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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

175. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 14.3-66

Washington, July 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79-R01012A. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem/Sensitive; No Dissem Abroad. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY POTENTIAL FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Problem

To estimate: (a) the present strength of the North Vietnamese military establishment; (b) its capability to expand; (c) its capability through 1967 to send troops to the South and support them there; and (d) the probable buildup of forces in the South.

Assumption

For the purposes of this estimate,/2/ we assume that North Vietnam will generally continue to pursue its current strategy in the war over the next 18 months.

/2/The figures in this estimate are current as of June 1966. [Footnote in the source text.]

Conclusions

A. We estimate the present strength of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces to be slightly over 400,000 with about 375,000 of these in the army. North Vietnam has sufficient manpower to provide a total military force of over 500,000 men without serious strain.

B. The total Communist force in South Vietnam is estimated at between 260,000 and 280,000. The major combat elements include some 38,000 North Vietnamese troops, approximately 63,000 VC regular main and local forces, and about 100,000 to 120,000 guerrillas.

C. North Vietnam is estimated to have a current annual capability to train 75,000 to 100,000 individual replacements for infiltration. By making a maximum effort, this total might be doubled. From these, North Vietnam could organize some 24 to 36 infantry regiments per year.

D. There is considerable margin for error in estimating total Communist losses. Nevertheless, we believe these losses are mounting rapidly. The loss rate has already begun to strain the replacement capability of the VC in South Vietnam, but it appears that current total Communist losses could be replaced, if necessary, from within South Vietnam.

E. We estimate that the VC could recruit and train 7,000 to 10,000 men per month. The replacement of cadre, however, is probably a problem and is almost certain to become more difficult in the future. By the end of 1967, the loss rate may exceed the estimated capability of the VC to recruit replacements from within South Vietnam, especially if the rate of combat increases. In such case, the Communists might be forced either to scale down their plans for expansion or to step up the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam.

F. Present evidence suggests that the total infiltration for 1966 will probably be between 55,000 and 75,000 men. These would probably include one or two infantry regiments per month, additional units and combat support battalions, and individual replacements.

G. We have no reliable evidence of Communist force goals. By the end of 1966, however, the Communist regular force may include 35-40 regiments and other units and number about 125,000 (65,000 VC and 60,000 NVA)--a net gain of about 50,000 for the year. By the end of 1967, this force may grow to over 150,000, provided attrition remains substantially at 1966 proportions.

H. We believe that current and estimated future capacities of the Laotian road network are sufficient to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Even if this capacity could be reduced, say by one-third, and combat activities were to double, we would still estimate that the capacities would be sufficient on an annual basis to support the requirements for the Communist forces at current and future levels. However, at these higher levels of forces and combat, the excess of road capacities over requirements would be reduced during the rainy season.

I. Maintenance and operation of the North Vietnamese truck fleet in North Vietnam and Laos is a serious problem, and the regime is dependent on the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe for trucks, spare parts, and POL. However, despite truck losses from air attack, breakdown, and retirement, we believe these losses could be offset by imports. The POL requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement has not been large enough to present significant supply problems. But local shortages have occurred from time to time and may become significant as a result of attacks on the POL distribution system.

J. Other channels of supply complement the Laotian corridor, Cambodia has become an increasingly important source of supplies, particularly food. Although sea infiltration has been curtailed, the Communists will probably continue to attempt to resupply their forces by this means, particularly in the delta area.

K. We believe that morale problems for the Communists will become aggravated in the future. Hanoi's problems in implementing its military strategy have increased, and the record of combat must raise questions, at least among some leaders in North Vietnam, as to the wisdom of their long term military strategy.

[Here follows the body of the 18-page estimate.]

176. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

July 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 8. Confidential. Drafted by Rostow en route by airplane from Los Angeles, where he had attended the Governors Conference, to Washington, and transmitted from the White House to the President in Texas at 6:21 p.m.

Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles

What struck me about the Governors was their honest eagerness to hear the facts and to hear what we think and why.

It is clear that even these mature and able men have not gotten a clear picture of all the elements in our policy and how they fit together.

It is also clear, talking with people out here, that your Omaha speech/2/ was a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL.

/2/The President spoke at Omaha on June 30. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 679-685.

I recommend, therefore, that we organize a campaign to drive home each of the themes of the Omaha speech:

--We are fighting aggression; we are confident (not optimistic: we don't want to promise too much, too soon); we shall persist; we shall succeed.

--We are proud of our skillful, brave, compassionate men fighting in Viet Nam; and we shall back them to the hilt.

--There is a vital Free Asia emerging behind our defense of Viet Nam. (Several governors came up afterwards to tell me this was new, exciting, hopeful.)

--There is a vital, modern South Viet Nam emerging. (The Honolulu program is slowly gaining credibility. We don't want to over-sell it; but I found by talking about how Korea emerged after 1961 I could make them see why it was possible.)

--Peace. Why we believe that there is a fair prospect of a relatively tranquil era ahead if we see it through in Viet Nam, but only trouble and more war if we bug out.

--Food and Development. This is the real war for all to fight. (At some stage you should consider a statement like that I got into President Eisenhower's April 1953 speech after Stalin's death:/3/ you are prepared to recommend to the Congress that we put a proportion of what we save in military expenditures, when the war in Viet Nam ends, into increased development assistance. This would put extra pressure from developing nations on Hanoi and Peiping.)

/3/"The Chance for Peace," delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. For text, see ibid.: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179-188.

These six Omaha themes must be repeated until every newspaper in the country knows them; every knowledgeable citizen; every commentator.

Repetition is the heart of both politics and teaching.

You should consider a series of talks in which you refer briefly to them all and then elaborate one of them at length.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara should do the same.

And all our other foreign policy spokesmen should follow suit.

You may wish to send a memorandum to this effect to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara./4/

/4/In a July 8 memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, Rostow indicated that the President wanted the "six themes, developed in his Omaha speech, elaborated and driven home systematically in speeches and statements made by members of the Departments of State and Defense on Vietnam." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

In short, I believe the POL bombing and Omaha have caught the nation's attention. Our people sense new determination; new ideas; new hope.

Now, in a quite systematic way, we must drive the lesson home.

177. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 11, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top Secret. On July 11 Rostow forwarded Taylor's memorandum to the President and, at the President's request, to Rusk and McNamara. In his covering memorandum to the President, Rostow indicated that he and Taylor had been "going into the negotiating question quite deeply" but that there were "some critical gaps." He proposed to formulate these gaps into "key unanswered questions" in consultation with Taylor, submit them to the Departments of State and Defense, and later schedule a meeting for the President to review the planning. (Ibid.) The President indicated his approval on Rostow's covering memorandum, resulting in the preparation of Document 178.

SUBJECT
Preparations for a "Cessation of Hostilities" in Viet-Nam

In commenting on Mrs. Gandhi's statement of July 7,/2/ our government spokesman included the following sentence: "A cessation of hostilities both in North and South Viet Nam could be the first order of business of a reconvened Geneva Conference."/3/ This, of course, is not new prose but I would like to raise the question whether, as a government, we are in agreement as to what it means or implies.

/2/Gandhi proposed an immediate reconvening of the Geneva Conference and an immediate end to the bombing of North Vietnam followed by a cessation of hostilities, with the ICC safeguarding the standstill military arrangement. (The New York Times, July 8, 1966)

/3/Telegram 4535 to New Delhi, July 8, reported the text of the spokesman's statement on July 8 and provided "confidential observations" on the proposal to be put before Gandhi. Telegram 4653 to New Delhi, July 9, detailed the proposal's "numerous deficiencies," which needed rectifying if the initiative was to "serve any useful purpose." (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

As I understand it, it means that we will negotiate a cessation of hostilities (which the newspapers call a "cease fire" but is more properly an "armistice") in advance or as a part of negotiations aimed at a final settlement in South Viet Nam. Since it took over two years to negotiate an armistice in Korea, I think it very timely for us to make sure that we are not about to get into an equally frustrating and unsatisfactory exercise.

I am aware that considerable work has been done and is being done in the State Department at the planning level in anticipation of a possible cessation of hostilities. I have recently seen quite a good draft on this subject which undertakes to define terms and proposes a way to use our most valuable negotiating blue chips./4/ I would hope that this paper or one like it would get to you shortly because I am constantly fearful that a Communist proposal will catch us by surprise. Any day we may be presented with an offer to "stop bombing and start talking".

/4/Reference is to a 14-page paper entitled "Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam: Planning Considerations," prepared by the Working Group of the interagency Vietnam Planning Group and sent by Unger to Rostow, McNaughton, Ball, William Bundy, and other officials on July 8 in light of Gandhi's July 7 proposals. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 72, E/Documents Relating to a Cease Fire in Vietnam) Taylor's July 11 memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, critiquing the paper, is ibid.

An analysis of the possible course of events in the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities reminds us that, before we are successful, we are likely to be faced with many difficult situations, particularly in winning and retaining public support in the face of the sharp criticism of allies, neutrals and segments of the U.S. public, evoked by the unpopular positions which we shall be obliged to maintain. Throughout the negotiations, unless we are willing to sacrifice vital interests, we will have to establish and maintain an unyielding position on points like the following:

a. The U.S. will not stop bombing or pay any other price for the privilege of participation in negotiations with the Communists.

b. The U.S. will not tolerate another prolonged Panmunjom-type negotiation. The negotiations will have to demonstrate sincerity and obtain tangible results within a reasonable time after their initiation.

c. If it is impossible to get a system of international supervision of the execution of agreements reached, the U.S. will reserve the right to decide whether violations have occurred and to take appropriate action.

d. The Government of South Viet Nam will have the right of circulation throughout all of South Viet Nam during a cessation of hostilities and will have the obligation to protect its citizens and to maintain law and order.

Obviously, the maintenance of these positions will subject us to Communist attack and will cause acute unhappiness in many international and domestic quarters. Thus far, I have the feeling that we have not prepared the domestic and international public for our attitude on these points. Not only have we not laid the ground work to justify our attitude on these matters, but in some cases in the past we have used misleading language which invites misinterpretation. An example is statement No. 14 of the U.S. Official Position which reads: "We have said publicly and privately that we would stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace."/5/ We need to clear up what we really mean by such a statement or run the risk of being charged with double-dealing or at least of misleading the hopes of the many nations who feel involved in the situation in South Viet Nam.

/5/For text of the "Fourteen Points of the United States Official Position on Peace in Southeast Asia," January 3, 1966, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 740-742.

As time may be running short, I would recommend that you urge State to propose to you at once a plan for negotiating a cessation of hostilities in advance or as a part of the negotiation for a final settlement and that the plan suggest ways and means for winning domestic and international understanding for the unpopular positions which we will inevitably be obliged to take and hold throughout the negotiations.

Maxwell D. Taylor

178. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, July 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret. Benjamin Read forwarded the memorandum to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy on July 14 under cover of a memorandum stating that Rusk "has asked me to get your succinct private views on this matter." (Ibid.) For background information on Rostow's memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 177.

The President wishes at an early stage to review with you both our planning for negotiations in Viet Nam. In this connection, it may be helpful if answers were developed with respect to the following questions, among others:/2/

/2/The 13 questions were prepared by Taylor and submitted to Rostow in a July 12 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor)

1. What are the US/GVN negotiating assets and how should they be played to gain what? In particular, what should we obtain from the other side to warrant a cessation of bombing in North Viet Nam?

2. How can we verify the cessation of infiltration of supplies and personnel into South Viet Nam, (a) with third party supervision and (b) without such supervision?

3. If no third party policing of a cessation of hostilities is possible, can we afford to enter into any such agreement?

4. What is our response if the DRV takes the position that it exercises no control over the VC/NLF and has no authority to represent them?

5. To get a negotiation started, what might we communicate in advance to the Communist side to make them see that an accommodation with us is preferable to the existing situation? What attractive "golden bridge" or bridges can we offer to them? What carrots?

6. How would we want the NVA/VC units to behave under the terms of a cessation of hostilities? How do we visualize the dissolution and/or repatriation of VC/NVA units and individuals?

7. During a cessation of hostilities, how would we prevent the DRV/VC from regaining strength and continuing "non-shooting" activities such as propaganda, recruiting, tax collection and accumulation of supplies?

8. During a cessation of hostilities, how do we avoid legitimatizing VC occupation and control of areas of the country which government forces can not enter without fighting?

9. If we are to maintain the right of the GVN to circulate throughout South Viet Nam during a cessation of hostilities to maintain law and order and to protect its citizens, how can these activities be carried on without violating a cease fire?

10. How do we avoid prolonged negotiations on the model of Panmunjom?

11. How do we prepare the domestic and international public for the hard nose positions we must maintain, such as:

a. The U.S. will not stop bombing or pay any other price for the privilege of participation in negotiations with the Communists.

b. The U.S. will not tolerate another prolonged Panmunjom-type negotiation. The negotiations will have to demonstrate sincerity and obtain tangible results within a reasonable time after their initiation.

c. If it is impossible to get a system of international supervision of the execution of agreements reached, the U.S. will reserve the right to decide whether violations have occurred and to take appropriate action.

d. The government of South Viet Nam will have the right of circulation throughout all of South Viet Nam during a cessation of hostilities and will have the obligation to protect its citizens and to maintain law and order.

12. How and when do we bring our allies into these pre-negotiation discussions?

13. During or after negotiations, is it feasible to relate the intensity of our bombing to the violence of VC activities in South Viet Nam? If so, we would probably never have to stop bombing completely and would have a flexible means of replying to VC incidents following a cessation of hostilities. Otherwise, when the inevitable violations occur, we would have no alternative other than to denounce the cessation of hostilities or to tolerate the violations./3/

/3/William Bundy responded to this memorandum in a note to Rusk, July 15, stating that "we do not have, at this moment, well organized answers to the questions" and thus Rostow "has precipitated the very need that I had foreseen before our trip." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)

W

179. Memorandum for the Record/1/

New York, July 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. In a July 20 letter to Bohlen, Johnson indicated that messages concerning the contact described in the memorandum printed here would be slugged "Elm Tree." (Ibid.)

I met with General Khanh from 1:00 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. July 17 in a suite at the Waldorf Astoria. As was previously the case in our meetings, we conversed in a mixture of French and English, with General Khanh talking primarily in French and with my interrupting to clarify points I did not fully understand.

After exchanging pleasantries, I referred to his previous conversation with Col. Jasper Wilson,/2/ which I said had been brought to the attention of the President, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. The President had asked that I meet with General Khanh to follow up on that conversation and no one else was privy to our conversation or to his previous conversation with Col. Wilson. General Khanh expressed much satisfaction and at my request went over the ground he had covered with Col. Wilson but in more detail.

/2/No record of this conversation has been found; prior contacts in July between Khanh and the CIA regarding this subject are summarized in two memoranda, dated July 7 and 20, from [text not declassified] of CIA to William Bundy, who are identified in the memoranda by pseudonyms. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78-000032R, Chipwood Memos-FE)

He traced the Viet Cong movement in the South back to the "Movement Republicain de Cochine" (MRC) which he said was one of several political movements that originated in the South in the 1946 period, others being the "Movement Populaire de Cochine", which was a French puppet that disappeared, the Dai Viet and the Viet Minh. The MRC was heavily composed of Cochinchinese, essentially non-Communist intellectuals such as Tho. It was subsequently suppressed by the French and its leaders imprisoned. They were released in 1954 and initially worked with Diem. However, to these Southerners the Tonkinese Diem was essentially a "foreigner" and they broke with Diem around 1957 to form what became the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front.

While southern-born cadre trained in the North were infiltrated and some supplies, the movement was thus essentially Southern as opposed to Annamite or Tonkinese. However, various units were under varying degrees of Communist or Tonkinese control, depending on the type and number of cadre. However, Khanh said (it was not clear how much he was expressing his own opinion and how much that of "Mr. Out")/3/ that there were no organized North Vietnamese forces introduced into South Viet-Nam until after the introduction of the Americans. Nevertheless, he agreed with my observation that, from what we now knew, the North began to move elements of the 325th Division toward the South before the introduction of the first American combat units into Danang in April 1965. We did not return to or further resolve this point.

/3/"Mr. Out" was Le Van Truong. Le Van Truong identified himself at a meeting with Paul Sturm on July 27. The substance of the meeting was reported in Document 195, and the information on Le Van Truong's identify was reported in telegram 1523 from Paris, July 30. After serving in Vietnam as secretary general of the Movement Populaire Cochinchinois, established in 1946, Le Van Truong had lived mostly in France from 1947 to 1954 and then in Saigon from 1954 to 1963, when he left Vietnam. His overt political activity had principally taken the form of journalism. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) In an August 11 memorandum for Sturm, U. Alexis Johnson noted that biographical information from CIA files, although very skimpy, generally "checks out with" Le Van Truong's story. (Ibid.)

However, as Khanh saw the problem, it was a "problem of the South for the South".

He then recounted the history of his relationship with "Mr. Out" along the same lines as to Col. Wilson. He said that "Mr. Out" alleged that he was one of the three leaders of the NLF along with Nguyen Huu Tho and "Mr. In". He said that on our list of NLF officers "Mr. In" was listed as Ho Thu, a Deputy Secretary-General (but of course that was not his real name) and, contrary to Col. Wilson's understanding, he was not now living in Saigon but rather in Viet Cong-controlled area in South Viet-Nam.

In reply to my question as to how "Mr. Out" was able to maintain from Europe the communication necessary to be a leader of the NLF, Khanh said he was not familiar with the details but he knew that he exchanged communications in 48 hours, Khanh thought possibly through the NLF office in Prague and thence through Cambodia.

Khanh said "Mr. Out" said that some three weeks ago the CIA had attempted to establish contact with "Mr. Out's" "liaison officer" in Brussels but he had turned them down as he did not want to deal with the CIA.

Khanh said that, as a result of his talks with "Mr. Out", Tho, "Mr. Out" and "Mr. In" now agreed on a program under which they would ask for the presence of American forces on the assumption that North Viet-Nam would not agree to accept any arrangement for an independ-ent South Viet-Nam and would seek to continue its efforts to take it over. However, they would not want the presence of other foreign forces such as the Koreans, the Australians and the Philippines, as they desired to deal solely with the United States. They would also ask for continued American economic assistance.

Khanh said that he had not discussed how the Viet Cong forces would come over or how arrangements could be made, but he thought it important that we not talk in terms of "ralliement" but rather in terms of "conciliation."

In reply to my observation that at some stage discussions of arrangements such as this would have inevitably to involve the GVN and how did Khanh foresee the possibility of working this out, Khanh said that it would be entirely impossible with Ky and the other Tonkinese now in the GVN. It would have to be a purely "Southern solution" by Southerners for Southerners. America should reach agreement with the NLF and then see that the kind of a government was installed in Saigon necessary to carry it out. In reply to my observation that, as Khanh knew, we did not have that kind of control over the political picture in Saigon, he observed that we had been very successful in bringing about a satisfactory solution in the Dominican Republic.

In reply to my question on how we could test the bona fides of "Mr. Out" he suggested that we might ask him to arrange the release of a few selected prisoners within an agreed period of time or ask for a stand-down in Viet Cong operations in a specified area for a specified period of time. In this connection, he said that "Mr. Out" had pointed out to him that the NLF had at one time prolonged a stand-down in operations for three days longer than Hanoi had announced they were going to be stood down in order to demonstrate, particularly to Rumania, the independence of the NLF from Hanoi. Khanh said that he was not clear whether this was at Tet or at Christmas, but he thought it might be interesting for us to look up the record and see whether in fact such an event had taken place./4/

/4/In a July 20 memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson stated that no substantiation had been found for this claim. (Ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE)

Khanh also said that Y Binh Aleo (a Vice Chairman of the NLF), whose real name he says is Y Bit, is the leader of the Montagnard element in the NLF and could probably bring along the Montagnards in any arrangement that was reached with the NLF. He said that, while, as I knew, the Montagnards did not like Vietnamese in general, they liked Tonkinese least of all and would prefer a southern government. Khanh said that as a political ploy he had in mind the pattern of Malaya, in which the British had, after careful arrangements, brought about the defection of the southern part of the country and the Malays from the rebels and left the Chinese element isolated in the North.

In reply to his question, I told Khanh that he could be assured that the President was, in principle, interested in vigorously pursuing the matter. I said that, while the complications and difficulties were obvious, I knew that the President was deeply interested in anything that could bring about an end to hostilities in at least part of the country or would in any way shorten the hostilities. I told him that an individual/5/ who enjoyed the President's confidence and who could speak with authority was prepared immediately to go to Paris to make contact with "Mr. Out". I said that the individual was a retired diplomat not now active in the government who spoke good French and who could visit Paris inconspicuously. I said that he was prepared to go at any time and urged Khanh immediately to go to Paris and arrange the contact between this individual and "Mr. Out". I pointed out the importance of proceeding urgently with anything that could shorten hostilities by even a week or an hour. Khanh entirely agreed but said that the French had been very "sticky" about his visa and had given him a visa valid only for one exit and reentry. The French in Paris watched him very closely and, if he returned unexpectedly and applied for another visa to return to his daughter here, he was sure it would at the minimum attract much French attention and they might even refuse him a visa. He felt that attracting French attention in this situation was very dangerous and unwise. However, at my urging he promised to think it over and see whether he could not work out something that appeared practical and get in touch with me.

/5/The reference is to Paul Sturm, who was "Y" in the XYZ negotiations (see Document 4) and is referred to as George in documents concerning his meetings with Khanh and Mr. Out during July 1966.

We also discussed how contact could be made in Paris between himself and the individual we had in mind. After dismissing several possibilities that did not seem practicable, we agreed that, subject to my consultations in Washington, I would see him again in New York before he left and arrange for him to meet the individual we had in mind so that they could directly work out their arrangements for meeting in Paris without the interposition of anyone else. Unless Khanh can leave earlier, he will in any event leave New York on July 28 with his daughter. He said that, as "Mr. Out" travels a great deal, it will probably take him a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 7 days to make contact with him after he returns to Paris.

NOTES

During the course of our conversation, Khanh throughout and in many ways laid heavy stress on the fundamental differences and hostility between the Tonkinese, the Annamites and the Cochinchinese. He gave me illustrations. He said that while he was fighting in the North with the French he thought nothing of bombarding a village because he looked on the people of the North as being essentially "foreigners". However, he had quite a different attitude when he was fighting in the South. He said the Tonkinese officers in the South Vietnamese forces have a similar attitude towards southerners; that is, they really look upon them as "foreigners" and have little care or concern as to what they do to the local population. He said that the Tonkinese are essentially warlike and their life revolves around making war. This applied to the Tonkinese officers in the South Vietnamese forces such as Ky and it would be a very serious problem for which he did not have the answer working out any arrangements such as we had discussed. As another example, he pointed out that, when General Cao was recently sent to the First Corps to put down the trouble in Hue and Danang, as a Catholic whose family had suffered at the hands of the Annamite Buddhists he had every reason to be very "rough". However, he did not do so because he himself was an Annamite.

In discussing the dispositions of the regular North Vietnamese forces as opposed to the Viet Cong forces, Khanh said that, while he did not have exact and recent information, it was his general impression that the North Vietnamese forces were generally to be found roughly North of the line crossing the southern part of the Pleiku and the northern part of Darlac down to the South of Nhatrang. As far as military command was concerned, he had the impression that these forces, which were generally in the V Military Region, were commanded directly from Hanoi whereas the command line to the forces in the South ran through the NLF and COSVN. He did not think that there was much distinction between the NLF and the COSVN.

He stoutly protested that he was not seeking anything for himself in this but, if "we ever thought he could be of service" he would be willing to consider whatever we might propose. He accepted my replies to his queries to the effect that, after he had made contact between our representative and "Mr. Out", the discussion should be entirely bilateral without his participation.

In reply to my query, he said that Le Van Hoach had been in touch with Huynh Tan Phat, Vice Chairman of the NLF, during the period that I was in Saigon. He said that Phat was not a Communist but that Hoach was entirely out of the question as any channel or contact because he was known to everyone as such a big gossip.

I pressed him hard on the identify of "Mr. Out" and at one time he seemed almost to the point of giving it to me, but said that he had "solemnly sworn" to "Mr. Out" that he would not disclose his identity until the meeting had been arranged. He said that we would of course then learn who he was but he doubted very much that we had much information with regard to him.

He expressed great fear of the French and what they might try to do to prevent any such arrangement as well as what they might try to do to him personally. He said the French were determined to make an arrangement that would be acceptable to the Chinese and wanted to see all of Viet-Nam under the control of the North.

I did not attempt to discuss with him where all of this would leave Annam or how it could be fitted into the picture. The strong implication is of course that the southerners do not care too much if they can make a deal that will take care of themselves.

Khanh agreed that he would say absolutely nothing to anyone concerning our meeting and I said it would be discussed only with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara at present./6/

/6/In his July 20 memorandum (see footnote 4 above), a copy of which was sent to the President, U. Alexis Johnson outlined a scenario for his next meeting with Khanh, scheduled for July 23, and for Sturm's first two meetings (as yet unscheduled) with Mr. Out. He concluded that if the contact with Mr. Out turned out to have some substance, a minimum objective was to obtain the release of some American prisoners and the defection of some members of the NLF, but that "a broad political arrangement with the NLF, which requires a radical shift in the personnel and orientation of the GVN," presented "probably insurmountable difficulties."

UAJ

180. Memorandum From William Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 18, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. Copies were sent to William Bundy and Moyers.

SUBJECT
The Viet Cong and Liberation Front

We have been looking at the Viet Cong Liberation Front as the enemy, to be ignored politically or destroyed militarily. I think it is time to look at them as a target of opportunity.

We keep getting reports, based on POW interrogations and other sources, that many VC are getting fed up./2/ If this is true of the fighting man in the field, it must also be true of some in the political structure of the Front. Surely there are some nationalists who are fed up with tight Communist control. Surely there are some Southerners disgusted with ever-increasing domination by the Northerners. There must also be many in both military and political echelons who are not happy with the prospect of continuing battles and bloodshed and who feel that their sacrifices are going to be in vain.

/2/Presumably a reference in part to Lodge's report in telegram 879 from Saigon, July 13, of his conversation with Leon Goure of the Rand Corporation, who had just finished a study based on interviews with prisoners of war and defectors during the first 6 months of 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) For Rostow's view of the implications of Goure's findings, see Document 198.

I believe we and the GVN should be working on this in a forceful and coordinated way. The effort should be both overt and covert.

On the covert side, we should be trying by every possible means to promote high-level defections from the VC and the Front. We have said that the failure of any genuine nationalist to defect to the Viet Cong is clear proof that they have no major appeal to the South Vietnamese. The other side of that coin is that there have been no major defections from the VC. We ought to try by every available means to generate some--the more the better. I need not point out how the appearance in Saigon suddenly of Nguyen Huu Tho or some of the other leading figures in the Front would influence U.S. and world opinion. The group defection of a VC military unit, however small, would be equally impressive.

It would be worth millions--or worth a division--or both.

On the overt side, I think Prime Minister Ky ought to make a major appeal to the VC. This would follow up that part of the Honolulu Pledge which stated the "Purposes of the Government of Viet-Nam."

I think Ky should make a major speech on this subject. He would point out that China is prepared to see the Viet-Nam War continue to the last Vietnamese; that Hanoi was ready to see the war go on to the last South Vietnamese. He would contrast his government's purposes--peace, independence, progress, security--with those stated just two days ago by Ho Chi Minh./3/

/3/In his appeal to "compatriots and fighters throughout the country," reported in Hanoi newspapers on July 17 and over Hanoi radio in English on July 18, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed that "our people and army, united like one man, will resolutely fight until complete victory, whatever the sacrifices and hardships might be." For text, see The New York Times, July 17, 1966.

Ky calls for peace; Ho calls for war.

Ky wants independence for Viet-Nam; Ho would put his people under the control of an alien ideology.

Ky wants to work with his neighbors and with friendly states to build a new Viet-Nam and a new Southeast Asia; Ho wants to rule all of Viet-Nam and to put it at the mercy of the Communist world--which has neither the resources nor the desire to do anything useful for the Vietnamese. Etc., etc.

Ky would call on the VC to look at what is happening around them, to recognize that military victory cannot be achieved. He would ask them to foreswear the use of terror and armed attack and to join with their fellow Vietnamese in the works and the satisfactions of peace. He would promise safe conduct, jobs and other assistance to those who come in with their weapons. He would cite the coming elections and ask them to participate in this new and exciting effort at nation-building and in the creation of a truly democratic state.

He would challenge both the VC and Hanoi to a contest. He would urge that the fighting end. And he would say: "Let us see which system is better in peaceful competition! Let us see whether the Communist system in the North--with help from its communist comrades--or the system of freedom and independence in the South--with help from the free world--can produce more and achieve more!"

And he would ask those southerners who have been impressed or misled into the VC ranks to join with him and their southern compatriots in building a new nation.

I think Ky could take a powerful initiative in this manner. If it produced results--in terms of VC defections--all the better. But even without such defections on a large scale, it would be an impressive document--good for him and for his cause.

With your approval, I will explore what has been done--and what further efforts can be undertaken--on the covert side.

I will also draft a speech for Ky which we might get Ambassador Lodge to provide for him on a confidential basis.

What do you think?/4/

/4/In telegram 23332 to Saigon, August 6, drafted by Jorden, the Department of State proposed a "psywar campaign"--launched by a speech by Ky and using appeals similar to those sketched in Jorden's memorandum--to encourage defections from VC and NVN forces. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Bill

181. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Special Assistant (Komer)/1/

Washington, July 18, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, V-1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam. Secret.

SUBJECT
Report to the President on Your Recent Trip to Vietnam, 1 July 1986

You very kindly invited my reaction to your report to the President on your latest trip to Vietnam./2/ I find myself in accord with your general conclusions as to the situation in the area and the long road ahead. As you know, I also fully agree with your view as to the importance of increasing the emphasis on our pacification and civilian operations, as without this even successful military operations will not produce a lasting result.

/2/Document 171.

With respect to how to accomplish this greater emphasis, you lay a great deal of emphasis on better organizational approaches to the job, both on the Vietnamese and American side. Because of the weakness of the Vietnamese which you note as one of our problems, you quite properly emphasize the need to step up the American effort to compensate. To provide additional manpower, you suggest a greater engagement of MACV in the civilian aspects of pacification, at both central staff and district levels. This appears on the surface a quite reasonable judgment and one can only support the idea of increasing the contribution of our military resources to the overall pacification problem. I do suggest, however, that these steps may have to be watched very carefully in order that they not inadvertently alter the essentials of our pacification effort, which to date has given great weight to irregularity, local characteristics and individuality of leadership.

While we refer to the "civilian" aspects of pacification, I believe that the greatest element of the program is its political content. The various civilian institutions, police structures, administrative programs, etc. are in truth merely supporting additives to the key political heart of a successful pacification program. Engagement of the population in a pacification effort, to secure its collaboration in expunging the Communist fish from the popular sea, must come as a result of a motivated population, not merely an administered one. Too much emphasis on our side on the administrative aspects can result in the major effort being put in this field with only lip service given to the importance of political motivation. This is particularly possible, of course, when our pressure upon the population is aimed at eliminating the enemy from its ranks rather than primarily to stimulate the community to better itself, and incidentally to purge itself of elements hostile to this process. A particular fondness of Vietnamese officialdom for eyewash pleasing to superiors has frequently led to such mistake in emphasis, i.e., counting barbed wire stretched, piglets distributed, or mass public pledges of loyalty.

I am sure you have no basic disagreement with these thoughts, but I do believe that as we review the organizational aspects of the pacification job, we should be very sure that all Americans engaged in the program start from its basic principle of motivating the population as its guiding doctrine, rather than its statistical successes in terms of VC KIA or otherwise. This would be particularly important for MACV district teams asked to "keep an eye" on the RDC teams, as the standards they use and their command levels impose will clearly dictate their measurement of their effectiveness. With this approach, the various steps you propose seem unexceptionable; without it, I would have concern over some of the suggestions you make. There is a great difference between arousing local partisans and organizing a national soldiery.

Aside from these general remarks, I should like to offer comments on some of your specific points:

a. Study of Roles and Missions. This is a highly appropriate effort. Strengthening of the civilian or political command structure vis-a-vis the military in the pacification program would be a highly appropriate result of such a study. Of greatest importance is the strengthening of the local structure of pacification, of course, and improvement up the line, rather than from the top down.

b. Province Team Chief. If these should be revived for more efficient coordination of the Americans in a province, they are critical figures to whom the general thoughts I expressed above must be put across. Our experience has been one of considerable success in working locally with other agencies on a cooperative basis and some problems under a formal team chief. Some of these stemmed from the nature of our intelligence or operational work; some stemmed from the degree of emphasis given by the chief in question to the political heart of the pacification program.

c. RD Cadre Program. The problem of supervision of the RD Cadre teams is one on which I believe our Station is making considerable progress at this time, although I cannot contest your statement that we cannot match the MACV presence throughout the districts. Against the apparent desirability of this greater engagement of local Americans with the teams however, I do suggest that some thought be given to the impact of this attention on the mission and political content of the work of the teams. It may well be that a search for perfection in management through close American review of the work of the teams may create very substantial problems with the teams themselves, their political mission and their reception as "revolutionary" Vietnamese.

d. Vung Tau. We have fully supported General Thang's assignment of Col. Chau to take charge of Vung Tau. Since Major Mai was so clearly the originator and most effective exponent of the motivational aspects of the training there, however, we are frankly concerned whether this change may have adverse effects on this all important heart of the program. We are examining this carefully.

e. Area Priorities. I fully concur with your comments on areas for pacification work. Pacification is so heavily dependent on the exploitation of popular attitudes that I fully agree that we should exploit areas of movement and not batter remorselessly against targets fixed by selection from the map. This is another area in which the importance of flexibility may be greater than the apparent virtues of firm planning.

This memorandum has addressed itself to your trip report. You are aware separately of my concern over CIA's responsibilities and role with respect to the Revolutionary Development Cadre program. I have sent Mr. Colby to Saigon to secure a clear statement of the Mission's recommendations on these points per the message he showed Ambassador Leonhart last week, a copy of which is attached./3/ The above comments on your trip report should be read in the light of this message as well.

/3/Attached but not printed.

Richard Helms/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

182. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, July 21, 1966, 1533Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon, Vientiane, Hong Kong, and Moscow. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 1022 to the President on July 22 under cover of a memorandum stating that he agreed that "our best chance for making negotiating progress is through very secret talks with Hanoi." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9)

In telegrams 18844 and 20306 to Paris, July 30 and August 2, the Department of State requested clarification and further exploration of a number of points raised in this telegram. Bohlen responded in telegrams 1535 and 1657, August 2 and 3, noting that further consultation with Sainteny would have to await his return to Paris in early September. (All in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

1022. Ref: State 6653, June 15, 1966./2/ The following is a summary of a long conversation I had this morning with Jean Sainteny./3/ He asks of course that the information and the source be treated confidentially. I believe that Sainteny was very frank and spoke without inhibition, although of course it is always possible that he did not give me every detail of what the North Vietnamese said to him.

/2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 27-7 VIET)

/3/Sainteny, a former French colonial official in Indochina who maintained close ties with Ho Chi Minh, visited Hanoi during July 1966 as President de Gaulle's personal emissary.

1. Sainteny saw no Russians during his overnight stop in Moscow, nor any Chinese at all during his stay in Peking. In regard to the latter capital Sainteny said that he had already sensed the Chinese were hostile to his trip to Hanoi and therefore for reasons of race he did not ask to see any Chinese.

2. While in Hanoi he delivered the innocuous letter from De Gaulle to Ho Chi Minh/4/ and had several tete-a-tete conversations with Ho Chi Minh and several others with Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong and other North Vietnamese officials. Sainteny said that he had come to the following conclusions in regard to the Vietnamese attitude:

/4/Not further identified.

A. That they were determined to fight to the bitter end in protection of North Vietnam. He said the country is mobilized, its population has never known anything but war and considered it on the whole to be not an abnormal state of affairs. In reply to my question, he made a distinction between defense of North Vietnam and the pursuit of the war in the South and said he found the North Vietnamese attitude somewhat different in regard to the war in the South.

B. That while they looked forward to the eventual reunification of the country, he said that all Vietnamese had spoken to him of the necessity of the creation of a government in the South which they maintain could be done by the inhabitants of the South itself following which, after an extended period probably five years or more, there could be negotiations as envisaged by the Geneva Accords of 1954. Sainteny said that he could not be absolutely sure but that he personally felt that the North Vietnamese were genuine in their view that there could be no military conquest or decision in South Vietnam but that the peaceful methods would be devised for the organization of a government. I pointed out to him that in effect it was largely because of the success initially of the Diem government that the North Vietnamese had organized in 1958 or 1959 the current Vietcong movement and assistance from the North. He did not disagree with this historical analysis but said that the Vietnamese had been very consistent in repeating this thesis to him. (I may add here that Sainteny is not naive in regard to the duplicities of the Oriental mind.)

3. He said that Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong had indicated to him on a number of occasions that they would not totally reject the idea of some form of negotiation. He doubted however if they would ever come to a conference or that there would be any public negotiation. He felt that the only method would be a secret channel by an individual, not too well known, possibly here in Paris or in some other neutral capital. He said that Pham Van Dong had said to him in Ho Chi Minh's presence that the U.S. should stop the bombardment of North Vietnam, and that finally after some discussion Sainteny stated that if they were being realistic at all there would have to be some North Vietnamese quid pro quo. Pham Van Dong finally admitted that there would be some such reply from the North, which night take the form of a cessation of "infiltration."

4. In regard to the prisoners of war, Sainteny said that Pham Van Dong had told him that the American prisoners were being well treated and would continue to be well treated. The night before American prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hanoi. He said he thought it was conceivable that Pham Van Dong had not known of the intention to parade them when he made this statement to him. He anticipates that some of these pilots will be tried by typical Vietnamese popular courts, sentenced, but the sentence would be commuted. He said he had argued at considerable length with North Vietnamese on the subject that these men were not criminals of war under the Geneva Convention but that they had merely repeated the statement that there was no declaration of war. (Sainteny seemed to be familiar with Article 2 of the Convention.)/5/ I told him that I thought any such action by the North Vietnamese would be very serious and the reaction in the U.S. extremely severe, and I could not say what reprisals we might undertake if any. Sainteny referred in this connection to the dikes in the North and said if these dikes were touched his estimate would be about a million people would be threatened with death.

/5/For text of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, see 6 UST (pt. 3) 3318.

Sainteny said that his strong conclusion from this trip was that the Chinese were the real benefactors from this war. He said there were four factors which he felt led to this conclusion:

(1) There had been a certain loss of American prestige in the Orient because we appeared in popular eyes to be successfully resisted by a very small nation.

(2) The longer the war continued the more Hanoi became a prisoner of Peking. He said that there were Chinese commissions, political and other advisers in Hanoi, and that the Chinese were handling the aid in a way to increase Hanoi's dependency on Peking. He said the Russians were virtually non-existent politically in Hanoi.

(3) He felt that the war in its present dimensions, which he was convinced the Chinese would do everything to maintain, was essential to the Chinese as part of the justification for the very savage and severe purge which was being done to the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. He said the Chinese could point to the assistance of capitalist aggressors almost on the border of China as a need to tighten the turn of the vise.

(4) The Vietnamese war is a distinct obstacle in Soviet-American relations.

In reply to my question, Sainteny said that of course he was not in any position to give advice to the U.S. Government but that his personal view was that we should seek through secret channels to get in touch with Hanoi and to suggest cessation of bombing in the North in return for some commitment to cease infiltration into the South. He seemed to think that such a case might be successful since he was convinced that Hanoi wished to find some means of bringing the war to an end although determined to resist attacks on North Vietnam indefinitely. He mentioned in this connection that Ho Chi Minh had twice been to Peking (he assumed to discuss with the Chinese either a search for settlement or an increase in Chinese aid). He believed that the Chinese had refused the first and had agreed to the second.

Finally, Sainteny said that he had seen De Gaulle yesterday and made a report to him and he did not anticipate any French move in this affair since there would not seem to be any prospects at the moment. In this connection, he said the rumor from Phnom Penh/6/ was quite without foundation.

/6/Not further identified.

Bohlen

183. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, July 22, 1966, 0910Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 1631 to the President at 4:35 p.m. on July 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) Also passed to CIA and Defense.

1631. 1. I called on Ky at 11:00 a.m. on Friday, July 22.

2. As soon as I came in, he began by saying that he had been in the extreme northern part of Viet-Nam yesterday, and he felt that Vietnamese and Americans now fighting there had arrived "just in time." He agreed with my guess that Hanoi had planned a double barreled retaliation for the bombings of June 29: a military surprise in the extreme North and sabotage-terrorism in Saigon. The Vietnamese-American reaction had, he thought, surprised Hanoi.

3. In a speculative discussion of what Hanoi was thinking, he made the same analysis which I have made to Washington: that Hanoi sees itself defeated militarily; politically in Saigon; and economically with the anti-inflation and port decongestion measures. But it still thinks it can triumph in the field of criminal violence, i.e. terrorism and subversion via the village guerrilla. Hanoi, Ky believes, is waiting to see if revolutionary development will succeed. They believe it will not, and that Americans, regardless of military, political and economic success, will tire and leave, and then Hanoi, still possessing its tool of criminal, subversive, terroristic warfare can start all over again. It is not, Ky said, a stupid theory. When, therefore, General Thang's program really gets rolling, Hanoi will realize the jig is up--and not before. This does not diminish the importance of winning the three other wars (of which bombing North Viet-Nam is a crucial part).

4. Continuing to talk before I had even raised the purpose of my visit, Prime Minister Ky spoke about the Province of Go Cong, where the local authorities had stopped the transportation of lobster and fish to Saigon. He looked into it and found that they had been bribed by black marketeers, and, he was sure, by the French.

5. Turning to the Buddhist self-immolation last night, Ky had the would-be self-immolator talk in response to questions, with the conversation being taken down on a tape recorder. The man had said that he had not given a thought to self-immolation and that suddenly he had felt strange (Ky indicated that he had been drugged). Then the man said he had lit a cigarette and "was set on fire." Ky plans to give all this to the press. The man evidently was neither a religious fanatic nor a mental defective, but had been used.

6. I then brought up the purpose of my visit, which was to call his attention to the fact that two candidates' lists in Saigon had been disqualified on the basis of technicalities. The first was led by Phan Khac Suu, and had been disqualified because one of the candidates had not produced an "extrait de casier judiciaire." (Which I translate as a legal document certifying that the subject has no criminal record.) The other was headed by Dang Van Sung. I hazarded the guess that maybe the Prime Minister did not realize these disqualifications had been made--undoubtedly in good conscience--but that the political effect would be considerable given the prominence of the two men.

7. Ky knew all about both cases, and that the law was, strictly speaking, against both persons. He said, however, he had "done a favor" for Phan Khac Suu and had arranged to have him put on the list. He realized this could create a precedent which would plague him, but in view of Phan Khac Suu's prominence, he thought he should do it.

8. As regards Dang Van Sung, he said that he had no co-signers--no team mates--and was alone on his list. Sung was unable to find anybody to team up with him, even after he had been given two or three days to do so. He has, therefore, agreed to withdraw his candidacy.

9. I stressed the importance of these elections in terms of U.S. opinion, of which Ky was well aware--also the effect on world opinion. I told him our leading television and press men would be here.

10. He said that the Generals had had a meeting concerning the elections, and had agreed that it had to be organized honestly, that the world was going to watch, and that they were not going to emulate the procedure of the late President Diem, who had moved troops into an area to supply more votes as needed. General Thang had been put in charge of the elections to be sure that they would be free and honest.

11. I then read him paraphrase of POLAD Francis' wire no. 029,/2/ which in paragraph 12 describes a scene in Tam Ky on July 16 of what might be the first anti-election action taken by Communists. On that date Viet Cong attached VNQDD headquarters, killing a number of party members. They were clearly after the party leadership. As a result of the attack, the leading VNQDD candidate, Phan Thong, lost both his legs, but has sent word from the hospital to the Province Chief that he would not be counted out and intends to run.

/2/Not found.

12. Ky knew all about this, and said that General Lam had told him about it.

13. I asked Prime Minister Ky what was planned in connection with regional forces and popular forces. I said they were badly needed to protect the pacification process and were frequently diverted by division and corps commanders. We believe that they should be under the primary control of General Thang.

14. In reply, Ky said the Generals had agreed to reorganize the regional forces, putting them under the direct control of the Province Chief, and, he said, General Thang now has control of the Province Chiefs. He evidently regards this as a big forward step.

15. I then adverted to the importance of not being stampeded by pressure for wage increases, which I said simply stimulate merchants to raise their prices, and in turn stimulates further demands for higher wages. I assured him that we on the U.S. side were doing everything that we could, and hoped the GVN would pay close attention to this, and try to keep wage pressures dampened.

16. Ky agreed and said that on certain items, prices have started to go down. He had heard an unconfirmed report that the Banque de l'Indochine in Laos was selling gold. He was sure that both the French and the Viet Cong needed piasters badly, having in mind the plans they have for sabotaging the elections.

17. As I was about to leave, he talked to me in a very informal and personal way about his belief that the time had come to establish a rallying point ("centre de ralliement") in North Viet-Nam for what he believed were many fervent anti-government elements in North Viet-Nam. The knowledge that there was a rallying point might, if all else was well organized, bring about an uprising. He made it absolutely clear that he was definitely not advocating an amphibious landing. He was talking about a parachute drop of "a battalion--about 400 men," all Vietnamese, no Americans, at a point which he knows of south of the 19th parallel, in the western part of the area, in the mountains. North Viet-Nam is narrow at that point. The men would be thus close to the sea. They could be supplied at night by planes. There are now so many planes flying around at night that this would not attract attention. They could conduct sabotage operations, terrorism, and help political uprisings. Life would not be anything like as dangerous for them as the life of the Viet Cong is here now. He said that Viet-Nam has the finest soldiers in the world for this kind of duty./3/

/3/In telegram 14858 to Saigon, July 25, the Department of State indicated that it would "not wholly rule out" such a project but believed that Ky should not be given any encouragement for now. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Lodge

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/

Washington, July 22, 1966, 9:19 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Miller, cleared by William Bundy and McNaughton, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Also sent to New Delhi, Warsaw, and London, and repeated to Saigon, Moscow, Vientiane, Bangkok, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, and COMUSMACV.

13905. 1. Intelligence gathered over recent months points to greatly increased use by DRV of demilitarized zone (DMZ) as infiltration route for DRV regular units coming into SVN. MACV and GVN have in fact confirmed publicly from prisoner interrogation and photo reconnaissance presence of DRV 324th Division in SVN just south of 17th parallel and that Division infiltrated into SVN through DMZ. GVN on July 21 energetically protested to ICC against DRV's infiltration of troops through DMZ and informed ICC that it (GVN) would be obliged to take appropriate measures to protect SVN population. GVN note/2/ said that infiltration was dangerous threat to peace in SVN and made "urgent appeal" to ICC to take adequate measures to halt it.

/2/Not found.

2. To counter what is now large scale DRV use of DMZ as infiltration route in clear violation of Geneva Accords, USG has authorized air action in DMZ on both sides of demarcation line and artillery fire (land and naval) into that portion of DMZ south of demarcation line, only against clearly defined military activity. Before taking decision on what additional limited-defensive action on ground south of demarcation line circumstances may require, USG desires establish public and diplomatic case for such defensive actions. By separate tel of lower classification, action addressees are instructed to make demarche to ICC governments as major step in this effort./3/

/3/Telegram 13895, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Joint State/Defense telegram 18807 to Saigon and the JCS, July 30, transmitted newly-approved instructions authorizing ground operations by US/FWMAF forces in the DMZ "south of the demarcation line while in contact with VC/NVA forces or when such engagement is imminent." (Ibid.)

3. Embassy Ottawa should inform GOC in strict confidence of authority granted for use of air and artillery action in DMZ as described above.

4. Embassy London should inform HMG at appropriately high level of authority granted for air and artillery action in DMZ as described above and of USG demarches to ICC powers.

Rusk

185. Telegram From the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge and Porter) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms and the President's Special Assistant (Komer)/1/

Saigon, July 23, 1966, 0456Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables. Secret; Eyes Only. Received in Washington via CIA communications facilities and transmitted by CIA to the White House at 0800Z on July 23.

We have carefully reviewed the over-all revolutionary development program with a view to determining the most appropriate role for CAS. As you know, we consider this over-all program an absolutely vital part of our total war effort here. Our military is involved in it both directly and through advisory influence on ARVN, arranging properly coordinated military actions to extend areas of pacification. USAID is heavily engaged in providing economic assistance and improving government programs and administration under a coordinated plan of strengthening of revolutionary development areas. USIA, through JUSPAO, is providing psychological support. CAS, of course, is providing intelligence support and has been heavily engaged in the cadre program. We believe that CAS should, at least for the time being, remain responsible for the cadre program. All of these activities, of course, are conducted as an integrated program under the direct command of Ambassador Porter.

The present cadre program, of course, is a result of the work of CAS officers here who saw the need and went ahead and developed this tool. The cadre probably would not have been developed were it not for several of the unique attributes of your agency. Of great importance was the flexibility of your funding and logistics, but even more critical was your Agency's ability to decentralize your operations to the Province Chiefs and to inject into the cadre a high degree of patriotic consciousness and motivation. While your Agency originally conducted these operations under an informal clearance from the GVN, the success of the approach has resulted in the GVN establishing a formal structure in the Ministry of Revolutionary Development to carry on this program as a fundamental element of its over-all prosecution of the war.

The establishment of this formal GVN structure, and the scale the cadre program has assumed, caused us to review whether it should properly be continued by CAS, or whether it should be turned over to more normal mechanisms for our government's support of the GVN's efforts. We know that there are reservations on this point in various elements of the executive and legislative branches in Washington, who have doubts that a secret agency should be engaged in such a massive and overt program, with the difficulties this can cause in the procurement of the necessary funds, the exposure of the CAS apparatus, and adverse political publicity. We have also had rumbles of concern from some Vietnamese that CAS sponsorship may reflect some more menacing U.S. intentions with respect to this cadre program. Giving these factors full weight, we nonetheless conclude that, if this program is to fill its vital role in the war effort here, CAS must retain over-all responsibility and authority for it until a better alternative is discovered. We have directed that a review of the program and its future sponsorship be made by 21 October 1966, as outlined in Ambassador Porter's Memorandum of 24 March 1966, copy attached./2/ Further, we will carefully review the specific elements of the program to see whether portions of it could appropriately be performed by other agencies, even prior to a turnover of overall direction, so that the CAS role can be reduced to the minimum essential.

/2/Attached but not printed.

In specific terms, therefore, we recommend that your Agency continue to pay the cadre, which should be increased in numbers as rapidly as feasible, commensurate with maintaining quality; provide the logistics channels and advisory personnel to support the cadre program throughout the country; and retain for the time being the over-all responsibility for support to the revolutionary development cadre training program, including the construction of new facilities as they are shown to be necessary.

We have reviewed the over-all cadre program and recommend that it be supported in the sum of VN$2,376,814,000 and US$28,510,000. A recommended budget is attached/3/ and has our full approval and strong recommendation for adoption.

/3/Attached but not printed.

With respect to the proposal of a new training camp at Long Hai to supplement, but not to replace, the facilities at Vung Tau, we are reviewing the need for such a project. If, as, and when built, this will be accomplished in segments, reflecting the arrangements made to obtain additional manpower for the cadre program, and at the same time insisting that quality supersede quantity in future cadres. If built at Long Hai or elsewhere, we believe that the construction of new camp facilities should be the responsibility of your Agency in order to maintain the integrity of your authority over U.S. support to the revolutionary development cadre program. At the same time, we will direct that other agencies provide specific in-country assistance to this job as possible and appropriate.

We recommend that the President charge CAS with this responsibility, and we are prepared to assist CAS as may be necessary in its requests to the appropriate sub-committees of Congress for the financial resources necessary to carry out this program.

[end of document]

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