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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

234. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large's Special Assistant (Cooper) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/

Washington, September 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. A copy was sent to Unger.

I met today with Bill Colby and Mr. Stone from the Agency. Stone is in charge of the "Intelligence Division" of CIA's station in Saigon. He has been here for several days and was returning to Saigon this evening.

All the activities in connection with the Viet Cong are handled by Stone. (The other major division of the Agency in Saigon deals with the pacification cadres.)/2/ Stone discussed in some detail their plans and their progress in the area of Viet Cong defections. He indicated that the Agency has made some inroads into the Front and Viet Cong apparat. Eight Province Committees have thus far been penetrated. Other things being equal, the Agency prefers to keep a defector "in place", i.e. to have him ostensibly remain in the Viet Cong and meanwhile report valuable intelligence. They anticipate, however, as their program moves forward they will get an increasing number of Front officials who will prefer for many reasons, including their own safety, to "come over". Stone was quite confident that they would have at least a few of these chaps in hand before very long.

/2/In an undated report on CIA operations in East Asia through 1966, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research stated the following regarding programs in Vietnam: "CIA has remained responsible for several political and social projects which originally had some intelligence potential. The Revolutionary Development program (which is to be funded in part by AID), the Chieu Hoi program, and Census/Grievance teams are run by CIA. In addition the Agency supports and trains various police and intelligence organizations. Veterans, labor, youth, and student organizations in Vietnam are being given guidance and support." The report noted that "the cost of the Vietnam program is approximately $30,000,000 per year, not including any funds which will be supplied by AID." (Ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, EAP General, EA Reviews, 1964-66)

I told Colby and Stone of our hopes and plans for a large-scale amnesty program and our desire to have this go hand in hand with a stepped-up effort at defections. They welcomed this and indicated that it might be possible to line up some significant defections that would be timed to take place at the most dramatic moment following Ky's appeal.

I cautioned Stone to do some quiet thinking and planning but to keep our conversation to himself until Lodge was informed directly from Washington of what we had in mind.

I gave a copy of our amnesty memorandum/3/ to Colby who later in the day called me back and said that he was in perfect agreement with it.

/3/Reference is to Cooper's draft paper, "A Program of National Reconciliation and Reconstruction," which was discussed at length at a meeting of Harriman's Negotiations Committee on September 15. Harriman's record of the discussion is ibid., S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam Negotiations, 1968. A September 29 draft of Cooper's paper is ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III.

Chester L. Cooper/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-594-66

Washington, September 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4662, VIET 385 BARRIER. Top Secret. In an earlier memorandum to McNamara, CM-135-66, April 18, Wheeler recommended against construction of a barrier and forwarded "A Study of Feasibility and Requirements for a Counter Infiltration Barrier" in support of his view. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Proposal for Barrier Systems (U)

1 (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the concept for an infiltration barrier system which was forwarded to them by your memorandum, dated 3 September 1966,/2/ subject as above, and they have noted your directive to Lieutenant General Starbird, Director, Defense Communications Agency, dated 15 September 1966./3/

/2/In this memorandum McNamara stated that he was "inclined to believe that the proposal has sufficient merit to warrant a decision that we will accept the plan or some modification thereof in principle." (Ibid.) Attached to McNamara's memorandum was a 6-page excerpt from the study noted in footnote 2, Document 233.

/3/Document 233.

2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the historic use of barriers and the potential inherent in this concept. The imaginative use of technology and surprise can contribute considerably toward solving the infiltration problem. While the capability of the system to meet the objective established for the system is subject to determination, the development of its component parts and operational techniques will be useful regardless of the success of the entire project. Your directive to General Starbird provides adequate direction, flexibility, authority, and control. It is requested that the project definition as developed by General Starbird be submitted to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. (TS) The views of CINCPAC, incorporating those of his component commanders and COMUSMACV, have been received (CINCPAC 130705Z September 1966, JCS IN 99920)./4/ CINCPAC affirms that any measure that will effectively impede and disrupt the flow of men and material into South Vietnam merits careful consideration, and he recommends the development of the components of the system regardless of the decision to proceed. CINCPAC questions the practicality of the concept as presented. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate and share the concern behind his reservations but recognize that these issues could be resolved by rigorous determination of feasibility that must precede execution or commitment of resources.

/4/In telegram 130705Z, September 13, Sharp devoted eight paragraphs to questioning the barrier's practicality, doubting that it "would impede infiltration, even initially" or "appreciably improve the U.S. position in SVN." He emphasized, among other things, that its establishment and maintenance would likely involve tremendous amounts of time, effort, manpower, and material and require either the "introduction of large numbers of additional forces" or the diversion of land and air forces needed for revolutionary development and ongoing air operations. In addition, the considerable force required to man the static barrier would be vulnerable to attack by a mobile enemy from both north and south. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the barrier concept, as set forth in your memorandum, dated 3 September 1966, is not offered as a substitute to any major US or Free World military effort in North or South Vietnam. They concur. It is important that logistical support for the barrier be of a scale that precludes diverting critical munitions and strike forces from other combat operations.

5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the system deployment date given to General Starbird is optimistic. However, they recognize that the concept may have the potential of shortening the war and that proceeding in the manner directed will provide a quick determination of concept validity and accelerated development of associated hardware.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, September 17, 1966, 6:17 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Lake, Miller, and Unger; cleared in substance by Cooper and Jorden; and approved by Rusk and Unger.

49407. From Secretary. Refs: A. State 27973; B. Saigon 3130; C. State 23182;/2/ D. Saigon 1350./3/

/2/See Document 203 and footnote 6 thereto.

/3/Dated July 19. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI)

1. We here are intensely interested in moving ahead rapidly on long-er range program directed toward VC discussed reftels. In favorable atmosphere surrounding highly successful Constituent Assembly elections, believe moment propitious, if you have not already had opportunity broach subject in pursuance State's 27973, to open dialogue with GVN on this whole subject.

2. With respect to timing, we are thinking in terms of Ky launching a call for "national reconciliation" on November 1, which would appear to be logical date since it is SVN National Day. On other hand, if earlier date would be feasible and appropriate, this would be even better. Appeal in effect would have various purposes, within SVN and internationally, which were outlined Reftel C, para 5. We accept that in present time frame chances of accomplishment better in field of encouraging defections and fomenting divisions among VC than in leading to discussions with VC/NLF as organization concerning wind-up of insurgency. We recognize of course that this appeal must be carefully worded in order to maximize psychological impact on VC without damaging current SVN fledgling political development process now so well begun. Appreciate your comment on foregoing./4/

/4/Lodge replied in telegram 6423, September 20, that he would initiate the dialog with the GVN. Regarding the call for national reconciliation, he concurred on the timing and noted that he now envisaged its principal purpose to be to "encourage defections and foment division among VC," since he saw no chance now that it could be used to open contacts between the GVN and the VC. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)

3. With respect amnesty and defection questions we are developing some specific proposals for action which will be forwarded to you shortly. These include points which would, as appropriate, be covered in Prime Minister's call for "national reconciliation." Subject to your views, we would have in mind sending out two or three people very soon to elaborate on Washington thinking on these proposals and to stay longer to assist as you deemed useful.

4. Re idea of leaving local VC administration temporarily undisturbed (para 4, Ref A), see Unger-Furlonger August 11 memcon,/5/ pouched Saigon; this provides some elaboration our ideas on this subject.

/5/Not further identified.

Rusk

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, September 18, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:57 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 253-254.

6280. 1. D'Orlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski Friday night./2/ It started as a social affair on D'Orlandi's invitation and on Lewandow-ski's initiative became a discussion of the war. According to Orlandi, Lewandowski said the following:

/2/September 16.

2. The United States Government is not really interested in talks. He said he had reason to believe that the State Department is trying to promote talks elsewhere along lines having to do with the revision of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, he says, the United States doesn't care about talks in Saigon. He heard there might be another attempt by Ronning. This would be hopeless. What we do not need are messengers carrying bits of paper but men who are inventive and imaginative and out of whose conversations something creative could come. With this as a preface Lewandowski went on to say:

3. Obviously he cannot give any kind of guarantee and no one else can--"not even Kosygin"--but should any kind of a reasonable proposal emerge he would take the first plane to Hanoi and put it in the best possible way.

4. Averting to what the nature of such a proposal should be, Lew-andowski said that it was very simple and very easy to agree on "immortal principles" and grandiose platitudes such as "we love peace in Viet Nam," etc. It is the practical application which presents insurmountable difficulties.

5. If the Americans ever really cared, they should especially concentrate on Pham Van Dong's fourth point concerning "who is to speak for South Viet Nam." This does not mean that Hanoi would be trying to ram the Viet Cong down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a coalition government, the bulk of which would be made up of "sensible South Vietnamese politicians." To preserve appearances you could have "on the fringes" men from the "right" in one or two "unimportant Ministries" and from on the "left" fill one or two "unimportant Ministries with the so-called NLF."

6. D'Orlandi--this is unthinkable. If this is what you want to talk about, it is better for us to stop the talks.

7. Lewandowski asked whether D'Orlandi realized that what he meant to say was that this would be the last step not the first.

8. D'Orlandi said: What would be the ultimate goal? If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of Viet Nam, I won't even submit such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge.

9. Lewandowski said that is not at all what he meant to put to D'Orlandi. Plainly, the ultimate aim would be: "To make of South Viet Nam a second Cambodia."

10. D'Orlandi said that makes more sense, it is at least worth talking about.

11. Lewandowski said: "But I don't believe the Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two things at once: military escalation grouped with political proposals. You can't do both. So long that they won't make up their minds, we can't do anything. We must wait until November.

12. Comment: It is clear that the criticism of the United States for engaging in military escalation and political proposals at the same time is thoroughly disingenuous. Orlandi senses that Lewandowski realizes that the only possible chance for significant talks is that our military success should grow. End of comment.

13. D'Orlandi fixed on Lewandowski's statement about waiting until November to say that the more you postpone the worse things will get for you. If you had started having discussions a year ago when the Americans were much less numerous you would be in much better shape today.

14. Lewandowski said what I have said is my considered opinion. The Americans should produce some evidence that they are using their imagination. Why should we do it all?

15. D'Orlandi said--Doesn't this mean that you don't care any long-er to be in touch with me?

16. Lewandowski said: No, I want to be in touch with you, but when it comes to our tripartite talks, that's how I see it. That is why I say we may all be in a better position in November.

17. Comment: As the Department is aware I have been thinking that there would be no real talks until after our November elections although I have also considered and still do think that the time between now and then can be useful for the formulation and consideration of ideas. Lew-andowski's technique seems to be to say how hopeless it all is and how there is no use in going on and then sliding something in sort of at an angle, in this case a status for Vietnam similar to that of Cambodia. As I understand it, the problem has never been any difficulty with the idea of South Viet Nam being eventually neutral. The trouble has been that she wasn't strong enough to be neutral. The very weak cannot be neutral. The second difficulty has been that North Vietnam did not want her to be neutral but wanted to conquer her. End of comment.

Lodge

238. Research Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

RSB-89

Washington, September 18, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives--Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

SUBJECT
Soviet World-Wide Demarches on Vietnam Seek to Isolate the US and Deter Escalation

Soviet diplomats have been active in recent weeks in pressing Moscow's views on Vietnam. In this paper we sort out the diverse and occasionally inconsistent elements of the Soviet demarches to governments other than the US.

Abstract

The USSR has approached a large number of governments in the past six weeks on the Vietnam issue. This campaign has not indicated any shift in Moscow's position on the settlement of the war and may be the prelude to a Soviet effort at the forthcoming UN General Assembly to generate opposition to US policies in Vietnam. The Soviet demarches appear intended to isolate the US on the Vietnam issue, to discourage the US from further escalation of the war, and to underline Soviet support for Hanoi and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV).

In a number of cases, these demarches appear intended primarily to intensify pressures on the US to desist from further intensification of the war by citing the potential dangers of Chinese or even Soviet intervention. These demarches and recent Soviet propaganda have shown a concern at the possibility that the war might spread into Laos and Cambodia. The Indian delegation left the USSR after Mrs.Gandhi's visit in July convinced that Moscow's major fear was that the extension of the war into these countries would lead to Chinese intervention. Kosygin, moreover, warned Mrs.Gandhi that World War III would result if the US crossed the 17th parallel, stating that the USSR would have to stand by its ally. On a number of occasions, Soviet officials have mentioned the possibility of "volunteers."

Soviet statements about the precise type of American escalation which it might hope to deter has been deliberately vague, since Moscow has not wished to imply approval for some further American step to intensify the war. Soviet emphasis has varied over time, primarily as it has responded to events. Thus, at the time of Mrs. Gandhi's visit, Kosygin stressed the dangers inherent in an invasion of North Vietnam at a moment when North Vietnamese infiltration through the DMZ was getting underway. At other times, when Western press reports have mentioned mining Haiphong, the Soviets have given public indications of their concern on that score. A general step up in Soviet emphasis upon Moscow's aid to the North Vietnamese air-defense effort has reflected Soviet concern over the relatively poor showing of the SA-2s as well as over the possibility of American extension of bombing beyond the POL facilities to include populated centers. Finally, press reports in the West about operations in Laos and Thailand have evoked expressions of Soviet concern over the prospect of the war's spreading to the rest of Southeast Asia.

In other cases, the Soviets have used these demarches to indicate opposition to negotiations as long as Hanoi refuses them. The Soviet leaders continue to resist efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference or to bring about negotiations under any other aegis until Hanoi is ready for them. Gromyko told the Japanese in late July that the USSR had not and would not act as an intermediary. Gromyko asserted that the solution of the war must be found among the participants. This position was probably not meant to be taken literally as the Soviets have given some evidence of a concern about a peace settlement which would exclude them from Indochinese affairs. Rather, Gromyko merely sought to emphasize Moscow's position that it will take no initiative on a peaceful settlement until Hanoi indicates that it desires negotiations.

The theme of full support for Hanoi is reflected also in Soviet public statements which seek to refute Chinese charges of Soviet indifference to the North Vietnamese cause. Recent publicity of pilot training given North Vietnamese in the USSR and of the alleged effectiveness of Soviet surface-to-air missiles are examples of Soviet efforts to demonstrate the extent and effectiveness of the support given Hanoi.

Both private and public Soviet statements, then, are intended to convey the same message that Moscow is wholly loyal to Hanoi and will not take any step not already acceptable to the North Vietnamese. This message, while limited in scope, reflects continued Soviet desire to exert a voice in any future Vietnamese settlement. This concern reflects Soviet determination, since the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, to play a significant role in Far Eastern affairs. This determination has led Moscow to render Hanoi extensive economic and military aid as well as full diplomatic support. Having chosen this course, the Soviets find few diplomatic options open to them as long as Hanoi refuses to consider negotiations on any terms other than its own.

[Here follows the body of the memorandum, including a list of 29 Soviet demarches on Vietnam during July and August 1966.]

SEPTEMBER 19-NOVEMBER 27: MANILA CONFERENCE; DEBATES OVER PACIFICATION AND STABILIZATION OF THE WAR

239. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 19, 1966, 1:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIX. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
Status of Civilian Morale in North Vietnam

This wrap-up is based on the full text of the comprehensive CIA report from all sources, which Sect. McNamara initiated./2/

/2/Reference is to "The Vietnamese Communists' Will To Persist," August 26. See Document 219 for the principal findings of the report.

When bombing of the North first began, it generated a high degree of patriotic response. It was not unlike the initial reaction of the British when the Germans hit their homeland in 1940. But it seems clear that the initial level of patriotic fervor has not been maintained.

As a result of the bombing, every segment of the population has been forced to make sacrifices in living standards. Hardest hit are those living in southern North Vietnam--about 15% of the population. Letters to relatives and friends (e.g., in Thailand) mention personal hardships and anxieties more than do letters from other parts of the country.

The NVN Ministry of Labor released data early this year on absenteeism among construction workers. It was worst among the people in the southern provinces--averaging more than 16 days per worker--or 5% of total working days scheduled. Shortages of food are reported.

Main sources of complaint elsewhere are: hardships caused by evacuation from urban centers; splitting of families; lower quality of consumer goods; longer work hours without added pay; loss of income resulting from transfers from normal jobs to defense-related tasks.

The regime has talked publicly of the need for tighter discipline among both Party members and the general population. A high government official called a few months ago for revision of the legal code dealing with counter-revolutionary activities, protection of state property, and the rights and duties of citizens "in order to satisfy the demands of wartime."

As the bombing has continued, economic and political problems have intensified. Patriotic fervor appears to have diminished.

Official publications have complained of difficulties in using people already mobilized. There have been complaints about lack of experience and discipline among Party cadres. Prejudice and discrimination against the young and against women are reported.

Managerial inefficiency is reported; for example, a recent message reported 1,600 workers being sent to a highway repair site, with no supervisory personnel present or available.

Captured North Vietnamese soldiers in the South have told us that people in the North are aware of the hardships, sickness and injuries suffered by infiltrated troops. As morale of NVN troops in the South drops, there is every reason to believe it will have an effect on the folks at home.

Outlook

Civilian morale is likely to continue to drop in the North over the next year. Trouble on the farms--resulting largely from labor mobilization--has already affected the current harvest. Food prices have started to rise on the free market. Beyond food shortages, other strains are likely to increase.

There is no agreement in the intelligence community as to when morale may reach the breaking point. The intelligence community doubts that weakening morale will deprive the Hanoi leadership in the coming year of the freedom to pursue the conflict in any manner it chooses. My feeling is that the pressures on the regime may be greater than most of us realize.

I make this point not because I believe they are hurting enough to force them to negotiate now--or at any particular early date; but because debate about bombing in this town between crusaders and detractors has sometimes failed to make clear the important middle ground: that we are imposing a day-to-day cost on Hanoi; this cost is considerable, if not decisive; it is rising; and we shouldn't let them off the hook until the very day they make parallel de-escalatory moves.

Walt

240. Editorial Note

During a telephone conversation on Vietnam with President Johnson that began at 5:30 p.m. on September 19, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara made the following comments:

"What I'm much more concerned about, Mr. President, is what we should be doing on the bombing, and the force levels, and our whole position out there. Once you have time I want to talk to you further about it. I myself am more and more convinced that we ought definitely to plan on termination of the bombing in the north but not until after the election, and I hate to even talk about it before then for fear of a leak."

Following an unintelligible interjection by the President, McNamara continued:

"So I haven't said anything in this building yet, but I just wanted to exchange some views with you when you had time on it. And I think also that we ought to be planning as I mentioned before on a ceiling on our force levels. I don't think we ought to just look ahead to the future and say we're going to go higher and higher and higher and higher--600,000, 700,000, whatever it takes. It will break the economy of that country and will substitute U.S. soldiers for South Vietnamese and will distort the whole pattern of conduct in South Vietnam if we do. We ought now to be planning on the ceiling of our forces. I would think they ought to be somewhere around--somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 ought to be the ceiling; and after the election we ought to tell that to our military commanders to get their planning on it."

The President did not respond to McNamara's comments prior to concluding the conversation. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.25, Side A, PNO 1)

241. Draft Paper by the President's Special Assistants (Rostow and Komer)/1/

Washington, September 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 13. Secret. Forwarded to the President by Rostow on September 28 under cover of a memorandum stating: "Here is the strategy paper which Bob Komer and I put together and talked over with Bill Bundy. We are all in basic agreement." (Ibid.) Also sent to Komer and William Bundy.

A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT PHASE IN VIETNAM

Barring either a diplomatic breakthrough in the conversations between Gromyko and Secretary Rusk, or a major increase in North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, our position in South Vietnam can be described as follows:

We have frustrated the VC and North Vietnamese main force units; we are imposing a painful but not decisive cost for continuing the war on North Vietnam through our bombing; we have moved politically and economically in the South to make increasingly unlikely a political disintegration which the VC might exploit.

Meanwhile, at home, whatever the debates, Hanoi cannot count on a political cave-in of US public opinion which would destroy the foundations of the President's policy towards Vietnam. Thus, all western logic would indicate that the NLF/Hanoi should start negotiating now, before they lose even more bargaining counters. Perhaps they will do so at some point after the US elections, at least putting out feelers.

On the other hand, the VC have not yet come to a point of either military or political disintegration; the burden of bombing in the North, however awkward and painful, has not yet been decisive. Present evidence is that we have come to a point where Hanoi cannot win, but obviously we have not yet forced it to accept negotiations on our terms.

Our problem is to present them with a situation where, whatever their will to hold on and sweat us out, they have no realistic option but to accept our terms.

There are, in conception, two major routes to this objective short of occupying North Vietnam:

First, to increase the weight of our bombing in the North so radically that the whole economic, social, and political infrastructure of North Vietnam is endangered. I believe this course of "bombing them back to the Stone Age" should be rejected. The pressures at home and abroad we would have to bear would likely be excessive. The possibilities of much deeper Chinese Communist involvement in the war would be increased if they thought our objective were to destroy the Communist regime in North Vietnam.

A more temperate buildup in the pressure on the North, however, could play a significant role in the alternative strategy outlined below.

The second way to force acceptance of negotiations is to produce a palpable process of political and military disintegration of the Viet Cong. This is the recommended strategy.

The elements of such a strategy must be more than military. It is increasingly apparent that political, psychological, and economic factors--as well as the civil/military problem of pacification--have an ever more important role to play. A strategic plan should be developed on an across-the-board basis. Moreover, many of its components might conflict with each other unless adequately coordinated.

On the military side, the ARVN/US ground campaign and bombing offensive will be stepped up. Barrier possibilities will be explored intensively. But perhaps the major new development should be a stepped-up attempt to deal with the "weak sisters" of the NLF/Hanoi combination, the VC. Their morale is already declining more rapidly than that of the NVN infiltrators. Their strength has stopped increasing. Most of the rising number of defectors are VC. They are probably hardest hit by food and medicine shortages, and by the increasing success of the GVN in establishing itself. By focussing on their vulnerabilities, we can accelerate their decline and possibly split them off from Hanoi, which could be a decisive step toward winning the war. At the same time by continuing the cost to Hanoi, Hanoi might be more willing to accept such a splitting off.

Disintegrating the Viet Cong

The headings for a policy to produce an accelerated disintegration of the Viet Cong should include the following:

A. A dramatic and sustained political and psychological appeal to the VC to join in the making of a new South Vietnamese nation

(i) an amnesty offer.

(ii) enlarged and sustained efforts to defect VC leaders.

(iii) an expanded psywar effort to split the VC from Hanoi.

(iv) a radical expansion in Chieu Hoi efforts.

(v) agreement on a Constitution followed by elections in accordance with the Constitution in which the VC who had accepted amnesty would be allowed to vote.

B. Accelerated Pacification

(i) new organizational arrangements providing more unified US/GVN civil/military management.

(ii) size of forces to be allocated.

(iii) converting appropriate ARVN forces to pacification functions.

(iv) 1967 targets to be set, including rapid pacification of certain key areas (as recommended by Sir Robert Thompson).

(v) contributing programs to be expanded, e.g., RD cadres, agriculture, land reform, police.

C. An accelerated, workable land reform scheme

D. Pressing forward rapidly and dramatically with formulation of post-war development program

E. Assuring good military-civil political relations in post-election period, including creation of a national political party embracing both elements

F. Avoiding another round of severe inflation

G. US/GVN military offenses against VC/NVA Main Force maintaining the capacity to deal with present or enlarged North Vietnamese military formations introduced into the South, plus whatever we can do about infiltration.

H. Bombing offensive in the North continuing to impose a cost on the North for continuing the war.

242. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS Trip, vol. 1. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

Mr. President:

Here is Bill Bundy's proposed scenario.

I would only add this: October will be a month of prayer among Catholics for peace in Viet Nam. That fact will be politically important in the U.S. and throughout the world.

Therefore, if we go forward with this meeting, we ought to give a lot of thought to making the most of a common plea for peace at the meeting and give maximum emphasis to the civilian aspects of Vietnamese development:

--An appeal to the VC and an amnesty offer;

--The surfacing of work on a Vietnamese long-term development program;

--Forward movement on the Honolulu program; etc.

As for Bill's raising the question of the political impact of the conference--at home and abroad--I have these observations: the domestic effect is a matter on which only you can render a judgment; the impact abroad will depend, in the end, on whether the conference produced ser-ious results and an authentic sense of forward movement. In turn, that will depend on having the conference as well prepared as we can by a small first-class, imaginative group.

If we go ahead, I would suggest that we put Bill Moyers, Bill Jorden, Bob Komer, Bill Leonhart, and Len Unger to work virtually full time from the moment you make a positive decision.

I just talked to George Ball to ascertain what Sec. Rusk's view was of the enterprise. He is reported as "very enthusiastic."

Bill Jorden and I think Ky should initiate the meeting--the others should respond. It's their war.

Walt

P.S. Now a wild idea. Send a message, in greatest secrecy, to Ho Chi Minh that you want to talk to him personally in, say, Rangoon. You win if he refuses or if he accepts.

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/2/

Washington, September 21, 1966.

/2/Secret.

SUBJECT
Scenario and Issues on a Meeting of Chiefs of Government to Discuss Viet-Nam

The Proposal

The proposal is that a meeting be held in late October in Manila, to be attended by the Chiefs of Government of South Viet-Nam, the US, and the nations contributing military forces in South Viet-Nam--The Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and Thailand. Such a meeting would have the over-all purpose of presenting to the world a dramatic picture of the collective support being given to South Viet-Nam; it would provide an effective occasion for reviewing the military situation at least in general terms, but stress would be placed on the non-military programs and on the posture of South Viet-Nam, the US, and the other participants toward a peaceful settlement.

This memorandum discusses the possible sequence of actions in bringing about such a meeting, and the major issues that should be considered in making plans.

Possible Sequence of Actions

1. Both Holt and Holyoake have elections, and would feel very hurt if they were not privately consulted before the Asian participants are approached. We believe that both will see no political problem in the proposed meeting--and may well see some advantage. Nonetheless, we should have a quick turn-around with them before we approach the Asians. (Messages for this purpose will be drafted immediately.)

2. Our next approach should be to South Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Ky and Thieu should both be "consulted" but in a fashion that makes clear that we expect them to agree, and that also makes clear to Ky that this conference would essentially be in lieu of his visiting the US separately. (A message for this purpose will be drafted immediately.)

3. Marcos, Park, and Thanom should then be approached concurrently; at the same time confirming invitations should go to Holt and Holyoake. Part of our approach to Ky should be to get him to agree to be the inviting party jointly with us, but he should agree also that we will be the ones to handle the diplomatic exchanges in establishing the meeting. (Messages to this effect will be drafted immediately.)

4. Announcement of the conference could then follow. As one possibility, it should be done concurrently in Saigon and Washington, with confirming announcements in the other four capitals. Alternatively--and perhaps better--Marcos could make the announcement. In view of the minimum period of 2-3 days required to get concurrence from Australia and New Zealand and then from Viet-Nam, it might be possible for Marcos to make the announcement before he leaves US territory on the 27th. However, to seek an immediate announcement without those clearances might well involve serious adverse reactions in Viet-Nam and to a lesser extent in Australia and New Zealand.

In all of the above sequence, it would be desirable, although not essential, to have as clear a picture as possible on the scope of the conference, its duration, and other features. The question of dates should of course be firm in any event.

Issues Requiring Early Decision

1. Dates. While a successful late October conference would have many great and perhaps decisive advantages, we must reckon that many quarters in the US and significant elements of third-country opinion would relate the timing of the conference to the US elections. However successful the conference in fact turned out to be, its "image" would be up against considerable cynical advance comment and resistance. If Ky later had political trouble--and particularly if that trouble was attributed, however wrongly, to the conference--the possible eventual net loss might be serious. In other words, a conference in late October has possibly greater potential gains but also greater potential losses, than a conference after the US elections.

The alternative date would appear to be in mid or late November, which would not have a favorable impact on our elections but would have somewhat less risks.

In the choice of dates, we do not see the Viet-Nam political situation as a predictable factor arguing either way. The Constituent Assembly will be in operation by late October, and will probably be continuing into November. It is just possible that it will have completed its work by early November, so that Ky would appear in a strong and favorable light in mid-November. On the other hand, the Constitution would represent a milestone on the election of some successor, so that Ky's authority and tenure might look more solid in late October./3/

/3/In a telephone conversation at 12:40 p.m. on September 22, Ball told Rusk that the President wanted to move very fast on the Manila trip and was thinking in terms of October 18, adding that "this may be a little soon but this would be a way of heading off Ky." (Telcon; Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II)

2. Level and Location. We agree completely that a meeting of Heads of Government is the proper level, and that the Philippines is an ideal location. In many ways, however, Manila itself might be less desirable than Baguio. However, this need not be decided before the conference is set up, and Marcos might even suggest a third site.

3. Scope. The following are considerations and possible useful points.

a. Since the meeting is based on military contributions, it would be incongruous to omit a review of the military situation. Moreover, the Koreans in particular would undoubtedly welcome and want this. However, we should probably try to confine this element to a simple review and forecast, with no implication that great new decisions on military strategy are being taken. This of course follows the Honolulu pattern.

b. On the non-military side, the South Vietnamese should play a leading role in presenting a progress report on the actions that have been taken in pacification, economic benefits, and the rest. The communique should stress these elements, and also the South Vietnamese presentation of their political timetable and progress. An additional element which might be stressed in this area is that of plans for post-war reconstruction and development, including the conversion of military facilities to civilian use. At the same time, this theme should not be so stressed as to convey the implication that the participants are confident of early victory.

c. The communique must contain a firm and clear statement of position on negotiations and the elements of a peaceful settlement. Here we must note that we have not had the fullest possible discussions with the South Vietnamese--although we plan to do so in the immediate future--and that we have never gone deeply into many of the issues with Korea, the Philippines, or Thailand. This suggests the practical need that each participant send its Foreign Secretary, and that the Foreign Secretaries meet separately in the early stages of the conference to hammer out the necessary communique language and to explore as much of the subject as can be profitably discussed. We would have to do careful advance work so that South Viet-Nam, through its able Foreign Minister--Tran Van Do--took as much of a lead as possible.

4. Duration. Because of time pressures on the Chiefs of Government, two days might have to be the duration of the actual conference, although a third day would have many advantages in cementing the picture of serious and deep discussions. With the time-change adjustment from a long Pacific trip there would be advantage if the President would plan to arrive at least a day before the opening of the conference.

5. The Philippine Angle. If the conference were held in Manila itself, a call by the President on President Marcos would not add significant time to the schedule. However, we must reckon that there would be significant Philippine pressures for the President to pay his respects to our bilateral relations with the Philippines through some separate speech, a separate reception, or otherwise. If the conference were held outside Manila, such actions might be even more pressed by Marcos.

6. Possible Additional Visits. It is understood that the President might consider going on to Australia. If so, this reinforces the importance of the first contact being made with Holt. As of now, we would suppose that Holt is fairly certain of reelection and that a Presidential visit would if anything enhance his chances. However, we must reckon that such a visit would involve the US deeply in Australian politics, and would be open to sharp criticism from Holt's opponents.

Working Preparations

To get a solid and effective discussion of the issues and particularly to get good presentations by the South Vietnamese, a small and not too conspicuous US team might be sent to Saigon a few days in advance to assist the Mission. Extensive work will obviously be required on all the non-military programs, and General Westmoreland should presumably work with the South Vietnamese military leaders so that they take as much of a role as possible in presenting the military picture. On the diplomatic side, we should try to have careful advance discussions in the various capitals to cover the issues and to prepare the way for the meetings of the Foreign Secretaries.

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:58 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Thrush. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rostow in substance; and approved by Ball.

51896. For Amb. Lodge from Acting Secretary. There is an intense interest at highest levels in carrying through defection of principal and getting him out./2/ Assuming effort described Saigon's 6522, Para 2,/3/ does not work out, would like you to consider again whether there is not some way in which matter might be again set in motion through your taking it up with PriMin Ky. He surely would grasp immediately how important it is for this project to succeed and might be able to develop some method of obtaining release of uncle without exposing operation to Loan or others. You should understand that in urging you to reconsider this point I do not mean in any sense to press you into any action which seriously risks spoiling the project./4/

/2/In telegram 49432 to Saigon, September 18, Rusk stated (in anticipation of his meeting with Gromyko in a few days): "I suppose it is impossible to bring off the Thrush operation before then but it would be an enormous help could it be done." Lodge replied in telegram 4773, September 19, that Tho's uncle, Nguyen Huu An, was still being detained by GVN authorities, for reasons apparently unrelated to Thrush, and that "in the interest of preserving the operation we should sit tight." (Ibid.)

/3/Paragraph 2 of telegram 6522, September 21, dealt with the issue of obtaining the release of Nguyen Huu An. (Ibid.)

/4/In telegram 6811 from Saigon, September 24, Lodge recommended that the issue not be brought up with Ky; the Department of State concurred in telegram 54428 to Saigon, September 26. (Ibid.) In telegram 8570 from Saigon, October 15, Lodge reported that Nguyen Huu An was finally out of jail and commented that "perhaps now we will learn whether we have gold, brass or too much imagination." Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President under cover of an October 15 memorandum stating: "Now we shall see. Timing is first class if it can be pulled off in the next few weeks." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush)

Ball

244. Editorial Note

On September 22, 1966, at the opening meeting of the 21st U.N. General Assembly, U.S. Representative Arthur Goldberg made a major speech on the Vietnam war in which he stated that the United States was "prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side." For text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, pages 518-525.

In forwarding a draft of Goldberg's speech to the President on September 21 for his clearance, Rostow noted in his covering memorandum that the key passages on Vietnam did "not go beyond existing policy." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 13) William Bundy told Canadian Ambassador A. Edgar Ritchie that Goldberg's speech contained "nothing of substance" that "had not already been said privately," but "as codified it represented a new formulation in certain respects. Moreover, the speech took more explicitly into account the need for realistic phasing in any supervised mutual de-escalation." (Memorandum of conversation, September 29; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, summarized the reaction of Hanoi, Peking, and the NLF to Goldberg's speech in an intelligence note to Secretary Rusk, September 28. Peking and the Viet Cong were "predictably negative," observed Hughes, while Hanoi avoided direct rejection of Goldberg's proposals but insisted that he had offered nothing new. (Ibid., EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, National Liberation Front)

245. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. McNaughton sent copies of this draft memorandum to Ball, Gaud, Helms, Marks, Wheeler, and Komer under cover of a September 22 memorandum, in which he stated that McNamara had been asked to prepare a draft reorganization of pacification responsibilities and wanted to discuss his draft memorandum the following week with a view to having it ready for the President during the first week of October. (Ibid.)

Now that a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam seems to have been thwarted by our emergency actions taken over the past 18 months, renewed attention should be paid to the longer-run aspects of achieving an end to the war and building a viable nation in South Vietnam.

Central to success, both in ending the war and in winning the peace, is the pacification program. Past progress in pacification has been negligible. Many factors have contributed, but one major reason for this lack of progress has been the existence of split responsibility for pacification on the U.S. side. For the sake of efficiency--in clarifying our concept, focusing our energies, and increasing the output we can generate on the part of the Vietnamese--this split responsibility on the U.S. side must be eliminated.

We have considered various alternative methods of consolidating the U.S. pacification effort. The best solution is to place those activities which are primarily part of the pacification program, and all persons engaged in such activities, under COMUSMACV. Attached (at Tab A)/2/ is a chart showing the present organization in Vietnam, with the "pacification" activities indicated by the bolder bordered rectangles. Also attached (at Tab B) is an illustrative chart showing the proposed reorganization which integrates all pacification activities. In essence, the reorganization would result in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would be in command of all pacification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification activities in the field.

/2/Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.

It is recognized that there are many important aspects of the pacification problem which are not covered in this recommendation, which should be reviewed subsequent to the appointment of the Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification to determine whether they should be part of his task--for example, the psychological warfare campaign, and the Chieu Hoi (defector) and refugee programs. Equally important is the question of how to encourage a similar management realignment on the South Vietnamese side, since pacification is regarded as primarily a Vietnamese task. Also not covered by this recommendation are important related national programs, all of which have an obvious impact on the pacification effort--such as the anti-main force military activities and the efforts to control inflation. Finally, there is the question of whether any organizational modification in Washington is required by the recommended change in Vietnam.

I recommend that you approve the reorganization described in this memorandum as a first essential step toward giving a new thrust to pacification. Under Secretary Ball, Administrator Gaud, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director Helms, Director Marks and Mr. Komer concur in this recommendation./3/

/3/For Komer's response to McNamara's recommendation, see Document 249. For Gaud's response, see footnote 6, Document 263. For Helms' response, see footnote 3, Document 248. Wheeler responded in JCSM-626-66, September 29, concurring in the draft memorandum's concept of organization, particularly in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would direct all pacification activities. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, VIET 380 PACIFICATION) In a memorandum to McNamara, September 27, Taylor raised six questions about the proposed organization which he felt needed answering at an early stage of discussion. (Ibid., McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)

Robert S. McNamara/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

246. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, September 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb Harriman--Negotiations Comm. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

SUBJECT
"Negotiations Committee"

We have been reviewing for some weeks the advisability of a broad offer of amnesty and reconciliation to the NLF/VC by Prime Minister Ky. Because of the outstanding success of the election and moderately encouraging reports of decline in morale of the VC, we believe that the time has come for such an offer. Lodge is in agreement and has undertaken to talk to Ky and his principal colleagues at an early propitious moment.

A draft speech of reconciliation and amnesty to be delivered by Ky has been sent to Lodge for his comment./2/ It covers three areas. The first deals with the economic, political and military progress during the past year. The second offers amnesty and reconciliation to all VC who are ready to put aside their arms. It also expresses Ky's willingness to talk to leaders of the NLF/VC as a group to achieve national reconciliation. The third states the GVN's war and peace aims.

/2/The draft speech was transmitted in telegram 52727, September 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The speech was discussed at a meeting of the Negotiations Committee on September 23. A memorandum of the meeting is ibid., S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Negotiation.

November 1 has been suggested as the most advantageous date as it is the anniversary of the 1963 revolution, and Ky made a significant speech on that occasion last year. I had favored an earlier date and Lodge is considering whether that is possible, though there are a number of preliminary actions to be taken. Lodge has accepted our offer to send a two or three man team from Washington to help work out the plans.

Averell

247. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

New York, September 24, 1966, 6:30-11 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on September 26 by William D. Krimer of the Language Services Division, Department of State. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. A memorandum prepared on September 30 in the Bureau of European Affairs analyzed "new elements" in Gromyko's conversation with Rusk. (Ibid.)/1/

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September-October 1966

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler
Ambassador William C. Foster
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
Mr. William D. Krimer (Interpreter)

USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Nikolai T. Fedorenko
Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Mr. Lev I. Mendelevitch
Mr. Alexei A. Roschin
Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

The Secretary said he would appreciate a chance to make some observations concerning the problem of Viet-Nam. It was our clear understanding that the Foreign Minister felt he was not in a position to negotiate concerning Viet-Nam, since he had not been authorized by certain parties to do so and we respected this position. The Secretary did, however, want to explain to Mr. Gromyko the problems we were facing in bringing the problem of Viet-Nam to a conclusion. He wanted to express the frustration we were experiencing in this respect. In the Warsaw Pact Communique of Bucharest,/2/ the Warsaw Pact countries had called upon us to comply with the 1954 and 1962 agreements concerning Southeast Asia. We agree with this proposal. We assumed that the Communique had meant that other parties, too, would comply with these agreements; how do we get started? We had said on many occasions that we agreed to sit down at a conference to talk about the problem of Southeast Asia; yet, such a meeting or conference had proved to be impossible to convene. We had said yes to Prince Sihanouk's requests to the International Control Commission to protect and insure respect for the neutrality and integrity of Cambodia; the other side had not reacted, even though we have no desire to involve Cambodia in the present conflict. We had urged the ICC to take the necessary steps to assure the maintenance of the demilitarized zone between North and South Viet-Nam. Yesterday Hanoi informed the ICC that they would have no part of any such idea. We had made it clear that we were prepared to carry on bilateral negotiations with Hanoi; we had made it clear that we would welcome third parties as intermediaries; we have also made it clear that we would welcome discreet and tactful unofficial contacts with Hanoi; still, nothing happens. We tried to talk to the other side about deescalation; nothing happens. We tried to arrange for an exchange of prisoners and have even returned some prisoners unilaterally; the other side expressed no interest. We had said that we would stop the bombing if anyone could tell us what else would happen if we did so; to date no one has been able to tell us anything in this respect. In the meanwhile North Viet-Nam continues to send its regular armed forces into South Viet-Nam. During the last few days again the traffic has increased and a new regular North Vietnamese army division has entered South Viet-Nam through the demilitarized zone. Hanoi and Peking have called Ambassador Goldberg's new proposals a "peace swindle". They have called the Pope a mouth-piece of the reactionary forces. It seems to us that the Soviet Union and the United States have no conflicting interests in this situation. We are not interested in punishing or bombing or attempting to destroy North Viet-Nam. The bombing can stop, literally within hours, if something can be done to stop the attacks of NorthViet-Nam upon South Viet-Nam. We are puzzled over the fact that all the processes capable of bringing about a peaceful settlement appear to have been blocked. Hanoi had asked us to accept its four points./3/ We had replied that we were prepared to discuss their four points if others at the table were free to state the points they had in mind. Actually, we had no great problem with points one, two and four; we had suggested some changes in point three; we have received no reply. Over the last five years we had made literally hundreds of efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement; so far, the only reply has been a continuation of the traffic from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. We have had absolutely no indication that Hanoi is interested in a peaceful settlement. We think that is unfortunate. Concerning the Warsaw Pact Bucharest Communique: the Soviet Union has prompted us to comply with the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962; we agree, but how do we get started?

/2/Excerpts from the communique, July 6, are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 832-834.

/3/For text of the four points, April 8, 1965, see ibid., 1965, pp. 852-853.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said in reply that the Soviet Union's position on Viet-Nam had been stated many times and he saw no need to repeat it. He had to say in the name of the Soviet Government, however, that the many statements of the US Government on Viet-Nam and the actions of the United States in Viet-Nam had very little in common, to say the very least. Concerning these statements about the desirability of a peaceful solution of the question: if one were to read these statements only, one could indeed come to the conclusion that the United States was seeking a peaceful solution to the problem. Yet, the concrete facts of escalation of US military actions in Viet-Nam lead us objectively to the opposite conclusion. If we were to characterize such statements, particularly some of the statements made by the US Secretary of Defense, we would have to use very harsh words indeed. Mr. Gromyko had no desire to do so, he only wanted to speak on the substantive aspects of this problem. Therefore, he repeated, words were one thing, actions--something else again. Thus, the latest US statement before the UN General Assembly/4/ also failed to produce any new confidence, for it had been preceded by very recent evidence of plans and by statements indicating further escalation of US military actions in Viet-Nam. Secondly, the proposals the US had made before the UN General Assembly were accompanied by conditions which the other side could not possibly accept. In fact, each statement made by the US had been accompanied by such conditions, conditions which cannot be fulfilled. The Soviet Union was therefore not surprised that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam did not react to these American statements in any other way except to reject them out of hand. He therefore concluded that while he could not negotiate, and while he did not want the US to underestimate this influence,/5/ he had seen nothing new in the American position during the latest period of time. As to what the Secretary had said about US efforts to establish contact not having produced any results, he was not surprised. The trouble was that the US had made no effort to make its proposals acceptable to the other side. He was therefore concluding that the United States was determined to continue the war in Viet-Nam with all the consequences that ensued. Thirdly, the Soviet Government had, of course, not failed to consider the reasoning and the position of the United States, not just once, but repeatedly. His Government had concluded that for reasons of its own the United States had decided to unleash and escalate the war in Viet-Nam. It was his Government's view that this was a grave mistake, if the statements of the United States Government about its desire to reduce international tensions were to be taken at face value. For, if the US really wanted peace in the area of Indochina and wanted to put an end to the war, it would have to furnish proof of this desire to the other side. Not only verbal declarations, however. What kind of proof? What, specifically, could improve the situation? Cessation of military actions in South Viet-Nam. The United States was a great and strong country. As Mr. Gromyko saw it, the prestige of the United States would not be damaged if the bombing of North Viet-Nam were stopped, as "a minimum of minimums". On the contrary, such a step would be evaluated positively throughout the world. Yet, the US did not even stop the bombing. The US ought to realize just what it was doing; it was unthinkable to try and bring the DRV and South Viet-Nam to their knees. The Soviet Union knew and thought the US also realized the fact that the people of Viet-Nam were full of resolution to expend whatever time and effort were required, whatever sacrifices were required, in order to defend their land. What would unconditional cessation of military actions accomplish? Itwould improve the general situation in Viet-

/4/See Document 244.

/5/The Soviet interpreter omitted this particular reference to influence. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Secretary said that he was most interested in Mr. Gromyko's remarks, despite the fact that as Mr. Gromyko had indicated he was not in a position to negotiate. It was important that this problem be discussed between them, precisely because they both agreed that the problems of peace in the world depended heavily upon the US and the Soviet Union. These two nations had the power and the responsibility before mankind and before history. He hoped that there would be another occasion for them to discuss this problem further. However, he did want to comment on Mr. Gromyko's remarks about the difference between the statements and the actions of the United States. He recalled that in June of 1961 his Government and ours had discussed the situation in Southeast Asia. This had eventually led to an agreement on Laos and after some period of time this agreement had been signed by the USSR, the US and Peking. We were bitterly disappointed over the way that this agreement had worked out; in fact, President Kennedy had been bitterly disappointed by it. We had accepted the Soviet Union's candidate for Prime Minister of Laos, we had also accepted a coalition government which included all three factions. This had not, however, deterred Hanoi from continuing infiltration into the areas which were controlled by the Pathet Lao. Neither the International Control Commission nor representatives of the coalition government were able to penetrate into these areas. Still, we continued to discuss peace in Southeast Asia. For a period of five years, while there was no bombing of North Viet-Nam, its Government continued to infiltrate its forces into SouthViet-Nam. These five years were filled with efforts toward finding a peaceful solution. We continued to believe that the USSR had signed the agreements on Southeast Asia in good faith; for some reason Hanoi had not. Undoubtedly Mr. Gromyko knew better than we did, why. We cannot accept the view that the problem in Viet-Nam is purely a problem between the people of the two Viet-Nams; we could not accept such a view with respect to the people of the two Germanys either. The situation is becoming increasingly difficult for us. Over the past few years many governments, groups of governments and individuals such as U Thant and the Pope have continued to make proposals for peace. To all of these we have said yes; Hanoi--no. Yet, we are still expected to say something new in spite of the fact that there has been no response from Hanoi to any proposals for the past two years; we are expected to surrender South Viet-Nam to North Viet-Nam. It is not easy for us to separate the military actions of our side from those of the other side. No one can tell us what might happen to the 19 regiments of the regular forces of North Viet-Nam which are now in South Viet-Nam. When we stopped the bombing early this year the only response was more infiltration. It was carried on on a 24-hour basis instead of just at night. Hanoi made no proposals or counter-proposals at that time; it only said for us to get out and to turn South Viet-Nam over to North Viet-Nam. Nevertheless we continued to probe for a peaceful settlement. What the people of South Viet-Nam want we were prepared to leave to them, to ascertain their wishes by a vote. We did not believe that they wanted to have North Viet-Nam impose its will upon them by force. We intended to continue our efforts to find a peaceful solution, but we were made to wonder whether the very efforts we had been undertaking in that direction had not led Hanoi into a grave miscalculation. There had not been any other example in history when one side had made so many efforts to end the war, as had been the case with the United States with respect to Viet-Nam. Perhaps this then convinced Hanoi that we would weaken and eventually surrender South Viet-Nam to its forces. During the 1964 electoral campaign President Johnson had said repeatedly that we wanted no larger war. We wondered if this d

Mr. Gromyko said that he had expressed the position of the Soviet Government, which was guided by the recognition of the great responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union for world peace. He hoped the United States would not be carried away by setting conditions for the other side. If the US was really interested in peace much depended upon its actions and its not raising complicated and humiliating conditions for the other side. He repeated that the views of his Government were dictated by recognition of the great responsibilities of the two powers.

248. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/

Washington, September 28, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, McNamara Project. Secret/Sensitive.

SUBJECT
The Agency's Position on the OSD's 22 September Draft Pacification Reorganization Proposal/2/

/2/Document 245.

1. The 22 September OSD draft proposal raises and conflates two important but quite distinct questions:

(1) Whether the U.S. pacification effort in Vietnam should be radically reorganized and placed under a single command authority--i.e., pacification czar.

(2) Whether this pacification czar should be a civilian U.S. official directly subordinate to the Ambassador (or Deputy Ambassador) or a U.S. military officer subordinate to COMUSMACV.

Our position on (1) should be affirmative. If such a czar is created, we should be willing to turn over to his control, under a suitable administrative agreement, the Cadre Operations Division of the Saigon Station. Our position on (2) should be diplomatically but firmly negative, since we feel strongly that it is neither in the Agency's parochial interests nor in the larger interests of the pacification program and the U.S. Government's objectives that program is intended to further, for pacification ("the other war") to be under direct military control.

2. Leaving the military versus civilian question momentarily aside, we have serious problems with the particular pacification organization structure proposed in the 22 September OSD memorandum. The "pacification staff" it advocates incorporates not only the Station's Cadre Operations Division, which we are prepared to surrender, but also key elements of the Intelligence Division which we feel should not be removed from our Chief of Station's command jurisdiction. Specifically, the DOD proposal would incorporate our liaison with the Police Special Branch at regional, province and district levels into the command authority of the pacification czar. This would complicate our continuing responsibility for liaison with the South Vietnamese police apparatus at the national level through the Director General of the National Police and with the Central Intelligence Organization at national, regional and local levels. It would splinter the internal intelligence collection capabilities of the CIA Station in a way that would make it difficult if not impossible to discharge our continuing overall responsibilities in this field. The takeover of our Station's Intelligence Division assets implicit in the DOD proposal, therefore, is something we cannot accept and should resist.

3. Actually, if the pacification czar were a civilian, we probably could work out a satisfactory arrangement with regard to provincial and district Special Branch liaison. If he is a military subordinate of COMUS-MACV, however, we should stonewall on this point. DOD will not be able to budge us here since the same arguments for bringing our intelligence activities at province and district levels under the pacification command also apply to military intelligence activities at those levels.

4. Any assignment of Station functions, programs or personnel to a non-CIA command structure will generate serious support and, in some instances, legal problems. It will fracture the unified integrity of the present Station support structure and break up an intricate, interlocked cycle through which we presently supply funds, people and management to all CIA Vietnam programs. The administrative mechanisms of such a detailing of assets would have to be very carefully structured to avoid impinging unacceptably on the Director's responsibilities to Congress for funds expended by this Agency on his personal accountability. The funding and support of the activities of the Cadre Operations Division are currently being organized so that these activities can be turned over to someone else to operate at some future time without major administrative or legal problems. The support of Intelligence Division activities, however, is not so structured. It is an integral piece of the total support for the Saigon Station. Though it could be factored out as a separate entity, doing so would be very difficult.

5. On the major issue, we agree that the pacification effort needs to be better managed on the U.S. side (and, for that matter, on the Vietnamese side as well). We cannot agree, however, that the road to progress lies through subordinating pacification to the U.S. military. Bureaucratically there are several major objections to the philosophy behind the DOD proposal. For one thing, what it does is implement much of the Command Relationships Agreement even though Vietnam has not been (and under President Johnson is never likely to be) formally and legally declared an "active theater of war". The DOD proposal guts the present pacification arrangement, including Deputy Ambassador Porter's role and functions. General Westmoreland becomes, in effect if not in title, the U.S.proconsul or High Commissioner, with the other senior members of the country team being relegated to largely ceremonial functions and their assets and functions placed under the command of one of their peers.

6. As we know from private soundings, the Department of State is going to argue strongly against the DOD proposal. A central element of State's argument will be that the optics are all wrong. The U.S. Government is strongly encouraging, indeed pressuring, the Vietnamese to civilianize their pacification effort. Making our support of pacification a military endeavor would go directly against the grain of this policy. State's point is valid and we endorse it, but we feel it is a consideration we should let them argue.

7. Our objections to placing pacification under U.S. military control are not emotional or even predominantly philosophical. We have in Switchback an historical indication of what is likely to happen to the RD program if the U.S. military takes it over as they did not CIDG./3/ Undoubtedly the organization charts would be tidier. Without question RD cadre would be turned into good soldiers. But that is what they would become, soldiers. The spirit of revolutionary development and sense of movement towards an endogenously rooted political structure would be lost. Political aims would be subordinated to military objectives. Because of this, the pacification effort--however well managed--would almost certainly fail. The argument (Komer's argument, which we believe is in large measure responsible for the DOD proposal) that since the U.S. military organization in Vietnam is far larger than the civilian organization, it should be given control over all U.S. activities simply does not wash. This war can be lost by bad management but it cannot be won by good organization unless that organization serves as a vehicle for implementing non-charitable ingredients of spirit and attitude. It will not be won until a Saigon-directed civil structure takes hold of and roots in the countryside. Progress towards this essential goal will be impeded rather than facilitated by placing pacification under military direction.

/3/Switchback was a program for transferring responsibility for advising and assisting ethnic tribal groups in South Vietnam from CIA to the U.S. Army.

8. As for the play of the Agency's Washington hand in the immediate future, we believe your initial written reply to Secretary McNamara should address itself to the Agency's difficulties with the details of the proposal submitted and should not address the larger considerations./4/ We should let State be the first to table these. However, we recommend that you be prepared to support State's view in oral discussion. We also recommend that you support State in arguing that basic decisions on how the U.S. pacification effort is to be organized should not be made in undue haste. This is a very complicated problem to which an optimum solution is not going to be worked out in a few days. Furthermore, it is a decision which should not be made until the field components of the U.S. agencies involved or affected have had the chance to express their views on the proposals Washington is seriously weighing.

/4/A draft reply to Mr. McNamara is appended as an attachment to this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text. The draft is attached but not printed. In the reply sent on September 30, Helms indicated that the proposal "would cause us some problems in its present form," particularly by providing "for assumption of operational control by the pacification czar of some of our Station's intelligence collection and intelligence liaison responsibilities and assets." Helms also called for careful examination of the political ramifications of assigning primary operational responsibility to a "subordinate military officer within the COMUSMACV command structure." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, McNamara Project)]

9. As indicated above, we agree that the U.S. pacification effort needs managerial improvement but we feel you should oppose carving up the Saigon Station and should oppose placing pacification under military command. However, your posture should not be purely negative. As a constructive contribution to the discussion, you should support the following alternative proposal which State will make in some form and you can endorse: The outlines of a sensible pacification structure already exist. Ambassador Porter's present position was established as a result of the Warrenton Conference in order to accomplish the very ends that the DOD proposal is designed to achieve. The problem is that Porter has operated as a committee chairman rather than as a director or commander. The easiest solution, the one most in keeping with overall U.S. policy objectives as well as the one most administratively feasible to institute, is to make some senior civilian (Porter himself, or possibly Ambassador Sullivan) what Porter was originally intended to be--i.e., the pacification czar. In order to play this role he should have a planning and coordinating staff equivalent in function (though not necessarily in size) to the staff which supports General Westmoreland as COMUSMACV. He will have to exercise operational control over those elements of the various components of the U.S. Mission which deal primarily with pacification problems. This could certainly include the Cadre Operations Division of the Saigon Station, provided suitable support and funding mechanisms were arranged, particularly if through such a device the cost of the RD program could be taken off the Agency's account. Other Station elements would, of course, be responsive to the requirements of the pacification director.

10. Your initial discussion with Secretaries McNamara, Rusk, et al., should focus on the major issues (e.g., pacification czar under the Ambassador or under COMUSMACV; civilian or military) rather than the details, which can be most effectively ironed out once agreement is reached on the basic points. We have appended, however, a sketch organization chart which shows bureaucratically how our preferred alternative would look./5/ In essence, it is an attempt to give the pacification czar the control and staff means for discharging his responsibilities without doing unnecessary violence to the organizational integrity of the components of the various U.S. Government agencies which, collectively, compose the present country team. It provides the pacification czar with an adequate staff, which Porter does not now have. This staff would be joint, its members drawn from the various components of the Mission Council, including our Station as well as the military. Our proposal would also include a military deputy which would insure ample representation of military views and facilitate integrated political-military planning.

/5/Attached but not printed.

George A. Carver, Jr./6/

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Carver signed the original.

249. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, September 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, Gaud, Marks, and Helms.

After weighing the pros and cons, I concur in your 22 September 1966 memo proposing a unified US pacification management under COMUSMACV./2/ In fact, despite the many secondary disadvantages which might be entailed, such a step seems to me essential if pacification is to be given the large scale push forward which I strongly believe is central to a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam.

/2/Document 245.

As my small staff and I have progressively steeped ourselves in the Vietnam civil side, we have as you know also been insisting that stepped-up pacification is "central to success, both in ending the war and winning the peace . . ." We further agree that progress to date in this neglected aspect of the war has been negligible, largely in my view because of the lack of military resources which could be devoted to doing the local security part of the job. In any event, with most other aspects of the Vietnam war going better, pacification has become--as Cabot Lodge says--our chief unfinished business.

Stepping up pacification seems doubly important because it targets directly on what I believe to be the most vulnerable element in the enemy lineup--the southern VC. If we can step up both pressures and inducements targeted on the VC, we can increasingly isolate Hanoi. Moreover, until we can crack the VC infrastructure, the enemy always has the option of reverting to protracted guerrilla warfare.

I. So I favor every sensible measure to accelerate the momentum of pacification. The most important step is to get the GVN and ARVNAF really targeted on it, and adequately organized and motivated to do the job. At present the ARVNAF are not pulling their weight; unless we can get them fully involved in pacification, US forces will have to assume the main burden here too.

On the principle of first things first, straightening out the lines of responsibility on the US side is an essential prerequisite to tackling the GVN and ARVNAF. Split civil/military responsibility has not worked well enough in the past, nor is it likely to do so in the future. Unified management on the US side seems to me essential to giving a real push to pacification.

If such a "single manager" is thus essential, I further agree that he should be military. Indeed, I don't see any other realistic option given the simple fact that the bulk of the resources and management assets needed for pacification are military, on both the US and GVN sides:

A. The first prerequisite for successful pacification is adequate local security. This is primarily a military job. Even if the civil side has the whole responsibility, it doesn't control the key assets. An estimated year end strength comparison drives home this point.

GVN Pacification Assets

ARVN (the 50% that Gen. Westmoreland proposed to be devoted to pacification)

Military, 140,000

Civil, 35,000

RD Cadre (mostly not-Vung Tau-trained)

RF

Military, 145,000

Civil, 20,000

Police (in provinces)

PF

Military, 155,000

Total

Military, 390,000

Civil, 55,000

B. Similarly, on the US side there are far more Americans in uniform advising on pacification than there are civilians. This is entirely separate from the question of how many US forces are or will be engaged in supporting pacification. Again, the arithmetic is instructive, particularly down at the critical district (sub-sector) levels.

US Advisor Assets for Pacification

Corps

Military, 480

Civil, 143

Region

Sector

Military, 860

Civil, 327

Province

Sub-Sector

Military, 1200

Civil, 0

District

Total

Military, 2540

Civil, 470

C. The military are much better set up to manage a huge pacification effort. Quite frankly, I believe that we have made real progress toward strengthening the civilian management side of pacification since Ambassador Porter took this over last February. Progress has also been made toward better coordination between the military and civil sides of pacification. But coordination in my view is not enough to produce the needed results. The alternative of unified management under civilian control falls down because most of the assets involved are military, and because only the US military staff and advisory resources in Vietnam are big enough to manage pacification on the scale we seek. It would take at least eighteen months in my judgment to get a civilian management structure which might handle pacification as effectively as MACV could today.

In sum, if 60-70% of the real job of pacification is providing local security, this job can be done by the military, and without it the civil side of pacification cannot really get off the ground, the advantages of providing military management seem over-riding.

II. Clarification of your Charts would help. Your proposals raise several questions, particularly on US civil-military relationships. I believe that if they were handled in the manner described below, your proposal would be workable.

A. Would the primacy of overall supervision of the pacification process by the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador be clearly restated? I believe that the Ambassador and his alter ego must retain clear personal authority over pacification as over all other aspects of our operations in Vietnam.

B. What would be included in pacification and put under the new MACV Deputy? We should avoid overburdening him with any more ancillary activities than he can effectively handle. The purpose of the exercise is to get pacification rolling in the countryside, not to get single management of a lot of functions that the manager won't know how to manage. I assume you would put under him only those field activities (and the Saigon field operations staffs) which primarily and directly contribute to winning the village war. This should include Chieu Hoi, refugees, and resource control. It should not include (1) overall economic policy, the CIP, or anti-inflationary programs--these are best left to AID; (2) CIA programs other than Police Special Branch and Cadre; (3) national information and postwar programs other than those directed at the VC guerrilla structure and the rural population; (4) certain national AID project programs which are still best handled separately, e.g., medical, national agricultural activities, or education at other than the village level, etc.

C. Would the civilian components merely come under the new Deputy's command control or would MACV take them over in toto? The new Deputy and his corps and province Pacification Directors should assume operational control over the existing civilian components, but these should remain in civilian clothes, and be paid, administered, and logistically supported as at present. This would lead to certain "dual responsibility" problems, but be less disruptive than blanketing all the civil echelons functioning in the field into MACV.

D. What should a new Deputy's responsibility be for developing plans, programs and requirements for pacification? Clearly he must have such management tools at his disposal. Yet he shouldn't be burdened with the laborious tasks of preparing the CAP, programming personnel replacements, etc. Basically, he should be responsible only for those plans and programs that directly bear on field operations, and draw on the existing agencies for such support.

E. Should the pacification organization have logistic responsibilities? These should remain with AID, CIA, JUSPAO, and other elements of MACV, which would together service the new organization. To do otherwise would be disruptive and cause major delays, when the purpose of the exercise is to get up more momentum now.

III. Likely Disadvantages. There's no doubt that we'd have to pay a price for unified US military management of pacification, but some of these seem to me to be more apparent than real.

A. The image problem. At a time when we're trying to emphasize the non-military aspects of the war, and when the GVN itself is civilianizing, there will be criticism of any apparently opposite trend. But this must be offset against another, even more important image which we seek--that pacification is finally moving forward, that the NVA forces are being increasingly isolated as the southern VC fall away, and that the population is at long last coming our way in ever larger members.

B. Is an essentially military US management the best means by which to influence the GVN? Since our policy is to utilize mainly Vietnamese for pacification rather than US forces, the interface between the US and GVN pacification structures is important. But the fact remains that the bulk of GVN pacification assets are under military control. Even the RD Ministry is largely military. So are the province chiefs. Military officers are in most of the key slots at region, province and district levels. The ARVN, RF, PF, and really the police are under military management, and likely to remain so. In practical terms, I suspect that a US military management could most effectively motivate and advise them.

C. An essentially military pacification structure might put us in an awkward position in case of negotiations. This would be the case if any truce arrangement called for a stand-down of organized military forces on both sides, which could leave the GVN/US without adequate instruments to deal with the VC infrastructure. For this reason, some have argued that we should civilianize the GVN paramilitary forces and put them under a civilian ministry. But I doubt as a practical matter that the Directory would countenance this, even after another election.

D. The proposed structure is too corps-heavy, when many argue that corps is an impediment to pacification and should be more decentralized. I agree, but doubt that it will be politically feasible to push the ARVN corps commanders out of the picture for a while. If so, let's use them, not deplore them.

E. Problems will arise from putting US civilians under the US military. Will many of them refuse to serve in this manner, including some quite senior people? Many bureaucratic sensitivities will be affected. Would this result in a major loss in efficiency on the increasingly important US civilian side of pacification? I believe that keeping civilian personnel in their own agencies, even though under a new Deputy's command control, would mitigate many of these problems, especially after a shakedown period. The mixed civilian-military staff you contemplate at all levels would help further.

F. Some dual responsibility and administrative confusion would result. I believe that this could be minimized under the leadership of Ambassadors Lodge and Porter, who would remain in policy control of all US activities in Vietnam. What is proposed is essentially to unify management responsibility for pacification in the field. I cannot see that such a reorganization would create more dual responsibility and administrative confusion than exists today. Simply having a US team chief in each province would be a major step forward; collaboration is no substitute for management control.

IV. Conclusion. Despite the disadvantages cited above, and perhaps others, they seem to me to be outweighed by the positive thrust which would be generated by unified US management. To be perfectly candid, I regard your proposal as basically a means of bringing the military fully into the pacification process rather than of putting civilians under the military. Without minimizing the growing civil side contribution to pacification, the US and GVN military have the bulk of the assets needed to provide the essential local security input and the management structure needed to make pacification work. So assigning responsibility to the Deputy COMUSMACV is the best way to get pacification moving in Vietnam. I don't think that we can achieve this--soon enough or well enough--without such a step./3/

/3/Carver forwarded a copy of this memorandum to Colby under cover of a memorandum, October 3, stating that "this office finds little it can agree with in Mr. Komer's memorandum." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-Executive Registry, Job 80-B0158R, McNamara Project)

R.W. Komer

250. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 30, 1966, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Bill Moyers, BDM Memos, Sept. 1966-Feb. 1967. No classification marking.

I have been concerned for some time because while we are at war in Vietnam, the Government is not really organized for war. We have no one high official of the Government who spends full time on the war; not even the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East devotes more than 50% of his time to the effort. We are just not orchestrating the handling of the most critical problem we face.

One small step forward would be to take advantage of the new wind at State, and make Nick Katzenbach/2/ chairman of a little kitchen cabinet--to meet at least biweekly and report directly to the President in writing. Nick would be a good impartial chairman and has no hawk/dove image problem. Cy Vance and Komer and Rostow could be members./3/

/2Katzenbach was appointed Under Secretary of State on September 30 and entered on duty October 3, replacing Ball.

/3/The wording of this paragraph was taken from a memorandum forwarded to Moyers by Komer on September 30. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, WH Chron)

You are not getting the kind of service on Vietnam out of the Government that I think you need. We're fighting a war on a part-time basis./4/

/4/Rostow's list of action items prepared following the President's Tuesday lunch meeting on November 15 includes the following item: "President wants Mr. Rostow to set up a group--Katzenbach to chair--Komer, Rostow, Vance, good military man--to meet three times a week on Viet Nam and all its dimensions." (Ibid., Rostow Files, Meetings with President) In a November 18 memorandum to Vance and Katzenbach, Komer proposed an agenda for the first "non-session" of "our non-club." (Ibid., Komer Files, Katzenbach) For more information on the group, see Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 479-482.

251. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, September 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. Harriman-Negotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
"Negotiations Committee"

While the Secretary's discussion of Vietnam with Gromyko/2/ did not reach any affirmative understanding, Gromyko's relatively relaxed attitude, his willingness to continue discussions and his emphasis on Soviet influence in Hanoi were encouraging indications of possible future Soviet initiative. We hope that further talks with Gromyko can be held prior to your meeting with him.

/2/See Document 247.

The group found no significant concessions in recent statements by NLF Chairman Tho/3/ and Pham Van Dong,/4/ but we believe that our public reaction to these and other restatements of position by the other side should avoid being too negative. The Secretary's statement/5/ that we were studying the new formulations strikes the right note, as well as Ambassador Goldberg's attitude on proposals made in his UN address. Meanwhile we are asking Ambassador Goldberg in his conversations in New York to encourage the Eastern Europeans and others to try to obtain clarification of what the recent statements mean.

/3/Nguyen Huu Tho outlined his peace terms in an interview on August 25 with Australian correspondent Wilfred Burchett, which was broadcast by NLF clandestine radio on September 13 and by Hanoi radio on September 28. For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part VI B, pp. 218-219.

/4/Presumably a reference to Pham Van Dong's speech in Hanoi on September 24 to a Czechoslovak delegation, broadcast over Hanoi radio the same day. For text, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Report, North Vietnam, September 26, 1966, pp. jjj 13-19.

/5/Not further identified.

The October meeting in the Philippines provides an excellent opportunity to convince "hard line" Asians such as the Koreans and the Thais of the necessity of continuing efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. Our group believes we must establish promptly and emphatically that the October meeting is not a "council of war," as not only the communist but other press and radio are already announcing, but is a "council of peace and postwar reconstruction."

The group feels strongly that between now and the meeting any escalation of our bombing of the North should be avoided. Military escalations could drown out talk of peaceful negotiation.

In advance of the meeting the group thought it might be worthwhile to have me or another senior American emissary discuss with the leaders of other Asian countries not participating, the aims of the conclave and ask for their suggestions. The countries he might visit would be Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, India and possibly Indonesia. The thirty-odd countries who are making some contribution to the effort in Vietnam should also be briefed in advance as well as after the meeting through their Ambassadors here or by some other channel.

Averell

252. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Miscellaneous Vietnam Reports: Lot 70 D 48, Briefing Materials on Vietnam. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Unger.

SUBJECT
Secretary McNamara's Proposal for Placing Pacification Program in South Viet-Nam Under COMUSMACV/2/

/2/Document 245.

1. Secretary McNamara is seeking your concurrence in a Memorandum for the President proposing that all activities which are primarily a part of the pacification program and all persons engaged in such activities be placed under the command of COMUSMACV. This action is intended to increase the efficiency of the operation and remedy the split responsibility for the program on the US side. The proposal also rests in part on the fact that an important segment of the US personnel engaged in pacification are military, although some of them are presently working under civilian direction.

2. Secretary McNamara's concern about the limited progress shown by the pacification program thus far is justified, and I agree with his emphasis on the program as central to the ultimate achievement of our objectives in South Viet-Nam. Here I would observe only that a much more serious liability of the program is the failure of the GVN to devote adequate ARVN forces to the task and take such forces out from under the corps commander whose interests lie elsewhere.

3. Secretary McNamara's proposal does offer one possible means of remedying the problem of split responsibility, but before adopting this remedy I believe we should look very closely at some of its effects:

a. We have made extended efforts to emphasize the "other war" and to project an increasing role for the civilian side in South Viet-Nam. This would be seriously undermined both in appearance and in fact by put-ting pacification under military command. It would be difficult to remove the impression that pacification had not become a civil affairs/military government matter, with all the overtones of the US taking over in an occupied country.

b. As a military organization MACV quite naturally works through the corps and division, and orders to the sector level, where pacification must really be carried out, come through these filters. Placing pacification under MACV command would thus tend to emphasize the military channel through higher commands whose interests and competence lie much more in the military field than in pacification. This would also work against the civilianization of pacification which we are seeking in our efforts, among other things, to bring sector-level activities (including regional and popular forces) more directly under the authority of Revolutionary Development Minister Thang. In a more general sense both Thang and the civilian leaders now beginning to emerge on the political scene in the constituent assembly could also be expected to see the placing of pacification entirely under MACV as a set-back and reflecting a return to military rule.

c. It is a fact of life whether justified or not that the morale of the many US civilians now working on pacification and indispensable to the program would be affected most adversely if they were put under military direction.

4. Without any intention of "fighting the problem", I question whether the problem of split responsibility on the American side is such a serious one and so urgently in need of remedy that we should take on the liabilities mentioned above. Moreover, the present framework on the US side has been in operation barely six months and the RD program itself is hardly any older, and while I am certainly not satisfied with the progress of pacification, I am not sure that we yet have a reliable enough reading on how it is proceeding and where the problems lie to justify our again upsetting the organization and starting over. Furthermore, there are alternative means of reducing the problem of split responsibility which should be examined. A possible alternative would be the appointment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would also be adviser to the pacification czar, Ambassador Porter; Porter would have as deputies the chiefs of the civilian agencies (AID, JUSPAO and CIA) also involved in pacification, and those deputies and DepCOMUSMACV might form a Pacification Council under Porter's direction. While DepCOMUSMACV would himself command, under General Westmoreland's authority, the MACV elements advising the GVN military and para-military elements engaged in pacification, he would be made as integral as possible a member of Ambassador Porter's staff in order to achieve the fullest possible coordination.

5. The questions discussed above have received extended consideration in the Mission in Saigon and this is as it should be since there are involved many complex questions of US-GVN relationships and the need for an intimate knowledge of the workings of the machinery from top to bottom. Although we have not yet received any comprehensive comments from the Mission, Ambassador Porter will arrive in the United States this weekend and could tell us where this question stands in the Mission and could give us his own views.

Recommendation/3/

/3/There is no indication on the source text whether Rusk approved the recommendation. In a telephone conversation with McNamara on October 3, Rusk stated that his "principal problem" with turning over pacification to the military "was that we seem to be moving toward military govt when South Viet Nam was moving the other way." McNamara responded that he "realized this but his chief concern was that the administration of it be effective." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)

6. Before Secretary McNamara's proposal is given final consideration, we should have the considered views of our Mission in Saigon on the overall question of organization for pacification on the US side. Meanwhile, you may wish to point out to Secretary McNamara our reservations about placing responsibility under COMUSMACV and our hope that a means should be found to put Ambassador Porter in a position to carry out his responsibilities, as originally envisaged, fully and effectively.

[end of document]

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