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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield/1/

Washington, June 10, 1966, 8:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.16, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Here follows discussion of several topics, including Vietnam and Senator Dirksen.]

LBJ: What do you think about Vietnam?

MM: Well, I'm not happy about it any more than you are.

LBJ: No. Nobody is.

MM: I was a little bit disturbed by Lodge's first paragraph in his weekly report/2/ to you about heavier bombing which I assumed meant the Haiphong-Hanoi complex or was leading up to it. I think it would be a serious mistake because those places have been evacuated to a degree except for industrial needs so there won't be much damage hurt. But you've got Giap with his 320,000-330,000 man army waiting and if you knocked him out of there he'd say, "What the hell. We've got nothing to lose. Let's go." And they won't come down in divisional strength. They'll just disperse those divisions into guerrilla units, and it will be awfully hard for us to maintain the ratio needed. As far as petroleum is concerned, I don't think it plays a hell of a lot in the life of the Viet Cong, or the Vietnamese rather. As far as mining or blockading Haiphong Harbor is concerned, you've got more stuff going out of Haiphong than going in. Very little is coming in at Haiphong. The ships have been reduced considerably. What British ships are left are usually under Hong Kong registry and are struck maybe under the ownership of the Communists. You run up against other nations and here the situation is already difficult; you make it more difficult. It's just a hell of a can of worms. If you really go at'em, this could turn into an open-ended war and other countries would begin to criticize us more than they are at the present.

/2/Document 153.

LBJ: I think that nearly everybody--well, they're not gonna mine anything and they're not gonna bomb any industrial complex. What they're gonna try to do is take out the POLs. They find the petroleum supply is almost double what it was last year--their needs are; and their supplies are stored there. And they're trying to get rid of that storage and disperse it. And they're scattering it around where we can't get to it with the individual bombs. They're puttin' it underground and puttin' it in concrete and they won't take it out before it's all gone. And they're just about to walk out on it. They think it's a tragic mistake not to destroy that petroleum that's supplying ten thousand trucks that are coming down now. It's in the edge. It's kinda like Mt. Vernon, Alexandria, Arlington, and Washington, DC I seem to be the only one that's afraid that they'll hit the United States Capitol or hit a hospital or hit a school or something. They don't think so. But I see so many of these airplanes that get off all the time--like this B-70 thing. They just constantly make mistakes.

MM: Yes. And you don't know when these planes will fly over to China--two or three or four already.

LBJ: Oh, they do that. They do that. They do that. I don't think that'll be a problem here, but just as they do get off over there they're liable to get off here. And if they get off one little inch here you could drop a bomb on a school or on a hospital and that's quite different from the oil. Now, the experts say that the oil is not going to infuriate or inflame them more than the bridges that we're taking out running to China now. That is about as big a needle as we can put in them, what we're doing now. But the oil is so much more important because they gotta have it for their trucks--and then now, we've got their light plant knocked out and they knocked out one of ours yesterday, too--that we've got to take out the oil. Now we just keep delaying these decisions for various reasons. It's somebody going on a mission. This time Rusk is in Brussels--you can't do it. When you get back we've got another fellow going to Hanoi. And things of that kind that it's pretty hard to do this while this is going on 'cause they'll say that you do it. But the military and the fellows out there, Westmoreland, just feel like that you're just lettin' 'em shoot our men unnecessarily. That you ought to stop this--you ought to make it as difficult--we can't stop it, but make it as difficult for them to get supplies as possible or you ought'n to be in there. And that's another thing. None of them think you can get out this year. They all think that while they just--the casualties are hell, like hell. They killed several hundred yesterday in one raid. We just give 'em a mopping up every time we meet 'em. They nevertheless think that we're gonna be there all year.

MM: Well, I think so. I wish it was only for just a year, Mr. President, but I'm afraid it may be longer unless there's a break somewhere in between.

[Here follows a brief discussion of peace negotiations.]

155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret. Komer sent copies of the attachment to Rostow and Taylor under a June 17 covering memorandum in which he stated that the President was "strongly in favor" of his proposals. (Ibid.)

Here's my think-piece on where to go from here on the civil side. It's long but every word counts, so I hope you'll plow through it.

I've shown it only to Bob McNamara (since it's his ox I want to gore, I thought this only fair). He said to tell you he "strongly supports" it, which made me feel I'm on the track.

The key point is that neither Porter in Saigon nor the civilian agencies are thinking boldly enough or pushing hard enough to galvanize the civil side. Porter needs a pep talk (McNamara and I will give him one too) and to be told that it's his job to take hold and run the civil side (not just understudy Lodge).

We've laid on the first meeting with Porter for 11 a.m. Thursday/2/ (followed by impromptu press conference), then later perhaps the Congressional briefing you had in mind (by Monday I hope we could crow about devaluation). Is the attached war plan generally in accord with your views?

/2/June 16.

Yes
No/3/

/3/The President checked neither of these options and instead wrote: "See me, L."

R. W. Komer

Attachment

Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson

Washington, June 14, 1966.

Before you talk with Porter,/4/ here are the ideas which I am slowly maturing as I grab hold on Vietnam.

/4/The President met with Porter and Komer from 11:10 to 11:45 a.m. on June 16. Leonhart and Zorthian joined the meeting for 10 minutes at 11:35 a.m No record of the discussion has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

I. The civil side--our "other war"--is even more central than I had realized. Indeed it may be the critical determinant of success or failure in Vietnam. Our military buildup has already reversed the trend toward defeat. As it continues, we can seize the initiative even more and outmatch any increase in Hanoi's infiltration. We can also selectively increase our direct pressure on Hanoi. But I doubt that we can definitively contain the guerrilla threat primarily by military means. We can chase the VC and PAVN around the countryside, maul them when we catch them, and weaken their resolve. Yet without a major pacification effort to secure the countryside and give Vietnam's war-weary people a sense of hope as well as security, this military process could be well nigh endless--and infinitely more costly.

We also have to cope with a likely prolongation of the political turmoil of the last few months. The Buddhist extremists may have been balked for the moment, but we are committed to a democratic process which--necessary as it is--will create perhaps as much instability in the short run as it offers hope in the longer run.

This leaves the pacification-social reform side of the equation. I suspect that only through an effort in this field, more fully complementary to our military effort can we achieve success.

II. The Problem of Scale. So far I haven't said anything new. You and your advisors signed on to the above in Honolulu. What may be new, however, is my growing conviction that we are not thinking big enough, or moving fast enough, on the civil side to complement our military effort adequately--or achieve reasonably quick results.

Some crude comparisons of scale are instructive. We are spending perhaps $15-18 billion on the military side and only $700-800 million on the civil side. We've deployed about 300,000 troops compared to about 3,000 civilians. The ARVN contribution is about 700,000 (plus around 80,000 Vietnamese working for defense construction, etc.) while the GVN civil servants, police, cadre, etc. number on the order of 250,000. Of course, such gross comparisons are misleading--but they illustrate the basic point.

Moreover, Porter and I have so far concentrated (and I think rightly so) on essential measures to prevent disaster, and to provide basic building blocks for a future civil effort:

A. Coping with inflation, created largely by our own buildup, was Problem No. 1, because left unchecked it could undermine the country. With luck, we're on the verge of real success:--(1) if Ky goes through with devaluation, it will be a major step; (2) if DOD actually limits the local impact of our buildup to end-FY 1966 levels, we'll at least prevent a whole new inflationary thrust--though we'll still have the existing one; (3) a variety of steps--including military takeover of Saigon port--should reduce port and inland distribution bottlenecks so that we can keep supply more in phase with demand.

B. We are also reforming and streamlining the aid program to reduce corruption, increase efficiency, and meet growing Hill and press criticism.

C. We have underway a doubling of RD cadre output--the most promising rural pacification device--and are energizing the new Ministry of Revolutionary Development (clearly the best outfit in an otherwise feeble GVN).

III. Need for an Expanded Effort. But the above is far from enough. We've prevented economic collapse, and this in itself is good. But we aren't going anywhere fast. If we continue along present lines, and at the present pace, it may be years before we generate a major positive impact So we've got to think bigger on the civil side:

A. Even at the accelerated rate, the cadre and RD program will take years to blanket the countryside. It lags far behind in ability to secure and hold what US and ARVN forces can initially clear. The police program is also too small and unambitious for its internal security mission.

B. As Orville Freeman will attest, it's incredible that in 11 years in a rural country, even during wartime, we've accomplished so little in agriculture.

C. Our overall economic aid program is not big enough--or good enough--to permit more than slow progress. It will only suffice to feed the people, help contain inflation, keep such little industry as exists going, prevent epidemics, slowly expand basic education. Nonetheless, AID is programming little more for FY 1967 than for FY 1966. Nor could AID, as presently organized, spend much more efficiently. It was never set up to run massive logistic, relief, and rural construction programs in a war-torn country with little infrastructure left, and to do so through a feeble "government" which works fitfully at best. AID has on board only 2,900 plus of the 3,900 US and local employees called for, and at the present rate of recruiting won't reach strength for another year or two. Nor is 3,900 probably enough.

In sum, while we've accomplished a good deal since Honolulu, especially in containing inflation, the rest of civil side is still barely off the ground, and not going anywhere fast.

IV. My Solution. I don't want to argue for grand schemes which can't realistically be achieved in the short term. But a substantial gearing up of civil programs is (a) essential; (b) can be achieved fairly quickly by such measures as temporary turnover to our more efficient military of functions AID just can't do as well ; and (c) would pay greater return per dollar and man invested than almost any other US investment in Vietnam:

A. Administrative Steps. There is still too much "business as usual" on the civil side, both in Washington and the field. This will take time to correct; the lead time needed for most "civilian" enterprises seems to be two or three times longer than it would take our military to do the job. So if we want quick results, there is no substitute for borrowing from DOD. I'm fortified in this by a strong suspicion that borrowing say two percent of its Vietnam assets (less than one percent of its manpower) could give us a much higher percentage of improvement on the civil side. And this would be in the military's own interest as well as the nation's.

1. So my first proposal is to turn over more civil logistics functions to the military. AID is simply not geared up to the unfamiliar task of providing at least half the needs of a civil economy in wartime. Unlike its operations in other countries (where it works through a halfway decent local government and infrastructure) AID has to do just about everything in Vietnam--from managing the whole import program, scheduling ships, improving port facilities, and clearing goods to distributing them in-country. AID has sought to go about this by setting up a roughly parallel logistics organization to that of our military. But the lead time needed is great and AID is understandably less efficient. Hence my solution is for our military to provide temporarily as many logistic services as it can do more efficiently by simple extension of its existing machinery, e.g. take over scheduling of AID shipping, Saigon port, the bulk of in-country transport, medical supply, etc. Otherwise we just won't get the job done soon enough. Then, when AID has shaken down it can plan in orderly fashion to take over again later.

2. Strengthen Porter's mandate. Though you put Porter in charge of Vietnam civil programs, he is still kept far too busy running the Embassy to devote more than part-time to it (Lodge confines himself mainly to high policy). Porter must be freed to do the civil job--more than enough for any one man--and get others to run the Embassy. Porter also needs a good chief of staff and more staff of his own, as he's now coming to realize. At present he has only a part-time Colonel from MACV; its contribution needs to be upgraded.

3. We need better coordination of the civil and military efforts. We are still running two wars, even though the military makes a major contribution to the civil side. I may be wrong, but I sense that Westy may be devoted too much to search and destroy, and not enough to slower moving clear-and-hold operations, to preventing the siphoning off of civil resources to the VC, and to helping the pacification effort. Rice control is a good example. The Delta delivered 700,000 tons of rice to the cities in 1963. This year we expect to get only 260,000 tons. We 're meeting this shocking deficit by importing PL 480 rice--and maybe this is right. But Porter and Westy ought to be working harder on control of this key resource--for example by pressuring General Quang in IV Crops. At present the Vietnamese economy is feeding the VC and Cambodia, while we feed the cities.

B. Gearing up the Civil Side. Once we relieve AID of matters it can't handle efficiently, we can get it focussed better on the problems which only it can manage. Here are the actions I think needed--not AID's alone--for the purpose:

1. Expansion of RD Ministry Operations. This most promising of the GVN ministries needs more US support. There are complaints of shortages of men, cement, and concertina wire from the provinces. Let's ship in more. Let's start planning now for CY 1967--civil agencies rarely plan ahead. And we must help the GVN strengthen its village and hamlet administration.

2. Further Expansion of Cadre and Police. We have planning exercises underway at least, but they will entail an argument over civil vs. military use of manpower. My proposal is to have the argument now, in the shape of discussion of a manpower budget, which will provide a framework for more rational US/GVN manpower use (and hopefully more manpower for the civil side).

3. Expand the US civil advisory role at district level. We don't really know enough about what's happening at the cutting edge down in the village or even district. Instead we're dependent on what the Vietnamese tell us (which is notoriously unreliable). MACV is the only US agency with advisors below the province (roughly two captains and three sergeants at district headquarters). Of course, these MACV advisors spend much of their time on pacification matters. But this is not their primary function. So if we want to expand operations in the critical countryside, and monitor effectively what is done there, we need people with primary civil side duties at district too. But we can't recruit civilians fast enough for even the province level vacancies as yet. Once again my solution is quick and dirty--borrow temporarily from MACV three bright young captains and sergeants to work primarily to pacification in each of the 200 odd districts where our people can now function. This adds up to only about 600, who could be kept in uniform and supported logistically by MACV just like the other district advisors. Operationally, however, they'd be under Porter's direction. I'd experiment first with say 10 districts right now--and then the 26 districts in the National Priority Areas.

4. Porter should also be given clear and unequivocal authority over civilian agency operations in the regions and provinces. At present he shares this fuzzily with USIA, AID, and CIA. We need a unified chain of command on the civil side, reaching from Porter's office down to the districts. He should have--and assert--unequivocal control over all USG officials, from whatever agency, assigned to pacification operations. I would also favor strengthening his organization by giving to each of his Provincial Representatives a fund of up to $10,000 annually in piasters to be spent, subject to Porter's approval, on small-scale projects of high political impact where speed and flexibility are crucial for effectiveness (such a plan worked well in African countries where rural problems are similar).

5. Step up our agricultural effort. Freeman's program may contain too much now, but AID's has too little for the peasant in this agricultural country. The program needs better direction, agricultural experts at provincial and district levels, a systematic effort to develop a local seed industry, expanded fertilizer distribution, and a stepped-up animal husbandry effort. Both Freeman and Gardener have also urged a broad-scale approach to irrigation, drainage, flood control, and rural water supply systems. We should at least make a beginning, though local security is a prerequisite.

6. Forestry. We are exporting lumber, which is in tight US supply, to Vietnam at exorbitant prices while forest reserves there are untapped and saw mills are operating at 40% capacity. Help to this industry is in Vietnam's interest and our own. Local security is the hooker, so let's get Westy in the act.

7. Defector Programs (Chieu Hoi) have had a tremendous pay-off for a peanut US contribution ($ 700,000 this year). The program is now deteriorating instead of building up. It needs new direction, and better backing than AID is now giving it. Here again I'd borrow some MACV bodies.

8. Reaching the very young VC. You urged at Honolulu that a psy-ops plan be developed to reach the VC age group in the 9 to 15 year old bracket. Little has been done to counter the long VC lead with this group. I'd like to get a small group of real experts onto this.

9. Resource Control and Economic Warfare. We're not doing enough of either, largely because it falls between stools (CIA, MACV, AID). Surely we ought to be able to outbid Cambodia for rice. Keeping rice and aid commodities from being diverted to the VC ought to have a substantial pay-off at relatively modest cost. More Mission, MACV, and AID support and enthusiasm is the key.

D. Doing the Above will take More Money as well as More Bodies. Once again, the way to get an immediate add-on is from a man who'll take decisions--Bob McNamara. AID is thinking only in terms of $650-700 million for Vietnam in FY 1967 (including about $100 million in PL 480), at most $50 million more than the $640 million programmed for FY 1966. But we are already considering $63-116 million more in add-ons, plus considerable dollar purchase of piasters. While I can't quantify yet all the further proposals I've made above, I'm thinking for forward planning purposes in terms of at least $200 million more in FY 1967 than FY 1966.

One way to get the money is a supplemental--if DOD goes for one in January, we could tack AID on. If DOD doesn't, however, I'd be dubious of AID's chances. AID is already trying to cut some $80 million of over-commitments in FY 1966 programs, and has no stomach for a new round of hearings before Fulbright et al. Another solution is to cut AID programs elsewhere. But these are already pared and will probably have to be pared some more to absorb Hill cuts. Nor do we want to rob Peter to pay Paul.

So the only quick answer (at least to carry us till a supplemental) is to bury a good chunk of the civil programs in the DOD and CIA budgets (the latter for RD cadre costs). My principle would be to have DOD itself pay for (instead of being reimbursed) all that it provides to the civil side. At a rough guess this might be on the order of $100-150 million ($25 million for operating Saigon port, $18-23 million for cadre and police ammo and ordnance, $20-40 million for medical supplies, $10-15 million for in-country airlift, $17 million for mothball ships, etc.) DOD is already providing major help to the civil side on a non-reimbursable basis--but it might be easier all around to hide another $100 million or so in a budget so big it could hardly be found.

E. Conclusion. The above civil program is still painfully imprecise. It also ignores the gut issue of how to get a feeble GVN to play ball. But at least it starts us going somewhere, with a sense of urgency comparable to our military effort, at a piddling fraction of its cost. I believe that up to $200 million more so spent--even wastefully--would still pay more return per dollar than the same $200 million spent in any other way. And it will suffice to galvanize the civil side--which otherwise will limp along as primarily an anti-inflationary dole without making any contribution positive enough, quickly enough to complement properly our military push.

My program is not dramatic--but it will help win the war.

R. W. Komer

156. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/

Washington, June 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6. Top Secret; Personal; Exdis. The message was drafted by Rusk, reviewed by the President, and redrafted by Rusk and Rostow in light of the President's instructions. Rostow informed Read in a June 14 memorandum that the message had been sent that day and that an information copy had gone to McNamara. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Dean Rusk has told me of his private talk with you about the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi./2/ Specific orders have not yet been issued but I see no way of avoiding such action, given the expansion of the illegal corridor through Laos, the continuing buildup of North Vietnamese forces in South Viet Nam, the growing abuse of Cambodian neutrality, and the absence of any indication in Hanoi of a serious interest in peace.

/2/Rusk met with Wilson in London on June 10.

We expect costly fighting during the Monsoon season, the first engagements of which have undoubtedly come to your attention. I must do what I can to reduce our casualties at the hands of those who are moving in from the north.

I deeply hope that you will find a way to maintain solidarity with us on Viet-Nam despite what you have said in the House of Commons about Haiphong and Hanoi./3/ We are not talking about an air assault on civilian centers but a specific attack on POL installations with a direct relevance to the fighting in the south. I hope that you can give further thought to your own interests and commitments in Southeast Asia under the SEATO Treaty. Dean tells me that, in his talk with you and your colleagues, several references were made to the "revival of SEATO." South Viet Nam and five signatories of SEATO are not talking about a revival but are committing troops to repel an armed attack from the north. Nor do I believe that your role as co-chairman means that Britain should stand aside; the other co-chairman is furnishing large quantities of sophisticated arms and other assistance to North Viet Nam and is, therefore, an active partner in the effort to take over South Viet Nam by force.

/3/In telegram 5768 from London, June 2, Bruce reported that on February 8 Wilson stated in the House of Commons: "We have made it clear in Washington that we could not support any extension of the bombing against North Vietnam by stages to Hanoi and Haiphong." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

I know that you have some problems about Viet Nam, as do I. But I believe that it is sound for us to base our policy on the simple principles of the Geneva Accords and the SEATO Treaty, and on the assumption that North Viet Nam will not be permitted to seize South Viet Nam. Since we are determined about the latter point, much of the present criticism will come right at the end of the day.

I gather Dean spoke to you of the possible combination of points which would put a different cast upon disassociation by you from a decision to strike the POL. Quite frankly, I earnestly hope that you will not find it necessary to speak in terms of disassociation. But it would be important to us if you could include the following elements:

1. You were informed of the possibility that such an action would, in our minds, become necessary.

2. You expressed your own views to us in accordance with statements which you have already made in the House of Commons.

3. The particular step taken by U.S. forces was directed specifically to POL storage and not against civilian centers or installations.

4. Since Britain does not have troops engaged in the fighting, it is not easy or appropriate for Britain to determine the particular military action which may be necessary under different circumstances.

5. It is a great pity that Hanoi and Peiping have been so unresponsive to unprecedented efforts by the U.S. and others to bring this problem from the battlefield to the conference table.

6. Britain is satisfied that U.S. forces have no designs against civilian populations and are taking every possible precaution to avoid civilian casualties.

7. Britain as a member of SEATO fully understands and supports the determination of its fellow SEATO members to insure the safety and the self-determination of South Viet Nam.

I would hope that you could in this context affirm your support for the effort in Viet Nam and your understanding that it is Hanoi which is blocking the path to peace.

The timing of a visit to Washington is somewhat complicated. You and I agree that there should be a good deal of blue sky between your visit and possible action in Viet Nam. That alone would suggest that the month of June is out, as we now look at the calendar of events. When we get into July, I shall expect to be away for almost a full week surrounding July 4th. You have Pompidou's visit on July 6-8 and your possible visit to Moscow on July 9-10. I have just suggested to President Senghor that he come here July 11-13.

It appears, therefore, anything before mid-July is blocked by our respective calendars.

If you feel a talk at that time is essential, we can say now that we expect it to be held in mid- or late July, leaving the precise dates open for further determination. In response to questions as to why you are coming, perhaps we both should simply say that we have felt occasional talks to be worthwhile and that a number of matters of mutual interest could be usefully discussed, and that mid-July appears to be a mutually convenient time.

I was much interested in what Dean told me of your talks about Rhodesia and the maritime strike. You have my best wishes in bringing both of these troublesome matters to an early conclusion.

157. Memorandum From William N. Morell, Jr., of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, June 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The memorandum and attachment were forwarded to the President on June 16.

SUBJECT
An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam

1. The attached report represents a comprehensive research effort by this Agency and DIA on the effects of Rolling Thunder attack against North Vietnam in 1965, and will, I believe, be of interest to you.

2. Although the Rolling Thunder program flew many thousands of attack sorties against military and economic targets, the resultant damage was relatively light, in good measure reflecting the restricted nature of the air campaign. North Vietnam reacted vigorously to restore transport facilities essential to maintaining the flow of supplies to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The toll in human casualties, based on fragmentary sample data, is estimated to have been between 11,700 and 14,800, divided about equally between dead and wounded, with a somewhat higher percentage of military as compared to civilian casualties.

3. The major effect of the attack has been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity and to divert manpower in significant numbers to war supporting activities. North Vietnam may now require 200,000 full-time workers (or about 10 percent of the non-agriculture labor force) for tasks associated with dispersal and emergency repair and maintenance, and the part-time work of another 100,000.

Bill Morell
DirectorResearch and Reports

Attachment

Intelligence Report/2/

Washington, June 1, 1966.

/2/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 H (1), Appraisal of Bombing of NVN-CIA/DIA. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared by the CIA and DIA.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM/3/

/3/Covering the period from 2 March through 31 December 1965. [Footnote in the source text.]

Summary

The Rolling Thunder program, a systematic but restrained air offensive against selected economic and military targets in North Vietnam, was begun on 2 March 1965. The basic objectives of the air attacks on North Vietnam have been made clear in public statements by the President and other high officials of the US Government. These objectives are (a) to reduce the ability of North Vietnam to support the Communist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos; (b) to increase progressively the pressure on North Vietnam to the point where the regime would decide it was too costly to continue directing and supporting the insurgency in the South; and (c) to bolster the confidence and morale of the South Vietnamese.

The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Vietnam has been a carefully controlled means of gradual escalation to achieve strictly limited objectives. Consequently, the program has operated under a set of firmly defined ground rules which have limited both the choice of targets and the areas to be bombed. The existence of large restricted areas has effectively insulated almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's limited modern industrial economy from air attack; these areas contain 75 percent of the nation's population and the most lucrative military supply and LOC targets.

The estimated dollar cost for the restoration of economic and military targets attacked in the Rolling Thunder campaign is less than 10 percent of the value of the economic aid given to North Vietnam in recent years by Communist countries.

Restoration Costs of Facilities Attacked by the Rolling Thunder Program
Million US $

Attacks on fixed targets

Economic, 23.6

Military, 26.4

Total, 50

Armed reconnaissance missions

Economic, 12.8

Military, 0.7

Total, 13

Total

Economic, 36

Military, 27

Total, 63

About 57 percent of the total damage--$36 million--is attributable to the destruction of economic targets. This cost has been broadly distributed throughout the economic sector, and no one sector has been forced to bear unacceptably high levels of damage. In terms of national capacity the greatest damage was inflicted on electric power and petroleum storage facilities. These target systems lost 27 and 17 percent, respectively, of their national capacity. In each case, however, the target system has adequate cushion in the form of excess capacity to absorb these attacks, and economic activity could therefore be maintained at almost normal levels.

The damage to military facilities is just over $ 27 million. Almost 60 percent of this damage was to military barracks, but the effect has been negligible. The damage to military targets has shown a definite downward trend since the peak month of July 1965.

The damage to military facilities not only has resulted in losses of equipment but also has prompted the abandonment of installations such as airfields and the dispersal of equipment and supplies normally stored in ammunition and supply depots.

The United States has placed restrictions on the air offensive against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian casualties. It has been to North Vietnam's interest to assert otherwise, however, and propaganda media attempt to give the impression that the air offensive has been a vicious and unrestrained assault on the civilian population, hospitals, schools, and other nonmilitary objectives. Nevertheless, in only one instance have Hanoi officials presumed to provide a total for the number of casualties. In September, Egyptian journalists were told that total casualties were 75,000, including 40,000 killed and 35,000 wounded. No procedures devised in this report for the purpose of estimating casualties can support a figure of this magnitude.

Although the Rolling Thunder program has flown many thousands of attack sorties against targets in North Vietnam, the toll in human casualties has been light. Based on sample data, through the end of 1965, North Vietnamese casualties--both civilian and military--are estimated to have ranged from 11,700 to 14,800, divided about equally between killed and wounded.

Estimated Casualties Resulting from Rolling Thunder

Attacks on fixed targets

Military, 3,900 to 4,700

Civilian, 1,700 to 2,400

Total, 6,500 to l7,900

Armed reconnaissance missions,

Military, 2,600 to 3,200

Civilian, 3,500 to 4,500

Total, 6,100 to 7,700

Total

Military, 6,500 to 7,900

Civilian, 5,200 to 6,900

Total, 11,700 to 14,800

About 55 percent of these casualties were military personnel. The civilians killed or injured by armed reconnaissance attacks were for the most part truck drivers or transport and construction workers rather directly engaged in maintaining the logistic pipeline to South Vietnam.

Approximately 3,000 civilian deaths (one-half of total civilian casualties) as a result of military action against North Vietnam is a small number. The impact of 3,000 civilian casualties is slight in a country where over 350,000 persons died in 1965 from other causes and where the accidental deaths alone produced casualties some three to five times greater than those resulting from the Rolling Thunder program.

The economic and military damage sustained has presented an increasing but still moderate bill to Hanoi, which in large measure can be (and has been) passed along to Moscow and Peiping.

The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam has been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity, particularly in transportation and distribution. Reconstruction efforts have been hampered by difficulties in allocating manpower. The regime has relocated large elements of its urban population. Problems in the distribution of food have appeared, although these problems are not yet pressing. Where the bombing has hurt most has been in its disruption of the road and rail nets and in the very considerable repair effort which became necessary. On the other hand, the regime has been singularly successful in overcoming US interdiction efforts.

An examination of destroyed and damaged facilities shows that only a small number were truly essential to the war effort. The major essential restoration has consisted of measures to keep traffic moving, to keep the railroad yards operating, to maintain communications, and to replace transport equipment and equipment for radar and SAM sites. These measures have probably been effected at a cost of between $4 million and $5 million, or between 5 and 10 percent of the total economic and military damage sustained in North Vietnam to date.

The ability to react and to offset the effects of the air attacks has not been without its costs. It is estimated that the diversion of manpower to tasks associated with dispersal programs and emergency repair and maintenance of lines of communication throughout North Vietnam may now require the full-time services of 200,000 workers (equivalent to about 10 percent of the nonagricultural labor force) and the part-time impressment of another 100,000. An additional 150,000 people are also obligated, on a part-time basis, to serve in various aspects of civil defense which take them away from their normal pursuits. Thus a significant share of the labor force is diverted in varying degrees to supporting the war in the South. The diversion of labor has been supplemented, particularly in the northern provinces, by Chinese logistic support troops.

In response to the intensified US and Vietnamese air offensive in 1965, all countries of the Communist camp have extended economic assistance as proof of their support. Total assistance extended by China and the USSR in 1965 is on the order of $250 million to $400 million, of which military aid accounted for $150 million to $200 million. This aid is a relatively insignificant drain on the capabilities of both countries.

The USSR is by far the major source of military equipment for North Vietnam, supplying 70 to 95 percent, or $142 million, of the total provided in 1965. The major components of Soviet military aid were SAM sites (15 to 20), antiaircraft guns (1,000 to 1,200), planes (44), motor vehicles (2,600), radar, and jet fuel. China's identified military aid, totaling only $11 million, consisted principally of planes (8) and trucks (1,400). In addition, large amounts of infantry weapons and ammunition are provided by Communist China. The inclusion of the cost of this equipment would probably raise the value of China's total contribution by a few million dollars. Military aid from the Eastern European Communist countries--consisting principally of small arms and ammunition, medicines and medical equipment, and some trucks--is valued at only a few million dollars.

[Here follows the body of the 146-page report.]

158. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Saigon, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LV. Secret. Lodge forwarded the memorandum to Rostow under cover of a memorandum dated June 17. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
General Taylor's Memorandum for the President of April 27, 1966, entitled "Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips,"/2/ concerning which you asked my opinion

/2/Document 127.

1. Your attention is first invited to:

a. Saigon's 1377 of October 21, 1965,/3/ notably to suggestion for an opening negotiating position and for definition of a "Satisfactory Outcome";

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 470-473.

b. Letter to Leonard Unger of November 30, 1965,/4/ commenting on the State Department paper, "A Settlement in Vietnam" dated November 3, 1965;/5/ which includes

/4/Not found.

/5/Not found, but see footnote 7, Document 115, regarding a later version of this paper.

c. a paper by me entitled, "Negotiating with the Communists" (based on experience at the UN and study of negotiations elsewhere);/6/

/6/Attached but not printed. Lodge sent a copy of this undated memorandum to the President on January 17, 1966. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 212, Negotiation)

d. Saigon's 2343 of January 1, 1966;/7/

/7/Document 1.

e. Saigon's 2376 of January 4, 1966./8/

/8/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

2. General Taylor's paper is of great value and he is to be congratulated on it. There are some observations of his which are particularly wise. They should be a guide to anyone who represents the United States at a negotiation and are as follows:

a. The initiation of discussions does not mean the advent of peace. Probably more people were killed after the Panmunjom talks started than would have been killed had we kept the military initiative.

b. There must be an incentive for the enemy to come to a prompt settlement. Without such an incentive the talks could drag on indefinitely. Therefore, military pressure must be maintained while the talks are taking place.

c. The bombing must not be stopped without a quid pro quo. To do so solely for the purpose of getting talks going would seriously prejudice the success of any subsequent negotiations.

d. Moreover, we should never give up any one of our assets in advance as a precondition for discussions. We should only concede one step at a time.

e. Orthodox troop withdrawals, such as the US can make, are very easy to verify. Infiltration on the communist model is so elusive that an effective detection system of a "ceasefire" is not feasible.

f. There should be an analysis by competent experts in Washington as to how our assets should be played.

3. In his last paragraph, at the bottom of page 3, General Taylor affirms that the United States must never give up any of its assets without achieving an equivalent gain. I agree emphatically. He also says that his specific "estimate of assets and values may be challenged," which I take as a gracious invitation to comment--and possibly to suggest variants--on his assessment of the "blue chips." In this spirit I make the following observations:

4. The Essence of the Taylor Proposal

a. General Taylor proposes for the first phase of diplomatic negotiations that, in exchange for the US stopping its bombing and its offensive military operations in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong stop their incidents and their military operations.

b. For the second stage, the US would stop its force increase and the Viet Cong would cease its infiltration.

c. After this, would come withdrawal by the Viet Cong and by the US and dissolution of the Viet Cong (which the Viet Cong would agree to). In exchange, the GVN would give amnesty and civic rights to the Viet Cong.

d. General Taylor adds that if the Viet Cong performance is bad as regards cessation of military operations, we can resume bombing.

e. He also says that under his plan the US and GVN would retain the right to use weapons to protect the civil population outside of the Viet Cong territory.

5. My General Comment on the Taylor Proposal

a. General Taylor, in effect, proposes a general ceasefire as a substitute for unilateral ending of United States bombing.

b. If this becomes our policy, we should never reveal the fact publicly because the pressure of so-called world opinion would probably force us to stop the bombing first, after which we would be committed to a general ceasefire. Then, when we came to working out the all-important specific provisions of a ceasefire, we would be without some very valuable bargaining power.

c. I also question whether we could readily resume bombing if the Viet Cong performance is bad, given the influence of organized propaganda against the bombings. Whether we like it or not, bombing the North is in a special propaganda category. But we could, to be sure, resume operation on the ground.

6. My Comment on the Substance of the Taylor Proposal Regarding "Blue Chips"

a. The Taylor proposal does not reach terrorism in the Viet Cong areas, even though it does enable us and the GVN to retain the right to use weapons to protect the civil population outside of the Viet Cong territory.

b. But it is very difficult to define Viet Cong areas geographically and this makes it equally difficult, if not impossible, to define prohibited US-GVN "offensive" military operations therein. This would lead to continual charges that we are violating the ceasefire. For example, many large segments of the countryside are "controlled" by whichever side happens to be physically present at any given time. With a ceasefire, would we be able to use arms to protect the people in such areas from the VC? Other extensive areas of the countryside are controlled by the GVN by day and the VC by night. Would friendly forces be able to patrol such areas at night? Could GVN officials stay in rural areas at night with impunity from the VC? These considerations call into question the practicability of arranging a ceasefire in isolation from a more general political settlement.

c. Whatever steps we might take to protect ourselves after the "ceasefire" was in effect would put us in clear violation of the ceasefire.

d. On the other hand, the Viet Cong method of operation, being unorthodox from a western military viewpoint, makes it easy for them to keep below the threshold of the proposed "ceasefire" agreement. The term "ceasefire" cannot reasonably apply to such things as sabotage, assassination, terrorism, propaganda, impressment, kidnapping, torture, subversive action, VC tax collection, infiltration from the north, and direction of strategy and tactics. None of these things necessarily involve the use of firearms.

e. In the areas now embracing about 25 per cent of the population and which are presently controlled by the Viet Cong, the forces of law and order would thus be prevented from using weapons, but the Viet Cong would be free to go on using the methods which they traditionally use.

f. A general ceasefire would legitimize Viet Cong areas, thereby leading to partition or to irresistible demands for a coalition government.

g. To end the military pressures against presently hard-pressed Viet Cong units, as a ceasefire would do, would also enable them to regroup and launch operations later under more favorable conditions, as happened very often in the Chinese civil war.

h. If a ceasefire permits unimpeded access by the government to the entire country it will be unacceptable to the Viet Cong, but we would be committed to a ceasefire without a political settlement.

i. If a ceasefire leads to the recognition of Viet Cong safe areas, a political outcome will have, in effect, been imposed by the formalities of the ceasefire.

7. My Alternative Proposal

a. Instead of linking the cessation of bombing to a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations, I would rather link the bombing to stopping infiltration by North Vietnam into the South and to an agreement to establish control posts along the Ho Chi Minh trail and along both sides of the Vietnamese-Laotian and Vietnamese-Cambodian borders.

b. This has the advantage that it would not be necessary for Hanoi to admit that it has infiltrated. Hanoi could maintain a public posture of non-intervention and control posts could be established without loss of face.

c. Also, this scheme has the advantage of relating the end of bombing to the interdiction of supplies--a logical thing to do since the purpose of bombing is precisely to interdict supplies. For Hanoi publicly to fore- swear infiltration would be a heavy blow to the morale of the Viet Cong. It would enable us to continue the bombing until a satisfactory inspection mechanism is worked out. The issue of a general ceasefire could be left to the general political settlement, where it belongs.

d. I recognize that General Taylor doubts the feasibility of an effective detection system for infiltration. Concerning this very important objection, I make two observations: A. It should be promptly studied by the best experts we have; and B. We should, under my proposal, continue bombing while a detection system was being worked out--assuming that such a system was not ready when negotiations began.

8. Probable Consequences

a. My trade looks somewhat less dramatic than General Taylor's, but I wonder whether it would not put us in a stronger position.

b. If Hanoi refuses to cease infiltration--or to establish control posts to verify that it is not infiltrating--it will be in a difficult position to mobilize world opinion against an end of the bombing.

c. Also, my proposal would not force us to stop military operations in the South during negotiations. We would thus remain in a position to maintain maximum incentives for a flexible communist attitude.

d. Also, the trade which I propose would enable us to tie a "cease-fire" to a political settlement or at least to the outlines of it. And "cease-fire," as regards the Viet Cong, is much more political than military.

9. "Satisfactory Outcome"

a. I renew my recommendation that we be clear in our minds as to what constitutes a "satisfactory outcome." Without a dependable stand-ard of measurement we run the risk of yielding to the pressures of the moment to such an extent that we actually find that, immediately upon the conclusion of the negotiations, we have lost the war and thus all that we have fought and sacrificed for. See Saigon's 1377.

b. The negotiator must not be made to feel that if the negotiations break down, he has failed. I have known negotiations at the UN where on three separate occasions the US representative said in effect that he was being asked to make such impossible concessions that there was no point in continuing the conversation--and left the room. Yet an excellent understanding finally resulted. The other side was simply trying to see how far we could be pushed.

159. Summary Notes of the 559th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, June 17, 1966, 6:05-8 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

Vietnam--POL

The President summarized the actions required and the judgments which will have to be made in the next several weeks, emphasizing the decision to strike POL targets.

In general, we should seek, with minimum loss and minimum danger of escalating the war, to achieve the maximum effect on the North Vietnamese. We know that the North Vietnamese are dispersing their POL stocks in an effort to anticipate our bombing. The effect of not disrupting POL shipments to the North Vietnamese forces in the field is to pay a higher price in U.S. casualties. The choice is one of military lives vs. escalation.

A decision on bombing is not being made now and one is not imminent. The reasons for our delay include: the Secretary was at the NATO meeting,/2/ Canadian representative Ronning was visiting Hanoi,/3/ time was required to talk to Prime Minister Wilson and our allies, and some sounds have come from Hanoi. Every bit of information is needed in reaching a decision.

/2/Rusk was in Europe May 31-June 10. He attended the NATO Ministerial Meeting June 3-8 and then met with Prime Minister Wilson in London.

/3/Ronning met with DRV officials in Hanoi June 14-17.

There is no uncertainty about my willingness to use the authority which is the President's.

There must be no discussion of this meeting. Everyone present can be trusted but we must be careful about talking to the press or even to staff members who might talk to the press. The highest security must be maintained.

Secretary Rusk: We have an elementary obligation to support our combat troops when they are carrying out an assignment. The American people have a feeling of impatience and, over time, they may demand a quick end to the war as the price for their continued support. This restlessness is evident in the public opinion polls. Opinion abroad hopes that no larger military measures will be necessary. It is difficult to separate in the minds of people attacks on POL supplies from attacks on the civilian economy. There is a major difference between a 2- to 3-day strike and strikes continuing over a long period. We are under constant observation by everyone abroad. We must get across to the public that if we widen the bombing program to include POL targets that this does not mean a change in our policy of making every effort to avoid killing civilians.

Many people who have no responsibility for the conduct of the war oppose a wider bombing program. As early as we can we must get a check on whether the Ronning mission to Hanoi produced any change in the North Vietnamese position. Mr. Ronning is reporting only to Canadian Foreign Minister Martin. He declined to tell our Charge in Vientiane whether the Hanoi leaders told him anything new./4/

/4/Regarding the results of Ronning's visit, see Document 161.

The President: We must get the news fastest about the Ronning mission.

Secretary Rusk: Prior to executing any new orders on bombing, we must give 24-hour advance notice to several Heads of State, including Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, and the UK.

If the decision is negative, we have no problem. A go decision will produce sharp reactions throughout the world. There probably will be attacks on our Embassies. The reaction will be less if a decision is limited to a short, sharp action.

We must try to bring Hanoi to a decision. There is no evidence of their willingness to talk now. We cannot guarantee what the Chinese Communist reaction will be. Our guess is that there will be no military reaction from the Chinese Communists or the Soviets. There will be many problems in the UN.

Secretary McNamara: Strikes on POL targets have been opposed by me for months. The situation is now changing and the earlier bombing decision must be reconsidered. POL targets are military targets. The military utilization of these targets has been greatly increased. The North Vietnamese dispersion of their POL is lessening our chance of ever destroying their POL supplies. Military infiltration from the north is up sharply. Consequently, the pressure on their lines of communication has increased. Their POL imports have doubled. The military importance of their POL system is way up and will increase further.

The reasons for attacking POL targets are:

1. Our guess is that such attacks will limit infiltration from North Vietnam.

2. Those North Vietnamese troops in the south will worry about their source of supplies.

3. Pressure will be exerted on the political leaders in Hanoi. This bombing program seems to be the least costly way to tell them of our serious intentions.

The reason against the POL bombing program is that it moves us further away from a termination of the war, thus costing more U.S. lives.

General Johnson: The number of Vietnamese trucks has jumped from 6,900 to 10,000. Approximately 2,600 are en route to South Vietnam. All need fuel to operate. North Vietnamese POL imports are up from 900 to 23,000 tons.

The President: What is coming in the next few weeks or the next 60 days?

General Johnson: The North Vietnamese will reinforce the military power they now have and make a drive into central Vietnam--possibly even further south. Hitting the POL targets will hurt them in moving rice and weapons to replace those we have captured. They have to step up the rate of supplies from the north to the south.

We will lose 3 to 4-1/2 percent of planes used on these missions. (Secretary McNamara interrupted to say this amounted to 20-25 planes.) More U.S. troops will be lost on the ground in the same time period than will be lost in the air strikes.

The off-loading capacity of the North Vietnamese in the port of Haiphong would be struck. However, the Chiefs' view is that POL targets should be hit as a first priority. These attacks might play a significant part in bringing the war to a halt. If the POL targets are hit, the North Vietnamese will have to find alternative ways of delivering POL. Meanwhile, the dispersion of their petroleum supplies is continuing.

Secretary McNamara: Already we have identified 70-80 POL dispersal points. POL tanks are being put underground and more POL is being stored in small tanks. Existing large tank farms would be destroyed.

The value to us of the destruction of their oil supplies has greatly increased.

Following are the risks:

a. Civilian casualties would be very small. The estimate is for 50 casualties in the three prime targets. If, as is possible, our bombs miss their primary targets, we will undoubtedly hurt our cause. The casualty figure could go as high as 12,000. Six thousand of these would be civilians and of the civilians, three thousand would be killed. The casualties caused if the bombs land on-target would be less than those which would occur on targets now authorized to be struck. Our operation orders to our commanders are to minimize civilian casualties by being certain of their targets, i.e., positive identification, visual bombing, etc. We have made clear our views to Admiral Sharp regarding civilian casualties.

b. As to the military reaction to the widened bombing, every expert says the risk of this is small.

c. If we do not widen our bombing, the morale of U.S. troops and of the American people will suffer. People will say: If you consider a POL target a military target, why do you not strike it?

d. The risk of hitting a Russian or foreign ship in a North Vietnamese harbor is very small.

The President: Have we hit targets deeper into North Vietnam and nearer to civilian centers? There will be a psychological reaction because our bombing will be nearer to the center of cities.

Secretary McNamara: The POL bombing program would hit areas further north and nearer civilian centers.

Secretary Rusk: The cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, rightly or wrongly, are symbolic. Although we have hit oil storage areas in the city of Vinh, the reaction would be different if targets in Hanoi and Haiphong were struck.

Walt Rostow: The military and political payoff of a strike on the POL targets hinges on the success of the effort. We will never be able to get them all.

Secretary McNamara: We probably cannot do the job in one strike and would have to go back at least once. We do not know how quickly they would be able to restore the oil storage facilities, but we doubt that frequent strikes would be necessary to prevent rebuilding.

Mr. Rostow: Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy. We have been attacking their LOCs. Because of our restraint, the North Vietnamese have changed their military planning to take advantage of our existing target system.

Ambassador Goldberg: Have we previously struck at the civilian economy as we would be doing if we destroyed their supply of oil?

General Johnson: We estimate that 60 percent of POL is used by the military.

Mr. Rostow: Our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges. Our policy should remain steady and our actions should be cool and professional. We should not be on the defensive. Our military effort is based on the violation of the Geneva Accords by the North Vietnamese.

Ambassador Goldberg: The risk of widening the bombing program to attack POL targets is too great. The results will not be what we think. All of us want to save U.S. lives but will such air attacks achieve this objective?/5/

/5/In a June 16 memorandum to the President, Rostow stated that, at the President's instruction, he had met the day before with Goldberg on the issue of POL strikes and had "marched carefully through all the considerations." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6)

The Chinese and Soviet reactions to the headlines reporting the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong will be a challenge to them to give all aid necessary to make up the loss. The Chinese Communists as well as the Soviets will not sit by. At the very least they will replace the petroleum and the facilities destroyed.

The Communist bloc is not going to let this outfit go down the drain. They see the Vietnam war as a confrontation. With minimum risk, they can make up for the damage we do to the North Vietnamese petroleum supplies. In addition, the world reaction would be strongly adverse--even Canada would oppose our action.

During the President's absence from the meeting, Secretary McNamara estimated the probability of missing our targets as slight. This remark was in response to the Vice President calling attention to our having missed Mu Ghia pass on an earlier air strike. Added that a high level of damage was assured if we bombed the POL targets. He acknowledged that more than one strike would be necessary to do the job.

When the President returned to the room, Ambassador Goldberg said that the maximum military risk is that Chinese Communists will move in troops. The decision to bomb POL will mean that we will be isolating ourselves internationally. If we lose Canada and Japan as a result of these strikes, we will lose the Chinese representation issue in the UN.

The domestic reaction will be very adverse if we strike these POL targets and then this act does not end the war. The reaction domestically will be to demand stronger military action by the President. The country's mood will turn at election time if the war is still going on. The American people are supporting the President because he is cool and reserved. My judgment is based not on an interpretation of the polls but on my travelling about the country. We must delay at least until after the Ronning peace effort is safely out of the way so that if we take additional action, Mr. Ronning will be unable to say that we got a peace feeler in Hanoi and wrecked it.

The President: No one has been reckless. Had we been, we would have struck these targets already.

The Vice President: We have been up and down this hill many times. If we authorize these strikes, our action will be considered and looked upon as a change in policy even though it isn't. The action will complicate our problems in the UN and in Europe. We should wait until Ronning is out of the way. If the air strike is done cleanly, there will be less reaction. The North Vietnamese will not come to a conference table but will slowly withdraw. We should keep up the punishment we are inflicting on North Vietnam while seeking peace.

It would be a catastrophe if a Soviet ship were hit and if Soviet personnel were killed.

I have come around reluctantly to accepting the wider bombing program. Not to attack the POL targets would be to contribute to North Vietnamese strength. The strikes will complicate their logistic problem and exert pressure on Hanoi. As to the political consequences, it will play hell. But we should go ahead with the additional strikes, exercising precautions.

Secretary McNamara responded to the President's question by saying that every precaution to avoid civilian casualties had been taken. He again summarized the limitations placed on the pilots carrying out the air strikes.

Secretary Fowler: We should recall the Korean experience where we failed to strike military targets because of geographic limitations and where we failed to use our predominant military power.

a. Operational judgment on the strikes should weigh heavily with us. It is a most persuasive case which has been made. (Secretary McNamara added that the military advice was unanimous and very strong in favor of the strikes.)

b. We need to accelerate progress toward ending the heavy fighting in South Vietnam. The only way open to us now is to weaken Hanoi.

c. Time is important because the North Vietnamese are dispersing their storage of petroleum.

We should move ahead.

Assistant Secretary of State Bundy: Ambassador Reischauer rather surprisingly said that he believed we could put up with the Japanese reaction which he thought would be steep but supportable. This view is different than that stated by Ambassador Goldberg as to the effect on Japan.

The recent meeting of our Ambassadors in Asia recommended that we undertake the expanded bombing program.

CIA Director Raborn: We estimate that the Japanese reaction will not basically affect our relations with Japan. As to the Chinese Communist reaction, we think that by no means would they invade. It is very difficult for them to move into Vietnam and to support troops there. As to Soviet reaction, it will be vigorous and sharp and might involve their moving oil ashore by emergency means.

We should recognize that this is not a one-shot operation. These targets will be a cause of continuing concern. If we took out the two major targets, there would be a terrific effect, but not overnight, on the confidence of the North Vietnamese troops.

We learned in World War II that we should step up pressure when the enemy shows signs of weakness.

USIA Director Marks: We should not decide this question on the basis of world opinion but rather on a military basis. We have created our own problem in part by developing what have become sacred cows. We should make a statement concerning the importance of oil off-loading facilities to the North Vietnamese military effort. We should ride out the reaction rather than take to the TV.

Director Raborn: No statement as to our plans should be made because to make public our intentions would result in the loss of more U.S. planes.

Secretary Rusk: If we make any mention of our intention to strike POL targets, we will have given the other side preventive warning time.

The President: In order not to be lobbied on the decision, not another soul should be informed of this discussion.

Deputy CIA Director Helms: The petroleum supplies are feeding the meat grinder in South Vietnam and this North Vietnamese military effort will continue unless we take out their petroleum supplies.

General Johnson: Must we tell all our allies in advance?

The President: This is very worrisome. The fewest number of allies should be told on the shortest possible notice.

Bill Moyers: We should be clear about what we say to the public. We should not oversell what we expect to accomplish. We should keep in mind what the increased bombing program will do as well as what it will not do. As to what it will do, we should stress the increasing burden and the cost of the war to Hanoi.

Secretary McNamara: The reality is that we are not going to get all of the petroleum supplies but the effect on the North Vietnamese will be to hoard the reduced petroleum supplies which remain.

Bill Moyers: No statement should be made to the public saying that we acted to shorten the war. If the air strike does not shorten the war, then later people will say we misled them.

Secretary Rusk: Will there be any public reaction to bombing SAM sites near Hanoi?

Ambassador Goldberg: There will not be a major reaction.

Mr. Rostow: The decision is a rational one. Taking out the petroleum supplies sets a ceiling on the capacity of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate men into South Vietnam. A sustained POL offensive will seriously affect the infiltration rate.

Each person in the room, during the course of the discussion, indicated approval of the recommendation to strike the recommended POL targets.

Bromley Smith

160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:36 a.m. and passed to the White House.

5684. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Many congratulations on the statement which you made at your Saturday news conference./2/ It was impressive in its solidity, its broad base, and its well balanced view of the situation.

/2/At his news conference on June 18, the President made a statement on Vietnam and answered questions about the war. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 625-636.

A. Hue back under GVN

2. Hue, the country's most persistent political trouble spot, has been brought back under government control during the past week after having been effectively in disloyal hands for the past three months.

3. Under the direction of National Police Director, and Ky intimate Colonel Loan, four battalions of loyal government troops plus about [garble] riot police dispatched from Saigon removed from the streets the thousands of Buddhist altars which have blocked traffic throughout the city. They also arrested many agitators including several prominent student and Struggle force leaders; and they dispersed a spate of small anti-government demonstrations./3/ First Division Commander General Nhuan, who has been mouthing his loyalty to the government while giving aid and comfort to the dissidents, has been relieved; and former I Corps Commander and dissident leader General Dinh has been taken out of Hue and sent to Saigon. Commercial activity is gradually returning to normal.

/3/On June 10 Ky sent several hundred special riot police to the Hue area under Colonel Loan's command. The riot police took control of the local police force. On June 15-17 two airborne and two marine battalions joined the police and carried out a 4-day campaign against disorganized opposition. By June 19 open resistance from Buddhists and military dissidents had collapsed. (Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, p. 143; The New York Times, June 11, 16, 17, 19, 1966)

4. These operations were accompanied by a heavy outpouring of pro-government propaganda designed to bring the city back under control with a minimum of opposition. Partly because of this propaganda, but mostly because the majority of people in Hue never have supported Tri Quang during this Struggle movement. Opposition was not serious. During the operation of the last few days, the Buddhists had been able to gather only small bands of civilian demonstrators and a few First Division troops, largely from service rather than combat units, who had responded to Tri Quang's appeal. Tear gas sufficed to bring the dissidents under control. There were only rare instances of gunfire, producing very few casualties with no more than five persons believed to have been killed. Most people in the city were happy to see bright prospects for ending the turmoil. Once again, Ky had shown his skill in the use of force--a useful talent for anyone trying to run a government in this part of the world.

5. Tri Quang remains on his so-called "hunger strike" (15 days as of June 22, although he has been taking many types of nourishment in liquid form and can probably live indefinitely at this rate). His rabble-rousing activities, however, have been effectively stopped. He has almost certainly lost the considerable popular support he once commanded. He has now been brought to Saigon, reportedly at his request--some say to protect him from being assassinated by the Viet Cong.

6. I hope that the return of Hue to government control, and the failure of the Buddhist Institute to arouse mass popular support in Saigon mean that we are now at the end of the political crisis in Viet-Nam, which began with the relief of General Thi on March 10. Although Ky did not see the trouble this would make for him, he must be given credit for his wise and restrained application of force once the crisis had started. This allowed the opposition extremists to overplay their hand. Now the government has regained its power and can resume the many tasks which need doing./4/

/4/Telegram 5712 from Saigon, June 23, provided a detailed summary of developments in the "GVN-Buddhist confrontation" during the previous 4 days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

B. Much governmental activity

7. Over the last weekend, there was more governmental activity than at any time since Ky became Prime Minister a year ago. On June 18, Minister of Economy announced a broad range of tough anti-inflation measures which we and the IMF have been urging. It looks as though Ky has shown real courage and decisiveness.

8. Sunday, June 19, was the first anniversary of the Ky government, making it the government which has held office the longest since the overthrow of Diem in 1963. Instead of making it an occasion for self-congratulation, Ky and his colleagues made the wise decision to designate the anniversary as armed forces day with an impressive two-hour parade, a torch light ceremony and display of fireworks, which, for the first time since I have been here, could be described as creating festive atmos-phere.

9. It is good for Vietnamese to think about the armed forces who are still the one disciplined, anti-Communist and nation building element in the country. During the last few months, the armed forces have been attacked by the Viet Cong; they have had their prestige injured by the antics of certain political Generals; their unity has been a target for the Buddhists and their chaplains; and the "Struggle" movement has put a strain on their unity and morale. It was wise not only to have this celebration on June 19, but to have used it as the occasion for announcing promotions and a pay raise.

10. The so-called "Unified Buddhist Church" is in considerable disarray. Its "Young Turk" bonzes who are associated with the Struggle in Saigon appear unwilling to accept the moderate leadership of Thich Tam Chau. He, on the other hand, sent a letter informing them that he still regards himself as chairman of the Buddhist Institute. It would be wonderful if out of all this wreckage, a sober, responsible Buddhist church might emerge.

C. Elections

11. On June 19, the government issued the election decree law setting forth the regulations for candidates and voters in next September's election for Deputies to a National Assembly which aims to produce a constitution. A decree was also issued dealing with the organization of the Assembly. The election law represents the work of the drafting committee as modified by the enlarged Directorate (containing 10 military and 10 civilians). I believe it compares well with the election laws and regulations in one of our states. To organize elections in a war torn country, which has only had a very slight experience with elections, and which has never had elections in a national framework, is quite a job.

12. For this reason, I advise officials in Washington who speak about the Vietnamese elections not to over-praise what has been done. While it is as certain as anything can be that elections are going to be held, it is not at all certain that they will be held without intimidation, and that the results will command widespread respect. It would be imprudent for our spokesman in Washington to say what a great thing these elections are going to be, and then to have disappointing news. It is much better for us to say very little, and then if the elections turn out well (a possibility which is not excluded), public opinion at home will be entitled to feel really encouraged.

D. Military

13. Our forces continued to enjoy significant successes in their operations against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army forces during the week. A total of 928 enemy troops were killed and some 232 were captured. These figures are down somewhat from the preceding week. Contrasted with these totals, friendly forces lost 239 killed in action (including 44 U.S.). The wounded figure was 725 (including 306 U.S.), but we count all slight wounds and Vietnamese only count hospital cases.

14. Our Coast Guard units made a significant catch in the night of June 19-20. While on patrol duty in the China Sea, they picked up a steel-hulled coastal transport about 125 feet long. The vessel refused to respond to their challenge. They pursued it, ran it ashore and discovered that it contained 250 tons of Chinese war material destined for the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese Government is lodging a protest with the International Control Commission and an inspection team of Canadian and Indian officials has already gone to the site.

15. Despite the important gains we have made on the purely military front over the last several weeks, we still seem to be having great difficulty in dealing with the Viet Cong's systematic campaign of terror. Two nights ago in the vicinity of Hue, the Viet Cong summarily executed a district chief. Last week in Binh Long, a village chief was murdered. This terror tactic which has been a Viet Cong trademark is still terribly effective in demoralizing the population and breaking down the government's administrative machinery. Since the turn of the year, there has been some slight improvement in the number of local officials killed or abducted, but it is still running at the rate of seventy per month.

16. The "village guerrilla" is the responsibility of regional and popular forces, which are under the Vietnamese military and, for the U.S., pertains to MACV. And the "village guerrilla" is also the responsibility of the police which, for the U.S., pertains to USAID and its police advisers. Finally we hope that our revolutionary development cadres will make life unbearable for local terrorists.

17. I doubt that Hanoi will conclude that it cannot win in South Viet-Nam as long as they can do so well with local terrorism.

E. Chieu Hoi

19. We still get no Chieu Hoi figure from I Corps. I, therefore, have analyzed Chieu Hoi figures since January leaving out I Corps (which is 7 percent of the total) so that we can see how we're doing in the rest of the country. It looks as though it is starting up again. These figures are as follows: January 1005; February 1862; March 2141; April 1444; May 1458.

Lodge

161. Notes of President Johnson's Meeting With the National Security Council/1/

Washington, June 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. No classification marking. Prepared by George Christian. In a memorandum to Bromley Smith dated October 30, 1968, Christian stated: "I have reconstructed the NSC meeting of June 22 from sketchy notes I took which have been locked up for all this time." (Ibid., White House Central Files, Ex FG 11-5) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and lasted from 12:50 to 2:20 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

Bill Bundy: It is very clear there was no response from Hanoi. We had a long read-out from Ronning./2/ There is no give in their position. They indicated they wouldn't even talk as they did in Rangoon. There may be a slight lateral shift, but no forward move. Canada accepts that. Martin went before the House today. Our area of worry is their general underlying lack of sympathy with us. Martin said he would be disturbed if Canadians thought they had been used. They may charge we put them in a false position.

/2/During his Hanoi visit, June 14-17, Ronning met with ICC liaison officer Ha Van Lao, Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Go Thach, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. On June 21 Ronning reported on his visit in meetings with William Bundy and Canadian officials. Records of the meetings on June 21 include: 1) telegram 1740 from Ottawa, June 21 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S); 2) memorandum of conversation in Paul Martin's office, June 21 (ibid., POL 7 CAN); and 3) Bundy's memorandum for the record, June 22, re Dinner Meeting with Paul Martin and Other Canadian Officials on June 21 (ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron).

Secretary Rusk: We cannot accept the merit of Martin's argument.

Secretary McNamara: (Discussing proposed air attacks on POL) What are the benefits and costs? Why now?

1. Why now? The situation has changed dramatically. This is now an important target. Tonnage to the South is increasing; truck traffic is up 100%, personnel infiltration 120%.

2. Costs? Criticism from abroad; dissension in the United States. There will be some civilian casualties, and the estimate is 50 to 300. (Secretary McNamara read the orders, directing that the strikes be made only under ideal conditions.)

General Wheeler: A POL strike will not stop infiltration, but it will establish another ceiling on what they can support. There are three divisions there with another ready to move.

The President: How much chance is there of hitting a Russian ship?

General Wheeler: Negligible. There is a tanker in port now. It draws too much water to get close. We have never seen a tanker tied up at any other pier. They use a 250 foot floating pipeline. The strike area is 1500 to 1600 yards from the main tank center. The tanker will be at least 1100 yards away.

The President: MIG's?

General Wheeler: Tactical surprise may prevent that. When there are later strikes, they may use MIGs to defend.

The President: How many planes will we lose?

General Wheeler: In all 7 strikes, we will lose about 10.

The President: Suppose your dreams are fulfilled. What are the results?

General Wheeler: Over the next 60 to 90 days, this will start to affect the total infiltration effort. It will cost them more. In a very real sense, this is a war of attrition.

The President: You have no qualification, no doubt that this is in the national interest?

General Wheeler: None whatsoever.

The President: People tell me what not to do, what I do wrong. I don't get any alternatives. What might I be asked next? Destroy industry, disregard human life? Suppose I say no, what else would you recommend?

General Wheeler: Mining Haiphong.

The President: Do you think this will involve the Chinese Communists and the Soviets?

General Wheeler: No, Sir.

The President: Are you more sure than MacArthur was?

General Wheeler: This is different. We had ground forces moving to the Yalu.

Secretary Rusk: How many days until we are ready?

General Wheeler: A week or ten days.

The President: Can that tanker shoot back?

General Wheeler: It is unarmed.

The President: Will there be retaliatory pressure from the USSR?

General Wheeler: They could stop duty trains in Germany. In 1962 they ran maneuvers in the air corridors in West Berlin.

If the tanker is at the pier, we will not strike the pier.

The President: Are we adequately prepared?

General Wheeler: We have a family of contingency plans to counteract Soviet retaliation.

Secretary McNamara: No senior military leader recommends anything other than proceeding with this program.

The President: Would General Taylor give me his views.

General Taylor: I am optimistic. I think we have to press hard on all four fronts--economic, political, military and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way. We should be escalating. Personally I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak over with.

The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating, and that it will continue to go down. Some in Congress are disgusted about the Buddhist uprising and are talking about pulling out.

Secretary Rusk: The overplay on the Buddhist matter hurt more than anything else.

The President: What is the difference between POL and the power plant?

Secretary McNamara: The plant is more dangerous in that they may react more forcefully.

General Wheeler: POL is recognized as a legitimate military target, related to the movement of military supplies. We have already hit 4 POL facilities.

Secretary Rusk: Llewellyn Thompson does not believe there is a danger from the USSR.

The President: Who should we talk to?

Secretary Rusk: The chiefs of governments with troops in Vietnam, Mr. Wilson/3/ and Mr. Pearson.

/3/The President's message for Wilson was transmitted in telegram 7699 to London, June 23. The President stated that he had no choice but to proceed in light of the failure of Ronning's talks in Hanoi and "the accumulating evidence both of the importance of POL installations and a program to disperse them beyond our reach." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S/NINA)

Secretary Rusk: On this matter of retaliation, might the North Vietnamese try to hit our carrier?

Admiral McDonald: No problem.

The President (going around the table): How do you stand?

General Johnson: For, without qualification.

Admiral McDonald: I am too.

General McConnell: Agreed.

General Greene: I concur fully.

The President: Do we have enough men to prevent trouble?

General Johnson: Yes.

The President: If you were Ho, what would you do?

General Wheeler: Attack in Pleiku. Westmoreland expects that and has concentrated his forces. He has his eye on eventualities of this kind.

Admiral McDonald: If I were Ho, I would send IL 28's against the air base at Danang.

General McConnell: I would too.

Admiral McDonald: We would have a hard time stopping them at Danang.

The President: That is a little alarming. Bob, will you comment?

Secretary McNamara: He would lose his Air Force. It would be a foolhardy military operation. Also, if we can't beat 6 obsolete bombers, we ought to abolish the carriers.

The Vice President: I reaffirm my position in favor.

Cy Vance: Fully agree.

Walt Rostow: Fully agree.

Ambassador Goldberg: I am still opposed. I do not think it will bring them to the conference table. I am the least expert of any in this room, but I can see these risks:

--More involvement of North Vietnam in the South;

--No real shortage of supplies (Red China has plenty for them);

--More involvement by the Chinese;

--More involvement by the Soviets; (It is inconceivable that they can allow this significant action to pass without reaction of some kind.)

--Attrition of friends abroad and people at home.

This would be regarded in the world as a major step and there are bound to be reactions.

What are the alternatives? Don't withdraw. I think we are doing well. Beef up our forces, go after more successes and pressure of that type. Don't convert this to an extension of the war even to Hanoi. It is tougher and painful to absorb, but it will hopefully lead to an agreed solution to let the people in the South alone.

Secretary Fowler: I support it as an operational movement, and think it will increase the prospects for peace. The time is urgent.

Leonard Marks: I am for the target.

Mr. Raborn: I support. We need even more pressure, such as mining.

Dick Helms: The most effective thing we can do is mining. It would do extra damage of course. I agree there would be reaction from them.

The President: Any warnings you want to give me before I go to commune with myself and my God?

Mr. Ball: All things equal, this is a good thing to do, but it does not outweigh disadvantages. The world thinks Hanoi and Haiphong shibboleth that war not expanded. It will affect Europe. It won't affect North Vietnamese manpower. It would be hard for the Russians to take. They will have to supply POL across China. I am concerned about increasing the level of violence. I believe we have considerable trouble ahead on the political front. But if we are going to do it, do it now.

Mr. Bundy: I favor the strikes./4/

/4/JCS telegram 5003 to CINCPAC, June 22, authorized air strikes on June 24 against seven key POL storage installations in the vicinity of Haiphong and Hanoi. Lodge was notified of the decision in telegram 4011 to Saigon, June 22. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Due to bad weather and news stories anticipating the attacks, the initial strikes were delayed until June 29. See Document 164 regarding Johnson's June 28 conversation with McNamara about the strikes.

George Christian

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 23, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Nina. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:02 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11:50 a.m. on June 23 under cover of a memorandum stating: "Thieu's reaction to your decision is worth reading." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7)

5710. 1. I gave Thieu gist of your 4011/2/ (Ky not in Saigon today) and used appropriate material from the explanatory notifications being given to troop contributing countries.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 161.

2. Thieu listened with a most intense concentration and said that the President had chosen a "most favorable moment". It had been clear, he said, that if we could survive the last political crisis, it would be much harder for the Communists to attempt any more troublesome maneuvers in the future. It is now clear, he said, that "this year will be a decisive year for the Viet Cong." It is also clear that "they will make their maximum deployment this year." We here in South Viet-Nam, he added, hope that this is what will happen. For the President's decision to come after we have surmounted our political crisis and as the Viet Cong face such a bleak prospect is most welcome.

3. The Viet Cong, he said, cannot do any more than they are now doing; it is their maximum effort. It was clear to them in February that they could not reasonably hope for military success and that they needed some political gains. Before going to any peace talks, said Thieu, they hoped at least to have a government in Saigon which was weak and which, in the political field, would compensate for their own weakness in the military field. Now, if they accept conversations, they must hold them under conditions which are very unfavorable to them. If they cannot win militarily and if they cannot win politically, they will have no choice but to either stop the fighting or return to guerrilla war for ten or twenty years, and for them to do this will not be profitable for them. What can it accomplish? Nothing decisive.

4. If fact, he added, with our program of pacification, which contrasts so markedly with their terrorism, they will lose further public support without accomplishing anything militarily or politically.

5. What kind of conversations, therefore, he asked, can they have? If they stop the war in the South, they will surely have it in the North because there will be so much dissatisfaction with them which an admission of defeat would crystallize and bring to a head. Those who are running the show up there will surely lose their positions.

6. When I asked whether that meant Ho Chi Minh would go down, he said, "Maybe not. Maybe he could maneuver at the top and let the ones immediately under him be sacrificed."

7. Under questioning by me, he said that there were really three courses open to them rather than two. The first was to have conversations, which meant that they would in effect have to admit defeat and which would bring down the responsible parties in Hanoi; the second was to continue the war by switching all their efforts to guerrilla fighting. Then he said, in response to my questioning, that there was a third possibility: they could look as though they were continuing the war but actually it would be at very low gear, and on a very small scale.

8. He believed they were now in a state of mind where it would be expedient to challenge them to accept the Geneva Accords of 1954. He did not believe they would do so.

9. Returning to the recent political crisis, he said it had been "a test for us", for Hanoi and for all the accomplices of Hanoi. It was unquestionably the most serious political crisis which South Viet-Nam had had in three years. Their opponents had tried everything. In particular, they had tried to stir American emotions by the self-immolations, the demonstrations, putting the altars in the streets, etc. But this had failed.

10. Maybe, he said, "some people thought the GVN had been a little bit soft. But, he said, "if the GVN had operated against Danang early the consequences might have been dangerous." The GVN, he said, wanted to allow time for the people to understand so that when they finally did move, they had public support and people thought they were reasonable.

11. During the conversation, I was called to the telephone to be given news of the tidal wave approaching the city of Danang. Komer, who came with me, then said to Thieu that if this year was the year of decision, as Thieu had said, and as Komer agreed, then it behooved both of our forces, Vietnamese and American, to make maximum effort. To this Thieu agreed.

12. When the time came to leave, Thieu, apparently recalling what Komer had said, commented on the fact that Komer had four more days in Viet-Nam and said that would give him plenty of time to speak with Vietnamese and see for himself how strong their determination was. He had said earlier that it was true there was war weariness in Viet-Nam, but that did not mean that they were for peace at any price, or that they were indifferent to the kind of a peace which would be made. He obviously thought that there was a great deal of war weariness in North Viet-Nam too.

13. Comment: A. This is the first time any high ranking and responsible Vietnamese has talked to me about a decision coming as quickly as this year and about specifics of the courses open to Hanoi. Thieu showed a new and unprecedented confidence. B. He was very clear that he thought that the President had picked an extremely favorable time to bomb POL facilities, having in mind all the factors in Southeast Asia with which he, Thieu, could not have first hand knowledge. End comment.

14. I gave him the pictures of the Moon, with the President's covering letter, for which he was most grateful.

Lodge

163. Letter From George B. Kistiakowsky to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, June 23, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075, Vietnam, 1966. Confidential; Privileged.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The eight days of briefings certainly have not made us into Vietnam experts or enabled us to reach well-founded conclusions. However, they helped us to reach, among ourselves, a large measure of consensus on several tentative inferences and also to identify several problem areas, the intensive study of which might lead to conclusions and recommendations useful to you./2/

/2/From June 13 to June 22 a group of more than 40 distinguished scientists met in Wellesley, Massachusetts, for briefings on the Vietnam war by military and civilian officials and follow-up discussions. The meetings were organized by the JASON Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses under a contract funded by the Department of Defense. A list of attendees and an agenda for their meetings are attached to the source text but are not printed. Following the Wellesley meetings, the participants broke into four study groups and in late August submitted to Secretary McNamara four reports, which concluded that the bombing of North Vietnam was ineffective and recommended construction of a barrier as an alternative means to check infiltration. The reports' major conclusions are excerpted in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 115-123 and in the appendix to Document 269, and are discussed in Document 233.

We have been strongly impressed by the arguments of our military briefers that effective suppression and liquidation of main enemy forces is a necessary condition to the successful prosecution of the war of the villages and pacification of the countryside. However we heard no evidence that it is also a sufficient condition for achieving this ultimate objective. In fact, the emphasis on the war of the big battalions and the attendant buildup of U.S. forces is apparently having harmful effects on the war of the villages because of its economic impact on South Vietnam, gradual disintegration of the fabric of Vietnamese society, etc. There was presented to us no convincing evidence that the war of the villages is progressing favorably on the whole. There is thus already, from this point of view--aside from many other reasons--a strong incentive for rapidly winning the war against the hard core forces of VC and PAVN.

The military briefers left us with the impression that this war will "bottom out" early in 1967 so that the going will be easier thereafter. However we were forcibly impressed by the extraordinary unreliability and uncertainty of data on the infiltration of manpower and supplies from the North, on attrition of enemy forces, etc., data which, we assume, are the basis of their cautiously optimistic predictions for the course of war in the next twelve months.

If these predictions come true or if the will to fight of North Vietnam is broken in the meantime, what we propose to do will be a wasted effort. However we feel that prudence requires us to act on a more pessimistic view of the course of the war, which is that the war of the big battalions will continue escalating far into 1967 without the turning point being reached. This process will, we suspect, make the winning of the subsequent war of the villages much more difficult. One natural reaction under these circumstances is likely to be a very major escalation of the air war north of the 17th parallel. Whether this would be successful in forcing North Vietnam to give up the fight we are unable to judge, but we are mindful of the historical facts that aerial bombing never did it in the past and that the government of Ho Chi Minh is a very tough bunch. What the briefings did bring out is that the present level of bombing has caused only limited damage to North Vietnam and could have had no significant effect on the present level of the flow of manpower and supplies to the south, although undoubtedly making this flow more difficult to maintain. We would, however, like to examine the relevance of these difficulties to the capacity of DRV to prosecute the war. Since North Vietnam, with its comparatively easy terrain and high density of population and roads, is most likely not the choke point in the logistic supply line from China to South Vietnam, probably only its conversion into total shambles could interdict such flow. We should like very much the opportunity through detailed study to understand better whether that is so.

Since an operation leading to destruction of North Vietnam could have some very undesirable consequences for United States, we feel that the search for a different military policy option should become the central theme of our project. This option we can define at present only very vaguely as the creation of interdictory force fields (i.f.f.) at the proper choke points from the North and thus reduce the flow of materiel and manpower to such levels that the war of the big battalions could be substantially de-escalated. Where the choke points are--near the border between Laos and North Vietnam, in Laos or within the borders of South Vietnam--is not yet clear to us. Also the nature of interdictory force fields--stationary fences, air-sown mines and delayed action bombs, ECM, in addition to a further tightened sea barrier, etc.--or some combination of these--is still totally unclear to us, although the briefings left us with the impression that the present bombing of the Laos roads alone is not sufficient. The option for interdictory force fields, incidentally, may have some attractive side effects, aside from making the war of the big battalions more difficult for the enemy. If these fields are reasonably successful, the complex arguments for continued bombing of North Vietnam become clearly separated and some components eliminated. Also the acceptance of a cease-fire and subsequent policing of it will clearly be more feasible. On the other hand, we should be mindful that an i.f.f. could itself become a source of escalation of the war.

One of the major factors for the determination of the nature of the optimum interdictory force field is better understanding of intelligence data on infiltration rates and rates of attrition (men and materiel) since, for instance, large dumps of supplies in the Laos-South Vietnam border area would make materiel flow interdiction further North less attractive. If the infiltration of personnel is the controlling factor, quite a different i.f.f. may be required, and so on. Hence we would like to study the base of intelligence data.

A possible component of the interdictory force fields is an effective disruption of the enemy's command and control structure by selective electronic jamming and more sophisticated measures. The very limited information given to us does not prove that this would be either impossible or harmful to U.S. objectives on an over-all basis. We would like to study this question, also.

Needless to say, these studies will include thorough exploration of means for better utilization of our technology in the war, although, generally speaking, we do not propose to become involved in a broad effort at inventing new gadgets.

After some consideration, we concluded that the chances of our making useful contributions to the prosecution of the war of the villages and to the effectiveness of South Vietnam government are even less than in the above areas and do not propose to engage in systematic studies of these problems.

George Kistiakowsky
for Jason-East

164. Editorial Note

At 7:59 a.m. on June 28, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara telephoned President Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening Washington time. The strikes had been decided upon earlier (see footnote 4, Document 161) but delayed several days due to bad weather and concern over press leaks. The President expressed hesitation about proceeding immediately rather than waiting until July 1, citing events scheduled for June 30 that might be impacted adversely, including his own trip to the midwest.

The President then queried McNamara about the possible repercussions of hitting a Soviet tanker in the Haiphong harbor. After noting that he thought the chances of hitting one were small, McNamara replied: "I think it's serious, Mr. President, but I think that we have told the Russians that this clearly is--and we put it in writing--that we have done everything possible to avoid antagonizing them in this military conflict; and I think while it would be serious and while we would have a very strong protest, I myself doubt that it would lead to any military action. As a matter of fact, the appraisals are that if we mined the harbor and stopped Soviet ships from coming in there it won't lead to military action, so if we hit the tanker I doubt that it would lead to military action."

After further discussion of this issue and of Secretary of State Rusk's position on the strikes, the following exchange took place:

"President: I think now what we've got to analyze very, very carefully and we have, but before we execute, I think we've got to say, do we get enough out of this for the price we pay. The Hartkes are all--they're starting their campaign tomorrow on the Senate floor, they're speaking.

"McNamara: Well, Lippmann's got an article in this morning's paper, same thing, on exactly that point, and I think the answer is, this is just a minor incident in the war, and it's almost an incident that you can't avoid taking. I don't see how you can go on fighting out there, Mr. President, without doing this, to be absolutely frank with you. I don't think you can keep the morale of your troops up; I don't think you can keep the morale of the people in the country who support you up without doing this. About that point. Now in addition to that I myself believe it has military value, although I don't for the minute put the weight on it that the Chiefs do; but I don't put the cost on it that some in State do. I don't put the cost on that George Ball does, for example. I don't believe any Soviet experts, including Tommy Thompson, put the cost on it that George Ball does."

During further discussion, McNamara recommended sending out an execute order and then canceling it later in the day if the President changed his mind. The President gave his assent. Subsequently the following discussion took place:

"President: Things are going reasonably well in the South, aren't they?

"McNamara: Yes, I think so.

"President: What are these 6,000 men doing? They're trying to locate the enemy, I see, and they've run 'em into caves. Do you know anything about that?

"McNamara: Yeah. It's just so typical, Mr. President, it's a relatively small enemy force. We think we're taking a heavy toll of them. But it just scares me to see what we're doing there. We're taking 6,000 U.S. soldiers with God knows how many airplanes and helicopters and fire power and going after a bunch of half-starved beggars of 2,000 at most, and probably less than that. And this is what's going on in the South and the great danger, and it's not a certainty, but it's a danger we need to look at, is that they can keep that up almost indefinitely.

"President: Well I'd say with their manpower resources they have, they can't.

"McNamara: Yeah. That's the point. The only thing that will prevent it, Mr. President, is their morale breaking. And if we hurt them enough--it isn't so much that they don't have more men as it is that they can't get the men to fight because the men know that once they get assigned to that task their chances of living are small. I, myself, believe that's the only chance we have of winning this thing. And that's one reason I'm in favor of this POL, because there's no question but what the troops in the South--the VC and North Vietnamese troops in the South--ultimately become aware of what's going on in the North. We see this through the interrogation and the prisoner reports. I've been trying to watch those carefully to see what comes through those. And they know that we're bombing in the North. And they know we haven't destroyed the place, so that in a sense our bombing isn't fully effective, but they also know that nobody is protecting North Vietnam, and we just have a free rein. And when we bomb this POL, ultimately that will become known to the North Vietnamese soldiers and the Viet Cong in the South. And this is just one more foundation brick that's knocked away from their support. And when they see they're getting killed in such high rates in the South and they see that the supplies are less likely to come down from the North, I think it'll just hurt their morale a little bit more. And, to me, that's the only way to win. Because we're not killing enough of them to make it impossible for the North to continue to fight. But we are killing enough to destroy the morale of those people down there if they think this is gonna have to go on forever.

"President: Go ahead, Bob." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.17, Side A, PNO 2)

Between 1:10 and 2:27 a.m. on June 29, the President had 11 telephone conversations with Walt Rostow and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance during which he was provided with reports on the air strikes. Recordings of 10 of the conversations are ibid., Tape 6606.06, PNO 1-PNO 10.

JUNE 29-SEPTEMBER 18: EXPLORING NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM AND CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG; REASSESSING PACIFICATION

165. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

Washington, June 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sullivan was in Washington for consultations.

SUBJECT
Proposal for an "Asian Peace Offensive"

1. In Asia it is generally felt that our peace offensives concerning Vietnam are not sincere. This feeling derives from the fact that we have generally directed our efforts toward a Geneva-type conference which would include the Chinese Communists. The Asians understand that the Chinese Communists will not go to such a conference. They also assume that we understand it. Therefore, they feel that we are proposing a political arrangement which we know is a non-starter. Consequently, they doubt our sincerity in seeking a political understanding.

2. I believe there is a need for new political action which will make clear that our interest in a peaceful settlement is genuine and which will provide some feasible means for permitting the North Vietnamese to extricate themselves from the military and political situation in which they now find themselves. In the military field, I feel they are hurting badly and would be interested in seeking some way out of their current predicament. However, in the political sense, they cannot do this unless they are provided some assurances with respect to their future.

3. These assurances revolve fundamentally around their need to have a guarantor of their political and military continuance as a communist state and of their economic development to a tolerable level of exist-ence. They are considerably dependent upon the Chinese Communists for both political and economic support in the current circumstances. However, this support is contingent upon the North Vietnamese continuing to carry out a line of disruptive action in Southeast Asia which is compatible with Chinese interests and tactics. If the North Vietnamese were to change their line of action, this support would doubtless shrivel and they would have to turn elsewhere for guarantors. Since they could not ideologically depend upon any Western country or upon the UN, they would obviously have to turn to the Soviet Union as their guarantor.

4. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be expected to be entranced by the prospect of assuming these responsibilities with respect to North Vietnam. They would in effect be buying a sort of Asian Albania or Asian Cuba and a rather expensive one at that. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Soviet Union, if it were to agree to take on the responsibility of supporting North Vietnam in a state of peaceful coexistence in Southeast Asia, would charge some price for these services. In short, they would wish to bargain with us and the Western world for the service of taking the North Vietnamese plague off our backs.

5. The problem is how to become engaged in a discussion with the Soviet Union on this subject. It seems clear that neither the Soviets nor the North Vietnamese wish to enter into blunt negotiations in this context. Therefore, an indirect, more oriental approach seems indicated. I would like to suggest such an approach in this memorandum and would submit that it has certain other values both in a domestic and an international context.

6. The approach I would suggest involves the public proposal that both North and South Vietnam become members of the UN and that the UN mechanism be engaged to help settle the problem of Vietnam. There are several by-products of UN membership, of which I shall mention only a few. First, it would enable the Soviets and others to recognize the accredited existence in Saigon of a government which is chosen by means acceptable to the membership of the UN. This absolves them of their responsibility to seek only a Viet Cong dominated government. Secondly, it could address itself to the ultimate goal of unification and stipulate that goal as part of the purpose of membership. Thirdly, it would provide us with a quid pro quo against which we could suspend bombing operations in the North. Fourthly, it would represent a clear break with China and Chinese policies but in a manner not so violent as to induce Chinese Communist retaliation. Fifthly, it would be a revival of an old Soviet proposal and therefore presumably difficult for them to ignore.

7. I would further suggest that we take advantage of the proposal for North Vietnamese membership to extend our "peace offensive" to all East Asia. That is to say, I would include also dual membership for North and South Korea and dual reception in the General Assembly for Communist and Nationalist China. In other words, I would propose wrapping all three of these into one large and rather impressive initiative which would capture public imagination and at the same time give a positive thrust to our inevitable change of policy on the question of Chinese representation.

8. This device would, in my opinion, bring us for the first time into serious negotiations with the Soviets on the price which they will demand for some initiatives with respect to Vietnam. Because of the nature of the proposal, I think it is clear that we can expect their price to be expressed in some similar terms: namely membership applications for East and West Germany. This may not be the case, but it would seem logical to anticipate and they have already given some indication of this by their recent proposal of East Germany for UN membership. In any event, I think we must assume that the Soviet price would somehow or other be associated with the European area and the questions of military confrontation in Europe which are paramount in their relations with the U.S.

9. I do not believe that we need to accept the Soviet proposal for East German membership, and perhaps we could even give West Germany an assurance that we would not accept it. However, since it would probably be the opening Soviet bargaining counter, we would at least have to discuss it in the context of moving toward an acceptable price for Soviet services. It is conceivable that the price could be in some related field such as MLF, nuclear proliferation, etc. etc. Nevertheless, I do not feel that we should preclude the possibilities of opening discussions in this vein merely because the subject which the Russians will wish to discuss would be offensive to our German allies and unacceptable to our national interests.

10. It would be my suggestion that this blanket proposal be discussed with a limited number of countries to sound-out not only their points of view but also the possibilities of various tactics. For example, we might conclude that it would be the better part of valor to have the Canadians take the initiative on this whole proposal and have ourselves become involved only in bilateral discussions with the Russians to determine how much the traffic will bear.

11. I end where I began with the conclusion that we have not yet offered a practicable political route of escape for the North Vietnamese to use under our increasing military pressure. I would suggest, therefore, that this proposal be examined in that light and that discussion of it at an appropriate level within the U.S. Government begin immediately./2/

/2/In a memorandum of July 1 to Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel called Sullivan's proposal a "non-starter and one we cannot afford, particularly at the risk of paying the price with no return whatsoever." Stoessel contended that the steps proposed by Sullivan to get the negotiations started were unnecessary and would give the Soviet Union a political victory over Communist China "worth ten times the price of Soviet assistance in the rehabilitation of North Vietnam." Moreover, the proposal would impair relations with West Germany and fuel suspicions in Europe that "we might be willing to sell European security interests for a solution to our problems in the Far East." (Ibid.)

166. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Senator Mansfield. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Two Meetings on Viet Nam with Democratic Members of the Senate

On June 28, I met with two groups of Democratic Senators to consider the question of Viet Nam. Participants in the first meeting were Committee Chairmen or their designees. Those attending the second meeting were drawn from the bottom of the seniority list of Democrats in the Senate, in order and as available.

The meetings were held on a confidential basis. Completely free discussion was encouraged. Members were asked to speak out on whatever aspects of the Vietnamese question were on their minds.

There was no attempt to obtain a consensus. What was sought rather was a free flow of the concerns, ideas and attitudes of the older and the younger Democrats in the Senate. Yet, in the general outpouring of thought, there were several points so constantly reiterated and so unchallenged as to suggest areas of very heavy agreement. They may be stated as follows:

1. There is general support for you among the Members in your overwhelming responsibilities as President;

2. The prompt end of the war is seen as most essential and there is confusion and deep concern that we have not yet found the way to end it, either by extension or contraction of the military effort;

3. There is no sentiment among the Members for an immediate withdrawal;

4. There is a strong conviction that candidates of the Democratic Party will be hurt by the war.

Enclosed are brief summaries of the various lines of thought and ideas which were expressed at the two meetings on yesterday./2/

/2/Attached, but only the summary of the first meeting is printed.

There is also attached herewith a copy of a memorandum which was sent to you after a similar discussion on Viet Nam among a group of Senators from both parties which took place a year ago./3/

/3/Attached. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 270-278.

Attachment

Washington, June 28, 1966, 12:30 p.m.

DISCUSSION OF VIET NAM BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN OR DESIGNEES

The following Senators attended:

Russell (Ga.)EllenderEastlandMcClellanMagnusonFulbrightRobertsonLong (La.)AndersonYarboroughJacksonBibleJordanRandolphInouyePastoreWilliams (N.J.)

Summary of Principal Lines of Thought and Ideas Expressed

A. General Comment

1. We may have gone too far in trying to obtain negotiations last year, even though we want the matter settled honorably at a conference table.

2. We ought not to withdraw unilaterally, but we are in a fix, and it is not clear how we are going to get out of it.

3. To get out in present circumstances would be very destructive of our stature in the world.

B. The War and Policies

1. We already have 400,000 men in the area and the cost will soon reach $2 billion a month.

2. Unless stable government can be had, the war is not going to be won, and the pressure to pull out altogether will increase.

3. Stability of government in Saigon cannot be expected soon, and we make a mistake by emphasizing it. Any government there is going to be a "puppet" for the present. What is involved here is that "this is Communism's last stand" and the problem is to hit the Communists harder while giving whatever puppet government we have in Saigon the economic support it needs.

4. The only moral reason we have for being in Viet Nam is the contention that the South Vietnamese people want us there but have we tried to find out whether this is really so or not--whether, in fact, the people want us?

5. The Secretary of State's theory of the conflict has been that we are facing an aggression pure and simple; it is a wrong theory. We face, in fact, a situation not too different than that faced by the French.

6. Recent broadcasts by Eric Sevareid and Bill Lawrence have been very revealing and suggest we have not, heretofore, been getting a complete and accurate picture of what is happening in Viet Nam.

C. Other Nations, International Organizations and the War

1. Beyond Viet Nam, the problem is the containment of China. The Chinese, however, are not likely to become active participants unless we put forces into North Viet Nam.

2. The only major country supporting us is Britain which is totally dependent on us.

3. Most friendly countries are concerned by our preoccupation with and entrapment in Viet Nam.

4. Although the Australians will stand with us, there are indications that they want us to get out.

5. The U.N. does not want in, in this situation. It may be that the Geneva group can be helpful in negotiations.

6. Improvement in relations with Eastern Europe is stymied by the Vietnamese war.

D. Suggestions

1. If we cannot get a stable government, we should agree to elections and get out as best we can; and sooner rather than later, because it is a very expensive war. It is not dishonorable to have a conference and get out.

2. We must think of our prestige and honor even if the area is not vital in a geographic sense.

3. The Communists are seeking to protract the war in the hopes of U.S. impatience; we must contract the protraction or get out.

4. The question is not to stay in or get out but how to get out.

5. Increased military pressure is necessary. If we back off in Viet Nam, the U.S. public will support no President in any effort to save any part of Southeast Asia.

6. It may not be possible to settle the war by negotiations; both sides would save face if the war just peters out.

7. The bigger the war is expanded, the more it is going to be lengthened; a quick ending by expansion is a fallacy.

8. The way to get negotiations is by calling for a cease-fire and neutralism.

9. The President should get his advice from the Armed Services.

10. The President should call groups of Senators together and tell Rusk and McNamara to be quiet while they talked.

11. Is there not some way in which the U.N. can be brought in?

E. Political Implications

1. The Democratic Party is badly hurt by the war even though individually some Democrats may not be troubled.

2. If war drags on, the Party will suffer badly. People want a decision, by a step-up of the war; they are not interested in casualties. Indeed, it might be a good idea to stop televising what is going on over there.

3. The people are following the President but not with enthusiasm, in part, because they do not understand the importance of the war. There is a lot of worry over why we are there.

4. It is not a major war, but its consequences are being felt by many families in the nation.

5. The war is hampering domestic programs of Administration.

6. Democrats are badly split in West Virginia; the matter is not an issue in Virginia; the political difficulties among Democrats in New Jersey over the war, as recently reported in the New York Times, were vastly over-stated.

7. Viet Nam is worse than Korea and remember what Eisenhower did with the latter.

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:06 p.m. Passed to the White House and to Canberra, where Rusk was attending the SEATO and ANZUS Council meetings. In telegram 1961 to Saigon, July 6, the Department of State indicated that all messages dealing with the "Italian-Polish approach on Viet Nam" were to be slugged with the code name Marigold. (Ibid.) The telegram is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 237-239. Many subsequent telegrams concerning Marigold are printed, in whole or in part, ibid., pp. 241-370, and are summarized in a 90-page "Chronology of Marigold," prepared by the Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147, Marigold Chronology)

5840. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary, and the Acting Secretary.

1. This afternoon D'Orlandi, Italian Ambassador, telephoned to say it was urgent that I come to his office as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had ended. I went to his office at about 6:45, and he began as follows:

2. Two days ago, the Polish representative on the ICC, Lewandowski, came to him with a "very specific peace offer".

3. D'Orlandi said he had requested instructions from Fanfani, who told him 1) to submit the whole proposal to me, and 2) said that he, Fanfani, would send the whole thing to Washington for their consideration.

4. By way of background, D'Orlandi said he considered the Pole to be a friendly and outspoken man, and that they had a number of general discussions with D'Orlandi saying how very obdurate and foolish the North Vietnamese were not to accept President Johnson's offer at a time when there were only 30,000 American advisers. Now there are now 265,000 fighting men which may go to between 400,000 and 500,000.

5. A salient feature of these various conversations had been that the Pole had talked about the need for absolute secrecy in diplomacy--that nothing could be done without it. D'Orlandi felt that he was "not as stubborn as most Communists," and had received the impression that he had "rather high rank," and enjoyed the special confidence of his government and was actually in Saigon on a "very special mission."

6. Nevertheless, D'Orlandi said, he was surprised when he came to see D'Orlandi within a half hour after his request for an appointment on last Monday./2/

/2/June 27.

7. When he arrived, D'Orlandi spoke of having recently seen Sihanouk who thought that Hanoi was not willing to do anything.

8. The Pole said, "You'd be surprised how much my visit completely contradicts what Sihanouk says. I have been in Hanoi and can state a number of points." After stating his points, he read them over to D'Orlandi afterwards so there was no misunderstanding.

9. The Pole began by saying that Hanoi has been deeply disappointed by the proposals made by Ronning which, they are sure, had emanated originally from the United States and not from the Canadians. Ronning had proposed that the U.S. stop the bombing if North Viet-Nam stopped the infiltration, and had talked about the exchange of prisoners' parcels and letters. This had bitterly disappointed North Vietnam. The first point, they had said, would be unconditional surrender, and they could not accept it, but they are open to a "political compromise" settling once and for all the entire Vietnam question.

10. When D'Orlandi said that he was skeptical, the Pole said that Hanoi was prepared to go "quite a long way." "It is useless for me to add," said the Pole, "that should there not be any kind of a preliminary agreement, Hanoi will deny flatly ever having made any offer." According to the Pole, the North Vietnamese are "tightly controlled" by the Chinese Communists. The preliminary talks, therefore, should be between Moscow and Washington. When and if proposals should emerge which could be considered as a basis for negotiations, Hanoi would at that time and under those circumstances get into it. The Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese Communists who have an interest in dragging on the war for many years. D'Orlandi added that the Pole was evidently "proud of himself" for having brought these proposals about.

11. The proposals are as follows:

A. They insist that the so-called National Liberation Front "take part" in the negotiations. The key word is "take part." According to D'Orlandi, there is "no question of their being the representative; they are not to have any monopoly."

B. There must be suspension of the bombing.

12. These are the two proposals.

13. Then there are other points, which D'Orlandi called "negative ones," which are that A) Hanoi will not ask for immediate reunification, either by elections or otherwise, of North and South Vietnam; B) they will not ask for establishment of a "socialist" system in South Vietnam; C) they will not ask South Vietnam to change the relationships which it has in the field of foreign affairs; and D) they will not ask for neutralization; E) although they will ask for U.S. withdrawal, they are ready to discuss a "reasonable calendar"; E) although "we would like someone other than Ky"--to quote the words of Hanoi--they do not want to interfere with the South Vietnamese Government.

14. The Pole thinks that these proposals were not made through Sainteny, because, he says, Hanoi feels that proposals through French channels would "not be sympathetically considered in Washington."

15. Once again, the Pole insisted on utmost secrecy. He said to D'Orlandi, "we as Poles and you as Italians are missing a terrific opportunity for agreement between Moscow and Washington. The sooner we settle it, the happier we will all be." If this attempt failed, he would ask to be assigned elsewhere. To illustrate the amount of secrecy, he said that none of the Polish Embassies in the world, including the Polish Embassy in Rome, had been informed.

16. He did not give the name of the individual with whom he had talked in Hanoi. He did say that he believed that Washington knew of this proposal already.

17. D'Orlandi said to me that it was clear from the above that Hanoi is trying to "run out" on China, that the top officials in Hanoi not only fear for their political lives, but that they are actually afraid of having the country occupied by the Chinese Communists.

18. The Pole said that his government would be willing to arrange for D'Orlandi to meet with appropriate Polish spokesmen anywhere--Hong Kong or Singapore. In response to a question by D'Orlandi as to why they had come to him, the Pole said they wanted "an able debater to put the case to President Johnson, and we feel that the Italian Government has the sympathy of the United States Government." Moreover, the Italians have the same interest we have in agreement between Washington and Moscow, and in shutting out Peking.

19. D'Orlandi's impression is that the Poles are desperately seeking a way out on Moscow's instructions. This, he said, may need further exploration. He had the definite impression that now Hanoi "was amenable to common sense" saying "they do not want anything that would not stop the whole war. They want a political settlement, and are prepared to go a long way."

Lodge

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, June 29, 1966, 8:17 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Ball. Repeated to Canberra for Rusk.

4108. Literally eyes only for Ambassador. Embtel 5840./2/ Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came in today with Faroche, Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada, who had hand-carried message similar to that contained reftel and who said he was under instructions to hand-carry our reply back to Rome. We did not indicate that we had received Saigon's message. Main differences between two messages was that "participate" was used in place of "take part" with respect to role of NLF in negotiations.

/2Document 167.

We told Fenoaltea that, except for use of term "participate" with respect to NLF, which could have implication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be "sole representative" of SVN, and "suspension of bombing" in place of "cessation of bombing", position Hanoi indicated to Pole was very similar to previous indications their position. Thus in light of various translations these words have gone through, it is not clear whether their use has any significance. Therefore, without indicating to Pole that message had been passed to USG, suggested Italian Government on its own responsibility, query Polish Rep on these two terms to determine whether formulations contained in Polish version of Hanoi's position were used advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in position or were accidents of translation. We told Fenoaltea we would be in better position to give him reply after receiving answer, and Fenoaltea promised immediately to query D'Orlandi./3/

/3/In telegram 61 from Geneva, July 6, Goldberg reported that he had learned of the Polish-Italian approach through U Thant, whose source was Fanfani. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, vol. 4) In telegram 145 from Rome, July 9, Goldberg transmitted a written summary of the Polish-Italian approach from June 27 to July 7, which had been provided by President Giuseppe Saragat of Italy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD) Both telegrams are printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 242-243 and 245-247.

Ball

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:03 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 241-242.

5855. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary and the Acting Secretary.

1. To me the Polish "proposal" contains matters of substance which, so far as we know in Saigon, are new. The fact that the so-called NLF will not be the sole representative, and will merely "take part" or "participate" (in this context there is really no difference) seems to be a new departure.

2. The fact that the talk is of "suspension of bombing," rather than a demand for complete "cessation," also looks like new substance.

3. The proposals attributed to Hanoi, as a package, go far beyond anything we have heard mentioned before. In fact, they appear so forthcoming as to arouse suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish intermediary. It seems to us that not only is the so-called NLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining agent, but so also is the NLF program of a "socialist" state, of unifying the North and South, and of "neutralization." Also the phrase "reasonable calendar" indicates a definite softening of position regarding U.S. troops. The same is true of acceptance of the Government of South Viet-Nam and its foreign relationships.

4. As I have said many times, it is indispensable that total secrecy be preserved. I am convinced that the slightest mention of anything like this will cause its immediate abandonment.

5. This proposal clearly comes in response to the successes we are having militarily, politically, and economically. They must see themselves blocked everywhere--except terrorism and we are making progress on that.

6. The officials in Hanoi are afraid for their own official lives, and they also undoubtedly have a generalized fear as to what China may be going to do to them and their country.

7. Unquestionably the Polish proposal would never have been made without specific Moscow approval. Hanoi's best chance is to get Moscow to underwrite some kind of a way out. An understanding between Washington and Moscow is, therefore, attractive to them and obviously has some very attractive aspects for us.

8. D'Orlandi and the Pole conversed in English. Whenever I have talked with the Pole, he has pretended not to know any French. I do not know in what language the conversations were held in Hanoi.

9. It may be pertinent for me to remind the Department of the warm friendship which I have with D'Orlandi, which goes back to my first tour here in 1963, and which was very much emphasized by the help which the U.S. gave him at the time of his desperate illness when, thanks to your support in Washington, I was able to get him a plane with a bed.

10. I believe him to be a careful and accurate reporter, and there is no doubt of his complete mastery of English. In fact, I gather he has really been bilingual in English since he was a child./2/

/2/Rusk responded in Secto 58 from Canberra to Katzenbach and Lodge, June 30, stating that there might be something in the Polish approach. The telegram has not been found, but is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 241.

Lodge

170. Editorial Note

In a telephone conversation with Federal Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin that began at 9 a.m. on June 30, 1966, President Johnson made the following comments about the peace feeler that had been transmitted the previous day in Document 167:

"I'm not going to tell anybody else this, Bill, and I don't put much credence in it, but before the day was over yesterday I had the most realistic, the most convincing, the most persuasive peace feeler I've had since I've been President. That was at 3 o'clock yesterday. I hadn't finished this dinner here with the Prime Minister [a luncheon for Prime Minister Holt of Australia] and they were calling me out on a very urgent call--the Secretaries of State and Defense. Now, I don't think it amounts to anything. I'm not a fellow like Adlai Stevenson that gets a drink in a bar and thinks that somebody buying for him means he wants to surrender. I'm too hard headed for that."

After a brief discussion of the previous day's air strike near Haiphong, the President returned to the peace feeler:

"Yesterday they had a man in Saigon and yesterday they had a man in Washington, one talking to the Secretary of State and one talking to our Ambassador, both of 'em saying that Hanoi had said that here were conditions they'd never offered before. Now we're analyzing those, and I don't think much of 'em, although the diplomats do, but I don't think so. I don't think they've had enough yet." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Martin, Tape 66.18, Side A, PNO 3)

171. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret.

SUBJECT
Second Komer Trip to Vietnam, 23-29 June 1966

This trip was far more valuable than my first. By now I've established sound working relations with all the key people, and have begun to find out the real problems.

I try to make these visits both educational (for me) and cathartic (for others). In the course of a week I talked with 60-70 Americans from Lodge and Westy on down to sergeants, and at least 60 Vietnamese from Ky down to villagers. Each got a tailored pep talk.

I. General Conclusions. I return both an optimist and a realist. Optimistic because Westy's spoiling operations are going well; his prudent concern that a monsoon "offensive" is still in the offing is partly offset by abundant evidence that the VC has lost a lot of steam despite the infusion of strength from the north. Optimistic also because our own civil side effort has finally gotten off the ground, and because the GVN itself has a new wind--born of its success in containing the Buddhist bid for power over the last three months. It is taking pacification more seriously too. Third, we've got the economic situation under better control. In short, the US/GVN effort is greater and more efficient than ever before--though one keeps wondering why it takes so long.

But is all this enough? The more I learn the more I'm sobered by the realization of how much further we may have to go. On the military side, our intelligence is improving but it is still only one in several sweeps that really catches and clobbers a VC main force unit. Nonetheless, Westy sees the VC/NVA as committed to a classical Phase III Maoist strategy rather than reverting to guerilla war. He thinks they are trying to concentrate in divisional strength in at least 8-10 different areas. Their aim is to tie down our forces by synchronized though widely separated attacks and hopefully to overwhelm us in at least some cases. Westy's counterstrategy is to mount spoiling attacks, hitting the VC first wherever he can pinpoint a concentration. He seems to be keeping them off balance.

But our military effort against the VC is not yet matched by our pacification and civil side operations. Our greatest weakness is our inability as yet to capitalize on the initiative our own military operations have given us by extending our control over the countryside. We have stopped the erosion of GVN control, but I would judge that we have not really extended our control significantly outside the main towns over the last year. Until we can get rolling on pacification in its widest sense--securing the villages, flushing out the local VC (not just the main force) and giving the peasant both security and hope for a better future--we cannot assure a victory.

The weak link in the chain is the GVN and the ARVN. We must get a greater return out of them--and it would be cheap at the price. The 700,000 ARVN forces are not pulling their weight. Nor is the GVN civil side. The US is bearing the brunt of the effort--which is neither necessary nor desirable.

My two main conclusions from this trip are that we must (a) step up our own support of pacification/RD; and (b) galvanize the GVN and ARVN into a much greater--and better--effort in this field. There are some encouraging signs that this is feasible. My ideas as to how to do it follow--they differ in some significant respects from the views in my 14 June memo to you/2/ (which proves to me that trips are quite useful).

/2/Document 155.

II. Stepping up the RD/Pacification Effort.This is essentially a matter of better management of US/GVN resources, and of generating enough resources to meet the need.

On the US management side, there is encouraging progress. Porter has recognized that he can't run a billion dollar enterprise without a staff. He is organizing one, headed by Ambassador Koren, a top notch FSO. He'll report 10 July. With Westy's help, I've also urged Porter to get a good general officer as No. 3, because better civil/military coordination is essential. Most of our pacification people in the field are military--some 2200 MACV advisers working at least part time on pacification vs. some 300 odd civilians.

Also most encouraging is Ky's plan to give General Thang, the highly energetic RD Minister, super-ministerial supervision over the Agriculture, Public Works, and perhaps Information Ministries--as well as the Regional and Popular Forces. This step should serve to integrate control over the key security, cadre, and reconstruction assets in the countryside under probably the most capable man in the GVN. Equally important, the province chief will now be given more direct control over the local RF/PF security assets available. Divided authority between the province chief (usually a Lieutenant Colonel) who is pacification-minded and the ARVN regimental, division and corps commanders--who often are not--has been a serious problem. In my visits to five provinces I found this a concern of US advisors as well as province and district chiefs.

Next steps. We may need to go further in this direction, however. The crazy quilt pattern of ARVN and local forces has further proliferated over the past year as pacification concepts have evolved. Now Police Field Force companies--which Westy has come around to favoring--and RD cadre teams have been added. The security element of the 59-man RD cadre team roughly equates to a Popular Force platoon; a Police Field Force company is not much different than a Regional Force Company. Confusion exists as to the proper roles and missions of each component of the pacification forces. There are also a number of hangovers from earlier programs, such as auto-defense forces and Combat Youth.

So Porter and I started a high priority study by a top notch inter-agency group in Saigon to redefine these functions. Then, working with the GVN, the Mission hopes that the roles and missions of pacification forces can be precisely defined by a GVN decree. Such a rationalization of roles and missions might also lead to certain consolidations and overhead reductions--essential as well for meeting the growing Vietnamese manpower shortage.

Some of the most knowledgeable and imaginative experts also believe that there is a critical lack of enough bodies to extend GVN control further into the countryside and provide security for the RD effort. They say that all the RF, PF, Cadres, and police put together are not enough to do more than hold the present real estate the GVN controls. One solution advocated is to shift many of the ARVN regular units--which are not pulling their weight in the battle against the VC main force anyway--into local security work. Those who advocate this solution would break up the lower grade ARVN units into battalions and put them under the province chiefs. They argue that when regular ARVN units are committed to a pacification (clearing and security) role, the ARVN regimental/division/corps levels frequently inhibit the proper tactical employment of company and battalion-sized units.

This highly important matter of the GVN military and para-military structure merits open-minded investigation. It is plain that whatever change in operational roles or chain of command might be contemplated, the present MACV-supported logistic and administrative structure must be maintained. No one else could do the job. There might also be local political complications in disturbing the present distribution of military power. Major changes would doubtless be stoutly opposed by many in MACV or elsewhere. But as MACV necessarily devotes more and more attention to an ever larger US military effort, it inevitably becomes less of an advisory group and more of an operational headquarters. So experienced hands like General Krulak in Honolulu support a re-examination of this whole problem area.

The MACV advisory effort. Whatever is done about the above, however, the MACV province and district advisory effort is indispensable--and one of the bright spots in Vietnam. We have 153 subsector (district) teams in 75% of the districts now, and MACV is considering 12 more. They are really the backbone of our effort in the countryside. Their high quality must be maintained.

Indeed, I favor a "single manager" concept whereby the senior man in each province or district--military or civilian--would be designated as team chief for pacification/RD advisory purposes, reporting through region to Porter's office. Over a year ago, we experimented by appointing one of the US representatives at provincial level as US Team Captain, with coordinating authority over the entire US effort. I was impressed by how well this concept is still working in Binh Thuan province, even though the experiment ended six months ago with the decision to operate on a cooperative basis--not under a team captain. It stands to reason that if the province chief is a single manager on the VN side, we should have a single manager on the US side. Therefore, I intend to re-open the question of a US team chief. He would receive guidance directly from Porter operating in his expanded role. MACV would still be able to deal with the sector advisors on purely military matters.

The RD Cadre Program is now fully launched. Over 26,000 cadre are in the field (not all well-trained). We will be graduating 5700 more each four months from the Vung Tau center and the Montagnard center at Pleiku. I visited three 59-man teams in their hamlets. Many of them were not on duty stations. Neither Porter nor I are satisfied with the quality of the cadre or their supervision in the field. I have urged that the MACV district advisory teams (the only Americans down at the district level) keep an eye on them. CIA is simply spread too thin to do the entire job; nor is AID much better

Colonel Chau, a trusted member of General Thang's staff (assisted by Major Be, who did such an outstanding job with the cadre in Binh Dinh) has taken charge of Vung Tau. The former chief instructor (Captain Mai) and a group of close supporters attempting to build the cadre into a "third force" have been removed. There has been a temporary setback in the orderly development of an effective training establishment. Porter will recommend any slowdown in rate of cadre output needed to insure that quality has priority over quantity. The cadre program is promising, but it is just one of many pacification instruments and will take time to achieve significant impact.

Police Field Forces (company sized units of motivated, well trained policemen working night and day in the areas between hamlets) are receiving a great deal of attention. The concept is good; execution on the part of the first units in the field has apparently been good also. Because of the manpower implications and the overlap with Popular and Regional Force roles and missions, MACV has opposed PFF expansion. Based on my discussions with Westmoreland, he now favors police and agrees with a 15,000 PFF level by 1967. Again (I will explain how later) this powerful instrument must be fully integrated with the overall RD effort.

The Police Special Branch, charged with the local intelligence effort against the VC infrastructure seems to be progressing nicely. Black lists given to US units before operations have led to the capture of many VC cadre. Likewise, pacification has been enhanced by the pin-pointing of cadre and guerillas in hamlets. Here is an area where I think we'll see progress of the most meaningful sort.

Land Reform. No progress here. A study has recently been completed but the recommended program is more theoretical than practical. The big problem is now to administer a new land reform law with the very thin GVN administrative apparatus. My idea is to implement simple reforms in local areas as the areas are secured. Liberalized tenure and credit for tenant accomplished improvements are two possibly workable ideas. Cabot's people will work with the GVN.

Chieu Hoi. Much more can be done. The cost per defector is 1/100th the cost per enemy killed by military action. We've recruited a new and imaginative chief US advisor, who will work directly under Porter to step up our effort, since an inter-agency committee approach hasn't worked. The GVN has to carry the ball, but we can prod and help to insure that the effort at least keeps pace with expanding military operations.

Area Priorities. Clearly, present capabilities for expansion of area control are limited and may not correspond with the four National Priority Areas to which the GVN and ourselves are committed. By and large, I favor instead more attention to those areas where greatest progress is feasible. For example, with very little additional effort it might be possible to pacify the entire province of Tuyen Duc. Binh Thuan Province under a dynamic province chief and an excellent US provincial team appears ready to expand the area of government control. Wherever US bases exist the spillover improvement in security and economic conditions should allow extension of pacified areas. Much depends also on the competence and morale of the local GVN organization at province, district, and village. As the RD mechanism at province and below grows in capability and the national level RD organization takes shape, this type of selective expansion probably should become the general operational approach. Porter intends to foster this concept.

Better Civil/Military Coordination. In keeping with the move toward super-ministerial status for RD, the US Mission needs to strengthen its own machinery for civil/military coordination. I had useful discussions with our Mission principals, who all agree on expanding the capabilities of Porter's office, perhaps by adding a general officer as a chief of field operations and top-flight assistants for economic warfare, Chieu Hoi, manpower, revolutionary development (in the restricted sense), and possibly RF and PF. Given this organization, Porter should be able to work closely with the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and cover the key civil/military components of pacification.

III. The Economic and Logistic Front. Here we are doing much better. Ky's bold devaluation plus McNamara's piaster budget should between them keep about 30 billion piasters out of circulation during FY 1967, thus effectively braking inflation. Devaluation led to some short term price rises of 10-25% except for rice (which we got the GVN to subsidize)--but prices should drop back after a few months unless we undermine the devaluation by too many offsetting wage increases. This would also nullify the special wage increase allowed the GVN and ARVN, the chief victims of inflation. So I pressed the Mission not to yield too much to the RMK strikers--lest we trigger a further chain of wage demands.

MACV port takeover should take place shortly. Westy, Lodge and I found Ky quite willing. Everyone (AID included) agrees that takeover is the right thing, even though Mann claimed that waiting time on commercial ships was down to two days. I gave Westy the green light to proceed as fast as feasible (he confessed that after I mentioned the likely need on my last trip, he laid on contingency planning long before formal instruction was received). The GVN also insists that goods are moving out of the port much faster under the new 10-day rule (and the spur of devaluation). Next, we are proceeding to bring AID cargo under the military shipping scheduling and priority system, which will help ensure a smoother flow of goods into the ports.

I stressed to Westy the McNamara/Komer "most efficient operator" and "single manager" concepts for meeting civil sector needs. If the military are already doing similar things and can take care of the civil side as well by a marginal increase in already well-established military logistic programs, let's do so. It saves money and increases efficiency. We're setting this up right now on medical logistics. (Westy would like to go further and integrate the whole civil/military medical effort under General Humphreys, but the latter is opposed.) My problem here is not Westy, who agrees, but the reluctant civil side. Both will cooperate in the BOB logistics study I've laid on with DOD. My next target for possible integration is in-country lift.

Meanwhile, AID is seeking to strengthen its Vietnam team and to increase the efficiency of our economic aid program. We've made real progress toward agreement on streamlining the Commercial Import Program via consolidated procurement, bulk purchasing, and opening up the Saigon import community to insure healthy competitiion. I personally prodded Minister Thanh on this front, and believe I made some progress. AID is also sending a dozen more top people to Saigon. Wehrle's agreement to extend six months is another boon. I hit the AID people hard on stepping up our agricultural programs, and getting more help from Orville Freeman.

Lagging rice collection from the Delta remains a critical problem. Collections are up a bit from the nine-year low of the last four months, but we're still estimating less than 300,000 tons this year (compared to 700,000 tons in 1963). A lot of this rice seems to be going to Cambodia, and then partly to the VC. So I taxed everyone from Ky and Thanh to Lodge and Westy on the importance of an integrated civil/military rice strategy. "Rice is as important as bullets" was my theme. I even invested a lunch with General Quang at IV Corps in pressing him on rice.

Porter will join me in pressing for more effective rice control meas-ures, before the next harvest begins around the turn of the year. He's plugging the concept of a canal barrier along the Cambodia/Delta border, but MACV claims it will take too long to build, require too many engineer resources, and tie down too many troops. However, Westy's plan to put one or two US brigades in the IV Corps region will help a good deal. We will also press more effective resource control measures (the 750 police checkpoints are largely farcical). Next, I'm seeking ways to use over 400,000 tons of US aid rice as leverage to force the GVN to subsidize rice purchases and then subsidize rice sales (we'll foot the bill through piaster counterpart). Lastly, we must open up the Delta transport routes and get more barges. We are still neglecting the Delta.

Economic Warfare. Aside from the rice problem, the broader field of economic warfare requires increased attention. For years we have urged that a widespread resource control program be enforced. Except for some police check points (mostly statically positioned on major roads and simply bypassed by the VC), few effective resource control measures are being carried out. Yet thousands of military outposts exist on roads and canals. Ergo, use these outposts as resource control points and employ the many daily PF/RF patrols and ambushes as part of a system of mobile resource control check points. Ample laws exist giving military forces emergency police powers. However, the GVN has an aversion to using military forces for checking supplies and people moving throughout the country. It must be changed.

The extensive bombing of VC base areas, military search and destroy operations against the bases, and crop destruction are effective economic warfare measures. But unsupported by other necessary measures, these military activities alone will not result in economic strangulation of the enemy. It should also be possible to undertake both active and passive measures against the widespread and productive VC efforts to tax merchants, truckers, barge operators and the peasants.

Manpower. The most critical commodity in South Vietnam is manpower, particularly skilled manpower. Since some drastic control meas-ures are needed, I took Assistant Secretary of Labor Leo Werts and Dr. Kidd from Dr. Hornig's office with me to look into the situation. They are doing a great job, and have outlined the dimensions for its solution. A carefully worked out manpower budget will be necessary before we can lift the temporary manpower ceilings that have been imposed. I should have a preliminary report on the manpower team findings within a month.

IV. Briefing the Saigon Press Corps. Both Lodge and Porter have responded handsomely to your injunction that they devote more attention to the US press people. I followed up hard on this. It will take continued urging, so I will regard it as an ongoing chore. Lodge still complains about his Mission giving daily press briefings (i.e., only the Ambassador should speak), but he can't cover 350 pressmen by himself.

The above is a mixed bag of large and small thoughts and actions. But I increasingsly see the civil side problem as less one of discovering any single new key to success than one of much better management and stepped up activity on many fronts. At the least I can say that we are moving more rapidly in this direction, and I am reasonably confident that we can move faster yet.

R.W. Komer

172. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, July 2, 1966, 0459Z./2/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Manila, where Rusk was meeting with President Marcos, and passed to the White House.

/2/Z refers to Greenwich Mean Time.

131. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary and the Acting Secretary.

1. I bumped into D'Orlandi unexpectedly Friday night,/3/ and he told me the following:

/3/July 1.

2. He had received queries from his government concerning the two points raised in Deptel 4108,/4/ that is the words "take part" versus "participate," and the words "suspension" versus "cessation" of bombing.

/4/Document 168.

3. His understanding of the words was the same as mine, but in order to make sure, he called on Lewandowski who confirmed his understanding that these words meant, respectively, that the so-called National Liberation Front would not be the sole representative, and that what was desired was a suspension, meaning stopping temporarily without any commitments concerning resumption.

4. D'Orlandi said he had great difficulty getting Lewandowski on the telephone, which is why he called in person, and that he had arranged for Lewandowski to telephone him twice a day at 10 and at 4. He also has an appointment to talk with him on Monday night.

5. D'Orlandi found Lewandowski more eager than ever. Lewandowski said he was sure that this was the right time to score against the Chinese. When D'Orlandi brought up the bombing of the POL in Hanoi and Haiphong, Lewandowski made it clear that this, contrary to what some Senators are saying at home, did not affect the prospects for reaching a political settlement. He stressed that the heart of the matter was a political settlement, and not the question of whether or not the so-called National Liberation Front was the sole representative or whether or not they meant suspension or cessation. He evidently feels that we must get rid of the "cease-fire mentality," and think in terms of a political settlement of the whole Viet-Nam issue.

6. Lewandowski was particularly earnest in saying that any initiative from the U.N. or the ICC at this time would be "most unfortunate." He was sure that such initiatives would result in Peking putting pressure on Hanoi for immediate rejection, and this would jeopardize the maneuver which he, Lewandowski is trying to carry out.

7. This ends the report of what D'Orlandi said to me Friday night.

8. This is another reason why U Thant's attempt to get into the act would be dangerous to the cause of peace./5/ Knowing U Thant quite well, I can understand his determination to get involved, now that he has realized that the wind is beginning to shift, which was reported from here in Saigon 5437, June 10./6/ I have been thinking of some way to bring about his participation without injury to the cause of peace and one idea, which is perhaps worthy of study, would be to consult with him before the Geneva conference, or alternatively we might ask him to present whatever agreement was reached to the United Nations once it had been ratified at Geneva.

/5/CIA Intelligence Information Cable [document number not declassified], June 28, reported that U Thant planned to send a representative to meet with Chinese Communist and NLF representatives "in an effort to obtain agreement that U Thant serve as an intermediary in a Vietnamese peace settlement." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 4) Lodge commented on the report in telegram 81 from Saigon, July 1, calling it "improper and un-neutral." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET)

/6/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

9. Herewith a comment on the statement in paragraph 4 of the Secretary's message from Canberra Secto 58, June 30, transmitted to me as Deptel 4113,/7/ in which the Secretary says "D'Orlandi is a professional, although his opinions seem to go up and down in Saigon on basis that seems to depend heavily on gossip."

/7/Not found; see footnote 2, Document 169.

10. D'Orlandi has a rather usual Italian love of making startling and paradoxical statements at dinner parties. He does so partly for his own amusement and also hoping it will startle and provoke other people into talking. He also often has opinions about what is going to happen here with which I disagree. I doubt whether many opinions are very firmly held. For example, he has been saying a number of unfavorable and pessimistic things about Ky, and when I knew D'Orlandi was going to Cambodia, I asked him please not to give Sihanouk the impression that this whole place was falling apart, and believe he obliged in a very convincing way.

11. There are several things about him which, I think, are of great value. The first, as the Secretary says, "D'Orlandi is a professional." He is thus an extremely accurate reporter. He has a complete command of English, and can discern shadings and distinctions as well as any of us can. Secondly, in the very core of his being, he is pro-American, and believes that the United States is carrying out a wonderful and indispensable role in this dangerous world for the benefit of all humanity. If, therefore, you were decided to work through him, you could be guaranteed of devoted help actuated by the deepest feelings of friendship for the U.S. as well as absolutely accurate reporting with considerable insight into the implications of everything that is said.

Lodge

173. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Kyoto, Japan/1/

Washington, July 5, 1966, 8:31 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and Ball and approved by Ball. From July 4 to July 7 Rusk attended meetings of the U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in Kyoto and Tokyo. Rusk approved the course of action proposed in this telegram in telegram Secto 113 to Katzenbach, July 6. In telegram 2673 to Tokyo, July 7, Ball informed Rusk that the President had approved the script and added that it was felt that, carefully nurtured, the approach might develop into something. Neither telegram has been found; telegram 2673 is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 243, and both telegrams are summarized in the Marigold Chronology prepared by the Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147, Marigold Chronology)

1773. Tosec 169. To Secretary from Acting Secretary. Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow/2/ and I am proposing to send through them the following memorandum to the President.

/2/Rostow, Harriman, Unger, and Goodpaster flew to the LBJ Ranch on the morning of July 6 to meet with the President, and departed about 1:30 p.m. for Los Angeles to brief the Governors Conference on Vietnam. McNamara arrived later that afternoon and departed the next morning. No record of the discussions at the Ranch has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

"Bob McNamara, Walt Rostow, Tommy Thompson, Alex Johnson and I have discussed further the Italian-Polish approach on Viet-Nam and concur in recommending for your approval the following line of action:

1. Tell the Italian Ambassador here that:/3/

/3/A memorandum of Ball and U. Alexis Johnson's conversation with Fenoaltea on July 7 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD.

a. We are very appreciative of his government's role and are interested in the approach, but there are obviously aspects that require clarification.

b. In view of the Polish representative's statement that he would be willing to meet any place to follow up on the matter, we suggest that Ambassador D'Orlandi, in Saigon, seek discreetly to arrange a meeting between himself, the Pole and Ambassador Lodge. At that meeting Ambassador Lodge would seek the necessary clarifications directly from the Pole.

2. Instruct Ambassador Lodge at such a meeting to:/4/

/4/These instructions were transmitted to Lodge in telegram 2626 to Saigon, July 7. In telegram 604 from Saigon, July 9, Lodge reported that he had "stated the four points in your 2626" to Lewandowski at a meeting on July 9 and that Lewandowski had responded that he would seek to get answers "as soon as possible." Telegram 604 is ibid. and both telegrams are printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 244-245.

a. State that the United States shares the desire for an over-all political settlement.

b. Inquire when, where, and with what parties Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place.

c. Inquire what if any action Hanoi on its part would propose to take or not to take during the period of suspension of bombing. (This is of course an implied reference to infiltration.)

d. Inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic to keep negotiations secret if the United States suspends bombing with the inevitable speculation this would entail.

3. We would await outcome of foregoing action before making any XYZ approach. If these actions led nowhere or disclosed that initiative of the Pole was not well founded, we would seek to confirm this fact through XYZ. In other words, we would inform Hanoi, through XYZ, of the supposed approach and ask for their confirmation or denial.

This course of action has the advantages of:

1. Keeping the Italians in the act for the time being and, if nothing comes of it, satisfying them that it was through no fault of our own. At the same time we would avoid too great a dependence on communications by the tortuous channel of the Italian Ambassador in Saigon to Rome to the Italian Ambassador here.

2. Directly engaging Ambassador Lodge in a matter with which he is already fully familiar and for which he has expressed some enthusiasm.

3. Keeping the XYZ channel in reserve either to confirm a negative result or to follow up on a positive result from the Polish channel.

If anything positive comes from Lodge's talk with the Pole we will have to decide whether or not to cut out the Italians. We will also have to face the hard decision as to what role we will give the NLF and how we can make that palatable to the GVN, what performance and degree of verification on cessation of infiltration we will require to suspend bombing, how we can best maintain our freedom to resume bombing if negotiations are unsuccessful, et cetera.

We feel that, if Lodge does meet with the Pole, it will be desirable that he say something of a general nature to Ky in order to anticipate the inevitable rumors in Saigon./5/ However, I think that this is manageable with Ky, who will at this point probably see in it the signs of a change of heart by Hanoi."

/5/Lodge reported in telegram 642 from Saigon, July 10, that he made an oblique reference to Marigold as he was leaving a meeting with Ky, to which Ky responded "that he was sure that North Vietnam could not stand much more of what they were getting." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 247-248)

If you have any comments or suggestions I would like very much to have them before 10:00 a.m. Washington time Wednesday./6/

/6/July 6.

Ball

174. Memorandum From George Carver of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/

Washington, July 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam. Secret.

SUBJECT
Comments on Mr. Komer's Report to the President on his 23-29 June Trip to Vietnam/2/

/2/Document 171.

1. Mr. Komer returns from Vietnam a cautious optimist. He feels the military side of the war is going fairly well but the civil/pacification side is not keeping pace with our military effort. In no small measure this is due to the fact that neither the GVN nor the ARVN is pulling its weight. His principal conclusions are that the U.S. must step up its own support of pacification and rural development and must galvanize its Vietnamese allies into greater and better effort. Mr. Komer offers a number of detailed recommendations for achieving this goal.

2. Though we should respect the request that circulation of this memorandum be restricted, its only really sensitive elements are its adverse comments on the performance of our allies. We recommend that copies be furnished on an Eyes Only basis to the DDP, Chief/FE, Chief/FE/VNC, the Acting DDI, D/NE, D/CI, and SAVA.

3. Mr. Komer makes a number of perceptive and valid comments on a variety of subjects: the need for better manpower allocation and a more rational definition of the roles and missions of various counterinsurgency elements, the Chieu Hoi program, area priorities, the economic scene, economic warfare, and the desirability of MACV's taking over the Saigon port. He also has some useful things to say about land reform, though like most observers he misses the point that credit, not tenure, is the principal problem.

4. Within the bosom of the family, however, this memorandum--or rather the analysis and perspective it reflects--has some serious flaws and raises some basic problems. Surface features such as its "gee whiz" style, fondness for the perpendicular pronoun, and breezy bandying of first names ("Westy") are irritating but relatively unimportant. What is important is its tone of activist omniscience which masks some fundamental misconceptions about the nature of the war in Vietnam. Perhaps unconsciously, Mr. Komer is encouraging the President to anticipate early and quantifiably measurable results. Even with a proper mix of programs and personnel, such results are not going to occur in a short time span. If we expect such results, we may be misled into constantly re-jiggering valid approaches before they have had enough time to accomplish anything worthwhile. Mr. Komer perceives this unpalatable truth dimly (". . . the US/GVN effort is greater and more efficient than ever before--though one keeps wondering why it takes so long."), but he does not understand it.

5. The most serious defect in the memorandum arises from its misconception of the nature of pacification, which prompts action recommendations we feel would be counterproductive. Mr. Komer notes:

"until we can get rolling on pacification in its widest sense--securing the villages, flushing out the local VC (not just the main forces) and giving the peasant both security and hope for a better future--we cannot secure victory."

Had he stopped right there he would have been on solid ground and his memorandum would have been most useful. He does not stop there. He goes on to argue that improvement in the pacification effort is "essentially a matter of better management of US/GVN resources, and of generating enough resources to meet the need." Management and resources are both important, but the essential aspect of pacification is one of doctrine. Without the proper doctrine, management and resources can accomplish little.

6. Mr. Komer makes a number of concrete recommendations for improving the management of the pacification effort, particularly the Rural Development cadre program. Their net effect would be to give this program a military cast which would ruin its chances of success. For example, he recommends that Ambassador Porter have a considerably augmented staff and that a U.S. General Officer be assigned to it as Number 3 man in charge of all field operations--i.e., the Rural Development teams. He also suggests that because "CIA is simply spread too thin to do the entire job; nor is AID much better", MACV District Advisory teams should be tasked to "keep an eye on" all RD cadre in the field. Should both of these recommendations be accepted, the rural development program that this Agency created would cease to exist and would be replaced by, essentially, a new form of Popular Forces.

7. The opinions outlined above are private ones offered for your eyes only. They have been discussed with Mr. de Silva who is in substantial agreement and would like to pursue this matter with you further./3/ We recommend that the Agency acknowledge receipt of Mr. Komer's memorandum with a bland and courteous response and not use his report as the vehicle for taking issue with his approach./4/ Nevertheless, we should also prepare an additional paper, not so closely keyed to his trip report as to be provocative, to set forth this Agency's considered views on these larger questions.

/3/In a July 8 memorandum to Helms, DeSilva called Komer's views on pacification "appalling." He found "really depressing and discouraging" Komer's proposals for establishing a "single boss" at the province level and for giving MACV "broad supervisory authority at the lower levels." He predicted this would result in rural pacification losing its momentum and coming to a halt. "If we have learned any lesson in the past two years," DeSilva continued, "it is certainly the lesson that the military establishment is incapable of contesting the armed guerrilla subversion of the Viet Cong throughout the countryside." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam)

/4/For Helms' response to Komer, see Document 181.

8. At some point soon, fundamental decisions will have to be made on the shape and future scope of RD cadre program, how it is to be managed on the U.S. side, and how it is to be funded. The three questions are so closely interrelated that they will have to be answered collectively rather than seriatim. The Agency's written and verbal input to this decision-making process would be the most appropriate vehicle for presenting our arguments on the fundamental questions raised in Mr. Komer's report.

George A. Carver, Jr./5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[end of document]

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