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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

272. Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, October 15, 1966, 2:40-3:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith.

Vietnam--Manila Conference

The Council Meeting had originally been planned to give Secretary McNamara a chance to report on his visit to Vietnam. However, it was later decided to spend the meeting time discussing the President's Asian trip.

Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler see the President alone prior to the NSC Meeting. The purpose of this private session was to have been a discussion of the differences between General Wheeler and the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara with respect to future military actions in Vietnam.

The meeting in the President's office included, in addition to Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, the Vice President and possibly the Secretary of Treasury. There is no record of this discussion/2/ but it apparently centered on the differences recorded in memoranda from Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, single copies of which are attached./3/

/2/For Wheeler's record of the discussion, see Document 274 and footnote 3 thereto. The meeting with the President in his office began at 2:10 p. m. and was attended by McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, and Humphrey. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

/3/Documents 268 and 269.

The formal NSC Meeting was opened by the President, who requested Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler and Under Secretary Katzenbach to report briefly on their recent visit to Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara: The military situation in Vietnam is better than he expected it to be. Military preparations are progressing in an entirely satisfactory way. Progress in pacification is less than he had hoped. More emphasis needs to be placed on pacification programs. The pacification situation was worse than it had been when he was last in Vietnam.

We will be in Vietnam longer than we have thought. We should prepare now contingency plans looking toward the future so that if it turns out that we have to stay a long time, we would be prepared to do so.

General Wheeler: There has been substantial improvement in the military situation. The morale of our troops is the best ever.

General Wheeler then gave a short summary of fighting in and along the Demilitarized Zone, citing the activity of the North Vietnamese 324B Regiment. He described Operation Irving/4/ and said that there was still a belief in the field that the North Vietnamese were trying to separate the two most northern provinces from the rest of South Vietnam.

/4/U.S. troops, assisted by South Vietnamese and South Korean soldiers, launched Operation Irving on October 2 against a combined Viet Cong-North Vietnamese force in the central coastal area about 305 miles northwest of Saigon.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Efforts in the field of pacification are not as good as they should be. Lack of security in many areas prevented progress toward re-establishment of the authority of the South Vietnamese Government. For example, we constructed 65 school rooms in one area, only to have 55 of them destroyed within the year.

The Council then turned to a discussion of the President's Asian trip, including the Manila Conference./5/

/5/Filed together with the source text is telegram 66747 to Saigon, October 14, 16 pages, transmitting a paper drafted by William Bundy that discusses the scope and issues of the conference.

Secretary Rusk: The purpose of the conference is to give the President an opportunity to meet with the Heads of State of those countries contributing to the war effort in Vietnam. Although there is basic unity among the seven countries involved, there is rivalry among Korea, Thailand and the Philippines for Asian leadership. The conference will come out satisfactorily for us.

Bill Moyers: The purpose of the Asian trip is to show our friendship for Asian countries rather than accomplish substantive policy gains. There are specific problems which will be encountered in each country, e.g., Malaysia--the rubber problem; Thailand--the internal security problem. In addition, there is the problem of rivalry between Korean President Pak and the Philippines President Marcos.

There followed a discussion of public information problems which was initiated by the President who referred to a leak to Drew Pearson of the substance of the President's conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

The President: There should be no backgrounding on the Manila Conference unless it is cleared with Bill Moyers. Our public information must be coordinated. Our Ambassadors in these countries should talk to the heads of government about the dangers of public airing of differences among us as well as the critical need for unity.

Mr. Moyers: We should play down any expectation that a hard peace proposal will come out of the conference. Our emphasis should be on reconstruction in Vietnam after the fighting stops.

Secretary Rusk: Summarized the draft communique (copy attached)./6/

/6/Not attached.

The President: The conference will probably accomplish little so we must consider now how to keep the initiative in the period ahead.

Bromley Smith

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, October 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:59 a.m.

8583. 1. This is in reply to your 66655./2/

/2/In telegram 66655, October 14, the Department of State posed four questions that Lodge should put to D'Orlandi and that are answered in this telegram. (Ibid.)

2. On Saturday I asked D'Orlandi this question:

"Does Lewandowski's strong position against what he calls any form of 'barter' i. e., 'We stop doing this and you stop doing that' reflect his own appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based explicitly on what he has been told by North Vietnamese?"

3. D'Orlandi's reply: This question is not phrased so as to reflect the realities. Lewandowski's views reflect Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap who are the only two North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski has been in contact. Are or are these not the real power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. D'Orlandi believes you know more than we do about that.

4. Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any variation on Goldberg's September 22nd bombing-infiltration formula which would be compatible both with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which would be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure?

5. Answer: D'Orlandi says: I don't think he would answer that question. It would be going back on what he has said he refused to do. He wants an overall agreement--not a truce which would allow conversations. He wants a "package deal" which covers everything and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something that is "final."

6. When I asked D'Orlandi what would be the elements of a package deal he said for illustration: After one or two years, elections internationally controlled; a Vietnamese government which would abide by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave "eventually" (this word was stressed); a coalition government (which he said was not a "must") which would contain representatives of so-called "extremists" having nominal ministries. By "extremists" he meant the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the other. D'Orlandi was sure there would never be an answer to the question "What will you do if the bombing stops?" But a "real package deal" would get "very serious" consideration and it would get it "immediately".

7. This is also an answer to the last question in your paragraph 1./3/

/3/The last question in paragraph 1 was: "Are there in Lewandowski's view other elements which might be included in formula which would cause Hanoi to give it serious consideration?"

8. As far as the question in your paragraph 2/4/ is concerned I think it is answered effectively by Lewandowski's intention to go to Hanoi immediately after the U.S. elections. Lewandowski says he "attaches special importance" to these elections. Even though he says he does not understand our national politics, he knows that the fact that the elections have been held will "clear the air, whatever the results may be." It will mean that the electoral question will have been removed and he will know that the United States "can deal if it wants to."

/4/The question in paragraph 2 was: "Did Lewandowski have a particular reason to attach importance to the November 15 date, after which, according to him, there would be 'much to do.'"

9. Comment: I find this interesting since it confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace talks are very dangerous for us. It appears now that they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are utterly unacceptable for them. End comment.

10. D'Orlandi's illness has been diagnosed as a type of slow moving leukemia. He is very pleased with the care he is getting here from Dr. Richard Cohen, Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, who has had tests made, the results of which D'Orlandi can take with him to Rome. Would you tell Dr. Shirley Fisk, the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for medical matters, about D'Orlandi so that he will have it in mind should there ever be an opportunity for a doctor who is a specialist in such diseases to come to Saigon and then take a look at him?

Lodge

274. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/

Washington, October 17, 1966, 2139Z.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.

JCS 6339-66. 1. Reflecting on our telecon on Saturday afternoon,/2/ I have come to the conclusion that I can and should give you a better grasp of the situation here as regards pacification. The discussion of the inadequacy of the pacification program took place in the smaller meeting which preceded the National Security Council meeting to which I referred in my message Saturday afternoon./3/ Those present were the President, the Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance and me. It came out clearly that the President views pacification as critical to the success of our effort in South Vietnam; that he is dissatisfied with the present direction and execution of the program; but that he is unwilling to override the strong objections of Secretary Rusk (in consonance with those of Ambassador Lodge) to transferring the control of the program from civilian to military hands. However, he stated flatly that he wanted action soonest. "Soonest" was established as a period of ninety days within which to produce, the implication being that he would entertain a transfer of responsibility at the expiration of that time if the pacification situation remains unsatisfactory. As I mentioned to you on the telephone, he directed Cy Vance to draft for him a memorandum which would establish this deadline.

/2/October 16. No record of the telecon has been found.

/3/In JCS telegram 6313-66, October 16, Wheeler reported that at the "smaller" meeting "the President was quite receptive to certain proposals I presented regarding Rolling Thunder 52. Specifically, he indicated his readiness to take out the steel plant, the cement plant and certain thermal power plants. Without indicating which portions he disliked, he said that certain of the items gave him great difficulties. I consider that we will get favorable action from him on his return from the Manila Conference." (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)

2. During the NSC meeting pacification was referred to in more muted and general terms. However, the need for speedy strengthening of the civilian side of the program was made amply clear to all concerned.

3. Now as to the matter of personalities, my thinking along these lines is influenced by several factors:

A. The heightened Presidential interest in and dissatisfaction with our pacification efforts is going to increase the boiler pressure substantially with every passing day.

B. You and Heintges are both extremely busy and, in my judgment, can devote only a fraction of your time to pacification activities. Someone on your staff should devote full time his attention to pacification in its many ramifications.

C. Fred Weyand would no doubt make an admirable choice for this job.

D. Bruce Palmer would be equally good, I think, once he got his feet wet.

E. No one here is optimistic that a civilian-type operation can be gummed together to perform the pacification function effectively except at the cost of considerable delay. Many of us, and I am one, doubt that an effective civilian-type organization can be put together at all. Therefore, your effort should be designed, first, to plug in a pacification channel between the Embassy and your headquarters; and, second, to permit a transfer of authority and direction of the whole operation to you at some future time.

If the above factors are valid, I come down on the side of establishing in your headquarters now a deputy charged with pacification; of course, his title is immaterial, it is the functions performed that are important. Apropos of this, I have learned that Porter may be furnished an officer, in civilian clothes, to assist him. Rest assured there is no intent to take any of your forces from you.

4. New subject. As I mentioned in my message of Saturday, the President is receptive to striking a few targets of greater worth in North Vietnam despite advice he has had from some quarters to forego expanding the target system or increasing the weight of effort in the North. Specifically, he told me on Saturday that he was opposed to reducing the sanctuary areas around Hanoi and Haipong. As we know, there are many targets in these two areas which should be struck; a fine example is the motor repair facility, a picture of which your J-2 showed us during our meetings in your headquarters. I surmise that this subject may be discussed with you during the Manila Conference. I suggest that you be prepared to discuss the air campaign against North Vietnam in a broad way. I think you agree that the air campaign against North Vietnam is an integral and indispensable part of our overall military effort in Southeast Asia. Since we are committed to a program of increasing pressures, we should continue to increase pressures rather than staying on a level of decreasing effort.In this regard, I think it would be good for you to mention also the need to apply Naval pressures against ground LOC's and other high-value coastal targets in North Vietnam such as radar and air defense sites.

5. Mr. McNamara informed me one hour ago he finally got the President to agree that he will not attend Manila Conference. Neither will I. Best regards to you both.

275. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:30-7:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved in S on October 19. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. In a letter to Bruce, October 18, Bundy explained that the meeting flowed from a "rather painful dinner party" on October 15 at which George Brown pressed Bundy and McNamara relentlessly for the "minimum terms" on which the United States would stop the bombing and claimed that what they told him "did not square with what he had been told by the President." (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)

SUBJECT
Possible Conditions of a Cessation of Bombing

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Bundy
Ambassador Dean of the United Kingdom
Sir Michael Stewart, Minister, UK Embassy

Dean said that he had come to talk about the conditions under which we might be prepared to cease bombing, for the guidance of George Brown in future contacts with Gromyko, specifically if and when Brown went to Moscow in response to Gromyko's recent invitation to him.

The Secretary said that the first question was where we wanted to come out. In general, we looked to a solution under which all North Vietnamese elements were withdrawn, there was a return to full observance of the general principles of the 1954 Geneva Accords and of the 1962 Geneva Accords in toto, and South Vietnam was thus left free to determine its own future.

The Secretary said that this was the eventual objective. However, the question of bombing could be separated from it. It seemed to him unlikely that all the elements of an eventual solution could be embraced in a written and negotiated agreement; some of the elements would come into place on a de facto basis and through a withering away of activity. In any event, the question of de-escalation was important and interesting, in itself.

The Secretary therefore said that, in connection with the bombing, he was not inclined to spell out the details of a final settlement. The point was to get a significant process of de-escalation started. It would be difficult to get around a conference table while military operations were going full blast. But the way might be prepared by "sufficient identifiable concrete military action to indicate that a process of de-escalation was under way,"

The Secretary then said that if we did stop bombing in response to such action, it must always be recalled that we could not "write in blood" that we would not resume. There was a possible snag here in that the Communists wanted a cessation accompanied by a guarantee that the bombing would not be resumed. Hence, serious difficulty could arise if the other side carried on everything else, so that we felt we had to resume.

Therefore, the Secretary said, we must know what would happen if we stopped bombing. Gromyko had said that things would be different. We needed to know in what way and how. At the same time, we recognized that the action on the other side might be hard to smell out and that we might have to probe for a time to see what the true basis was and would be. In sum, the Secretary said that we must have "some indication" that something concrete would happen on the military side. At the same time, if this something did not extend into significant de-escalation, we would have to resume. Thus, Mr. Brown should explore with the Russians to see what more the Soviets could say about what would be different.

The Secretary noted that the bombing constituted in our judgment a major incentive to Hanoi to stop the war. It was a military plus, but it also played a key political role, for without it Hanoi could simply watch events in the South and play them as it chose without any elements of pain to itself.

The Secretary said that Gromyko had indeed gone a little further than any past Soviet statement, by saying that things "would be different." He then remarked that Foreign Minister Peter of Hungary had told him that it was his impression that Hanoi would accept a solution based on the 17th parallel. When the Secretary had pressed him whether he in fact had this from Hanoi, Peter had responded that he had good information and that he was making the statement soberly on the basis of official responsibility. If Peter had any grounds for such a belief, Gromyko must be aware of them, and therefore may go further and give us something more on which to build.

Dean then said that various forms of concrete actions had been mentioned in discussions with other Americans, specifically reduced military activity in the South, or a cessation of infiltration. It had apparently been made clear in connection with these conversations that the US could not accept a mere cessation of infiltration through the DMZ, but a combined cessation of DMZ infiltration and acceptance of ICC policing of the DMZ had been mentioned as an acceptable concrete action.

The Secretary responded that the last could not be a final answer, but must be part of a process of significant de-escalation.

The Secretary then returned to the suggestion that Brown could ask the Russians: "What more can you say?" and start the process of probing moving.

The Secretary said that he wanted to make clear that he was not concealing from the British any piece of paper on the precise conditions we could accept for stopping the bombing. The subject had been discussed at great length between the President, Secretary McNamara, and himself. The fact was that there were too many variables and a wide range of possibilities that defied precise delineation. Among the variables he specifically mentioned the political confusion in Communist China and its possible effect on what would be acceptable.

Dean chimed in that Hanoi's view of the American elections and the Manila Conference might also affect the timing question. He said that Gromyko had spoken to Brown in terms of a possible January visit by Brown. He asked, in effect, whether we thought this timing made sense.

The Secretary did not respond directly on this question, and it was left open.

The Secretary then returned to what Gromyko had said, and attached particular significance to Gromyko's response to the question of which Eastern European country had the most effective influence and role with Hanoi. Gromyko had responded flatly: "Moscow." The Secretary then summarized what he had been saying along the following lines:

a. The issues of a final settlement and de-escalation could be separated.

b. The Communist side said it regarded the suspension as an ultimatum, and was therefore talking about a cessation. In that event, you must elevate the price, and this could be summed up as actions amounting to "the serious beginning of a process of de-escalation."

Sir Michael Stewart asked what we would think of any proposal to suspend the bombing and see what would happen. The Secretary responded that the Communist side appeared clearly to regard a suspension as an ultimatum. If the suspension went along without reciprocal action, a very dangerous situation would be created. Therefore, there must be "some substantial information" because what we had to consider in effect amounted to a cessation even if we stopped the bombing without saying we were doing so finally, as a cessation, at the outset.

The Secretary then went back to the main threat, saying that his remarks should give George Brown enough to start discussions with Gromyko. If Gromyko produced any response, then we could consult urgently about how to move toward a deal.

Dean returned to the question of concrete actions that we might regard as adequate. He asked in what areas to look. The Secretary responded that the actions we could consider should be "something highly relevant to continued infiltration." Dean said this was most helpful. In explaining his definition, the Secretary said that any action meeting this criterion would surely have a significant effect on the other side's morale, which would make it thus a serious matter for them to undertake.

Finally, the Secretary noted that Ambassador Thompson had that day seen Dobrynin to ask him specifically about Gromyko's remark that "things would be different." Thompson had asked whether Dobrynin had anything to add, and the response had been negative. Thompson had also alluded to the remarks by the President and Brezhnev, in order to counter any negative implications the Soviet side might have drawn from the President's press conference remarks.

Comment: It seemed to Mr. Bundy likely that the conclusions Dean would have drawn from their conversation, and reported to Brown, would be roughly as follows:

a. As to the degree of likelihood of responsive action by Hanoi, that we must have "some substantial information" that such action would take place.

b. As to the nature of responsive action by Hanoi we would regard as satisfactory, that we would be looking for actions that would be concrete and in the military sphere, and that we would require actions indicating that a significant process of de-escalation was being started. The best area to look was in the sphere of actions "highly relevant to continued infiltration."

c. That in the nature of the problem the US could not be more precise than this as to what it would accept in return for a cessation of bombing, and that it would be highly useful in any event if Brown were able to obtain from the Russians any indications that went beyond the general statement that "things would be different." Such an indication could open the way to further discussions that would bring about an understanding on which a cessation of bombing could be based.

d. That the Secretary was not suggesting at this point any acceleration of the contemplated January date for Brown's discussions in Moscow.

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, October 19, 1966, 1230Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra and Wellington and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

8835. Ref: Saigon 7630./2/ Subject: GVN national reconciliation program.

/2/Document 258.

1. Thieu and Ky informed me today that they are prepared to go ahead with national reconciliation program as discussed at our October 3 meeting./3/ They will make a general reference to the program at Manila and will follow up with a proclamation on November 1.

/3/See Document 258.

2. They are in agreement with us on need to expand Chieu Hoi program and to make a concerted effort to win over VC cadre at all levels. General Tri, Minister of Information and Chieu Hoi, is now actively engaged in working out program and will be coordinating closely with US agencies./4/

/4/Lodge outlined his view of the components of such a program in telegram 8958, October 20. Kissinger outlined a program of national reconciliation in a 9-page paper prepared with Daniel Davidson of FE and forwarded to Lodge on October 19. Frank Sieverts of S/S forwarded a copy to Katzenbach on November 1 under cover of a memorandum stating that it was the "key memorandum" for a proposal for national reconciliation on which William Bundy and Harriman were working. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

3. Thieu reiterated GVN view that they cannot deal with VC as a political entity, but only as an internal security problem involving individuals or groups who will be given opportunity to return to the fold. In regard to the amnesty, he said, the VC will comprise two groups: those who may wish to return to NVN, and those who may wish to stay. The latter will be handled through national reconciliation program.

Lodge

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, October 19, 1966, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by McNamara, Katzenbach, and William Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Canberra and Wellington, eyes only for the President through Rostow.

The President left Washington October 17 for an extended trip through Asia. He visited New Zealand October 19-20; Australia October 20-23; the Philippines October 24-26, where he attended the Manila Conference (see Document 281); Cam Ranh Bay October 26 where he visited U.S. military personnel; Thailand October 27-30; Malaysia October 30-31; and Korea October 31-November 2. He returned to Washington November 2.

69371. Eyes only for Lodge and Westmoreland from Rusk and McNamara. We are gravely concerned about continuing uncertainty over Cabinet situation and impressions of political disarray in Saigon on eve Manila Conference./2/ It is obvious that if general impression is created that there is nothing in Saigon to support, main purposes of Manila Conference will be frustrated and allied efforts will look ridiculous. We appreciate your own personal efforts but it does not seem to us that it is enough that certain patchwork be accomplished to paper over a major political crisis for duration Manila Conference since everyone knows that the crisis exists and that no answer has been found. From point of view of American and international opinion, situation is very close to that of worst days of Tri Quang's efforts and we can expect strong revulsion against South Vietnamese who play games while Americans are getting killed to carry the brunt of the battle.

/2/In his discussion of the Cabinet crisis in telegram 8838 from Saigon, received at 10:35 a.m. on October 19, Lodge indicated that even dissident Ministers were insisting on resigning. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

We believe that we should weigh in strongly with all parties concerned, but especially with Ky, Thieu and the seven dissident Cabinet members. The seven Cabinet members should be shamed or shocked into full realization that American people will find intolerable moves which destroy sense of South Vietnamese unity at a time when Constituent Assembly is meeting to bring about the very kind of political order they seem to want. If they have legitimate grievances about personal har-assment or intimidation, you can assure them that we are much interested in that kind of point and will do what we can to bring about corrections. Believe you should discuss with Ky and Finance Minister Thanh whether they really want to engage in gross discourtesy to the President of the United States by Thanh's failure to appear at Manila Conference just after the President has himself received Thanh and when the President is traveling half way around the world to support the freedom and safety of South Viet-Nam. The object would be, in consultation with Ky, to bring about the withdrawal of the resignations of the civilian Ministers immediately. This may have to be accompanied by a hair shirt talk with Loan about some of his Gestapo tactics.

This is a matter of such importance that a maximum effort should be made even if it means some delay in your own arrival at Manila. The object is to produce an international impression of solidarity in Saigon but this cannot be done unless there is in fact some resolution of the problem behind the scenes.

Believe you should see Ky before his press conference to alert him fully to the grave dangers we see in this situation to insure that he not make matters worse by any ill-considered statements and that he knuckle down to a solution of the problem. At press conference he perhaps ought to say a police state will not be tolerated in South Viet-Nam.

The American people are prepared to do what has to be done against the application of force by North Viet-Nam and their Communist allies but the South Vietnamese have the job of convincing the American people that the South Vietnamese themselves are interested in the result and are prepared to work together to achieve it./3/

/3/In telegram 8966 from Saigon, October 20, Lodge reported on his "lengthy conversation" with Ky pursuant to this telegram. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)

Rusk

278. Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/

Washington, October 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 350.09 Vietnam. Secret. In his October 20 covering memorandum to Helms, Kent stated that "on the whole, we think the chances are better than even that the crisis will be compromised in some fashion which will limit the damage and leave Ky about where he is."

SUBJECT
Implications of the Current Cabinet Crisis in South Vietnam

1. Situation. The current cabinet crisis derives from an unfortunate meshing of two of the major divisive factors which have long complicated political life in South Vietnam--regional rivalries and the issue of civilian versus military control./2/ It does not represent a new development, but merely the first significant manifestation of these fundamental maladies since the September elections. It will not be the last.

/2/A third major divisive influence is religion which is not yet openly involved in the crisis; but should the crisis drag on, religious animosities and political jockeying among the various religious groups could readily come into play. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. The seven cabinet ministers (out of 29) who have proffered their resignations are all of Southern (Cochinchinese) origin and are civilians./3/ They share the general Southern antipathy toward the Northern "carpet-baggers" who dominate the Ky government and the military establishment. They also suspect that the military leadership will not fulfill its pledge for a transition to a civilian government. The visits of various GVN leaders (in particular those of Police Director, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan) to military-dominated South Korea adds fuel to Southern suspicions. With this backdrop of traditional mistrust, the heavy-handed action by Loan, a Northerner, in arresting an acting cabinet minister provided a rallying-point for the Southern ministers. They began to pressure Ky and to charge that Loan was attempting to create a "police state." Moreover, the imminence of the Manila Conference gave them an advantageous moment to bring pressure on Ky. The ministers assumed that Ky would be eager to avoid any political crisis before the Conference, in particular one involving the issue of civilian-military relations which the US considers crucial to the "other war" in Vietnam.

/3/The exact status of these ministers is unclear. Ky has said that they have agreed to remain at their posts until after the Manila Conference (24-26 October). Nonetheless, the resignation statements have appeared in the press after the ministers supposedly agreed to stay on, and the statements at least appear unequivocal. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. It is also likely that General Dang Van Quang (IV Corps Commander) and perhaps General Nguyen Huu Co (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War) are involved behind the scenes in the challenge to Ky's regime. Both men are Southerners. More important, they have strong personal reasons to oppose Ky: both men are prime candidates to be removed from their posts for corruption.

4. In any event, Ky, a Northerner (Tonkinese) and a military man, is almost certainly the ultimate target of the Southerners although the ministers have scrupulously avoided attacking Ky personally. Instead they have aimed their attack at those close to Ky, particularly Loan, head of the two principal security organizations; but also at General Le Nguyen Khang, III Corps and Marine Commander; Bui Diem, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Dinh Trinh Chinh, Secretary of State to the Prime Minister. These men are all Northerners. Because they command the security forces in the Saigon area, Loan and Khang provide much of the physical protection for the Ky regime. Should Ky be obliged to remove these men, his power base and prestige would be seriously weakened.

5. The crisis has already done some damage to Ky's image. Regardless of the immediate outcome of the crisis, Ky will go to Manila with his domestic house in a state of some public disarray. There has already been adverse foreign publicity on this score, and the heavy press coverage of the proceedings in Manila will engender more. In South Vietnam, the crisis has helped dim the glow left by the successful September election. It also has publicly raised the issue of civilian-military conflict. This will have reverberations in the Constituent Assembly where there is a sizeable and vocal bloc of Southern delegates, the most notable and most vocal being Tran Van Van, who may be working covertly with the dissidents.

6. Implications. The crisis can almost certainly not be resolved before the Manila Conference, and the best that can be looked for is its deferral until after the Manila Conference. Such a deferral would put the best face on an embarrassing problem at Manila and might allow things to simmer down in Saigon. On previous occasions, Ky has been adroit at fashioning compromises which have at least temporarily tended to placate the contending elements. If no compromise can be reached this time, or if Ky is compelled to meet the problem head on, he has two alternatives: 1) to accept the cabinet resignations, or 2) to sack or substantially curb Loan.

7. If Ky does accept the resignations, it would be a blow to civilian-military relations and would further exacerbate regional rivalries. There would be a chorus of unfavorable publicity in the foreign press. To lessen the impact of such a move, Ky would probably try to replace the ministers with other Southerners. He could probably do so, and this would help. Nevertheless, there would be a new round of anti-GVN statements, charges of "military dictatorship", and the like. Some of the firebrand Southerners in the Assembly might resign in protest. In these circumstances, there might be some street demonstrations and the militant Buddhists might strike up a temporary alliance with some Catholic Southern elements.

8. A move by Ky to drop Loan could cause more immediate and serious problems. Ky realizes this and has said that he will not fire Loan, though like all decisions in South Vietnam, this is probably not irreversible. As director of the two major security organizations, Loan is a power in his own right. Moreover, he is the foremost figure in the loose grouping of young, hard-line officers collectively called the "Baby Turks." Loan's removal would raise the spectre of renewed military factionalism which has not seriously plagued the GVN since the removal of General Thi last spring. Moreover, Ky has confidence in Loan, who played a major role in upholding the GVN in its recent victory over the militant Buddhists. In considering a move against Loan, Ky would be aware that this would only temporarily appease the opposition elements and only whet the Southerners' appetite for more concessions. Loan's removal under pressure would weaken Ky in the eyes of all concerned.

9. On the whole, the best thing that could happen would be that the crisis not come to a final head before Manila and that after Manila it can be settled by a compromise or at least by a not overly disruptive showdown. The worst that could happen would be a shattering of the unity among the military. At present and for a long time to come, military support, and probably predominance as well, is essential for any regime in South Vietnam.

For the Board of National Estimates:
Sherman Kent

279. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and approved in U on November 7.

SUBJECT
Rumanian Approach on Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

H.E. Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador
The Acting Secretary/2/
Robert H. Miller, Director, Viet-Nam Working Group

/2/Katzenbach.

The Acting Secretary received the Italian Ambassador at the latter's request on October 22. Ambassador Fenoaltea said that he had just received word from his Foreign Office that the Rumanian Ambassador in Rome had seen a senior Italian Foreign Office official on October 20. The Rumanian Ambassador stated that his government had carefully analyzed the situation in Viet-Nam and that on the basis of this analysis and various contacts which the Rumanian government had had, the Rumanian government had concluded that if the U.S. were to cease its bombing of North Viet-Nam permanently, a concrete response from North Viet-Nam would not be lacking. Ambassador Fenoaltea said that the Italians had queried the Rumanian Ambassador for clarification of the phrase "permanent cessation" on the grounds that it was difficult to imagine the U.S. taking such a step without a clear indication of what counteraction would come from the other side. According to Fenoaltea, the Rumanian had replied that the U.S. should not declare publicly a cessation of bombing for a limited time or with any conditions. The Rumanian had said that the 37-day pause last December and January had had the appearance of an ultimatum to Hanoi, and that the U.S. should now be asked to cease its bombing without any time limits or conditions. The Rumanian Ambassador repeated that his government's information had brought it to believe that if such a move were to take place, an appropriate and a positive reaction from the other side would not be lacking. The Rumanian Ambassador noted that a sentence in Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu's recent speech in the UNGA/3/ had apparently escaped the attention of the Western world, and that this sentence had particular significance.

/3/Not found.

Ambassador Fenoaltea said that he had asked to see the Acting Secretary on Saturday/4/ because he had been instructed to seek the U.S. Government's reaction to this Rumanian approach before Tuesday night, when the Rumanian Ambassador would be seeing the Italian Foreign Minister.

/4/October 22.

The Acting Secretary noted that the U.S. position with respect to a cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam was most recently stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the UNGA./5/ He said that it was difficult to know who was speaking for Hanoi, if they were actually able to speak for Hanoi, and furthermore what the specific response to a cessation of bombing would be. In other words, the Acting Secretary said, we had to have a firmer and more specific idea of Hanoi's intentions.

/5/See Document 244.

In response to Ambassador Fenoaltea's query as to whether this Rumanian approach to the Italians might possibly be the beginning of "the right channel," the Acting Secretary expressed some skepticism. He observed that, although there is a feeling in some quarters that if the U.S. would stop bombing North Viet-Nam something would happen, this had not happened in response to the two previous bombing pauses. The Acting Secretary stressed that it was extremely important to be clear as to the specifics of any bona fide approach from the other side. He suggested that the Italian Foreign Minister press the Rumanian Ambassador hard on the details of the Rumanian approach to the Italians and to quite frankly emphasize to him that this was not a game. The Acting Secretary emphasized that the U.S. Government could not just turn the bombing of North Viet-Nam on and off lightly and that we really had to know whether the Rumanian approach was serious. We had to know, in specific terms, publicly or privately, what response would be forthcoming to a cessation of bombing. The Acting Secretary said that, on the basis of what we knew of the Rumanian Ambassador's approach in Rome, he was not disposed to take it too seriously, but that of course we would be interested in any indication of serious intent.

Ambassador Fenoaltea referred to press reports that Philippine President Marcos was proposing a bombing pause in connection with the Manila Conference. The Acting Secretary noted that, in our view, there was no relation between the question of a pause and the Manila Conference, and that our position was as stated by Ambassador Goldberg.

Ambassador Fenoaltea asked whether he could report that the U.S. Government was not interested in a suspension of bombing as a good will gesture. The Acting Secretary replied affirmatively and added that the U.S. Government needed to have, publicly or privately, a concrete indication of what response a cessation of bombing would bring.

The Acting Secretary expressed appreciation for the information conveyed by Ambassador Fenoaltea and emphasized that the U.S. Government would be most interested in any indication of Hanoi's serious intent to resolve the Viet-Nam conflict.

280. Notes of Meeting/1/

Manila, October 23, 1966, 9:15-10:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Asian Trip Memcons. Secret. Drafted by Rostow (identified as WWR in the notes). The meeting was held in the Manila Hotel. Rusk, Lodge, Komer, and Westmoreland attended along with the President. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) President Johnson arrived in Manila about 3 p.m. on October 23. He flew from Washington to Honolulu on October 17 and stopped at American Samoa on his way to New Zealand October 18. (Ibid.) For his itinerary during his Asian trip, see footnote 1, Document 277.

Meeting of the President with Thieu and Ky (Republic of Vietnam)

MEMBERS OF PARTY
Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu; Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky; Dep. Prime Minister Co; Foreign Minister Tran Van Do; Secy of State for Foreign Affairs, Bui Diem; Amb. Lam--GVN Amb. to the Philippines

The meeting opened with Thieu asking if the President were tired. The President replied that he missed his naps, but was feeling fine. He added, "I don't have as many or as burdensome problems as some of my colleagues." He then went on to congratulate Ky and Thieu on the success of the election. He said that when Ky had come out in public with a prediction of 60-70% of the registered voters voting--and he thought of our 40%--his thought was, "What the hell are we both going to do when we only fetch up with 25%?"

Ky replied that Ho thought the same, and that's why he is still fighting. (This thought still remains somewhat obscure to me. WWR)

The President reported that an Australian politician dealing with Labor Party attacks on Holt's phrase, "All the way with LBJ" came up with the slogan, "Better all the way with LBJ than half a win with Ho Chi Minh."

The President then asked General Westmoreland how the Australians were doing in combat. He reported they were fine: two strong battalions, two batteries, one manned by the New Zealanders. They were excellent troops. The President then resumed by saying that Honolulu was a much better conference than we were given credit for. It was a big blow to Hanoi. The press systematically misinterpreted it. "Both of us," the President said to Ky, "must be careful not to let the press bait us."

The President said our task at this conference was to make it clear that it was not just the "imperialist" Johnson and Generals Thieu and Ky who were running this war, but seven nations were engaged because it was in their interest. We must indicate that we are ready to negotiate on the basis of reason, but we must give no grounds in Hanoi for illusion that we're going to give up, or that they can win the job in Washington as they once won it in Paris. The people of the world should get a picture of reasonable people ready to take steps towards peace when the other side is reasonable.

The President then told Ky that he had an enormous opportunity in his speech the next day./2/ "The whole world will listen to your words. It will be much more effective than if you gave the speech in Saigon where it might get lost, the way some of my speeches in Australia were lost." The President's advice was this: lean as far away as you can from the "imperialist" Johnson, from the hard-liner Rusk, and that fellow with stars on his shoulders, Westmoreland. You just hold the Bible in your hand tomorrow. You be a man of good will; love your neighbor; but indicate, of course, that you will not take steps which tie your hands behind your back when they are still shooting.

/2/The text of Ky's speech is in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, President's Asian Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966.

The President then went on to say that many in the West were prejudiced towards Asia because of ancestry, distance, and color. He told the story of his own position vis-a-vis Hawaii, and how he brought about the entrance of Hawaii as a state, pushing the U.S. 2500 miles out into the Pacific. This was one of the major sources of pride as he looked back over his career--to have overcome within the Congress and among the people of his region the color prejudice which had kept Hawaii out of the Union. Now he wanted to push the interest of the U.S. firmly out into Asia, not 2500 but 10,000 miles.

One doesn't enter public service to make money. If one is interested in money one goes into a big corporation. In public service the only satisfaction is what you can do for human beings. It is in Asia that the bodies are--2/3 of humanity. It is there that people die under 40; where illiteracy is high and income is low.

One of the purposes of his trip is to turn the spotlight of the world on this area. It is here where the problems of tomorrow must be faced. The President is prepared to do this, he said, because he sees the emergence of new leaders, new voices, new institutions, like the Asian Development Bank.

With respect to the conference, the President doesn't think we should produce new battle plans. They should come from the soldiers. And he quoted Sam Rayburn's remark when the President once criticized Eisenhower: "If he doesn't know more about military matters than you and me, we've wasted a hell of a lot of money on West Point."

Nor can we expect peace as a result of the conference. The critically important negotiations are not here. What we can expect is a demonstration that we are united (and we must not let the newspapers pull us apart). We are there to stay as long as it is necessary. We are there in a group. We are willing to reason; we are willing to forgive and to forget; we are willing to live and let live; but we are not going to tie our hands behind our back and let them shoot at us. The President then told Ky and Thieu of his reaction to the demonstrators in New Zealand and Australia; they should talk to Ho, not to Johnson. They've already sold Johnson on peace. Again the President underlined the importance to Ky and Vietnam of his speech so he could do himself, his cause, and all of us a great deal of good the next day. He advised Ky to go into the causes of war--Asian poverty--and to look forward beyond today to the long future of Vietnam and Asia. The President said that every day he listens for a few hours to television. What makes news is what goes wrong--for example, if some of Westy's forces hit our men or friendly Vietnamese by accident.

Here all they can report is what you say. Ky should try to reflect the new emerging Asia, young and fresh with great opportunities as well as great problems, beginning to build institutions like the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong Committee, etc. The President then turned to inflation. Ky replied that they had taken quite effective measures, but the problem was still there. This time they hoped to institute measures in anticipation of the inflationary pressures that might arise as the number of troops from abroad expanded. He said that they would deal with port congestion. Ky, going back to an earlier suggestion of the President's, said he would love to talk in a speech about the future of Asia. The President advised him to put out the cold hard facts on life in Asia: the facts about health, and life expectancy, and the state of the children.

The President then asked about the effectiveness of Viet Cong prop-aganda. Ky said that the people of Vietnam under the colonial and post-colonial governments had no reason for confidence. That is why they listened to the Viet Cong. The worst problem in Vietnam is the problem of corruption.

The President then picked up this theme and asked if there were any steps we can take to find and deal with corruption before his critics got there. There were several Congressional investigations about to go forward in this matter.

Ky said that this was his hardest problem. He said, for example, the port is run by his navy. The police and importers and some politicians make money. He gave orders to the police chief to clean it up. They found one case where a general was supposed to have gotten 40 tons of supplies. He informed the police that they must give him the hard evidence on this. They have not gotten back. Ky said he would struggle against these deeply ingrained forces and habits.

The President then asked Ky what is in the mind of the Viet Cong--do they expect to win? (there was a thoughtful pause) Ky replied: "No. I don't think so. I believe they will very soon collapse--if we can get to them the facts." He said that Westmoreland had reported to him the other day that half the prisoners captured in Operation Irving/3/ still thought Diem was running the government in Saigon. We must improve our information, get to the people, give them the facts, enlarge the open arms program. Then they will come back to us. As for the port, aside from corruption, progress is being made. The problem is that commercial importers don't pull their cargoes out of the warehouses. They hold them awaiting higher prices. The warehouses are clogged. This slows down the unloading of ships. The shortage is warehouse space. The entrepreneurs exploit the fact that the warehouse storage rates are very low. Therefore they are issuing a decree which will specify that if importers don't remove their goods in a certain time, the government will pick them up. They will be moved to military warehouses and confiscated. In the interval, the storage rates will rise with the length of time that the goods are in storage. The President asked Bob Komer what he thought. He said he hoped it would be all right. But there have been lots of decrees. Westmoreland added that if it were enforced, the decree would clear the port. He believed it would be enforced.

/3/See footnote 4, Document 272.

The President then asked Westmoreland for his assessment of the military situation. He said that by every index, things were improving. He cited Operation Irving as the biggest success of the war. He also cited the favorable trend of relative casualty figures, defections, weapons losses. Above all, an optimistic spirit was now unmistakable in Vietnam. The ARVN are fighting better and are more aggressive. There was improved outlook for pacification which would become the first task of the ARVN as they were retrained. Improved intelligence from the villages permitted more effective police measures. The President asked if the VC would still seek a major victory in October. Westmoreland thought they would try, but they would not succeed. Substantial forces were gathering in Cambodia, apparently aimed at the Kontum area. General Westmoreland then described operations over the past six months in the DMZ.

The President asked General Westmoreland whether he had enough troops. He said he would certainly need more forces. He would like all the allies fighting in Vietnam to increase their forces at least by 35%. The President turned to Secretary Rusk and remarked that he had his work cut out for him. The President asked if there were any more troops to be generated from South Vietnam. General Westmoreland replied that he envisaged an increase of about 22,000--up 20,000--by the end of 1967, but basically South Vietnam was a country whose manpower for military purposes was being stretched to the maximum. There followed some discussion of the possibilities of individual nations generating more forces--the Philippines and Korea were referred to. General Westmoreland would like to see another Korean division, and expressed the hope that as the Philippines went into action, they would generate a national pride of the kind which took hold in Korea, with the passage of time./4/

/4/See Document 286 for Westmoreland's report of this discussion.

General Westmoreland said that while there was light at the end of the tunnel, we had to be geared for the long pull. The enemy is relying on his greater staying power. It is only his will and resolve that are sustaining him now, and his faith that his will is stronger than ours.

With respect to bombing, General Westmoreland regarded it as very important. We should in no case unilaterally quit bombing. Infiltration continues. The price of infiltration has definitely been raised. The President suggested that General Westmoreland talk with Secretary Rusk, and instructed Rostow to get a fuller version of General Westmoreland's suggestions about the future of the bombing program./5/

/5/See the attachment to Document 282.

Returning to the conference and summing up, the President told Thieu and Ky that they should bear in mind the importance of projecting unity. Dissent is fine, and we all are for it; but there is a danger if Hanoi interprets dissent as weakness. It will prolong the war.

The conference will be neither a war nor a peace conference. The central lesson will be that we are all together; that we won't give up until it is over.

The President asked Ky if he had anything to add. Ky said no, except the problem of infiltration. Bombing is good, but the establishment of a base camp and patrols above the 17th parallel could do more. This concept was explored at some length.

The President asked how serious was the Cabinet crisis. Ky replied that it was not serious at all. These men were invited to work in the Cabinet as individuals and technicians. They are not representatives of substantial groups in the country. He can easily find replacements for them. He has spoken to each of them and explained his position. They were all present at the airport at the time of his departure. The Acting Premier is one of the dissidents.

The President was grateful for this information, but noted that it was a considerable problem in the U.S., where people thought of Ky's government as a European Cabinet. He asked Ambassador Lodge to talk to the press and explain the distinction.

The President then asked Tran Van Do if he had anything to add. He said that what Ky said was O.K. with him. He said he had already had a discussion with Secretary Rusk.

The President's last word was: Don't let the newspapermen divide us.

WWR/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

281. Editorial Note

The Manila Summit Conference opened at 9:07 a.m. October 24, 1966. In attendance were President Lyndon Johnson; President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines; Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of Vietnam; President Chung Hee Park of Korea; and Prime Ministers Harold Holt of Australia, Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, and Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand. Three days earlier, on October 21, delegations from the participating nations, including Secretary of State Rusk, had met in Manila for preparatory discussions.

An opening public session on October 24 was followed by a 3-hour closed session at which Vietnam's leaders reviewed the situation in their country and General Westmoreland made a statement. At a 2-hour closed session on the afternoon of October 24, following a working lunch, the chiefs of other governments, including President Johnson, made statements. The conference resumed at 11 a.m. on October 25 with a long executive session during which the communique was discussed and approved. A closing public session featured announcement of the three conference documents: the Declaration of Goals of Freedom, the Joint Communique, and the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pages 1259-1265.

Summary and verbatim records of the public and closed sessions, except for the executive session on October 25, are in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, President's Asian Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966. No official record was kept of the executive session. Audiotape recordings of the public and closed sessions on October 24 are at the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts. Comprehensive documentation of the conference, including planning documents and follow-up reports on international reaction, are ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the Manila Conference; ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, boxes 2-12; Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, President's Asian Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966; and ibid., Central Files, POL 7/PHILIPPINES.

Chester Cooper, a member of the U.S. delegation, described behind-the-scenes deliberations prior to and during the conference in The Lost Crusade, pages 310-320, including the controversy over insertion in the joint communique of wording calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and Allied troops within 6 months of North Vietnam's disengagement from the war. For commentary on the conference by two other members of the U.S. delegation, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton and General Westmoreland, see Documents 284 and 286.

Following the Manila Conference, President Johnson visited South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea, returning to Washington on November 2. At the President's request, Ambassador at Large Harriman and Assistant Secretary of State Bundy reported to foreign leaders on the results of the conference. Harriman met with Heads of State and Ministers of Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Iran, Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Morocco, in addition to Pope Paul VI. Memoranda of his conversations are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. He discussed his trip at a meeting of the Negotiations Committee on November 10 (see Document 300) and submitted a report to the President on November 22 (Document 315). Chester Cooper, who accompanied Ambassador Harriman, described the trip in The Lost Crusade, pages 320-324. Bundy visited Taiwan and Japan and summarized the results in a memorandum to the President, November 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15)

282. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Manila, October 24, 1966, 11:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret.

Mr. President:

You asked me to go into more detail on General Westmoreland's views on bombing strategy. I thought the simplest way to proceed was to get him to put on paper his assessment of the value of bombing the North and what targets we ought to consider in the weeks and months ahead.

In para. 6 he lists seven further target systems. I believe you will wish to read this line by line. It is the sober assessment of the responsible commander on the spot. I would not agree with all of his seven suggestions; but I am convinced:

--bombing the North is a greater asset than our intelligence people recognize;

--we should consider, if they persist in the war, having some further target systems, but our first duty is to mop up more oil because there is now evidence that they are hurting; and

--I agree with his observation in para. 7 that we should, in any circumstances, "avoid any restriction on strikes in the extended battle area."

W.W.R./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)

Manila, October 24, 1966.

SUBJECT
COMUSMACV's Comments on Rolling Thunder/3/

/3/In a telegram to Rostow in Manila, CAP 66803, October 25, Bromley Smith transmitted a message from Wheeler stating that he had read Westmoreland's comments, concurred heartily, and urged from a military point of view the earliest approval of his recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX)

1. The Rolling Thunder program (the bombing of North Vietnam) was designed to disrupt the movement of men and materiel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and to influence the will of the leadership in Hanoi against further prosecution of the war.

2. Although the program has not stopped the flow of men and materiel to South Vietnam, it has had significant impact on the war effort by the communists. The enemy has been required to divert to his air defenses substantial quantities of his manpower and skills that are in short supply. Also, quantities of labor and materials have been diverted through necessity to the maintenance of his lines of communication. Prisoners testify to the debilitating effect of the long march south caused by circuitous routes and inability to move personnel by vehicle. In addition, the amount of materiel and munitions that has been destroyed, as evidenced by pilot reports, has been significant. In my opinion, one of the main reasons for the lack of success thus far of the enemy's massive effort across the Demilitarized Zone was the disruption by the intensified air interdiction program north of the DMZ and along his major arteries of communication.

3. To stop the bombing campaign to the North would adversely affect the war in the South in serious degree. The enemy would be able with impunity to move his men, materiel and supplies to the South. He would no doubt move numbers of anti-aircraft weapons and surface-to-air missiles south toward the Demilitarized Zone and along his routes of communication leading into Laos. Furthermore, he would probably prepare jet airfields further south to give himself an offensive air capability. The adverse psychological effect that the cessation of bombing would have on the Vietnamese and allied forces fighting in Vietnam would be of significance. Our troops would be placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the enemy, since the enemy would no doubt continue his shelling of airfields, his sabotage of lines of communication, his ambushes, and his terrorism.

4. Thus far our air campaign to the North has been characterized by creeping escalation. This strategy has not influenced the will of Hanoi. The strategy has used air power inefficiently and expensively, and has achieved results far short of potential. In addition, a considerable and growing risk factor has been injected into the situation. The enemy now has a comprehensive air defense system under centralized control with a three-fold effectiveness. First, it involves a great number of automatic weapons and anti-aircraft units for use against low flying aircraft. Second, there are surface-to-air missiles for use at medium altitudes. While their kill ratio has been less than the enemy would have hoped, the threat of these missiles drives our aircraft to the lower altitudes where they encounter heavy automatic weapons fire. Third, there is a growing MIG capability at the higher altitudes. Besides the actual effect of these weapons, they have caused a degradation of accuracy in our bombing. In some cases, the threat of MIG attack has forced our planes to jettison their loads prior to reaching their targets in order to maneuver. This very hostile environment will result in mounting casualties as the war goes on--perhaps more than we will be willing or even able to sustain, given the present limitation on targets.

5. The time for a change in strategy is at hand. Two courses of action appear open to us. The first involves giving consideration to moving to shock action by striking over a short period lucrative targets that will hurt the enemy and convince him that our power does not have to be restrained. The second course of action would involve elimination of these same targets on a well programmed but graduated campaign, as opposed to shock action, and would be followed by a level of operations we can sustain. In any case, even with the elimination of any initial group of lucrative targets, it is doubtful whether the required effort can be supported without greater flexibility in target selection. Following either of these two courses, we should maintain a given level of air effort against North Vietnam on a sustained basis, but with sufficient target flexibility that will serve to bring maximum pressure to bear on the war economy of North Vietnam with minimum risk to our planes.

6. Specifically, the following targets are recommended in the general priority listed:

a. Large motor maintenance facilities which support his transportation system regardless of their location. There is a particularly lucrative installation inside the Hanoi ring.

b. The SA-2 missile assembly area, also inside the Hanoi ring.

c. The Haiphong port with emphasis on the dock area. It is believed that this target could be destroyed without jeopardizing foreign bottoms in major degree.

d. The complex of thermal power plants which numbers approximately twelve installations. These are known, are vulnerable, and could be struck without unacceptable risk.

e. The steel plant which reportedly manufactures POL drums and has a direct role in supporting the war.

f. The MIG air bases, to include supporting facilities and fighter aircraft. This could be done in retaliation for attacks on our airfields in South Vietnam which has been and will continue to be a recurring action by the enemy.

7. If the situation dictates that there be some cessation of the bombing campaign, the above targets should be hit before any consideration is given to such action. Furthermore, any change in the bombing program should avoid any restriction on strikes in the extended battle area, that area of North Vietnam from Quang Tri Province north to Vinh. In consideration of his responsibility in fighting the ground war, the field commander on the ground should be permitted to bring military power to bear on the enemy along those lines of communication leading directly to the battlefield.

W. C. Westmoreland/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

283. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Honolulu, October 26, 1966, 1920Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Repeated to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, and CGFMFPAC. The source text is marked with an indication that McNamara saw the telegram.

91125. Air campaign against North Vietnam (U).

1. The air campaign directed against North Vietnam is an essential element of our strategy for achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this message is to establish clearly the critical importance of these operations to our military efforts in South Vietnam and to identify the grave risks involved should these operations either be suspended or their scope significantly reduced before NVN actually ceases infiltration of men and material into SVN and the DMZ.

2. Self-imposed controls on the use of air power against NVN have had an adverse impact upon the effectiveness of air power in reducing the capability of NVN to direct and support the insurgency in SVN. These operations, nevertheless, have had a significant impact upon the military capabilities of the North Vietnamese Army and the VC. Indeed, the amount of disruption and enemy material destroyed has been of such magnitude as to represent the probable balance of power which to date has denied the enemy a capability for seizing significant portions of I and II Corps. The enemy has been unable to move concentrations of requisite military force to SVN to accomplish such a task without incurring unacceptable losses from air attack. The tactics of the enemy, the nature of the terrain in SVN and the concealment which it affords all dictate that we must not withhold our airpower until he closes with us in close ground combat. We must begin disruption, harassment and attrition of enemy forces as far back as we can find and attack them, thus degrading his capability qualitatively and quantitatively before he reaches the battlefield. Otherwise, his full capability must be met on the battlefield in a mode of combat which is certain to increase our casualties by appreciable and unnecessary numbers.

3. The risks described above are of immediate and pressing concern in connection with NVA concentrations now known to be in and near the DMZ. This is an area where the enemy is adept at moving and concealing large forces, and from which he can attack with little warning. The military security of our numerically smaller forces in this area depends in great measure on the ability of our air power to deny the enemy freedom to move and concentrate in positions from which he can attack with great advantage. A stand-down of air operations against enemy forces in or within supporting distance of the DMZ for even the shortest period of time would create the gravest of risks to the security of friendly forces in the area. The enemy would be accorded a greater freedom of movement for his men and supplies. We cannot afford to risk creation of a sanctuary of this nature close to our own forces.

4. Our air campaign in the North is a major military activity wherein we have the initiative and control over the intensity of combat. In SVN, the enemy can engage or disengage on the ground almost at will, thus in a sense pacing the ground war to his advantage. Such is not the case in the air over his homeland, where he must make a concession if he is to gain any relief from the pressures being applied against him. It must be quite apparent to him that decisions which can increase his losses at home will not be of his own making. We cannot afford to relinquish these initiatives except under conditions clearly indicative of success in our over-all objectives.

5. There are very serious military risks attached to any form of a partial stand-down, either in terms of reducing the targeting base or in restricting air operations to small geographic areas. As soon as such reductions become apparent in the past, the enemy has reacted quickly by readjusting his air defenses and our attrition has increased proportionately. It is essential that we avoid any voluntary simplification/reduction of his air defense problems. In fact it is becoming critically apparent from current attrition trends that a broader target base in NVN is urgently needed.

6. Our primary objective in the air campaign against North Vietnam is to make it as difficult and costly as possible for the NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause Hanoi to cease controlling and directing the insurgency in SVN. To achieve this objective, a steady increase in the pressure applied to the enemy is necessary to cause him to reconsider his support of the aggression. The most recent increase of pressure was applied through the systematic destruction of the NVN POL system. Inaugurated in early July, the program has resulted in the destruction, greatly reduced capacity or abandonment of all major POL targets authorized for attack. In recent weeks our pressure on the enemy has not continued to increase. In fact, it has decreased. Our air power is not being used to its maximum effectiveness. Many lucrative targets and target systems should be attacked to increase the pressure applied to the enemy.

7. This is not the time for relaxation of pressure. A broadened target base designed to lead Hanoi to expect attacks anywhere, at any time, against any type of military target or activity that supports their aims is essential. The targets and freedom of actions proposed by the JCS for Rolling Thunder 52 are a first step towards this broadened target base. Implementation of RT 52 would again increase the pressure on NVN, although not using our air power to its maximum effectiveness. It is time now to tell Hanoi that no military target, no activity that helps sustain the NVN effort to prosecute the war, is free from attack.

8. In summary, air operations in NVN have not yet reduced NVN support of the insurgency in SVN to the level desired. Hanoi has not been brought to the negotiating table. However, air operations in NVN have prevented the enemy from supporting his forces sufficiently to mount any major offensives or to seize and hold any vital areas in SVN. The NVN air campaign is the one action that brings the war home to North Vietnam. It disrupts the daily life in North Vietnam. It causes multiple and increasing management and logistic problems. It prevents the enemy from conducting an aggression from the comfort of a sanctuary.

Any continued relaxation of pressure in our air campaign against North Vietnam will provide the enemy with the incentive to sustain and increase his support of the aggression in SVN. Our allies in SVN will consider the US irresolute in its determination to force the Hanoi government to stop supporting the insurgency. The communists will be encouraged to increase their disruptive efforts throughout SEAsia. Our alternative is to convince Hanoi that its best hope is the negotiating table. A broadened target base is essential to achieve this end. The JCS proposed RT 52 is the first step towards a broadened target base. It is recommended that RT 52 be implemented now, with additional broadening of the target base authorized at the earliest to clearly signal our intent to Hanoi.

284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, October 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, VNS 2, Vietnam 66-68. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Vance, Hoopes, and Steadman.

SUBJECT
McNaughton in Manila, October 23-25, 1966

Herein: Key items on (1) Manila Conference, (2) Westmoreland's thoughts, (3) Thai-related problems, and (4) more ROK troops:

1. Manila Conference. The Conference went well. I think we got what we wanted: Display of not-US-aloneness, of resolve, of beginnings of an awakening responsible Asia, and of concern for the miseries of the Asian billions. Not least, the Heads really got to know each other, we clarified some stands (for the world and for the enemy), and we tacked Saigon down to some useful propositions. (The President's extemporaneous statement/2/ was particularly moving. He was tough and determined, saying, e.g., that he did not expect success on the economic or diplomatic front until we won the military front. But he also had a lot of "peace" and "Great Society" in it.) Most important Conference specifics--

/2/For Moyers' notes of the President's extemporaneous statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1256-1259.

--Withdrawal within six months. This sentence (in para 28 [29] of the Communique, DOC/3 attached)/3/ had to be negotiated by the President himself. I'll tell you the tale later.

/3/Attached but not printed. Paragraph 28 in the attachment was divided into two paragraphs, 28 and 29, in the final text printed ibid., pp. 1259-1265. The sentence in question appears in paragraph 29 in the printed text.

--US commitments not expanded. It was a continual battle to keep language out of our own drafts either hooking us to enlarge our treaty commitments or adding preconditions to our withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. The issue arose in the first form in Part I of the Declaration (DOC/4 attached);/4/ and in the second form in the Communique, paras 3, 4, 27(1), 27(5) and 28 [29]. I would not allow "end of all terror" or "peace assured" language; in all cases but one, our position is protected by words such as "externally supported" or "aggression" (which implies "from without"). My failure was partial in para 28 [29] of the Communique. It resulted from the President's having to negotiate the language himself. The offending language involved is "and the level of violence/5/ subsides." We also succeeded in avoiding giving South Vietnam any bilateral post-war guarantees (para 27(6)) or promising to do more than to consult with our allies regarding settlement of the war (see paras 28 and 29 [and 30] of the Communique).

/4/Not attached; printed ibid., p. 1259.

/5/McNaughton added here in hand the word "thus," which appears in the final text.

--Message to the enemy. Among the messages to the enemy are (1) a display of resolve (statements of resolve, the fact and aura of the meeting, the attention paid to long-term concerns); (2) a reference to conversion of military installations (para 18 of Communique); (3) tabling of the six-point South Vietnamese "essential elements of peace" (para 27 of Communique); and, probably most important, (4) the public undertaking to have our forces out within six months of the time North Vietnam "turns herself off" (para 28 [29] of Communique).

--Specific Vietnamese commitments. In the Communique you will find specific references to treatment of POWs (para 9); to allocation of forces to RD (para 11); to fighting corruption (para 14); to holding down inflation (para 16); to forward political steps (paras 21 and 22); to national reconciliation (paras 23 and 27(4)); to staying south of the 17th Parallel (paras 27(2) [29] and (3); and to withdrawal of US forces (paras 18, 27(5) and 28 [29]).

2. Westmoreland's thinking. Westy sought me out twice to give me his thinking on force levels, Rolling Thunder, the barrier and RD. His thoughts--

--Force levels. He is thinking of an end-CY 67 strength of 480,000 filled out by end-CY 68 of 500,000. Barring surprises, he would plan to hold it there. He believes that this will be what the US can sustain over time without mobilization and without calling up reserves and what the Vietnamese economy can bear. (In this latter connection, he said he could not live within P42 billion; but in further conversation he said he meant that he could not "plan" on that basis--that "reasonable" (conservative?) assumptions led him to P46 billion, but that as he moved along he might end up using no more than P42 billion.) He said the 480-500,000 men would be enough even if infiltration goes on at a high level--at one point he said that "we have great mobility and fire power" and that "there is only so much geography" (but at another he said, "I can't say now whether I will have enough troops to take on the Delta"). He said with respect to air power that he wants more B-52 strikes, but that, when he gets the presently programmed TAC air capability, he will need no more TAC air. He wondered if he got across to you his need also for a "Corps contingency force" to back him up in case of emergency. "It could be located in Hawaii, Okinawa or CONUS, and could be part of the rotational base." His strategy is to create and maintain "a balanced, powerful force that we can sustain indefinitely." He believes (perhaps as a result of my, or your, suggestion) that such a posture will be of critical importance in convincing the North of our resolve.

--Rolling Thunder. He says he "shudders" at the thought of our stopping bombing the North. He called RT our "only trump card--our only pressure on the North." He said that it has slowed down the movement of supplies, has been costly to the North, and has diverted enemy manpower. He favors reducing the restrictions on the program ("more flexibility"), noting that "you are asking for a very bad political reaction." He was referring to the large aircraft losses when our aircraft are after "low-value targets." (He mentioned the "most hostile environment we've ever operated in--AAA at low level, SAM at medium level, and MIG at high level.") His recommended targets: The missile assembly area, the motor (truck) maintenance facility, the MIG bases, the Haiphong docks, the 12 thermal power plants ("which would cripple their war-making potential"), and the steel plant ("where we think they are making POL drums"). I did not, for obvious reasons, press Westy hard on this. But I did say that whenever I write a paper in support of RT strikes I have trouble developing the reasoning clear through, connecting recommendations with payoff. I noted that CIA says that, even with enlarged strikes, the enemy could supply several times the amount of materiel required to support a much-increased level of combat in the South. I asked how, for example, hitting the power plants would end up in fact helping him in the South. He said, "I'm not responsible for the bombing program. Admiral Sharp is. So I haven't spent much time on it. But I asked a couple of my best officers to look into it, and they came up with the recommendations I gave you." At another point he reported that the President had asked him his views in front of Ky and Thieu, and that he had given them; that Walt Rostow had asked him to put them down in a memo for the President and that he was doing that./6/ It turns out that he favors some targets because they are directly related to air defense, some because he relates them to infiltration, and all of them because of their "shock" and "bargaining" effect. He said that, in any event, we should not shut off bombing in the "extended battle area" up to Vinh. He said the North will merely use a pause to improve their air defenses and air fields ("I would").

/6/Attachment to Document 282.

--The barrier. Westy seems to be fighting the barrier less (although he obviously fears that it is designed mainly to justify stopping RT, at which he "shudders," as reported above). He seemed reconciled to an air-delivered area-denial system at the west end. He did comment that you may have too much time pressure on the Starbird program--"it may cause us to make some bad mistakes." His only specifics, though, related to the need in Vietnam to evacuate people, to condemn real estate, etc., "all of which takes time." He mentioned, in connection with the barrier, the possibility of using a Nike battalion in a surface-to-surface all-weather function. He said the conventional warhead, if authorized, could be ready in six months, but he had not done a cost-effectiveness study of the idea.

--Revolutionary development. He plans for 75% of ARVN and perhaps 25% of US to be devoted to RD. What the mix will be as between ARVN and US, he cannot now say--in some cases, US might comprise 90% of the forces, in another case it might be the other way around. He thinks the new arrangement should be in operation by July 1, 1967.

[Here follows a paragraph on Thailand.]

--Korean troops. Ambassador Brown advised against bumping Park now for more troops for Vietnam. So far as I know, the President did not do so. But (1) the President's off-the-cuff remarks on Monday hit hard at the "we're all going to have to get in there and do more" theme. The theme was so strong that word had to go out to all hands afterward to deny that the President had put the bite on the other six for more troops. And (2) Park was the one who asked Westy in the Monday session whether more troops would be needed. Westy said yes.

John T. McNaughton/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that indicates McNaughton signed the original.

285. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, DOD. Secret.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asia Costs

As you requested, we have estimated the incremental cost to the Defense Department of the Southeast Asia conflict; that is, the cost over and above the normal costs of the Defense establishment. These estimates are:

$ Billion

Annual Rate as of 30 June 1967

For FY 1966, 9.4

For FY 1967, 19.7

Total, 22.4

Robert S. McNamara

286. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Saigon, October 27, 1966, 1201Z.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.

MAC 9451. Subject: Manila Conference.

1. Now that the Manila Conference is over and the President has completed his short visit to Vietnam, on which I reported separately,/2/ some comment on the events of the past few days are in order.

/2/In telegram 270440Z from COMUSMACV, October 27. (Ibid.) On October 26 the President flew from Manila to Cam Ranh Bay, arriving at 4:34 p.m. He reviewed the troops, awarded service decorations, spoke to the assemblage, visited the NCO Mess Hall, met with top commanders from all over Vietnam, and departed at 6:57 p.m. for Manila. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Dairy)

2. On Sunday evening,/3/ the President asked Ambassador Lodge, Secretary Rusk, Walt Rostow and me to a meeting which started at 2000 hours. The President spoke briefly on his view of the Conference and his hope for unity of purpose at the meeting. In anticipation that I might be asked to comment on the general situation in Vietnam, I had drafted some remarks which I left with Walt Rostow./4/ These were in extension and support of remarks to be made by Vien and Thang. The next morning the President told me that he had read my prepared remarks and fully approved them.

/3/October 23.

/4/Not found.

3. At the same Sunday evening meeting, the President also asked my ideas on the bombing of North Vietnam. He requested that I write up my views and give them immediately to Walt Rostow./5/ I did so on Monday following which I sent both of you copies TWX./6/

/5/Attached to Document 282.

/6/In telegram 250532Z from COMUSMACV, October 25. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)

4. At 2115 hours on Sunday, Thieu and Ky came in and joined the meeting./7/ The President discussed with them his concept of the Conference. There was some discussion as to the need for additional forces. When asked, I replied that such an increase was definitely needed and estimated about 35 percent above end year levels. I suggested that we urge the other nations to contribute their proportional share. The President tied the proportional share to percentage of population, a line which he subsequently followed in the closed sessions of the meeting.

/7/See Document 280.

5. The first closed session started Monday morning, 24 October. Statements were made by Ky, Vien and Thang, following which I made my statement,/8/ a copy of which has been mailed to you. (Subsequently, the President asked that I make a videotape of my remarks which was done that afternoon.) I received a question from the Prime Minister of Australia asking about the impact of large numbers of foreign troops on Vietnam. In my reply, I admitted the political, psychological and economic risks, but explained how friction was minimized by careful orientation of the troops of all nations. Violations of standards are infrequent although one occurs from time to time. The Prime Minister of New Zealand asked about enemy activity in the DMZ. I replied with a detailed explanation. The Korean President asked if more troops would be needed, to which I gave an affirmative answer.

/8/Text is in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, President's Asian Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966--Documents, vol. IX.

6. Late Monday afternoon, at the request of the President, I held a back-grounder for about 30 members of the press at the Manila Hotel. Questions revolved around revolutionary development, the state of training and morale of the RVNAF and the concept of troop deployments. I made the point that the available leadership of the RVNAF was stretched to the elastic limit. For leadership, manpower and economic reasons, the strength of RVNAF would expand only marginally over what it now was. I stressed that quality must now be emphasized, mentioning the detailed and practical leadership training programs we had launched, in which the Vietnamese Government was taking renewed interest. I explained the need for education of officers and retraining of troops to shift emphasis from the needs of combat to the support of revolutionary development. To questions on the U.S. Mission organization to deal with RD, I replied with a historical account and some general phil-osophy rather than in practical terms to avoid speculation of friction within the U.S. Mission.

7. The session on Tuesday, 25 October, was taken up primarily in waiting for the Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of State or Heads of Government to come up with a final report and communique. This gave me a chance to conduct further conversations with various delegations. I had ample time to talk with the Australian and New Zealand delegations and I believe we may get additional troop contributions after their elections next month. (I had had time for extensive talks with the Koreans while their President was here, and believe them receptive to a further contribution.) The attitude of the Philippine leadership is unclear, although I went out of my way to praise the quality of their contribution, both to individuals and to the press. The Australian and New Zealand delegates were interested in the question of the Cambodian sanctuary. At lunch, I had a long discussion with Ambassador Harriman on the same subject and believe I was able to cast some new light on the problem as seen from Washington.

8. With respect to the six months withdrawal provision in the final communique, I was as surprised as most when this emerged in final version.

9. As I have reported, when the final session ended on Tuesday, the President held me over to talk about his trip to Vietnam. I returned here early yesterday morning to make the necessary arrangements.

10. Best regards.

287. Report Prepared by the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Washington, October 1966.

/1/Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (29 Oct 66). Top Secret. Prepared by J-3, Directorate for Operations. Forwarded to Wheeler by Goodpaster under cover of an October 31 memorandum, noting that the report was prepared in response to Wheeler's request. A copy of the report is also at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 193, Evaluation of the Effects of the Air Campaign.

In a November 7 memorandum to Goodpaster, signed by General Robert Taylor for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA commented on the report, noting that its judgments and statements "could be challenged by someone unwilling to depart from the relatively confined area of solid intelligence evidence," but that, on the whole, DIA was "inclined to accept the J-3 report as a reasonable analysis of the situation." (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3/3200 (CY 1966))

AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS

[Here follows a 2-page Summary.]

Discussion

1. The war in Southeast Asia is a single conflict against an enemy whose operations are integrated militarily, geographically and politically, and therefore cannot properly be compartmentalized in strategy or in evaluation of results. Combat operations of all types, and in all areas, contribute to the eventual achievement of US objectives in Southeast Asia. Thus, the results of the air campaign against North Vietnam and the infiltration routes through Laos, are directly and decisively related to the success or failure of US/FW/GVN operations in South Vietnam. Conversely, increasingly effective combat operations in South Vietnam have a major influence upon North Vietnam's capability and determination to support the insurgency. (See Appendix A)./2/

/2/Appendices A-G are attached but not printed.

2. In early 1965, when the fortunes of the GVN were at their lowest ebb, two important actions were taken by the United States which have changed the course of the war in Southeast Asia: the deployment of US combat troops; and the initiation of the air campaign against North Vietnam. These two actions were integral elements of a single strategy designed to blunt the increasingly successful communist advance in South Vietnam, and to seize the initiative from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces; eventually to cause the communists to cease their aggression in South Vietnam; and finally, to assist that country in its development as a viable, independent, non-communist nation. It was understood at the time these critical actions were taken, that US objectives would not be achieved in a short time, even under optimum military conditions, and that the force build-up, as well as the accumulation of the over-all impact of this military effort upon the enemy, would take time. It became obvious also, as indications of rapidly increasing support and participation by NVN were obtained, that the successful implementation of US objectives in SEAsia could not be achieved without continued direct pressures against NVN, unless the United States was prepared to provide a major increase in the number of US ground troops already deployed or programmed for deployment. (See Appendix B).

3. There is increasing evidence that US/FW/GVN combat units have now successfully seized the initiative in SVN. Recent past and current combat results support this loss of initiative. This has been the combined results of operations in NVN, SVN, and the Laos panhandle. Increasingly effective combat operations in SVN have aggressively searched out and attacked VC/NVA main units, destroyed their bases, constantly disrupted planned schedules, and maintained continuously increasing military pressures against them. (See Appendix C). At the same time, the air campaign in NVN and the Laos panhandle has destroyed significant amounts of materials and munitions, killed numbers of troops moving south to the combat area, and disrupted NVN's transportation and lines of communication supporting this logistic flow. It has required the enemy to divert substantial quantities of his manpower and skills that are in short supply, and quantities of labor and materials have been diverted because of the necessity to maintain and expand his lines of communication. The lack of success thus far in enemy attempts to mount large scale offensives has been due in large part to the disruption of his main arteries of communication. (See Appendices D and E).

4. The substantial activities in US ground, air, and naval forces in SEAsia is beginning to evidence signs of positive results. Despite major military handicaps, indications of some of the cumulative effects of US/FW/GVN combat operations are now emerging. The VC/NVA force build-up has essentially leveled off, despite major attempts to infiltrate and recruit larger numbers of military personnel; VC/NVA organized large scale military initiatives have dropped to a low level; shortages of critical military supplies and morale problems among VC/NVA units in SVN are beginning to surface; VC control of population and area in SVN is decreasing; NVN support of combat operations in SVN in terms of men and resources has been degraded; NVN has been denied a total sanctuary from which to export insurgency; the life and economy of NVN has been disrupted; morale in NVN has suffered; national aspirations are being frustrated; large portions of NVN's population have been displaced; NVN's demands upon communist nations for war-supporting equipment and materials has increased substantially, and at the same time, its ability to provide reimbursement has decreased; doubts are now emerging among NVN leaders as to their ability to succeed in SVN; major drains on manpower resources have occurred; and a massive, well-coordinated worldwide communist diplomatic and propaganda effort to pressure the United States to cease bombings, whose scope and intensity testify to the growing impact of the US combat operations, is in full operation. (See Appendix F).

5. To decrease the current level of coordinated military pressures against the enemy at the very time evidence of progress is beginning to appear, would at a minimum, prolong the war significantly, require substantial increases in US ground troops, and result in greatly increased loss of US lives. It would also provide the communists with new hope and new opportunities, postponing or completely removing the necessity for any major strategy changes on their part. It would forfeit the hard fought gains which have already been achieved at significant cost in US lives and equipment, and in the long run, could result in failure by the United States to achieve its objectives in all of SEAsia. (See Appendix G).

6. It has been recent practice to attempt to evaluate the progress of operations in SEAsia by analyzing known statistical results. The problems which are associated with this approach are numerous and serious. It tends to separate the war into separate compartments, ignoring the interrelationship of all operations in support of a single strategy. Statistics on combat results are unreliable at best, and in general, focus on small segments of the over-all operations while overlooking the major trends on which little or no data are available. In SEAsia good intelligence information on the results of combat operations, particularly relative to their overall impact upon the enemy is minimal; and yet, this is the only kind of information which really measures the true pulse of the enemy. Recognizable indications of this kind of effect may not appear for months, or perhaps years, after a military campaign has been initiated. The history of past wars has repeatedly borne this out. Thus, the current statistical analyses by which progress is judged have not touched upon such matters as the depth of erosion of communist stockpiles in NVN and SVN, or the extent and nature of major deficiencies in NVN's war-supporting capability. They do not indicate the extent of disruption and upheaval within NVN, nor the real state of the morale of the North Vietnamese people. These analyses have therefore not indicated the true value of the investment in aircraft, munitions, and US lives that has been made to date.

[end of document]

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