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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

186. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

No. 1683/66

Washington, July 23, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (THROUGH 14 JULY 1966)/2/

/2/This memorandum is the Central Intelligence Agency's issuance of a joint Central Intelligence Agency-Defense Intelligence Agency Study prepared monthly. [Footnote in the source text.]

Summary

1. The most significant air strikes of June and early July were conducted against the major bulk POL storage facilities. Analysis of data available through 9 July indicates that the air strikes resulted in the loss of about one-half of the preraid targeted capacity which existed on 28 June.

2. A high level of road interdiction attained nearly four times as many road cuts and cratered segments as the previous month with a rec-ord number of trucks, ferries, and rolling stock destroyed or damaged. Through rail service probably is not possible on at least three and perhaps four of the five major railroad lines in North Vietnam, although rail shuttle service continues on all lines. Miscellaneous military targets, including SAM sites and naval craft, were also struck.

3. The cumulative effects of the bombing since March 1965 have placed some strains on North Vietnam, particularly in the economic areas, but on the whole the North Vietnamese have been able to meet their military needs and to support the insurgency in South Vietnam, although their capability for overt military aggression has been limited.

4. The recent US air strikes against targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area do not appear to have weakened the North Vietnamese leadership's resolve to continue to prosecute the war. At the same time, the Hanoi leadership appears to be taking note of the effects the bombing raids are having on popular morale and is initiating steps to prevent or curb, if possible, any decline in the fighting spirit of the people. Presently, however, there continues to be no hard evidence of real alarm in Hanoi or that morale in North Vietnam has slipped to the extent that it would force the regime to change its policy of continuing the war.

5. The attacks on the petroleum facilities will make the operation of the economy more difficult and costly. Even before these attacks, the bombings were causing increasing disruption of economic activity. Food shortages and rising food prices apparently are becoming more prevalent throughout North Vietnam. The economy, nevertheless, is still able to provide the essential needs of the population. Measurable cumulative direct and indirect losses caused by the air strikes now amount to about $100 million./3/ In addition, there are other losses and costs to the economy and the military establishment which have developed as a consequence of the air strikes but to which values cannot be assigned.

/3/US dollars are used throughout this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]

[Here follows the body of the memorandum.]

187. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/

Washington, July 23, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the President and Sturm.

Alexis Johnson and George/2/ met with General Khanh at the Waldorf in New York from noon to 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, July 23. They discussed the detailed arrangements for their meeting in Paris. Khanh is leaving the evening of July 23 for Paris with his daughter. He was told that George will arrive in Paris the morning of July 28. Johnson told Khanh that he was authorized to tell "Mr. Out"/3/ that the President was fully aware of the conversations between himself and General Khanh and that George was a trusted emissary who would be able to maintain direct contact with Washington.

/2/George was a code name for Sturm.

/3/Le Van Truong. See footnote 3, Document 179.

They went over much of the ground that Johnson and Khanh had previously discussed/4/ but in more detail, and throughout the conversation Khanh was much less reticent than he had been at the previous meeting in implicitly and explicitly setting forth the role that he saw for himself in the developments that he hoped to see in South Viet-Nam come out of these discussions.

/4/For a summary of the discussion, see Document 179.

In good Vietnamese fashion the detailed formulae that he spun out tended to end up, without his ever saying so, with the logical necessity of his playing a key role. It was difficult to tell how much of the formulae were his own creation and how much they were those of "Mr. Out" and his associates. However, Khanh took a very proprietary interest in them. Only from direct contact with "Mr. Out" can we hope to determine how much of this is Khanh's creation and how much of it is that of "Mr. Out" and his associates.

In his usual orderly fashion, and reading from notes, during the course of the conversation he outlined a five-phase program substantially as follows:

First Phase: Conversations between our emissary and "Mr. Out" leading to agreement in principle.

Second Phase: The "signature" of a secret agreement between ourselves and the NLF, presumably with the direct participation of Mr. Tho and "Mr. In".

Third Phase: The establishment in Saigon of a "transition government" that would implement the "secret agreement" between the USG and the NLF, followed by a call by it to the NLF for a "cease-fire".

Fourth Phase: The establishment of a "government of national union" which would incorporate the non-Communist elements of the NLF.

Fifth Phase: The holding of an international conference to put its "seal of approval" on what had been done, work out a "Federation" in which Cochinchina and North Viet-Nam would be joined (he was vague as to where Annam would fit into this) and generally work out the "Federation's" relations with its neighbors.

Under these arrangements all allied troops except those of the United States would evacuate Viet-Nam and the U.S. troops would remain at the request of the new government on bases to be agreed upon. (He was very insistent on the importance of the evacuation of other allied troops on the grounds that, looked at through the eyes of "we Vietnamese", the presence of these other forces would "infringe on the sovereignty" of Viet-Nam but the same would not be true of U.S. forces remaining at the request of a new government because U.S. forces would be there "for the protection" of Viet-Nam.)

In reply to questions on how Khanh saw the "transition government" being established and what he saw becoming of those areas of the country not under NLF control, he said that the U.S. now has "enough troops" in Viet-Nam to take care of both problems.

In reply to questions on how much of the NLF "Mr. Out" and his associates controlled, Khanh said he could not answer precisely but the Front contained a number of elements, including Buddhists, Catholics, Saigon intellectuals, Cochinchinese intellectuals, Center intellectuals, and Communists, but the majority of the Front is non-Communist. While "Mr. Out" and his associates probably could not speak for all of the NLF, he thought they speak for the majority. He somewhat airily dismissed the problem of Communists in the NLF, although he did say that great secrecy was required in order to prevent the Communists from carrying out a purge.

In reply to questions as to why these non-Communist elements in the NLF had not made some approach at the time that, first, Big Minh and then he, Khanh, who were both Southerners, were in the Government, Khanh said that they did not at that time believe that he was really a Nationalist but thought that he was an "American puppet".

Khanh said that he had no reply to the question on how "Mr. Out" and his associates felt that they would be able to manage divorcing themselves politically and militarily from the Communists and the DRV.

Khanh said that he had already discussed with "Mr. Out" the release of some prisoners as a means of verifying his position and authority, and indicated that "Mr. Out" said that it would take a "couple of days" to get a message back and then it would probably take a week or ten days to effect a release. When Johnson talked about "not less than four prisoners," Khanh talked about "two or three," but neither followed up this point. However, Khanh talked about the importance of a "gesture" on our part such as suspending the B-52 bombing in Viet Cong-controlled areas for "a few days" or carrying out the bombing in Viet Cong-controlled areas only "every other day" a la Quemoy as a signal to "Mr. Out's" associates in South Viet-Nam that he was really in contact with Washington. Johnson said that such matters could be considered in the conversations between George and "Mr. Out".

In reply to questions as to in what areas of the country the NLF exercised military control over the Viet Cong, Khanh said he had nothing to add to what he had said previously to Johnson.

In reply to Khanh's pressing as to whether we "accepted" the phase concept as outlined above, Johnson replied that we could not accept anything that required us to carry out a "coup" in Saigon, and the concept obviously involved great difficulties. It was Johnson's hope that, as the conversations proceeded, a way could be found for the NLF to fit into the constitutional process that was now under way. Johnson pointed out that, in the natural course of events, it would seem probable that the Constituent Assembly to be elected on September 11 would have a heavily southern flavor, and noted that it was perhaps for that reason that Tonkinese and Annamites such as Father Quynh and Tri Quang were opposing the elections. The Constituent Assembly would draft a constitution and presumably sometime thereafter national elections would be held under the new constitution. It seemed to Johnson that the critical period was between the undertaking of drafting of the constitution and the holding of elections under it. Johnson hoped that a formula could be worked out in which the non-Communist elements in the NLF could participate during this phase so that the government that would eventually emerge would be acceptable to all non-Communists in South Viet-Nam. Khanh expressed skepticism about elections "in wartime" but did not flatly reject Johnson's remarks.

NOTES

In reply to questions about "Mr. Out", Khanh said that he was of the "older generation", three or four years younger than Khanh's father, and Khanh had known him all his life as a family friend. Several times during the conversation Khanh strongly pressed the point on the importance of protecting "Mr. Out" and preserving his incognito. In reply to questions on how "Mr. Out" was able to operate effectively from France under an incognito, Khanh asserted that he "saw many people," wrote many letters, and travelled widely. Contrary to our Western concepts, his very significance to the movement lay in the fact that he was operating "in secret". He asserted that "Mr. Out" "gives order to Tho".

In discussing meetings between George and "Mr. Out", Khanh said he felt George should not see him more than once or twice in France, and then that another point, perhaps in Switzerland or Belgium, should be found.

Khanh said that he believed "80 percent" of the information he received from "Mr. Out" but he could not be sure of the other 20 percent.

In reply to questions about Mai Van Bo, Khanh said that he was a Southerner by origin from My Tho but was now completely a Northerner. He said that Mai Van Bo had gone to Hanoi some months before and had come back about six weeks ago, and that about three weeks ago the status of his mission in Paris had been changed from that of trade mission to a "general delegation".

During the course of the luncheon conversation, Khanh told Johnson that he knew the CIA had paid $10,000 to a colonel whose name Johnson did not recognize for a briefcase containing Khanh's private papers which had been left in a car in the confusion attending Khanh's departure from Saigon. Khanh said that he in fact was glad that we had the papers because he was sure that we would not have found in them anything personally discreditable to him.

Johnson told Khanh that he could freely and frankly deal with George in exactly the same manner as he dealt with Johnson and, in reply to Khanh's request for a contact in Paris in the absence of George, Johnson suggested that he get in touch with Mr. McBride, DCM in the Embassy in Paris, identifying himself as "Ray".

Khanh accepted from Johnson, in accordance with their previous conversation, the exact amount of additional cost that he had incurred by converting his excursion ticket to a ticket that would permit him to return at this time, first class, but stoutly refused to accept any advance on future expenses that might be incurred. He said he would inform George of the exact amount of any "out-of-pocket expenses" but would not accept a "cent more" from us.

U. Alexis Johnson/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, July 23, 1966, 2:26 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy and Miller, cleared in substance by Rusk, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

14059. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. We had high-level review today of election progress as reported in your recent cables, including your useful discussion with Ky reported in your 1631./2/ Your reporting has been most useful, and we look forward to your more definitive analysis and assessment of candidates and, more generally, the real significance of the September elections for SVN's future political evolution.

/2/Document 183.

2. In following paragraphs we list certain negative indications in Embassy's recent reporting which give us cause for concern. We therefore fully support your frank remarks to Ky reported Embtel 1631. We are fully aware of realities of Vietnamese political scene and do not expect political miracles out of September elections. At same time, we believe that Ky, Thieu, and others must be made to understand clearly that international focus of attention is on these elections and that there is already widespread skepticism regarding GVN's intentions to carry out free, meaningful elections. GVN leaders must be made thoroughly aware of importance internationally of these elections and that burden of proof regarding elections is on GVN.

3. Indications that could be construed as governmental rigging. As you know, this will be most sensitive possible subject from every standpoint. We recognize that Government has every right to put up and support sympathetic candidates, but we are somewhat perturbed by reports that many candidates in provinces are civil servants and that a significant number of military officers are filing to run. This situation can very easily give impression that Government is seeking to rig elections, and at very least will focus attention sharply on constituencies where candidates closely identified with Government are involved. For example, we find FBS 13, 396/3/ particularly disturbing.

/3/Not found.

4. Screening of candidates. We wish to reinforce the views expressed State 8259/4/ that this will be key process. GVN should bend over backward to see that ineligibility criteria are strictly applied and that minimum number of candidates are eliminated and these on solid grounds. We note from your 1641/5/ that Government has now approved Saigon lists headed by Suu, Sung, and Nghe, and suspect your conversation with Ky may have contributed to this result. Article 16 provision/6/ that whole list can be thrown out if one ineligible candidate is included could prove troublesome, and we gather from Ky's discussion with you that Government may find it possible to permit list to be corrected and re-submitted in cases where one candidate is ineligible, or there is some other defect such as existed in Sung's list. We hope Ky and others can be urged to make use of this discretionary authority wherever possible.

/4/Dated July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S)

/5/Dated July 22. (Ibid.)

/6/Reference is to Article 16 of the election law governing the Constituent Assembly election scheduled for September 1966. The election law is discussed in "Background on Vietnamese Election Law," an enclosure to airgram CA-4 to all posts, July 1. (Ibid.)

5. Boycott movement. Another unfortunate development, in our view, is ability of Father Quynh's Front of All Religions to attract personalities such as Mai Tho Truyen and to produce Tri Quang at a rally. September elections will be dealt another serious blow if Central Viet-Nam Buddhists are not represented in Constituent Assembly even indirectly and we would be concerned if Southerner of Truyen's stature cast his lot in opposition to elections. While GVN of course not directly responsible for those developments, Father Quynh's movement can only benefit by being able to point to evidence of GVN manipulation of election process.

6. Believe you should continue to discuss these issues very frankly with Ky, as well as with Thieu and others as appropriate, keeping pressure on them and making clear to them that we consider political progress in SVN as indispensable as military progress. We assume, too, that Embassy continuing to do everything within its power to encourage all elements to participate in and lend their support to September elections. We realize that these are delicate missions and leave to your discretion and judgment how they should be handled tactically.

7. General comment. We have following additional thoughts for prospective actions:

a. For your use and our own full information here, we are planning to send you every Tuesday and Friday a round-up of significant comment here and internationally on election progress. US comment would include both media lines and Congressional angles.

b. Handling of instances of VC harassment may become important. We gather that GVN is reluctant to publicize such incidents lest it contribute to very atmosphere of fear VC will try to create. However, it seems to us that background low-key briefing of US correspondents, for reporting here, would not be open to this objection and could assist in putting situation in focus.

c. As we have already made clear to each other in our exchanges, our basic policy should be to maintain regular flow of information to press and media, not seeking to conceal defects and difficulties while trying to give proper emphasis to positive and favorable developments. We have been taking background line here that a certain amount of local skulduggery is almost inevitable in the situation, and that such actions have not been uncommon in advanced democracies recently or even now.

d. We have been giving further thought to additional methods of international observation, particularly best use of Asian democratic countries. We will have further thoughts on this early next week. In this connection, we have been discouraging idea of individual American Congressmen going out to observe elections, believing that Asian observers would be much more effective and not open to charges of US intervention. You may be interested that there has been one Congressional demand for public hearings on election progress; at some point, this might conceivably be useful, and we are keeping it under review. In general, we will be trying here to get facts before interested Congressmen in all possible ways.

8. We gather that GVN campaign to get out the vote is proceeding with reasonable effectiveness, although with some spotty performance as well. Publicity to this operation would of course be helpful. In this connection, we note that there is considerable impression here that there are major restraints on right to vote, including impression that Communists and others are excluded. We should be keeping up steady effort to make facts clear in this respect.

9. One final point of potential concern here--as we know it is to you--is that Ky avoid public statements on what will happen after the Constituent Assembly convenes. We anticipate that the question of whether Constituent Assembly can assume legislative powers may become acutely controversial once Constituent Assembly is picked. However, any statement by Ky trying to pre-judge this issue or suggesting his determination to stay in power over a substantial period can only feed the fires of criticism that he is trying to rig the whole process. It would be helpful, of course, if he could reiterate his past statements about willingness to hand over power to a duly constituted civilian government just as soon as it exists. We say this knowing full well the difficulties you face in influencing his utterances, but trust you will do all you can through whatever channel is appropriate.

Rusk

189. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, July 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:25 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 248-249.

1785. 1. D'Orlandi, Lewandowski and I met at D'Orlandi's office at 4:30. The meeting lasted for twenty minutes. Lewandowski talked as follows:

2. "I have the following instructions from Warsaw which I have been asked to transmit to Ambassador Lodge:

A. "It is difficult to discuss any proposition during the current important escalation of war activities in the South and of the bombing in the North.

B. "To hold such discussions could be looked upon as a maneuver to force the DRV to negotiate under American conditions.

C. "We know very well that the DRV will not give up the fight while the United States pursues its present policy of military pressure.

D. "We have reasons to state that no proposition without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will produce results.

E. "United States Government has no right to bomb the DRV and no right to propose conditions for its cessation.

F. "If the United States desires a peaceful solution, it must recognize the Four Points proposed by the DRV and prove it in practice.

G. "The United States must stop bombing and other military activity against North Viet-Nam. Only then can a political solution be expected."

3. That was the end of his prepared statement.

4. I said that it was evident that not one of the three questions which we had asked on July 9 had been answered, to which he nodded his head.

5. I called attention to the fact that in his first paragraph, he had mentioned the escalation of war activities in the South as well as the bombing of the North. Did this, I asked, mean that they were not only insisting that we stop bombing the North but that we also stop all our military activities in the South while they offered to do nothing in return?

6. Lewandowski said, "my interpretation" is that there are five places in the text where the bombing of North Viet-Nam is mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. This is the most sensitive and most important part of the statement. Twice in the statement he said Warsaw says: "We know very well" and "We have reasons to state" that no proposition can succeed without cessation of bombing. He implied this was significant.

7. I said that I would, of course, report all this to Washington, but that it looked to me as though this was a backward step, and that we were being asked to give up a great deal and that Hanoi was not prepared to give up anything.

8. Lewandowski said it is a question of who will be the first to start giving.

9. I said: why can't each give something simultaneously?

10. Lewandowski read his statement in a very matter of fact tone and didn't seem at all surprised by my statement.

11. He then said: "There is one thing more in the telegram. My government believes that the contact here should not be made public for the very practical reason that if anything is known, we won't be able to have this contact in the future"--the implication being that they would like to have the contact in the future.

12. I said that this was one thing on which we could agree and that he could absolutely count on the United States keeping this secret.

13. Lewandowski said that in the first week in August, he was going to Hanoi and that "I can't tell what effect that may have on this," meaning our meetings.

14. This mentioning of future meetings led me to say that it was obvious that we could not in the future continue to meet in D'Orlandi's office in the middle of Sunday afternoon. I was continually followed by Vietnamese police, I understood that he was too. I said that I felt sure that I could get out at night without being followed, and that I had access to any number of houses which were not being watched. I said that I understood that he, however, could not get out unobserved.

15. To this he said, yes, he could and that in the case there would be no great difficulty of him and I meeting in the future.

16. D'Orlandi then spoke as follows:

17. "This is definitely a step backward. I had thought that the first meeting was rather encouraging. Both the opening and the American questions were encouraging. I felt something might come out and, as a matter of fact, I still feel this as a hunch. Accordingly, I hope the stiffness of your reply today is due to prevailing circumstances, and that this channel may be kept open and resumed as soon as possible. We were expecting a reply. Now we have a statement. I understood what led to this statement. It is the circumstances of the moment."

18. I asked to what circumstances he was referring. He said to all of the rumors in the newspapers of peace talk./2/

/2/For example of speculation in the press about peace talks during June and July 1966, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part VI-A, pp. 22-25.

19. I had thought he might say the bombing of the North or the intensified military activity in the South, and I was surprised when Lewandowski agreed that it was all the peace talk which created the current circumstances.

20. I said that I presumed Warsaw's statement was formulated with the knowledge of Hanoi. Lewandowski did not deny this, but said that Warsaw was, of course, not in a position to commit Hanoi.

21. When I got up to go, Lewandowski said with a smile, "I'm sorry we can't have a glass of wine this time in celebration of a real result."

22. There is one postscript which I should add to make the record complete, as follows:

23. D'Orlandi told me last night (Saturday) at a diplomatic function that he had called on Lewandowski that morning and had said that Fanfani wanted D'Orlandi to come to Rome for consultation. D'Orlandi therefore asked Lewandowski how long it would be before Lewandow-ski had something since D'Orlandi wanted to make plans.

24. Lewandowski answered by saying that, by a strange coincidence, the word from Warsaw had just arrived and that he would be ready to talk on Sunday. Lewandowski then made the following additional remark:

25. That realistically this whole conversation with the Americans could not take less than six months. D'Orlandi gathered that what he meant was that it takes time for Hanoi and Warsaw to formulate its proposals; it then takes time to submit them to me; it then takes time for the USG to consider the proposals and formulate their own answer.

26. Comment: It seems obvious that if the conversations are to accomplish something and if misunderstandings are to be avoided and precise results achieved, this is not unreasonable. I also think that while there may be progress, one cannot expect decisive results until after our elections.

Lodge

190. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, July 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:45 a.m. During a telephone conversation at 11:10 a.m. on July 24, Rostow told Rusk that he had "left the negative Marigold cables upstairs for the Pres. to read"; Rostow also said that "his reflection this morning had been re press leak" and he wondered "if on next round it wouldn't be wiser for direct approach." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)

1788. 1. I allowed enough time for Lewandowski to leave and then talked with D'Orlandi again.

2. He said that after I had left, Lewandowski made it clear that he was "much distressed." He had walked up and down the room, saying how distressed he was.

3. D'Orlandi said that Fanfani had called him to Rome and that there was now no reason to stay if this was the kind of line that Lewandowski was going to expound. He was, therefore, going to leave immediately for Rome.

4. Lewandowski asked him when he would be coming back, and D'Orlandi replied by August 15.

5. According to D'Orlandi, Lewandowski's great preoccupation was China. He was terribly worried about China. D'Orlandi thought it was China's influence which was making Hanoi so intransigent, but he also feared that China might take some sort of action which would "mess up the situation." Lewandowski was certainly worried about Chinese pressure.

6. It is clear, said D'Orlandi, that three or four weeks will go by during which nothing will happen and, D'Orlandi surmised, this may explain Lewandowski's remark on Saturday/2/ morning that the entire conversation between Lewandowski and me would take about six months altogether.

/2/July 23.

7. Fanfani is going to Warsaw tomorrow and will be back in Rome on Thursday. D'Orlandi's telegram describing today's meeting will reach Fanfani before he goes to Warsaw.

8. D'Orlandi intends to ask Fanfani how much the Italian Government is interested in this whole procedure, and how long he, D'Orlandi, should stay in Saigon. He said that Fanfani had had the idea of replacing D'Orlandi as Ambassador and of sending him to Saigon on specific trips. Both D'Orlandi and I felt that this would pretty much destroy the present arrangement. It appears that the minute anyone goes on a special trip connected with Viet-Nam the ensuing publicity causes failure. The advantage of the present situation is that D'Orlandi, Lewandowski and I all have regular jobs in Saigon, which serve as cover for our conversations.

9. Lewandowski told D'Orlandi that he would not spend more than a week in Hanoi which would get him back here around the 10th or the 12th of August. D'Orlandi felt that Lewandowski's trip to Hanoi might be "quite pointless" and that Lewandowski's instructions were coming from Warsaw, with Warsaw undoubtedly telling Hanoi what it was doing. On the other hand, D'Orlandi felt that the original demarche had come as a result of one of Lewandowski's visits to Hanoi.

10. One thing is sure and that is that Lewandowski and Warsaw--and probably Hanoi--wish to maintain the current contact between Lewandowski and me.

Lodge

191. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

No. 1684/66

Washington, July 25, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence. Helms forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Moyers on July 25 under cover of a memorandum stating that "After your call to me last week indicating that we had 'a hard mandate' from Higher Authority to collect information on North Vietnam, I thought it would be advisable to get together for you what up-to-date information we now have on the subject." (Ibid.) In a July 20 memorandum to the Deputy Director for Plans, Helms indicated that, according to Moyers, the President was particularly interested in the intentions of North Vietnam's "leadership with respect to waging the war, the American prisoners, etc." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966)

NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR/2/

/2/Produced by the Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated with ONE and SAVA. [Footnote in the source text.]

Introduction

1. The Communist military drive in South Vietnam has been stymied and the prospects for victory as viewed from Hanoi are almost certainly dimmer than at any time in the past five years. Nevertheless, Hanoi probably feels that the moment for a basic decision on whether or not to end the conflict is still well over the horizon. As the Vietnamese Communists see it, the allied will to persist in the war has not yet been adequately tested. Also still to be fully measured, in their view, is the ability of the US combat force in Vietnam to sustain its effectiveness, particularly in rolling back the Communists from the substantial ground position they still hold or in uprooting their political infrastructure.

2. It is clear that the Vietnamese Communists believe Washington will soon be forced by the demands of the conflict to put the US on an extensive wartime footing. They hope that such measures, combined with the effect of sustained and increasing US casualties, will fan additional domestic American opposition to continuing the war. In their view, these developments may well inhibit substantially greater US ground escalation of the conflict and may, in the long run, force major concessions in Washington's policy which could offer a realization of some Communist objectives in the South. Hanoi probably still believes that Washington's determination to pursue the war will crack before curtailed Communist capabilities make it necessary for Hanoi to completely rethink its strategy. They realize that the domestic position of the Republic of Vietnam is stronger now than at any time in the past three years, but they also judge that Saigon's programs to win the populace over have a long way to go before they reduce significantly the insurgent hold on the South.

3. In sum, the policy makers in Hanoi see little choice but to continue to support and prosecute the war generally along the present lines, at least until their prospects worsen decidedly. It is probable that they view the coming winter as at least the earliest point at which the long-term outlook for the conflict may come into sharper focus. In their view, the Vietnamese Communists have the ability to continue the fighting through this period, and probably well beyond. Despite the bombing of the North, sufficient supplies of men and materiel are still moving south and the will and ability of the domestic population to support the war remains adequate. The main force Communist units in the South still hold a powerful hand, and the Communist grip on a substantial segment of the populace in the South is still strong enough to ensure most of the indigenous logistic backing needed for the war effort.

[Here follows the body of the 9-page memorandum.]

192. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 25, 1966, 3:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw it.

Mr. President:

This is the first explicit suggestion from Saigon that Ky might run for President of South Viet-Nam in the 1967 election./2/

/2/Attached is an extract from the text of telegram 1848 from Saigon, July 25, in which Lodge reported that, according to Do, "Mrs. Ky's trip to the U.S. was also the opening gun in Ky's campaign for the President." Also attached is the text of telegram 1786 from Saigon, July 24, in which Lodge stated that he thought it "imprudent to rule Ky out as early as this"; envisioning adoption of a Vietnamese constitution with a "strong U.S. type President," Lodge saw no one else "as ready to fill this job" and "ready to run."

This should be no surprise: Ky's Directorate has been studying the evolution of South Korea after 1961. There Park took off his soldier suit and became a politician, barely winning a quite honest election in 1963. He has since grown remarkably in his job.

The Quayle polls showed Ky quite strong when they were taken late in 1965: 92% of the people were familiar with Ky; 34% liked him "very much"; 43% liked him "only a little"; only 5% "disliked" him. Only two other men in South Viet-Nam were close, in terms of being known and "liked"; the moderate Buddhist leader Tam Chau and our old friend Tri Quang.

Since then he has gained stature by his showdown in Hue and Danang; but he will lose because of devaluation and inflation, unless we really get that rice, pork, etc., in there.

I'm sure we shouldn't hook ourselves to Ky; but I believe we should keep our mind open to the possibility that he may emerge as a logical candidate, if he handles himself well over the next 6-9 months.

The critical question, in my view, is whether or not in the months after the Constituent Assembly meets, the South Vietnamese can form a big national political party. The party should have military support but reach far out into every region, religious and racial group./3/ If Ky and the Directorate can form such a party and Ky can lead it, his candidacy might make sense.

/3/Rostow elaborated on this point in an August 4 letter to Lodge, a copy of which he forwarded to the President under a covering memorandum, August 6, in which he noted that his views about the urgent need for a large national political party were shared by Kissinger, Unger, and Jorden. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI)

A party law in the Constitution, forcing the small fragmented parties to come together in bigger units, would be helpful. Such an article was written into the Korean Constitution.

In the meanwhile, quarrels and jealousies inside the Directorate are our greatest concern: a sample is the attached bitter comment on Ky by his Foreign Minister./4/

/4/According to Lodge's report in telegram 1848, Do said that "anybody could beat Ky," who was "inescapably connected in peoples' minds with devaluation and with inflation" and "literally had nobody with him." Only Bui Diem could "get any work out of him," and "if Bui Diem were removed, Do said, Ky would be like a man with both his arms and legs cut off."

Walt

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, July 27, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:04 a.m., and Rostow forwarded the text to the President at 6.45 p.m. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, July 27; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9)

2041. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

I thought your argument on your trip through Indiana was extremely effective. Your remarks about the Communists having bombed the Embassy were much appreciated here./2/

/2/For text of the President's remarks on Vietnam in Jeffersonville, Indiana, on July 23, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 782-783.

A. Elections

1. A preliminary analysis of the candidates running in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area and I Corps (that is 43 of the 108 seats being contested) shows that of 328 candidates, only 30 are active military. Another 34 are civil servants. The largest category is businessmen, with 69 candidates. 57 teachers, 23 provincial and city councilors, and 13 farmers are running. While there may be some government sponsored candidates who do not appear in the military and civil servant categories, there is no sign of the government's entering a large number of its own hand-picked candidates.

2. Two traditional parties, VNQDD and Dai Viet, are strong in I Corps. But in Saigon, slates tend to be built around prominent individuals, and party affiliation is distinctly secondary. Except for Dr. Phan Quang Dan's alliance, the National Democratic Bloc, no party or group in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area is supporting more than one list.

3. Local election control boards were scheduled to complete screening of candidates on July 22. Preliminary reports indicate that few slates were eliminated. In I Corps, two or three were apparently rejected because of connections with the "Struggle," which was a conspiracy to overthrow government authority by violence--not a bona fide political movement. Communist or police records and incomplete documentation have caused the control councils to eliminate some others. In the Saigon-Gia Dinh areas, no prominent politicians were struck from the lists; the slates headed by Phan Khac Suu, Dang Van Sung, and La Thanh Nghe were all approved. Suu and Sung had been stricken for technical reasons, and I spoke to Ky about them.

4. There are reports that the Viet Cong intend to make a major effort to interfere with the election. Some candidates in Saigon have told us of threats. Authorities in I Corps have told us that they expect the Communists to try to repeat past tactics such as attacking polling places, intimidating voters, and stealing voter registration cards. Perhaps the first instance of Communist terror directed against the election was the July 16 attack on the VNQDD Party headquarters in Quang Tin Province.

5. Popular attention is not yet focused on the election. JUSPAO field representatives speak of ignorance and apathy, with the cost of living and terrorism still the big worries. The government is trying to publicize voter registration and is producing a "how-to-vote" film.

B. Elections are an opportunity

6. To try to hold elections in the middle of a war, in this underdeveloped country and with no real experience of democracy on a national scale, is difficult, complicated, unprecedented and dangerous. We must expect turbulence. Very few countries--developed or otherwise--hold elections in war time. Neither the British nor the French did during World War II.

7. But in spite of these considerations, I believe that holding elections in Viet-Nam at about this time had to be tried. The heart of this war, after all, is political, and the elections, while a danger, are also an opportunity for our side to look clean, to make it clear that cheating in Viet-Nam is really on the way out. It is no exaggeration to say that if our side looks clean, this can change the course of the war.

8. This is because the Communists, while brutal, imperialistic, ruthless, unscrupulous, crafty and cruel, appear puritanical by insisting that corruption exists on our side only. One rarely hears of a corrupt Communist--at least while he is with their organization, but their abandonment of their own movement and its values when they defect or are captured cast strong doubt on their supposed internal morality. Nonetheless they are widely believed to be incorruptible.

9. I have put Lansdale onto the job of helping to bring about this big psychological victory. This is what he did in the Philippines, admittedly an easier problem than this because of their island status. Another asset which should stand him in good stead is the excellent relationship which he has developed with General Thang, whom Ky has had the good sense to put in charge of the administration of the election laws. I hope that all this will work together.

10. I have suggested to Lansdale that he draft a brief statement of guidance for Thang to publish under his own name, listing the essential points: free speech for all candidates; travel in their districts, as far as the war permits; no intimidation of candidates or of voters during the campaign and on election day; watchers at the polls; and count of the ballots in the presence of all the watchers. After Thang has issued this statement, I would then put it out to all the Americans in Viet-Nam as guidelines for them to follow in their relationship with the Vietnamese.

11. I have also asked Lansdale to interest himself in the growth of national parties. They expect there will be about 700 candidates for about 100 seats. Will there be any organization that seeks to endorse candidates in every one of the 100 odd districts?

C. Course of the war

12. Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News is the most senior and most experienced daily newspaperman in Viet-Nam, and one who has many times expressed his disgust at the journalism which is practiced here. He also has in the past criticized what he thought was the U.S. role in the '63 coup. He recently came in for backgrounding and, after we finished talking, volunteered the statement that obviously the situation in Viet-Nam is "much, much better." When I asked him what he meant by that, he said it was "much better than it was a year ago." Then after short pause, he said it was "much better than it was when you and I first started talking three years ago." Finally he said that it's the best it's ever been.

13. He thinks roughly: that we are winning militarily, politically and economically; and that once Hanoi is convinced we have learned how to overcome subversion, terrorism and criminal violence generally, they will stop--provided we continue to maintain momentum militarily, politically and economically. He does not anticipate ChiCom intervention or escalation into World War III, or a demand by the American public to bring the boys home. He does not think any publicized trips, such as those of Ronning or Sainteny or Wilson or Gandhi will accomplish anything, but that there will be a secret understanding and a quiet fade-out.

14. Beech has a house in Tokyo and travels all through the East. He says a new tide is running which makes the old fashioned anti-Americanism obsolete. People like Bhutto in Pakistan, who saw a career in trying to be a junior Krishna Menon, are out of step with the times. In none of the countries bordering China is there a move toward Communism. Although the U.S. has been clumsy and made mistakes, there is no doubt that our policies are beginning to bear fruit.

15. Beech says that once a place has felt the touch of the American bulldozer it is never the same again. The reason for the phenomenal growth in Korea is because during the American stay there, we trained many young men in handling the modern machinery which spells development of the country--that is bulldozers, trucks, airplanes, electrical equipment of all kinds. This is one of the things we leave behind us, which starts to grow after we have gone. He thinks that the progress in South Korea today is so great and dynamic and is having such a magnetic effect on North Korea that it may eventually unify the North and the South.

16. Comment: In Viet-Nam, we are doing the same thing--training young men in handling modern equipment. This is one reason why our decision to construct a big trade school in Saigon is valuable, and why we insist our contractors do on-the-job training. It helps to train the Vietnamese to develop their own resources; it will be giving them an educational institution and training which they really want (as compared with university educational facilities about which there is a great deal of doubt in my mind), and it is enormously popular.

D. Pacification

17. I hate to say this, but I cannot see that any really big and significant headway is being made on pacification. I talked with a very dependable man last night who had just been in Long An, which is the province immediately south of Saigon, and on which I used to concentrate in my first year here and he said the situation there is just about what it was three years ago./3/

/3/In a July 27 letter to Porter, Komer stated that "the civil side is a mess. Compared to our military operations, it's still farcical. There are many reasons, few of them your fault or mine. But we inherited this mess, indeed we were both appointed because it was such a mess; and from here on we're tagged with straightening it out. The President wants results." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Porter/Komer Numbered Letters)

18. The reason is easy to find. It is that GVN will not give pacification the proper priority. I get reports which I am investigating that ARVN is not fitted to handle it--or else does not want to, or both. I am told that the present kind of war has become a way of life with ARVN and that the American logistic support is making it even more so. Apparently they won't want to chance anything.

19. We are surely better organized on the American side than ever before and the Vietnamese have an organization headed by General Thang which is potentially better than they have ever had before. But General Thang is not being given the tools to do the job, particularly in the form of military means to protect the process of pacification. Everything should be geared to that.

20. What distresses me about this is that I believe our successes in military and other fields make this a particularly good time for a really effective body blow at the village guerrilla, and at terrorism, and subversion and criminal violence generally. Such a body blow would, I believe, very seriously diminish all recruiting into the Viet Cong, which depends overwhelmingly on terror. If you can stop recruits from going into the Viet Cong, you are crippling it just as surely as if you defeat it in battle.

21. Also I believe that Hanoi will regard their proficiency at terrorism as their ace in the hole--their way to start all over again, even though they are defeated militarily, politically and economically.

E. Casualties, military and civilian

22. American military casualties this week were 108 killed and 478 wounded. Seven were listed as captured or missing. The Communists lost 1,272 killed and 120 captured as compared with the previous week's total of 1,200 killed and 116 captured.

23. In a typical attack on civilians, the Viet Cong raided a refugee resettlement village near Quang Tin Province headquarters. They killed three refugees, wounded eleven, and left 145 homeless when they burned 11 buildings. The total number of civilians killed this week by the Viet Cong was 33, including one hamlet chief; 66 others were wounded.

F. Economic

24. This week, for the first time since devaluation, the USAID retail price index was down two percent--probably due mostly to an increase in the official price of live hogs in Saigon. It is hoped that this will increase pork supplies by encouraging growers to send more hogs to market. The price of pork in Saigon fell ten percent or more following the announcement of the official increase. Imported commodity prices also dropped in most instances, breaking rises which had been continuous since before devaluation. Our rice sales seem to be helping hold the line in that respect. We are endeavoring to produce a rational rice policy for GVN acceptance and I will have more to report on this.

25. Port improvement surveys for Da Nang, Ba Ngoi and Nha Trang have been completed and designs are in the final stages. A contract between the Navy and designers of port construction (World Wide Consultants) was signed last week.

26. USAID cargo continued to move out of the port at an ever-increasing rate and, I am assured by General Breakfield of USAID, that this rate shows definite improvement over the past three weeks. General Pham Dang Lan, new port director, has formed a series of sub-committees to study port problems and recommend solutions by July 27. The 4th Transportation Corps (which is taking over supervision and control of the port of Saigon) and GVN customs officials have been meeting to work out ground rules of customs administration by the GVN within and under ARVN and U.S. military control.

G. Psychological progress

27. From July 16 to July 22, 322 returnees entered Chieu Hoi centers. This is an increase over the 256 reported last week, but still below the 339 which came in during the week of July 2. The total number of returnees this year now stands at 10,754. For the same period last year, January through July, the total was 4,686. The total for all of 1965 was 11,124. If the present rate continues, the number of returnees this year may equal in eight months the total for all of 1965. Daily average this year is 52.9 as compared with 30.4 for 1965.

28. The successful youth project in Saigon's District VIII is now being extended to District VI. As in the first project, selected youth leaders will take over the government of the district as well as the organization of a comprehensive program of civil improvements. Other youth activities include 73 work camps set up in July, with participation by 5,000 students.

H. U.S. Congressional candidates

29. Two candidates for Congress were here last week, one Republican and one Democrat--Robert Taft of Cincinnati, Ohio, and Clive Du Val of McLean, Virginia. Very confidentially, both appeared well impressed by our effort here and thought that they had learned much which they had not known before. Mr. Taft left a note of thanks, saying:

30. "Your staff has been extraordinarily helpful in every way as has the establishment at JUSPAO. This has enabled me to get maximum coverage in the shortest period of time. The experience has been an exciting and interesting one. The extent and necessity of the effort here is not sufficiently understood and my own views have been fortified so that they can be better expressed. If I can be of service in any way that can help the picture here, please call on me."

Lodge

194. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/

Bangkok, July 29, 1966, 1141Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

1218. 1. In my meeting with Foreign Minister Thanat this morning, he said he had been giving considerable thought to what new initiatives might be made prior to the beginning of the UN General Assembly. He referred to the proposal previously tentatively advanced by Secretary for a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the nations contributing troops in South Vietnam. He also alluded to the unsuccessful attempts to get any constructive action out of the Geneva Co-chairmen on U.S. willingness to expand the ICC activities on the Cambodian borders, and further to the unsuccessful attempts of PriMin Wilson and PriMin Gandhi to move the Soviets towards any constructive utilization of their position as Co-chairman. He said he would like the Secretary's reaction to the thought of having the Japanese invite the FonMins of SVN and the troop-contributing nations and the FonMins of the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping and possibly also the Soviets to meet in Tokyo sometime in early September.

2. Thanat explained that if we continued to depend upon the Co-chairmen machinery as the only device for negotiations, we were giving the Soviets not only a veto power, but making their position increasingly difficult since they were vulnerable to Chinese criticism had they made any forthcoming moves regarding the reconvening of either of the Geneva conferences. It might be time, Thanat thought, for an Asian initiative honestly seeking to break this impasse. He did not think the Chinese would agree, although he thought it might have quite a bit of attractiveness for Hanoi. He thought that even in the event of the highly likely refusal of both regimes of such an invitation, it would allow us to go into the General Assembly with still another demonstration of the intransigence of the Communist camp. On other hand, in the unlikely event of the acceptance of such an invitation, he assumed that we would be prepared to participate.

3. Thanat pointed out that his own appraisal of Shiina and Sato led him to believe that, after their initial shock, they might be attracted by the thought. He recalled that in the 15 months patient preparations for the Seoul conference he had brought a great deal of pressure on both the Koreans and Japanese to settle their outstanding differences before he would agree to facilitate the preparations for the conference which was finally held. In this process he said he had come to have an increasing respect for both Sato and Shiina and thought that together they could handle any initial internal Japanese opposition.

4. I said I would immediately convey his thoughts to the Secretary./2/

/2/In telegram 1881 to Bangkok, June 30, the Department replied that Thanat's proposal had, in its view, "no chance of success," but it would not deter Thanat from trying it out with Shiina. (Ibid.) Thanat announced his proposal on August 3. Rostow indicated in a telephone conversation with Rusk on August 4 that the President was "quite excited about it"; Rusk replied that "we had a session on this yesterday and we are quite enthusiastic about going ahead with this; the problem is the kiss of death problem." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) On August 5 Rusk endorsed the proposal at a news conference. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 848) In telegram 22271 to Tokyo, August 5, Rusk instructed Reischauer to convey "our favorable view" to Japanese leaders. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Circular telegram 36816, August 27, reported that "Japan's vigorous support" had been the "most hopeful immediate outcome" of the proposal but that "reaction from other 15 Asian states to which proposal was addressed has been reserved or distinctly skeptical." (Ibid.)

Martin

195. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, July 30, 1966, 1100Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Elm Tree. Drafted and authenticated by Bohlen. According to a July 30 cover memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson sent a copy of the telegram to the President on August 1. (Ibid.) George, Ray, and Out are code names for Sturm, Khanh, and Le Van Truong, respectively.

1522. 1. George met noon 27th with Ray and Out for four-hour lunch at secluded restaurant and stroll in park of St. Cloud. Ray present during most of talk but both men seized occasion as it arose for private work with George. Ray helpful in keeping Out to issues at hand when latter tended to stray into jungle of Vietnamese politics. Out's identity and history, the major themes of conversation, are subject of separate message;/2/ he is extremely sensitive this matter and welcomed assurances his name would become known only to handful of men in highest positions of U.S. Government. In these messages, therefore, he will be referred to by cover name. Following is summary of highlights of conversation which ranged widely over twenty years of Vietnamese history and politics.

/2/Telegram 1523 from Paris, July 30; see footnote 3, Document 179.

2. Out presented himself as a Cochinchinese nationalist, of intellectual stripe, accustomed to good bourgeois comfort and with horror of physical combat and miseries of life in the Maquis, which his friend Nguyen Huu Tho appears able to tolerate. He expressed abhorrence and fear of Communists and apprehensiveness of DRV Mission in Paris. He is interested first in Cochinchina autonomy, second in a Vietnamese federation, and ultimately in an Indochinese federation to include Laos and Cambodia, although Sihanouk's instability seems to him an obstacle. Except for regional bias, Out's point of view as far as he expressed it to George, held few surprises. He appeared eager to use any means to bring war to an end before Cochinchina could be submerged by North (DRV) or Northerners (like present Premier). His conversation reflected no hostility toward U.S. or Americans except as sustainers of governments not chosen by people. He spoke with feeling of Diem government as bad U.S. creation.

3. Out's channel of communication to Vietnam is liaison officer stationed at Prague, who makes weekly visits here to carry messages. Ordered to report 28th to be available following meeting with George, he failed to appear. Moreover, Out was notified 28th by DST (French equivalent of FBI) not to leave French territory. Out feared liaison officer may have been intercepted carrying documents which compromised Out. Whereas he had hoped be able prove his bona fides and authority within two weeks, he now believed a month would be required.

4. George asked how Out was able to maintain his authority at so great a distance. Out gave no clear answer except to allude to subsequent performance of which he seemed sure, even though execution might be delayed.

5. Asked how and where next steps might be carried out if U.S. received proper assurances, Out said best locale might be Saigon. George expressed doubt and suggested it might be possible arrange for Tho and others to proceed to safe neutral spot where talks could take place in suitable atmosphere. Out replied that Tho was in effect a prisoner, not because he was detained but because he and his associates feared he might be replaced by someone unacceptable to them. George commented that U.S. view of coalitions including Communist elements was that these tended to become Communist tools. Out admitted FLN contained Communist members but said it was no more under Communist direction than the Movement Populaire Cochinchinois of 1946. (His statement regarding Tho suggested less confidence.)

6. With reference to possible outcome of contacts between U.S. Government and FLN, Out had little precise to offer but tenor of his remarks suggested belief that somehow might emerge a cessation of military action in Cochinchina, popular election of government in South acceptable to FLN, and gradual diminution of hostilities in 17th parallel region as upper hand is gained by U.S. forces, which would remain as "protection."

7. George handed over prisoner list which Out pocketed without glancing at it. He accepted without comment George's statement U.S. would consider acceptable evidence release any two civilians and any two military, with preference for those needing medical care. Ray mentioned possibility of quid pro quo. Out misunderstood this as reference to money and took offense. Reassured, he replied subject could be discussed later. Alone with George thereafter, Out said he would not ask for corresponding gesture on part of U.S.

8. Since delay in prisoner release seemed certain, George said he would report conversation to Washington and propose temporary return to his home. Simple code message based on reference to car would bring him back to Paris within hours to resume contact. Communication would be through Ray as Out indicated that great concern for his safety and especially for his wife, who is cardiac, made him reluctant have any possible compromising document about him. George said before he left Paris he would let Ray know. Ray too expressed some anxiety regarding his own security. He would return to Spain if need arose as his visa is still valid. In reply to question, both men explained fear of French on grounds latter have "own plan" for Vietnam.

Comment: In this tangle of improbables, George feels some confidence in Out's sincerity. Certainly there was no doubt of his cordiality, to which George responded in kind. Whether Out can in the end produce remains to be seen./3/ On balance it seems at this time U.S. has nothing to lose in playing along with Out and company as long as interests of both parties remain parallel. This may not be very far. We might, however, along the way, win freedom for some prisoners and to some extent undermine NLF. George did all possible to assure Out of importance U.S. attaches to contact and its maintenance. In the early phases, such risks as there are threaten Out and his friends rather than U.S.

/3/In telegram 55594 to Paris, September 28, U. Alexis Johnson asked McBride to tell Khanh: "Have heard nothing since George's meeting two months ago and nothing has happened." McBride replied in telegram 4675, September 30, that an Embassy official had met earlier that day with Khanh, who stated that Le Van Truong had delivered the message regarding the release of prisoners to Tho "about a month ago." Telegram 5440 from Paris, October 13, reported that Khanh had again seen Le Van Truong, who was under the impression that one U.S. prisoner on Sturm's list had been released but was very disturbed about his failure to deliver on the agreed-on number, since it cast doubt on his influence within the NLF. Le Van Truong further stated that if the authority of non-Communist elements was waning within the NLF, it was due to Hanoi's recently increased efforts to strengthen its influence, which had led to tension between Hanoi and the NLF. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ELMTREE)

In meeting, Ray played role of honest broker with more seeming disinterest than he displayed in New York. In aside to George he said much of what Out had to say of himself and his history he had never heard before despite intimacy of their families. His attitude was one of slight aloofness, which may have reflected some apprehension or reluctance on part of one of his former eminence to serve as a "letter box" (his word). Out's manner toward Ray, however, suggested latter was trusted collaborator.

It is clear that Out's point of view in many respects departs from reality as U.S. sees it, and his claims and pretentions in the eyes of a detached observer are implausible on the face of them. Nevertheless, Vietnamese politics is a sphere in which the implausible need not be synonymous with the impossible. Note: George requests authorization proceed as stated numbered paragraph 8 above.

Bohlen

196. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, August 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Kissinger, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador-at-Large
Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of International Law, Harvard
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant, FE
Monteagle Stearns, Special Assistant, S/AH

Professor Kissinger came in at the Governor's request to give his impressions of the situation in Vietnam following his recent visit there./2/ He explained that this had been his second trip to Vietnam. His first visit was in October of 1965.

/2/Kissinger visited Vietnam July 16-29.

Atmosphere

Professor Kissinger emphasized the conspiratorial atmosphere which he said prevailed throughout South Vietnam. He had never visited a country which was so self-absorbed. During his two visits and countless conversations with Vietnamese he did not recall being asked a single question about problems outside Vietnam. He was also impressed by the amount of backbiting that went on among the Vietnamese and the value they attached to qualities like cleverness and cunning as opposed to attributes like probity and integrity which were esteemed in the Western World. He recalled a long conversation he had had with a Provincial Official in the First Corps area. The official had described with considerable pride the tricks and maneuvers he had employed at the time of the struggle movement crisis to avoid committing himself either to the Government or the struggle forces. To many Vietnamese, conspiracy had become a way of life making political stability that much harder to achieve.

Military Situation

Kissinger acknowledged that the influx of American troops into Vietnam had resulted in a short term improvement in the military situation. In the Spring of 1965 Hanoi and the Viet Cong had entertained real hopes of a military victory. Their prospects for achieving this in the foreseeable future had been greatly diminished. Nevertheless, Kissinger thought that the basic situation had not changed since October of '65.

In his travels outside Saigon Kissinger had seen no sign that the Viet Cong's political organization and capacity for guerrilla warfare had been seriously affected by our military operations. The pacification program had made little progress. The Viet Cong still moved with relative impunity outside the main cities and towns. Their intelligence was excellent and more often than not, despite the mobility of our forces, the Viet Cong could avoid contact when they wanted to. While our military often pointed to the heavy enemy casualties as a sign that we were winning the war, Kissinger thought that Hanoi and the VC could accept a 10-1 kill ratio almost indefinitely. Even without infiltration of an estimated 4500 men a month from the North the Viet Cong could make good their losses by recruitment in the South. Kissinger did not seem impressed by evidence that Viet Cong recruiters were finding it difficult to get able-bodied men. He thought the Viet Cong were still far from the bottom of the barrel.

Kissinger praised the morale and dedication of our military forces but asserted that our strategy was wrong. "The best way to exhaust ourselves", he said, "is to spend our time chasing main force units near the Cambodian border." Only the Marines had learned that the war had to be won against the guerrillas and not against the main force units. Governor Harriman said that General Krulak had told him that the Marines in the First Corps area were now starting to concentrate on small unit operations, the task of which was to break the link between the guerrillas and the villagers. Kissinger observed that this was a slow, hard job which did not appeal to the generals in Saigon. He thought that General Westmoreland still conceived of his job as the location and destruction of main force units.

Kissinger cited as evidence of the lack of progress being made in pacification the fact that 18 months after our arrival in Danang it was still impossible to go four kilometers outside of the city at night without running a real risk of being shot. The situation around Saigon was almost as bad. Kissinger described his experience of flying over main highways in a helicopter and seeing as many as five or six Viet Cong road blocks. He noted that Government officials in ostensibly pacified areas refused to sleep in their villages at night.

While praising the Marines for having understood the real problem, Kissinger said that they were just beginning to learn how to conduct anti-guerrilla operations. Our military were not well equipped by training or experience to fight this kind of war. The problem of how to establish effective civil administration in the Provinces was still unsolved. We tended to confuse charitable activities with political action. The rebuilding of schools and the distribution of emergency food supplies were useful and constructive actions which won friends for us among the villagers. Such activities, however, did little to break the Viet Cong stranglehold on the villages when our forces had departed.

Kissinger said that he understood that the effectiveness of South Vietnam's military forces continued to suffer from their lack of aggressiveness. In the First Corps area General Lam actually deployed his troops within the Marine perimeter. He cited areas in which the ARVN set up its road blocks and conducted its patrols in the same locations night after night. Consequently, the VC learned quickly how to avoid them. Kissinger agreed with Governor Harriman that the best way to increase the effectiveness of the ARVN was to encadre South Vietnamese units with the American forces. Governor Harriman observed that General Krulak had told him that this was being done by the Marines in the First Corps area. Kissinger said that encadrement was not yet extensive. (Governor's note--2 Vietnamese squads to 1 U.S. Marine)

GVN Attitudes Towards Negotiations with NLF-VC

Professor Kissinger said that none of the Vietnamese military officers with whom he had talked showed any flexibility about negotiations with the NLF. He thought the civilians were less rigid and singled out Tran Van Do and Bui Diem as GVN officials who could conceive of some value deriving from contacts with the NLF. He thought this was a change from October 1965 when the NLF was "unmentionable" even among civilian officials. Tran Van Do had told Kissinger and Phil Habib that he thought, personally, that it might be easier to talk to the NLF than to Hanoi. Kissinger and Habib had not reported this remark by telegram be-cause, according to Kissinger, the mere mention of negotiations with the NLF would have greatly antagonized Ambassador Lodge. They feared that Lodge might tell Ky that Do was being disloyal.

Kissinger thought that a factor strongly influencing some Vietnamese to think about the possibility of negotiations with the NLF was the increasing cost of the war. The massive influx of Americans had created a better military situation for the GVN but large numbers of Americans inevitably created frictions with the local population. Some thoughtful Vietnamese were beginning to conclude that whoever won the war in the South the Vietnamese would lose. Kissinger noted that it was generally believed in Saigon that many Vietnamese, including GVN officials, maintained discreet contacts with the NLF and VC. In some cases this was because they had relatives on the other side. In other cases they were simply hedging their bets. Few Vietnamese admitted that they maintained covert contacts of this kind because of the obvous danger of doing so. Similarly, few GVN officials were willing to advocate talks with the NLF-VC because they assumed that the Directory and the U.S. were strongly opposed to such negotiations.

The Road to Negotiations

Kissinger said that we should stop talking about "unconditional" negotiations if we wanted to convince the world that we were serious about trying to find a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam problem. He did not find that anyone in Saigon understood what the phrase meant and it was usually interpreted to mean that we did not want to talk. In Kissinger's view we should keep pressing for negotiations and state openly what our conditions were. This was particularly important if we wanted to persuade the GVN to think in terms of talks with the NLF-VC. At present the GVN leadership was convinced that we were completely inflexible on this question.

Kissinger argued that negotiations with the NLF-VC offered greater chance of success than negotiations with Hanoi or multilateral negotiations under the umbrella of the Geneva Agreements. Of all the methods of negotiations available to us he believed that a big Geneva-type conference was the least likely to succeed. Such a conference would involve too many people who didn't know the situation and who brought to the conference nothing more than their prejudices. Furthermore, the composition of a re-convened Geneva Conference would be stacked against us.

One advantage of direct negotiations between the GVN and NLF-VC was that it ducked the troublesome problem that would be posed by VC representation at an international conference. Kissinger also thought it possible that Hanoi would prefer to let the NLF-VC take the lead since their own prestige would not be directly engaged in compromises reached by southerners in the South. If agreements could be reached with the NLF they could be ratified by the Geneva powers in a large international conference.

He agreed that the central problem was to conduct negotiations in the South which would not result in a take-over by the NLF. The fragility of the GVN created real difficulties and meant that we were continually in the position of being blackmailed by the political weakness of the GVN. Despite the problems, Kissinger thought that we should direct all of our efforts, military, political and economic, to creating a situation favorable to negotiations with the NLF-VC.

In practice this would mean (a) re-orienting our military strategy to put anti-guerrilla operations before operations against main force units, (b) encouraging the development of a broader political base in Saigon through elections and increased civilian participation in the Government and (c) putting more effort into improvement of civil administration both in Saigon and the provinces.

Another step that Kissinger considered necessary was to levy a top priority requirement on CAS to obtain more and better intelligence on the composition and leadership of NLF-VC. This was vitally important if realistic negotiations were ever to be conducted with the NLF. Even if a deal could not be made we might be able to induce the defection of non-communist members of the NLF. For this reason we had to do a better job of identifying non-communists and hard-core leaders. Kissinger noted that the NLF leader, Tho, had gone over to the communists in 1962 because of his opposition to Diem. He had tried to return to Saigon in '62 or '63 but Diem had refused to let him. It was barely possible that Tho and others like him could still be induced to return. Kissinger emphasized that we needed not only information on the principal NLF leaders but on their provincial leadership as well.

Kissinger thought that an amnesty offer by the GVN would be useful and should precede any serious effort by the GVN to engage in talks with the NLF-VC.

Impressions of the Embassy

Kissinger said that it would be extremely difficult to bring Ambassador Lodge to accept negotiations with the NLF-VC. He thought it might be done on a step by step basis. If Lodge could be convinced, the job of convincing Ky and the GVN would be much easier. The Vietnamese were somewhat in awe of Lodge's personality and his views would carry real weight with them. Lodge was completely sold on Ky and did not like twisting his arm. The Ambassador was sensitive to charges that he had pulled the rug out from under Diem and did not want the same thing to happen again.

Bill Porter was doing an excellent job under difficult circumstances. He had to spend far too much time answering questions from Washington. This was particularly unfortunate because the mission needed pulling together and Washington often asked the wrong questions.

Phil Habib was a first class professional. Kissinger regretted that he would be leaving in about 6 months. The 18 month tour of duty was a mistake since it took about a year and a half to learn the situation well enough to be able to influence it. The Department should reverse its decision not to let wives remain with their husbands and extend tours of duty to 2 to 3 years.

Kissinger had mixed impressions of Lansdale who he thought was too much of a Boy Scout. He commented that Lansdale had the great virtue of patience and was willing to spend long hours talking to Vietnamese. He was an excellent man for contacts but ineffective when it came to details. According to Kissinger, Lodge should have put Phil Habib in charge of monitoring the elections instead of Lansdale.

Kissinger did not believe that the PATs were accomplishing much. They had been recruited and trained too quickly. He said that it was admitted that they had a desertion rate of at least 15% and the rate might be significantly higher. His own observation of the PATs in operation indicated that they tended to stick close to their base of operations and were no match for the highly motivated VC.

197. Memorandum of Meeting/1/

Washington, August 2, 1966, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 72 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 8/8/66. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Harriman's office. Assigned by the President in July to devote full attention to the search for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, Harriman established a "Negotiations Committee," which met once a week beginning with this meeting. In an October 4 memorandum to Katzenbach, Harriman stated that his committee met each Thursday "to develop, assess and follow up all leads to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict." Principal participants were U. Alexis Johnson, Llewellyn Thompson, William Bundy, Joseph Sisco, Leonard Unger, Thomas Hughes, and Benjamin Read. (Ibid., S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State--Rusk)/1

PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman
U. Alexis Johnson
Llewellyn ThompsonLeonard Unger

SUBJECTVietnam: Negotiations

Amb. Unger's check list/2/ was reviewed. It was agreed that a message to Saigon should be prepared exploring the possibilities and problems of secret GVN talks with the NLF-VC.

/2/Not found.

The group agreed that we need to know much more about the leadership and composition of the NLF and the VC. Amb. Johnson commented that Mr. Helms had told him in a recent conversation that CAS was beginning to develop the capability to obtain better intelligence on this subject through penetration of the NLF-VC. He concurred, however, that more had to be done and that Saigon should be informed that we consider this a top priority requirement.

It was agreed that the question of an amnesty offer by the GVN to the NLF-VC was closely tied to the question of secret talks. A meaningful amnesty offer should open up the possibility of NLF leadership (not merely rank and file) returning to "normal" political life in the south. Any GVN initiative to engage in direct talks with the NLF-VC should be taken against the background of the amnesty offer.

It was recognized that there would be considerable resistance in Saigon, both on the part of the GVN military leaders and the Embassy, to the idea of negotiations with the NLF-VC. Amb. Thompson suggested that the idea might be sold on the basis that it offered the possibility of sowing dissension in the ranks of the enemy and peeling off non-communist elements from the NLF. Amb. Johnson commented that this point had to be handled very carefully because dissension could be sowed in both directions. He thought that in its present mood of confidence the GVN would be hard to persuade that an initiative for talks with the NLF-VC was desirable. He thought that it would take six weeks at a minimum to prepare the ground in Saigon.

It was agreed that Amb. Unger would prepare a draft of a message to Saigon.

The subject of a Congressional resolution setting forth US aims in Vietnam was discussed. Amb. Unger said that he visualized such a resolution as a means of emphasizing the limited nature of our objectives and our readiness to engage in unconditional talks. If the right language could be worked out, such a resolution might be a way of getting Fulbright back on the track. Governor Harriman commented that it was hard to conceive of any resolution which would be acceptable to both Congressional hawks and doves--to Fulbright and Symington for example. The group agreed that there could be no more effective way of convincing Hanoi and the rest of the world of our unity and determination than to bring Fulbright around.

Amb. Unger will prepare a draft Congressional resolution so that the group can see how it might look.

198. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 2, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. A copy was sent to Moyers.

Mr. President:

The attached latest report on Viet Cong motivation and morale, January-June 1966,/2/ is important both as an intelligence document and as a basis for action. Not included in the report is the following estimate which I am having refined in Saigon and will present to you in about a week:

/2/Attached but not printed, is "Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study, January-June 1966: A Briefing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," August 1, prepared by Leon Goure for the Rand Corporation. Goure spent an hour with Rostow on August 2 and briefed McNamara on August 3.

--When Rand first began to interview the VC, 65% of those who defected or whom we captured believed that the VC would win; 25% felt the GVN would win; 10% were uncertain.

--The present figures are: 20% now believe the VC will win: 60% believe the GVN will win: 20% are uncertain.

The rise in those "uncertain" reflects, in itself, an important fact. The number of hard core Communist defectors has increased. These men find it difficult to go beyond a statement other than "uncertainty" about victory.

What this report shows is a progressive decline in the morale and the fighting capacity of the VC. As you said at lunch yesterday to the newspaper men, no one can tell you when this progressive decline will lead to the breaking up of units or to the ending of the war. But the process under way among the VC is clear.

The operational implication, in my view, is that we must now persuade the government in Saigon to mount a campaign which effectively appeals to the VC and the North Vietnamese troops along the following lines:

1. All Vietnamese should now rally to stop the killing and end the war.

2. The Americans will go home as soon as peace is assured.

3. It is time for all Vietnamese to turn to economic and social development of their country.

I have put Bill Jorden to work this morning with State to produce an operational scenario which would hammer away at these three simple themes.

Two final observations. We must get a team in Saigon to work now on a post-war Vietnamese development plan. One aspect of that plan should be the constructive post-war use of Camranh Base. Apparently nothing makes Vietnamese more skeptical that we will ever leave than our willingness to construct that marvelous installation. We ought now to encourage thought and planning as to how it might be used in the future development of the country. Second, all the interrogators (Vietnamese and U.S.) are convinced that if the VC fail this time in the South they--and the whole country--will be swept by a mood of wanting no further violence and killing. They are close to having had enough. As Goure put it, they will be like the Spanish after the civil war--prepared to take even a bad government rather than to risk civil war again. We have seen that mood also in the Dominican Republic and earlier in the 1920's in Mexico after their bloody revolution. I cite this to illustrate the need of getting the government in Saigon to shift from talk about invading the North to a policy of appealing for peace, order, and progress in the South.

It may be that you would like to hear directly from Goure his reflections on the evidence which now, as you can see, includes not only interrogations but a mass of captured documents which bear on morale. He will be here a few more days.

It is, of course, extremely important that we not overestimate these trends and develop excessive optimism; but it is equally important that we look at them soberly and, especially, mount the kind of political as well as military operations which will accelerate them.

Walt

Bring Goure in (I spent an hour with him today)
Not necessary/3/

/3/The President did not mark either option. The President's Daily Diary indicates that he did not meet with Goure during August 1966. (Johnson Library)

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/

Washington, August 2, 1966, 6:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Buffum, cleared in draft by William Bundy and Harriman, and approved by Rusk.

20124. For Goldberg. Dept. has given most serious study to ICRC proposal (Urtel 466)./2/ We commend you for handling discussion with great delicacy. We endorse fully your view that proposal must be handled with great care and that ICRC channel may offer possible fresh avenue to probe Hanoi's present intentions.

/2/Responding to a question about possible war crimes trials in Hanoi for U.S. prisoners, President Johnson had indicated in his press conference on July 20 that the United States was ready to participate in an ICRC-sponsored conference on the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the Vietnam conflict. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 744) In telegram 466 from Geneva, July 26, Goldberg transmitted a proposal from the ICRC to convene a conference that would seek a more general settlement of the conflict. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III) Rostow's notes of the Tuesday lunch meeting on August 2 state: "ICRC language was changed. President uneasy about drafting of that." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President)

Onus for any rejection of proposal should rest on Hanoi and not on US. Our willingness to continue to probe possibilities of peace talks through this channel should help our position both internationally and domestically. Note verbale which we providing you is drafted on assumption that at some point, if proposal is not accepted by Hanoi, it might be advantageous to have it surfaced publicly. We fully agree, however, that for the time being this should be treated as a matter of utmost sensitivity.

General posture we wish to strike is appearance of being forthcoming without giving up any points of principle. In particular, we wish assure our response fully accords with frequently stated US readiness engage in unconditional discussions which might help terminate conflict in Viet Nam. We assume ICRC suggestion for broad conference on all humanitarian problems, based on resolution X,/3/ would logically involve discussion of ways to end conflict.

/3/Resolution X, adopted at the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, encouraged the ICRC to undertake efforts to prevent or settle armed conflicts.

Recent reports of Hanoi mood and intentions are contradictory but merit further study. On one hand, Hanoi has recently moved one additional division to SVN. On other hand, there appears to be some difference between Hanoi and Peking on continuing validity of Geneva Agreements. Also noteworthy is timing of Hanoi's statement that foreign volunteers not now needed,/4/ coming as it does on heels of Bucharest Declaration./5/ In short, these recent moves might presage some willingness on Hanoi's part to decelerate present trend of escalation, and we of course would be interested in probing meanings of these moves in very private and quiet manner.

/4/Not further identified.

/5/In the Bucharest Declaration, issued July 6, Warsaw Pact members meeting in Bucharest proclaimed their readiness to allow volunteers to go to Vietnam if the DRV requested it. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 832-834.

Following is text note verbale you may give Gonard:

The US Government has studied carefully the note verbale given to Ambassador Goldberg by Samuel Gonard, President of the ICRC, suggesting that a conference be held under the auspices of the ICRC which would not be limited solely to the study of humanitarian problems arising out of the application of the Geneva Conventions as such, "but that its scope should be extended to include also the study of those problems arising out of the methods employed in the conduct of military operations." Consistent with its position that it is prepared to engage in unconditional discussions, the US would be ready also to discuss all humanitarian problems "over and beyond the strict application of the Geneva Conventions" as suggested by the ICRC.

The ICRC has asked whether the US would be willing to take now certain measures susceptible of facilitating the convening of such a conference. The US looks sympathetically on this request. The ICRC can state unequivocally to the government at Hanoi, that it is satisfied the US is ready to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and would be willing to accept a reduction of hostilities on a reciprocal basis, either prior to or during a conference.

In addition to delivering the above note, you should make the following points orally to Gonard:

1. You should stress that when the US speaks of reduced military activities on a reciprocal basis, we are obviously including bombing of the North as one of the elements. While US cannot agree to a formal bombing pause except as part of a reciprocal reduction of hostilities accepted by Hanoi, you may reaffirm to Gonard that if he decides to pursue matter personally in Hanoi he need have no fear for his safety as far as US bombing concerned. You may add that if his efforts succeed in bringing about a meeting of the type he envisages, we would be prepared to consider sympathetically steps to facilitate such discussions.

Moreover, we would be prepared to consider indications of an informal nature by Hanoi as to what it would do on its side by way of a reduction of hostilities; and would consider carefully indications that Hanoi was in fact reducing its infiltration or other operations, recognizing always that we would have to observe carefully whether such a reduction was in fact taking place and being continued. FYI: We had recent indication from Sainteny report/6/ that some Hanoi leaders recognized that they would have to do something on their side if we were ever to consider suspending or ceasing bombing. However, we have always recognized the difficulty they might face in saying something for the record as to what they would do or were doing. End FYI.

/6/See Document 182 for a report on Sainteny's trip to Hanoi.

2. We remain concerned that ICRC initiative not result in effort to trade off safety of POWs for cessation of bombings of North Viet Nam. Should we continue discussions on wider issues as outlined by Gonard, we would feel free to discuss all aspects of military activities, including Viet Cong terrorism in South--not just bombing of North.

3. We continue to believe that first step would be for Gonard to go to Hanoi. As you have told him, depending on reaction he receives there, further consideration could be given to question of whether Viet Cong participation in conference is an important element.

Rusk

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, August 3, 1966, 1:21 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared in substance by Rusk and McNamara, and approved by Rusk.

20533. For Ambassador Lodge.

1. Your recent comments that pacification seems to be moving too slowly,/2/ plus other reports to this effect,/3/ have been subject highest level discussion here./4/ We generally share your views, including your belief that GVN is not fully employing its military assets (ARVN, RF and PF) either offensively or in support of pacification. Clear to us they ought to put more effort into pacification. No one here believes that GVN military forces are contributing to offensive operations of pacification programs in a measure anywhere near what should be expected from a 600,000 man force. We also note that Ky himself is becoming much more concerned about pacification, for example in his 22 July talk with you.

/2/See Document 193.

/3/In an August 2 memorandum to the President, in anticipation of Johnson's lunch-eon meeting that day, Komer stated that pacification of the countryside, one of the "four chief components of our Vietnam strategy," was the "area where we've made least progress." He saw "Problem No 1 in Vietnam as increasingly that of redirecting the ARVN to the pacification task, with US logistic support." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Ko-mer Files, Memos to the President)

/4/After the President's lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to Read: "Go to Westmoreland and Lodge on weaknesses of pacification and ask Westmoreland and Lodge to do a cable asking for a plan to improve the whole pacification effort and to see in general how in that context can use ARVN more effectively." (Notes re Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Moyers attended the President's lunch meeting on August 2, which lasted from 1:24 to 3:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary). No record of the discussion has been found.

2. Highest authority requests that you personally address the question of best means of accelerating and giving direction to the pacification effort--by pinpointing responsibility of both GVN and US officials at Saigon level as well as in provinces and districts, by clear-cut directives to both GVN and US officials, by appropriate assignment of GVN resources, by full and fast reporting, by vigorous follow-up, and so on--as a preliminary to discussing these matters with the GVN. Top levels here are most interested in your suggestions as to action needed to galvanize the lagging effort in this essential field./5/

/5/Lodge replied in telegram 2675, August 4, noting that Westmoreland had a team studying Vietnamese military, paramilitary, and police forces and that once Westmoreland submitted his proposals, Lodge hoped to develop a unified U.S. position to take up with the GVN. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Rusk

201. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 13-66

Washington, August 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79-R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board except for the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

Rostow forwarded the estimate to President Johnson on August 5, noting in his covering memorandum that it had been produced "at our request." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10)

CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION

Conclusion

The Chinese Communists have responded to recent US air action against North Vietnamese POL facilities and to Ho Chi Minh's July 17 appeal for more aid/2/ with massive propaganda demonstrations all over China. These occasions were used to renew pledges of complete support for Hanoi and to reiterate the Chinese view that the war must be continued to final victory. At the same time, the Chinese seem likely to provide more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam, and, for the first time, they may move some infantry troops into North Vietnam as a precautionary step against the contingency of invasion.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 180.

We do not conclude, however, that the Chinese have changed their basic policy because of the recent air strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded or if the collapse of the Communist regime seemed likely. But we continue to believe that, at present levels of US action against NVN, China will not commit its ground forces to the war, nor its air force to deliberate and sustained action against US forces.

[Here follows the body of the 7-page estimate.]

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, August 4, 1966, 6:59 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and Unger; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Harriman, Thompson, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Rusk.

21944. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. Saigon 1781 and 1927./2/ Several of recent reports from Saigon have raised intense interest here at high levels in possibility of generating GVN initiatives to foment divisions among VC/NLF, stimulate increasing scale of defection and ultimately pave way to GVN-VC/NLF talks to work out negotiated solution to Viet-Nam conflict on favorable terms. We have in mind both a covert course of action for the GVN, which is discussed in this message,/3/ and a longer range overt GVN program which will be discussed in Septel./4/

/2/In telegram 1781 from Saigon, July 24, the Embassy reported that, in a conversation with Kissinger on July 23, Bui Diem seemed prepared to accept the NLF "into the body politic of the South if (1) they would turn in their arms, and (2) agreed to participate on same basis as other Vietnamese political elements." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1927 from Saigon, July 26, the Embassy reported that Tran Van Tuyen, an influential VNQDD politician, had taken the same position in a conversation with Kissinger, indicating that it would be appropriate and easy for the Vietnamese to establish contact with both the NLF and Hanoi, whose leaders were known personally to him and many of his countrymen. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)

/3/After the President's lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to Read: "Cable to Lodge which asks him to encourage SVN to begin to see what contacts can make covertly with VC. Maximize covert operations. Suggest Ky, instead of sounding out about going to North, ought to launch peace campaign based on Honolulu where he said: come on over." (Notes re Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson Library, National Security Files, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President)

/4/Document 203.

2. We have made specific note of Kissinger conversation with Tran Van Tuyen, and have related it to the reports of poor morale and dissention in VC ranks (e.g. recent Rand/Goure Report)/5/ as well as hints at more significant divisions among VC/NLF leaders and eventual possibility splitting off certain dissatisfied, anti-NVN elements not wholly under communist discipline. Our conclusion is that time may now be favorable for aggressive GVN action on covert side to exploit its contacts with VC/NLF elements and encourage expanded contacts in order to smoke out all evidences of divisions in VC ranks and prospects for important VC defections. As opposed to earlier periods, we judge that GVN today could take such actions from position of relative strength and therefore avoid spreading suspicion and consternation among its own people about possible intentions of making a deal with VC.

/5/See Document 198.

3. You will know better than we how GVN might proceed but we have in mind generally accepted reports that through family and village connections, ties of northerners who have gone south, etc. there are many quiet and informal avenues to VC/NLF and we also understand many GVN officials and military commanders know in greater or lesser degree their VC "opposite numbers". It may therefore come down to a matter of confidential GVN instructions to appropriate officials and military to lift present inhibitions on contacts and provide them with effective line to be taken in any contacts which ensue.

4. We would like you to consider how we might best get GVN into motion on this matter and if general line set out above makes sense you are authorized to proceed without further exchanges with us. If you see problems in what we are suggesting, please let us know and give us your suggestion as to how to move this matter forward./6/

/6/Lodge replied in telegram 2814, August 5, and in telegram 2818, Document 204. In telegram 2814, he indicated that he had spoken to Ky about covert exploitation of contacts with the NLF leadership and that Ky had liked the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

5. You may also want to consider in this connection whether there is any way our own intelligence efforts might be expanded to develop greater body of information on VC/NLF especially their leaders, and potential weaknesses within its ranks (see Deptel 1130, Oct. 26, 1965 and Embtel 1467, Oct. 28, 1965/7/ for our previous exchange on this subject).

/7/Neither printed. (Ibid. and ibid., POL 15 VIET S, respectively)

Rusk

[end of document]

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