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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, August 5, 1966, 8:08 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, McNaughton, Thompson, Rostow, and Jorden; and approved by Rusk.1

23182. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. State 21944./2/

/2/Document 202.

1. In this message I would like to put before you longer range GVN program mentioned ref State tel. I would appreciate your giving this overt program intensive study at your earliest convenience and telling me how you feel it might most effectively be promoted with GVN (with such modifications as you consider desirable) for execution at appropriate moment.

2. We have touched on certain elements of this plan in past, notably through Deptels 2534 of last February/3/ and 5454 of July 11,/4/ in conversations when you were last in Washington and in paper (Item 17) prepared for that visit/5/ and, we understand, it was discussed by you with Henry Kissinger during his recent visit to Saigon.

/3/Telegram 2534, February 25, stated that "we should do all possible to try to break off some of the elements of the NLF/VC" and urged Lodge to "encourage Ky and Thieu to exercise their imagination and ingenuity in this field." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/4/In telegram 5454, the Department recommended that Lodge discuss the issue with Kissinger during his visit in July. (Ibid.)

/5/"Contacts with the VC," prepared for Lodge's visit to Washington in early May 1966. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting, 5/10/66)

3. The essence of the program would be an approach to VC/NLF personnel, individually and collectively, to promote their reconciliation with GVN and reincorporation in body politic. As we see it now, and subject to your views, the approach would be in the form of a proclamation by the GVN PriMin or Chief of State offering the VC/NLF in return for the surrender of its arms and the abandonment of its insurgency, amnesty for its members and their right to participate in the political process as well as possible material rewards. Specifically the proclamation might follow these lines: Sketch out the origins of the present struggle; mention the improved military situation in the South and the strikes at the root of the aggression in the North; call on VC/NLF to recognize that it cannot impose its will on the people of SVN by force; urge it to join in effort to achieve national reconciliation and to carry out the peaceful reconstruction of the country.

4. More particularly, the proclamation would offer VC amnesty in return for turn in of arms, or freedom to return North; would renew GVN pledge to carry out program of transition to civilian, representative government, with VC participation in political life whenever they forswear violent means, would leave local administration undisturbed pending local elections, at same time affirming GVN authority throughout country in principle; would announce phased withdrawal of foreign troops as security reestablished; and would announce intensified economic and social programs. Finally, proclamation would envisage talks with Hanoi at appropriate future date on trade resumption, etc. and reunification. (Fuller exposition of program together with one or more versions possible text being pouched.)

5. Briefly, we see following advantages to such a program:

(a) Would go long way to take heat, domestically and internationally, out of demands for VC/NLF representation in international negotiations or Conference, since GVN would have made offer (whether accepted or not) to work out internal political problems on reasonable basis.

(b) If offer rejected would put onus on VC/NLF side and would probably intensify their internal differences over continued prosecution of insurgency, encouraging individual and group defections.

(c) If offer accepted GVN dealing from strength in subsequent negotiations.

(d) Would provide phased settlement of conflict without calling on DRV to admit defeat or direct participation in conflict.

(e) Any later international conference could devote itself primarily to provision of guarantees and enforcement machinery since resolution of basic internal SVN political questions would hopefully have been largely achieved by GVN-VC/NLF negotiation.

6. Successful launching of such a program requires that GVN speak from strength so that its action is not interpreted as a preparation for a compromise deal with VC/NLF and therefore a signal for politically sensitive individuals to seek their own accommodation. Politically and militarily present time appears relatively favorable but we see following difficulties in moving ahead too soon:

(a) Will require careful preparation with GVN, particularly to overcome anticipated reservations of military, and successful launching requires full understanding and acceptance of program by entire GVN leadership. May take time achieve this if violent reactions (coups?) are to be avoided.

(b) Offers to VC/NLF personnel envisaged in proclamation concerning restoration civil rights if made prior to Sept. 11 elections could create embarrassment with provisions of present electoral law.

(c) GVN forthcoming posture more credible following successful elections.

We have concluded therefore the program could best be launched in late September or early October, but our views on this are not fixed./6/

/6/Lodge replied in telegram 3130, August 10. Given how "uninformed" GVN leaders were regarding "diplomatic techniques for bringing a war to an end," Lodge proposed that such a program not be broached directly to the GVN but that a "broad dialogue on settlement possibilities" be opened with the GVN. "We would seek quickly in this educational process to reach agreement on your specific proposal." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department concurred in telegram 27973, August 15. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)

7. In your comments I should appreciate your also covering the possible desirability of launching such a program in one area only at first, as for example in Region IV, before attempting it on a nation-wide basis.

8. Septel/7/ discusses some more immediate measures, including psywar campaign, aimed at encouraging individual and group defections now.

/7/Telegram 23332 to Saigon, August 6; see footnote 4, Document 180.

Rusk

204. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, August 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:14 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 2818 to the President on August 9, together with the text of telegram 3038, August 9, in which Lodge provided a progress report on contact with Tho. In his covering memorandum Rostow stated: "Here is the first attempted major operation to go to work on the political orientation of the NLF. The case itself is attractive, if it works out; but it is equally important that Lodge is now aboard and interested." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10)

2818. Absolutely no distribution except at direction of Secretary.

1. This is in further reply to State 21944./2/

/2/Document 202.

2. We have been impressed by growing number of indicators, buttressed by Rand/Goure report, that NLF-VC morale sinking. These have naturally led us to give intensive consideration to what might be done to stimulate decay in their organization. At present, we are endeavoring to set up test in a particular province (that of official now in charge of Chieu Hoi activity) with view to determining whether certain incentives can be provided, in the form of material and status rewards, which would induce high-level NLF-VC defections. By material and status awards, we mean (a) substantial cash awards to families to enable such high-level defectors to "reconstitute their lives" and (b) assurances that their status as officials will be recognized if they come over, that they will not be herded into ordinary Chieu Hoi centers or prisons, that they and their families will not be maltreated, and that they will be permitted to resume their professions if they have them, provided they maintain correct attitudes toward GVN.

3. It will probably not be easy to induce GVN to accept such approach, though their attitude toward returnees has improved considerably. Their objection stems from reluctance to "reward" NLF-VC, while patriotic elements are unrewarded. Their tendency has been to rely on rewards for NLF-VC taken "dead or alive." To counter this, it is currently our idea that proposal be described as GVN rewarding families for performance of patriotic duty in persuading their relatives to return to GVN side. We are now developing format to propose to GVN on this. If we are blocked by bureaucracy from running test along general lines mentioned above, I will take matter to Ky with view convincing him that this is worthwhile effort, that it is better to induce NLF-VC by such means to walk in rather than have to go shoot them and get shot ourselves in the process. My talk with him yesterday will, I hope, have paved the way. We do not intend to confine awards to families of returnees, but will consider other devices calculated to minimize political resentment, such as donations to Vietnamese war veterans, etc. I will keep you informed as this matter develops.

4. A second effort we are making is at present closely held among very few of us here. On July 23, one of our most experienced American officials, a man with excellent reputation among Vietnamese, was approached and requested to meet with an uncle of Nguyen Huu Tho,/3/ chairman of the National Liberation Front. The uncle is head of the Tho family as now constituted, and has assumed responsibility for the welfare of Tho's wife and nine children, the tenth child, a boy, being with Tho in the Maquis. We approved meeting between the American and the uncle in presence of the intermediary. The uncle said he wished to induce Tho to come back, not only for patriotic but for family reasons. As Tho would turn himself over only to the Americans, they wished to know whether we would help, if he did so, and particularly whether we would put Tho beyond reach of VC.

/3/In a September 27 memorandum to Helms, Carver identified the uncle as Nguyen Huu An, Permanent Secretary of the (South) Vietnam Red Cross. (Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80-R01720R) Although Nguyen Huu An is referred to as "uncle" in most White House, State Department, and CIA documents dealing with him, Carver notified Helms in an October 17 memorandum that it had been revealed that An was not actually Nguyen Huu Tho's uncle but a cousin of Tho's father. (Ibid.)

5. Bill Porter, who is handling matter at my request, instructed American to give assurances that we would assist Tho and family in every possible way, including protection from VC. This assurance was given on July 26 and in return, Tho's uncle stated that plan would be implemented immediately by sending his (uncle's) wife to Cambodia (they declared no problem doing this) where she would meet with Tho's mother-in-law. The two women would then go either singly or together to meet with Tho or call Tho to see them, their purpose being to obtain from Tho statement of conditions under which he would come back. Uncle's wife would then return to Saigon with these conditions, which would then pass from her to uncle to intermediary to American contact. Uncle believes Tho will insist on talking to authorized American before actually turning himself in. He insists Tho not real Communist.

6. Intermediary who arranged meeting with Tho's uncle expressed view that if Tho comes over, several other prominent NLF-VC officials would also come. He cited by name Nguyen Van Tri, alias Muoi Tri, VC political and military advisor, Zone D; Hbay Mon, VC chief of west; La Van Liem, special commissioner, for VC special missions in Saigon, Cholon and Gia Dinh (terror, sabotage). Tho's uncle said during meeting with American that if Tho comes over, he may arrange to free some American prisoners when he does. Uncle said there no further need for direct contact between him and American, that further messages on subject would come through intermediary.

7. We have learned that uncle's wife left immediately as scheduled. No further word.

8. If and when matter progresses to point where arrangements are required, CAS will be brought in to effect them.

9. Cannot forecast what will come of this, but it is interesting family initiative. We will look for others./4/ I assume I have authority to make any arrangements required to get Tho or any other top-ranking NLF-VC to come over and that if they wish to do so to us instead of to GVN, we should accept and leave problems to be cleared up with GVN later./5/

/4/In telegram 27768 to Saigon, August 13, the Department of State notified the Embassy that messages referring to the possible defection of Tho and other key NLF leaders should be slugged Thrush. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH)

/5/In telegram 23352, August 7, the Department indicated that Lodge assumed correctly that he had such authority. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

Lodge

205. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/

Saigon, August 7, 1966, 0005Z.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to General Wheeler.

MAC 6814. Subject: 66-67 force requirements (U). Ref: Emrick's message, DTG 032207Z Aug 66./2/

/2/In his August 3 telegram, Emrick indicated that CINCPAC's 1966-1967 force requirement package was in trouble in Washington and that the JCS were loathe to recommend approval without additional rationale, which would probably mean presenting a special briefing. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to McNamara, JCSM-506-66, August 5, the JCS indicated that they had some reservations particularly with respect to CINCPAC's added requirements for "air defense, security units, attack sorties, and the force requirements derived therefrom." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 320.2 Vietnam)

1. Continuous study of the situation indicates that past and current developments reinforce my appraisal of the war on which the CY 66-67 force requirements were based. There are no indications that the enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased his rate of infiltration, formed division size units, introduced new weapons into his ranks, maintained lines of communications leading into South Vietnam, increased his use of Cambodia as a safe haven, and recently moved a combat division through the DMZ. These and other facts support earlier predictions and suggest that the enemy intends to continue a protracted war of attrition. We must not underestimate the enemy nor his determination.

2. The war can continue to escalate. Infiltration of enemy troops and supplies from NVN can increase and there is no assurance that this will not occur.

3. If, contrary to current indications, Hanoi decides not to escalate further, some modification of the forces which I have requested probably could be made. Under such circumstances, I conceive of a carefully balanced force that is designed to fight a long war of attrition and sustainable without national mobilization.

4. I recognize the possibility that the enemy may not continue to follow the pattern of infiltration as projected. Accordingly, my staff is currently conducting a number of studies with the objective of placing this command and the RVN in a posture that will permit us to retain the initiative regardless of the course the enemy chooses to pursue. These include:

A. A study which considers possible courses of action by the enemy on our force posture and counteractions to maintain our superiority.

B. An analysis of our requirement to determine a balanced US force that can be employed and sustained fully and effectively in combat on an indefinite basis without national mobilization.

C. A study to determine the evolutionary steps to be taken in designing an ultimate GVN security structure.

D. A study to determine the optimum RVNAF force structure which can be attained and supported in consideration of recent experience and our estimate of the manpower pool.

5. If a briefing officer or team is required as suggested by reference message, the briefing would only convey the philosophy reflected above and reiterate the forces requested and justified in CINCPAC CY 66 adjusted requirements and CY 67 force requirements, SER: 000255, 18 June 1966./3/ Moreover, it would emphasize the requirement for a well balanced, sustainable force in SVN for an indefinite period even if Hanoi elected to stop the escalation.

/3/Not found.

6. At this point in time I cannot justify a reduction in requirements submitted.

206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, August 7, 1966, 1:57 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk.

23355. Literally eyes only for Lodge from Rusk. I was most interested in your 2818,/2/ especially beginning with paragraph four. You should know that we have had some intimation about Tho's attitude from an interested Viet Cong source in Europe. Some recent public discussion in Hanoi reflects concern about the solidarity of some of their comrades in the South.

/2/Document 204.

A defection by some of the key Liberation Front leaders could be worth many battalions to us and could greatly stimulate Chieu Hoi among rank and file. I'm sure you know that funds in any amount will be provided if silver bullets will help.

Rusk

207. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, August 9, 1966, 1936Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House.

714. For Secretary of State, Goldberg, Harriman, Bundy and Sisco.

1. Met with ICRC President Gonard and Executive Director Gallopin today and received oral report on meeting of ICRC delegates August 8 at which USG's note verbale/2/ reportedly received careful study and consideration.

/2/See Document 199.

2. Referring to moderation displayed by Hanoi in postponing trials of American POWs, Gonard said ICRC had hoped that USG, the major power in the conflict, would have offered a more positive gesture to enhance ICRC efforts to bring Hanoi to conference table. Gonard then recalled ICRC note verbale in which they inquired as to willingness of USG to suspend or restrict military operations.

3. The ICRC feels, Gonard said, that USG offer to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and willingness to accept reduction of hostilities on reciprocal basis, ties ICRC hands vis-a-vis Hanoi. As consequence, Gonard believes any approach by ICRC to Hanoi "would not appear to offer much hope for success."

4. Gonard observed that humanitarian law, on which ICRC proposed efforts were to be based, "does not know the notion of reciprocity." The purpose of this law, he said, is to alleviate the suffering of all victims of conflict regardless of relative positions of contending parties.

5. Referring to Ambassador Goldberg's comments and observations, Gonard said that ICRC appreciated that USG experiences during the Korean conflict and in Viet Nam during 1965 bombing pause account for the USG attitude now; however, he reiterated that our request for reciprocity would jeopardize ICRC chances for success in Hanoi. At this juncture I recalled to Gonard our complete lack of success in getting any favorable response from Hanoi during last suspension of bombing and informed him that during first four weeks of last suspension the Viet Cong committed more than 2500 terrorist acts against the South Viet Namese people, i.e., school teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, health workers, religious leaders and all categories of local civic officials. I said that I personally thought the reaction in the U.S., and in South Viet Nam, would be bitter if there were yet another pause during which Hanoi continued to carry on aggression and committed atrocities. Gonard said as soldier he appreciated problem for our forces if they were hit by enemy during a pause.

6. Referring to the Sainteny report/3/ and other reports which suggest that Hanoi may be adopting a more conciliatory attitude, Gonard said ICRC does not agree with these views. Gonard observed that Hanoi is decentralizing its industry and that there is large-scale evacuation of civil populations from urban areas. Gonard stated further that he believes decentralization of industry reflects a far-reaching decision which suggests that Hanoi may be preparing for a long struggle.

/3/See Document 182.

7. Gonard said it was neither his wish nor intention to dictate to the USG but rather he wanted to make USG realize difficult position of ICRC in this matter. Gonard said that because USG so strong he thought it could afford make a more positive gesture. In this vein be observed that the greater power can make gesture at lesser risk. The USG must evaluate, Gonard said, whether risk of another pause would be worth taking on chance that it would lead to negotiations. He suggested pause of 10 to 15 days may be sufficient to test Hanoi.

8. While again reiterating ICRC willingness take soundings Hanoi, Gonard said USG's request for reciprocity makes it difficult for ICRC to operate on basis its proposal. He then expressed hope that USG would reexamine its position with respect reciprocity condition. He also alluded to possibility of abandoning broader approach and reverting to President Johnson's proposal expressed at July 20 press conference/4/ indicating that USG would be ready whenever the Hanoi government is ready to sit down at a conference table under the sponsorship of the ICRC to discuss ways in which the Geneva Conventions of 1949 can be given fuller and more complete application in Viet Nam.

/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 744.

9. I assured Gonard that ICRC views would be communicated to Washington immediately and that I would be in contact with him again when reply available. Gonard will be in Geneva balance current week but will be absent most of next week.

10. Comment: Despite strong representations by Ambassador Goldberg and myself re U.S. willingness to deescalate on reciprocal basis, clear that ICRC feels U.S. should make first gesture, even at risk that another bombing pause would not lead to negotiations./5/ As have previously reported Gonard on recent trip to several Eastern European countries got impression that new pause might lead Hanoi to table. However today he spoke of signs indicating Hanoi preparing for long struggle. ICRC caution understandably may be due to fear failure of mission to Hanoi "unless given a strong hand," and I suspect even with it, they would recognize chances for success limited.

/5/Rusk replied in telegram 26108 to Geneva, August 11, that the United States stood by its position on reciprocity and could not accept a bombing pause, "which would, once more, permit the other side to move substantial additional forces into South Viet-Nam with impunity." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Tubby

208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, August 10, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:34 a.m. and passed to the White House. In telegram 27780, August 13, Komer told Lodge that the President was "greatly heartened" by his latest weekly report, particularly by the plans to "shift much of ARVN into a stepped up pacification campaign." In addition, the President hoped that the "civil side effort in the countryside" could be stepped up "in similar fashion" and also that, given the importance of a good election turnout, Lodge would "quietly keep pushing the GVN to get out the vote." (Ibid.)

2375. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Smell of victory

1. In the struggle for the independence of Viet-Nam, the following can be said:

2. We are not losing; we cannot lose in the normal sense of the word; never have things been going better; indeed, never have things been going so well. We are "on the track" with regard to almost every aspect of the war and we are winning in several.

3. All of this is a great tribute to the excellence of your policies and to the courage with which you have made your decisions. It is also a tribute to those who execute the policies, notably our magnificent military men.

4. But all of this is still not called "victory." Indeed, however much they disagree about many things, everyone--in Washington and Hanoi and in Saigon--seems to agree that what we have now is not "victory."

5. In truth we do not need to define "victory" and then go ahead and achieve it 100 percent. If it becomes generally believed that we are sure to win (just as it is now generally believed that we cannot lose) all else will be a mopping up. If there is the "smell of victory," we will be coasting.

6. There are a number of things which would psychologically mean "victory" to US, to Hanoi, to Saigon and to the world, as follows:

A) First on the list would be some really smashing results as regards the "criminal" war: terrorism, subversion, village guerrilla. Figures indicate a diminution in assassinations of local officials, but we have as yet no good figures on the trend as regards civilian casualties in general.

B) Important defections as described in State's 21944/2/ could mean a great deal.

/2/Document 202.

C) A successful advance towards constitutional democracy could bring a feeling of success.

D) Really spectacular numbers of people coming into the Chieu Hoi camps would look like the end of the war.

E) Of great significance psychologically would be a situation in which one could start at Camau and drive securely all the way to Quang Tri, since this would mean that the 50 percent of the population which is in Saigon and the Delta and the 35 percent of the population in the coastal strip from Hue to Qui Nhon had been effectively pacified. To be able to ride the whole length of the railroad would also mean much. (Several months ago I sent you a population map/3/ which illustrates this.)

/3/Not further identified.

F) Other things which would have great meaning would be to be able to drive securely to Dalat or to Vung Tau.

7. Clearly the type of "battle victories" which we have been winning, and the impressive 10 to 1 casualties we are inflicting, do not look like victory to many Vietnamese as much as does the phenomenon of open roads. Driving the Viet Cong out of a certain place on the map seems to mean little in and of itself. In that sense this looks more like naval war in which one particular point in the ocean is much like another. The solid thing is the people and 85 percent of the people live in the area through which a traveller driving from Camau to Quang Tri would pass.

8. But none of these things are just around the corner.

9. Let us, therefore, by all means rejoice in the good news: that a wildcat, soul-destroying inflation seems unlikely; that a successful Communist takeover of the government of Viet-Nam seems now improbable; and that we have the beginnings of a policy on the main "unfinished business"--counter-terrorism, being mindful that unless definitively crushed, terrorism will always remain as Communist ace-in-the-hole and the ground for hope by Hanoi that it can at any time "go to Phase 1" and start the whole struggle up again. Finally, let us be thankful that our troops are so magnificent.

10. But our troops will be the first to speak of their respect for the hard-fighting Viet Cong--and General Westmoreland says North Viet-Nam army strength in South Viet-Nam has increased from 15,580 on January 1 to 47,100 as of July 31--the equivalent in battalion terms of from 31 to 81. Also 4 divisional and 10 regimental headquarters have been introduced since January 1. Average infiltration rate is 4,400 men per month. No evidence of serious food or ammunition shortage among major units is observable despite acknowledged effect of our air strikes. 60 percent of enemy forces, it is estimated, have yet to be committed to combat.

11. If the above is true statement of the situation, it is obvious that we have quite a stretch of time ahead of us.

12. The question, therefore, arises: How much time? And the corollary questions are: Can we shorten the time? Should we shorten the time: and, if so, how?

13. In trying to answer these questions, the first point is that time is not necessarily on the side of the U.S. or the Vietnamese.

14. Is not a relatively big, fast war easier for the U.S. to sustain than a relatively moderate slow war?

15. As far as the Vietnamese are concerned, they have demonstrated the patience for which Asians are famous and maybe they can keep on going as they have been. But their leadership is thin, both militarily and politically. This is partly due to the numbing effect of colonialism, with all its deliberate and rather diabolical discouragement of a national spirit, and with all of its educational effort aimed to make people Frenchmen rather than Vietnamese. The war has also played its part. Hope for the future of country is to be found among young people in Viet-Nam. But they will not be ready for some time.

16. Maybe the Vietnamese can last indefinitely--although it would be dangerous to assume it. But certainly they would be helped by a quick end to the war, assuming always that a satisfactory outcome was achieved. At present U.S. military forces must help the Vietnamese actively in order to get the Vietnamese pacification effort moving--let alone the war against the big units. We have high hopes that eventually they can undertake it all themselves and our soldiers have already expressed appreciation for the newly created Vietnamese political action teams and have recognized that they render the kind of service no American can render. Nonetheless our help is at present indispensable in the field of criminal/terrorist war as it is on the purely military side.

17. Therefore, it seems that, for both Vietnamese and American reasons, time is not necessarily on our side and that a quick victory would be of immense value to both.

18. These thoughts, which are not, of course, original with me, merge from many talks and much reflection. They reminded me of a statement which General Eisenhower once made to me, as follows:

19. If you desire to conquer one ably led and well organized battalion solidly entrenched and favorably located, and you try to do it with two battalions, you may succeed, but it will take you a long time and you will have many casualties. If, on the other hand, you use a division, you will do it quickly and the losses will be very slight.

20. In a war like this, in spite of everything, there is something tremendously effective about sheer mass. On the fifth floor of this building, I can see the port of Saigon, thick with shipping and in the green flat fields through which the Saigon River winds, I see more ships constantly making the sixty mile trip to and from the open sea. When I flew over Vung Tau last week, I counted eighteen ships anchored there. There are undoubtedly more in the Philippines and elsewhere. This is American mass, which none can produce as we can.

21. While I do not believe we can bring anything more into the city of Saigon (in fact, I think the American presence in this city must be reduced), I submit that if ports, piers and warehouses throughout Viet-Nam are ready and the military leaders can manage, and it can be done without political damage--three big "ifs"--there is a strong case for "more" coming in "quicker."

22. Such are the agonizing questions of history, since we never know what would have happened had the course which was not followed been followed. But common sense suggests that the more we bring in and the quicker we do it, the sooner there will be the "smell of victory," the sooner will the war be over and the fewer will be the casualties. Is this worth what it will cost in further dislocating the lives of Americans? Could they be made to understand that something is being asked of them now so as to avoid much great sufferings later?

B. Pacification

23. At Mission Council meeting on last Monday,/4/ MACV presented their proposal for a revised role for the Army of Viet-Nam (ARVN) as regards pacification, as follows:

/4/August 8.

A. The war in South Viet-Nam is a political struggle with violent military and terroristic (criminal) overtones. We must thus succeed in both the conventional military and unconventional terroristic areas. If we are not equally successful in both, Hanoi will find some way to slide back to so-called "Phase 1" activities, consisting primarily of clandestine, guerrilla-type actions. (And Westmoreland recognizes that one effective guerrilla is worth two main force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army soldiers.)

B. In the past, says MACV, ARVN has been so hard-pressed by Viet Cong main force and North Vietnamese Army units that it has had no choice but to concentrate on major offensive and defensive operations against these forces, leaving regional and popular forces with primary responsibility for providing local security in hamlets and villages. The latter have not been adequate to this mission. Now the buildup in U.S. and free world military forces makes it feasible to release a major part of ARVN from its former primary task of search and destroy operations and direct its main attention to pacification.

C. Thus, behind the security screen provided by U.S. tactical units (plus some elite Vietnamese Army units), who will take care of the enemy's regular, hard-core forces, the main task of the Vietnamese Army, along with regional and popular forces, political action teams, police and police field forces will be to support district and village chiefs in establishing and maintaining law and order in villages and hamlets.

D. Greater stress will be placed on ARVN small units operating at night, on continuity of operations and on more prompt and thorough exploitation of local intelligence.

E. For ARVN to be successful in these activities, there must be a new attitude among ARVN personnel towards the farmers, and ARVN commanders engaged in pacification will be evaluated to a large extent on their success in effecting this change. (Comment: Lansdale points out that the turning point in the Philippines' campaign against the Huks came when the Filipino soldier began treating the peasant as his brother. End comment.)

F. No major changes in ARVN's organization in order to handle pacification is now envisaged. At least 50 percent of ARVN's strength in the I, II and III Corps areas will be diverted to this mission; in IV Corps, where U.S. forces will be much more limited in number, about 25 percent of the ARVN tactical units will be focused on pacification. In many instances, depending on the local situation, ARVN pacification forces will be placed under the direct control of the province chief.

24. General Westmoreland and his staff are working closely with the ARVN high command to develop a campaign plan for 1967 which will reflect and carry out this scheme.

25. This new concept of ARVN support of pacification operations will mean that U.S. tactical forces will be carrying the main burden of search and destroy operations against Viet Cong main force and North Vietnamese Army units, while ARVN will be concentrating on pacification. This will probably mean that U.S. military casualties will constitute a higher proportion of total friendly military casualties, although some elite ARVN units will participate with U.S. units in operations against main force units so that there will always be a Vietnamese presence.

26. But it will be important when announcing casualties in the future that the Vietnamese civilian casualties inflicted by the Viet Cong be announced concurrently with the Vietnamese and American military casualties. The Communists make no distinction between military and civilians and it seems ritualistic for us to adopt the World War II style of always announcing military casualties separately. It is disadvantageous to our best interests and, at the same time, it is not an honest reflection of the true situation. As I have said, we are working to set up a reporting system throughout the country on Vietnamese civilian casualties.

27. If, in the future, there should be criticism because U.S. military casualties are a higher proportion of total friendly military casualties than they have been, the answer is that the purpose of our military sacrifices and military successes is to create the opportunity to do the pacification job without which the war cannot be successfully completed. If we do not definitively end terrorism, this whole tragic business can start all over again. In pacification the overwhelming bulk of the casualties are borne by Vietnamese.

C. Casualties, military and civilian

28. For the first time in thirteen weeks the total of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army dead dropped below one thousand--to 649 for the week. Overall friendly military losses for the week as follows:

189 killed in action (including 59 U.S.)
605 wounded in action (including 229 U.S.)
60 missing in action (including 6 U.S.)

29. The July figures for local officials killed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong are still incomplete. So far all of the four corps have reported in except for II Corps. The total to date is 33. Depending upon what II Corps reports, this could represent the lowest figure in the last eighteen months.

30. Totals for GVN officials killed or kidnapped for the first seven months of 1966, as compared with the same month for 1965, are as follows:

January 1965, 258

January 1966, 76

February 1965, 68

February 1966, 91

March 1965, 119

March 1966, 59

April 1965, 120

April 1966, 52

May 1965, 112

May 1966, 78

June 1965, 214

June 1966, 64

July 1965, 73

July 1966, 33 Plus

31. As you see, generally speaking, the figures are lower in 1966 than they were in 1965. This may be because Viet Cong guerrillas were busy with military operations or that friendly defense against terrorism has been improving or a combination of both. It is hard to tell. Also, there is no reason to believe that the 1966 figures cannot be increased whenever the Viet Cong decide they want to do it. One thing is clear: this is a time tested traditional Viet Cong weapon. It is this--and not popularity--which brought them into existence at a time when there were no constabulary forces to cope with terrorism and it is their way to get started again if everything else they attempt has failed--as it looks as though it might.

32. I apologize because my civilian casualty figures are by the month and do not match up with the military casualty figures, which are by the week. I also apologize because we still have not got overall civilian casualty figures which are an integral part of the casualty picture. As soon as we have adequate figures for civilian casualties on a monthly basis, I will examine the possibility of providing them week by week, as I do the military figures.

D. Elections

33. The Central Election Review Council has recently met in Saigon to examine the cases of candidates who had either been disqualified on the basis of provincial screening or had been challenged by their opponents. Of the forty-two cases reviewed, twenty-three were reinstated. This review process was carried on beneath the gaze of the local press and the interested parties and even those who were adversely affected by the council's decision have admitted that the hearing was fair and free of pressure from the central government.

34. Election lists have now been posted in all cities, provincial capitals, district towns, and villages giving the names of qualified voters in each area. Purpose of the posting was to permit citizens to see if their names were inscribed. Anyone finding his name omitted could petition for its inclusion. I have no country-wide results as yet concerning how many people checked the lists, found their names omitted and complained. However, as a spot check, over 5,000 people had already registered in Saigon last week after finding their names not included in the lists. Many of these were undoubtedly refugees who had moved to the city within the last year. This statistic provides some measure of popular interest in these elections.

35. The campaign itself will not begin until August 26. Until then candidates are proscribed from engaging in campaign activities so that everyone will have an equal chance during the fortnight the campaign officially runs. Nevertheless, some of the more sophisticated candidates are already engaged in the campaign here in Saigon through their friends, the columns of the daily newspapers, and in other ways.

36. I am cautioning Americans here and Vietnamese against making any very optimistic claims about the September 11 elections. I have told them to say in response to questions that, to hold elections in war time is very ambitious, particularly for a country with no experience with democracy; that even the British never had elections in World War II; that the Viet Cong are going all out to intimidate;/5/ and that the GVN will do very well if between 35 percent and 40 percent of the qualified voters vote.

/5/In its Field Information Report, [document number not declassified], August 8, the CIA Station in Saigon reported that "from all evidence the Viet Cong/VC/ intend to make an all-out effort to disrupt the government of Vietnam/GVN/ elections." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 85-00392R, 137-9-23, Government Activities in SVN, 1 Aug 66 thru 31 Dec 66)

37. As you know, I confidentially think it is going to be quite good. But if we make extravagant claims now, we will get no credit, whereas, if the public expects 35 percent and gets 70 percent, it will look like a miracle. I think this could be most important.

38. I am looking around for things to do which will put the people in a good humor as far as the government is concerned during the first ten days of September. The general supply office is helping: through the sale of rice from the backs of trucks in low income areas, the transportation and sale of pork, and the importation of motorbikes. Frozen pork carcasses will be arriving from Europe by September 1 and will be released on the market in Saigon at the rate of 50 tons a day, which is about 30 percent of the daily Saigon requirement.

E. Psychological

39. For the first time awareness of the elections--in urban areas--has become more general than complaints about prices, according to the JUSPAO weekly "evaluation of attitudes." They get reports throughout most of the country that "rising costs seem to have leveled and have stopped rising, and there is relief that inflation has apparently halted."

40. JUSPAO also reports that the government's publicity efforts are resulting in more people knowing about the elections, and that elections are being talked about, although sometimes cynically. The Viet Cong are increasing their effort to disrupt the elections, particularly in IV Corps, and elements of Buddhism are opposing or boycotting.

41. There is more ground fire against planes dropping leaflets indicating increasing concern by Viet Cong commanders over the psychological effects.

42. Other notes are: the Mayor of Danang is making an excellent impression on the public and is meeting with many groups to explain the government's program, and to invite them to make known their complaints. In IV Corps the flow of farmers from outlying villages into more secure hamlets is increasing due to heavier Viet Cong taxation and artillery barrages. A Viet Cong propaganda officer reported stubborn resistance by peasants to the Viet Cong draft, saying that the peasants cried out: "If you want a revolution, fine, but don't make us and our sons fight it for you." Also morale went up in Kien Toung where a military operation uncovered another sizable cache of foodstuff and equipment.

43. Evidence was uncovered in Chuong Thien that a large Viet Cong campaign was in the making to obstruct the voters from reaching the polls and to confiscate their identification cards which are the equivalent of registration in the U.S.

F. Economic

44. The economic picture has brightened--a tribute to you and your associates for your long, hard efforts and to the GVN for following our advice. It is all set forth in Saigon 3055/6/ which also includes news on Chieu Hoi and the port and which I will not repeat.

/6/Dated August 9, not found.

45. Some months ago, Prime Minister Ky asked me for help in setting up a GVN PX/commissary system for Vietnamese military and civil servants--people with fixed incomes whose purchasing power has diminished as prices rose. As a result of our reaction to this request USAID and MACV have been working actively with the GVN general supply office under the Ministry of National Economy to develop a series of PX/commissary outlets for civil service and military use. The layout of the first proposed outlet in Saigon for the sale of vegetables, meats and staple items has been forwarded to the U.S. military subsistence center in Chicago for technical review and the site for this first service center in downtown Saigon has been selected. Certain refrigeration items have been identified in U.S. excess property lists and are being held in place for use in this center. In addition, a U.S. military specialist in commissary and PX systems is being assigned to assist the GVN run their system.

G. Visitors

46. Chester Bowles is here and is favorably impressed with our entire operation. He attended a Mission Council meeting and remarked on General Westmoreland's remarkable sensitivity to political factors and his breadth of view. Bowles believes this struggle is of both historical and world-wide importance and is the kind of thing that happens once in 200 years. If, he says, we succeed (and he is confident that we will) it will be the beginning of the end for world Communism and will be a date in Communist history comparable to 1917 when Communist government was born in Russia. He was much impressed by the way American soldiers understand and carry out in practice the truth that, in this war, unlike World War II, we must win the war and build the peace at the same time. He has seen them doing it. He believes also that victory here will change America, in that so many young Americans have seen at first hand the importance of economic and social development going hand in hand with security against violence.

47. Another visitor was Gough Whitlam, deputy leader of the opposition in the Australian Parliament. I had a fine visit with him. I sense that he does not think his party will elect the Prime Minister at their forthcoming elections. I also sense that he is favorably impressed with the effort here, and I would be surprised indeed to hear him attack what Americans and Australians are doing in Viet-Nam.

Lodge

209. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)/1/

Washington, August 11, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor.

SUBJECT
Possible Sequence of Actions Toward a Settlement in South Viet-Nam

I find the paper of August tenth on the possible sequence of actions toward a settlement in South Viet-Nam/2/ excellent and most useful. I would like to suggest that I doubt that Hanoi will ever agree to negotiations until the Viet Cong are in favor of a settlement. If the VC should decide they have had enough, it seems to me that there might be great advantage in negotiating with them through the GVN rather than with Hanoi if this can be arranged.

/2/Drafted by William Bundy, the 28-page paper was sent by Unger for comment to Harriman, Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor on August 10. (Ibid.) In an August 13 memorandum to Unger, Taylor took issue with a number of points, calling the exchange of a cessation of bombing for a cessation of infiltration "bad business." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 72, B/Negotiations and Related Matters) Bundy sent Lodge a copy of his paper, together with Thompson's and Taylor's comments, under cover of a letter, August 19, in which he noted that his paper concluded "that we should explore exactly the same kind of 'three track' approach" that had been under discussion for a while but that its "discussion of other issues is somewhat more full and blunt than in any other paper we have ever produced on this subject." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)

I do not believe that we can get away with trading a cessation of bombing against a cessation of infiltration, and believe it would be unwise to put such a position forward even as an initial bargaining position because of the damage we would suffer in a retreat from such a position. I believe that we would have to agree to trade a cessation of reinforcements for a cessation of infiltration and agree that so long as the provisions of such an agreement were observed we would not bomb North Viet-Nam. I do not believe that this is as unfavorable a bargain as it might seem at first glance. In the first place, we could prepare for such an agreement by stepping up the numbers of our troops in South Viet-Nam and there is, in any event, a question as to what the optimum number should be. Casualty ratios are running so much in our favor that even allowing for the fact that a high proportion are Viet Cong and not North Viet-Namese, a continuation of hostilities in the South might well be in our favor without significant reinforcements from either side.

More important, such an agreement would presumably only come about if we were on the verge of serious negotiation, if not a real settlement. In these circumstances, I should think we would, for a considerable period of time, not want to send reinforcements even to replace casualties. If negotiations broke down, or if the agreement should be significantly violated by the other side, we could always call the whole deal off. I should think that in the event of such an agreement, large numbers of VC would rally to GVN in the light of the amnesty that presumably would be declared. This alone should mean that we would have no need for reinforcements. I quite agree that we would have to be free to bring in materiel and supplies.

I must say I doubt very much that the North Viet-Namese will ever admit that they have sent in regular units and this is why I believe that our negotiations should be with the NLF or VC. The NLF would be representing Hanoi rather than the other way around, and if agreement were reached, I should think the withdrawal of the North Viet-Namese regular units would follow automatically.

There are several positions in the paper which I do not believe could be sustained unless we have a greater victory than now seems likely. Among these are those on page 12. The first suggestion is that North Viet-Namese elements would have to be withdrawn before our withdrawal in stages. The second is that those southerners who went north for training and were reintroduced would also have to be withdrawn to the north.

210. Editorial Note

On August 13, 1966, General Westmoreland flew to the LBJ Ranch in Texas to meet with President Johnson, arriving at 6:24 p.m. He stayed overnight and departed for Honolulu at midday on August 14. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) W. Thomas Johnson of the White House staff took informal notes of Westmoreland's meeting with the President on August 13, which are ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. On August 14, the President made a statement to news correspondents about his meeting with Westmoreland, and Westmoreland also held a news conference. Transcripts of both are printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1966, pages 335-338.

In a telegram to General Wheeler reporting on the visit, HWA 2419, August 16, General Westmoreland stated that the "only significant exchange" with the President "involved the possibility of another stand down of the air campaign in North Vietnam." Westmoreland urged that President Johnson "not consider any cessation of the full bombing program to the north," emphasizing that "as a minimum" the air interdiction campaign of lines of communications in the southern part of the panhandle of North Vietnam south of Vinh was "militarily essential to the battle in the south." (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, #8 History File)

In JCS telegram 5039-66 to General Westmoreland, August 24, General Wheeler reported that the President had talked with Secretary McNamara that morning about Westmoreland's visit to the Ranch, stating that he appreciated better the problems confronting Westmoreland and his efforts to solve them, but there was one area in which he wanted "new and further action": the "scale-down" of American personnel and facilities in Saigon. (Ibid., COMUSMACV Message Files)

211. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, August 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Unger.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador
Ambassador W. Averell Harriman--S/AH
Mr. Leonard Unger--FE

1. Ambassador Vu Van Thai called on Ambassador Harriman following Ambassador Harriman's having undertaken at the President's request a "peace mission" on Viet-Nam. Their conversation, which lasted almost two hours, was quite full and frank and ranged over many aspects of US-Vietnamese relations as well as the situation inside South Viet-Nam. There are recorded below the more significant points which emerged from the conversation and which have not been recorded elsewhere.

2. Ambassador Thai agreed with Ambassador Harriman on the importance of a good turnout at the September 11 elections for a constituent assembly. He expected the Viet Cong to be trying in a few instances to infiltrate candidates sympathetic to their cause and, behind the scenes, to drum up votes for them. Of more significance he felt would be the Viet Cong efforts to discredit and interfere with the elections by various means including terror. He pointed out, however, that an election situation was different from a VC terror campaign aimed at one or several objectives and that the Viet Cong resources were probably insufficient to permit them to be effective all over the country at once.

3. The Governor turned to the question of Chieu Hoi and encouraging defections from the Viet Cong and splits in VC/NLF ranks. He emphasized the importance of the treatment of Chieu Hoi, as well as the treatment of prisoners in general and asked Ambassador Thai for his thoughts about what might be done to encourage defections, particularly of important figures like Nguyen Huu Tho. Thai reviewed his own acquaintance with Tho dating back to about 1954 when the latter was active although not an important figure in a peace movement. He mentioned Tho's imprisonment along with the present Finance Minister, Thanh, and of the efforts he, Thai, had made with Prime Minister Diem to secure their release or at least good treatment of them. Thai said that Tho was not a strong figure and was used by the VC/NLF primarily as a figurehead, someone who is pliable. He believes that the Viet Cong and the fighters and doers are separated from the NLF who play the role of spokesmen and he considers the latter not a fundamentally significant group. He expressed doubt as to how much would be achieved even if some of these front individuals should defect from the VC/NLF. While Thai recognized that important defections would have great significance internationally, he did not feel persuaded it would have real impact on either the Viet Cong or on the population of South Viet-Nam. The only effective action would be if some of the core Communist group could be influenced--here the personalities are not too well known to us. In answer to the Governor's question he agreed that Phat is perhaps a more important person and seemed dubious about the chances of his defecting.

4. With regard to North Viet-Nam Thai referred to the basic division between the Le Duan and Giap groups and he reminded the Governor of Le Duan's adamant opposition to compromise even as far back as when he opposed Ho Chi Minh's accepting the Geneva Accords of 1954. After some discussion of the relation of the Chinese-Russian split to North Vietnamese positions, Ambassador Thai stated that a fundamental difficulty for North Viet-Nam was that today it could not come to the conference table or in some other fashion bring the war to an end without ending up by being unacceptably dependent on the U.S. and its close friends in the Southeast Asian region. To bring the fighting to an end means a cooling off of relations with Communist China; since Chinese Communist prestige is so much at stake in the Viet-Nam war it is unlikely to acquiesce in North Viet-Nam's bringing the war to an end. If it cuts its ties in that direction, North Viet-Nam has no alternative but to face a knuckling under to the United States since the Russians are not at present a force of any significance in the region. Thai thought that perhaps an environment could be created in Southeast Asia which would appear to the North Vietnamese to be some alternative to an exclusively U.S.-run show. He was thinking of some association of aligned and non-aligned countries, particularly in the economic field, in which the Japanese and French and others might also play some role. An important incentive to North Viet-Nam would also be concessions by South Viet-Nam on the matter of food supply, a field in which China can offer no effective competition. To illustrate the importance of this point, Thai referred to the situation in 1959 when the North Vietnamese dropped their five-year plan. He said this resulted from their having discovered, from a recent census, that their population was growing at 3% per annum as opposed to the previously understood 2 or 2-1/2% and this made them realize that without the possibility of securing food from abroad they could not proceed with the plan. At this time Vu Van Thai said he pled with President Diem to open trade but to no avail.

5. This led Thai into a discussion of his belief in the importance of stimulating economic development in South Viet-Nam and in the Southeast Asian region as a means of persuading Viet Cong sympathizers in the south of the wisdom of coming back to the Government's side and to demonstrate to North Viet-Nam the value of turning to cooperation within the region. Thai felt that within five years economic activity and output could be 200% of its present level and this might even be achieved sooner if cooperation within the area grows. He talked about the Mekong project and his favorite theme of a regional university and of selected industries in each of the four Mekong countries. He noted that both from the point of view of power requirements and food requirements North Viet-Nam was even more interested than South Viet-Nam in the Mekong. Governor Harriman pointed out that the five years which the Ambassador had mentioned might be an impractical period to wait in view of the dangers among other things of escalation.

6. The discussion then turned to the internal situation in South Viet-Nam and Ambassador Thai's conviction that effective and clean administration, particularly on the part of the district and province chiefs, could do more than anything else to weaken the VC and increase the attractiveness of the Government side. He felt the quality of district officers was continuing to decline at present and attributed this, in answer to Governor Harriman's question, to the fact that the military have taken over so many of these posts. He recognized that some of the military were quite competent but expressed concern particularly about growing corruption. This grows inevitably, according to Thai, as the scale and scope of the war grows and the opportunities for getting hold of large sums of money are expanded. He said the military are not trained, as were the civil servants formerly in charge, in a respect for laws and regulations and they are prone to taking arbitrary action. He referred back to the technically efficient administration under President Diem which, however, had its drawbacks also because of its arrogant style and preoccupation with building the record for Diem. Thai said that the civilians formerly in the Civil Service are many of them now working for American contractors or for the U.S. Government and others who are still civil servants have lost much of their earlier zeal.

7. In answer to Governor Harriman's question the Ambassador said that the ten new civilian members of the Directorate were weak personalities and not likely to have much influence on decisions. He felt that the Constituent Assembly will have stronger figures elected and that even though the Assembly does not have legislative powers it nevertheless will serve as something of a deterrent to arbitrary action by the GVN. Returning to the matter of a government with more appeal for the people, Thai regretted the split that developed between Generals Ky and Thi. He identified them both as honest men who have some grasp of the aspirations of the people. He was hesitant to answer the Governor's question about General Thieu and only said that the latter played a "moderating" role.

8. The conversation turned once more to the question of how to end the war and whether the South Vietnamese could not find a way to work this out between themselves. Could not the Government, once the VC have accepted the fact that they are bound to lose, either bring them over to its side or divide them so that they no longer have any effective power? Ambassador Thai kept returning to his conviction that the key is in Hanoi and that Russian-Chinese relations are crucial in Hanoi's decision. He also referred to the bombing of North Viet-Nam and urged a pattern which would make the North more dependent on the Soviet Union. The Ambassador emphasized that the mining of Haiphong could increase the Chinese role. With regard to bombing, he advocated an irregular program with various starts and stops. This would serve to confuse but also bring North Vietnamese energies to bear on reconstruction with the threat of repeated destruction if they do not finally come to terms.

212. Memorandum of Meeting of the Negotiations Committee/1/

Washington, August 18, 1966, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. The meeting was held in Harriman's office.

PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman
U. Alexis Johnson
Wiliam Bundy
Leonard Unger
Benjamin Read

SUBJECT
Vietnam

1. Memorandum to President and Secretary

The Governor's memorandum for the President and the Secretary/2/ was read and approved by the Group.

/2/Document 213.

2. Ambassador Thai's Conversation

The Governor noted that he and Ambassador Unger had talked at length with Vietnamese Ambassador Thai on August 17 and that Thai had made a number of interesting observations about the situation in Vietnam./3/ Ambassador Unger observed that the Governor had tried to draw Thai out on the subject of contacts with the NLF-VC. Thai, however, had not committed himself on the desirability of such contacts. Instead he had turned the conversation toward the subject of talks with Hanoi. Mr. Bundy commented that Thai might be reluctant to reveal his true feelings in a formal conversation with Departmental officials. Ambassador Unger agreed that this might be so, but said that Thai had been extremely candid about other subjects including GVN personalities.

/3/See Document 211.

3. Corruption

Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Lodge's talk with Ky about corruption. In this conversation Ky indicated that he was aware that Generals Co and Quang were deeply implicated. Lodge had asked for guidance from the Department on what to tell Ky. Mr. Bundy said that his inclination was to tell Lodge that if Ky was confident that he could get rid of these officers smoothly and efficiently without bringing down the government, he should do so. Ambassador Johnson observed that the IV Corps situation was a mess and that action to clean it up was overdue. He pointed out that if Co and Quang were to be removed, the timing had to be just right. Ambassador Unger thought we should ascertain whether Co and Quang had significant support in the army. The Group generally agreed that both officers should be purged if the operation could be accomplished efficiently after the September 11 elections. Mr. Bundy commented that it was encouraging to see that Ky was doing some soul-searching on the problem of corruption.

4. U Thant in Moscow

Governor Harriman raised the subject of U Thant's special talks in Moscow. He said that Arthur Goldberg wants the Department to develop questions that the SYG could put to Ho. These might include an effort to interpret Hanoi's 4 Points in a way that would be acceptable to us. Governor Harriman noted that Chester Cooper was preparing an analysis of the 4 Points along these lines. It was agreed that U Thant did not expect anything from us immediately to convey to Ho.

5. NLF Rep in Algiers

Governor Harriman referred to the information which the SYG had given Arthur Goldberg about the new NLF representative in Algiers. The SYG understood that the new rep was a senior Lao Dong official and had suggested that we try to contact him through a non-American intermediary. The Governor said that he had approved a telegram/4/ asking our Embassy to provide us with the best information it could obtain on the NLF rep and to suggest the names of non-American newsmen presently in Algiers who might be good intermediaries.

/4/Not further identified.

Ambassador Unger said that information available in Washington did not indicate that the NLF rep was a significant Lao Dong official. The Governor thought it would be useful to supplement this information through CIA sources abroad. Ambassador Unger said that he would have CIA check their sources in Saigon [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and elsewhere to see if other significant information was available.

6. POWs

Governor Harriman noted that the objectives which we hoped to achieve by encouraging direct contacts with the NLF-VC included increased defections and divisions in the ranks of the NLF-VC. His memorandum to the President and the Secretary spoke of the possibility of a proposal by the GVN for a general amnesty by early October. The Governor said that our ability to achieve these objectives would be impaired if we did not take immediate and effective steps to improve treatment of POWs in the South and to put more steam into the Chieu Hoi program. He recalled that General Johnson had made some encouraging remarks about improvements being made in the Chieu Hoi program. The POW question was difficult and complicated. The Governor wondered whether our military in Vietnam were sufficiently well indoctrinated on treatment of POWs. Ambassador Johnson said that the handling of POWs was always a problem but that he thought that General Westmoreland was keenly aware of the importance of handling it correctly. He observed that in Korea we had to offer a bounty to our forces to guarantee a flow of captives for intelligence purposes.

Governor Harriman said that he understood that the critical period for prisoners in Vietnam was between the time they were captured at the front and the time they were delivered to a place of detention. Ambassador Unger said that Frank Sieverts was working on a series of recommendations which would help assure the security of POWs while being transported to detention areas.

7. Kissinger's Impressions

Mr. Bundy said that Henry Kissinger had formed a number of interesting opinions about GVN contacts with the NLF-VC, some of which had not been reported when he was in Saigon. Kissinger had found Thieu and Vien negative about the value of such contacts. Tran Van Do had been less rigid and had told Kissinger that contacts between GVN officials in Paris and resident Vietnamese "neutralists" had been undertaken at Do's initiative. Mr. Bundy said that Dan Davidson was putting together a memorandum on Kissinger's views.

8. DeGaulle's Trip

The group briefly discussed the pros and cons of communicating our views on Vietnam and Cambodia to the French prior to DeGaulle's trip. It was agreed that a message from Secretary Rusk to Couve would be preferable to a message from the President to DeGaulle. Mr. Bundy said that he would prepare a draft for the Group's consideration.

9. 3-Track Paper on Negotiations

Mr. Bundy said that he had discussed the 3-track paper/5/ with Kissinger. He thought it would be useful to supply a copy to Lodge and to Arthur Goldberg before his proposed trip to Eastern Europe. Mr. Bundy thought that the paper was useful in setting down the fundamental elements of our thinking about the problems and possibilities of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Governor Harriman said that he wanted to re-read the paper and would let Mr. Bundy know his views about it.

/5/For information on the paper, see footnote 2, Document 209.

Note: Ambassador Goldberg is on leave in Virginia for a week. No definite date has been set for his trip to Eastern Europe.

10. Sainteny

Mr. Bundy referred to the proposal that Henry Kissinger see Sainteny in Paris on or about September 9. He though Kissinger was the right man to talk to Sainteny and that there were two subjects in particular that we would like to see explored: (a) could Sainteny obtain clarification of Pham Van Dong's reported indication in an earlier conversation with Sainteny that Hanoi might be willing to stop infiltration into the South if we stopped bombing the North? (b) could Sainteny find out what Hanoi has in mind for a political settlement in the South? Governor Harriman agreed that Kissinger was the right man to talk to Sainteny and said it would be useful for him to determine what Sainteny thought we should be saying to Hanoi.

11. Tokyo Contact

Mr. Bundy said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had received information from a Japanese businessman to the effect that the President of a Japanese news agency who is an ex-communist had offered to set up a contact with DRV representatives and had claimed that Hanoi would be willing to have discussions with us which were not confined to or conditioned on Hanoi's 4 Points. Mr. Bundy said that he was telling Bill Colby to go ahead and see what the self-proclaimed intermediary could accomplish. If he could arrange for unconditional talks we would be there.

12. Thanat Proposals

Governor Harriman asked whether there was anything further that we could do at this time on the Thanat proposals. He observed that even if the Thanat initiative did not produce a conference it was an extremely valuable example of Asian initiative. Mr. Read commented that Chuck Percy is claiming credit for Thanat's proposal and Senator Douglas would appreciate anything that could be done to show that Thanat was not a registered Republican.

213. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, August 18, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 8/8/66. Secret.

As a result of previous consideration, and particularly Henry Kissinger's talks in Vietnam, we have begun to take several steps looking toward possible eventual reconciliation between substantial elements of the Viet Cong and the GVN. There are three areas of activity:/2/

/2/In a 6-page memorandum to Harriman entitled "The NLF and Where We Go From Here," August 31, Cooper discussed a number of ideas for advancing activity in all three areas. (Ibid., Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968)

1) Efforts to increase defection, including the higher echelons;

2) Consideration of ways and means to create divisions within the NLF or VC;

3) Development of conditions which might eventually lead to negotiations between the GVN and NLF.

Ambassador Lodge is on board but he points out, and we agree, that it will take some time to get full understanding and cooperation from General Ky and his colleagues.

In the meantime the Chieu Hoi program will be emphasized and steps undertaken to bring about the defection of important individuals.

It is our hope that after the elections, perhaps by early October, conditions will be ripe for a proposal by the GVN for a general amnesty with full social, economic and political status for those who come over.

Our targets are the noncommunist VC. There is not much hope of influencing the hard core communists who are part of Ho Chi Minh's party apparatus.

One interesting feature is that the Rand interrogation reports indicate little communist indoctrination among the VC rank and file. The propaganda emphasizes three themes--land, peace and a better life.

These and other reports indicate that efforts along the lines undertaken will be useful even though it may take some time before their full impact is felt.

There are a number of leads to Hanoi which we are investigating in detail, but none so far can be considered as a hot trail.

W. Averell Harriman/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, August 19, 1966, 6:54 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Nodis; Thrush. Drafted and approved by Rusk.

31851. Personal for Lodge from Secretary. I am encouraged by information developed through Thrush/2/ traffic. I am sure that it will occur to you that if we get through a good South Vietnamese election and operation Thrush comes to a successful conclusion before too long, the combined impact of both in the forthcoming General Assembly could be very constructive indeed. Even more importantly, such an event just might jar some of those on the other side to begin to think about a peaceful settlement. We will all keep our fingers crossed.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 204.

Rusk

215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

SUBJECT
Ky and Lodge Discuss Corruption in Vietnam

Prime Minister Ky in a long discussion with Ambassador Lodge/2/ laid on the table the great problem he was having with two senior officers, Generals Co and Quang. Both senior and young officers were asking that the two generals be removed from office because of the corrupt conditions which existed in the areas that they control. Ky said that General Quang opposed the sending of U.S. troops to the IV Corps area because they would interfere with his corrupt practices.

/2/Lodge reported on the discussion in telegram 3842, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Ambassador Lodge replied that his raising the matter of corruption was indeed a coincidence. Earlier in the day he had decided not to raise this subject with General Ky because he did not want to urge on Ky a step which might precipitate a coup.

Ky said that the people of Vietnam want to get rid of corruption and so did he, but that the generals he would have to act against would seek support from others to prevent him from removing them. He had decided not to do anything before the September 11 elections but to think very hard about it immediately thereafter.

Ambassador Lodge replied that men in positions of high responsibility led pretty bleak lives in all countries, but that in this country he had the added problem of leading it out of the middle ages into constitutional democracy, and there were still some people like Co and Quang desperately fighting a rear guard action and it was bound to be very unpleasant.

Ambassador Lodge believes that the decision to do nothing about corruption until after the election is wise. There is no doubt in his mind that there is widespread disgust with corruption and that it shakes confidence in the government and in the integrity of the elections. He believes that reports of corruption will get into the U.S. press, particularly in connection with the sale of U.S. supplies to the Viet Cong. He is convinced that the problem will have to be dealt with at some time or other but that it ought to be done quickly and surgically.

Secretary Rusk replied/3/ to Ambassador Lodge's request for advice by saying that the Ambassador was quite right in warning about the dangers of precipitating a coup and thus risking the undoing of forward steps in the political and economic field so laboriously brought about over the past year. He added that the unity of the military is an indispensable factor in maintaining sufficient stability and continuity in the government of Vietnam to permit it to carry on its military fight as well as essential political and economic actions. He recognized that the problem of corruption is a fundamental stumbling block in the way of constructing a government in South Vietnam which could defeat the Viet Cong in the political realm.

/3/Rusk replied in telegram 32309, August 20. (Ibid.)

Secretary Rusk agreed that Generals Co and Quang should go when this can be managed without endangering government continuity. He believes that the sooner this can be accomplished the better but doubts that it can be carried off before elections. He asked the Ambassador to assess the line up of military leadership in the Co-Quang issue.

Ambassador Lodge replied/4/ that the first thing that must be done is to gather all the facts on Co and Quang. They would be confronted and asked to go abroad quietly and if they refused they would be forced to leave. The military directorate would have to be lined up by Ky prior to any such action.

/4/Lodge replied in telegram 4107, August 22. (Ibid.)

The embassy is assembling in detail how it thinks the military leadership would react to a confrontation with Co and Quang.

Bromley Smith

[end of document]

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