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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

288. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, November 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. In his covering memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh stated: "Attached is my reaction to Secretary McNamara's memo on Vietnam [Document 268]--which seemed to me exceedingly and excessively pessimistic." (Ibid.) In a separate memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh listed the pros and cons of both a cessation and an intensification of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and also listed the major criticisms of the bombing together with opposing arguments. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam)

SUBJECT
Winning the War in Vietnam (U)

I believe that it is possible to win the war in Vietnam within the next 12 to 24 months.

By winning the war I mean the elimination of infiltration of arms and men and the reduction in in-country insurgency to proportions generally manageable by the Vietnamese but without precluding U.S. troop and material assistance.

I believe this outcome is possible without greatly increasing the risks of expanded CHICOM or Soviet participation in the war.

Obviously, it is in the U.S. interest to win this war as soon as possible if it does not involve great risk, because any prolongation of the war causes U.S. casualties and diverts our energies and resources from pursuing the Great Society at home and abroad. Perhaps less obvious is the fact that prolongation of this war will probably encourage the communists to resort to other low-cost (to them) wars of adventure.

I believe that it is especially important for us to win the war before our political conventions in the summer of 1968. If the war is still being fought in the summer of 1968, I think that the communists would have every incentive to hang on at all costs until after the fall elections in hopes of a change in U.S. policy.

I do not believe that our present strategy is likely to end the war within the next 18 to 24 months--but it might.

a. The final conclusion of the CIA study The Will to Persist,/2/ stated:

/2/For the principal findings of the study, see Document 219.

"If on the other hand, pressures on them (the communists) are maintained and the course of events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to take stock and consider a change in their strategy."

b. The continuing efforts to get the U.S. to stop bombing the north give a possible indication that the other side is genuinely interested in stopping the war. Until Hanoi's responses are more forthcoming, however, it is prudent to consider that the anti-bombing campaign may be simply part of their psychological warfare efforts to gain a respite to improve their chances of holding out until after the 1968 elections.

The prolongation of the war by the other side involves a complicated interaction of will and capability. At the present rate of attrition, the communists would have the theoretical capability to fight on for at least 15 years. But the history of warfare shows that the will to resist collapses long before the absolute capability is destroyed. Thus, my analysis--which as you know is not shared by the intelligence community--indicates that the communist calculation of profit and loss applied to their manpower drain would bring about the end of the war within three to six years.

It seems to me that this three- to six-year period will most probably be shortened by the U.S. elections in 1968. Regardless of the outcome of our elections (barring Senator Fulbright's becoming President), I believe the war would most likely end between January and June 1969.

If the above analysis is correct--and it is a big if--the policy question facing the President now is: What might reasonably be done now to shorten the war by 6 to 12 months? This is a question which should be faced now because of the time involved for decision, for implementation, and for the actions to take effect.

Although it could be argued that we should wait until the spring of 1967 to see whether the communists will in fact change their strategy, this possibility does not seem sufficiently likely to base major decisions upon it. Furthermore, action taken now will have more impact than the same actions taken six months from now because of:

a. The cumulative impact of an additional six months of pressure.

b. The longer time that the communists would have to hang on before the 1968 elections.

c. The apparent expectation by the communists of increased pressure after the Manila Conference which if not forthcoming will give them a psychological boost.

There are five interrelated major elements of our strategy that need to be addressed:

1. National development. After many months of your urging, I believe that there is a general recognition of the need for developing national political and economic institutions. Some progress in both areas is being made.

We need to get on with the job of developing (a) national political parties and (b) a long range economic development plan.

2. Pacification. In many respects, this element of our strategy has shown the least satisfactory progress but it is the single most important element. It is not only essential to our success within SVN but progress within SVN must greatly affect NVN calculations of gains and costs. With due regard to South Vietnamese sensitivities and interests, it is important to unify all pacification efforts as quickly and effectively as possible.

Eventually, we should look toward the appointment of a U.S. "proconsul." In the meantime, the U.S. effort in SVN should be unified--whether under civil or military leadership--and supported by a unified effort in Washington. This effort should be given equal priority with the military effort.

3. The war in the south. Perhaps the most satisfactory element of our strategy has been our search and destroy operations in SVN.

While continuing an appropriate level of search and destroy operations, we must divert as much of the U.S. and Vietnamese effort as seems militarily sound to the clear- and hold-type operation essential to progress in pacification.

4. The war in the north. I believe that the war in the south has reached the point where the continued bombing of the north is no longer essential to victory in the south--unless the cessation of bombing were to bring about a major increase in infiltration.

In any event, as long as North Vietnam pursues the war, we would pay a price for ceasing to bomb the north. If we relaxed our pressure on his lines of communication, we would need more troops in the south. No one can say precisely how many more troops would be needed but the bombing campaign must represent the equivalent of one to three divisions of troops.

Even with additional troops, a cessation of bombing would most likely prolong the war because we would no longer be exacting a price on the North Vietnamese homeland for their continuing adventurism.

Conversely, while it cannot be proven, it seems logical that at some point an increase in the intensity of the bombing ought to contribute to shortening the war.

I believe that in conjunction with the other recommendations that a renewal of the program of increasing pressures would materially improve our chances of ending the war by summer of 1968.

It must be recognized, of course, that increasing the intensity and scope of the bombing could cause a wider war. However, there are only two categories of targets--population and mining of the ports--which have not already been taken under attack. Although we have attacked a number of airfields, so far we have avoided those airfields in the vicinity of Hanoi. As long as these categories are avoided, we would not seem to risk widening the war by attacking additional targets similar to those we have already hit.

Attacks on population we can reject out of hand, both on political and military grounds.

Attacks on the remaining airfields have so far not seemed militarily essential. We can continue to take the calculated risk of avoiding attacks on these airfields without undue danger until the NVN air forces become a major interference to our bombing campaign. In the meantime, attacks on other elements of their defense network could decrease the potential effectiveness of their aircraft. In any event, a major air campaign should be undertaken against his radars, communications, and SAM facilities as soon as the appropriate weapons become available.

There remains, however, the major gap in our pressure on the north--the ports through which they import without interference the materiels necessary to sustain their war effort. We should be able to reduce substantially their imports either by attacking their port handling facilities or mining their ports. Air attacks on the ports would have the disadvantage of causing noncombatant casualties. Even so, casualties could be minimized by careful targeting and precise attacks.

Mining of the ports creates the risk of a potential confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese.

I believe this danger is overestimated.

If our mining is limited to North Vietnamese territorial waters and if everyone is forewarned that the waters are mined, the sinking of the ship would be the direct result of a positive action by the ship captain. This, it seems to me, is far different than sinking a Soviet or CHICOM ship by air or surface attack--both of which should be avoided unless we are prepared to take much greater risks.

We should, therefore, immediately renew our air campaign of gradually but constantly increasingly pressures on the North. The proposals of Rolling Thunder 52/3/ would be an appropriate start followed up in timely fashion by additional attacks on similar targets. In the process, we should carry the POL and electric power campaigns through to completion. As soon as appropriate weapons become available, we should mount a concentrated campaign on his air defenses--avoiding airfield attacks unless his aircraft cause major interference to our operations. Ports should be mined at times when there are no third country ships in harbor, and port facilities should be struck in such fashion as to avoid third country ships. Such a campaign should be played in low key. It should not be described as escalation. In answer to any queries, it should be described merely as implementation of U.S. determination to do whatever is reasonably necessary to cause the North Vietnamese to cease and desist.

/3/See Documents 226 and 295.

5. Diplomatic posture. By any objective measure, I believe that the United States has been most forthcoming in a search for peace. I think we are now at the stage where any new diplomatic overtures will be counterproductive barring some kind of response from Hanoi. Further initiatives on our part can only serve to erode our negotiating position and give hope to the communists that we are looking for a way out. Our diplomatic posture should be one of simply quietly restating our position and remaining alert to any possibility of favorable response from the other side.

G

289. Editorial Note

In telegram 10098 from Saigon, November 4, 1966, Ambassador Lodge advised the Department of State that the scheme to secure the defection of National Liberation Front Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho by working through his purported uncle, Nguyen Huu An, was "largely based on wishful thinking." In forwarding the telegram to the President's Special Assistant, Walt Rostow, Arthur McCafferty of the White House Situation Room noted in his covering memorandum that "in short, the Uncle is one of the best 'fiction' writers of our time." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush)

Two months earlier, Lodge had notified the Department that a promising operation had been launched to secure Nguyen Huu Tho's defection and that other high-level defections from the NLF might follow; see Document 204. Secretary of State Rusk and Rostow followed the case closely, and President Johnson was kept abreast of developments; see Documents 206, 214, 225, and 243 and the footnotes thereto. Additional information on White House and Department of State interest in the operation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush, and in Department of State, central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Director of Central Intelligence Helms was informed regularly about the operation by his Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, George Carver, who wrote him at least 14 memoranda about Thrush from late September through late October 1966. In an October 11 memorandum to Helms, Carver noted that Secretary of Defense McNamara, who arrived in Saigon on October 10, had been briefed on Thrush and "seemed pleased at the way things are being handled." Carverâs memoranda are in the Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80-R01720R.

In telegram 8635, October 17, Lodge informed the Department of State of "unresolved discrepancies, inconsistencies and apparent falsifications," especially involving Nguyen Huu An, which affected the substance of the defection effort and called into question the honesty of the participants. A "confrontation meeting" on November 3 between a CIA representative and An, reported by Lodge in telegram 7657, confirmed that An had "lied about all of his activities during July and August." An was still regarded as a potential asset, Lodge indicated, but given theoperationâs "metamorphosis into a longer term intelligence/defection effort," full control would be turned over to CIA personnel. (Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S/THRUSH)

290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 4, 1966, 1:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Katzenback, and approved by Rusk. The President met with Rusk, McNamara, and Rusk from 10:35 to 11:20 a.m. on November 4. (Johnson Library, Presidentâs Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. However, under a November 4 covering note in which he stated that reorganization of the revolutionary development program was on the agenda, Rostow forwarded to the President back-up papers for the meeting that included a draft of this telegram, which had originally been transmitted to the President for his concurrence in telegram 68390 to Wellington, October 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15)

78865. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. You have described the RD program as the heart of the matter in SVN. We agree. Also, you have reported and we agree that progress in the RD program so far has been slight and unsatisfactory. We all agree that progress must be made in this crucial area if the war is to be won in the South and if the North is to be persuaded to negotiate. It is clear to us that some organizational changes are required on the American side to get RD moving--to bring harder pressure on the GVN to do its job and to get solid and realistic planning with respect to the whole effort.

We had considered putting the entire program under COMUSMACV to achieve these ends; and this may ultimately prove to be the best solution. But recognizing certain objections to this approach, we are prepared to try a solution which leaves the civilian functions under civilian management. As we see it, the trial organization would involve the following changes:

1. The several civilian lines of command within U.S. agencies would be consolidated into one. Thus, line responsibility for all personnel assigned to RD civilian functions would rest solely with one high-ranking civilian. (We presume this man would be Ambassador Porter. If so, he would have to be relieved of all other duties, and you would have to have another deputy assigned to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter.) The authority of this civilian would be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the civilian RD team, including relocation of personnel, the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities, and the apportionment of the funds allocated for RD by each agency to Viet-Nam (bounded only by statutory limitations).

2. To strengthen Porter administratively, it might be well to assign him a competent Principal Deputy and Executive Officer--a military officer of two- or three-star rank. If this officer is desired, General West- moreland can supply him or, if he requests, the officer can be provided from here. This officer would not be to command U.S. military forces or operations or to perform MACV's functions of advising and prodding the ARVN, but would be to provide administrative strength on the civilian side and to serve as a bridge to MACV, ensuring efficient interface between the civilian and military structures.

3. We understand General Westmoreland is already considering a MACV Special Assistant for Pacification or a Deputy for Pacification. We presume that the appointment of such a Special Assistant or Deputy could be timed to coincide with the changes on the civilian side, making possible the highest-level command focus and consolidation to MACV's RD concerns and staff.

4. Careful definition and delineation of responsibilities of the U.S. civilian and U.S. military sides would be necessary in the whole RD establishment in South Viet-Nam to ensure that nothing falls between the stools and that the two efforts fully mesh.

We are most anxious, as we know you are, to make progress in RD. So this new organizational arrangement would be on trial for 90-120 days, at the end of which we would take stock of progress and reconsider whether to assign all responsibility for RD to COMUSMACV./2/

/2/Lodge responded in telegram 10204 from Saigon, November 6. He stated that the crux of the problem was security, not defective organization, and that the first priority was more U.S. troops allotted to pacification. He agreed that civilian functions should be consolidated under Porter but argued against creating another deputy ambassador to absorb Porter's other responsibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Rusk

291. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

At your instruction I went to Saigon from Manila and spent three days trying to convince the mission that a period of profound calm in Vietnamese politics was a top United States priority.

I discovered on arriving that--with the elections here a mere ten days off--Ambassador Lodge was off on vacation in Thailand.

Deputy Ambassador Porter has been virtually forbidden by the Chief of Mission to deal with Thieu and Ky.

--The Ky's talk only to Lodges. And Lodge doesn't talk to anybody--in Saigon at least.

This has as its practical consequence that effective American pressure on the GVN can come only from Ambassador Lodge. And he is seldom really there--he puts in a five or six-hour day.

I went to make it clear that I consider Ambassador Lodge a fine American who has loyally undertaken what may be an impossible task.

But we need in Saigon a man with immense vitality, who can and will work an 18-hour day.

--one who can assert real administrative authority over that sprawling, feudal American mission.

--one who can keep two jumps ahead of the Vietnamese, anticipate and head off trouble, and put the arm on them when they play French games.

--For example, they have--in the best French tradition--agreed "in principle" to the reform of the Port of Saigon.

--Which means they really haven't agreed to anything that will specifically remedy the problems; they are stonewalling at the administrative level.

Plenty of trouble is coming. Some time this winter or spring there will be a moment of truth between the Directorate, the People's Army Council and the Constituent Assembly./2/

/2/On October 4 Roche sent a memorandum to the President warning of a "head-on collision between the Directorate and the Constituent Assembly" and expressing criticism of the U.S. Mission's role in the matter. (Ibid., Office of the President File, John Roche)

--The recent resignations were a precursor and the lines of stress run through all three bodies.

--There are generals in every camp and a, to me, ominous fact is that Chief of State Thieu (who has played second fiddle to Ky so far) is a very old buddy of two generals Ky is out to purge: Co and Quang.

--None of them is Northern. (Thieu is from the center, Co and Quang from the south.)

--They were together at Hue Military Academy (1948-49), at Infantry School in France (1949-50), Tactical Command School, Hanoi (1951-52) and at Fort Leavenworth (1956-57).

Our task is to prevent any confrontations and disruptions--or we are likely to be back where we were after Diem fell--which would be disastrous in terms of American public opinion and the long-range conduct of the war.

And somebody out there in top authority should be worrying about this sort of thing seven days a week, 18 hours a day (possibly even 24).

In my considered judgment this is our top priority in Vietnam. We can't lose the war, but we can find ourselves fighting it endlessly in a political vacuum.

John P. Roche

292. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

[document number not declassified]

Washington, November 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 H (1), Appraisal of Bombing of NVN. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The CIA forwarded the memorandum to the President on November 5.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM IN NORTH VIETNAM/2/

1 January-30 September 1966

/2/This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, this memorandum has not been coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 3 November 1966. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Rolling Thunder air offensive against North Vietnam has been accelerated sharply in 1966, compared with operations in 1965. The 59,000 attack sorties flown in the first nine months of 1966 against targets in North Vietnam were about 2.3 times the 1965 effort; the 90,000 tons of ordnance dropped was 2.6 times the ordnance delivered on targets in 1965. The 1966 air operations have also been carried out more efficiently than the 1965 campaign. The average bomb load per attack sortie has increased, and the rate of aircraft losses has been some 58 percent of the 1965 rate.

In spite of these improvements, it is estimated that the cost effectiveness of the air campaign diminished in 1966. The direct operating cost of inflicting a dollar's worth of damage in North Vietnam has increased by about 28 percent--from an estimated $6.80 in 1965 to about $8.70 in 1966. The major determinants of this decrease in cost effectiveness have been the far greater proportion of attack sorties accounted for by armed reconnaissance strikes (as opposed to initial strikes on fixed targets) and the geographic concentration of the air effort against logistic targets in the southern areas of North Vietnam, principally Military Region IV.

By the end of 1965, a growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets outside of sanctuary areas, as well as other operational restrictions virtually forced a continually increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance. This trend was temporarily interrupted by the strikes against major petroleum storage installations, which began late in June 1966. Strike sorties against JCS fixed-target systems dropped from more than 30 percent of the total sorties flown in 1965 to less than 3 percent in 1966. Armed reconnaissance sorties increased by over 230 percent, from about 17,300 sorties in 1965 to 57,300 in 1966. Almost two-thirds of these--37,000 sorties--were directed at the southernmost areas of North Vietnam, the Panhandle section south of Vinh.

The air campaign over Laos shows similar emphasis on the attempted interdiction of the infiltration network into South Vietnam. Attack sorties flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs increased from 11,000 sorties in 1965 to about 38,000 during the first nine months of 1966. Ninety-five percent of the attack sorties flown in Laos in 1966 were on armed reconnaissance missions.

The major measurable effects on North Vietnam of Rolling Thunder attacks are:

(1) About 20 percent, or 70,000, of the total military forces are engaged directly in defensive programs and countermeasures against the Rolling Thunder program. About 220,000 full-time and 100,000 part-time workers have been diverted to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs in North Vietnam and Laos. In 1965 and 1966, from 25,000 to 35,000 persons are tentatively estimated to have been casualties of air attacks in the North.

(2) Physical damage to economic and military targets has also increased. This damage amounted to $65 million in 1965 and an additional $95 million in the first nine months of 1966. Of the latter total, over 70 percent represented damage to economic targets.

Despite the increased weight of air attack, North Vietnam continues to increase its support to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The Rolling Thunder program has not been able to prevent about a threefold increase in the level of personnel infiltration in 1966. The external logistic support needed to maintain the expanded VC/NVA force in South Vietnam has been adequate. In particular, despite the neutralization of the major petroleum storage facilities in the North, petroleum supplies have continued to be imported in needed amounts.

Taking a broader view, during the course of the Rolling Thunder program the North Vietnamese capability to support the war effort has improved.

(1) The capacity of the transportation system, at least as it affects the ability to handle the flow of men and military supplies to South Vietnam, has been increased.

(2) The sizable manpower drain has peaked, unless there is a sharp increase in estimated VC/NVA manpower losses in South Vietnam or a radical change in the nature of the air campaign against North Vietnam. In 1965 and 1966, North Vietnam had to mobilize 80 percent of its physically fit males as they reached draft age. Subject to the assumptions just delineated, this levy could be as low as 50 percent of the 1967 class.

(3) Aid from the USSR and Communist China received in 1965 and 1966 has amounted, in estimated value, to about five times the total caused by Rolling Thunder attacks.

The fact that a large share of the imports now flowing into North Vietnam is not military aid but machinery and equipment seems particularly significant. On the one hand, it reflects a willingness of the major Communist powers to provide additional equipment for war-related industrial facilities, probably encouraged by the fact that the modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy has been largely off-limits to air attack. On the other hand, it suggests that adequate reserves of skilled manpower, electric generating capacity, and other essential inputs are available on a significant scale for conversion to a war-supporting role. While this new emphasis accelerates the ability to support military operations in the short run, it does postpone Hanoi's long-run plans for the development of heavy industry.

Nor has Rolling Thunder served visibly to reduce the determination of Hanoi to continue the war. We see no signs that the air attack has shaken the confidence of the regime, and with increased Soviet and Chinese aid to bolster its capabilities, North Vietnam in the short term at least, will apparently take no positive step toward a negotiated settlement. In any event, it is estimated that Hanoi will continue to be insistent on a cessation of the bombings as a prerequisite for negotiations. Analysis of popular attitudes in North Vietnam indicates a continued firmness in support of the regime's policies. Although the long-term effects of the war may have some wearying effect on the population, there is no evidence that it has yet reached a point sufficient to deter Hanoi's leaders from their present policies.

Finally, the course of the air campaign in 1966 has had no significant effect on the attitudes of third countries. From the resumption of the bombings in January 1966 to the escalation represented by the bombing of the petroleum storage facilities, third-country attitudes have been, predictably, relatively constant. The unyielding attitude of the North Vietnamese, particularly during the January bombing pause, has had a somewhat sobering impact on some third countries. Indeed, the escalation against POL storage facilities produced a reaction more restrained and less critical than had been anticipated. Among Communist third countries, the USSR and the Eastern European countries would prefer a neogtiated settlement because they regard a continuation of the war as potentially dangerous to themselves and in any case as posing an awkward dilemma for them within the Communist world. The Chinese Communists, however, remain adamant in their attitudes toward the war and any steps leading toward a negotiated settlement.

Over and above the measurable effects discussed in the foregoing, the Rolling Thunder program has certain intangible aspects such as enemy morale and determination which are much more difficult to assess. The Rolling Thunder program has been the object of much neutralist criticism and the target of a concerted Communist diplomatic and prop-aganda campaign. In one sense, this must serve to stiffen Hanoi's back; at the same time, the program has become one way Hanoi probably meas-ures US determination--though the extent of US commitment on the ground conveys this determination far more persuasively. Moreover, the Rolling Thunder operation carries some threat of further escalation, and in this way may exert a certain worrisome pressure on Hanoi. On the other hand, if Rolling Thunder were to be terminated at this point without concessions, the United States would be deprived of one form of leverage against Hanoi which it now has.

293. Editorial Note

On November 5, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara flew to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, arriving about 10 a.m. At 11:30 a.m., following a meeting with the President, he held a news conference on the front lawn of the Ranch. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) He indicated that in a meeting the previous day (see footnote 1, Document 290) and continuing at the Ranch that day he and President Johnson had reviewed the Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1968. As a basis for making decisions on the budget, they discussed the situation in Vietnam currently and as it looked "for the months ahead" in comparison to what it had been about a year earlier. "Whereas the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong forces were approaching possible victory some 15 months ago," Secretary McNamara stated, "I think it is clear to all that today a military victory is beyond their grasp."

Secretary McNamara then stated that, looking ahead to 1967, the following points seemed clear, barring unforeseen circumstances: 1) draft calls for 1967 would be lower than for 1966; 2) increases in U.S. forces in South Vietnam in 1967 would be substantially less than during 1966; 3) a second cut in the planned annual rate of production of air ordnance, on top of the $1 billion cut already ordered, was a probability; and 4) he expected "that this same trend towards stabilization will govern our air operations, and the deployments of air units to South Vietnam, and the level of our air activities." Secretary McNamara also indicated that the military situation had improved to the point that additional emphasis could be placed on the rural reconstruction program through shifting more South Vietnamese forces to the effort. For text of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pages 1325-1331.

294. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/

Saigon, November 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret.

Dear Mr. President:

At the meetings which I had with you in Manila, the urgency of bringing about a quick decision in the Viet-Nam war was touched on, but there was no opportunity to pursue the subject thoroughly.

I, therefore, submit for prompt and searching analysis a program (the result of much study) to hasten the end of the war to the greatest degree possible, as follows:

The heart of the matter in the war in Viet-Nam is to destroy the terrorist organization and network--what Ho Chi Minh calls the "guerrilla infrastructure"--so that terrorists can no longer assassinate, kidnap, torture, sabotage, cut roads, blow bridges, engage in sudden and surreptitious mortaring and shell fire (as they did last Tuesday/2/ in Saigon), and, above all, so that they can no longer impress young males into the service of the Viet Cong, as they are still capable of doing, at a rate of four battalions a month.

/2/November 2.

All concerned agree that this is indeed the crux, and MACV specifically states that what it calls "offensive operations" are conducted so as to create the opportunity to destroy terrorism, that is "pacification".

But the phrase "offensive operations" is defined as meaning to "seek out and destroy". This is how the Germans were beaten in World War II.

I believe that the Vietnamese war will certainly never be won in this way; that the phrase "offensive operations" should be defined as "split up the Viet Cong and keep him off balance"; and that U.S. participation in pacification operations should be stepped up./3/

/3/Lodge made the same argument he makes in this letter--that offensive operations should be defined as "split up and keep off balance" rather than "seek out and destroy"--in at least three other communications: 1) a memorandum he read to McNamara during their private conversation in Saigon on October 10 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Vietnam Papers; printed in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 451-452); 2) a memorandum to Rostow, October 24, which Rostow forwarded to the President the same day, noting in his covering memorandum that it raised a "first-class issue" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX); 3) and telegram 10204 from Saigon, November 6 (see footnote 2, Document 290).

This new definition of the phrase "offensive operations" will require fewer U.S. soldiers and will (according to reports made to me) mean fewer U.S. casualties.

It will also mean that more U.S. troops will be available to help out in pacification (an even more fundamentally "offensive" operation)--to be catalysts; to lead by example; and to work with the Vietnamese on the "buddy" system. They would be the 10% of the total force of men under arms (90% of whom would be Vietnamese) which would get the whole thing moving.

From experiments already made in doing precisely this, it is clear that U.S. casualties would be few. Yet the result would be durable--an unusual thing in Viet-Nam where much of the land is to the Army what the ocean is to the Navy--something you move around on, but most of which you don't want to hold. What counts in this war is people.

The gains under such a program, while not flashy, would be solid. While it would take time, it would be absolutely clear at home that time was working for us, and the light at the end of the tunnel would get steadily brighter.

What I propose has been done on a small scale by elements of the U.S. Marines, the 1st and 25th U.S. Infantry Divisions, and the Koreans. We know that it works.

It means that the Vietnamese will ferret out and execute (or send into dependable exile) the hard-core terrorists--the human monsters who cut out men's livers and inflict other nameless tortures. They are the keystone of the Viet Cong terrorist organization. Their elimination would mean that the night no longer belongs to the Viet Cong and that the impressment of young men would stop. These key terrorists would be the real, the ultimate coonskin.

While the Vietnamese must do the ferreting out and the executing, we can help through our police advisers and our CIA counter-terrorist intelligence. This would be in addition to our military help. I am calling a meeting of these men to stimulate action.

This program will also hasten the revamping of the ARVN, which is now due to have been completed by normal Vietnamese bureaucratic methods by July 1967. (I believe this is an optimistic date.) My proposal would, in effect, revamp the ARVN by "on-the-job-training". It is the only way I can think of to accelerate the present pace. This would at last correct an error made ten years ago when the U.S. decided that Viet-Nam should have a World War II type Army rather than a constabulary.

To do this is constructive; it means building a nation; our men like it. In fact, a number have signed on for another tour so as to do it.

None of the above, of course, applies to overt aggression--that is conventional invasions such as that in the DMZ and which must always be defeated.

As regards public opinion at home, I think it most unlikely that a clean-cut news event can be brought about within an acceptable period of time which will cause the press to say that the "war is over" or that an "armistice has been signed"--or any sharp focus news stories such as we had in World War I, World War II, and Korea, and to which public opinion in the West is conditioned.

The Communists will not make such an agreement, and if they did, their word is no good. Any peace proposal they make will probably be to make us stop winning while they keep on fighting.

But I believe a condition can be brought about in which in effect our troops simply keep the enemy off the backs of the South Vietnamese so that they can go ahead on the job of permanently wiping out terrorists.

An illustration of such an allocation of tasks is provided by the experience on Election Day, September 11, when

a) We, in effect, kept the main force and NVN units off the backs of the South Vietnamese;

b) with the result that South Vietnamese under arms--military and police--were enabled to provide order for the voter;

c) with the result that more than 80% of the qualified voters voted; and that

d) for that day anyway, 65%, rather than the commonly accepted 54%, of the population were secure.

Had this condition continued, much ferreting out of terrorists could have ensued--durable progress.

While the above does not produce a "war is over" type of headline, it would mean that the war had entered a new phase--a phase of which American public opinion would be clearly aware, in which our battle casualties would be very low, and in which time was plainly and obviously on our side. When Hanoi faded out, there would be no clean-cut headline, but everyone would know it.

The above raises very large questions on the whole conduct of the war--questions which are far more than purely military. I propose that this should be thoroughly analyzed and decided on the broadest possible basis.

With respectful regard,
Faithfully yours,
Cabot L.

P.S. All my best wishes for your good health./4/

/4/Lodge added the postscript by hand.

HCL

295. Memorandum From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

CM-1906-66

Washington, November 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE Primarily McNamara Recommendations. Top Secret. On November 8 McNamara forwarded copies to the President (ibid.) and to Rusk (Department of State, EA/VN-Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966).

SUBJECT
Military Actions against North Vietnam

1. As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that we should increase military pressures on North Vietnam. They believe that military actions designed to reduce still further the capabilities of the North Vietnamese to receive help from out-of-country, to move men and material in-country and from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, and to reduce in-country war-supporting facilities and supplies are necessary and feasible--militarily, politically and psychologically. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Rolling Thunder 52 (RT-52) program, provided earlier,/2/ is a desirable first step in undertaking such military measures against North Vietnam.

/2/See Document 218, footnote 2 thereto, and Document 226.

2. Another useful concurrent action would be the employment of our surface naval vessels against waterborne coastal traffic between 17 degrees 30' N and 20 degrees N.

3. The salient features of the recommended program are set forth in the following subparagraphs:

a. Reduction of Restricted Areas. Reduce the restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong to a ten-nautical-mile radius racetrack pattern around Hanoi/Phuc Yen airfield; reduce the restricted area around Haiphong to four-nautical-mile radius.

Comment. Within the Hanoi restricted area are located at least thirty-six (36) major targets of military worth. The location of population argues against striking some of these targets; however, many are located in population-free areas. While the number of targets in the Haiphong restricted area is much smaller, there are worthwhile targets not now subject to attack. Additionally, reduction of both the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas will permit armed reconnaissance operations against an additional 284 nautical miles of the primary lines of communications around these two cities and the searching out and destruction of the increasing number of dispersed supply installations in these two restricted areas. Area reductions will also provide desirable flexibility, now lacking, in targeting and tactics, thereby degrading air defenses.

b. SAM Support Facilities. Three (3) SAM support areas are recommended for attack.

Comment. Since 1 July 1965 the North Vietnamese have launched at least 949 SA-2 missiles against our strike forces and have destroyed thirty-two (32) manned aircraft. At least twenty-eight (28) SA-2 missiles were launched in the Hanoi/Haiphong area on 4 November. Obviously, we should destroy concentrations of SAM equipment and SAM support facilities wherever discovered in order to reduce their limiting effect on our strike forces, which is greater than revealed by the number of U.S. aircraft destroyed by missiles.

c. POL Storage Systems. As of 4 November our intelligence indicates that some 24,800 metric tons of fixed POL storage capacity remains of a pre-strike fixed capacity of 132,000 metric tons. Dispersed storage capacity has grown to 42,500 metric tons. The program recommends strikes on fixed POL facilities at Ha Gia and Can Thon, formerly erroneously identified as being associated with Phuc Yen and Kep airfields respectively.

Comment. It is apparent that identified dispersed storage now represents the major portion of the POL storage system in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, it would be militarily desirable to destroy all fixed storage in order further to reduce flexibility in receiving, storing, and distributing POL throughout the country. In this connection, while the residual Haiphong POL storage area is not included in RT-52, railroad tank cars have been identified in the Haiphong POL storage area, leading to the belief that the remaining pumping station is still in use and should be destroyed.

d. War-Supporting Facilities. The program recommends attacks on selected elements of the Thai Nguyen steel plant and the Haiphong cement plant. These two facilities are producing materials to repair damaged lines of communications and, in the case of the steel plant, to build barges and tanks to move POL products.

Comment. There are other industrial areas which should be brought under attack because they produce or contribute to production of small arms, grenades, ammunition and the like.

e. Electric Power Systems. Two electric power plants, Haiphong TPP West and Haiphong TPP East, are recommended for attack in RT-52. These two plants represent fifteen per cent of remaining generator capacity in North Vietnam and destruction will reduce operating efficiency in the entire Haiphong area; specifically, six (6) shipyards and the naval base, the ship and railway shops and, to an undetermined degree, the off-loading of cargo in the Haiphong port will be affected.

Comment. There are eight (8) major electric-power generating plants remaining in North Vietnam. All should be struck, as should the Hanoi transformer station, in order to affect to a major degree both military and civilian support to the war effort. In this connection, the North Vietnamese have contracted from Czechoslovakia, and are in the process of installing, a number of small packaged generating plants which, apparently, they will employ to supplement or to replace electric power sources in North Vietnam.

f. Waterway Locks. Four (4) waterway locks are recommended for attack. These locks control water levels on water lines of communications. We have noted an increasing use of inland waterways by the North Vietnamese to supplement or to replace interdicted rail and road lines of communications.

Comment. These locks are not associated, except indirectly, with agriculture. Flooding resulting from their destruction will be minor and very few people will be at risk. Moreover, the North Vietnamese have expressed on many occasions their apprehension that we will destroy the Red River dikes as a part of our air campaign. The destruction of these four (4) locks should exert desirable psychological pressures on both leaders and population.

g. Ports. Selected areas of Cam Pha port and Haiphong port are recommended for attack. The particular areas, remote from berths and wharves to preclude damage or destruction of foreign shipping, were chosen not only to destroy important facilities but to exert psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese, shipowners and crews by showing that ports are not sacrosanct. It is anticipated that attack of these port facilities could cause shipping (as in the case of the Soviet tankers) to move out of the port areas into roadsteads and unload by time-consuming use of lighters and barges.

Comment. If the result hoped for is achieved, not only would the unloading process be impeded but barges and lighters would be open to attack once they had left the cargo vessel, thereby giving us the opportunity to destroy imported materials in bulk.

4. Mentioned earlier was the military desirability of using our naval surface craft to interdict coastal shipping in the area between 17 degrees 30' N to 20 degrees N. Pertinent to this comment is the fact that, from 25 October through 2 November, 325 coastal craft were sighted in coastal waters between the DMZ and 17 degrees 30' N with 132 craft destroyed and 140 damaged. Since 2 November very little movement of coastal water craft in this area has been noted.

Comment. It is pertinent that, during the month of October, in the coastal waters lying between 17 degrees 30' N and 20 degrees N our aircraft observed over 800 coastal craft. Obviously, surface naval activities in this area would restrict further the flexibility and capacity of North Vietnamese lines of communications.

5. I informed you the other day that I have had prepared folios of blown-up photographs of the target system in North Vietnam which reveal very clearly the military worth, the location of population and other factors pertinent to air strikes.

6. I recommend the following: (a) that President Johnson be briefed in the immediate future on RT-52 so that his early approval of the program can be obtained; and (b) that I be present in order to explain the photographs and RT-52 and to respond to any questions the President may have./3/

/3/See footnote 4, Document 299, regarding Wheeler's meeting with the President.

Earle G. Wheeler

296. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/

Washington, November 9, 1966, 1416Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Bombing. Top Secret.

CAP 66932. You will receive this morning by courier the JCS views on expanded military pressure against North Viet Nam./2/ Sec. McNamara and Sec. Rusk will forward their views/3/ as soon as they have had a chance to study Gen. Wheeler's recommendations.

/2/Document 295.

/3/See Document 299.

My own views are as follows:

1. We must begin now to lean more heavily on the North. I have reviewed all the evidence and all the reports we have on the effect of bombing the North. It is clear that the attritional cost we are imposing is significant for the North Vietnamese in military and economic terms and increasingly significant for Moscow and the Eastern European countries which are being forced to expand military and economic aid to compensate for our bombing; and they don't like it. That increased burden may add to their interest in a negotiated settlement.

2. The expansion in military pressure should be as steady and undramatic as we can make it.

3. We have to take into account George Brown's visit to Moscow later in the month. There is no reason to be excessively hopeful about that visit; but we must give him a fair chance to probe. It might help his mission if we signalled, between now and then, our intent to up the ante in the North; but it could destroy his mission if we did anything dramatic or noisy.

4. The Rolling Thunder program proposed by the JCS probably goes too far at this time in the light of the Brown visit.

5. Therefore, I suggest you approve certain limited targets from the JCS recommendations, which would make clear to Hanoi and Moscow the seriousness of our future intent, without putting them under public challenge or ultimatum. For example, we might hit the SAM support sites, one or two thermo-power plants, one of the two unstruck POL storage facilities, and extend the surface sea interdiction zone a bit to the North. In the last few weeks the sea interdiction between the 17th parallel and 17 degrees 13' has been an effective operation. An additional northward shift of 30 minutes would represent the kind of steady incremental increased pressure we wish to signal.

6. A limited quietly expanded program of this type, involving no new target systems, is, I believe, what we need between now and Brown's visit. Properly done it could both increase Moscow's leverage on Hanoi and Brown's leverage in Moscow. While he is actually in Moscow, we might cut back to armed reconnaissance.

297. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 9, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. Sent through Under Secretary Katzenbach. On November 1 the Department of State changed the title of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

SUBJECT
JCS Proposal for RT 52

1. This proposal which has been forwarded to the President and to you by Secretary McNamara (see Tab A)/2/ is very similar to his earlier informal proposal presented early in September/3/ which was subsequently withdrawn and considerably reduced in scope and re-presented somewhat later. Memoranda to you and the Acting Secretary of September 10, re-submitted on October 31, discussed this reduced proposal for RT-52; they are attached at Tab B./4/

/2/Document 295.

/3/See Document 226.

/4/Attached but not printed.

2. The renewed proposal for an expanded RT-52 includes strikes on SAM support facilities, POL storage areas, electric power, steel and cement plants, waterway locks and port areas. It also proposes moving naval gun fire farther north and permitting armed recce up to within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi and Phuc Yen and 4 nautical miles of Haiphong. There is attached at Tab C a tabular review of each of these target proposals, together with recommendations for approval or disapproval./5/

/5/Attached but not printed.

Discussion

3. In general the RT-52 proposal would, if carried out in full, be interpreted as an escalation because of the inclusion in an RT program for the first time of steel and cement plants and waterway locks as targets. Whether or not RT-52 envisages a greater intensity of activity is not clear because there is no period mentioned within which the targets proposed would be struck. However, permission for armed recce to enter the present 30 and 10 nautical mile circles around Hanoi and Haiphong would undoubtedly appear to be an intensification in sensitive areas. The recommendations which are made in Tab C assume that we wish to continue the bombing pressure on North Viet-Nam as it has been applied over recent months but do not wish to make any sharp departures in the way of more intensive activity or new kinds of targets which begin to enter the civilian realm or which take less account of the danger of civilian casualties.

4. With regard to four SAM support facility targets which have not previously been proposed we are unable to comment intelligently since we have neither information on civilian casualties nor any photographs. With regard to the waterway locks, we have not had time to assess their full impact on the civilian population in terms of flooding and particularly crop destruction; the two targets where these dangers appear to be great have been negatively recommended.

5. Under Rolling Thunder 52, armed recce would be authorized up to 10 NM from the center of Hanoi and Phuc Yen airfield and up to 4 NM from the center of Haiphong vis-a-vis the present 30 NM for Hanoi and 10 NM for Haiphong. There would be a route and railroad segment which would approach within 10 NM of Phuc Yen airfield; however, this was authorized in Rolling Thunder 51. We believe the proposed new limits for armed recce to be too close for "free wheeling" without special justification and the designation of special route segments--(Rolling Thunder 51 included 4 railroad and 1 highway segments that were within the 30 NM limit of Hanoi). The attack of dispersed POL within the armed recce limits surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong would continue to be authorized provided positive identification is obtained, the targets are not in populated areas, and after notification to Washington of the plan to strike. (Attack against dispersed POL co-located with JCS numbered targets within the above limits that have not been authorized for attack is prohibited.) SAM sites would also be authorized for attack except in the Chinese buffer zone and in populated areas.

6. Naval gun fire operations against military and logistic water-borne traffic in coastal waters of NVN would be authorized south of 20 degrees north latitude vis-a-vis the present limitation of south of 17 degrees 30' north latitude. The present authority has only been in effect since October 15 and we believe that it should remain in effect until greater experience factors have been developed. We are concerned with the possibility of engaging purely civilian or commercial traffic north of 17 degrees 30'.

7. In light of the experience of the past eighteen months, we judge that the full program will have only marginal impact on Hanoi's general war effort and, in particular, its ability to sustain the conflict--at the present level or above--in South Viet-Nam. INR adds the following observations: The program proposed by JCS would have significant diplomatic repercussions in offsetting the positive impact of the Manila Conference and in reducing prospects for exploring modalities for negotiation. It is highly unlikely to have an adverse effect on the determination of the leadership in Hanoi to pursue the war, or significantly undermine the regime's ability to maintain public control and a disciplined war effort.

Recommendations

8. That you approve the targets as recommended in the Tabular Review at Tab C with provisions outlined and with the understanding that the strikes will be spread out over a reasonable period of time to avoid the appearance of undue intensification and escalation./6/

/6/Bundy recommended approval of the following targets: 2 of 8 SAM support facilities (he recommended disapproval of 2 and deferred a recommendation on 4 while awaiting civilian casualty estimates); 2 of 2 POL storage areas; neither of the 2 industrial targets (the steel and cement plants); 1 of 2 electric power plants; 2 of 4 waterway locks; and 1 of 2 ports (Cam Pha but not Haiphong).

9. That armed recce be maintained with the present limits and subject to the present ground rules.

10. That naval gun fire operations against coastal military and logistic water-borne traffic be limited to the south of 17 degrees 30' north as presently in effect.

298. Editorial Note

At 2:51 p.m. on November 9, 1966, Secretary McNamara telephoned President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch regarding the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to expand the air war (Document 295). The President indicated that he had not yet seen it but had received Rostow's cable (Document 296). McNamara stated he had just discussed the proposal with Secretary Rusk and would send to the Ranch a memorandum containing their recommendations (Document 299).

At the President's request, McNamara outlined the differences between the JCS proposal on the one hand and his and Rusk's recommendations on the other, stating that the differences were "very substantial, I think. We recommend that we do more than we are presently doing but not nearly as much as they recommend." The following exchange then took place:

"RSM: I'd say we did about a third of what they recommended.

"LBJ: Well, we'll have to look at 'em. How long can this wait?

"RSM: It shouldn't wait until after you come out [of the hospital after surgery scheduled for the following week]. Some parts of it, at least, they and Dean and I are all in agreement on, and I don't see any reason, if you agree, why we shouldn't start that immediately. The remaining portions that we're in disagreement on can certainly wait. The weather is not too good at this time of year and we couldn't get all this in immediately anyhow. If you wished, I know that Buzz Wheeler and I'd be very happy to come down. He would appreciate an opportunity at some point to talk to you about it anyhow."

The President decided that they should come down the next morning, bringing McNamara's memorandum (Document 299) with them. The following exchange then took place:

"LBJ: My feeling on this is roughly this: I think we should and must use every hour, every day, every week, and every two months between now and January that we can. Number one, effectively, all around the clock. Two, I think that this pressure must be as steady but--this looks like a contradiction but I don't want it to be--steady but undramatic as we can make it. I think we've got to bear in mind that we've got the Browns [George Brown] going to Moscow and that we don't want him to feel we don't give him decent opportunity for that and if we caused this mission to fail, that could be dangerous. And I would feel that we ought to make clear to these folks the seriousness of our future intent without rubbing their nose in it in front of a television camera. And I would think of some of the unstruck ones that we've played around with sometime before and our POLs and some of these other things, but I wouldn't get into something that is so dramatic that you have a headline every day that you're really changing your policy. I would--

"RSM: That's exactly the character--

"LBJ: I'd have it trotting but I wouldn't have it running right now from a walk.

"RSM: That's exactly the character of the recommendations that Dean and I will make to you. We'll be there about 9 to 9:30 in the morning.

"LBJ: In other words, I want a limited, very quiet, expanded program, but I think it could serve to give Moscow a little leverage on 'em if it weren't so damn violent that it forced 'em to react otherwise. Do you follow me?

"RSM: Yes I do. I'm not sure I agree with the conclusion that it would give Moscow more leverage. I don't believe it would. But, in any case, I believe we arrive at the same conclusion.

"LBJ: Well, what I think is this: I think if we're causing 'em damage and they're hurtin' but we haven't got their children's hospitals afire and so forth, I think Moscow can say to Hanoi, 'Goddammit, this thing is gettin' awfully costly on you and on us and on everybody else. Let's try to find an answer here.' If it's not being costly, I don't think maybe they got any real desire to stop the bombing if it's not hurtin'. But, we can debate that tomorrow.

"RSM: Sure. We'll be there, Mr. President. Thank you very much." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.30, Side B, PNO 3)

299. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 9, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/VN-VietnamWorking Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. See Document 298 regarding the transmission of this memorandum to the President.

SUBJECT
JCS Recommendations for Military Actions Against North Vietnam

Attached is a summary of the changes in the Rolling Thunder and associated programs which the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to me in a memorandum dated November 8,/2/ a copy of which I sent to you yesterday.

/2/Document 295.

I recommend approval of the items checked in blue and disapproval of the items checked in red./3/ My recommendations are based on my belief that we should limit our attacks to military targets, and within the category of military targets, attack only those which can be successfully destroyed without substantial civilian casualties and the destruction of which will more than offset our probable strike losses.

/3/Items 2, 3, 11, and 12 were checked in blue. Items 1a, 1b, 1c, and 4-10 were checked in red. The last part of item 14, "17 degrees 30' N to 20 degrees N," was checked in red, but an emendation handwritten just below the typed item, "extend from 17 degrees 30' N to 18 degrees N," was checked in blue.

Because the military value of the targets and the possible strike losses may be expected to change with time, I may wish to recommend later that you authorize attack on certain of the targets presently checked in red.

The Secretary of State concurs in my recommendations./4/

/4/McNamara, Wheeler, and Rostow met with the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on November 10. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of their discussion has been found but see Document 298. Also, a note of November 9 to the President from his secretary, Mary Slater, indicates that Wheeler's memorandum and Rostow's cable, Documents 295 and 296, were among the papers that the President wanted to discuss with McNamara on November 10. (Johnson Library, President's Appointment File) Presumably a decision was made regarding Rolling Thunder 52. Strikes were authorized in JCS telegrams 7735 and 7783 to CINCPAC, November 10 and 11, against the targets indicated in items 2, 3, 11, 12, and 13 on the attached "List of Changes." Item 14, as amended by McNamara, was also authorized. Strikes on the targets indicated in items 4, 5, and 6 were authorized but deferred. (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52) McNamara recommended the deferment (tentatively until November 25), and the President approved, during a telephone conversation that began at 9:44 a.m. on November 11. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.31, PNO 2) Rolling Thunder 52 was initiated on November 22.

Robert S. McNamara/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment

LIST OF CHANGES IN ROLLING THUNDER AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS PROPOSED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. Reduce the restricted area around Hanoi from a 30-mile circle to a 10-mile "race track" pattern and reduce the restricted area round Haiphong from a 10-mile to a 4-mile circle in order to:

a. Permit strikes on approximately 36 identified military targets around Hanoi and approximately 8 such targets around Haiphong--these targets include bridges, supply depots, and similar facilities.

b. Carry out unlimited strikes against vehicles and other forms of military traffic on the approximately 284 miles of roads and waterways between the present and proposed circles around Hanoi and Haiphong.

c. Permit search for and destruction of dispersed military supply installations lying between the present and proposed circles.

2. Attack 3 surface-to-air missile support facilities: Kinh No SAM Storage (16 strike sorties); Hanoi SAM Storage (16 strike sorties); Haiphong SAM Assembly (40 strike sorties).

3. Strike fixed POL storage facilities at Ha Gia (40 strike sorties) and Cam Thon (54 strike sorties).

4. Strike Thai Nguyen steel plant (28 strike sorties).

5. Strike Haiphong cement plant (18 strike sorties).

6. Strike Haiphong thermal power plant west (4 strike sorties).

7. Strike Haiphong thermal power plant east (4 strike sorties).

8. Strike 4 waterway locks: Thanh Hoa (24 strike sorties), Ben Thuy (24 strike sorties), Xom Trung Hoa (24 strike sorties), Trung Luong (24 strike sorties).

9. Strike Cam Hoa Port (selected areas only--22 strike sorties).

10. Strike Haiphong Port (selected areas only--24 strike sorties).

11. Strike Xuan Mai highway bridge (34 strike sorties).

12. Strike Yen Bien railroad yard (4 strike sorties).

13. Strike Van Dien vehicle depot (56 strike sorties).

14. Extend the area in which naval gunfire is authorized against coastal shipping from 17 degrees 30' N to 20 degrees N.

300. Memorandum of Meeting/1/

Washington, November 10, 1966, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns.

PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman
Eugene Rostow
William P. Bundy
Joseph J. Sisco
John Roche
Thomas Hughes
Leonard Unger
Benjamin H. Read
Richard Steadman
Chester L. Cooper
Monteagle Stearns
Frank Sieverts
Daniel Davidson

1. Manila Conference

Governor Harriman opened the meeting by summing up reactions to the Manila Conference in the countries he had visited./2/ He believed that the reaction to the Manila Communique had been favorable. The emphasis placed at Manila on our limited objectives, agreement to withdraw troops promptly after aggression had ceased and on finding a peaceful settlement had provided convincing evidence of our desire to negotiate. The sections of the Communique dealing with elections and with national reconciliation were also important. We had to recognize that Ky was regarded as an American stooge in most of the non-aligned Asian countries and in Europe. The Governor believed that we must persevere in our efforts to encourage the development of a government in Saigon with legitimate roots. We should follow constitutional developments closely and not permit the GVN to draft a constitution which would bely the promises of national reconciliation contained in the Communique.

/2/See Document 281 for information on Harriman's trip.

The Governor observed that the government leaders with whom he had talked on his trip had been virtually unanimous in wanting us to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. The Governor had made plain that this could not be done without reciprocal action by Hanoi. Many non-aligned Asians and Europeans believed, however, that the United States could afford to take the first step toward de-escalation. They wanted to see talks get underway, believed that this would not happen as long as the bombing continued but gave no evidence for this conclusion.

Mr. Rostow asked the Governor about his talk with Couve. The Governor said that he had told Couve that DeGaulle's speech in Phnom Penh/3/ had simply made Hanoi more intransigent. Couve had not denied this and the Governor said that he seemed to gloat over the fact that DeGaulle was making life uncomfortable for us. The Governor said that he would review the memorandum of conversation with Couve/4/ to see whether any elaboration was desirable.

/3/For text of de Gaulle's speech in Phnom Penh, September 1, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 646-648.

/4/Not found.

2. George Brown and D'Orlandi

The Governor said that the group should consider what guidance could be provided to George Brown before his trip to Moscow. We should also see what could be given to Italian Ambassador D'Orlandi when he returned to Saigon. It might be useful, for example, to spell out with greater clarity what we mean by reciprocal action by Hanoi.

Mr. Cooper said that he and the Governor had met Ambassador D'Orlandi at the Fanfani luncheon in Rome./5/ He was returning to Saigon almost immediately and would be seeing his contact soon after he arrived. D'Orlandi had told Mr. Cooper that his contact expected to leave soon for Hanoi. Mr. Cooper suggested that D'Orlandi persuade him to postpone his trip a few days. This would give us time to pass to D'Orlandi through Ambassador Lodge any information that we wished him to convey to his contact. Governor Harriman noted that he had been impressed by D'Orlandi's evident sincerity. His health was bad and he had explained to the Governor that he would not be returning to Saigon if he did not believe that he could contribute to the task of getting negotiations started. While D'Orlandi might not be the most direct or authoritative channel to Hanoi available to us the Governor throught that we should not shut it off.

/5/According to the memorandum of their conversation on November 2, D'Orlandi told Harriman and Cooper that "it was time now to be more specific. In particular, he said that Washington should come to grips with the problem and find out from Hanoi just what kind of regime they would settle for, what kind of guarantees they expected, and what kind of guarantees they would comply with. In short, d'Orlandi felt that we should face up to the kind of ultimate solution we wanted and then worry about moving toward it." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Mr. Bundy observed that George Brown was somewhat nearer the heart of things than D'Orlandi and his contact. Consequently, he thought that we should concentrate on what we could give to Brown. Mr. Unger recalled that we had made a specific proposal for de-escalation in the DMZ to D'Orlandi's contact not long ago. Nothing had come of this. In fact, we had no firm evidence that D'Orlandi's contact was operating under instructions from his government. Mr. Cooper said that he had asked D'Orlandi about this and the Ambassador had stated that he was convinced that his contact had specific instructions not only from his own government but from Moscow. Mr. Cooper agreed with Mr. Bundy, however, that George Brown's talks in Moscow offered better immediate possibilities than the D'Orlandi channel.

Governor Harriman said that he had promised to give Brown an analysis of last Tuesday's election results in relation to the Vietnamese problem. Brown would then be in a position to disabuse the Soviets of any ideas they might have that the elections had been a repudiation of the President's Vietnam policy. He asked what we could tell Brown to clarify what we meant by a "signal" from Hanoi that could lead to a new bombing pause.

Mr. Bundy said that he intended to review the Secretary's talk with Sir Patrick Dean. The criteria were well stated in that memorandum./6/ He doubted that we could go much further with George Brown. He had asked Mr. Davidson to work with Mr. Cooper to prepare a draft telegram covering the points that Brown wanted to raise with the Soviet leaders. This paper ought to be ready by Monday./7/

/6/Document 275.

/7/November 14. The resulting 12-page telegram for Brown, 86196 to London, November 16, spelled out U.S. views on a number of key issues, including the role of the NLF in negotiations, the withdrawal provisions in the Manila Communique, and especially the "conditions for a possible cessation of the bombing"; the latter discussion included the same language for the Phase A-Phase B formula in paragraph 3d of telegram 83786, Document 305. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET)7

Mr. Bundy thought that the question was not only to define what we meant by reciprocal action but also to decide what next steps would have to be taken if Hanoi agreed to some form of de-escalation in exchange for a bombing pause. Mr. Bundy could foresee that if Hanoi took significant reciprocal action and we then suspended the bombing, pressures would quickly build up for us to stop troop re-inforcements as well. Mr. Cooper commented that we should keep in mind that George Brown in his Brighton Speech/8/ had publicly advocated a formula calling for a bombing pause plus no re-inforcements in exchange for an end to infiltration. Mr. Bundy agreed that ending U.S. troop re-inforcements seemed to figure prominently in Brown's thinking and came high on his timetable. Mr. Bundy observed that we had to be careful about how far we went with Brown. We would not want to make substantial concessions before Hanoi was even at the negotiating table. Nevertheless he recognized that we had to give Brown something to contribute to the value of his talks. Though he was not a discreet man he was well intentioned and capable and was a good friend of the U.S.

/8/Not further identified.

Governor Harriman thought that further discussion on this point could be deferred until the group could read the paper being drafted by Mr. Davidson and Mr. Cooper. The main thing to keep in mind was that the Soviets continued to be our best hope for getting negotiations underway. They were seriously embarrassed by our bombing of North Vietnam and he thought that they would go to considerable lengths to get the bombing stopped. Furthermore, they were deeply concerned by Chinese Communists' policies and would probably like to see a non-aligned buffer state or states develop in Southeast Asia against Peking. The Soviets wanted to get off the hook in Vietnam and for this reason had a stake in seeing the war ended and negotiations begun.

Mr. Bundy said that he doubted that the Soviets had anything new to say to George Brown about Vietnam. If there were new elements in the Soviet position he thought they would prefer to talk to us about them directly. Mr. Read observed that the Soviets might also be skeptical about Brown as an intermediary in the light of public statements he had made after talking to Gromyko in New York. Governor Harriman said that despite these cautionary factors we should try to make the most of Brown's trip to Moscow. The Soviets might be interested in trying out some ideas in their talks with Brown. We should not conclude in advance that nothing constructive would emerge. Furthermore, our relations with the British would suffer a damaging blow if the British government were to conclude that we were not serious about reaching a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The Governor agreed with Mr. Bundy that we should give Brown enough to work with to satisfy him but obviously should not give away our whole position. We might be able to refer to the concepts that the Secretary had mentioned to Pat Dean and then give Brown some examples of de-escalatory actions that Hanoi could take.

The Governor thought that it would also be useful for Brown to point out to the Soviet leaders that the Manila Communique's reference to withdrawal of allied forces from South Vietnam within 6 months of the time that North Vietnam had withdrawn its forces was directly responsive to Gromyko's request for public clarification of our intention not to remain permanently in Vietnam. Mr. Bundy observed that this point had already been made by Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobryn-in but he agreed that it would also be useful for Brown to cover this ground.

Mr. Davidson noted that Brown had requested any information that we could provide on the role we envisaged for the NLF/VC in negotiations. Mr. Bundy thought that the Soviets were less interested in this point than in stopping the bombing. In his conversation with Soviet Counselor Zinchuk before the Manila Conference this was one aspect of the Vietnamese problem that Zinchuk did not explore. Mr. Bundy doubted that it was either practical or necessary to give Brown much in the way of clarification of this point.

Mr. Rostow noted that the Secretary had mentioned to him a recent telegram/9/ in which the Soviets were reported to be telling Hanoi that the principal points at issue in Vietnam were the bombing of North Vietnam on the one hand and the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South on the other. If this was an accurate report it implied that the Soviets were trying to narrow the areas of disagreement. Governor Harriman said that other reports indicated that the Soviets wanted assurances about what the future of the NLF/VC would be if the conflict ended in Vietnam. He believed personally, however, that the principal Soviet objective was to stop the bombing.

/9/Not further identified.

Mr. Unger said that it was possible that the Soviets would raise with Brown the question of the Geneva Accords and the fact that the Manila Communique did not specifically re-affirm their validity as a basis for settlement. He thought it might be useful to touch on this point when we communicated with Brown.

Mr. Rostow wondered whether it would be worthwhile for Brown to discuss with the Soviet leaders the idea of stationing neutral troops in the DMZ. Mr. Cooper doubted that the time was right for this proposal. Mr. Unger commented that this was an idea that we had proposed originally but had never pressed because it presented a number of practical problems of implementation. In the first place it was hard to imagine the ICC as now constituted giving its approval to the proposal. It was also difficult to think of any neutral powers which would be willing to contribute troops. Finally, the proposal raised some tough military problems. Despite these considerations Mr. Unger could see no harm in Brown discussing the proposal with the Soviets. In fact, the subject could logically follow from whatever discussion Brown planned to have on the general subject of the ICC. It was decided that Mr. Cooper and Mr. Davidson would consider whether it was feasible to include some mention of the proposal in the package being prepared for Brown.

In closing the discussion of George Brown's trip the Governor said that after we had prepared the material for Brown we should see what morsels could be given to D'Orlandi. He repeated that he had been personally impressed by D'Orlandi and believed that we should give him some encouragement.

3. National Reconciliation and Constitution

Governor Harriman said that he was disturbed by indications that the new Vietnamese constitution would have a clause excluding "communists and neutralists". We must assure that the constitution was not inconsistent with the principle of national reconciliation. Mr. Bundy thought that our first objective should be to obtain from Ky and Thieu a strong statement on national reconciliation. The reporting from Saigon/10/ indicated that the GVN was now pointing to December to kick off their amnesty and reconciliation program. The wording of the constitution might present problems, as the wording of the electoral law had presented problems. But in Mr. Bundy's mind the first order of business should be to get the GVN firmly and publicly committed to the principle of national reconciliation.

/10/Telegrams 9690, October 29, and 10005, November 3, both from Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S and POL 15 VIET S, respectively)

Mr. Roche recalled that we had been caught short on the electoral law. He thought it might be risky to delay putting pressure on the GVN for the kind of constitution we could support. Mr. Unger agreed that it would be useful to flag the issue now so that the Embassy would have no doubts about our attitude.

Governor Harriman said that he tended to agree with Mr. Bundy that we should concentrate on the national reconciliation program as a first priority. He recalled that he had told the Indians and others that the GVN would announce a program of national reconciliation on November 1. This had been done. We had to hold the GVN to its new schedule so that an effective program would be announced and would get under way in December. Mr. Roche commented that it was easy to get the Vietnamese to agree to anything in principle. The real problem would be in getting them to follow through with an effective program. The Governor asked Mr. Davidson who would follow up with the GVN in Saigon. Mr. Davidson said that Henry Kissinger's recommendations to improve the Embassy organization as it related to national reconciliation, pacification etc. were not being followed. It was not clear to him who would be responsible for making sure that the GVN carried through a program of national reconciliation. Mr. Roche observed that Ambassador Lodge was the only American in Saigon with the access to and influence on Ky to do the job. He noted that Lodge expected to go on leave some time in December. Mr. Rostow said that this meant we should get to Lodge right away. Mr. Cooper remarked that Lodge would be able to provide the initial push but that we needed to keep after the GVN to see that a strong speech on national reconciliation was actually delivered. He assumed that by next week someone in the GVN would start drafting. The Embassy should be in a position to get our ideas across at an early stage. Mr. Unger said that he would undertake to see that a message to Saigon was drafted promptly to this effect.

Before the meeting closed Mr. Davidson pointed out that even if we managed to get the GVN leaders to commit themselves publicly to a program of national reconciliation, we could still have trouble dissuading them from introducing a clause into the new constitution excluding "communists and neutralists". We should realize that when Ky and Thieu spoke of national reconciliation they were thinking in terms of defections from the NLF/VC not of the NLF/VC itself playing a political role in South Vietnam. In short, a constitutional clause excluding members of the NLF/VC from Vietnamese political life would not necessarily seem to Ky and Thieu inconsistent with the principle of national reconciliation as they interpreted it.

301. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Washington, November 11, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII. Top Secret. Printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 364-365.

SUBJECT
Deployments to Southeast Asia (U)

I have reviewed your recommendations in JCSM 702-66, November 4, 1966,/2/ and the related military and economic effects of your recommended deployments. The attached table/3/ summarizes your plan and the forces which I am approving for planning purposes.

/2/This memorandum concerned "Deployment of Forces to Meet CY 1967 Requirements." (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (18 Jun 66), Section 8A)

/3/Attached but not printed. The table lists the following projected figures, in thousands, for total personnel in South Vietnam under the Southeast Asia Deployment Program:

JCS Plan:

June 1967, 455.9

December 1967, 504.0

June 1968, 522.2

OSD Plan:

June 1967, 439.5

December 1967, 463.3

June 1968, 469.33

As you know, a reasonably stable economy in South Vietnam is essential to unite the population behind the Government of Vietnam--indeed to avoid disintegration of the SVN society. Runaway inflation can undo what our military operations accomplish. For this reason, we have already taken actions to reduce military and contractor piaster spending towards the minimum level which can be accomplished without serious impact on military operations. Nevertheless, the price stability achieved last summer may be giving way to a new round of severe inflation. More must be done.

Ambassador Lodge has asked that U.S. military spending be held to P42 billion in CY 1967. The Ambassador's proposed program of tightly constrained U.S. and GVN civilian and military spending will not bring complete stability to SVN; there would still be, at best, a 10 billion piaster inflationary gap. It would, however, probably hold price rises in CY 1967 to 10%-25% as opposed to 75%-90% in FY 1966. The burden of inflation falls most heavily on just those Vietnamese--the ARVN and GVN civil servants--upon whose efficient performance our success most heavily depends. Unless we rigidly control inflation, the Vietnamese Army desertion rate will increase further and effectiveness will decline, thus at least partially cancelling the effects of increased U.S. deployments. Further, government employees will leave their jobs and civil strife will occur, seriously hindering both the military and the pacification efforts and possibly even collapsing the GVN.

For these reasons we must fit our deployments to the capacity of the Vietnamese economy to bear them without undue inflation. As your memorandum indicates, the program you recommend would cost over P46 billion in CY 1967 at current prices. I believe implementation of a program of this size would be self-defeating. The plan I am approving at this time for budgetary planning appears to me to be the maximum consist-ent with any reasonable hope of economic stability. If contingencies arise during the year, we can re-examine the plan accordingly. I plan to provide sufficient combat-ready forces in the U.S. to meet reasonable contingencies.

A troop list containing each unit in Program # 4 is attached./4/ You may wish to suggest changes in the unit mix, if there are units that have been deleted that have a higher priority than those I have approved. I would like to have these recommendations by December 1, 1966. I also would like your proposals as to ways in which approved units can be accelerated so as to provide maximum combat capability as early as possible in CY 1967./5/

/4/Attached but not printed.

/5/The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded in JCSM-739-66, December 2, proposing modifications in the plan for deployments to Southeast Asia. (Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII)

RMcN

302. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 11, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 138, Nodis/Louisiana. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to McNamara.

Yesterday the President elaborated to Bob McNamara and to me his desire to have a systematic assessment of what each of the following countries might do to help us in Viet Nam: Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, and others, including the Europeans. He has in mind three things:

a. Troops or additional troops where possible.

b. Other forms of assistance; e.g., increased training by Malaysians; increased economic aid for Viet Nam; increased political and diplomatic support; etc.

c. Even if increased help is not forthcoming, he wants our request to be part of our bilateral accounts so that if they do not act, they understand they have failed to act and should bear this in mind when asking us for assistance.

In this connection, he asked whether Ellsworth Bunker might not spend a part of his time touring some of these countries, where it is impossible for you to go before the NATO meeting.

He raised the question, on a different basis, as to whether it would not be wise for Bunker to go quietly to Indonesia to make an assessment of the situation on the spot, perhaps accompanied by a couple of good young military officers--"young Goodpasters."

In any case, the President wants to have available by the opening of Congress a systematic record of all our efforts to increase and widen international support for our effort in Viet Nam, in the form of a record that might be shown to General Eisenhower, Senator Dirksen, Gerry Ford, etc./2/

/2/In circular telegram 8350, November 11, the Department stated that the "time is ripe for major effort to obtain additional manpower contributions by other countries in Vietnam" both for "practical importance" and to demonstrate "wide support for basic objectives in Vietnam"; cable traffic on this subject was to be slugged Louisiana. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-3 VIET S/LOUISIANA)

Walt

[end of document]

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