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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

253. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, October 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on October 1 under cover of a memorandum suggesting that he read it and calling Ginsburgh a "superb JCS liaison officer" who "has made important contributions to our work on negotiating positions" and other Vietnam issues. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Vietnam--The Next Phase

Some time within the next two to three weeks I think it would be worth the President's time to reflect on and plan for his immediate post-election strategy in Vietnam.

I assume that the November elections will indicate basic public support for the President's Vietnam policy.

I am equally convinced that if Hanoi does not immediately sue for peace they will closely watch our actions immediately after the election for a clue to what they should expect from the US in the next two years. In the process of re-evaluating their position, they must attempt to gauge their capability for holding out until after the Nov '68 elections.

The closer we get to the Nov '68 elections, the greater will be the incentive for the VC/DRV to hold on at all costs in hopes of a political reversal of the US position in Vietnam. In fact in terms of the effect of the war in Vietnam on US domestic politics, it seems to me that the national political conventions are equally as significant as the fall '68 elections.

I do not believe that any US administration--Republican or Democratic would either abandon our commitment to Vietnam or recklessly escalate--regardless of campaign oratory. Because of the campaign oratory, however, I believe that it is in the US national interest to win this war in Vietnam before the beginning of the political conventions in the summer of 1968. This does not mean that we would need to have all of our troops out of Vietnam by that time or that all anti-guerrilla action needs to have ceased. But we must do our best to be clearly over the hump by then, and it would be extremely helpful to have started a phased troop withdrawal.

Action Program: In view of the above, I recommend the following:

1. Establish at top levels within the government the objective of winning--or at least passing the crest--by 1 June 1968. Keep this goal out of the press.

2. Allow the Communists one week to evaluate the political impact of the November election.

3. After one week, get the word privately to the VC/DRV that the US is prepared to resume its program of increasing pressure--at a faster rate than before. Issue no public ultimatums.

4. If no satisfactory de-escalatory signals are received within 10 days to two weeks resume our program of increasing pressures:

a. Resume the POL campaign.

b. Over a 2-3 week period take out the remaining hydro-electric plants.

c. Destroy the steel plant.

d. Mine the ports.

e. Eliminate the NVN air forces.

f. Attack the air defense system.

g. As d and e are eliminated shift weight of effort back to interdiction campaign.

5. As soon as details are worked out announce reorganization of pacification activities and beginning of new phase of operations.

6. By 1 January announce intention and commence withdrawal of up to two divisions and appropriate air units from Europe for transfer to Vietnam, with redeployment determined on basis of logistic capability. Justify as temporary move without committing US to necessarily redeploy to Europe after Vietnam war is over.

Finally, I urge that decisions on the above recommendations be made as soon as possible so that implementation can begin immediately after the November elections.

G

254. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, October 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC. McNamara visited Vietnam October 10-13, accompanied by, among others, Katzenbach, Wheeler, McNaughton, and Komer.

4244. A. Following is suggested agenda for our discussions in Saigon beginning Monday, October 10:

1. Intelligence estimates. An evaluation of infiltration and of enemy regular and VC force levels, including a projection through CY 1967; of enemy morale (in both the North and South); and of any signs that population under VC control is wavering. Include also estimates of the enemy capabilities to hinder RD programs; of the situation in the DMZ and capabilities of the enemy for attack across the DMZ and from Cambodia or Laos; and of how good our intelligence is, especially with respect to estimates of enemy's strength.

2. Operational analysis and statement of requirements. This would be briefing, of type given previously by DePuy, showing military requirements through CY 67. It should include a statement of US military objectives; of our strategy for and likelihood of achieving them; of roles to be played by US, FWMAF, RVNAF, paramilitary and police; of actions to be taken against NVN, in Laos and at sea; of proposed force deployments; and of proposed aircraft and sortie levels.

3. Air interdiction operations. An evaluation of Rolling Thunder; Steel Tiger; Barrel Roll; Arc Light (also of Shining Brass). Are major changes required in any of these?

4. Logistical estimate. Herein the construction program, port and shipping management, communications needs, maintenance capabilities, common supply system, and adequacy of supplies.

5. Barriers. The interdiction infiltration system being developed by General Starbird's TF 728. I suggest this be the first item on the agenda to permit Dr. Foster and General Starbird to depart promptly. Other concepts, including an involving compartmentalization of VC logistical movements within South Vietnam, could be discussed at this time.

6. Pacification (RD). Include an evaluation of the situation country-wide and in the priority areas, present against past, with plans for the future. Under this item we can discuss the development of a pacification concept, the possibility of consolidating responsibility for pacification (RD) on the US side, the plans to devote a portion of ARVN (and possibly US) forces to the pacification mission, improvements in GVN RD organization, and an evaluation of the RD cadre program.

7. The Delta. Pros and cons of, and the plan for, deploying US forces into the Delta, with the accompanying pacification program. Herein an assessment of any accommodation that may exist in the Delta and the relation between such an accommodation and our efforts to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion.

8. Chieu Hoi. Discussion of the program and how it might be improved.

9. US-RVNAF-FWMAF relations. Report on how the military commands are getting along, and comment on suggestions for changes in command relationships, e.g., the suggestion of a US Director of Military Operations (i.e., a Combined US-GVN-FWMAF Command under General Westmoreland).

10. US, RVNAF, and Pacification (RD) personnel morale. Morale of US military personnel and of US civilians, including proposals regarding any change in duty-tour or dependents policy; and, on Vietnamese side, the problem of desertions and the implications of the new anti-desertion program, and the question of Vietnamese will to implement the RD program.

11. Piaster budget for US military operations in CY 1967. A comparison by category with CY 1966; an appraisal of how it pinches our efforts; its relationship to the total anti-inflation program; and the outlook for success of such a program.

In addition to the above items, I will of course want to hear your views and to discuss (12) the extent and impact of corruption in the GVN at ministry, JGS, corps, division, sector andsubsector levels, and the price if any paid for "fencing around" big violators like Co and Quang; (13) the outlook for continued political development and the prospect that the Ky-constituent assembly confrontation can be handled; (14) the lines that might be followed to split the VC off from Hanoi, to make both the VC and Hanoi more amenable to a satisfactory settlement, and to bring the GVN along with us in these efforts; (15) the degree of anti-Americanism that prevails among peasants, army, intellectuals, etc., and actions we should take in this connection; and (16) any matters that need to be ironed out in preparation for the Baguio meeting of Heads of State.

B. I will want to get into the field while there; General Wheeler will discuss details of trips with General Westmoreland.

C. I hope to avoid formality and diplomatic affairs. This of course does not rule out working lunches and dinners which you might consider desirable. I will want to talk with key Vietnamese and third-country representatives if such talks appear useful.

D. I will be accompanied by General Wheeler, Bob Komer, Art Sylvester, and John McNaughton. I believe John Foster and General Starbird will be in Saigon when we arrive. The party will also include approximately five support personnel. As you know, I have offered a ride to Bill Porter and Henry Kissinger.

E. Please give me your views as to any additions to or changes in the above-suggested agenda.

255. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 3, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 14. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 9:30 a.m. on October 4 under cover of a memorandum stating that he concurred with McNamara's recommendation. (Ibid.) During a telephone conversation with McNamara that began at 7:48 a.m. on October 5, the President indicated that he had read McNamara's memorandum and thought his decision was justified but also thought McNamara should get the Joint Chiefs and their adherents to point out how disastrous it would be for the United States to inaugurate a new policy of this type during the closing days of Congress and on the eve of the Manila Conference, and "how the propaganda people would just wreck us." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.27, Side B, PNO 2)

SUBJECT
Naval Gunfire Against North Vietnam

On a number of occasions since May of this year, General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp have recommended the use of naval gunfire against North Vietnam. These recommendations have had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but have never received final approval, largely because of the international problems such action might entail. At present, naval fire on North Vietnam is authorized only in self defense against attack from the shore.

As you know, General Westmoreland is now quite concerned about the threat developing to the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam--in the form of enemy attacks supported, and potentially launched from, the DMZ and southern portions of North Vietnam. He is urgently requesting authority to employ naval gunfire against North Vietnam south of 175 30'--i.e. from Dong Hoi south to the DMZ. Again, he has the support of CINCPAC and the Chiefs. The advantages and disadvantages of approving this request are briefly set forth below.

1. Advantages. General Westmoreland and the Chiefs point out that the enemy buildup in and north of the DMZ involves numerous fixed military targets and a vital supply axis along coastal Route 1, supplemented by waterborne traffic, all of which cannot be consistently and successfully engaged by air attack. Naval gunfire is less inhibited by darkness and weather than is tactical air. It can deliver reasonably accurate area and harassing fire under any weather conditions. It can engage targets, including moving targets, with observed fire in weather which would preclude effective air attack. In good weather, its accuracy at reasonable ranges is equal to that of air attack.

Operating within 12 miles of the coast, the various ships and weapons involved can effectively engage targets up to 12 or more miles inland--a distance which encompasses the principal lines of communication in that part of North Vietnam and the eastern portions of the DMZ. At least in theory, the application of naval gunfire to targets in this area would free tactical air resources to engage targets along the more primitive LOC's to the west, in the western DMZ, and in the immediate battle area of any actual attack. Also, ships could be used to engage targets which the enemy has protected with heavy local defenses and thus avoid aircraft losses. (It is always possible, of course, to lose a ship to coastal guns or air attack.)

This fire could be provided with resources already deployed, at the expense of support to forces in South Vietnam. Ammunition supplies are adequate. The most probable average commitment would be 4 ships (one 6" or 8"-gun cruiser, two 5"-gun destroyers, and one 5"-rocket ship) of the 7 to 11 such ships which have been engaged in naval gunfire support to operations within South Vietnam. On a number of occasions, this in-country support has been quite effective.

In sum, the arguments in favor of employing naval gunfire against North Vietnam are: a serious threat exists involving targets appropriate for naval gunfire; the resources are readily available; and this fire can be delivered under certain conditions which preclude air attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that we approve the use of naval gunfire south of Dong Hoi against radar and antiaircraft sites, other fixed military targets, convoys and elements of LOC's and North Vietnamese craft which are definitely identified as naval vessels or vessels bearing military cargo. Attack would be prohibited against civilian craft and other targets which involve large collateral damage or civilian casualties.

2. Disadvantages. The disadvantages of this course of action still lie primarily in the reactions we may expect from the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, other nations, and certain elements here at home. There is also some doubt as to the measure of military advantage we would gain to offset these reactions.

While from one point of view the additional destructive force applied against North Vietnam by naval fire would be proportionately small, from another viewpoint this would be escalation, and a step toward extension of naval bombardment still farther north. The enemy probably would claim that we were engaging in a new kind of attack. Perhaps more important, since this is the kind of activity which would normally precede such action, the North Vietnamese and Chinese might conclude that we were in fact preparing to invade the North, and undertake some escalatory action in response. (At the very least, this action would lend credence to past South Vietnamese threats and American newspaper speculation concerning invasion.) Other nations, including some allies, would probably regret that we found this new departure necessary, and might dissociate themselves from it. International legal questions could be raised. It is certain that at least some of our detractors here at home would point to the action as a new and serious form of escalation. On the other side of this question, it must be conceded that our ships have already fired on North Vietnamese territory--in defense against shore fire--on three occasions (February, March and April of this year while engaged in search and rescue operations). There was no serious adverse reaction in these cases, but the self-defense nature of the fire was immediately demonstrable.

We have no guarantee that the incremental military benefits of naval gunfire would be of sufficient magnitude to compensate for these adverse reactions. Assuming that sufficient targets can be identified, ships engaged in this mission would probably fire on the order of 200 rounds per ship per day, or a total of 800 rounds.

--As one measure of the concentration involved, this would amount to 16 rounds per mile over the 50-odd miles of Route 1 from Dong Hoi to the DMZ.

--As another measure of weight of effort, the explosive charge in the average round involved is on the order of 14 pounds. This would mean about 6 tons delivered per day--quite a small amount (roughly the equivalent of 10 attack sorties) compared with tonnages we have delivered in the same area with tactical air.

--The average shell has an effects radius of 40-90 yards against personnel, and a somewhat smaller radius against vehicles. Some types can achieve good penetration of concrete and other fortifications, particularly if the target presents a vertical face, but this requires precision, observed fire.

Granted, this weight of effort could be concentrated (especially that of the rocket ship), or substantially increased (by committing more ships or by including a higher proportion of heavier guns). Even so, when we consider the large amounts of tactical air available--particularly in an emergency--and the rather limited sets of circumstances under which naval gunfire enjoys an undisputed superiority, the military advantages appear less imposing.

--Few fixed targets would be so time-sensitive as to demand attack during weather conditions when naval ships could engage them and tactical air could not.

--At least half the problem with fleeting targets, such as convoys, is to locate and identify the target; this part of the problem would be the same for naval fire as for tactical air. This detracts from the admitted ability of naval ships to engage a target, once located, under certain conditions when tactical air would not be effective.

--While the enemy may undertake to increase antiaircraft defenses in southern North Vietnam to support a major effort, at present his defenses in that area have been neutralized to the point where we lose relatively few aircraft.

3. Recommendations. On balance, I conclude that the military advantages of approving naval gunfire against North Vietnam at this time are outweighed by the probable adverse reactions and possible military risks. The Secretary of State and I recommend against approval.

Robert S. McNamara/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

256. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 3, 1966, 2:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS Trip, vol. 1. No classification marking.

Mr. President:

We want these results from the Philippines conference:

1. A reaffirmation of the commitment among the fighting allies to see it through to an honorable peace.

2. An agreed position among the fighting allies and Saigon on the terms on which peace will be sought.

3. An approach by the Saigon government, backed by the fighting allies, to those now fighting with the VC, including perhaps an amnesty offer, which would be beyond the appeal made in the Honolulu declaration by the Vietnamese government.

4. Increased emphasis by Saigon, backed by the fighting allies, on pacification, land reform, planning for long-term economic development (including future use of our bases), education, health, agriculture, etc.

5. If possible, an agreed statement of support for Cambodian territorial integrity and independence.

6. Support from all the governments for Asian regional economic development without creating or appearing to create a new Asian grouping made up of the fighting allies.

In general, we want the government in Saigon to recommit itself to its allies and to the world to getting on with the Honolulu program, where much progress has been made, including the commitment to go forward in next steps towards constitutional government.

W.W. Rostow/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

257. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 3, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX.Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 1 p.m. on October 4. In his covering memorandum he expressed his doubts that the Russians had the "power to make Hanoi end the war" and his opposition either to abandoning the hardware option or to letting the Germans "off the hook on balance of payments offsets." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
"Negotiations"

I believe the only real chance now in sight to induce Hanoi to negotiate a settlement depends on the influence Moscow is willing and able to exert. Events in China have probably made Hanoi look more towards Moscow than Peking, but have not eliminated Hanoi's dependence on Peking.

If Moscow is to take on the task of persuading Hanoi to move towards a settlement, theUSSR will probably have to assume certain risks and obligations. Thus I believe we must offer some compensating inducements.

In my judgment, the overpowering desire of Moscow today is for greater stability in Europe. Regardless of how we assess developments in Germany in the years ahead, I am convinced that the Soviet leaders are deeply concerned over a possible reemergence of a German threat to Russian security. The Kremlin desires a nuclear non-proliferation pact with Germany particularly in mind. I seriously doubt that the Soviet Union will be satisfied with a formula which would permit "hardware participation" by the Germans. A possible quid pro quo for Moscow's action in Southeast Asia would be our abandoning the hardware option in our proposals for the pact. Although few Germans really believe a NATO hardware deal is probable, its abandonment would mean to the Germans the giving up of a hope which has some political appeal.

To induce a German Government to abandon this hope would probably require concessions in "offset" agreements. Yet, the end of hostilities in Vietnam would more than compensate for the dollar drain resulting from such a concession.

In addition, a mutual reduction in forces in Germany would probably appeal to Moscow.

In sum, I believe that we will have to agree on some arrangement affecting Germany if we are to induce Moscow to act in Vietnam. I recognize the political difficulties in Germany at the present time, but our interests are so overwhelming to get the war over in Vietnam, that I cannot help but feel we should move as rapidly as feasible.

I hope that there will be an opportunity for you to raise this subject, or at least touch on it, in your talk with Gromyko. It may require discussions with Soviet leaders in Moscow before an understanding can be worked out. But the stakes are so great in ending the fighting in Vietnam, that action along the lines outlined above is highly desirable./2/

/2/Responding to a request from the President for comments, Katzenbach and Eugene Rostow each expressed disagreement with Harriman's proposal in memoranda of October 8 and 12, respectively. Katzenbach questioned both the necessity of the proposed concession to Moscow and "the wisdom of mixing Europe and Asia at our suggestion." (Ibid., box 212, Amb. Harriman--Negotiations Comm.)

Averell

258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, October 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:08 a.m.

7630. Ref: A. Saigon 7243;/2/ B. State 23182;/3/ C. State 52726;/4/ D. State 52727./5/

/2/In telegram 7243, September 29, Lodge transmitted a proposed outline for the discussion summarized in this telegram. (Ibid.)

/3/Document 203.

/4/Telegram 52726, September 22, discussed national reconciliation, contacts between the GVN and the Viet Cong, and the encouragement of Viet Cong defections. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/5/Telegram 52727, September 22, transmitted a draft speech on national reconciliation for Ky. (Ibid.)

1. I met Thieu, Ky and Tran Van Do Oct 3 in long and frank session which revealed much of South Vietnamese thinking on peaceful settlement and national reconciliation issues.

2. After agreement on the agenda to be followed, and using an outline similar to that in Saigon 7243, we went down the list point by point on the objectives, guarantees, and components of satisfactory outcome to the war, the methods of reaching a settlement, and finally the approach to a national reconciliation program. I pointed out that these were ideas for discussion and for illustrative purposes and were not to be considered official positions.

Objectives

3. In response to my question on their views regarding the three basic objectives (sovereignty of GVN to be intact, territorial limits of SVN to be intact, and system of guarantees), Tran Van Do and Ky emphasized that they were concerned with guarantees, specifically whether the US intended to keep its troops in SVN as one of the principal guarantees. They wished to know what kind of guarantees are envisaged and how control can be exercised in practice during critical period of withdrawal of NVA and VC as well as by US troops. Thieu asked what kind of procedures would be followed and how would timing be determined with respect to a so-called "cease-fire." He asked would we accept a "cease-fire" when we all start to talk with the VC? Their concern was with defining the system of control, the machinery to be used prior to any agreement to withdraw.

4. I replied that I was authorized to state that the US will not withdraw our troops before security is assured or GVN is able to cope with terrorism or while the VC infrastructure remains intact; SVN would not be left without protection. In addition, there are other forms of possible guarantees such as multilateral commitments, expanded ICC, and bilateral pledges. The question of a "cease-fire" depends on definition; a "cease-fire" means something different to Hanoi than to US and we can say at present only that it would be part of a general package or settlement--a point for negotiation, not an end in itself to be agreed to separately at the outset. We were aware that terrorists often did not use firearms and that a conventional "cease-fire" might have very little relevance for the main source of aggression, i.e., terrorism.

5. Tran Van Do inquired if it would be useful and possible to obtain a multilateral commitment from the impending seven nation conference. Although all the participants have given evidence of support, what does the US think of a general pact to provide a specific international guarantee? The basis of the US commitment is also not entirely clear. Do said a formal guarantee of mutual security would broaden support so that in the future the US would not have to initiate aid alone and then persuade others to join in. Thieu said they wished a broader international commitment than that provided by SEATO, which, Do noted, is an obligation for separate bilateral commitments. They wish an international obligation which commits an entire group of nations to the security of each member. This would not, Do said, be aimed just at SVN, but would be for the benefit of all SEA nations, any one of which may be threatened at some future date. It would do what it had been intended for SEATO to do. Could this be raised at the seven nation conference? Do asked.

6. I replied that I would report their views to Washington; the question of a multilateral committee [commitment?] is significant. I noted that there had been discussion [garble].

On the US commitment, I pointed out that in addition to the SEATO protocol authority, the US Congress had, after the Tonkin Bay incident, authorized the President to undertake broad military assistance to SVN; this was a legal commitment as far as the US alone was concerned. As for discussion of a mutual security arrangement at the seven nation meeting, it is obviously something which could be discussed.

Components of a Satisfactory Outcome

7. When we reached this item, I simply read the title and then paused, saying that I would very much like to hear their views on what they considered the specifics of a satisfactory outcome--or to put it in French terms, an acceptable result. They looked at each other and then said that they would like to hear what I thought the elements were. I then, making it clear that I was not making an official proposal on behalf of the US Government, but was merely proposing personal ideas for illustrative purposes, went through the following points:

A. Cessation of aggression--by ending "military" hostilities. GVN comment: This met with no objection.

B. Cessation of aggression--by "criminal" (terroristic) hostilities. This meant an end to the terrorist organization, to what is sometimes called the infrastructure. GVN comment: At this point Ky said the terrorist organization would have to be "dissolved." It would be understood, I said, that after the satisfactory outcome had been reached, any new case of assassination, torture, or kidnapping, or of recruiting or impressment, or of sabotage for subversive reasons would be justification for immediate retaliation.

C. Departure of hardcore Viet Cong officer personnel. GVN comment: Ky said, yes, but they would have to leave within a certain time limit.

D. Reintegration of rank and file Viet Cong.

(1) GVN comment: Ky pointed out that this depended on the Chieu Hoi program.

(2) Thieu stated that departure of the North Vietnamese Army by a time limit is not difficult, but for the village Viet Cong infrastructure, it is another problem. If local members of the Viet Cong organization do not choose to go North or join the GVN after a specific time, the GVN would consider them rebels and take action to eliminate them.

(3) I agreed that an intensified Chieu Hoi effort was most desirable and that a time limit would have to be imposed. The destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure was clearly a matter for police-type action. No government can be denied police powers, and I was glad to see that in that connection steps are being taken to train some ARVN troops in constabulary work. Thieu agreed.

(4) Tran Van Do asked how in practice infiltration could be really halted. Supposing Hanoi should agree to withdraw and take out many troops, they can still leave many thousands behind and resume infiltration at a later date. The Americans, however, would have stopped their strikes and ground operations. How then could we be able to control the ground and prevent infiltration across the border?

(5) Thieu said they had been thinking of constructing a surveillance system all along the border. Ky said that he wished to discuss this problem further with us. He was examining it carefully and was having a study made on a system of border outposts, of the question of troop roles and missions for all forces in South Viet-Nam on border control, counter-terror efforts, security, etc. I said that I had not realized that control of infiltration across these frightful jungles was a possible thing to do, physically. They assured me that it was and that it was entirely a question of whether one wanted to do it. They indicated a desire to bring this up with Secretary McNamara during his forthcoming visit.

E. Departure of North Vietnamese Army. (Comment on this just covered above.)

F. Stopping infiltration of men and supplies. (Covered above.)

G. All roads to be open to the ARVN; new roadblocks or blown bridges or re-establishment of underground redoubts would justify retaliation. (They all agreed.)

H. Viet Cong to disarm, give up explosives and weapons. (They agreed.)

I. North Viet-Nam to stop direction of Viet Cong. (Agreed.)

J. Staged withdrawal of free world forces. (Covered above.)

K. Supervision and guarantee of the actions listed. (Covered above.)

L. Peace talks not to be dragged on for a long period unless tangible results have been and are being achieved. (They agreed.) The methods to achieve objectives.

8. I went over each of the eight alternative methods, from tacit cessation of hostilities through a full multilateral conference, any of which might singly or in combination lead to a settlement, pointing out that we favored no particular one but that they should all be reviewed for planning purposes.

9. Thieu asked for our frank views on whether or not the US would agree to a new Geneva conference with the original participants. Tran Van Do asserted that "we do not know precisely what we want, but we know we do not want another Geneva conference." Ky said that for their part the best place for a new conference would be Tokyo. "We will have nothing to do with Geneva. Nor will we ever sit down with France." A cease-fire agreement now is 180 degrees different than it was in 1954, he stated, and the participants are now different, so why go back to Geneva or accept the same participants? Ky referred to Vice President Humphrey's statements that this war is an Asian problem and should be solved by Asian nations. Those involved number just about every nation in the area except Japan, and Japan, he pointed out, will not be attending the seven nation conference. The main point, Thieu said, is that SVN must not be committed beforehand to going back to Geneva. Thieu asked what nations might attend a Geneva conference?

10. We explained that the US has publicly stated it is prepared to go back to Geneva, that although we might prefer an Asian setting, we are always prepared to negotiate at any place, and that SVN has also agreed to this. Participation can be discussed and changed to comprise those countries with a legitimate interest in the war. We have not said that readiness to use a Geneva conference meant that we must reach agreement "in accordance with" the 1954 agreements, but rather "on the basis of." The important point is that we must both be always prepared to negotiate. As for an Asian conference, our acceptance of the Thanat proposal was evidence of our approval of the idea. Although we are in favor of such a conference, we cannot also refuse a Geneva conference. I told them I took note, however, of their strong opposition to any full scale multilateral negotiations using the Geneva conference format and their opposition to the inclusion of France.

11. Ky agreed that many combinations of nations, excluding of course, France, could be acceptable. He said in this regard that the GVN thought too much attention was focused on Hanoi and Washington and that Peking, Moscow and Saigon were often not mentioned. Reports should equate Saigon to Hanoi, and Washington to Peking and Moscow so that the roles of the latter are not forgotten. Ky then took up the point of including the VC in negotiations. "We cannot accept any conference with the VC, we cannot sit down with the VC," he said. He reiterated several times that the GVN must not go to a table where the presence of the VC is required; that any equating of Saigon with the VC is unacceptable.

12. It was explained that the issue is not one of sitting down at a conference, but of communicating with the VC to arrange a cease-fire. The VC would in no case be granted status as a sovereign equal, but as an internal Vietnamese problem. In the matter of reaching a settlement the enemy should be dealt with in alternative ways: externally, with Hanoi, as one channel, and internally with the VC as the other. It might be possible to handle the VC in one way and Hanoi in another.

13. Ky then switched to the possibility of a drawn-out tacit cessation of GVN-VC hostilities with a staged reduction of GVN-US military operations. He said he did not see how we Americans would have time to accept a "fade-away" solution, although he personally favored such a solution and he thought Hanoi would, too. It would mean fewer casualties, but he believed we were in too much of a hurry to make this acceptable to us. He feared that prolonged war of this nature would find US public opinion unprepared for the continued employment of US troops in what would be a purely guerrilla-type, terroristic war even though casualties would be light. He thought it possible that the VC might accept this option, but the US might have considerable difficulties. The fade-away of the Communists in Malaya, in this regard, is not comparable, Ky pointed out. Malaya did not have an active sanctuary behind the rebels. The point, according to Ky, is that SVN could accept a "fade-away" cessation only if it has a system of border guarantees. Even if NVN withdraws its troops from SVN, Ky strongly emphasized, a system of concrete guarantees will still be imperative.

14. We noted that the VC may very well opt for a tacit cessation, and this might be better for the US and GVN, but a system of guarantees was, of course, still required.

15. Ky said he preferred two systems of guarantees: first, an international commitment as discussed earlier for external threats, and second, a strong system of border protection against support of subversion. If it is decided after thorough study that we can establish a line of border outposts which will provide protection, then, Ky said, he believed the best option would be for all concerned to reach a secret agreement with the VC. We could afford it then, he said, but must exclude NVN. Tran Van Do supported the same doubts [re?] guarantee approach: an internal sealing off of the border by police efforts plus a broad international military commitment. Ky said that the actual number of geographical routes for infiltration in the air and on the ground into SVN are not numerous. It is possible to seal them off physically.

16. Concerning US-NVN negotiations, Ky said he did not believe that Hanoi would ever sit down with the US. To do so would contradict all its propaganda and destroy the people's belief in what the government has said. This is a Vietnamese reaction, and Hanoi cannot afford to accept it, which poses a real problem if it does want to consider negotiations. NVN has also never admitted its military presence in the South; to deal with the US would be an acknowledgement of this. Ky said he frankly believes that when Hanoi finally reaches the conclusion that it cannot win the war, they will simply withdraw their troops and cease active military operations for a period of years, leaving the GVN to cope with a revived VC at some later date. The VC, Ky said, if they decide to negotiate with the US, must, therefore, do it secretly. What they are really interested in, Thieu said, will be "la monnaie de change"--the chips to use in the poker game. In this case our best chips in NVN are our bombing, and our best chips in SVN will have to be our threat to the guerrilla infrastructure--when we have it.

National Reconciliation

17. I read through an outline drawn from State telegrams 23182, 52726, and 52727, noting the possibility of an amnesty proclamation on Nov 1.

18. Ky replied that the timing appeared to him to be premature. This is important since poor timing of an appeal could adversely affect the morale of the South Vietnamese troops who would see their enemies being accepted back before they were defeated. This could pretty well eliminate their fighting capacity.

19. Thieu, however, said he was planning a speech for November 1 which would be the kind of plea which we desire. I left with them a memorandum covering the proposal and they agreed to consider its applicability for the November 1 speech.

20. Ky said the govt can help itself by effectively helping the victims of the present floods in the Delta. A program is being launched by Social Welfare Commissioner Tran Ngoc Lieng to provide materials and assist-ance to build new houses upon stilts in flood areas. These would be permanent alterations since the floods recur annually, and houses on stilts would eliminate need for evacuations. The people are enthusiastic about the program, but it will take more time.

21. A further consideration to hold off on a proclamation is to allow successful dry-season operations to have full effect. We are agreed in principle, Tran Van Do said, on the idea of appeal, but it should be delayed until after the flood problem is resolved and the government has been able to demonstrate its authority and responsiveness to the people.

22. The flood alleviation concept is sound, I agreed, and said I would get USAID to provide what it could to help the program in addition to the food distribution program now underway. This is an area where the VC cannot be of any help to the people, thereby offering the government a useful opportunity. I asked their views on the Chieu Hoi program, saying I had been disappointed that the highly successful elections had had no effect on it.

23. Thieu replied that over the years Chieu Hoi has not had a powerful appeal. The enemy tends to wait things out, to sit back and see how actual conditions develop rather than respond to governmental appeals. What is needed is a dramatic gesture to get momentum started, backed by better organization. All agreed on the importance of improving the Chieu Hoi effort.

24. The meeting ended with mutual agreement that it had been extremely useful and that we would meet again in about six days.

25. Comments: One aspect of the positions taken by Thieu, Ky and Do deserves special mention. Those positions reflect a continuing fragility in the political structure in Viet-Nam, despite the substantial success of recent months. This lies behind some of the caution with which they approach the problem of negotiations, as well as the caution with which they approach other problems. We are still greatly concerned, as we have been for some time, with the importance of maintaining governmental stability in Saigon. The unity of military leadership is always precarious, given the rivalries that exist. Even self-assured people like Thieu and Ky recognize limits on how far and how fast they can move on any question--whether negotiations or the fight against corruption. I believe they responded well to our presentation, particularly to the dealing with amnesty and a reconciliation proclamation of November 1. On other items they were more cautious. They recognize something which I have mentioned before--namely, that there is a pace at which things can be made to move here. If we or they exceed that pace too greatly, then there is a danger of reaction and instability despite the best of intentions. This needs to be taken in particular account when dealing with a subject so replete with potential pitfalls as negotiations and contacts with the Viet Cong.

26. Please let us have your views on Tran Van Do's proposal that the seven nation conference make some sort of a multilateral mutual security commitment.

Lodge

259. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Secret.

Dear Dean:

By message of 16 August 1966 (Saigon's 3601),/2/ Ambassador Lodge raised the question of the possible extension of defoliation operations into the DMZ and requested the views of the Departments of State and Defense on the desirability of doing so.

/2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-10 VIET S)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that, from a military standpoint, defoliation of areas in SVN within and near the DMZ is highly desirable and should be undertaken. I agree with this position.

As you are aware, Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces have been exploiting the combination of remoteness and heavy vegetation found in the DMZ to their own purposes and advantage. This is particularly true in the western sector. The seriousness of NVA/VC use of the zone is illustrated by the recent introduction of the 324B Division of the NVA directly across the zone into SVN where the force now confronts GVN, US and other friendly forces in combat. Intelligence indicates that the communists are resupplying the units recently infiltrated into South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province through the DMZ and are building a supply base in the zone for future operations.

Defoliation in the southern portion of the DMZ may have political as well as definite military advantages. Such operations are defensive in nature and would assist the efforts of the ICC and all who seek actual demilitarization of the zone.

Defoliation has been conducted in SVN since 1961 and in Laos since 1965. Such operations continue routinely today. In my opinion, the political risks of defoliation in and near the DMZ should be less than the predictable military risks of failure on our part to take all reasonable measures to deny the communists continued use of the DMZ. Since it takes up to three months for the jungle cover to fall after spraying, this matter is one which requires early attention.

Current authority for defoliation within SVN was delegated to the American Ambassador Saigon and COMUSMACV after review by the highest authority in May 1963. Extension of this authority to include the southern portion of the DMZ would seem to be appropriate under current circumstances. If you agree, I would appreciate your releasing the required instruction essentially as contained in the attached draft joint State/Defense message./3/

/3/Attached but not printed. Rusk concurred in a letter of November 18 to McNamara, stating: "While I can foresee some unfavorable political reaction to these operations, I believe the reaction would be manageable as long as we avoid defoliating any area of North Vietnam." Defoliation operations in the southern sector of the DMZ were authorized in telegram 91707 to Saigon, November 26. Rusk's letter is quoted and telegram 91707 is cited in JCS telegram 1752, December 19. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII)

Sincerely,
Bob

260. Editorial Note

In his weekly telegram, October 5, 1966, Lodge notified President Johnson that a Cabinet crisis was brewing in South Vietnam:

"A crisis, so far not of serious dimensions, is taking place in the Ky government. The chief of the office staff of the Minister of Health, Nguyen Tan Loc, who, under Vietnamese and French custom, has the impressive title of 'Director of Cabinet,' was arrested September 29 and held overnight on vague charges of Southern separatist activity. The charge is believed untrue. Southern members of the Cabinet, particularly Youth Minister Vo Long Trieu, interpreted the arrest as a move to intimidate Southern officials. Trieu and other Southern Ministers apparently seriously considered submitting their resignations as a result.

"At an October 3 Cabinet meeting Minister of Education Truong (Southerner) raised the issue and suggested that Minister of Health Kha (a Northerner) was trying to force Loc out of the Ministry, a charge which may well be true since Loc and Kha are known to have been at odds over proposals to reorganize the Ministry. Deputy Prime Minister Vien (Southerner) then charged that Kha has managed the Ministry of Health very poorly. Kha thereupon tendered his resignation.

"It is not yet clear whether Prime Minister Ky will accept Kha's resignation. To fail to do so could trigger resignations by Trieu, Truong, and Vien. In any event regional differences have unfortunately been intensified within the government." (Telegram 7732; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

261. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

SecDel/MC/41

New York, October 5, 1966, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Approved in S on October 12. The meeting was held at USUN.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September-October 1966

SUBJECT
Vietnam Conflict

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
William M. Owen

Republic of Vietnam
Bui Diem, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Deputy Foreign Minister Diem said that Prime Minister Ky had instructed him to come to New York and to present his government's views to as many delegations as possible. The Secretary noted that it was important that this be done since Diem spoke as an Asian and his views would carry weight amongst the Afro-Asians. The communique issued at the ASPAC Meeting in Seoul/2/ had also been very helpful in this respect.

/2/The communique was issued following the first Ministerial meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council, June 14-16. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 618-619.

Diem said he had also been instructed by Prime Minister Ky to inquire as to the outcome of any discussions the United States had had with Russian and French representatives. The Secretary said that the talks with the French had been of no use whatsoever, since it was quite clear that France accepted no responsibility in Southeast Asia. De Gaulle's attitude was that he desired peace regardless of the consequences, which was not the U.S. view. The press had reported that Couve de Murville had tried to draw us out on an eventual peace settlement. The Secretary had told Couve that he would not negotiate this matter with him because Couve could not stop the fighting./3/ We have had no indication from Hanoi directly or indirectly that they are interested in a serious approach to peace, so it looks as if the fighting will have to continue for a period of time.

/3/Accounts of Rusk's conversations with Couve de Murville concerning Vietnam on October 3 and 4 were transmitted in telegrams 60476 and 62579 to Paris, October 5 and 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

As to the Russian attitude, the Secretary said that their basic view is that if they were acting alone they would be prepared to see the matter settled on the basis of the status quo ante at the 17th Parallel. The problem was that they were attacked by Peking, which accused them of conspiring with the U.S. The Soviet Union is impotent in the face of this bitter attitude from Peking. Russia does not like the fact that we are bombing a fellow socialist country in North Vietnam, but, when we ask the Russians what will happen when we stop bombing them, they have nothing to say on that point. They say they cannot negotiate on this matter because Hanoi has not asked them to do so. They are embarrassed. On the other hand, it would be of some interest to Diem to know that Gromyko did not interpose Vietnam as a barrier to discussion of other subjects with us. This was of some significance because it showed that Vietnam was not an overriding problem with them. Russia was very much concerned about Communist China, where none of us really knew very much about what was happening.

Diem said that he had met with Secretary General U Thant earlier in the day and pointed out to him that the South Vietnamese were more interested than anyone in peace. At the same time, Diem drew U Thant's attention to the fact that the Communists have not shown the same desire for peace, whether through the UN or any other channel, and said that fact should be taken into account.

After the discussion of another subject, the Secretary observed that he thought we were coming to a very interesting and critical period because Hanoi must now be coming to realize that they could not succeed by military force. They must therefore decide what consequences would derive from such a situation. Diem recalled the Secretary's visit to Saigon last year and the speculation which it created in Hanoi.

The Secretary expressed the belief that the recent elections in South Vietnam have had a very important international result. If the Constituent Assembly succeeded in working out a constitution and could cooperate with the government on progressive measures, there would be a new chapter in the development of Vietnam because it would be made quite clear to Hanoi that they could not succeed politically in the south, which has been one of their hopes. The military side was also going quite well despite the problems of guerilla warfare. One of the difficult tasks was, of course, to bring as many as possible of the misguided people in the National Liberation Front back into the orbit of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Diem agreed, but noted that progress had been made only at a low level. The NLF has a very tight control. Whenever a member of the NLF moves from one area to another, he is very closely scrutinized. Many people have raised the idea of having a`UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU

As to the Russis frankly refused because it is afraid of such a government.

Diem said he had told the African delegations here that it was crystal clear that the conflict was an international problem since North Vietnam was infiltrating personnel into the south and that they should go back north. When they did so, there would be no problem. It was clear from his talks that the various delegations had a common concern for peace. He also felt that there was now a better understanding of the Vietnamese position, although they were not going to say publicly that they understood it.

The Secretary estimated that there were 65-70 governments who very much hoped that the South Vietnamese, the U.S., and their allies would succeed although they did not emphasize the point publicly. About 25 governments, composed of the communist bloc, France, and some others hoped that we would not succeed, while another 15-25 did not want to hear or think about Vietnam. The Secretary did not believe that the situation with respect to these various governments would change very much, but we should not be timid about making them realize that the security of South Vietnam is of great significance to other small countries.

In reply to Diem's query as to what we had heard of a draft resolution on Vietnam at the General Assembly, the Secretary said that there have been reports that a number of countries have been working not on a joint resolution but on a joint statement, but that it appears that only a limited number of countries are interested, including Cambodia, Algeria, Guinea, and two or three others. Apparently it would not be a bilateral but a unilateral initiative. They were not getting much response, but we would watch the matter closely. The Secretary suggested that Diem need not be concerned about the statement.

The Secretary stated that it sounded rather harsh to say so, but the fact was that international opinion was not going to make these decisions as far as the U.S. was concerned, because most of these countries bore no responsibility. He found it rather distressing that those who have treaty commitments are not as solid as they should be: these include France, the UK--which should be doing more than it was--and Pakistan. Otherwise, all SEATO members were taking an active part and bearing responsibilities. Diem stated he did not think the French position was going to change unless De Gaulle left the scene. The Secretary agreed.

The Secretary added a point of clarification which he thought was of some interest. He had pressed Couve very hard to tell him whether his reference to the use of foreign troops in Vietnam included the use of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Couve responded ambiguously that he did not make that point publicly. If he did clarify that point, the Secretary observed, it would help somewhat.

Diem said that while his discussions with other delegations were helpful, he did not have the impression that the Secretary General was really willing to understand the problem. U Thant explains that he is trying to see the problem from a very humanitarian aspect. Diem was very frank with him and told him it was impossible to solve the problem from that viewpoint alone. The Secretary agreed and added that it would not be solved by being humanitarian and getting out of the way, thereby letting North Vietnam overrun South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese would then be able to liquidate the leadership of the non-communist elements in South Vietnam, which was the bulk of the leadership.

Diem said that many delegations had asked if South Vietnam had any concessions to make to the other side. He had told them that they had one shirt and nothing more. They had no territorial ambitions north of the 17th Parallel; they did not wish to destroy any regime; they simply wanted to be left alone. When queried about one of Ky's most publicized statements, he was able to explain that the Prime Minister had been speaking in purely defensive terms but that they had no choice but to fight if they were pushed against the wall. The Secretary said that we have no doubt in our own mind that all of the Asian countries outside Peking, Hanoi, and possibly North Korea hope that we succeed in our efforts, although some of them will not say so publicly; for example, India and Pakistan. Even Prince Sihanouk hopes for our success now that he has been made apprehensive by China.

Diem referred to the television statement by Deputy Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia/4/ in which he was quoted as saying that Malaysia would be sending troops to South Vietnam. The Secretary said that he had heard the program and thought that an ambiguous question and answer had been misrepresented by the press. The question seemed to ask for Malaysian views about sending troops to South Vietnam, which Razak apparently interpreted as referring to the troops which had already been sent there by other countries. He was thinking in general terms and was not thinking of sending Malaysian troops. The Secretary was quite sure that Razak had been misunderstood. Diem said that it was quite amazing because he had understood that the Malaysian position on the subject was still very vague. The Secretary noted, however, that Malaysia was prepared to give political support, as they did at the ASPAC Meeting in Seoul when they joined in the communique. Diem stated that he had been present, and understood that the Malaysians had had a problem with Indonesia and wished to stay on good terms with them until the non-confrontation agreement and withdrawal of troops had been fully implemented.

/4/Not further identified.

The Secretary said he thought it very important from the viewpoint of public opinion in the U.S. to let Asians speak for themselves on these matters. Diem said that he had tried to do so during his New York stay by giving the views of his government. Prime Minister Ky had directed that more initiative be taken in this respect, perhaps including the sending of more envoys abroad. If such measures were not taken, there would be an impression that they were only a tool of the big powers.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Constituent Assembly would move along constructively and smoothly and would build political solidarity which would demonstrate especially to Hanoi that the country was on firm foundations. Diem agreed, saying it was very important that Hanoi realize they would have to negotiate or at least to cease their aggressive actions.

The Secretary inquired whether there was any doubt now amongst the South Vietnamese that the United States meant business, that we were determined to see the matter through. Diem replied that in the government there was no doubt as to U.S. intentions. There was also an understanding of the difficulties faced by the U.S. in the exercise of its world-wide responsibilities and commitments. Nevertheless, sometimes the man in the street in Vietnam was rather vague about the U.S. position, as were people in the provinces. An example could be found in Ambassador Goldberg's recent speech. "All of us" agreed with 99 percent of his statement but on one point in which he referred to the "obstacle as not being unsurmountable,"/5/ there was some misunderstanding even though the government understood it very well. The Secretary noted that the same statement had been made by President Johnson in July 1965./6/ Diem said they understood, but some people thought it was really a change in United States policy. They had been told that it was not. Diem asserted that it was a problem of tactical approach.

/5/Reference is to Goldberg's statement regarding the role of the National Liberation Front in peace negotiations in his September 22 speech to the U.N. General Assembly; see Document 244.

/6/For text of the President's statement on July 28, 1965, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, p. 803.

The Secretary stated that there were two points which Diem might keep in mind if anyone raised this question with him: (1) the 300,000 Americans who were in South Vietnam were not there as tourists, but were fighting; (2) the democratic society of the U.S. was made up of people who wished to do what was necessary provided they understood that there was no honorable alternative. It was, therefore, necessary to tell them that there would be peace now if the other side would make peace. By tradition, if one scratched the skin of an American, one found an isolationist. The change of tradition which had developed in the past 20 years had called for an act of will on the part of the American people. They had suffered 180,000 casualties since World War II in resisting communist aggression around the world, most of the casualties being in Asia. If people looked at what we are doing, they should be persuaded. We have not abandoned anyone, but have kept our treaty commitments. We are not giving South Vietnam away. We have lost 5,000 killed to prevent his country from falling under Hanoi's control. The Secretary believed we should all concentrate on getting the job done. He did not know when and how the denouement would come. Diem said he hoped it would not be too far away. We had the initiative now. He hoped we could show the communists convincingly that they could not win. They would then accept the situation. It was a matter of pushing forward very hard, but it would take a certain period of time to do it. In South Vietnam they had suffered from various coups and changes of government which had stimulated the hopes of Hanoi. The Secretary said that if he might be very frank these problems have been our biggest concern in terms of U.S. public opinion. Americans keep asking, "whom have we to support?" Accordingly, if there was real solidarity in South Vietnam, there would be general encouragement and the American people would feel that progress was being made.

The Secretary said he looked forward to seeing Diem again in Manila and asked him to convey his good wishes to Prime Minister Ky and other South Vietnamese leaders.

262. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, July-Dec. 1966. Secret. Komer sent a copy of the memorandum to Katzenbach on November 29 under a covering memorandum stating that he believed it had "had considerable impact." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Manila--and Vietnam in General. Now that I've been on Vietnam six months (the only full time senior official in Washington), I feel that I've learned something about Vietnam.

I. The REAL OBJECTIVE. To me, it is achieving a satisfactory outcome by the end of 1967, or at the minimum achieving such momentum that it will be clear to all--including the US public--that it is only a matter of time. To me, this is quite feasible if we take the right steps beginning now.

We can't predict such imponderables as ChiCom intervention; but we can devise a policy which reduces their likelihood. For example, I believe we can develop a "win" strategy without further major escalation against the North, or sizable US deployments beyond what you've already approved.

We're doing better than we think. We've actually gotten up more momentum in Vietnam than we're willing to admit as yet. Most of the indicators are running favorably--indeed all except pacification and continued infiltration from the North.

On the latter score, Westy has hit on a winning strategy against the NVA/VC main force. So far this year the NVA/VC have mounted on the average only 1.3 battalion or multi-battalion-sized attacks a week. So most of the 170-odd enemy battalions our order of battle carries must be busy defending themselves or hiding from our air, artillery, and search and destroy operations, or foraging to support themselves. Westy keeps prudently estimating that they will yet catch us off-guard somewhere, but they haven't won a major battle in over a year so far. Meanwhile, Westy's strength continues to grow; he can go anywhere in the country and does. Our air power is up to more than 30,000 sorties a month. We're inflicting heavier casualties than ever before.

In fact, where is all that enemy strength? I'd agree with Joe Alsop that enemy effectives, especially VC, may be lower than our conservative O/B indicates. Certainly the enemy is hurting more if PW and defector reports, the generally declining incident rate, the total NVA/VC inability to win victories mean anything at all. Nor were the enemy able to exploit effectively the major dissidence in I Corps last spring or the 11 September elections, though we know they tried. Add our success in controlling inflation and in promoting the start of a healthy political evolution, and we have at the end of September 1966 achieved some real momentum in Vietnam.

II. HOW DO WE ACHIEVE EVEN GREATER MOMENTUM IN 1967? To me, there is no one decisive element! Rather it is a matter of properly orchestrating and pushing on at least seven different major fronts in 1967. If we do so, I think we can achieve sufficient cumulative impact either to force the enemy to negotiate or cripple his ability to sustain the war.

A. Step up Westy's campaign against the NVA/VC main force. This is essential to contain the NVA infiltrators and keep the organized enemy large units off our backs while we step up pacification. When I see what 80 or so US/FW maneuver battalions plus our air and artillery have already accomplished, I'm confident that with 10-15 more battalions by end 1966, we'll do even better. Westy prudently predicts new NVA/VC offensives, but if they couldn't mount one up to now the odds are he can keep them even more off balance from here on. The prognosis here is for even greater success, perhaps without much increase in US forces beyond our presently scheduled buildup.

But neither Westy's spoiling campaigns nor our graduated air offensive against the North seem likely by themselves to force the enemy to cry uncle. Our best estimate is that he could sustain this punishment and keep infiltrating for quite a time. I also doubt that Hanoi will accept that it's lost this war until we start steadily pacifying the countryside. This would also deny it the option of reverting to guerrilla war. So we need yet other strings to our bow to increase the pressure on Hanoi, deny it the guerrilla option, and erode its base in the south.

B. The trick is to focus increasingly on the most vulnerable enemy element--the VC. Even present intelligence suggests that their strength has already peaked, their morale is declining, and they face increasingly difficulty in finding food, medicine, and recruits. The more we can erode their strength and peel off the VC from the NVA, the more we can isolate the latter, sharply decrease their effectiveness, and demonstrate to everyone that the only real problem is invasion from the North. We can achieve this via the following programs, if we really back them up.

C. Step up Pacification in the Countryside. As I've repeatedly warned privately, we're not yet going anywhere fast. Nor will we, in my judgment, so long as we fail to recognize that pacification is first and foremost a military task--providing continuous local security. There's no point in blaming the civilians when the critical first phase of pacification is primarily a military job--and one which only the US and RVNAF military have the resources to do. This is why I back McNamara's proposal as an important first step.

D. Reviving the GVN Armed Forces. But unless we want to send a lot more US forces, and keep them there a lot longer than our political posture calls for, we must get the Vietnamese to do most of the pacification job. This makes sense, because they certainly aren't pulling their weight now. We've got to get them back into the war more effectively, so it won't be so much a US war. I think this is the biggest single thing we could do toward getting quick results in Vietnam--and it won't cost the US much at all because we're already paying and supporting all 700,000 GVN armed forces. To markedly increase their efficiency would be a major breakthrough at little cost. But it means guiding them more effectively--mostly into pacification, ensuring better leadership, improving their attitudes toward the peasant, and perhaps getting them under Westy's actual command (see below).

E. Mounting a massive national reconciliation campaign. Harriman is already effectively pushing this, and deserves top backing. We need to step up sharply all defector programs--high level and low. As we increase the pressure on the southern VC, it will increase the effectiveness of appeals to them to rally to the new South Vietnam. As the GVN acquires more confidence, plus a broader popular base, I believe that it will be less fearful of extending a hand to the VC.

F. We must avoid a retrogression to military government in Saigon. The success of the above strategy, and the credibility of our political purpose, depends on forestalling new military coups. I'm all for the military continuing to play a major political role in VN (we can't prevent it, and need their help). But we've passed the point of no return with the 11 September election. There are already worrisome signs of military wire-pulling in Saigon, and we can't afford to let it happen.

G. We must have a tough stabilization program to keep inflation under control. I won't rehearse the arguments, because I think we're all agreed. I'm also confident that McNamara can keep the really big spenders--the US and ARVN military--in line. I've even got Lodge on board in favor of a tough spending limit. We'll have to keep constantly after this matter, but note that my program does not require big US outlays. In fact, if it works we could cut back in certain respects.

H. Step up the "other war"--not just pacification but other positive meas-ures. We have plans for this, and should gain enough momentum in agriculture, health, education, port clearance, etc. during 1967 to help considerably.

I. If the above seven programs go at all well, we'll have another factor working for us--increasing confidence that our side has it made. This intangible psychological factor may be the most important of all. Lodge, who has a shrewd ear for such things, already senses a new mood of confidence in Saigon. We must build on this to get a real bandwagon psychology rolling--which will greatly reinforce all other elements of our strategy in 1967. By our own postwar programs we can add to this bandwagon effect.

III. We badly need a carefully orchestrated strategic plan and program in order to accomplish all the above in 1967. It won't just happen. To get optimum results will require pulling all the strands together in a comprehensive program for 1967, getting all US elements on board, selling it to the GVN, and last but not least establishing the machinery to make sure it's carried out. In all honesty, I must report that I don't think we're properly organized in Saigon or Washington to serve you most effectively on Vietnam. We need:

A. A comprehensive strategic plan for 1967. You've seen the Komer/Rostow paper/2/ which was a first crack at one. So far State is too busy with Manila preparations to be able to flesh it out.

/2/Document 241.

B. An effective sub-cabinet level mechanism in Washington to monitor performance. We badly need to organize more systematically to (1) keep you properly informed on key programs; (2) do the staff work necessary to present you with coordinated recommendations; and (3) follow through on your decisions. You've seen my proposal for a small "war cabinet" chaired by Nick Katzenbach./3/

/3/See footnote 4, Document 250.

C. A Joint Command which gives Westy more control over ARVN--an essential in my view if we are to get proper use out of this asset. With 400,000 US troops soon to be in Vietnam, and with six of seven countries at Manila already accepting US command, why couldn't you sign Ky on too? The Koreans have proposed this for the agenda, which gives a great opening.

D. Give Pacification Management to Westy. You've heard my voice on this. I'll just say again that we won't get up real momentum in pacifying hamlets until you give it to the only people who can do most of the job. Lack of progress so far is not the fault of the civilians--it is basically because the US and ARVN military haven't provided the one essential ingredient--local security./4/

/4/In a telephone conversation with McNamara that began at 7:48 a.m. on October 5, the President said regarding pacification: "I feel very strongly that it ought to go to the military." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape 66.27, Side B, PNO 2)

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: If what I say makes sense we can take a big step toward it during the upcoming trips to Saigon and Manila. In fact, what you can get moving privately there could be just as important as the public posture we create.

A. A real coup at Manila would be for you to sign Ky on to (1) continued political evolution--and no more coups; (2) a big push on pacification; (3) a tough anti-inflationary agreement; (4) a national reconciliation program.

B. But this will take a lot of prior spadework in Saigon. Lodge alone can't do it, but McNamara, Katzenbach, and I could help a lot if charged to do so.

C. So I urge that the above be the agenda for a meeting Saturday morning/5/ at which you tell us:

/5/On Friday, October 7, the President flew to the LBJ Ranch for the weekend, returning to Washington on October 10. He did not meet with Komer in Texas. However, from 7:35 to 8 p.m. on October 7, prior to his departure for Texas, he met privately with Komer, McNamara, and Katzenbach on board Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base. No record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

(1) You want us to press Ky/Thieu to stand up and say the right things at Manila.

(2) You want an across-the-board strategic plan and program for 1967 before Manila--one which will produce irresistible momentum before the end of 1967.

(3) You want an overhaul of our machinery both in Washington and Saigon so that this program can really be made to work (no need to saw off specifically on pacification management yet).

Postscripts. I may be way off base, but I think that a program like the one I describe offers the best chance of a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam:

First, it doesn't call for a lot more troops or escalated strikes against the North (I've omitted barriers, where I'm with McNamara). Instead, it calls for better management, better orchestration, and better use of the assets we already have.

Second, I don't think it will cost a lot more money beyond what we already plan to spend. It seeks to avoid greater inflationary pressures by making better use of what's already going for us.

Third, it is just as well designed to bring Hanoi to the conference table as it is to "win" the war. Few things would maximize the pressure on Hanoi more than our cutting down or defecting the southern VC--which leaves the NVA increasingly isolated.

Finally, if it works, and we do get up visibly growing momentum in the South, it opens the option of cutting back (I don't say stopping) at least the marginal increment of our bombing in the North--which seems to me awfully expensive in proportion to return.

R. W. Komer/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

263. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/

Washington, October 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, McNamara Project. Secret.

SUBJECT
McNamara Pacification Reorganization Proposal Activity

Summary

(1) The President has apparently bought the rationale behind the McNamara pacification reorganization proposal and presently feels that the burden of proof is on its opponents to come up with something better. No firm decisions, however, have yet been taken.

(2) AID (Mr. Poats), State (Ambassador Unger) and Ambassador Porter are all strongly opposed to the proposal but not sure how to proceed in fighting it or what to offer in the way of an alternative.

(3) AID's counter proposal (copy attached)/2/ is not likely to carry the day. As of now (6 October) it looks as if the final decision will not be made until the McNamara party (including Messrs. Komer, Katzenbach and Porter) has returned to Washington after reviewing the bidding with Ambassador Lodge and his colleagues.

/2/Not attached; see footnote 6 below.

(4) In discussing this whole affair, Ambassador Porter had high praise for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the Saigon Station.

1. On Wednesday, 5 October, I spent several hours with Ambassador Unger, Ambassador Porter and, intermittently, AID Assistant Administrator Poats, going over the McNamara proposal in all its aspects and ramifications. For essentially similar reasons AID (Poats) and State (Unger) and Ambassador Porter are all opposed to the proposal but uncertain about how to proceed in fighting it or what to offer in the way of an alternative.

2. Ambassador Unger felt that someone (Mr. Komer, Secretary McNamara, or both) had already gotten to the President and sold him on the thesis that pacification was not working, drastic U.S. organizational rationalization and surgery was required, the U.S. military alone "had the horses" to do what was needed, hence the U.S. military should be given command authority and told to do the job./3/ According to Ambassador Unger, the President was strongly inclined to endorse the McNamara proposal. He had listened to counter arguments (from Secretary Rusk) but was not persuaded and felt the burden of proof was on the dissenters, who should fall in line unless they could soon come up with a better alternative. In any event, the President wanted a decision made in principle before the McNamara party left for Saigon on 8 October. A White House meeting was tentatively scheduled for the morning of 8 October to review the bidding and come up with a decision. Ambassador Lodge would be consulted but, in effect, after the basic decision had already been made.

/3/In an October 2 memorandum to Rusk, Unger summarized Porter's views on McNamara's proposal following a telephone conversation with Porter. Under cover of an October 4 memorandum, Rostow forwarded Unger's memorandum to the President "as background to our discussion at lunch today." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX) No record of the luncheon discussion has been found; Rostow's agenda noted, under "Viet Nam: Organization of Pacification," that "Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been informed by Porter that there will be great difficulty with Lodge about turning the organization of pacification over to the military." (Ibid., Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 14)

3. Ambassador Porter objected strongly to the McNamara proposal itself and to the mode of procedure outlined above./4/ He felt:

/4/In a September 30 memorandum to the President, Komer made the following comments regarding McNamara's proposal to put pacification under the military: "I will say flatly that unless we do so, despite all the confusion it will entail, we will NOT get the early results in pacification necessary to 'win' the war with dispatch. . . . It's the only way to get real results before 1968." (Ibid., Komer Files, Memos to the President)

a. It was inaccurate to say that pacification was not going well and unrealistic to have expected spectacular, measurable results in the eight months since Honolulu. Pacification involves rebuilding the whole structure of South Vietnamese society, a task that could not possibly be accomplished in a short span of time.

b. No organizational structure is perfect. The current U.S. pacification organization could be improved; but scrapping it to set up a new one would inevitably check the momentum now building up. It would take us another eight months of shakedown to get back to where we are today.

c. Putting a military cast on the U.S. pacification effort would work against the major U.S. political objective of trying to civilianize the GVN and would seriously complicate our political problems within South Vietnam.

d. Past experience (CIDG/Switchback, the Saigon Port) does not indicate that civil programs are likely to improve if the U.S. military takes them over. For years the U.S. military has had all the command authority it needs to address itself to the crucial problem of rural security, which is far from being solved. This is hardly an argument for giving it more authority and assigning it additional tasks. Rural development, especially its associated cadre program, is not a military activity and its essential spirit would be lost if it became a military activity.

e. Above all, major reorganization of the U.S. Mission should not be decided on until Ambassador Lodge and his immediate colleagues have had a chance to examine the proposal and express their views on it. If the McNamara proposal were presented as a virtual fait accompli, Ambassador Porter felt Lodge's reaction was likely to be pyrotechnic and he would probably resign.

4. Mr. Komer called during our discussion and told Ambassador Porter the final decision would not be made until Ambassador Lodge had been properly consulted, though Porter had serious reservations about the value of these assurances. Komer also said the tentatively scheduled Saturday morning (8 October) White House meeting would not focus on reorganization of pacification but would be a general review of the bidding in Vietnam. Even after this call, Porter was not sure whether he was to attend the Saturday morning meeting, but understood that he was to accompany McNamara to Saigon.

5. Ambassador Porter mentioned that the essence of the McNamara proposal had been surfaced by Mr. Komer in an informal letter sent to Saigon last summer./5/ Mr. Komer's letter had stressed, however, that it was not an official proposal for the U.S. Mission to study but only an informal note designed to give Lodge and Porter the flavor of "some ideas circulating around town" (i.e., Washington). Unger felt that Komer might cite the letter as evidence that Lodge had in fact been consulted already on the reorganization proposal. (Unger later told me privately that it seemed to him that Lodge and Porter had apparently ignored Komer's letter, hoping the ideas expressed therein would die quietly. It was obvious that they had not done so.) Porter also said that Lodge plans to return to the U.S. in November on leave and to remain at least through December. If the U.S. pacification effort should be reorganized, Porter would be in charge during the transition period.

/5/Presumably a reference to Komer's August 10 letter to Lodge. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Komer Files, Lodge)

6. The only piece of paper that emerged from our 6 October conversations was the attached AID memorandum to McNamara, drafted by Poats and signed by Mr. Gaud./6/ Ambassadors Porter and Unger felt it was a weak lance with which to do battle and that AID's proposed "alternative" was not a satisfactory answer to the problem. (I agree.) They also felt that the best alternative lay in using the present structure (i.e., a civilian pacification director reporting directly to the Ambassador) but giving the pacification director a stronger personal staff and more direct command authority over pacification programs at regional and provincial levels. (In essence, this is the approach suggested in our 28 September memorandum to you.)/7/ I took the line that the Agency would be willing to turn the RD program over to such a structure (i.e., the assets and responsibilities of the Station's Cadre Operations Division) provided suitable arrangements could be made to relieve the Agency of the responsibility for funding this program and supporting it logistically. I also indicated that we would not be willing to turn over control of our intelligence collection activities at regional and provincial level (Police Special Branch liaison), but would be willing to detail an officer to the regional and provincial pacification directors to serve as their intelligence advisor and ensure that their requirements were serviced efficiently and promptly.

/6/Gaud's October 5 memorandum proposed six standards for organizing pacification/revolutionary development, including direct responsiveness to the U.S. Ambassador, unified command, and an "emphasis on civil leadership and constructive purposes, while fully utilizing military capabilities at all levels." Gaud stated that McNamara's proposal would "look like a move toward military government, play into the hands of critics," and run counter to the evolution of civilian government. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)

/7/Document 248.

7. The real problem remains that of integrating U.S. military assets into the pacification director's command channel, in particular giving him some effective control over the activities of U.S. military advisors to Popular Forces, Regional Forces and ARVN units assigned to pacification duties. Neither Porter nor Unger had an answer for this one that they felt the military would buy. Both were inclined to the notion of giving the pacification director a military deputy (two or three star) who could service his military requirements but could still, somehow, remain subordinate to COMUSMACV's overall authority. (One solution might be to double-hat such an officer as COMUMACV's deputy for pacification operations and as the pacification director's military deputy. This was the suggestion Unger planned to make to Mr. Katzenbach, who was to be briefed on the whole affair later in the afternoon of 5 October.)

8. As of now, all that can be said with assurance about the pacification reorganization proposal is that no firm decision has been made and there will almost certainly be more thrashing about before one is taken. It now appears that the final decision will not be made until after the McNamara party (which will include Messrs. Komer, Katzenbach and Porter) has visited Saigon and reviewed the bidding with Ambassador Lodge.

9. During the discussion outlined above, Ambassador Porter spoke several times in glowing terms about the Saigon Station and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He had high praise for the Station's performance and warm appreciation for the support and wholehearted cooperation he received from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

George A. Carver, Jr.

264. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 10, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Nodis. Approved in the White House on October 13. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, lasted from 5 to 6:41 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The President discussed his meeting with Gromyko in a telephone conversation with Senator Fulbright that began at 5:20 p.m. on October 11. Both a recording and a transcript of the conversation are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F66.28, PNO 2; the transcript is in Chron Series.

SUBJECT

Miscellaneous Matters

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson
Mr. Rostow

U.S.S.R.
Mr. Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev

The President opened the conversation by saying that he had been informed of the Minister's talks with Secretary Rusk and the Minister's other activities and thought he must have been a very busy man.

Gromyko said it was true that he had much to do here. He had an exchange of views with Secretary Rusk and had also had a meeting with Ambassador Goldberg to discuss questions which he had raised. He assumed the President was informed of the content of these meetings and this would facilitate his task.

The President said he had been informed of these discussions and that Secretary Rusk would have a further discussion with him this evening. While waiting for the photographers to come in, the President said that the Soviets had allowed their Ambassador to come back to Washington and in return the President had selected the best man we had to go to Moscow.

Mr. Gromyko said Mr. Thompson would be very welcome in Moscow. After the photographers had left, Mr. Gromyko remarked that the temperature of the room had risen as a result of their activities. The President replied that he hoped not as his job was to cool things down.

Gromyko said that the leadership and the Government of the Soviet Union often discussed the question of where the policy of the United States is leading. He presumed that there was an awareness of the responsibility of the United States and of the Soviet Union in world affairs. However, certain facts related to United States policy baffled the Soviets. He could declare on behalf of the Soviet Union that it was in our mutual interest to work for better relations. If the United States Government and Mr. Johnson, as President, were willing to take steps to promote international detente to improve relations, they would not find the Soviet Union lacking in response as this was in accord with the wishes of both the Soviet Government and its people.

The President said he agreed with the points Mr. Gromyko had made. We were just as baffled about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It was evident that we had not communicated with each other very well. He also agreed that agreement between our two great powers was of the highest importance and that we had a great responsibility to the world. He had on many occasions tried to take steps to ease tension. He had been greatly encouraged in the correspondence that had taken place during his early months in office. He had been deeply disappointed that the keeping of our commitment to South Viet-Nam seemed to frustrate these early beginnings. He had been distressed to read in the Soviet press remarks about himself personally and about the motivation of his Administration. He knew that the Soviet and American people wanted friendship and he was always ready to go more than half way to reach agreement. The greatest reward to him as President, and the greatest blessing for all people, would be if we could succeed in this endeavor.

Gromyko said that the President had referred to Viet-Nam and remarked that he had discussed this with Secretary Rusk and had explained the Soviet point of view./2/ He had also touched on this in the meeting with Ambassador Goldberg. He would like to hear the President's personal view and know what way out of the situation he saw. The Soviet Government has expressed its position on Viet-Nam and he had explained it to Secretary Rusk, but he would like to touch on certain points after hearing the President's point of view.

/2/See Document 247.

The President said he had mentioned Viet-Nam because he had heard that it was this question that explained the Soviet attitude toward the United States and its leaders. He had tried to explore every possible avenue to peace. There had been many consultations with various representatives of various countries interested in bringing about negotiations. He had always thought that as co-Chairman, the Soviet Union could exert its leadership in trying to bring about a negotiation. Early in his Administration and in his Baltimore speech,/3/ he had expressed our willingness for unconditional negotiations, he had made clear that we were willing to withdraw from that area and give up a very important negotiating position provided there was self-determination for South Viet-Nam and that it was not overrun. The President pointed out that United States forces had been moved into South Viet-Nam only after North Viet-Nam had moved into the South and we saw that we were faced either with tearing up our agreements as scraps of paper or of resisting. The United States was going to discharge its obligations and he hoped the Soviet Union would do the same. He believed the Soviet Union could exercise an important influence if it chose to do so. We were prepared to pull out our troops and convert our bases to civilian uses. We were prepared to try to improve the lot of the poor people in that area but we could not do this by running away or by capitulating. The United States could do more than it was doing in the war and the President said he had difficulty resisting pressures upon him to do more, but he had no desire to destroy Viet-Nam or to change its Government. He did, however, have an obligation to South Viet-Nam.

/3/April 7, 1965. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.

The President said that if South Viet-Nam tried to change the Government in North Viet-Nam, he would have a few words to say about this. His position was that he desired to see this difficult problem settled as there was so much that our two countries could do for the good of the world. We were willing to go from the battlefield to the negotiating table. If South Viet-Nam wanted to vote to go with North Viet-Nam, that was their business. He hoped that the Soviet Union and Great Britain or the United Nations or non-aligned countries or neutral nations could make proposals that could be acceptable to both sides. He had arranged a pause in bombing for thirty-seven days despite the opinion of the military that this would not help our situation, in the hope that we would get some message, but when we called, the other side hung up the telephone. He knew that Mr. Gromyko did not interpret these efforts on his part as a sign of weakness, but rather as an indication of his determination to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Namese affair. If the United States wanted victory over North Viet-Nam, we could achieve it, but our aim is not that but to settle the problem. The best way to test our sincerity in this would be to name the time and place for negotiations. He had said that Secretary Rusk would be ready to be there in twenty-four hours.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to make a couple of preliminary remarks. The President was familiar with the Soviet statement that they were not the country to conduct negotiations on this question and he was familiar with Soviet views about the conduct of the war and the Soviet assessment of the chain of events leading to it. Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Government pays attention to statements made by the President concerning his desire to see an end to the war. He had likewise given attention to the most recent statements on that score. He said he would make a detailed report to the Soviet Government on the statement which the President had just made. He said he must, at the same time, frankly state that the Soviet Government could not help but note that the United States Government has not taken any real step to end the war. Statements made by the United States, both by the President personally and on behalf of the United States Government at the United Nations had been accompanied by conditions known to be unacceptable to the other side as the other side would have to capitulate. Mr. Gromyko thought the United States should take a more realistic position and should not give ultimata or pose conditions as that was not the road to settlement of the war. This is what he had tried to emphasize to Secretary Rusk. The United States statements on the desire to end the war were not compatible with the steps which the United States had taken which had actually widened the war.

(The President interrupted the interpretation at this point to ask Mr. Gromyko if he was aware that the North was invading the South. We had not asked anyone to surrender. We were asking that they stop shooting, in which case we would stop shooting. Didn't Mr. Gromyko know that North Viet-Nam troops were in South Viet-Nam before ours? At first we had had only advisers getting shot but they sent whole divisions in and we had to act. If they would go back now, we would quit shooting. Every move on our part had been in answer to a move on the part of North Viet-Nam. The Minister talked as though the other side did nothing to escalate. Now they were coming across with four or five divisions.)

The interpretation of Gromyko's remarks was continued at this point.

Gromyko said that when Mr. Goldberg spoke to the United Nations and had put forward what we called a program for ending the war, the United States Minister of Defense had made quite another statement, implying a widening of the war.

(The President interjected that when Ambassador Goldberg made that statement, the Minister of Defense had asked Congress to place orders for planes for delivery two or three years from now. He assumed the Soviet Union may have placed some orders about the same time, but this had nothing to do with the Goldberg speech. He said we might also have laid the keels for some ships to be delivered six years from now.)

(The President again interrupted the interpreter to ask if Mr. Gromyko wanted to stop half the war or all of it. Mr. Gromyko replied that stopping the bombing was the first of first steps. This would bring a better atmosphere for a general settlement.)

The interpreter continued.

Mr. Gromyko asked what would happen if the United States widened the war and other countries, including the Soviet Union would give further aid to Viet-Nam. In that case, the Soviet Union and the United States would find themselves drawn into these events. The Soviet Union earnestly believed that the key to a solution was in the hands of the United States. The President had said he wanted the Soviet Union to use its influence to end the war. Although the Soviet Union did not engage in negotiations, he did not deny that they had some influence among their own friends but the position of the United States made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to use this influence. The Soviet Union was in favor of ending the war in Viet-Nam and believed this was in the interests of the great powers, including the United States. The first of first steps was to stop the bombing. Mr. Gromyko said he could not say what North Viet-Nam or the NLF would do, but the reaction would be a different one. He repeated he was prepared to say that the behavior of the other side would be different if the United States ended the bombing of North Viet-Nam.

The President said he had received some suggestions for a bombing pause twice before. The first time the other side sent our note back to us. As for the second pause, Ambassador Dobrynin would recall that he had been instrumental in convincing McGeorge Bundy and others that we should try another pause. The President asked whether if we stopped bombing, the other side would continue to bomb our soldiers in South Viet-Nam. We were prepared to stop the bombing if they would say what they would do if we did stop. The President asked Mr. Gromyko how long he thought we should stop before we should get some reaction. He also asked Mr. Gromyko what the reaction would be in his country if they found themselves in similar circumstances.

Mr. Gromkyo replied that the Soviet Union had no soldiers in the same situation as ours. He observed that the President had said we had stopped bombing and we had told the Soviet Government that we were going to pause and see what happened. This was not said in public statements but tens of governments knew that this was our position.

(At this point the President interrupted to say that he understood the Soviet Government had recommended this. Gromyko said this was true, but without conditions.)

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviets were very sincere in their point of view. It was their earnest opinion that the United States had no interest in establishing a base in Viet-Nam.

(The President interrupted to say that he agreed.)

Mr. Gromyko continued that when the question arose about the withdrawal of troops, the United States had avoided being specific and had given only a very general statement. He said that perhaps if we were more specific and would give a more concrete statement, this might be of use. He said that the Soviet Union was not holding anything back and was acting in good faith. They would like to see the end of the war.

The President said that he agreed. He had never questioned the Soviet good faith and he fully agreed with the importance of peace to both of us. He wondered if the Minister had any idea of what the other side would do. He saw some merit in stopping the bombing if the other side would stop. He pointed out that they had killed more of our soldiers with mortars and bombs than we had killed in the North by aerial bombardment. Was he expected to, in effect, tie our soldiers' hands behind their backs? He said, however, he would give attention to Mr. Gromyko's suggestion for clarification of our position and in his next public statement he would be careful to try to make our position clear. As he had said in Baltimore, we were ready to talk without conditions at any time and any place. We were ready to withdraw our troops when the other side was willing to stop bombing us and to withdraw their troops. The President said we would like to take the resources we are spending on killing people and use them to enable these people to live longer, both in North and in South Viet-Nam.

Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat that the Soviet Union could not give a detailed schedule as to what the other side would do, but he could say that the reaction of the other side could be very different.

The discussion continued on the subject of non-proliferation.

265. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

RFE-41

Washington, October 11, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives, DRV North Vietnam. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution.

SUBJECT
The Vietnam War: Situation and Prospects

Underlying the rigid Communist response to peace proposals from all quarters is an apparent confidence in ultimate victory. This memorandum, prepared at the request of the Under Secretary, examines some of the factors in both South and North Vietnam on which they may base the view that, their heavy losses notwithstanding, they still hold the advantage, and assesses the threat in Chinese intervention against the background of the Mainland's internal upheaval.

Abstract

The massive introduction of US forces into Vietnam beginning in 1965 retrieved a situation that was all but desperate. In the period immediately preceding our intervention on the ground, the GVN military response to the Communist drive had become virtually ineffective. The Communists were able to maintain at increasingly high levels the harassment of small forces, military outposts, administrative centers, and lines of communication that denied the government control of much of the countryside. Further in their increasing resort to large-scale operations, they were able to take full advantage of GVN military weaknesses in organization, force strength, mobility, and morale. With the GVN military fabric increasingly stretched and torn, the prospects that the country could be held together politically to support continued resistance over any long period were growing dim.

US intervention faced the Communists with a force of great mobility, vast fire power, and increasing strength. In so doing, it blunted their military offensive, heavily increased their costs in both North and South, seriously reduced their opportunities to move unexpectedly in strength, and opened them to attack in formerly almost impregnable base areas. At the same time, the new US role reassured the South that the US commitment was a firm and lasting one, and insulated the government against the full consequences of its many and continued weaknesses in cohesiveness, performance, and support.

This said, however, it must also be noted that the Communists retain the capability and, by all evidence, the will to prolong the war over a considerable period. They have shown that they are still able to increase the number of the small unit and harassing actions that have been the real key to their success to date, maintain their political infrastructure, interdict lines of communication, and reinforce and supply themselves from both North and South. For its part, the GVN has not yet been able to increase its control of the countryside to any appreciable extent despite its own and our efforts to move more rapidly into effective pacification programs.

The Communists can still utilize or at least deny to the government much of the terrain and resources of the countryside. They are also fielding a combat force almost equal in number to allied forces actually committed to combat, and thus still have some basis for believing that in due course they will be able completely to undermine the resistance of the South. In their apparent confidence that domestic and international pressures will make it impossible for the US to stay the course, they are open to misreading a situation with which they have little or no first-hand familiarity. They may well be closer to the mark however, in their belief that they can maintain much of their position in the countryside and that--as the war presses increasingly heavily on an urban population thus far relatively immune to their political influence--they can make political inroads in the cities to the point where the impact of the US presence as well as the level of conflict will become intolerable to the people of South Vietnam.

In the North, the war appears to be having a severe but not unbearable impact. The North Vietnamese people seem somewhat weary but not disaffected, and the regime has no evident difficulty in exercising effective control. The leadership had debated alternate strategies for conducting the war in the South, but has not deviated from basic policy goals nor altered its carefully balanced attitude towards Moscow and Peking. Bombing has seriously disrupted North Vietnam's small modern industrial sector as well as seaborne foreign trade, but has not materially interfered with the maintenance of transportation and lines of communications adequate to sustain its war effort. While some shortages of consumer goods exist, the supply of basic commodities, including foodstuffs, appears adequate for minimal needs. Some evacuation of urban areas, particularly Hanoi, has taken place recently.

Although it is too early to make any final judgment on the effects of the Peking purge, it has yet to result in any increased militancy on the part of the regime. The Chinese continue to view the conflict as essentially a Vietnamese affair. Like Hanoi, they may feel that Communist prospects in the war are far from bad and that current levels of Chinese aid, together with North Vietnamese resources and assistance from other Communist countries, may be enough to maintain Hanoi's will to fight and to lead eventually to the wearing out of American patience and determination. In addition, fear of US retaliation in all probability weighs importantly in China's calculus. Thus it appears that at the war's current level of intensity, which involves neither a threat of invasion of North Vietnamese or Chinese territory nor the destruction of the Hanoi regime, the Chinese will not actively and openly intervene in the fighting./2/

/2/This conclusion parallels that made in the latest coordinated estimate by the intelligence community on "Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation" (SNIE 13-66, August 4, 1966, SECRET). [Footnote in the source text. For SNIE 13-66, see Document 201.]

[Here follows the 13-page body of the research memorandum.]

266. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. President:

In spite of your repeated efforts and those of Arthur Goldberg and others, a way to open the door to negotiations on Viet Nam has yet to be found. With the passing of time, I am afraid that the options are growing fewer and that we are beginning to run out of alternatives.

It would be my hope, as I know it is yours, that we lose neither the desire nor the will to continue to try to bring about an honorable conference. In my judgment, the negotiation of a just and mutually acceptable settlement in the near future is the one possible way to end this war in accord with the interests of the United States. The alternative of looking for a way out by continuing to raise the military ante gets us in deeper all the time, with no terminus in sight. In the end, we are likely to wind up either in war with China, or all of Viet Nam (if not all of Southeast Asia) will be so devastated and depopulated by protracted conflict that the great delta areas of that vast region may become once again, as in the remote past, "natural" areas for colonization by the surplus rice farmers of China.

So I would say, with all due respect, that we should go to very great lengths to try at once to reduce the intensity of the struggle, both from the point of view of checking the rising cost in lives and resources, and as a possible prelude to negotiations. We should do so, not out of fear of the Viet Cong--the war is far more miserable for them than it is for us--and they know it. We should do so, not because we lack the means or will to stay with this conflict--we have both for as long as it is necessary and useful, and the world knows it. We should do so, rather, because a prompt settlement is the best, if not the only way, to serve our interests and those of the people of Viet Nam whom we set out to help in the first place.

On the basis of this view, I would respectfully suggest that the following points be considered for incorporation into existing efforts to bring about negotiations:

1. We should be prepared to terminate the bombing of North Viet Nam abruptly, without indicating whether it is permanent or temporary, but in the expectation that it will help to open negotiations in any reasonable forum, whether it is Geneva, the U.N., and Asian conference, or some other.

2. We should be prepared for an immediate and reciprocal "hold-fire" ("fire only if fired upon") in South Viet Nam, to be succeeded by a firm "cease-fire" and "stand-fast," as soon as the conditions thereof can be agreed upon in negotiations.

3. We should be prepared for a token and unilateral withdrawal of 30,000 U.S. forces, to be completed during the first week or ten days of negotiations, and we should be prepared to work out a time-table for joint and total withdrawals of all forces alien to South Viet Nam as part of a settlement by negotiations.

4. We should be prepared for the full participation of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front in all negotiations, with the understanding that they can be represented separately or together with Hanoi, as they choose, along with the Saigon military government.

If these points seems useful in your judgment, I would suggest, further that U Thant be enlisted, in his diplomatic capacity, to convey their content, as he sees fit, to the Hanoi government. If, for some reason, his services cannot be effectively used at this time, other routes such as Rangoon, Paris, or the Vatican or even a direct U.S. approach to Hanoi might be considered. However, these would be of considerably less utility, in my opinion, than the mediation of U Thant, with whom I am sure, on the basis of your New York meeting, you have a closer rapport.

In writing you, I have advanced what I hope are helpful suggestions for you to use or discard as you see fit. Some of them you may have already considered, because all of them, in my opinion, fit in with public statements of our position which you have made in the past.

While a military victory against us is impossible, our national interests seem to me to require of us that we seek a restoration of peace at the earliest possible time. The approach suggested above is not "tuck tail and run." Rather, it is proposed in the hope that it will be useful in producing bona fide negotiations which will accord with our interests, the needs of the Vietnamese people, and the hope and expectations of the world.

Respectfully,
Mike Mansfield

267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. Harriman--Negotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
"Negotiations Committee"

The Committee believes/2/ that an encouraging aspect of Gromyko's visit was the evident Soviet desire to have the war end in Vietnam. Another gain is that the Soviets have been put on the spot publicly as having a responsibility to get negotiations going. Sometime after our elections, which will undoubtedly confirm US support for your policy in Vietnam, consideration should be given to the next step in our dialogue with the Russians. I believe your statement to the press yesterday regarding your talks with Gromyko/3/ will be given searching consideration in Moscow and perhaps provide a basis for progress in later discussions.

/2/A memorandum of the Committee's meeting at 4.30 p.m. on October 14 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 PHIL.

/3/For text of the President's statement, made during his news conference in Washington on October 13, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1166-1167.

In Manila, we hope that you will have an opportunity to impress on Ky (as well as Lodge): (1) The importance we place on the constitutional process with the emergence of a government that has legitimate roots. This will vastly strengthen not only the position of Saigon but our own position in international discussions and world opinion. (2) We hope that in the speech which Chairman Thieu or Prime Minister Ky will deliver on November 1, the anniversary of the revolution, there will be included a declaration on amnesty and national reconciliation. You have placed great emphasis in your public statements on the fact that the people of South Vietnam should be permitted to settle their own affairs. This means that if the NLF-VC abandon violence, these people would have the opportunity to play a legitimate role in the political life of the country./4/

/4/In a 9-page memorandum to Harriman on "The Pursuit of Peace in Manila and Elsewhere," October 14, Cooper sought to "diagnose the reasons for Hanoi's sluggish responses to our overtures and to prescribe some new medicine that might produce a bit more animation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XL)

I talked to Gene Black yesterday in New York and suggested that in his trip to the Far East, he might be able to develop more specific ideas about economic cooperation with North Vietnam on a regional basis after the end of the war. This would be a follow-up of your Johns Hopkins speech. Saigon for its part could offer the possibility of trade relations, especially in rice, which would be mutually beneficial and relieve Hanoi's dependence on Peking. Out of Gene's talks and the discussions at Manila could come Asian proposals that might give some inducement to Hanoi to end the war.

Averell

268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret. Also printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 348-355. McNamara submitted the report to the President after visiting Vietnam October 10-13.

SUBJECT
Actions recommended for Vietnam

1. Evaluation of the situation. In the report of my last trip to Vietnam almost a year ago,/2/ I stated that the odds were about even that, even with the then-recommended deployments, we would be faced in early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much higher level of conflict and with "pacification" still stalled. I am a little less pessimistic now in one respect. We have done somewhat better militarily than I anticipated. We have by and large blunted the communist military initiative--any military victory in South Vietnam the Viet Cong may have had in mind 18 months ago has been thwarted by our emergency deployments and actions. And our program of bombing the North has exacted a price.

/2/November 30, 1965; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 591-594.

My concern continues, however, in other respects. This is because I see no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon. Enemy morale has not broken--he apparently has adjusted to our stopping his drive for military victory and has adopted a strategy of keeping us busy and waiting us out (a strategy of attriting our national will). He knows that we have not been, and he believes we probably will not be, able to translate our military successes into the "end products"--broken enemy morale and political achievements by the GVN.

The one thing demonstrably going for us in Vietnam over the past year has been the large number of enemy killed-in-action resulting from the big military operations. Allowing for possible exaggeration in reports, the enemy must be taking losses--deaths in and after battle--at the rate of more than 60,000 a year. The infiltration routes would seem to be one-way trails to death for the North Vietnamese. Yet there is no sign of an impending break in enemy morale and it appears that he can more than replace his losses by infiltration from North Vietnam and recruitment in South Vietnam.

Pacification is a bad disappointment. We have good grounds to be pleased by the recent elections, by Ky's 16 months in power, and by the faint signs of development of national political institutions and of a legitimate civil government. But none of this has translated itself into political achievements at Province level or below. Pacification has if anything gone backward. As compared with two, or four, years ago, enemy full-time regional forces and part-time guerrilla forces are larger; attacks, terrorism and sabotage have increased in scope and intensity; more railroads are closed and highways cut; the rice crop expected to come to market is smaller; we control little, if any, more of the population; the VC political infrastructure thrives in most of the country, continuing to give the enemy his enormous intelligence advantage; full security exists nowhere (not even behind the US Marines' lines and in Saigon); in the countryside, the enemy almost completely controls the night.

Nor has the Rolling Thunder program of bombing the North either significantly affected infiltration or cracked the morale of Hanoi. There is agreement in the intelligence community on these facts (see the attached Appendix)./3/

/3/Printed below.

In essence, we find ourselves--from the point of view of the important war (for the complicity of the people)--no better, and if anything worse off. This important war must be fought and won by the Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst, for training and inspiring them into effective action.

2. Recommended actions. In such an unpromising state of affairs, what should we do? We must continue to press the enemy militarily; we must make demonstrable progress in pacification; at the same time, we must add a new ingredient forced on us by the facts. Specifically, we must improve our position by getting ourselves into a military posture that we credibly would maintain indefinitely--a posture that makes trying to "wait us out" less attractive. I recommend a five-pronged course of action to achieve those ends.

a. Stabilize US force levels in Vietnam. It is my judgment that, barring a dramatic change in the war, we should limit the increase in US forces in SVN in 1967 to 70,000 men and we should level off at the total of 470,000 which such an increase would provide./4/ It is in my view that this is enough to punish the enemy at the large-unit operations level and to keep the enemy's main forces from interrupting pacification. I believe also that even many more than 470,000 would not kill the enemy off in such numbers as to break their morale so long as they think they can wait us out. It is possible that such a 40 percent increase over our present level of 325,000 will break the enemy's morale in the short term; but if it does not, we must, I believe, be prepared for and have underway a long-term program premised on more than breaking the morale of main force units. A stabilized US force level would be part of such a long-term program. It would put us in a position where negotiations would be more likely to be productive, but if they were not we could pursue the all-important pacification task with proper attention and resources and without the spectre of apparently endless escalation of US deployments.

/4/Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 strength of 570,000. However, I believe both he and General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of inflation will probably force an end 1967 deployment limit of about 470,000. [Footnote in the source text.]

b. Install a barrier. A portion of the 470,000 troops--perhaps 10,000 to 20,000--should be devoted to the construction and maintenance of an infiltration barrier. Such a barrier would lie near the 17th parallel--would run from the sea, across the neck of South Vietnam (choking off the new infiltration routes through the DMZ) and across the trails in Laos. This interdiction system (at an approximate cost of $1 billion) would comprise to the east a ground barrier of fences, wire, sensors, artillery, aircraft and mobile troops; and to the west--mainly in Laos--an interdiction zone covered by air-laid mines and bombing attacks pin-pointed by air-laid acoustic sensors.

The barrier may not be fully effective at first, but I believe that it can be made effective in time and that even the threat of its becoming effective can substantially change to our advantage the character of the war. It would hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use of the limited number of friendly troops, and would be persuasive evidence both that our sole aim is to protect the South from the North and that we intend to see the job through.

c. Stabilize the Rolling Thunder program against the North. Attack sorties in North Vietnam have risen from about 4,000 per month at the end of last year to 6,000 per month in the first quarter of this year and 12,000 per month at present. Most of our 50 percent increase of deployed attack-capable aircraft has been absorbed in the attacks on North Vietnam. In North Vietnam, almost 84,000 attack sorties have been flown (about 25 percent against fixed targets), 45 percent during the past seven months.

Despite these efforts, it now appears that the North Vietnamese-Laotian road network will remain adequate to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam--this is so even if its capacity could be reduced by one-third and if combat activities were to be doubled. North Vietnam's serious need for trucks, spare parts and petroleum probably can, despite air attacks, be met by imports. The petroleum requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement, for example, has not been enough to present significant supply problems, and the effects of the attacks on the petroleum distribution system, while they have not yet been fully assessed, are not expected to cripple the flow of essential supplies. Furthermore, it is clear that, to bomb the North sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoi's political, economic and social structure, would require an effort which we could make but which would not be stomached either by our own people or by world opinion; and it would involve a serious risk of drawing us into open war with China.

The North Vietnamese are paying a price. They have been forced to assign some 300,000 personnel to the lines of communication in order to maintain the critical flow of personnel and materiel to the South. Now that the lines of communication have been manned, however, it is doubtful that either a large increase or decrease in our interdiction sorties would substantially change the cost to the enemy of maintaining the roads, railroads, and waterways or affect whether they are operational. It follows that the marginal sorties--probably the marginal 1,000 or even 5,000 sorties--per month against the lines of communication no longer have a significant impact on the war. (See the attached excerpts from intelligence estimates.)

When this marginal inutility of added sorties against North Vietnam and Laos is compared with the crew and aircraft losses implicit in the activity (four men and aircraft and $20 million per 1,000 sorties), I recommend, as a minimum, against increasing the level of bombing of North Vietnam and against increasing the intensity of operations by changing the areas or kinds of targets struck./5/

/5/See footnote on page 7. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote 8 below.]

Under these conditions, the bombing program would continue the pressure and would remain available as a bargaining counter to get talks started (or to trade off in talks). But, as in the case of a stabilized level of US ground forces, the stabilization of Rolling Thunder would remove the prospect of ever-escalating bombing as a factor complicating our political posture and distracting from the main job of pacification in South Vietnam.

At the proper time, as discussed on pages 6-7 below,/6/ I believe we should consider terminating bombing in all of North Vietnam, or at least in the Northeast zones, for an indefinite period in connection with covert moves toward peace.

/6/Section 2e, below, entitled "Press for negotiations."

d. Pursue a vigorous pacification program. As mentioned above, the pacification (Revolutionary Development) program has been and is thoroughly stalled. The large-unit operations war, which we know best how to fight and where we have had our successes, is largely irrelevant to pacification as long as we do not lose it. By and large, the people in rural areas believe that the GVN when it comes will not stay but that the VC will; that cooperation with the GVN will be punished by the VC; that the GVN is really indifferent to the people's welfare; that the low-level GVN are tools of the local rich; and that the GVN is ridden with corruption.

Success in pacification depends on the interrelated functions of providing physical security, destroying the VC apparatus, motivating the people to cooperate, and establishing responsive local government. An obviously necessary but not sufficient requirement for success of the Revolutionary Development cadre and police is vigorously conducted and adequately prolonged clearing operations by military troops, who will "stay" in the area, who behave themselves decently and who show some respect for the people.

This elemental requirement of pacification has been missing.

In almost no contested area designated for pacification in recent years have ARVN forces actually "cleared and stayed" to a point where cadre teams, if available, could have stayed overnight in hamlets and survived, let alone accomplish their mission. VC units of company and even battalion size remain in operation, and they are more than large enough to overrun anything the local security forces can put up.

Now that the threat of Communist main-force military victory has been thwarted by our emergency efforts, we must allocate far more attention and a portion of the regular military forces (at least half of the ARVN and perhaps a portion of the US forces) to the task of providing an active and permanent security screen behind which the Revolutionary Development teams and police can operate and behind which the political struggle with the VC infrastructure can take place.

The US cannot do this pacification security job for the Vietnamese. All we can do is "massage the heart." For one reason, it is known that we do not intend to stay; if our efforts worked at all, it would merely postpone the eventual confrontation of the VC and GVN infrastructures. The GVN must do the job; and I am convinced that drastic reform is needed if the GVN is going to be able to do it.

The first essential reform is in the attitude of GVN officials. They are generally apathetic, and there is corruption high and low. Often appointments, promotions, and draft deferments must be bought; and kickbacks on salaries are common. Cadre at the bottom can be no better than the system above them.

The second needed reform is in the attitude and conduct of the ARVN. The image of the government cannot improve unless and until the ARVN improves markedly. They do not understand the importance (or respectability) of pacification nor the importance to pacification of proper, disciplined conduct. Promotions, assignments and awards are often not made on merit, but rather on the basis of having a diploma, friends or relatives, or because of bribery. The ARVN is weak in dedication, direction and discipline.

Not enough ARVN are devoted to area and population security, and when the ARVN does attempt to support pacification, their actions do not last long enough; their tactics are bad despite US prodding (no aggressive small-unit saturation patrolling, hamlet searches, quick-reaction contact, or offensive night ambushes); they do not make good use of intelligence; and their leadership and discipline are bad.

Furthermore, it is my conviction that a part of the problem undoubtedly lies in bad management on the American as well as the GVN side. Here split responsibility--or "no responsibility"--has resulted in too little hard pressure on the GVN to do its job and no really solid or realistic planning with respect to the whole effort. We must deal with this management problem now and deal with it effectively.

One solution would be to consolidate all US activities which are primarily part of the civilian pacification program and all persons engaged in such activities, providing a clear assignment of responsibility and a unified command under a civilian relieved of all other duties./7/ Under this approach, there would be a carefully delineated division of responsibility between the civilian-in-charge and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer, who would give the subject of planning for and providing hamlet security the highest priority in attention and resources. Success will depend on the men selected for the jobs on both sides (they must be among the highest rank and most competent administrators in the US Government), on complete cooperation among the US elements, and on the extent to which the South Vietnamese can be shocked out of their present pattern of behavior. The first work of this reorganized US pacification organization should be to produce within 60 days a realistic and detailed plan for the coming year.

/7/If this task is assigned to Ambassador Porter, another individual must be sent immediately to Saigon to serve as Ambassador Lodge's deputy. [Footnote in the source text.]

From the political and public-relations viewpoint, this solution is preferable--if it works. But we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails after a fair trial, the only alternative in my view is to place the entire pacification program--civilian and military--under General Westmoreland. This alternative would result in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would be in command of all pacification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification staffs and activities in the field; one person in each corps, province and district would be responsible for the US effort.

(It should be noted that progress in pacification, more than anything else, will persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw.)

e. Press for negotiations. I am not optimistic that Hanoi or the VC will respond to peace overtures now (explaining my recommendations above that we get into a level-off posture for the long pull). The ends sought by the two sides appear to be irreconcilable and the relative power balance is not in their view unfavorable to them. But three things can be done, I believe, to increase the prospects:

(1) Take steps to increase the credibility of our peace gestures in the minds of the enemy. There is considerable evidence both in private statements by the Communists and in the reports of competent Western officials who have talked with them that charges of US bad faith are not solely propagandistic, but reflect deeply held beliefs. Analyses of Communists' statements and actions indicate that they firmly believe that American leadership really does not want the fighting to stop, and that we are intent on winning a military victory in Vietnam and on maintaining our presence there through a puppet regime supported by US military bases.

As a way of projecting US bona fides, I believe that we should consider two possibilities with respect to our bombing program against the North, to be undertaken, if at all, at a time very carefully selected with a view to maximizing the chances of influencing the enemy and world opinion and to minimizing the chances that failure would strengthen the hand of the "hawks" at home: First, without fanfare, conditions, or avowal, whether the stand-down was permanent or temporary, stop bombing all of North Vietnam. It is generally thought that Hanoi will not agree to negotiations until they can claim that the bombing has stopped unconditionally. We should see what develops, retaining freedom to resume the bombing if nothing useful was forthcoming.

Alternatively, we could shift the weight-of-effort away from "Zones 6A and 6B"--zones including Hanoi and Haiphong and areas north of those two cities to the Chinese border. This alternative has some attraction in that it provides the North Vietnamese a "face saver" if only problems of "face" are holding up Hanoi peace gestures; it would narrow the bombing down directly to the objectionable infiltration (supporting the logic of a stop-infiltration/full-pause deal); and it would reduce the international heat on the US. Here, too, bombing of the Northeast could be resumed at any time, or "spot" attacks could be made there from time to time to keep North Vietnam off balance and to require her to pay almost the full cost by maintaining her repair crews in place. The sorties diverted from Zones 6A and 6B could be concentrated on the infiltration routes in Zones 1 and 2 (the southern end of North Vietnam, including the Mu Gia Pass), in Laos and in South Vietnam./8/

/8/Any limitation on the bombing of North Vietnam will cause serious psychological problems among the men who are risking their lives to help achieve our political objectives; among their commanders up to and including the JCS; and among those of our people who cannot understand why we should withhold punishment from the enemy. General Westmoreland, as do the JCS, strongly believes in the military value of the bombing program. Further, Westmoreland reports that the morale of his Air Force personnel may already be showing signs of erosion--an erosion resulting from current operational restrictions. [Footnote in the source text.]

To the same end of improving our credibility, we should seek ways--through words and deeds--to make believable our intention to withdraw our forces once the North Vietnamese aggression against the South stops. In particular, we should avoid any implication that we will stay in South Vietnam with bases or to guarantee any particular outcome to a solely South Vietnamese struggle.

(2) Try to split the VC off from Hanoi. The intelligence estimate is that evidence is overwhelming that the North Vietnamese dominate and control the National Front and the Viet Cong. Nevertheless, I think we should continue and enlarge efforts to contact the VC/NLF and to probe ways to split members or sections off the VC/NLF organization.

(3) Press contacts with North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and other parties who might contribute toward a settlement.

(4) Develop a realistic plan providing a role for the VC in negotiations, post-war life, and government of the nation. An amnesty offer and proposals for national reconciliation would be steps in the right direction and should be parts of the plan. It is important that this plan be one which will appear reasonable, if not at first to Hanoi and the VC, at least to world opinion.

3. The prognosis. The prognosis is bad that the war can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion within the next two years. The large-unit operations probably will not do it; negotiations probably will not do it. While we should continue to pursue both of these routes in trying for a solution in the short run, we should recognize that success from them is a mere possibility, not a probability.

The solution lies in girding, openly, for a longer war and in taking actions immediately which will in 12 to 18 months give clear evidence that the continuing costs and risks to the American people are acceptably limited, that the formula for success has been found, and that the end of the war is merely a matter of time. All of my recommendations will contribute to this strategy, but the one most difficult to implement is perhaps the most important one--enlivening the pacification program. The odds are less than even for this task, if only because we have failed consistently since 1961 to make a dent in the problem. But, because the 1967 trend of pacification will, I believe, be the main talisman of ultimate US success or failure in Vietnam, extraordinary imagination and effort should go into changing the stripes of that problem.

President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky are thinking along similar lines. They told me that they do not expect the enemy to negotiate or to modify his program in less than two years. Rather, they expect the enemy to continue to expand and to increase his activity. They expressed agreement with us that the key to success is pacification and that so far pacification has failed. They agree that we need clarification of GVN and US roles and that the bulk of the ARVN should be shifted to pacification. Ky will, between January and July 1967, shift all ARVN infantry divisions to that role. And he is giving Thang, a good Revolutionary Development director, added powers. Thieu and Ky see this as part of a two-year (1967-68) schedule, in which offensive operations against enemy main force units are continued, carried on primarily by the US and other Free World forces. At the end of the two-year period, they believe the enemy may be willing to negotiate or to retreat from his current course of action./9/

/9/Lodge's report of McNamara's meeting with Thieu and Ky is in telegram 8161 from Saigon, October 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-VIET S) Westmoreland's memorandum for the record of McNamara's meeting with Ky, October 11, is in the Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, #9 History File.

Note: Neither the Secretary of State nor the JCS have yet had an opportunity to express their views on this report. Mr. Katzenbach and I have discussed many of its main conclusions and recommendations--in general, but not in all particulars, it expresses his views as well as my own.

Appendix

Extracts from CIA/DIA Report "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam through 12 September 1966"/10/

/10/Not found.

1. There is no evidence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand, with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operations.

2. Air strikes against all modes of transportation in North Vietnam increased during the past month, but there is no evidence of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies to or within North Vietnam.

3. There is no evidence yet that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale.

4. Air strikes continue to depress economic growth and have been responsible for the abandonment of some plans for economic development, but essential economic activities continue.

Extracts from a March 16, 1966 CIA Report "An Analysis of the Rolling Thunder Air Offensive against North Vietnam"/11/

/11/Not found.

1. Although the movement of men and supplies in North Vietnam has been hampered and made somewhat more costly [by our bombing],/12/ the Communists have been able to increase the flow of supplies and manpower to South Vietnam.

/12/All brackets are in the source text.

2. Hanoi's determination [despite our bombing] to continue its policy of supporting the insurgency in the South appears as firm as ever.

3. Air attacks almost certainly cannot bring about a meaningful reduction in the current level at which essential supplies and men flow into South Vietnam.

Bomb Damage Assessment in the North by the Institute forDefense Analysis' "Summer Study Group"/13/

/13/A full copy of the report, "The Effects of U.S. Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability To Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospects and Prospect," August 29, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 192, The Effects of U. S. Bombing. Attached is a memorandum from Ginsburgh to Rostow, September 13, critiquing the five points excerpted in the Appendix printed here.

What surprised us [in our assessment of the effect of bombing North Vietnam] was the extent of agreement among various intelligence agencies on the effects of past operations and probable effects of continued and expanded Rolling Thunder. The conclusions of our group, to which we all subscribe, are therefore merely sharpened conclusions of numerous Intelligence summaries. They are that Rolling Thunder does not limit the present logistic flow into SVN because NVN is neither the source of supplies nor the choke-point on the supply routes from China and USSR. Although an expansion of Rolling Thunder by closing Haiphong harbor, eliminating electric power plants and totally destroying railroads, will at least indirectly impose further privations on the populace of NVN and make the logistic support of VC costlier to maintain, such expansion will not really change the basic assessment. This follows because NVN has demonstrated excellent ability to improvise transportation, and because the primitive nature of their economy is such that Rolling Thunder can affect directly only a small fraction of the population. There is very little hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government will lose control of population because of Rolling Thunder. The lessons of the Korean War are very relevant in these respects. Moreover, foreign economic aid to NVN is large compared to the damage we inflict, and growing. Probably the government of NVN has assurances that the USSR and/or China will assist the rebuilding of its economy after the war, and hence its concern about the damage being inflicted may be moderated by long-range favorable expectations. Specifically:

1. As of July 1966 the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South at the current level.

2. Since the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program the damage to facilities and equipment in North Vietnam has been more than offset by the increased flow of military and economic aid, largely from the USSR and Communist China.

3. The aspects of the basic situation that have enabled Hanoi to continue its support of military operations in the South and to neutralize the impact of U.S. bombing by passing the economic costs to other Communist countries are not likely to be altered by reducing the present geographic constraints, mining Haiphong and the principal harbors in North Vietnam, increasing the number of armed reconnaissance sorties and otherwise expanding the U.S. air offensive along the lines now contemplated in military recommendations and planning studies.

4. While conceptually it is reasonable to assume that some limit may be imposed on the scale of military activity that Hanoi can maintain in the South by continuing the Rolling Thunder program at the present, or some higher level effort, there appears to be no basis for defining that limit in concrete terms, or for concluding that the present scale of VC/NVN activities in the field have approached that limit.

5. The indirect effects of the bombing on the will of the North Vietnamese to continue fighting and on their leaders' appraisal of the prospective gains and costs of maintaining the present policy have not shown themselves in any tangible way. Furthermore, we have not discovered any basis for concluding that the indirect punitive effects of bombing will prove decisive in these respects.

Robert S. McNamara

269. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-672-66

Washington, October 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret. McNamara noted on his copy of the memorandum that it was received at 8:50 a.m. on October 15 and that a copy was sent to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)

SUBJECT
Actions Recommended for Vietnam (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your memorandum to the President, subject as above./2/ Their views as to the situation in Vietnam and the proper courses of US actions coincide substantially with yours in many areas; however, in some important areas the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with you. For convenience of reference their comments are set forth in subsequent paragraphs in the same sequence and with the same headings as in your memorandum.

/2/Document 268.

2. (TS) Evaluation of the Situation.

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military situation obtaining in Vietnam has improved substantially over the past year. Since the President authorized the deployment of US ground forces to South Vietnam (SVN), Free World military forces have enjoyed an almost unbroken series of successes in combat. The few enemy victories have been gained at the expense of South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force units. Our present posture achieves our often-expressed objective of ensuring that the enemy cannot win militarily in SVN at his current level of effort; our future programs should be geared, as a minimum, to retaining this favorable situation. Our restricted air campaign against North Vietnam (NVN) has destroyed substantial quantities of military supplies and war-supporting facilities, inflicted major damage on lines of communication, and forced the diversion of at least 300,000 men from agriculture and industry to repair and maintenance activities. The demands of communist leaders and leftist sympathizers for cessation of bombing give strong indication of the impact the bombing is having on the North Vietnamese. Widespread and uninhibited Viet Cong (VC) sabotage in SVN over a period of five years has been far less detrimental to a sustained war effort.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree there is no reason to expect that the war can be brought soon to a successful conclusion.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that the enemy strategy appears to be to wait it out; in other words, communist leaders in both North and South Vietnam expect to win this war in Washington, just as they won the war with France in Paris. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is reason for such expectations on the part of the communist leadership.

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that, manpower-wise, the enemy should be able to replace his heavy combat losses. This assessment, however, does not--indeed, cannot--take into account the adverse impact over time of continued bloody defeats on the morale of VC/NVA forces and the determination of their political and military leaders. Pertinent to the foregoing, there is evidence that the VC increasingly must resort to forced conscription to fill their ranks, and that men furnished from NVN to replace casualties suffered by the 324B Division are a mixture of hard-nosed regular soldiers (about 25%), fanatical communist volunteers (about 25%), and unmotivated conscripts (about 50%).

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that pacification (revolutionary development) programs have not been, and are not now, adequate to the situation.

f. Additional Comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that your memorandum addresses only SVN; it does not consider the prospect of the expanding threat in northeast Thailand or Laos, or the requirement for the Free World forces to cope with these threats.

3. (TS) Recommended Actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in your general recommendations that we should continue to press the enemy militarily, improve pacification programs, and attain a military posture we can maintain indefinitely. Their comments on your specific recommendations are:

a. Stabilize US Force Levels--The danger to Government of Vietnam (GVN) viability imposed by inflation is recognized. However, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that a stable, sustainable force level in SVN is desirable, the suggested level of 470,000 is substantially less than earlier recommendations of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve judgment upon the force level required until they have reviewed the revised programs now being prepared under the supervision of Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland at Headquarters, Pacific Command. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out the necessity of having in CONUS, Hawaii, and Okinawa, forces capable of immediate deployment to SVN to cope with contingencies.

b. Install Barriers--The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that barriers properly installed and defended by ground and air effort can impede infiltration into SVN from NVN. As you know, they have reservations concerning the effectiveness of the currently-proposed air-laid munitions barrier; moreover, they consider that this effort must not be permitted to impair current military programs.

c. Stabilize Rolling Thunder--The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in your recommendation that there should be no increase in level of bombing effort and no modification in areas and targets subject to air attack. They believe our air campaign against NVN to be an integral and indispensable part of our over-all war effort. To be effective, the air campaign should be conducted with only those minimum constraints necessary to avoid indiscriminate killing of population.

d. Improve Pacification Program--The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you earlier that, to achieve early optimum effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to COMUSMACV. They adhere to that conclusion. However, if for political reasons a civilian-type organization should be considered mandatory by the President, they would interpose no objection. Nevertheless, they are not sanguine that an effective civilian-type organization can be erected, if at all, except at the expense of costly delays. As to the use of a substantial fraction of the ARVN for pacification purposes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur. However, they desire to flag that adoption of this concept will undoubtedly elicit charges of a US takeover of combat operations at increased cost in American casualties.

e. Press for Negotiations--The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with your proposal that, as a carrot to induce negotiations, we should suspend or reduce our bombing campaign against NVN. Our experiences with pauses in bombing and resumption have not been happy ones. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the likelihood of the war being settled by negotiation is small; and that, far from inducing negotiations, another bombing pause will be regarded by North Vietnamese leaders, and our Allies, as renewed evidence of lack of US determination to press the war to a successful conclusion. The bombing campaign is one of the two trump cards in the hands of the President (the other being the presence of US troops in SVN). It should not be given up without an end to the NVN aggression in SVN. As to maintaining contacts with NVN and the USSR in order to find ways to end the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree; however, they advocate that US personnel involved should reflect a quiet determination to prosecute the war until communist aggression against SVN ceases.

4. (TS) Prognosis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree we cannot predict with confidence that the war can be brought to an end in two years. Accordingly, for political, military, and psychological reasons, we should prepare openly for a long-term, sustained military effort.

5. (TS) Additional Comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the war has reached a stage at which decisions taken over the next sixty days can determine the outcome of the war and, consequently, can affect the over-all security interests of the United States for years to come. Therefore, they wish to provide to you and to the President their unequivocal views on two salient aspects of the war situation: the search for peace; and military pressures on NVN.

a. The frequent, broadly-based public offers made by the President to settle the war by peaceful means on a generous basis, which would take from NVN nothing it now has, have been admirable. Certainly, no one--American or foreigner--except those who are determined not to be convinced, can doubt the sincerity, the generosity, the altruism of US actions and objectives. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time has come when further overt actions and offers on our part are not only nonproductive, they are counterproductive. A logical case can be made that the American people, our Allies, and our enemies alike are increasingly uncertain as to our resolution to pursue the war to a successful conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate the following:

(1) A statement by the President during the Manila Conference of his unswerving determination to carry on the war until NVN aggression against SVN shall cease;

(2) Continued covert exploration of all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement of war; and

(3) Continued alertness to detect and react appropriately to withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from SVN and cessation of support to the VC.

b. In JCSM-955-64, dated 14 November 1964, and in JCSM-982-64, dated 23 November 1964,/3/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views as to the military pressures which should be brought to bear on NVN. In summary, they recommended a "sharp knock" on NVN military assets and war-supporting facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressure which was adopted. Whatever the political merits of the latter course, we deprived ourselves of the military effects of early weight of effort and shock, and gave to the enemy time to adjust to our slow quantitative and qualitative increase of pressure. This is not to say that it is now too late to derive military benefits from more effective and extensive use of our air and naval superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

/3/For text of both memoranda, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 902-906 and 932-935.

(1) Approval of their Rolling Thunder 52 program, which is a step toward meeting the requirement for improved target systems. This program would decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas, authorize attacks against the steel plant,/4/ the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal power plants, selected areas within Haiphong port and other ports, selected locks and dams controlling water LOCs, SAM support facilities within the residual Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries, and POL at Haiphong, Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) and Can Thon (Kep).

/4/Inserted in handwriting at this point, apparently by McNamara, is "the cement plant."

(2) Use of naval surface forces to interdict North Vietnamese coastal waterborne traffic and appropriate land LOCs and to attack other coastal military targets such as radar and AAA sites.

6. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views as set forth above be provided to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle J. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

270. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/

Washington, October 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job. 80-B01285A. Top Secret. Helms forwarded a copy of the memorandum to McNamara under cover of an October 16 memorandum, stating that it resulted "from a detailed analysis undertaken by the seven top officers in the Agency on Vietnam" and "had been reviewed by the Deputy Directors involved as well as the undersigned." On his copy of the memorandum, McNamara wrote: "Prepared by Dick [Helms] at my request." (Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII)

SUBJECT
Comments on Secretary McNamara's Trip Report/2/

/2/Document 268.

SUMMARY

We endorse Secretary McNamara's evaluation of the situation and his prescriptive analysis of what needs to be done. We have problems with his proposed package of "recommended actions" and serious difficulties with the details of some of the actions recommended, particularly the "press for negotiation" recommendations which we feel would be counterproductive. We consider his prognosis too gloomy. If the odds for enlivening the pacification program are indeed "less than even", present U.S. objectives in Vietnam are not likely to be achieved.

1. Evaluation of the Situation: Secretary McNamara's evaluation of the situation is sound, perceptive and very much in line with our own appreciation. We agree that the struggle "for the complicity of the people" is "the important war", though we feel that the important struggle is not just for the "complicity" of the people but, rather, for their engagement, for a degree of active participation whereby they come to identify their fortunes with the political institutions and instruments of a non-Communist Saigon government. The only part of Secretary McNamara's evaluation with which we would take issue is its concluding sentence. We believe that despite the errors and administrative weaknesses of present programs, in the concept of revolutionary development (which involves much more than surface "pacification") we have found the right formula, a catalyst that is potentially capable of inspiring the Vietnamese into effective action. Revolutionary development, however, involves fundamental structural and attitudinal changes in Vietnamese society which even perfectly conceived and managed programs could not effect overnight. Thus, in spite of organizational weaknesses and performance shortfalls in our present programs, it is far too early to write them off as discouraging failures. Serious and systematic effort in this field is really a post-Honolulu Conference development and it would be unrealistic to expect dramatic, readily quantifiable progress in the short span of eight months.

2. Recommended Actions: We agree that "we must continue to press the enemy militarily", that "we must make demonstrable progress in pacification", and that "progress in pacification, more than anything else, will persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw". (The last point is in our view the most important one made in the whole report. It should be highlighted, not buried in a parenthetical aside at the end of paragraph 2.d.). We also agree that the U.S. should adopt a military posture that unmistakably signals its readiness to stick out a long war. Yet, though we agree with Secretary McNamara's prescriptive analysis of what needs to be accomplished, we do not believe the specific action mix he recommends would accomplish these objectives and feel that some elements of this recommended mix (particularly the "press for negotiations") would actually be counterproductive.

3. The key problem here lies in the fact that the U.S. simply cannot try to work both sides of the street and hope for any kind of success. On the one hand, we can keep the Communists under pressure and militarily at bay while we endeavor to help the South Vietnamese build a viable political structure and while at the same time we adopt a posture on negotiations which will put the onus on Hanoi, minimize domestic and international pressures on the U.S., and avoid detrimental effect on our political efforts within South Vietnam. Or, we can adopt a course of action which has some genuine chance of getting Hanoi to the table within the reasonably near term future. We cannot realistically hope to do both simultaneously.

4. Specific Action Recommendations: We have the following comments on the specific actions recommended in Secretary McNamara's report.

a. U.S. force levels: A U.S. force level of 470,000 will be sufficient to punish the enemy at the large-unit operations level and keep the enemy's main forces from interrupting pacification only if the increase over present levels is primarily in maneuver battalions (not support elements) and if measures to check the enemy's buildup through infiltration are effective.

b. The barrier: In order to achieve the objectives set for the barrier in our view it must be extended well westward into Laos. Air interdiction of the routes in Laos unsupplemented by ground action will not effectively check infiltration.

c. Rolling Thunder: We concur in Secretary McNamara's analysis of the effects of the Rolling Thunder program, its potential for reducing the flow of essential supplies, and his judgment on the marginal inutility of added sorties against lines of communication. We endorse his argument on stabilizing the level of sorties. We do not agree, however, with the implied judgment that changes in the bombing program could not be effective. We continue to judge that a bombing program directed both against closing the port of Haiphong and continuously cutting the rail lines to China could have a significant impact.

d. Pacification: We agree that revolutionary development (pacification) must be pursued vigorously, and that success in pacification depends on the interrelated factors Secretary McNamara catalogues. Although "the U.S. cannot do this . . . job for the Vietnamese", neither can the Vietnamese do it alone--we must integrate our efforts. We agree that corruption is a serious problem and the attitude of GVN officials must be improved, but we do not believe that these problems have to be solved at the top before attempting to make pacification cadre effective. We must work at both ends of the Vietnamese command chain simultaneously; working unilaterally if necessary at the lower end. We concur in the comments on ARVN.

e. The management of the U.S. pacification effort needs improvement. We are not sure just what Secretary McNamara's first recommended solution really involves. If it involves only minor cosmetic surgery on the present arrangement, it is unlikely to succeed. If Secretary McNamara is proposing real organizational change under which the civilian director would have a joint staff of sufficient scope to enable him to plan, control and direct the U.S. effort and have operational control over all--not just civilian--elements engaged in revolutionary development activities, then we support his recommendation wholeheartedly. "A carefully delineated division of responsibility between the civilian-in-charge and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer", however, does not look to us like the unified control and management arrangement necessary or an arrangement which would give the civilian director sufficient authority over U.S. military pacification activities.

f. A civilian pacification structure cannot be given a "fair trial" unless the civilian director has the necessary authority. Also, the trial will not be "fair" if major quantifiable results are anticipated in a matter of months. Further, even if a particular civilian-headed administrative structure does not work, the fact remains that revolutionary development (which is what we ought to be talking about, not pacification) can only succeed if it is something in which the civil populace engages itself. If an attempt is made to impose pacification on an unengaged populace by GVN or U.S. military forces, that attempt will fail.

g. Negotiations: While we agree that the U.S. must maintain an open posture toward negotiations for domestic and international political reasons, we do not believe we should actively press for negotiations until definite progress has been made in the revolutionary development/pacification program. Otherwise, we will be negotiating from a position of weakness and running a great risk of undercutting what we are trying to develop politically within South Vietnam.

h. Shifting the air effort from the northwest quadrant to the infiltration areas in Laos and southern North Vietnam would be quite unproductive. Such a course of action would not induce Hanoi to negotiate (since it would still involve bombing of the north) and would probably have little effect in changing present international attitudes. Furthermore, a concentration of sorties against the low-yield and elusive targets along the infiltration routes in the southern end of North Vietnam and in Laos would not appreciably diminish North Vietnam's ability to maintain the supply of its forces in South Vietnam.

i. For a variety of diplomatic, image and psychological warfare considerations, much needs to be done on imaginative amnesty programs. However, any U.S. effort at the present time to sponsor proposals which would give the VC a role in the government of South Vietnam would have very adverse effects on the morale and determination of our South Vietnamese allies.

4. Prognosis: We agree with Secretary McNamara's prognosis that there is little hope for a satisfactory conclusion of the war within the next two years. We do not agree that "the odds are less than even" for enlivening the pacification program. If this were true, the U.S. would be foolish to continue the struggle in Vietnam and should seek to disengage as fast as possible. We think if we establish adequate management and control on the U.S. side and ensure that the Vietnamese follow through on redirecting their military resources as promised, there are at least fair prospects for substantial progress in pacification over the next two years.

George A. Carver, Jr.

271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, vol. IX. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Administration of Revolutionary Development

I. Introduction

You requested a position paper on the administration of the "other war" in Viet-Nam. Let me begin by offering two powerful first impressions which I believe bear decisively on that question.

1. My overriding impression after five days in Viet-Nam is of a topic so common it is all-too rarely reported and so obvious it is all-too rarely considered: the unceasing, backbreaking toil of the peasant population.

To see rows of coolies bending down, hour after hour, tending rice plants in the exhausting sun, is to recognize that it is not so much water that their rice grows in; it is sweat. They seed, nurture, replant, irrigate, dig manure, harvest, dry, and carry day upon day, year upon year to squeeze only the barest of essentials from the land.

And to see all this is to recognize a political fact: how easy it is for these people not to give a whit whether they are governed by the GVN or by the VC or by anyone else. Given the dawn-to-dusk imperative of their work, what they may wish more devoutly than anything is simply to be left alone. They wish no longer to be bombed and shelled or knifed and shot, drafted or kidnapped, propagandized or harangued, gouged by landlords or "taxed" by guerrillas.

2. Second, I could not help but be struck by the extent to which Viet-Nam is commonly discussed in a strange language of abbreviation and acronym. For example, "If we can get MACV, USAID and JUSPAO to prod the GVN, then maybe ARVN--working with the PF, RF, PFF, CIDG and the PAT cadres--can get RD off the ground."

It is easy to understand why such sentences would be common in Saigon, where people talk of little other than the war and where shorthand thus becomes a necessity. The same is true, however, at a less superficial level, when shorthand is applied to concepts as well as to agencies--when real words become shorthand symbols--but destructive symbols because they mean such different things to different speakers.

An example--and one closely relevant here--is the word "security," which has come to blanket a variety of different meanings. I believe decisive, effective revolutionary development depends on a clear and precise common understanding of the security we all recognize to be the foundation of success in "the other war."

To illustrate the divergence of meanings, let me report briefly on a conversation I had with a small group of reporters in Saigon. It quickly degenerated into a debate, not between the reporters and me, but between Ward Just of the Washington Post and Charles Mohr of the New York Times.

Just argued heatedly that RD could not even begin to be effective unless security were first guaranteed both to the peasants and RD workers. "An AID man cannot do his work," he said, "while he is being shot at by the VC."

Mohr responded, just as heatedly, that security could not come first--because security from guerrillas is meaningless and impossible until the peasant populace is motivated to support the GVN and deprive the guerrillas of havens, secrecy, and resources.

Obviously, the easy answer to this circular chicken-egg debate is to say that both are necessary--military protection and public motivation against the VC. And yet even that answer is incomplete for it defines security only in the American frame of reference (more police in Central Park; or National Guard against riots).

What we must also ask is, what does security mean to the Vietnamese peasant, stooped over in the rice paddies?

Does security mean a guarantee of the absence of physical danger? Or is the peasant willing to take some risks in exchange for other factors?

If so, what are those factors:

Communist ideology?

Land reform?

Lowering of crushing taxes--whether imposed by the GVN or VC?

No further conscription--again by either side?

Social justice--such as the elimination of corruption which requires under-the-table payments even for an act so elemental as registering a birth?

A voice in local government?

The VC have found effective answers to such questions, tailored to specific local needs. We must do at least as well. And indeed each of these factors is important to the peasantry in some, many, or all areas. They must be seized on as a critical element in defining and providing true security.

If the peasant were not willing to accept any risks, then the outlook for revolutionary development would be grave, indeed. No matter how effectively they are administered, even military security and capable RD efforts cannot bring instant success. At best, they can give us a mutually reinforcing stairstep route to success.

A high level of physical security (against guerrilla, rather than main-force opposition) cannot be achieved without motivating the populace. Such motivation cannot be achieved without considerable progress toward physical security. Both must be sought at once, in a way designed to lower the peasant's current risks while at the same time inducing him to accept the risks of involvement that remain.

Given limited time, we must carefully identify and concentrate on those risks which are least acceptable to him and on those gains which are most essential to him.

II. The Ideal, Theoretical Program

I know of no one who believes we have begun effectively to achieve this goal, despite a series of pacification programs and despite even the budding early efforts of Ambassador Porter's new program.

The Military Aspect. Secretary McNamara, Mr. Komer, Ambassadors Johnson, Lodge, and Porter, Mr. Gaud, I, and all others who have approached the problem are perfectly agreed that the military aspect of Revolutionary Development has been spindly and weak.

This probably is the result of the entirely understandable preoccupation by MACV in recent months with the main-force military emergency. However justifiable this has been, a major effect has nonetheless been our failure effectively to press RVNAF to even start meeting their crucial RD responsibilities.

(I know of no one who believes that these should be met principally by American forces--unless we should wish the whole RD effort to collapse once we leave.)

The Civil Aspect. Similarly, the work of civilian agencies has fallen short--largely, but not only because of the failure of RVNAF to provide a military screen behind which to work.

For example, we have been successful in persuading farmers to turn to modern insecticides and fertilizers, overcoming the skepticism and hostility borne of old ways used for centuries. But having sold the peasants on the concept, there is not enough insecticide in the whole country now to meet the demand in Long An province alone.

We have built--as Mr. Komer outlined in such careful detail in his report to you of September 13/2/--large numbers of school rooms. But, again to cite Long An, the province which I visited, we built 65 school rooms in 1965--but 55 American-funded schoolrooms were so located that they were blown up by the VC.

/2/"The Other War in Vietnam--A Progress Report," printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, pp. 549-567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591-601.

We have sent 2.2 million textbooks to Viet-Nam, but how many are still tied up in warehouses?

Recent discussions of such shortcomings have been conducted in terms of who should control the program--civilian agencies or the military. I believe this is too narrow a frame of reference. It is too late to worry about organizational symmetry or inter-agency niceties.

Rather than engage in a civil-military debate, I think we should devote our efforts toward trying to devise an administrative structure that capitalizes on the assets each agency can offer to RD.

What should be the elements of an ideal organization?

1. It should have maximum leverage on RVNAF to engage in clear and hold operations in direct support of RDM efforts.

2. It should have a single American "negative", anti-VC channel--that is a single commander for all action against Communist guerrilla forces. This commander would calibrate and choose among the various force alternatives--depending on whether he believed the need to be military, para-military, or police.

This command would include complete responsibility for all anti-VC intelligence--that is, concerning all VC suspects either in the infrastructure or in guerrilla units.

3. It should have a single, unified channel for all "positive", pro-people aspects of RD, irrespective of the present lines of command within civilian agencies, allowing a single commander to calibrate and assign priorities to relevant positive programs on behalf of the peasantry.

This, too, would include the immediate expansion of and control over all "pro-people" intelligence--that is, detailed district-by-district and province-by-province reporting on the particular gains most wanted by the populace (land reform, for example, in one province; or schools in another; or agricultural assistance in another).

4. Sensitivity to political inputs and wise political guidance of the whole process are needed to ensure that military programs support rather than negate efforts to win public support and participation. Failure to assure this--which characterized French efforts in Indochina and Algeria, in contrast to civil-led, successful, British efforts in Malaya and the Filipino campaign against the Huks--means that the very process of gaining security would be weakened and prolonged, at increased cost in Vietnamese and American lives.

Thus, overall civilian command of the RD program is needed for fundamental practical reasons, by no means for considerations of international image alone (though on the latter point, it must be observed that as soon as we put "the other war" under obvious military control, it stops being the other war). In particular, it is important not to block or reverse--by the way we organize our efforts--the current genuinely hopeful Vietnamese trend toward increased civilian influence and participation in government.

In short, it is not the precise form of organization or the precise choice of flow chart that is important. What is important is:

1. An immediate and effective military screen for RD efforts; and

2. Authoritative and compelling administration of the efforts of civilian agencies.

III. Achievement of the Ideal

I believe we can institute effective administration of the RD program--which Ambassador Lodge has aptly described as the heart of the matter--achieving all of these ideals:

1. Maintain the effect and the appearance of civilian control by immediately assigning overall supervision of all RD activities to Ambassador Porter (and assigning a second deputy to Ambassador Lodge to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter).

2. That the several civilian lines of command within agencies be consolidated into one. Thus, USAID, JUSPAO, OSA, and the Embassy personnel assigned to RD all would continue under the nominal administrative control of their respective agencies but full, unified operational control would rest solely with Ambassador Porter.

3. That Ambassador Porter's authority be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the RD team, including:

--relocation of personnel;

--the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities;

--and the apportionment of the funds allocated by each agency to Viet-Nam, bounded only by statutory limitations.

4. That MACV immediately give highest-level command focus and consolidation to its RD concerns and staff, now that it is no longer so completely distracted from RD by the compelling requirements of main-force combat. This would be organized around the thesis that the central need is the most effective persuasive power or leverage on RVNAF. This thesis is strengthened substantially by:

--The firm intent, expressed to us in Saigon last week, of President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky to shift ARVN infantry to revolutionary development work starting in January;

--The enhanced powers they intend to give to General Thang, already an able chief of RD for GVN.

5. That the MACV effort embrace at least advisory control over all levels of force--starting with ARVN but also including RF, PF, CIDG, and the para-military operations of the RD cadre, PFF, and PRV.

These steps would greatly strengthen both the military and civil lines of command. They would contribute significantly to the success of RD. But not even these changes would be decisive without a strong link between them.

The civil side requires the capacity to influence military movement which no organizational chart can provide.The MACV side requires the political and substantive expertise which a military organization does not--and is not expected to--possess.

Thus the fundamental recommendation I would make is:

6. To appoint, as principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, a general of the highest possible ability and stature--of two, three or even four-star rank. To do so would win the following advantages:

a. Compelling indication of the seriousness with which the Administration regards RD;

b. The rank and stature to insure optimum RD performance from MACV.

c. The rank and stature to afford maximum impact on GVN military leaders and capacity to persuade them properly to prod RVNAF when necessary.

d. Demonstrated command administrative capacities with which to assist Ambassador Porter, while bridging the inevitable institutional difficulties that might well otherwise develop from one arm of MACV's taking orders from a civilian.

e. A solution to the military control image problem, by which the advantages of close military support would be veiled by civilian control.

f. The capacity and position to formulate an effective, qualitative plan encompassing both military and civil realities. Previous plans have focussed on numbers of provinces, volume of RD cadre trained, and so on. They have put an unrealistic premium on quantitative, "statistical" success. Meaningful criteria, however, must be qualitative. I would envision such a qualitative plan intended to cover at least the next 12 months.

There would be an additional prospective advantage as well. If it should later be found that dual lines of authority--even given this strong link--are not successful, then we could more readily fall back to a unitary, military command structure--with the new RD general taking charge.

He would have the benefit, in that situation, of having been under civilian control and his relationship to RD would already be evident, making the change to military control less abrupt and less susceptible to criticism.

Beyond the form of organization, I also would, later, like to advance a series of specific thoughts on matters of substance for the RD program.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

[end of document]

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