,/5/ and he has been following them for years and years and years and we have found him useful in the past, and I talked to him Saturday, as did Cy, and his own analysis was that the balance of power in Hanoi and among the Politburo there is such that it's in the hands of what I'd call hard-liners. And particularly it's in the hands of the First Secretary of the Communist Party, a man named Le Duan, who was in command in the South in 1954 at the time of the Geneva Accords and who always felt that Ho Chi Minh made a serious tactical error at that time. He had the war won. He let himself be negotiated out of it at Geneva. And who today, therefore, is putting considerable pressure on Ho Chi Minh and others to ensure continuing a war that he thinks they either are winning or can win. But in any event, whether that's a proper interpretation or not, and I'm not prepared to say it is, I don't see the signs of movement toward negotiation by them, as much as I have been looking for them and as much as I'd like to see them.

/4/January 14 or 15.

/5/P.J. Honey, author of Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), was a lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London.

LBJ: Do you see any signs of dangerous build-up during this period or that we've sacrificed much?

RSM: I don't, Mr. President. I do see signs of dangerous build-up, but I don't think that it's a result of the pause nor do I think it would have been prevented if we had not had a pause. But, I do definitely see signs of--

LBJ: You sure want to watch that and be prepared on it because I think that's gonna be a campaign issue.

RSM: Mr. President, I'm sure it is. And I think the longer you extend the pause, the more dangerous a campaign issue it becomes.

LBJ: That's right.

RSM: But I am prepared to say that the action they have taken, which has led to this build-up, was decided upon and originated prior to the start of the pause.

LBJ: What about their defections and their desertions?

RSM: Well, we've had an interesting report from a man named Goure,/6/ who works for the Rand Corporation. And we hired the Rand Corporation to go out there and carry on, over a period of months, an extensive interrogation of Viet Cong prisoners and defectors. And his report shows what I think you've heard from other sources. First, that the number of defections has increased substantially, I've forgotten exact figures, but it's on the order of 10,000 for 1965 versus 2,000 for 1964. The 10,000, still being a rather low number of defections from a force that's at least two hundred and some odd thousand, 250,000, in total. And these 10,000 may include Viet Cong sympathizers as well as members of that force. So that it's not a great number, but it's a substantially larger number than in 1964.

/6/Leon Goure. For a summary of a report later in 1966 by Goure on Viet Cong motivation and morale, see Document 198.

Much more important than the number of defectors is the attitude that they reflect of the morale of those who haven't defected. They say, for example, that they're ridden with disease. They're harassed by air. They're constantly forced to move. They have no sanctuary in which they can rest and recuperate. The bases that they formerly used, with the deep underground tunnels and caves, are under constant attack. They never know when they're safe. They find it difficult to obtain hot food. They find it difficult to move. They're short of medicines. The rate of incidence of malaria and other diseases, particularly in the Viet Cong in the highlands, appears to run between 24 and 35 percent. And that many of them are discouraged and many who did believe that they were winning or would win now question whether they will. Now I don't want to indicate to you the morale is shot. I just want to indicate that the pressure that is being applied to them by air and by constant offensive probing by the government and U.S. forces is beginning to appear in morale.

LBJ: What do you hear from the Kennedy boys on this?

RSM: I haven't talked to Teddy. I called him over the holidays to wish him holiday greetings. But, I haven't talked to him since he got back. I have talked to Bobby about it. He was very pleased to see the pause started. I think he feels that we've got to continue to increase our forces there, but that we ought to carry on efforts toward negotiations or some form of non-military settlement. As do I. I think if we resume the bombing, Mr. President, we ought to continue to carry on a number of these diplomatic moves. You remember the suggestion for the Six Nation meeting that came up in your office when Dean Rusk and George were present one day about a week or ten days ago? Well, that kind of action, it seems to me, ought to be initiated even after we resume bombing, if we do.

LBJ: Will Bobby oppose resuming bombing in light of the New York Times? I assume they will. They're gonna oppose anything we do, aren't they?

RSM: Well, I don't know if they'll oppose it. I think they'll say we didn't wait long enough or we didn't handle it right during the intervening period. They may oppose it as well. I talked to Scotty Reston, Friday or Saturday. My impression was that he personally would oppose it. While--

LBJ: Oppose the resumption?

RSM: Oppose the resumption.

LBJ: What's his thinking?

RSM: Well, it just isn't militarily effective and therefore by continuing the pause you don't suffer a military penalty and you may obtain a political advantage.

LBJ: That's not correct, though. You think you do suffer a military penalty don't you?

RSM: I think you suffer a military penalty in the sense, Mr. President, they can carry on the war in the South at a lower cost to their society. It doesn't cost them nearly as much to infiltrate the men and the equipment without our bombing as it does with our bombing. And I am absolutely certain in my own mind, beyond that, that the bombing represents a political pressure which we benefit from. The very fact that we're talking about negotiation, the very fact that the Soviets put pressure on them, and other nations of the world have put pressure on them, is a result of our bombing, which pressure would not have been put on them if we hadn't had the bombing. The bombing represents something we can give up in return for something they'll do at some point. Apparently, this isn't the point.

LBJ: Tell me about the women out there, Bob. I'm getting some--The Post is starting nagging at me.

RSM: The lack of women?

LBJ: Yeah. In the services. There ain't nothing but nurses. Say that you won't let any of the WACs go, or any of the WAVEs go, or any of the rest of them. You reckon' we can sprinkle any of them out there?

RSM: Frankly, the question of WAVEs and WACs hasn't been brought to me, Mr. President. I would oppose it. I think it would just cause a tremendous amount of unrest and trouble. We won't let the wives go out there, of officers or enlisted men or diplomatic personnel. And to introduce WAVEs and WACS, in the first place, they don't add anything in the way of efficiency to the operation. In the second place, they require a lot of special quarters and special handling. In the third place, it causes morale problems because of apparent discrimination. The wives in Bangkok are just sore as hell that there are wives of civilian employees and female employees out there. And beyond that, the wives of foreign diplomats allied with us, for example, the Australian diplomats, are allowed in Saigon and they take pictures of young American women in the area and they wonder what their husbands are doing. It seems to me that to send WAVEs and WACs will simply accentuate that problem. And I haven't felt any pressure for it. As a matter of fact, none of the serv-ices have even raised the question with me, but I'll look into it.

LBJ: No. No, I wouldn't stir it up. But, they're raising hell with me and I assume that it's coming from, they say, some Major Bonnie somebody at the Air Force, whatever they are, I guess WACs, Air Force, whatever you call 'em. I asked [indecipherable] told me they didn't want them unless they were a nurse; say they got about 250-300 nurses.

RSM: Well, I noticed an article or two a week or so ago about it. I didn't follow it up then because I just wanted to let sleeping dogs lie on this thing. But I can do so anytime.

LBJ: No, I think we'll just let it go. I'll tell them. I got a question in a press conference about it, and said they were very distressed, from a lady at The Washington Post. So I just anticipated I'd get that. Do you think we ought to have a meeting? When's Dean coming back? Do you know?

RSM: He should be back tomorrow, I believe. He's stopping in the Philippines yesterday.

LBJ: Are we doing everything we can now with the Philippines and with the Koreans to get them to come in?

RSM: Yes we are, Mr. President.

LBJ: Got any indication they're gonna come?

RSM: Well, the Koreans at least. There's no question but what the Koreans will come. It's just a matter of price. And they turned in a request for several hundred million, it's about $600-$700 million worth of cumshaw that they wanted from us in order to send that division. Both State and we have refused that and have gone back with an instruction to the Ambassador to negotiate the movement of the division in return for what amounts to something on the order of $70 million worth of extra equipment and payments. But Westmoreland didn't ask for the division to be landed in South Vietnam until about July. So we've got reasonable time to work that out. He won't be ready to have them until then. He does want a brigade by some time in April and that's our first requirement there for him.

In the case of the Philippines, the problem's more complicated by the fact that the President's just come in. He's trying to get his government organized. We're not making nearly the progress there that we are in the case of Korea. But, in Korea we're talking about an additional, maybe, 17,000 men. In the case of the Philippines, we're talking about a couple of thousand. So, it's much more important that we push on Korea than the Philippines, but we must have some Philippine contribution as well. They're talking about construction engineers at the moment, military construction engineers.

LBJ: The Germans coming through with anything?

RSM: Not a damn thing except the hospital ship. The Ambassador came in the other day and asked if the hospital ship was satisfactory as the substitute for combat troops and I told him absolutely not. I don't think it's going to make any difference to him, having said that. But at least I didn't think we ought to give in after the strong efforts you made to get combat units. I told him that you had personally asked the Chancellor for a medical unit and a combat construction battalion, done it twice in my presence, and I saw absolutely no excuse whatsoever for their failure to send it. Well, he didn't indicate they would.

[Here follows discussion of base closings, the deferment of authorized military construction funds, and the Springfield Armory.]

LBJ: I'm gonna rely on you heavily now in this decision this next week. I think you know where my leanings are and how I feel about it, and except for you, I doubt we'd have gone on as long as we have gone and I'm not sorry for it at all. I want to be patient and understanding and reasonable. On the other hand, I think you know my natural inclinations. You were down there when we made the decision. But I sure do want you to start building your case for a resumption and be able to discuss it before we really make the decision so I get every angle of it.

RSM: Right, right.

LBJ: OK.

27. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-41-66

Washington, January 18, 1966.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 54, Folder B, "Joint Staff Papers, 1965-66." Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Air Operations Against North Vietnam (NVN) (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in JCSM-16-66, dated 8 January 1966,/2/ forwarded to you their recommendation to resume offensive air operations against North Vietnam (NVN). They consider these operations a principal element of our strategy in Southeast Asia. This memorandum provides their recommendations for the conduct of offensive air operations when resumed.

/2/Document 13.

2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the air strike program against NVN, taking into account the recent views of CINCPAC. They have concluded that restrained air strikes against the north, as conducted thus far, will not achieve the primary military objective of causing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to cease its support and direction of the aggression in South Vietnam (SVN). The piecemeal nature of the attacks against the DRV has permitted the enemy greater freedom to replenish and disperse his stocks, redirect the flow of materials, and improve his defenses. The geographic restrictions and limitation on the number of armed reconnaissance sorties authorized have limited effective interdiction of the extensive rail, highway, and inland waterway LOCs. Moreover, these restrictions and the requirement for single coordinated attacks on specified targets have exposed our forces to greater risks.

3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that offensive air operations against NVN should be resumed now with a sharp blow and thereafter maintained with uninterrupted, increasing pressure. This course of action, as recommended in JCSM-982-64, dated 23 November 1964,/3/ offers the best probability of achieving our objectives at the least risk, casualties, and cost and with the least probability of enemy miscalculation. These operations should be conducted in such a manner and be of sufficient magnitude to: deny the DRV large-scale external assistance; destroy those resources already in NVN which contribute most to the support of aggression; destroy or deny use of military facilities; and harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and materials into SVN.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 932-935.

4. (TS) The denial of external assistance to NVN requires closing of the ports as well as sustained interdiction of land LOCs from China. Approximately 67 per cent of all imports in 1965 entered NVN through seaports (principally Haiphong). Military considerations would dictate that mining be conducted now; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the sensitivity of such a measure and recognize that precise timing must take into account political factors. Moreover, present sanctuaries should be reduced to permit more flexibility in interdicting major LOCs and striking key military targets.

5. (TS) The destruction of resources already in NVN would include the entire POL bulk and dispersed storage, distribution, and transportation system which contributes directly to the movement of supplies to the south. Large military facilities in the northern part of NVN would be destroyed. An intensified armed reconnaissance program, without sortie limitation, would be mounted to harass, disrupt, and attrite the dispersed supply and transport activities which have been identified through detailed intelligence analysis. Day and night air operations would concentrate on LOC centers, predicted traffic flow areas, transshipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC exits from the DRV. Electric power would be disrupted in order to hamper command and control as well as bring home to the DRV leadership and populace the heavy price of continuing the war. As in the past, these attacks would be designed to minimize civilian casualties and damage to population centers.

6. (TS) The increasing DRV air capability is a continuing threat to the security of our military forces and should be destroyed. In the execution of the air campaign, continuous surveillance of DRV airfields would be maintained. The neutralization of these airfields must be authorized whenever interference with our planned air operations, or offensive air actions against our military forces in SVN, is initiated. Further, the operational commander must be furnished the authority to deal with the SAM threat, as required to prevent interference with planned air operations.

7. (TS) Operations against additional target systems would be the subject of separate authorizations as the air campaign develops.

8. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the likelihood of adverse international reaction in response to sharply intensified air strikes and particularly to mining of the DRV ports. However, they believe that responsible Free World leadership will understand the necessity for these actions. Recognized also is the possibility of Communist China's direct entry into the war either through miscalculation or gradual escalation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that continued US restraint may serve to increase rather than decrease the likelihood of such intervention by encouraging gradual responses on the part of the Chinese Communists. This is in addition to the probable interpretation of such restraint as US vacillation by both the Communist and Free World leadership.

9. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that:

a. The authorized area for offensive air operations be expanded to include all of NVN less the area encompassed by a ten-mile radius around Hanoi/Phuc Yen Airfield, a four-mile radius around Haiphong, and a twenty-mile China buffer zone. Exceptions to permit selected strikes within these restricted areas, in accordance with the air campaign described herein, will be conducted only as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Numerical sortie limitations on armed reconnaissance in NVN be removed.

c. No tactical restrictions or limitations be imposed upon the execution of the specific air strikes.

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff be authorized to direct CINCPAC to conduct an air campaign against the DRV as described herein. Upon your approval of the above concept, a JCS directive of execution to CINCPAC will be prepared and submitted to you separately for approval.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.

28. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 19, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret; Limited Distribution. In his January 20 covering memorandum forwarding Bell's report to the President, McGeorge Bundy stated: "I think you will find it well worth reading all the way through. I agree with nearly all of it, and so does Bob McNamara." (Ibid.) See Document 15 for Bell's oral report to the President on his trip.

SUBJECT
Non-military aspects of the effort in Vietnam--January 1966

I spent the period January 1 to 5 in Vietnam, accompanied by Chet Cooper of the White House staff, Rud Poats and others of A.I.D., and Dick Cooper of the Bureau of Economic Affairs in State. We concentrated on the problems of inflation, port congestion, and the pacification of the countryside. Our principal conclusions and recommendations are reported in this memorandum. I would be glad to amplify them in any way you may wish.

1. Pacification/Rural Construction.

Now that the introduction of U.S. troops has arrested a deteriorating military position, the highest priority problem in Vietnam, in my opinion, is to develop a tested and reliable system for "pacifying" the countryside. "Pacification" means, once major VC or NVN military units have been swept from an area, to establish effective local security against terrorism, to identify and eliminate the hidden VC cells (the "invisible government"), to establish effective institutions of local government including means for popular participation, and to commence solid programs of economic and social development (education, health, agricultural improvement, etc.).

The joint GVN-US objectives in Vietnam require a steady widening of the "pacified" areas, behind the shield of military protection. And yet it is a striking and melancholy fact that no significant progress has been made in pacification for the past several years, despite a great deal of effort.

Now a new effort is underway under the title of "rural construction." In some ways the new effort is more promising than anything that has gone before: it has good leadership and backing within the GVN, and is based on more realistic plans and timetables than anything tried previously. There is as yet, however, no basis for optimism. The pacification task is inherently very complex and difficult and will require years to complete under the best conditions. The new effort is still almost entirely on paper. And neither the GVN nor the U.S. approach to the pacification effort, in my opinion, is yet strong enough or well enough organized to get the job done.

In view of the importance of this subject, I attach to this memorandum as Annex A/2/ a fuller discussion of the present situation.

/2/Attached but not printed.

In summary, my recommendations are:

--that higher priority--second only to that given the seeking out and destruction of major enemy troop units--be given to the pacification program by all U.S. elements in Vietnam;

--that, since all elements of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam are necessarily involved in pacification, a single point of responsibility be established in the Mission for managing the U.S. effort in support of the GVN rural construction program. My own suggestion for accomplishing this is to assign this responsibility to Ambassador Porter as his first priority assignment. Under this concept, Ambassador Porter, supported by a small staff and working with the heads of the country team units (MAC/V, A.I.D., JUSPAO, etc.), would be responsible for preparing integrated plans and schedules for the various action programs and, when they have been approved by Ambassador Lodge, for supervising their execution. (In preliminary discussions of this recommendation in Saigon, General Westmoreland and Mr. Mann expressed agreement with it, and Ambassador Lodge seemed to receive it favorably.);

--that, in view of the experimental nature of the pacification effort at present and the need to develop as soon as possible a proven system, a strong, continuing program of evaluation and analysis be undertaken with the objective of building a tested doctrine for Vietnamese pacification. I would suggest that this should include a thorough review of progress and problems in Saigon at least once a quarter, with high level participation each time from Washington. Ambassador Porter has been asked for a first report of this type on March 31st.

2. Economic problems of the war effort.

With the step-up in the scale of fighting and the involvement of more U.S. troops over the last nine months, the economic situation has changed radically--from a position of some underemployment of resources and relative price stability to one of severe shortages of resources, particularly of skilled labor, and strong inflationary pressures which have already resulted in price increases on the order of 40 per cent since the beginning of 1965. The prospects are for even stronger inflationary pressures this year, stemming from large GVN budget deficits, more spending by U.S. troops, and a larger military construction program, and for even greater pressure on scarce resources--labor, transportation facilities, etc. Remedial action of at least three kinds is required.

(1) There is now serious port congestion in Saigon and in the coastal ports. The latter problem should be short lived; actions now underway are expected within three or four months to enable the coastal ports to handle the anticipated traffic.

The port of Saigon is a different matter. There is agreement in the U.S. country team on the steps that are necessary to enlarge the capacity of the port of Saigon, but these steps will require strong and continuous managerial energy in the GVN, which is not now in sight. Accordingly, with Ambassador Lodge's approval, I recommended to Prime Minister Ky that he name a single, strong port manager, reporting directly to him, with sufficient authority to get the job done. The U.S. would name a single senior U.S. adviser to the port manager, who would have such staff as he needed and who would have authority over both the MAC/V and A.I.D. resources needed to improve port efficiency.

The Prime Minister accepted this recommendation in principle. If he carries it out, there will still be needed steady and continuing effort over a period of months to raise the capacity of the port to what is required. And beyond the problem of port expansion as such there will be further difficult problems of warehousing, internal transport, and other logistics elements.

(2) A strong and vigorously executed anti-inflation program will be necessary for the foreseeable future to prevent what could become a runaway inflation. The GVN leaders are seriously concerned, as they should be, by this prospect, and Bui Diem gave me unequivocal assurances, "speaking for the Prime Minister," that the government intends to do whatever is necessary to meet the problem.

The GVN has already taken the most important single step in an anti-inflation program, namely, to decide on an austerity expenditure budget for 1966. While I was in Saigon, a number of additional steps were agreed on: raising GVN taxes, requiring advance deposits of piasters by importers, eliminating the grace period on customs duty payments, increasing government bond sales, and at least doubling the rate of imports financed by the GVN and by our economic aid (both A.I.D. and P.L. 480). Moreover, General Westmoreland has been most cooperative in seeking ways to limit troop spending on the Vietnam market, and to limit the impact on the Vietnamese economy of the military construction program.

Nevertheless, GVN and U.S. economists are agreed that the meas-ures adopted thus far are not sufficient to hold price increases during 1966 to a reasonable figure (say 20-25 per cent). We discussed with the GVN a number of possible monetary measures, some of them rather unorthodox, which might help, but could not reach agreement on proposals which promised both to be useful and to be politically acceptable.

Accordingly, it is necessary to regard the inflation problem as unfinished business, and to keep working urgently with the GVN to reach agreement on a sufficient program.

(3) The underlying problem of resource allocation also remains a very important one for which neither GVN nor U.S. programs and actions are yet strong enough. On the GVN side, the government is roughly in the position of trying to run a war without a War Production Board or a War Manpower Commission. The overall demands on men and on material are not gathered in one place, examined in relation to each other, and the hard choices made of what to eliminate when it is plain that not all demands can be met. (For example, I was told that little progress can be expected on land reform this year because the technical men in the Department of Agriculture needed to carry on the work have been drafted into the army or have gone to work for construction companies--not as a result of conscious decision as to priorities but simply the haphazard working of the present system. The same is true of our village health station program.)

On the U.S. side there are the beginnings of arrangements to deal with issues of resource allocation, principally country team committees to consider competing demands on the ports and on construction materials and skilled labor. Stronger arrangements will clearly be needed both in the GVN and in the U.S. country team. I suggest:

--that a small staff be established in the U.S. country team to study anticipated requirements and availabilities for key resources, and to propose means for enlarging resources and for allocating scarce items according to proper priorities;

--that the U.S. country team develop a proposal for establishing staff and organizational arrangements in the GVN to deal with problems of resource mobilization and allocation.

3. As one means for improving the non-military aspects of the U.S. program in Vietnam, I discussed with Ambassador Lodge the idea of sending high-level teams from the United States to examine our work in such fields as agriculture, education, and health. Such teams could achieve three valuable results:

--to provide expert appraisals of our present programs and recommendations for improvement--particularly as to how these non-military activities can better support the pacification/rural construction effort;

--to emphasize to senior GVN officials the importance of these non-military fields and the nature of the program they ought to be supporting;

--to re-emphasize the importance that the U.S. gives to these fields.

As you know, the Ambassador agreed with the idea of sending out such teams, provided their trips were carefully prepared and focused on what it is practical to do in Vietnam under present circumstances. While I was in Saigon, the Ambassador discussed with the GVN the proposed visit of the first such team, to be headed by Secretary Freeman. GVN officials welcomed the proposed visit, which is now planned for sometime in February.

I recommend that we plan now to send further teams in the field of education (headed perhaps by Assistant Secretary Keppel) and in the field of health (headed perhaps by Dr. Boisfeullot Jones of Atlanta and by Assistant Secretary Philip Lee of HEW). The possibility of additional teams could be examined in the light of the experience gained in sending these three.

4. A few miscellaneous observations.

(1) I visited three camps for refugees--one at Hoi An, south of Danang, and two at Qui Nhon--and talked at length with the A.I.D. people in charge of refugees nationwide. At present, the number of refugees is fairly static at around 400,000 in recognized camps, with some still arriving but some also returning to their villages or becoming resettled in urban areas. All are receiving food and are under shelter. Much remains to be done to provide schooling for the children, training for adults, and assistance in resettlement.

(2) At Averell Harriman's request I looked into the matter of help and advice to other free world aid donors. In order to improve our performance in this area, the A.I.D. Mission is now establishing a special office whose sole job will be to act as liaison with other donors--to offer advice on the kinds of aid that will be most valuable, to arrange for logistic support for aid teams from other free world countries, etc.

(3) I talked with staff of A.I.D., Embassy, and General Lansdale's group about the problem of economic warfare, that is, the effort to deny medicines, food, and other items to the VC. This is a very complex problem on which the combined U.S. Mission is beginning to focus. We are proposing to assign an experienced senior officer to work full time on this task, which will require strong coordinated efforts by the police, the military, and the economic agencies in Vietnam.

(4) The A.I.D. Mission in Vietnam is being expanded rapidly from about 650 Americans to around 900-1000. It is by far the largest A.I.D. mission in the world, and has a much faster-moving, more operational set of responsibilities than most other missions. We are striving hard to find the executives we need, by reassignment from within A.I.D., by borrowing from DOD, by recruiting from outside. We have not yet caught up with the workload, and I expect that for months to come our top management in Saigon will be spread very thin. This is basically the result of the fact that A.I.D. has less of a career personnel system than any of the other U.S. agencies in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, I was for the most part impressed and pleased with the calibre of the A.I.D. personnel in Vietnam. We agreed on some replacements while I was there, and on some improved and simplified organizational arrangements. My present judgment is that if we are careful not to add low priority assignments to their present workload, the A.I.D. Mission in Vietnam will be able to carry out its assignments successfully.

David E. Bell

29. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 19, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7 p.m. on January 19, noting in his covering memorandum that he agreed that it was right to follow up quickly Hanoi's approach to Souvanna but that he thought that Ball "somewhat overstates its significance." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Possible Signal from Hanoi

Many of us have believe that at the last moment before the Communists think we may resume bombing, Hanoi will try to muddy the water by an ambiguous response. It is possible that this is now occurring through Vientiane.

Souvanna Phouma has told Ambassador Sullivan that the North Vietnamese Charge approached him on Monday/2/ to deliver a demarche under instructions from Hanoi./3/ This demarche consisted of four general headings, two of which related directly to our fourteen points:

/2/January 17.

/3/Sullivan reported on the approach to Souvanna in telegrams 773 and 774 from Vientiane, January 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

a. The DRV cannot accept the accusation that their troops are guilty of aggression, since there are no DRV troops in SVN (Point 13).

b. Peace can only be restored if the people are permitted to exercise free choice concerning their political and social future. There can be no free choice while US troops remain in the South (Point 8).

c. The US will never leave the South because of its agreement with Saigon and the extension of SEATO protection to the South.

d. The DRV denies any violation of Laos territory by the sending of 4,500 troops per month over the Ho Chi Minh trail. Again, there are no DRV troops in SVN.

Souvanna asked the Charge why he did not make these points directly to the Americans. The Charge replied that Souvanna was particularly familiar with Indochinese affairs. Souvanna then asked whether the North Vietnamese wished him to act as intermediary between Hanoi and the Americans. The Charge replied that he would seek further instructions on this point.

Souvanna raised the question as to Sullivan's authority to participate in a meeting directly between Sullivan and the Charge. Sullivan has asked for instructions and we have authorized him to talk with the Charge if Souvanna arranges it. Our telegram to Sullivan is attached at Tab A./4/

/4/Attached but not printed. The message was transmitted in telegram 478 to Vientiane, January 19. (Ibid.)

Why This May Be Hanoi's Response to Our Peace Offensive

There are several reasons it is logical for Hanoi to approach us through Souvanna:

1. It would be consistent with past conduct to use an Asian. In 1950 Peiping communicated to us regarding Korea through an Asian, the Indian Ambassador Panikkar, rather than through Eastern European Communist allies or neutrals.

2. A communication through Vientiane is less likely to be listened in on by the Soviets or Chinese than a communication through Moscow or one of the Eastern European capitals.

3. Communications with Hanoi from Vientiane are quicker and more secure than from Rangoon since the ICC plane goes back and forth three times a fortnight.

4. The North Vietnamese know Bill Sullivan since he was at the Geneva Conference of 1962. They also know that Averell Harriman (also associated with the 1962 Conference) was recently in Vientiane.

5. Since our pause began Sullivan has reported that the North Vietnamese Charge has twice made friendly social noises to him.

The Content of the Message

The Charge's message is significant in that it is addressed to our Fourteen Points. (Peiping has publicly denounced this formulation with the phrase "to hell with the Fourteen Points.")

The most interesting point in the message is that there can be no free choice (meaning quite possibly free elections) until American troops are withdrawn. We have never taken a position on the timing of troop withdrawal but have insisted only that conditions must first be created and guarantees provided under which elections can be held free of all outside interference.

The question of our withdrawal prior to elections has been very much on Hanoi's mind as the following facts disclose:

1. The Polish ICC representative, who was in Hanoi on January 10 to 11, is reported by an authoritative Western source to have said that Shelepin had tried to persuade the Hanoi Government that unification should come about in two stages.

Under the Soviet plan the first stage would be an election in South Viet-Nam in which all representative parties including the Liberation Front would participate in the creation of a new government.

The second stage would be an election in which both North and South Viet-Nam would determine the issue of reunification.

The Hanoi leaders reportedly told Shelepin that they disagreed with this two-stage approach but put special emphasis on the United States desire to take part in the supervision of elections.

2. The fact that the Polish ICC representative was in Hanoi and purported to know about the Shelepin proposal suggests that the Poles may have participated in planning--or at least were familiar with--the approach that the DRV has now made to Souvanna. This may explain the implication in Rapacki's conversation on January 18 with Ambassador Gronouski that something was moving on which he could not comment./5/

/5/Gronouski reported on this conversation in telegram 1172 from Warsaw, January 18. (Ibid.)

3. On January 16, the DRV official newspaper, Nhan Dan, discussed the issue of troop withdrawal in a manner similar to that employed by the Charge to Souvanna:

"Everyone knows that there can be peace and free elections in South Viet-Nam only when American troops have withdrawn from there. . . . US troops would never get out of South Viet-Nam or they would withdraw only on condition that the elections in South Viet-Nam are held under the US aggressors' control and will lead to the domination of South Viet-Nam by their lackeys."

Where Do We Go From Here?

Ambassador Kohler has asked for an appointment with the North Vietnamese Charge in Moscow./6/ He has been advised of Souvanna's conversation in Vientiane but we are instructing him not to mention it unless the other side raises the question. If in fact Hanoi has selected Vientiane as the channel of their choice we do not wish to confuse the situation.

/6/See Documents 25 and 37 regarding Kohler's contacts with the DRV in Moscow.

Certainly what has been said through Souvanna so far offers no basis for a solid dialogue. It is possible, however, that it may be the prelude either to the opening of conversations through Souvanna or a direct exchange between Sullivan and the North Vietnamese Charge. We are giving Sullivan full instructions in the event such an exchange becomes possible.

As you will see from Tab A Sullivan will suggest that Souvanna go back to the DRV Charge promptly in the hope that we can get clearer evidence within the next two or three days whether the North Vietnamese Government is serious or just trying to confuse the situation.

George W. Ball

[end of document]

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