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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

216. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-538-66

Washington, August 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, 381 Vietnam. Secret.

SUBJECT
A program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (U)

1. (U) In March 1966, the Army staff promulgated a study entitled, "A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam" (short title: PROVN). You will recall that, on 13 June 1966, members of the Army staff briefed you on PROVN. A copy of the study is attached./2/

/2/Attached, but only the "PROVN Summary Statement" is printed below. The 900-page report was produced by an Army study group formed in August 1965 at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff.

2. (C) At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army referred PROVN to them for their consideration as to its utility in the conduct of our effort in Vietnam and as to what disposition should be made of the study.

3. (S) As might be expected, a study of this depth and scope has its controversial aspects. PROVN was forwarded to the Services, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV for comment and each of them took exception to certain of the proposals therein. The Joint Chiefs do not endorse PROVN in its entirety, particularly in regard to those proposals which would in effect: downgrade the role of the Government of Vietnam in the conduct of the war effort; involve the United States too directly in influencing the South Vietnamese governmental structures at all levels, including the local level; and result in a major revision of current channels of command from Washington to Saigon. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs consider that PROVN, when viewed as a whole:

a. Presents a conceptual approach to matters of major concern in the US effort in Vietnam.

b. Provides a comprehensive digest of critical factors influencing the internal situation in South Vietnam.

c. Provides background material for use in developing future concepts, policies, and actions to improve the US effort in Vietnam.

4. (C) While neither unanimity nor consensus has been reached on PROVN, it is believed that no good purpose would be served by presenting an expurgated version. Moreover, any effort to accommodate all interests by deleting passages would emasculate PROVN and detract from its effectiveness.

5. (S) In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Have requested that the Chief of Staff, US Army, distribute PROVN on a need-to-know basis to interested Department of Defense agencies.

b. Recommend that you authorize the Chief of Staff, US Army, to distribute PROVN on a need-to-know basis to appropriate US agencies/activities outside the Department of Defense to include those listed below. Such distribution would be accomplished with a proviso to the effect that PROVN does not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(1) National Security Council.

(2) Senior Interdepartmental Group.

(3) Vietnam Interagency Committee.

(4) Interdepartmental Regional Group, Far East.

(5) Special Assistant to the President for Nonmilitary Programs Relating to Vietnam./3/

/3/In a September 1 letter to McNamara, Komer stated: "While I'm still only a 5-month expert, I've spent this time 100% on Vietnam. . . . Most of my ideas have been borrowed liberally from the people and studies which impressed me--especially the PROVN Study, the draft Jacobson Task Force report, and Brute Krulak (not Wally Greene)." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, McNamara/Vance/McNaughton)

(6) Appropriate offices both in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development.

(7) Central Intelligence Agency.

(8) US Information Agency.

(9) US Embassy, Saigon.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

Washington, March 1996.

PROVN SUMMARY STATEMENT

The situation in South Vietnam (SVN) has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to ensure eventual success. "Victory" can only be achieved through bringing the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won. The following are the most important specific actions required now:

Concentrate US operations on the provincial level to include the delegation of command authority over US operations to the senior US Representative at the provincial level.

Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US-GVN combined effort to solidify and extend GVN influence.

Authorize more direct US involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels adequate to ensure the accomplishment of critical programs.

Delegate to the US Ambassador unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all US activities, resources and personnel in-country.

Direct the Ambassador to develop a single, integrated plan for achieved US objectives in SVN.

Reaffirm to the world at large the precise terms of the ultimate US objective as stated in NSAM 288:/4/ A free and independent, non-communist South Vietnam.

/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 172-173.

The task of the enemy is much easier. He is opposing a "government" that cannot validly claim the active loyalty of a majority--even a significant minority--of the people. The US and the GVN, on the other hand, are dealing essentially from a point of weakness. Building upon the foundations of an ineffectual government, we must develop and "deliver" a positive program that assists the GVN to create an attractive environment so that a firm commitment of the individual to his nation will take root and grow. The VC do not have to deliver until they win. We have to deliver in order to win. The strategic implications of failure necessitate total resolve and effort.

The Strategic Importance of South Vietnam

The future role and accompanying strategy of the US in Asia, especially regarding the security of Southeast Asia, critically depends on the outcome of the current conflict in SVN. US foreign policy, through the short range, will have as its central focus the containment of world communism. Communist China today poses the most immediate danger. Targeting on the less-developed nations, the Communist Chinese have adopted the aggressive doctrine of "wars of national liberation" as a vehicle for communist encirclement of the US and Western Europe. Reiterated by Marshal Lin Piao on 2 September 1965, this doctrine is currently being tested in SVN.

US strategy in mainland Southeast Asia includes supporting the provisions of the 1962 Geneva agreements in Laos, continuing to strengthen Thailand economically and militarily and restoring peace and security in SVN. In general, US policy calls for the continued development of the individual countries of all Southeast Asia and their increasing regional integration--economically, socially and politically-- through the agency of such programs as the Mekong River Development Scheme and the recently established Asian Development Bank.

The outcome of US involvement in SVN will determine the future strategy which we as a nation can or will be willing to adopt in Asia.

Major Problem Areas

Five major obstacles stand out above all others as hindering the achievement of the ultimate US objective in SVN:

A Well Led and Adequately Supported Communist Political Military Machine: Long experience, the defeat of the French under the nationalist mantle, a formula attuned to peasant aspirations and sanctuaries continuous to the entire western flank of SVN have provided the Communists a significant advantage.

An Inefficient and Largely Ineffective Government, Neither Representative of Nor Responsive to the People: Instability, ineffectual leadership, corruption, over centralization and disdain for the peasantry have compounded the limitations of skills, experience and equipment.

The Marginally Effective US Method of Operation: Rapid expansion, lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict, inappropriate response and interagency competition have undermined US efforts to overcome the other four problem areas which fundamentally determine the nature of the conflict in SVN.

The Escalating Requirement for Material Resources to Prosecute the War and Meet Consumer Demands: Having an underdeveloped agricultural economy, SVN does not possess the indigenous resources, the communications infrastructure or the skills necessary to sustain the rapidly escalating conflict.

The Vietnamese Peasant Outlook: Fatalism and war-weariness have sapped peasant motivation; governmental corruption and inefficiency have caused disillusionment; and deeply ingrained traditional values have retarded social change.

US Short-Range Objectives

US short-range objectives must be designed and established to provide a base for gaining the initiative in the current struggle and to ensure significant progress toward overcoming the crucial obstacles. The five major short-range objectives should be:

The defect of PAVN and Main Force VC units and the reduction of VC guerrillas and political infrastructure among the population.

The development of GVN leadership and institutional practices capable of furthering nation building.

The establishment of an integrated US civil-military organization and method of operation capable of ensuring execution of US-GVN plans and programs in SVN.

The provision of a war-supporting economic infrastructure and initial foundations for economic growth.

The development of an allegiance to the GVN among the South Vietnamese people.

The Concept of National Operations

The situation in SVN is both challenging and unorthodox; it calls for the application of new and imaginative emphases and techniques. The US must devise an effective counter to "wars of national liberation." The proposed US concept of operations is a broad-front offensive which directs major efforts along three mutually supporting axes--eliminating armed Communists; ensuring the effective performance of the GVN; and conducting an effective combined US-GVN Rural Construction Program. To launch and sustain the momentum of this offensive, four initiatives must be taken now:

(1) The deployment of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) to destroy PAVN and Main Force VC units and base areas and to reduce external support below the sustaining level. Rural Construction can progress significantly only in conjunction with the effective neutralization of major enemy forces. The bulk of US-FWMAF and designated ARVN units must be directed against base areas and against lines of communication in SVN, Laos and Cambodia as required; the remainder of these forces must ensure adequate momentum to priority Rural Construction areas.

(2) The establishment of Rural Construction as the essential vehicle for extending security to, developing the requisite leadership of and providing the necessary social reform for the Vietnamese people. The war has to be won from the ground up; the people of the countryside are the target. RVNAF must be the main Allied military element supporting Rural Construction, with the US providing material and technical assistance and stimulating social reform as required. Requisite authority and resources must be provided to the province chief.

(3) The exercise of more direct US involvement to ensure the attainment of US-GVN objectives. Discriminate US involvement in GVN affairs--ranging from skillful diplomatic pressures, through the application of politico-economic leverage, to US unilateral execution of critical programs--is essential. The GVN has been either unwilling or unable to accomplish successfully many requisite tasks. The eventual creation of a cohesive society in SVN requires, however, that GVN achieve effectiveness and be directly credited with success. The US must exercise its influence to evoke GVN performance.

(4) The delegation of command authority from Washington to the district level in SVN and the concentration of delegated authority at each intermediate US organizational level in SVN. The requisite flexibility and responsiveness of day-to-day operations can only be achieved if those closest to the situation are delegated adequate authority and means to influence counterpart action. An Executive Agent in Washington should coordinate support activities in the US; the US Ambassador in SVN, raised to the new post of Single Manager, should exercise unequivocal authority over all in-country US activities, personnel and resources; and a single, senior US representative (SUSREP) should be appointed at each lower echelon to function as the counterpart of his parallel GVN senior official. Maximum authority must be delegated to province. The Single Manager must be authorized an adequate super-agency planning staff and a deputy for Rural Construction and Development (RC&D) who exercises operational control over USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and the Joint US Military Assist-ance Advisory Group (JUSMAAG) as well as MAP functions (a reduced MACV). US military units in SVN must be under the command of a newly established CINC US Forces Vietnam, coequal with the Director of RC&D.

Priorities. US-GVN priorities for action must be established on the interrelated bases of population and natural resource concentrations, the location and nature of the enemy, available Allied resources, current successes and military logistical requirements. The complex interrelation of considerations for establishing priorities and the varying mixtures of limited military, economic and political resources that may be marshaled to achieve any one objective make the determination of priorities extremely difficult. For these same reasons, establishing clear priorities is all the more important. After securing requisite logistical bases, the first priority must be the Delta (current emphasis on An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon). The second priority area comprises the Coastal Lowlands; the third is the Central Highlands.

Mid-Range Objectives and Subobjectives

Successful achievement of the short-range objectives should allow gradual transition toward mid-range development objectives. These objectives, together with representative subobjectives, are as follows:

The established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability. Subobjectives would include: elimination of VC infrastructure, use of Allied forces to support completion of the Rural Construction Program and transfer of Regional Force-Popular Force responsibilities to the National Police as the RCP progresses.

A government representative of, and responsive to, its people. Subobjectives would include: an efficient governmental and administrative system, increased authority and prestige of province chiefs and the development of responsible and forward-looking political parties.

A US organizational presence adequate for assured national security and development. Subobjectives would include: termination of the Executive Agent, return to the country team organizational concept (as the RCP nears completion) and the reduction of the US presence commensurate with increased GVN capability.

The amelioration of divisive social factors. Subobjectives would include: maximization of minority group integration into the social fabric, expansion of social reforms and the reintegration of the former VC into the society.

A viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion. Subobjectives would include: initiation of major land reform, acceleration of Mekong regional development and the development of light industry.

Long-Range Objectives: The Ultimate South Vietnam

Achievement of US-GVN mid-range objectives will lay the foundation for the long-term development of SVN as a free, independent, non-communist nation. Development should proceed toward a society that enjoys inner social cohesion; a viable government; a diversified, maturing economy; and an adequate security posture. In less than 50 years, SVN should have effectively integrated its significant minority groups into the fabric of its society. The government should be basically democratic with firmly established political institutions capable of withstanding crises and allowing for the legal and peaceful transfer of political power. Economically, SVN should have passed the take-off point to self-sustaining growth. A somewhat smaller, well-equipped and well-trained military establishment, backed by regional and international security guarantees, should be able to ensure national security. Throughout the long-range period, the US presence should be minimal.

[Here follows a section on "Measuring Progress."]

217. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, August 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Personal; Confidential. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held in Fulbright's office.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS
Senator J. William Fulbright
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large

I lunched today with Senator Fulbright. I opened by explaining my assignment and asking for his opinion on the way to get negotiations going. He rather evaded the question but did say there were two matters which he thought were preventing discussions. First was our unwillingness to accept the NLF or VC as full-fledged participants; second, and even more important, Hanoi did not believe that the United States Government had any intention of withdrawing its forces from Vietnam or, in fact, Southeast Asia.

He said he himself did not believe that we would in fact withdraw and pointed to the size of our installations in Thailand as well as Vietnam.

He spoke disparagingly of the September 11 elections because the VC were not permitted to put up candidates. He maintained that all the 550-odd candidates were of the same line of thought--opposed to the VC. He admitted, however, that not very many people would have voted for Viet Cong candidates.

I told him I was convinced that the President had every intention of removing our troops from South Vietnam if the North Vietnamese did likewise. I agreed that North Vietnam doubted our sincerity at the present time but that both Hanoi and Moscow were convinced that the President would be forced by public opinion to change his policies and that we would withdraw as the French did.

He repeated that he had said publicly that Congress was more war-like than the President and would force the President to take action which would involve us with China and the Soviet Union. I disputed these statements but did not appear to have any effect.

Towards the end of lunch he announced he had to go to a conference committee meeting on foreign aid, and the rest of the time was spent on my arguing with him to support the House version.

I left the door open to come back and asked him to call me if he had some constructive ideas.

He stoutly maintains we are overextended in Asia. He was skeptical when I described the new Asian initiatives--Asian Development Bank, ASPAC and ASA peace conference initiative.

Intermingled with the above was a discussion of Arkansas politics and the state of our domestic economy. Needless to say, we did not agree on the latter.

218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, August 25, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and Unger.

SUBJECT
Proposed RT Program, and Escalation Generally

I understand Defense has sent over a proposed RT program that would include strikes against the Haiphong docks, a steel plant, and other sensitive targets./2/ Since I will be away just overnight I am setting down my grave reservations about this proposal and about anything on our part which smacks of escalation at the present time.

/2/Presumably a reference to Rolling Thunder 52, which was approved by the JCS on August 19 and presented to McNamara by Wheeler on August 22. An August 18 memorandum for Wheeler outlining the proposal for RT 52 is in Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52. The proposal included strikes against the Phuc Yen and Kep POL storage facilities, a steel plant, a cement plant, two thermal power plants, four locks, the Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai ports, and other targets. CINCPAC's recommendation of August 8 for strikes against some of these targets was analyzed in an August 17 memorandum to Ball from Hughes. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

There are three reasons for my concern:

a. I am very worried about the apparent escalation in which we have been engaged over the past six weeks As you may know, the number of our sorties over North Viet-Nam has substantially increased in this period./3/ Moreover, while I think the other side understood what we were doing on the DMZ business, they--and certainly third countries--may have interpreted this as escalatory. Thirdly, although I think your refusal to exclude the possibility of land action against the north totally or for all time at your press conference/4/ was a right basic position, you probably have noted the Periscope item in this week's Newsweek--just the sort of thing other governments, including the other side, pick up--that we are seriously making plans for such action./5/ (I was asked at my Congressional briefing about this and said flatly we had no such plans.) These specific problems exist in a background of general comment to the effect that sentiment in the country is becoming more hawk-like. Thus, I think we have to be terribly concerned with both the fact and the appearance of our actions in the present.

/3/Under cover of a memorandum dated August 16, Read sent Bundy a report on U.S. "Escalatory Signals in July," which indicated that "10,198 attack sorties were flown against NVN [in July] compared with a previous high 7,398 in June." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII)

/4/For text of Rusk's statement, see Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1966, pp. 259-260.

/5/"Many top-level civilian analysts predict that sometime this fall the U.S. will invade North Vietnam." ("The Periscope," Newsweek, August 29, 1966, p. 9)

b. The real convulsion in Communist China still defies assessment, but at the very least it means that any escalatory action on our part might be construed in Peking and Hanoi as a sign that we thought we could get away with something because of the political confusion in Communist China. This could trigger irrational action by one or both of these capitals. In other words, while I think an unsettled Chinese leadership will not take any initiatives, this is the time to be very careful in not appearing to take advantage of their troubles.

c. On any reading we can make, Hanoi remains firm in its basic position, and our guess is that they are watching the September and November elections. There may come a time for extra pressure to bring about the right decision on their part, but there is no indication that that time is now.

I would suggest that not only the RT program but our whole pace of action against the north be discussed with these factors in mind, and my own feeling is that we should reach high level agreement that we will maintain the present pace, perhaps even cutting back on the possibly excessive sortie rate in the north, which I doubt to be effective in the margin in any event, and avoid anything for the present that could be construed as a significant escalation.

219. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

SC No. 09624/66

Washington, August 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Special Intelligence Material, vol. X. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The source text, pages 19-21 of the memorandum, is attached to an August 29 memorandum from R.J. Smith, CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, to Rostow, under cover of which Smith sent Rostow a copy of the full study; the full study has not been found in Johnson Library files.

Helms sent the President pages 1-21 of the study, consisting of the "Summary Discussion" and "Principal Findings," under cover of an August 29 memorandum, in which he noted that McNamara had asked CIA to undertake the study several weeks earlier. Helms noted that he had sent copies of the full study, which included several hundred pages of basic material backing up the "Principal Findings," to McNamara, Rusk, and Wheeler. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966) Helms also briefed Senators Mansfield, Russell, and Fulbright on the study on September 19 and summarized the discussion that followed in a memorandum to Rostow, September 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA) Rostow provided the President with his summary of this study in Document 239.

THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS' WILL TO PERSIST

Principal Findings

1. So long as the U.S. air offensive remains at present levels, it is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam's continued ability to provide materiel support to the war in the South. North Vietnam is taking punishment on its own territory, but at a price it can afford and one it probably considers acceptable in light of the political objectives it hopes to achieve.

2. The Viet Cong have borne the brunt of Communist personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also had to compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We believe that the Viet Cong capability to recruit and train manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated for 1966 but will probably be inadequate to compensate for casualties and losses in 1967. During 1967 the North Vietnamese will have to assume most of the burden of expanding force levels, and an increasing role in replacing losses. These manpower requirements can almost certainly be met from North Vietnamese resources, but they will impose additional strains on North Vietnam's limited supply of skilled personnel and leadership cadre.

3. The Communists' present strategy is costly in both human and economic terms and is taxing Communist resources in some areas, particularly within South Vietnam itself. Allied actions are complicating Communist efforts and raising the costs of their execution. However, neither internal resource shortages nor allied actions within present political parameters are likely to render the Vietnamese Communists physically incapable of persisting in their present strategy.

4. In absolute numerical terms the Communists cannot hope to match present and projected Allied force commitments. However, if present estimates of Allied and Communist force projections are accurate, by mid-1967 the Communists will have a slight advantage in maneuver battalions--i.e., tactical combat troops available for commitment to offensive ground operations.

5. Nevertheless, if they are objective, the Communists must acknowledge that during the past year their insurgent campaign has lost momentum in both the military and political fields. Although they may not be losing the war at the present time, they are certainly not winning it. The Communists are far from being defeated; but they are faced with problems greater than any they have had to contend with before in this struggle. Furthermore, Communist forces have at least temporarily lost the aura of invincibility which was one of their most potent political assets.

6. Morale within Communist military forces and the political apparatus in South Vietnam has declined since mid-1965 but not to a point presently sufficient to force any major revision in basic Communist strategy.

7. The Communists must be disappointed in comparing the present situation with that which existed in the spring of 1965. At least indirectly, they have acknowledged that the infusion of U.S. and Allied combat forces has created new problems which must be overcome before victory can be won. Yet Communist realism is presently tinged more with defiance than pessimism; the Communists may be disappointed, but they do not yet seem to be discouraged.

8. Consideration of world popular opposition to U.S. policy would certainly enter into any eventual Vietnamese Communist decision on whether to revise present strategy but would most certainly not be a decisive factor.

9. The Vietnamese Communists pay close attention to evidence of opposition to current U.S. policy arising within the United States itself. The outcome of their previous struggle with the French almost certainly predisposes them to draw invalid parallels to French domestic opposition in the Indochina war and to look for signs of American domestic political pressures capable of forcing policy changes on Washington.

10. The timing of any Vietnamese Communist decision on altering basic strategy--and the nature of such a decision--will be greatly affected by a variety of considerations, including those outlined in this paper. We estimate that none of the pressures upon the Communists which we can now identify is severe enough to force a major change in Communist strategy over the next eight to nine months. The Communists would be even less inclined to alter their strategy if they should find political and military developments during this period running in their favor--for example, serious political deterioration in South Vietnam, a series of major Viet Cong military successes, or what they construe as a significant rise of anti-war sentiment in the United States. If on the other hand pressures on them are maintained and the course of events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to take stock and consider a change in their basic strategy.

220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 29, 1966, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. No classification marking. The President wrote on the source text: "Let's get Komer to pick up & spark this inspiration."

Mr. President:

This cable from Gen. Westmoreland spells out his concept of where he's come from since 1 May 1965 and where he proposes to go from 1 November 1966 forward--towards pacification, without reducing the heat on the VC and NVN main force units.

It underlines the need to mount a maximum political campaign, overt and covert, designed to defect VC and start Saigon VC negotiations as soon after the Sept. 11 election as possible.

That is the political track required to match Westmoreland's military plan which is, clearly, in the right direction; although he and Lodge must engage Ky and the ARVN fully if it is to work.

Walt

Attachment/2/

August 26, 1966.

/2/Top Secret.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (29797)

SUBJECT
Concept of Military Operations in South Vietnam

In order to promote a better understanding of the role which military operations play in the overall effort in South Vietnam, I discern a need at this time to review the military situation in South Vietnam as it relates to our concepts; past, present and future. This is an appropriate time in light of the fact that we are on the threshold of a new phase in the conflict resulting from our recent battlefield successes and from the continuing US/Free World military buildup.

The enemy has launched a determined campaign to gain control of South Vietnam--its land, its people, and its government. There are no indications that the enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased his rate of infiltration, formed divisions in South Vietnam, introduced new weapons, and maintained his lines of communications into South Vietnam in spite of our increased air efforts. He continues to use Laos and the border regions of Cambodia as sanctuaries and recently moved a division through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into the First Corps Tactical Zone. His campaign of terror, assassination, intimidation, sabotage, propaganda and guerilla warfare continues unabated. The enemy still holds sway over large segments of the land and population. Although thwarted in his overt large scale campaign, he is still determined.

As a companion of the foregoing appreciation of the present enemy situation, a review of our strategic concept for the past year would appear to be useful.

A. During the period 1 May 1965 to 1 November 1965, our task was to build up our combat and logistical forces; learn to employ them effectively; gain confidence in ourselves in fighting in the counterinsurgency and Southeast Asian environment; gain the trust of the Vietnamese in our military skills, courage and ability; and protect our installations and forces from distraction by the enemy.

B. During the period 1 November 1965 to 1 May 1966, our objectives were to extend our deployments toward the frontiers; exercise our logistics in furnishing support to troops in sustained combat; indoctrinate commanders on the techniques of sustained ground combat; interdict intensively by air the lines of communications leading from North Vietnam to South Vietnam; disrupt enemy bases by B-52 strikes; deny the enemy rice by protecting harvests and capturing caches in storage areas; increase our surveillance along the coast; and initiate a program of patrolling certain vital inland waterways. In summary, our purpose was to disrupt the enemy's effort to prepare his battlefield, to throw his plans off balance by offensive operations, and to continue to gain experience and self-confidence in this environment.

C. During the period 1 May to 1 November 1966--the Southwest monsoon season--our strategy has been and is to contain the enemy through offensive tactical operations (referred to as "spoiling attacks" because they catch the enemy in the preparation phases of his offensives), force him to fight under conditions of our choosing, and deny him attainment of his own tactical objectives. At the same time we have utilized all forces that could be made available for area and population security in support of revolutionary development, rice harvests heretofore available to the enemy have been protected, lines of communication required by us have been opened, and some of the inland waterways used by the enemy have been interdicted to disrupt his communication and supply systems. The threat of the enemy main forces (Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army) has been of such magnitude that fewer friendly troops could be devoted to general area security and support of revolutionary development than visualized at the time our plans were prepared for the period.

During the period 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967--the Northeast monsoon season--we will maintain and increase the momentum of our operations. Our strategy will be one of a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of revolutionary development.

A. The essential tasks of revolutionary development and nation building cannot be accomplished if enemy main forces can gain access to the population centers and destroy our efforts. US/Free World forces, with their mobility and in coordination with Vietnamese Armed Forces, must take the fight to the enemy by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our ability to do this is improving steadily. Maximum emphasis will be given to the use of long range patrols and other means to find the enemy and locate his bases. Forces and bases thus discovered will be subjected to either ground attack or quick reaction B-52 and tactical air strikes. When feasible, B-52 strikes will be followed by ground forces to search the area. Sustained ground combat operations will maintain pressure on the enemy.

The growing strength of US/Free World forces will provide the shield that will permit ARVN to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct support of revolutionary development. Also, I visualize that a significant number of the US/Free World Maneuver Battalions will be committed to Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TOAR) missions. These missions encompass base security and at the same time support revolutionary development by spreading security radially from the bases to protect more of the population. Saturation patrolling, civic action, and close association with ARVN, regional and popular forces to bolster their combat effectiveness are among the tasks of the ground force elements. At the same time ARVN troops will be available if required to reinforce offensive operations and to serve as reaction forces for outlying security posts and government centers under attack. Our strategy will include opening, constructing and using roads, as well as a start toward opening and reconstructing the National Railroad. The priority effort of ARVN forces will be in direct support of the revolutionary development program; in many instances, the province chief will exercise operational control over these units. This fact not-withstanding, the ARVN division structure must be maintained and it is essential that the division commander enthusiastically support revolutionary development. Our highly capable US division commanders, who are closely associated with corresponding ARVN commanders, are in a position to influence them to do what is required.

C. We intend to employ all forces to get the best results, measured, among other things, in terms of population secured; territory cleared of enemy influence; Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army bases eliminated; and enemy guerrillas, local forces, and main forces destroyed.

D. Barring unforeseen change in enemy strategy, I visualize that our strategy for South Vietnam will remain essentially the same throughout 1967.

In summation, the MACV mission, which is to assist the Government of Vietnam to defeat the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces and extend Government control throughout South Vietnam, prescribes our two principal tasks.

We must defeat the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases.

We must assist the Government to gain control of the people by providing direct military support of revolutionary development in coordination with the other agencies of the U.S. Mission.

The simultaneous accomplishment of these tasks is required to allow the people of South Vietnam to get on with the job of nation building.

Ambassador Lodge concurs, with the following comment:

"I wish to stress my agreement with the attention paid in this message to the importance of military support for revolutionary development. After all, the main purpose of defeating the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases must be to provide the opportunity through revolutionary development to get at the heart of the matter, which is the population of South Vietnam. If this goal is achieved, we will be denying manpower and other support to the Viet Cong."

221. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson on August 30 under cover of a memorandum stating that the danger foreseen by Taylor must be met by 1) engaging elite ARVN units fully in fighting VC and North Vietnam main force units; and 2) "getting the ARVN engaged effectively in pacification." The President indicated on Rostow's memorandum that, prior to getting Defense, State, and Komer to prepare analyses and recommendations, Rostow should first "talk over" pacification with McNamara. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
"Concept of Military Operations in South Viet-Nam"

I have just seen General Westmoreland's message on the above subject/2/ and have found it thought-provoking reading. He has set forth very clearly what kind of war he thinks we should fight and the role of U.S. forces both in offensive operations and in support of "revolutionary development." While there is little completely new in his paper, there are indications of emphasis which could carry very important implications for the future with respect to the size and the manner of employment of our ground forces in South Viet-Nam.

/2/Attachment to Document 220.

The most significant change of emphasis is the reorientation of the military effort both of ARVN and of U.S. forces to support "revolutionary development." General Ky made the proposal to me over a year ago that the U.S. forces should operate generally as a shield for population centers in front of ARVN forces which would assume as a primary mission the direct support of the development effort. Westy is now proposing the same kind of shield mission but goes two steps farther in putting U.S./Free World forces into the business of pacification. He endorses the expansion by U.S./Free World forces of control over terrain and population around base areas in application of the "oil spot" concept as the Marines have been doing in the I Corps area (and other U.S. forces elsewhere to a lesser degree). Beyond the creation of an indeterminate number of such American "oil spots", Westy also contemplates mixed pacification operations in which U.S. forces would act in close cooperation with Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces in order to bolster their effectiveness in protecting pacification activities.

An additional mission to be stressed in the coming months is the reopening of rail and highway communications, an activity which, while of the utmost importance, will require large numbers of troops if these communications are to be kept open.

Several thoughts occur to me in reflecting on the consequences of the application of this new concept of military operations. The first is that, if successfully carried out, it offers the hope of speeding up the termination of hostilities in South Viet-Nam and of advancing the important non-military programs directed at controlling the population and rebuilding the shattered society and economy. On the other hand, there will be a cost to pay for this progress in a rise in the U.S. casualty rate and in the ratio of U.S. casualties to those of the GVN. Such a rise will reinforce the charges at home that the U.S. has taken over the war and is accepting a disproportionate share of the losses.

Most importantly, the acceptance of this concept would seem to create an open-ended requirement for U.S. forces. If our goal is to reestablish GVN authority over the entire territory, open and keep open the road and rail communications, and make good the manpower deficiencies in the revolutionary development program, General Westmoreland will be justified in asking for almost any figure in terms of future reinforcements. If we undertake to meet such requirements, there will be ground for renewed concern for the increased strains on the GVN economy and for the effect on U.S./GVN relations if we become deeply involved in revolutionary development activities.

In this connection, when General Ky raised the proposition I mentioned above, he was very explicit in saying that he felt the U.S. troops should be kept away from the Vietnamese population insofar as possible. At the time, I thought he had in mind the consequences of the U.S.-Montagnard relationship developed a few years ago in the Highland region. There, we became so popular with the Montagnards that GVN officials became convinced that we were trying to subvert the loyalty of the Montagnards to the government and to attach them to us. The recriminations arising from that episode are still heard from time to time. I have been expecting to hear some reaction of this sort from the very effective civic action efforts of the Marines in their "oil spot" activities. It is very easy for our representatives in Viet-Nam to forget that we are seeking to develop popularity for the Saigon government and not for ourselves. I have always been doubtful of the long-term benefits of U.S. actions, no matter how beneficent, in replacement of those of the responsible Vietnamese ministries.

These thoughts boil down to the following. General Westmoreland has sent us a very thoughtful and important cable, outlining his proposed future military policy in South Viet-Nam. It is full of important implications and deserves close study and a considered reply. It should not be accepted without a reply as this would convey tacit approval and would justify Westmoreland to feel that his concept had official approval. Perhaps it should be approved but only after a careful analysis and in full knowledge of its implications.

I recommend that you ask DOD for such an analysis.

Maxwell D. Taylor

222. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret. Komer forwarded copies of this memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Taylor, Rostow, and Moyers under cover of a memorandum dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Leonhart)

On September 13 Komer submitted to the President a 44-page report entitled "The Other War in Vietnam--A Progress Report." In his letter of transmittal, Komer called the report "mainly a review of accomplishments." Written for public release, the report and Komer's transmittal letter are printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, pp. 549-567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591-601.

SUBJECT
Visit to Vietnam--August 1966

I. Pacification.

1. The main purpose of my second visit to Vietnam was to find out more about Ambassador Lodge's views on where we go from here on pacification, how to speed it up, and how MACV planned to redirect more GVN military resources to tough local security problems. I tried out a number of ideas along these lines that Bob Komer asked me to discuss with Lodge and Porter.

a. Lodge was more than receptive. Your recent messages/2/ have firmly focused his attention on pacification which he now calls "the heart of the matter." Westmoreland and Porter are similarly engaged. An extensive planning effort is now underway--but its real bite will not come until 1967.

/2/See, for example, telegram 20533, Document 200. In an August 9 memorandum to the President, Komer asked for and received permission for Leonhart to deliver a private verbal message to Lodge and Porter from the President that he was "dissatisfied with the slow rate of pacification progress," that the GVN was "clearly not sufficiently pacification-minded," and that a "more coherent US-GVN strategy for pacification" and "a strengthened management structure" were probably needed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President)

b. On the Embassy side, a Roles and Mission Working Group is targeted on streamlining the hodgepodge of GVN military and civilian security forces. MACV is doing staff exercises on an optimum ARVN force structure; a design for a post-hostilities GVN security establishment; and a balanced U.S. force structure which can be sustained, indefinitely if needed, without a reserve call-up. You should have their conclusions by early October.

c. Similarly, a new US/GVN effort at coordinated pacification planning is underway, really for the first time. Porter has pulled together all the civilian agencies plus MACV in a Joint Planning Group on RD goals, resources, and guidelines. Regular meetings, including joint field trips, with GVN, RD and JGS officers are coordinating selection of 1967 national priority areas and setting combined resource and manpower requirements. Completion expected by December.

d. All of these are useful initial steps, but they must be followed through effectively and on a scale that matches our commitments. Much more remains to be done before there is an effective and responsible pacification system in operation on the ground. Moreover, even at this planning stage, there are still a number of unresolved questions--the extent of participation by U.S. forces; the role of ARVN corps and division levels in pacification operations; possible transfer of RF/PF to the RD Ministry; or the conversion of the RF/PF to a Police Constabulary for post-hostilities civilian security.

e. But there now seems general Mission agreement that, while U.S. forces must help, ARVN should carry the main weight of the pacification job and that in 1967 the GVN will devote at least 50 percent of its military resources to RD in I, II and III Corps, and 25 percent in IV Corps, where there are as yet no significant U.S. forces. As rough aggregates, these represent progress; their application to provinces and districts has yet to be worked out.

2. ARVN Force Improvement. Closely related to the use of ARVN for accelerated pacification is a systematic new MACV effort to improve the quality and effectiveness of GVN forces. This parallel effort may be the most significant event now taking place in Vietnam.

a. At its core is expansion of combined operations and the military "buddy system." It builds both on the small unit models of the Marines' Combined Action Companies and the newer association of the US 1st Division with the 5th ARVN and of the 25th US with the 25th ARVN. It will cover the use of forces in both pacification and major combat actions.

b. The ARVN improvement program will also include reduction of the ratio of tail to teeth in combat units, improved leadership training, battlefield commissions, reform of the draft law, new desertion penalties, and joint US/GVN military inspection teams to appraise the effectiveness of ARVN units and commanders in RD. (A similar program for ROK Forces turned the tide of battle in Korea.)

3. Enemy Situation. All intelligence available to us confirmed weakening VC morale: food and medical supplies are down; sickness up--enlistments more difficult; defections more frequent. The end of the beginning may be in sight.

a. There are a number of projects now being explored which we hope will accelerate the process: Ky's proposal for GVN warehouses and ARVN rice collections (paying market prices) in the delta; the question of a U.S. delta offensive now under examination by the Embassy and MACV staffs; improved surrender, interrogation, and prisoner exploitation procedures; stepped-up economic warfare and resources control. Bob Komer and I have been plugging away at all of these in Washington and Saigon, and will continue to do so.

b. Under pressure from here the defector program (Chieu Hoi) is now in higher gear. As you know, the rate is running twice last year's; should total 22,500 in 1966; now has a target--based on better backing and more skillful use of the defectors against other VC waverers--of 45,000 in 1967.

II. Economic Items.

1. Bob Nathan has reported to you separately on economic stabilization, field economic management deficiencies, and the need for top quality U.S. personnel in the field./3/ We are doing some of the economic forward planning here in Washington; and Bob Komer has laid on a new stabilization study to preserve the benefits of devaluation. But there is an urgent requirement for three or four qualified economic experts in the Mission to formulate--and negotiate with the GVN--an adequate stabilization strategy.

/3/Nathan's August 31 memorandum for the President emphasized the need both for a tough stabilization program to keep inflation in check during 1967 and for top economic talent in Saigon. (Ibid.)

2. GVN Foreign Exchange Reserves pose a special problem. At present GVN reserves total about $250 million and are rising $10 million a month. If present practice continues, they will be in the $450-$500 million range by the end of 1967. We took a tough line with Minister of National Economy Thanh and National Bank Governor Hanh that such accumulations would pose major political problems for us--and could risk Congressional and public support for the AID program. We had in mind particularly the vulnerability of a possible AID Supplemental to this kind of exchange reserve build-up. We suggested these GVN reserves might better be used in 1967 to finance a larger share of imports, prepay DLF loans, or increase GVN contributions to international monetary institutions. Both Thanh and Hanh will attend the IMF/IBRD meeting in Washington at the end of September and we will hit them hard again on this.

3. Port Situation. The takeover has gone well. Relations between the MACV advisers and their GVN counterparts are close and effective. But we are not yet out of the woods. Some deficit in capacity will remain throughout 1966 and into early 1967. Our military, as you know, only assumed responsibility for military and government-to-government CPA shipments--not the much tougher task of handling commercial imports.

What we need to do: (1) Give top priority to the completion of Newport, which continues to slip--restoration of a $30 million funding cut is now being sought; (2) Refurbish Saigon port by paving worn out dirt approaches, completing hard stands, and improving lighting and handling gear--MACV and USAID are now compiling estimates; (3) Control strictly U.S. civil/military inventory levels and shipments of non-essential supplies; (4) Review present arrangements for handling commercial cargoes at the end of the next 60 days, and, unless promised improvements have been made, press again for military management of commercial shipments.

4. Postwar Development Planning. At Komer's request, Nathan made a first-rate presentation to Ky of the political and economic benefits of launching a study now. He explained how it should be organized on sectoral and regional bases to best contribute to binding South Vietnam together as a nation. Ky seemed enthusiastic and eager to get started. The way now seems clear.

III. Post-Election Prospects.

Every indication points to a successful Constitutional Assembly election and an impressive voter turnout. The need to broaden the political base, to re-start the democratic process, to fold civilians into the directing military establishment, and to do so on terms the military will find tolerable are all evident.

a. But the Assembly will mark a new and more complicated political phase in our relations with Vietnam. There will be new opinion currents with which to deal and new influences at work to which we may have to adapt the timing or substance of our decisions. The political process in short is likely to become a good deal more tricky in the period immediately ahead.

b. These prospects strengthen the need to institutionalize the new network of joint US/GVN bodies that are now beginning to appear. While we were in Saigon, two new joint boards were set up: a Joint Economic Committee, to be co-chaired by the Minister of National Economy and the Deputy Ambassador which will meet regularly every ten days; and a Joint Rice Board for US/GVN cooperation on production, import, storage, sale and pricing. We still need a better handle on rice, and are trying to get one.

c. Additionally, we now have a Joint Planning Group for RD, a Combined Postwar Planning Group in prospect, and the standing liaison between MACV and the JGS. Properly used, these joint agencies can provide moorings and stability for our policies against the waywardness or inexperience of the Constituent Assembly or the future Parliament. They can develop into essential instruments of U.S. influence. But they must be staffed by first-rate people.

William Leonhart

Postscript

"Other War" Visits.

We were received throughout, and particularly by Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, with the warmest hospitality and the most unstinting cooperation. At staff levels, I think our visit alleviated some sense of strain in the Washington-field relationship. We have been pushing pretty hard, and the relationship between two unique jobs--Porter's as "theater commander" on the civil side and Komer's as the Washington guiding hand--is still in process of evolution. Such stresses can probably never be absent from a war-time situation which pits immediacy of field experience against the perspective of wider policy. But more, rather than fewer, visits from your "other war" headquarters may be the answer--so long as the overriding consideration is to speed up constructive movement on the civil side.

WmL

223. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 31, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 11. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Moyers and Komer.

Mr. President:

With reference to your note about General Taylor's comment/2/ on General Westmoreland's message,/3/ I had a long and good conversation with Bob McNamara.

/2/See Document 221 and footnote 1 thereto.

/3/Attachment to Document 220.

His view is that what is needed now is not a Washington exercise to review Westmoreland's message, but a reorganization of the military and civil resources in South Vietnam to produce concrete working plans, region by region, for pacification.

In turn, this requires clear-cut chains of command and assignments of responsibility on our side and the Vietnamese side.

The working out of this managerial task, he believes, can only be done on the spot. He envisages this as his primary mission when he next goes to Vietnam. This will be, he hopes, after the Erhard visit early in October. He would like Bob Komer to go and suggested that I also go (I am not sure the latter is wise, but would of course be quite willing).

It will be interesting for you to read Lodge's weekly telegram/4/ in the light of Bob's comments. The first part wholly concerns pacification. They are drifting towards a recognition that the critical problem is how better to organize our military and other assets to do the job. On the basis of performance in the past, I suspect Bob McNamara is right in his assessment; namely, that much more radical changes in organization will be required if we are to move forward effectively.

/4/Attached but not printed is telegram 4923 from Saigon, August 31.

I recommend we discuss this matter at the next Tuesday lunch.

W.W. Rostow/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Put on Tuesday agenda and have Taylor present/6/
See me

/6/The President indicated his assent and added by hand the request for Taylor's presence, but no record of the discussion at the next Tuesday luncheon, on September 6, has been found. According to a handwritten note at the bottom of the source text, the President also responded: "Let's get something to Westy so that he will not assume that we have approved."

224. Intelligence Report/1/

S-3690/AP-2F

Washington, August 1966.

//1Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Controlled Dissemination; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared jointly in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The source text does not indicate a specific day of issue in August 1966.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH 11 AUGUST 1966

Summary

1. (S/NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in July and early August have increased over recent months with particular emphasis on POL facilities, dispersed POL storage sites, lines of communications (LOCs) and transportation equipment. After the initial spectacular air strikes against the major bulk POL facilities, which began in late June, the campaign against NVN POL has steadied down to a slow and grinding effort to reduce the remaining bulk capacity and that of dispersed storage. This effort is slowing down and making difficult and costly the import and distribution of POL for the North Vietnamese.

2. (S/NFD) All five major rail lines were struck during the period. The Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh lines are interdicted for through service, the Hanoi-Dong Dang and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen lines are probably operational for through service, and the status of the Hanoi-Haiphong line is uncertain. With the exception of small water craft, the destruction of transport equipment in July was at the highest level to date. However, there are no indications that shortages in transportation have been serious.

3. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese are placing emphasis on the development of alternate highway routing within the NVN Panhandle network. Highways in this area have been subject to extensive interdiction which has required heavy maintenance and the development of longer and lower capacity bypasses. Continued restoration and construction work on the LOCs throughout the country combined with the use of expedients have permitted the North Vietnamese to satisfy their logistic requirements and to continue their support of Communist activities in South Vietnam and Laos.

4. (S/NFD) Although there has been no noted change in VC/NVA military capabilities in South Vietnam which could be attributed to the air strikes in NVN, the recent B-52 strikes in the DMZ area disrupted support of the NVA 324B Division and have probably discouraged operations of this type in the immediate future.

5. (S/NFD) There is evidence that the regime is experiencing difficulty in implementing its urban evacuation program and that it has caused some popular dissatisfaction, but there is no concrete evidence that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale.

6. (S/NFD) Damage to the economy increased by almost $10 million,/2/ the highest amount of economic loss measured during any reporting period in this series of reports. Total measurable direct and indirect losses to the economy and the military establishment are now estimated at $106 million. The loss of storage capacity in bulk petroleum facilities has presented Hanoi and its Allies with the necessity of improvising a makeshift storage and distribution system and conversion to this system has placed an additional heavy drain on economic resources. The cumulative debilitating effects on the economy are becoming increasingly apparent with the disruption of agricultural and industrial production. It is certain now that economic growth has stagnated. Shortages of economic goods and hardships are apparent among some parts of the civilian population but there have been no sustained and critical hardships among the bulk of the people.

/2/US dollars are used throughout this report. [Footnote in the source text.]

[Here follows the body of the 23-page report.]

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, September 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Thrush. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:16 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11 a.m. on September 1, under cover of a memorandum stating that "we should keep our fingers crossed; but this could be good news." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 143, Thrush)

4969. 1. Uncle/2/ saw nephew at Go Dau Ha in Tay Ninh Province yesterday. Arrangements were made for uncle to take our man to Can Tho on "Monday or Tuesday"/3/ at a point near the airport. The exact place will be given to uncle when he goes to Go Dau Ha on Saturday. On that day, uncle will meet nephew's son who will give him exact time and place and will then come back to Saigon with him.

/2/Nguyen Huu Tho's "uncle," Nguyen Huu An. For more information on this operation, see paragraphs 4-9 of Document 204 and footnote 3 thereto.

/3/September 5 or 6.

2. On arriving in Saigon, son will give letter to our man at our man's house on Sunday morning. The letter will be signed by the nephew in his official capacity as president of the organization. Our man does not know what will be in the letter.

3. But he is sure that it will not impede further action since it is understood that our man will go to Can Tho on Monday or Tuesday to "pick up" nephew.

4. Comment: It becomes urgent to decide where nephew should be taken. He is understandably concerned about his security as regards the GVN. Unless you can think of something better, I plan to have nephew met at Can Tho by a CAS plane of sufficient size and arrange to take him and his party to Chu Lai, which is an all American base, and from where I suggest he be flown to Okinawa [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

5. Upon reflection, I think this is better than flying him to Guam or taking him out to a carrier. Obviously we are honor bound to get him out of the country immediately.

6. Other questions which arise are:

When do you divulge this?

When do we tell GVN?

And what do we tell them? End comment.

7. It is expected that the son will be staying at our man's house in Saigon as a "gesture of good faith."

8. Our man has suggested that we would be generous with money and personal security. Nephew has said that he would eventually like to return to South Viet-Nam and take part in politics.

9. Please advise receipt this wire and give me any advice or instructions./4/

/4/The Department of State replied in telegram 39769, September 1, approving the plan set forth in paragraph 4 and providing guidance for informing Ky and revealing the defection publicly. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH) On September 5 Rostow forwarded three additional Thrush telegrams to the President (5245 and 5246 from Saigon and 41139 to Saigon, September 5), noting in his covering memorandum that "the bird is not yet in hand; but he hasn't retreated to the bush either." In a memorandum of September 9, Rostow informed the President that "Uncle, who has been trying to arrange Liberation Front leader's defection, was picked up by South Vietnamese security men on the morning of the 7th" for apparently unrelated reasons and was still being detained. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 143, Thrush)

Lodge

226. Editorial Note

In a letter of September 6, 1966, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Unger, the Department of Defense requested the Department of State's concurrence in authorizing air strikes under Rolling Thunder 52. The seven targets comprised three SAM support facilities, two POL storage areas, the Xuan Mai highway bridge, and the Yen Vien railroad yard. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966) In commenting on the proposal in an undated note to Secretary Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson observed that this was a "substantial reduction in the package McNamara gave you some time ago." (Ibid.) Regarding the earlier package, see Document 218 and footnote 2 thereto.

Assistant Secretary of State Bundy reviewed the Department of Defense proposal in a September 10 memorandum to Rusk. His reservations about attacking the Yen Vien railroad yard and the Hanoi SAM storage area were concurred in by U. Alexis Johnson in an undated cover note to Rusk and by Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson in a September 12 cover note to Rusk. Thompson also expressed concern about striking one of the POL storage areas. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966)

In a suggested agenda for the Tuesday luncheon scheduled for September 13, forwarded to President Johnson on September 12, Rostow included an item on the bombing of North Vietnam. He indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended additional targets, the Department of State was "resisting on the grounds of escalatory signals and the Rusk-Gromyko talks," and Secretary of Defense McNamara wanted a freeze "at approximately the present level, with perhaps a few additional targets." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) No record has been found of the discussion at the lunch meeting on September 13. According to Unger's recollection, summarized in an October 31 memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, it was decided in a conversation between Rusk and McNamara not to proceed with Rolling Thunder 52 either as proposed by the Department of Defense or in modified form. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966)

227. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, September 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:29 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 250-251.

5517. 1. D'Orlandi told me that in his recent talk with Lewandowski, the problem referred to in my last telegram/2/ regarding Lewandowski and D'Orlandi working up a proposal to submit to Washington and Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points:

/2/Telegram 5229, September 4, which reported that, according to D'Orlandi, "Lewandowski had returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts Pham Van Dong and General Giap were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There was absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 249-250)

A. He did not want the only outcome of the procedure between D'Orlandi and himself to be to inform the United States as to "just how far the North Vietnamese would give in."

B. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I had already given him ample assurances, he feels that emphasis must be given to the need of the U.S. approaching the problem so as to concern South Viet-Nam alone and not South Viet-Nam as a "piece of a general Chinese puzzle." Lew-andowski feels that the problem could be "simple enough" if limited to South Viet-Nam--but not if the United States is thinking of using conversations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowski's talks in Hanoi) as a way of getting at China or Chinese questions. I quickly assured D'Orlandi that, of course, we were solely interested in suppressing the aggression in South Viet-Nam and in nothing else. D'Orlandi said that not only did he realize this, but that Lewandowski did too. (Comment: Perhaps Lewandowski has had this point impressed upon him in Hanoi or elsewhere. It is a curious angle, as I, of course, have never said or even implied anything to justify his admonition. End comment.)

C. Lewandowski said that it was only fair to state that the "aim of the exercise" between him and D'Orlandi should not be to reinforce the status quo, but to get a "global" settlement. When he says "global," he obviously does not mean worldwide; he means "over all" as regards South Viet-Nam. This, said D'Orlandi, quoting Lewandowski, means "guarantees, etc."; therefore "not just deescalation."

2. When I asked D'Orlandi what this meant, D'Orlandi, for illustration, said that it could mean "elections;" "a new government;" "settlement with the Viet Cong."

3. Lewandowski went on to say that the purpose of his discussions with D'Orlandi would not be to inaugurate a "socialist" regime in South Viet-Nam; it would not be to get a "cease-fire" and still less a "standstill." (Comment: In the light of para 3, the "settlement with the Viet Cong" mentioned in para 2 must refer to some governmental arrangement and not to military operations. End comment.)

4. D'Orlandi told Lewandowski: "I have very clear cut instructions as I have already told you, and they are: be useful, or go home. Fanfani has instructions for me and Rapacki knows what they are. We may, of course, rule out an agreement confirming the status quo since this would be nothing more than the former approach. The fact is that either you and I are going to have these conversations or else nothing is going to happen at all anywhere concerning Viet-Nam. I was flatly told in Rome that you were to do something with me, and that it was you who wanted the conversation to go on with Ambassador Lodge."

5. Lewandowski said he was sure that something could be done. Hanoi, he said, looks at the situation through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong through whom they get all their information about the situation. "My job," said Lewandowski, "is to explain to Hanoi that they have a wrong view." The last time he had been in Hanoi neither Pham Van Dong nor General Giap were there, and "they are the only two in the whole place who talk sense and understand the real situation in the south."

6. This was the end of the conversation. D'Orlandi says he was going to puzzle over a possible agreement formula and when he has figured something out, he will get in touch with Lewandowski. No date has been set for their next meeting.

7. D'Orlandi is sure of one thing: Lewandowski absolutely does not want the conversations stopped. D'Orlandi surmises that the Communist intention is to state that there is no hope; for the record to break off all conversations; adopt an attitude of nothing doing; and then to have the kind of "non-talks," to paraphrase the late E.E. Cummings, with D'Orlandi of which this telegram treats. They would not only want to be able to deny publicly that they are having talks, they want to deny it to everybody privately. It is real "double talk"; if not "double think."

Lodge

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, September 12, 1966, 1:25 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, and Harriman; and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 251-252.

44917. Ref: Saigon 5517./2/

/2/Document 227.

1. We find Lewandowsky's thinking as conveyed by D'Orlandi very interesting but not always lucid. Would like you to discuss some of these ambiguities with D'Orlandi and suggest that he explore them further with Lewandowsky, hopefully not waiting until D'Orlandi has his "possible agreement formula" worked out. In ensuing paragraphs puzzling items are identified, together with points we would like to have you make to D'Orlandi.

2. Lewandowsky's remark that the aim of the exercise should not be to "reinforce the status quo" is all right if he is talking about the present status quo in South Viet-Nam. But we cannot buy a discarding of the status quo ante, i.e. the 1954 and 1962 Agreements. We have had so many experiences in the past 20 years with the Communists saying "What is mine is mine and is not discussable; we must talk about dividing what is yours". You may add for D'Orlandi's own information that we do not rule out consideration of revisions of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements but we could accept no changes until we had a clear picture of what was the total context of an understanding with the Communists.

3. As you have already indicated D'Orlandi can reassure Lewandowsky that we are not thinking of South Viet-Nam as a piece of a general Chinese puzzle; nothing is further from our minds than the idea that we should try to settle the China question somehow in Viet-Nam. However, D'Orlandi should be aware of our concern about Lewandowsky's statement that "the problem could be simple enough if limited to South Viet-Nam". North Viet-Nam is inevitably involved if there is to be any lasting settlement in South Viet-Nam. At the same time we must be very careful not to accept the idea that North Viet-Nam has a full right to sit in on the disposition of the internal political arrangements within South Viet-Nam (for example the points mentioned Para 2 reftel) just because it has sent 19 regiments where they have no right to be.

4. FYI. As you know our hope is that the GVN will be able to improve successively its position as the sole governmental authority in South Viet-Nam and will be able to dispose of as many as possible of the problems mentioned in Para 2 as a government dealing with a dissident group within its borders. This is process which we are hoping to get underway at the earliest possible moment pursuant to Deptel 23182 of August 5./3/

/3/Document 203.

5. Re Para 7 we remain skeptical as to whether Hanoi and even Warsaw likely to choose the Lewandowsky-D'Orlandi channel for substantive negotiation. We do nevertheless want to do nothing to discourage this channel but somewhere along the way we suspect we will reach point where we will not be able to be more concrete about our positions unless we have better evidence that Lewandowsky empowered to speak for Hanoi and that they are ready to go beyond standard positions. Nevertheless we will consider here whether there is something that could be given to D'Orlandi for his "possible agreement formula" which could demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and smoke out Hanoi's intentions. This might lie, for example, in realm of mutually-timed withdrawal formula, or quid pro quo on cessation of bombing and halt in expansion US forces against end to infiltration by Hanoi.

6. Please continue keep us closely informed of any indications of what Lewandowsky really in position do. For moment we would prefer you not even mention to D'Orlandi possibility sweetener for his "formula" mentioned in preceding paragraph./4/

/4/Lodge replied in telegram 5965, September 14, summarizing a long session with D'Orlandi during which Lodge clarified the points raised in this telegram. According to D'Orlandi, Lewandowski was "not interested in de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would lead to a settlement and which would at the same time perpetuate the personnel of the present government." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 252-253)

Rusk

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, September 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 5970 to the President on September 14 under cover of a memorandum stating, "Herewith Lodge's evaluation of the election--much like ours, but very interesting reading." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 12)

5970. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Elections

1. Looking back at the election on last Sunday,/2/ the following can be said:

/2/September 11.

2. The Viet Cong went all out, both by violent deed and violent word.

3. By deed. There were 166 Viet Cong deeds--acts of terrorism just before and including the election day. This was about nine times the level of activity four days before election and fifteen times the level of activity on an average day in August. GVN casualties from 6:00 p.m. September 10 to 6:00 p.m. September 11 are estimated at nineteen killed and one hundred twenty wounded. The Viet Cong casualties are estimated at eighteen killed, three wounded, and fifteen captured.

4. The government losses were small considering the all-out campaign of the Viet Cong because the GVN on its side went all-out too. It was high tide both ways. The Ky government once again showed its talent in using force and handling troops and police effectively.

5. By word. Then the Viet Cong by word made the issue, pumped it up, and unrestrainedly boasted about their certain success.

6. In quite a miraculous way, the GVN suddenly seemed to grasp the technique of effective publicity, certainly the posters, billboards, radio, television, and dragon dances were skillfully designed to work up interest and to do so in an honest and attractive way.

7. All of this was observed by more than five hundred journalists, diplomatic observers, and Japanese and Korean Parliamentary groups. In particular the Vietnamese people were watching intently. The election was therefore as clean as such a thing can be.

8. Big political defeat. It, therefore, must be set down that the vote on September 11 was an immense vote of "no confidence" in the Viet Cong. They asked for it, and they got it. It is very big--on a par in importance with the departure of nearly 1,000,000 Vietnamese refugees from the north in 1954 rather than live under a Communist regime.

9. The vote also indicates that the government is capable of influencing and providing security for more people than we had thought. We have consistently used the figure of 54 percent, which is up three percent from what it was a year ago, as indicating the percentage of people living under secure conditions--with something over 20 percent under complete Viet Cong domination. Four-fifths of the 5,288,512 registered voters went to the polls on Sunday. The vote must reflect a base of at least ten million people if you add in the children and members of the population who didn't vote. This makes the number of people who were living under secure conditions on that day nearer 65 percent than 54 percent.

10. An interesting feature was the marked willingness of people to talk. Never in my service here have I had so many reports come to my desk describing Viet Cong intentions and plans as were told to our people throughout the country by Vietnamese.

11. I also believe that relatively stable prices helped the government in its very successful efforts to arouse public interest in the elections.

12. U.S. troops acted as a shield and prevented large units of the Viet Cong and the Army of North Viet-Nam from interfering in the elections. Had we not been here, there could have been no elections. But, then, had we not come in when we did last year, there probably would be no VietNam either.

13. For us on our side to destroy the redoubts, divide the main force units, and keep them off balance while the Vietnamese on their side do the face to face, elbow to elbow, work of population security is the ideal division of labor. What we have so often talked about actually happened last Sunday--and it worked.

14. In Saigon there were no Americans on the streets, and the Vietnamese had their own city to themselves. This was good all around--especially for us who thus could not be accused of interference in elections. We kept our hand from showing all over the country. My orders to keep it a Vietnamese show and keep away from overt support were followed with great efficiency by all elements of this Mission.

15. We have heard no evidence of fraud in any of the fifty-two election districts. Several candidates known to be favored by the local authorities were defeated. Only twenty military men were elected, a fact that has stopped the rumor that the government planned to pack the convention with military delegates.

16. The Vietnamese people showed amazing courage in the face of record breaking attempts at terror. Embassy officers observed heavy voting at four Saigon polling stations which were grenaded on election eve. An eyewitness reported that in Tra Vinh the population trooped to the polls even while the area was under Viet Cong mortar fire. Only one polling area in the entire country suspended operations for security reasons.

17. The elections also showed the weakness of the militant Institute Buddhists, confirming a long standing suspicion of mine and, I hope, destroying a myth which some journalists have promoted. In addition to the September 6 press conference which I reported last week,/3/ the Institute militants tried several times to launch anti-election demonstrations and strikes. There was no popular response, and the handful of monks involved were quickly dispersed in every case.

/3/In telegram 5433, September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

18. Catholic opposition did not materialize. Nothing was heard from Father Hoang Quynh's front of all religions for three weeks before the elections. The Catholic citizens bloc never made good on its threat to call for a boycott of the election. On the contrary, Catholic citizens and candidates were very active in the campaign. And thirty Catholic candidates were elected. (This compares with thirty-four candidates who are listed under the broad label of "Buddhists.")

19. Cynics claim that most people went to the polls simply to avoid future difficulties with the authorities and that the Vietnamese people fear they will be required to show canceled voting cards whenever they come into contact with officialdom. No doubt this is part of the explanation. But if 80.8 percent of the registered voters went to the polls simply because the GVN pushed them into it, it at least shows that the GVN has some authority and standing with the great majority of the population. And adherence by the population to the government is what this political-military war is about. I believe it is nearer the truth to say that the average Vietnamese voter realized that the election was a major contest between the Viet Cong and free Vietnamese. Both sides impressed this fact on him. He made his choice.

20. The GVN not only conducted a most aggressive information campaign and handled military, police, and civil authorities to insure security with great skill; Ky showed political cleverness in his move to spike the Buddhist Institute's guns by sending them a conciliatory letter on election eve and encouraging the Peoples Army Council to try to mediate Institute-GVN differences. He and other government leaders made a series of well timed statements and public appearances designed to arouse general enthusiasm for the elections. We, of course, had been quietly counseling these things on Ky and some of his principal advisors.

21. The convention is truly representative. Regional differences are very important to the Vietnamese, and the Southerners often complain that they are not sufficiently represented in the government. There are forty-four Southerners in the convention. Twenty-seven successful candidates come from North Vietnam, five from North-Central Vietnam, and twenty-three from Central Vietnam. There are four ethnic Cambodian representatives, eight Montagnard tribesmen, and four Chinese. The convention also includes all major Vietnamese religions. We know of thirty-four Buddhist, ten Hoa Hao, thirty Catholic, five Cao Dai, and seven Confucianists among the successful candidates. The others are not clearly identified by religion but probably include people who practice ancestor worship, or are nominal Buddhists or are animists. The convention will include twenty-three teachers, twenty-two businessmen, twenty military, eighteen civil servants, eight lawyers, five doctors, and seven farmers. Twenty-three members have had valuable experience in provincial or municipal councils. The convention will also benefit by the experience of such leading political figures as former chief of state Phan Khac Suu, Saigon City Council President La Thanh Nghe, newspaper publisher Dr. Dang Van Sung, and prominent politician Dr. Phan Quang Dan.

22. The Vietnamese have taken the first step toward stable, democratic government. They still have a long, long way to go. But what we saw on September 11 is reason for confidence.

B. Pacification

23. On September 20, elements of the U.S. 25th Division will start pacification of Long An Province. This has been a longstanding dream of mine going back to 1963. At that time Long An was the only province in Viet-Nam which stretched from Cambodia across to the South China Sea. It has since been divided, but is still important. It is only eight miles south of the Saigon city limits and heavily populated. It will be the biggest test which U.S. troops will have had in fighting against guerrillas under urban conditions--a different thing from the war of movement in the unpopulated, high plateau.

24. I have always suspected that the Viet Cong have some of their toughest and ablest officers in Long An because it is so close to Saigon and has always been such a depressing place for us and, I imagine, an inspiring place for them. In pacifying Long An, we will have to depend on very effective police type measures, a precinct by precinct comb out, and, because it is so thickly settled, we will not be able to use our huge artillery capacity and our air power as we would normally do in open country. A long time ago, General Westmoreland and I agreed that this would be a great thing to do but we have never been strong enough to take it on. Now General Weyand has done so well in Hau Nghia to the west of Saigon that we are all encouraged that he can slip to the south of Saigon where the challenge is much greater. If he does, it should impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons we learn for further operations in heavily populated areas.

C. Economic

25. Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon retail index was down two percent over last week and six percent over a month ago. Main reason for the decline in the retail index was an increase in rice and pork deliveries in Saigon. Dollars dropped very slightly, from 167 last week to 166 this week.

D. Military

26. Although they attempted to avoid contact with allied forces and concentrated on terror and small unit actions against the elections, the Viet Cong lost over 1,000 killed in action during the reporting period. The 1,166 Viet Cong killed in action this week compares with 885 for last week. All other military indices were favorable.

27. Major operations during the week included: (1) Prairie, a USMC three-battalion operation immediately south of the DMZ intended to thwart a Viet Cong build-up there; (2) Paul Revere III and Su Bok (ROK), search and destroy missions in the Highlands area southwest of Pleiku; (3) Baton Rouge, a combined search and destroy operation in Rung Sai special zone designed to reduce the threat to the Saigon ship channel, and (4) Dan Chi 261B, a continuation of operations Dan Chi 261 in Ba Xuyen/Bac Lieu Provinces conducted by the 21st ARVN Division. The last named operation was a major ARVN victory with cumulative results Dan Chi 261 and 261B--313 Viet Cong killed, 179 Viet Cong small arms, 11 crew served weapons, and nine tons of ammunition captured.

E. Reaction to de Gaulle's Phnom Penh speech/4/

/4/On September 1, de Gaulle gave a speech in Phnom Penh, which, among other things, called on the United States to make a unilateral commitment to withdraw its forces from Vietnam by a fixed date. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 646-648. Lodge commented initially in telegram 5090, September 2, which Rostow forwarded to the President under cover of a September 2 memorandum giving Rusk's and his own views on how the United States should react. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 12)

28. Prime Minister Ky publicly castigated de Gaulle, and the Vietnamese press generally attacked the French President for his September Phnom Penh remarks. The de Gaulle speech was widely interpreted as a cynical attempt to re-establish French influence in Asia at the expense of Vietnamese freedom.

29. On September 8 two prominent French businessmen in Saigon were arrested on charges of financially aiding organizations which were trying to sabotage the elections. Ky said publicly that the money involved amounted to 50 million piasters and that if investigation showed the two men to be guilty they will be expelled and their businesses nationalized. Many in the French community regard the arrests as a response to the de Gaulle September 1 speech.

F. Americans and Vietnamese killed

30. Final totals of Vietnamese civilians killed and wounded as a result of Viet Cong action during the period September 4 through 10 are not yet available. However, incomplete figures available to us now indicate that at least thirty-four civilians were killed and thirty-three wounded. If we add the 174 Vietnamese military killed during that period to the 34 Vietnamese civilians, the total Vietnamese killed by the Viet Cong is 208. This compares with the 50 Americans killed in the same period.

31. I have just obtained figures of Viet Cong killed in action and captured in the months February to August inclusive. During that period the ARVN killed 17,692 Viet Cong, and the U.S. killed 15,187. The ARVN captured 2,399 Viet Cong, and the U.S. captured 1,521. Free world forces killed 2,135, and captured 236.

Lodge

230. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/

Washington, September 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78-05505A, Area Activity-Far East-Memos Re Agency Planning. Secret. The memorandum was produced by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and was drafted by George W. Allen.

SUBJECT
Comments on Vietnamese Election Results

1. The unexpectedly high vote in the 11 September elections represents a resounding success for the GVN's efforts to turn out the vote in the face of Viet Cong intimidation and a threatened boycott by Buddhist extremists. It cannot be construed, however, as a ringing endorsement of the GVN as presently constituted, nor as a political repudiation of the Viet Cong though the Communists have lost considerable face and the lie has been given to their exaggerated claims of "control". While the election does mark a significant step forward in the establishment of representative governmental institutions, it is only the first of many steps required in the evolution toward the viable political base which is essential to the success of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam.

2. The official returns reported by the GVN probably are generally reliable, although they may have been padded in some cases by local officials. In retrospect, several factors operated to bring about a higher turnout than that recorded, for example, in the 1965 elections. The most important of these was the unprecedented GVN program aimed at registering the electorate and publicizing the election. Bolstering this was the "command interest" in the elections throughout the Vietnamese civil and military structure which was demonstrated in terms of briefings and inspections of local preparations, and emphasis at all echelons on the need to turn out the vote. As a result, the electorate was probably more aware of its "responsibility" than in most previous Vietnamese elections.

3. The turnout does not necessarily reflect support for the GVN nor opposition to the Viet Cong, because these were not issues confronting the voter. In effect, his participation was not merely solicited, but actively arranged by the full energies of the GVN administrative and security apparatus in a demonstration of what that apparatus can do when directed toward accomplishing a single, uncomplicated task. This, in itself, is encouraging when measured against the normal inadequacies and relatively ineffectual performance of that apparatus.

4. The failure of Viet Cong efforts to sabotage the elections can be described as a case of their once again biting off more than they could chew in the political-psychological field. Given the GVN's massive effort to turn out the vote in essentially government-controlled areas, the improved effectiveness of GVN intelligence, and the elaborate and extensive security arrangements to protect the balloting, the Communist efforts were bound to be largely ineffectual. Viet Cong plans, intentions and techniques for disrupting the elections were known in advance by GVN authorities in some detail, and appropriate countermeasures were taken. Although most voters probably were aware of Viet Cong threats, their sense of "responsibility" and awareness of government security measures probably led them to minimize their individual vulnerability at the polls. In any event, although the Viet Cong capped the week-end buildup of anti-election terrorism with a widespread display of harassments and terror incidents, including mortar fire on at least four provincial capitals and eight district towns on election day, the voters were not dissuaded from going to the polls. The Communists lost considerable face because of their inability to enforce much-proclaimed opposition.

5. The virtual collapse of the Buddhist boycott was telegraphed well before election day by the evident confusion and dissension within their hierarchy in Saigon and in the provinces. These factors are a carry-over from the ill-fated struggle movement earlier this year, which clearly demonstrated the political bankruptcy and increasing isolation of the Buddhist extremist elements, who seem to have lost their ability to either guide or reflect the desires of the masses. To many Vietnamese, the opposition of the radical Buddhist leaders was irrational, since the elections had been the direct result of Buddhist demands. Although the Buddhists still have some potential for mass political action if they can heal the differences within their hierarchy, they are not now the dominant force in Vietnamese politics they once were.

6. The elections have produced a body which is charged with drafting a constitution which will establish the institutional framework of a future Vietnamese Government. But many potential obstacles remain before any new governmental institutions take shape and a viable political base is attained. There are many ways in which this new body may make mischief for the GVN, and vice versa, as the Vietnamese grope for an acceptable political formula. Even when new legal institutions are established, ways must be found to ensure their stability and continuity under conditions of civil war, increasing U.S. involvement in that war, and the latent war-weariness and cynicism of the populace. In short, the elections represent only the initial--and perhaps the easiest--step in the long and difficult but essential process of creating a political base sufficiently strong, dynamic, and appealing to undergird the pacification effort and contest the Viet Cong apparatus for political control in the countryside.

231. Intelligence Note From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

No. 569

Washington, September 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam, September 1966. Secret.

SUBJECT
Assessment of Current Situation in North Vietnam

Our assessment of the impact of the war on Hanoi leads us to believe that the strains are severe but not unbearable. The North Vietnamese people appear somewhat weary but not disaffected, and the regime has no evident difficulty in exercising effective control. The leadership has debated alternate strategies for conducting the war in the South but has not deviated from basic policy goals. Bombing has seriously disrupted North Vietnam's small modern industrial sector as well as seaborne foreign trade, but has not materially interfered with the maintenance of adequate lines of communications. While some shortages of consumer goods exist, the supply of basic commodities, including foodstuffs, appears adequate for minimal needs. Some evacuation of urban areas, particularly Hanoi, has taken place recently.

Morale and Central Government Control. Our intelligence on popular attitudes in North Vietnam is understandably spotty. However, what can be gleaned from various sources indicates that there is some dissatisfaction with hardships, as there always has been, but there is no serious dissidence. Although some war-weariness undoubtedly exists, the populace has an attitude toward the war that varies between enthusiastic support and resignation. Interrogations of prisoners in the South indicate that recruits for operations in South Vietnam start out in a state of high morale. The North Vietnamese regime has also been able to exploit nationalist sentiments and the instinct for self-preservation in order to impose an unprecedented degree of mobilization on the people, so as to insure the continuation of vital transport and essential production.

There is no evidence that any significant portion of the population blames the Hanoi regime for the bombing. Instead "US imperialism" is the focus of hatred. Although some of the people realize that American bombers are concentrating on military targets, most appear to believe that the strikes are aimed at civilian targets as well. A number of reports show that considerable evacuation of city dwellers to rural districts has taken place without substantial discontent. Nor is there any evidence to suggest the central government is experiencing difficulties maintaining control over areas outside of Hanoi.

The Leadership. Evidence of major disagreements within the leadership, notably Defense Minister Giap's alleged loss of influence, is tenuous and difficult to assess. However, in a number of recent polemical articles there have been clear hints of past and continuing disagreements over proper strategy in thwarting the strengthened US/GVN forces in the South. One side apparently argued unsuccessfully for a more cautious military policy against those who advocated maintaining an aggressive posture. There is no evidence, however, that the dispute involved a more fundamental change in political strategy, such as an effort to get negotiations underway.

The Economy. It seems evident that North Vietnam's small heavy industrial sector has been seriously affected by the bombing. Since mid-1965 Hanoi has been concentrating its productive efforts in dispersed light industry and agriculture while relying on outside assistance for the essential products of heavy industry. According to the North Vietnamese press, light industry is producing at about the same level as in early 1965. Poor weather, the disruption caused by bombing, and other priority calls for transport combined to reduce substantially procurement from the spring crop. It seems likely that the same factors will adversely affect the harvest now underway. Despite Hanoi's denials, the Chinese have provided small quantities of rice. Visitors to Hanoi and intercepted letters from North Vietnamese in the countryside indicate that sufficient food is available. The rice ration has not been reduced, but meat is quite scarce. Western medicines are in particularly short supply. There are conflicting reports about the availability of consumer goods and textiles, but these appear adequate for minimal needs. Prices are kept low to guard against inflation, although the average worker's buying power is insufficient to allow a run on goods.

Although the bombing of Haiphong has made off-loading more difficult, communist shipping continues to bring in supplies at a high rate. In July 1966 seaborne imports of goods other than petroleum reached the record volume of 80,500 tons, 76 percent of which arrived on Soviet ships. (Non-communist shipping is now almost nonexistent.) Strikes on transportation routes have all but halted North Vietnam's two principal exports, anthracite coal and apatite. Petroleum products are being imported by rail and sea at a level somewhat reduced from the high of last spring, but the supply is ample for North Vietnam's needs. Although distribution patterns have changed, there is no evidence of any shortage of POL as a result of the concerted bombing effort. DIA estimates that the entire country has POL stocks (most in small, dispersed storage areas) to meet normal civilian/military needs for two months and that two medium-sized tankers a month will be able to supply North Vietnam's needs.

According to a recent CIA study,/2/ the internal transportation system is now running more efficiently, though at obviously greater cost in manpower, than before the US bombing program began. Ingenious methods of repair and alternate means of communication, based in part on the Korean experience, have ensured the maintenance of adequate communication and rendered the transportation system increasingly less vulnerable to interdiction.

/2/Not further identified.

Civil Defense and Evacuation. The North Vietnamese are keenly aware of the need for continually improving their civil defense. An August 7 Nhan Dan editorial stresses the importance of digging shelters and communications trenches, evacuating urban areas, dispersing offices and living quarters of those remaining in the cities, and preventing resettlement areas from becoming densely populated zones.

Evacuation of some citizens, industries, and government ministries from Hanoi has taken place throughout the summer. Possibly about 40% of the populace had been evacuated by late August, although this figure must be weighed in light of other reports that many people apparently move out of the city during the day, but return at night, in part owing to the lack of accommodations in the countryside. Canadian ICC reports/3/ describe a large-scale section-by-section evacuation of old people and children, with priority given those living near bridges and dams. Some government ministries have been relocated (probably to a limestone region near Phu Ly, whose caves and grottos were used by the Viet Minh in the war against the French) and retail store hours have been ordered cut to reduce daytime activity in Hanoi.

/3/Not further identified.

232. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 15, 1966, 9:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam--W.W. Rostow. Top Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

Mr. President:

A reflection on bombing the North.

1. Clearly, bombing the North has not stopped infiltration to the South; although it may have set a limit on the scale of military operations in the South. For example, the Laos road net has been expanded, with great effort, to a capacity of 400 tons a day. A recent report/2/ indicates it is only being used at a rate of 80-100 tons a day.

/2/Not further identified.

2. Clearly, bombing the North as we have done it has not, by itself, brought Hanoi to the conference table; nor has anything else we have done by way of military, civil, or diplomatic action.

3. What has it done?

It has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese. Bombing in the North is our equivalent of Viet Cong guerrilla operations in the South:

--It engages a large amount of civil manpower (2-300,000), and substantial military resources and foreign aid in countering damage and air defense.

--It imposes economic stagnation or decline.

--It imposes a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time.

--It limits normal shipping to North Vietnam.

--It assures that the bulk of external assistance is to shore up North Vietnam rather than increase its thrust against the South.

4. Again--bombing as we have conducted it--is not a decisive instrument any more than the guerrilla operations in the South are a decisive instrument. But if it weren't hurting we would not have either the vast effort at air defense in the North or the extraordinary diplomatic and psychological effort to force us to stop bombing without conditions.

5. Put another way, without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off. I keep close by me all the time the November 1962 interview in the Saturday Evening Post/3/ with the Hanoi leaders, the punch line of which was this:

/3/Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," Saturday Evening Post, 235 (November 24, 1962), pp. 18-21.

"Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."

A cessation of bombing in the North would make it much easier for them to make that judgment stick.

6. Therefore:

--I am against taking the heat off the North: we should stay with oil and steady pressure on transport;

--I believe we should be studying ways to increase the pressure on the North at the right time in the future;

--We should not diminish our pressure on the North without a fully adequate quid pro quo in the South.

7. I add an amateur political judgment: a "pause" during the campaign, without solid evidence that a move towards peace will promptly follow, could be quite dangerous during the campaign, as well as providing evidence of over-anxiety and lack of perseverance to Hanoi./4/

/4/McNamara handwrote the following note in the margin of the source text, next to this paragraph: "I am inclined to agree that a 'pause' prior to November would be unwise."

Walt

233. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (Starbird)/1/

Washington, September 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, VIET 385 BARRIER. Secret.

SUBJECT
Infiltration Interdiction System for Vietnam

An infiltration interdiction system, to stop (or at a minimum to substantially reduce) the flow of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam, is to be designed, produced, and put in place in South Vietnam and Laos as a matter of highest priority. You are hereby named Director of Joint Task Force 728 to achieve the objective of having the system installed and in operation by September 15, 1967. The present concept, which may have to be modified as your work progresses, is summarized on the attached sheet./2/

/2/The concept summarized in the attachment was drawn from the study, "Air-Supported Anti-Infiltration Barrier," August 1966, prepared by the Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analyses. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2D, Barrier) For background information on the study, see Document 163 and The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 115-123.

To make this system work: There will be required experimentation and further development for such features as foliage penetration, moisture resistance, and proper dispersion of gravel; development of a better acoustic sensor than currently exists; aircraft modifications; possible modifications in BLU-26B fusing; refinement of strike-navigation tactics; and total system tests. Production of components will have to be increased, personnel will have to be trained, a unit and command structure to operate and supply the system will have to be created, and a doctrine for its operation will have to be developed. Communist infiltration practices and the location of civilian populations will have to be studied. Political groundwork will have to be laid. Public relations questions will have to be addressed./3/ Furthermore, to keep ahead of countermeasures, new components of the system and new tactics will have to be under development even before the first generation system is installed.

/3/Foster's memorandum for the record of a meeting on the barrier, September 6, attended by McNamara, McNaughton, Kistiakowsky, and other members of the Jason study team, indicates that "note was taken of a number of serious non-technical problems, including possible added dangers to Laos and Thailand; the CINCPAC, MAC-V and Ambassador Sullivan's attitudes; and the possibility of premature leakage to the press." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4662, VIET 385 BARRIER)

In carrying out your duties as Director of the Joint Task Force, you will report directly to me and are authorized direct contact with the JCS, the Military Services, and subordinate organizations. Dr. Foster (DDR&E) will represent me as necessary to assist you in the achievement of your assignment. Implementation will involve political affairs and matters of concern to ISA, the State Department and foreign governments; you should therefore keep Mr. McNaughton (ASD/ISA) fully informed and call on him for assistance as necessary in those areas. I expect you to make use of an advisory group of non-governmental experts, including Dr. George Kistiakowsky. You will keep the Chairman, JCS fully informed as to the status and progress of your work.

You should immediately establish a project office and submit to me by September 29 an outline of a program for carrying out your task. This program should include the approximate time schedule you plan to meet over the next twelve months; preliminary estimates of your needs in personnel, equipment and facilities; and an initial plan of your proposed organization.

The existence and operations of the Joint Task Force should be kept confidential.

You are to feel free to call on me as necessary for resources, guidance, decisions, and any other assistance.

Robert S. McNamara

Attachment

CONCEPT FOR INFILTRATION INTERDICTION SYSTEM FOR VIETNAM

The system would have two different parts--one part designed against foot traffic and the other against vehicles. The location for the anti-foot-traffic part would be in South Vietnam along the southern edge (outside) of the DMZ to the Laotian border and then on westward, north of Tchepone, to the vicinity of Muong Sen. Except for the portion nearest the sea, the area involved is virtually unpopulated and the terrain is quite rugged. The location for the anti-vehicle part of the system would be the area, about 100 kilometers north-south and 40 kilometers east-west, covering the road networks in eastern Laos from north of Mu Gia Pass to south of Route 9. The eastern end of the anti-foot-traffic part would be a wide ground barrier of mine fields, concertina, fences, sensing devices, patrols and air-mobile troops. The remainder of the anti-foot-traffic system and all of the anti-vehicle system would be effectuated entirely by air actions.

The first generation of the anti-foot-traffic part of the interdiction system would involve a combination of non-sterilizing gravel mines for area denial off the trails where sweeping would be difficult, gravel mines plus "button bomblets" on the trails to harass and to signal acoustic sensors, acoustic detectors to pinpoint explosions caused by infiltrators, and Sadeye/BLU-26B clusters for saturation attacks on areas where infiltrators were detected. The mined area--which would constantly be reseeded--would encompass a strip about 100 by 5 kilometers. The sensor patterns, laid through and around this field would be monitored 24 hours a day by patrol aircraft, which could call in strike aircraft on a few moment's notice.

The first generation of the anti-vehicle system would consist of acoustic detectors, supplemented by gravel mines, distributed along all truckable roads in the zone; 24-hours-a-day monitoring by patrol aircraft; and strike aircraft using SADEYE prepared to respond to signals that trucks had been located.

The cost of both parts of such an initial system has been estimated to be about $800 million per year, and the key requirements to be approximately 20 million gravel mines per month, 25 million button bomblets per month, 10,000 SADEYE/BLU-26B clusters per month, 1600 acoustic sensors per month, 70 appropriately equipped PO2V patrol aircraft, 20 mine-dispensing C-123s, 500 strike sorties per month, and sufficient photo reconnaissance to cover 2500 square miles a week.

[end of document]

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