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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

303. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 11, 1966, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. Top Secret; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Heyward Isham of EA and Unger. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655-661. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Dining Room. Documentation on Aspen, the codeword for the negotiating channel with North Vietnam through Sweden, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14/ASPEN, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. A substantial selection has been printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655-715.

SUBJECT
Swedish Diplomatic contacts with North Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

United States
Secretary Rusk
Deputy Asst. Secretary Leonard Unger
EUR/SCAN--David McKillop
EA/VN--Heywood Isham

Sweden
Minister of Foreign Affairs Torsten Nilsson
Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry R. Hichens-Bergstrom
Ambassador to United States--Hubert de Besche
First Secretary, Pol.Div., Ministry For.Affairs--J.C.S. Oberg

After preliminary exchange of greetings, Foreign Minister Nilsson read a report of two recent conversations between Swedish diplomats and representatives of North Viet-Nam which took place in Warsaw and Hanoi (The text of this paper is attached)./2/ Having read the paper, the Foreign Minister summarized the salient points of what DRV Foreign Minister Trinh had told Ambassador Petri in Hanoi: North Viet-Nam preferred a political to a military solution and was interested in a climate favoring a political settlement provided certain conditions were fulfilled; withdrawal was not specifically mentioned; the National Liberation Front was described as one of the spokesmen for the South Viet-Nam people although the most valid one. Regarding the possibility of reaching a final settlement, the NLF and Hanoi supported the formation of a National Coalition Government in South Viet-Nam founded on a broad basis including all political and religious groupings as well as all social classes generally desiring to achieve national independence. Moreover, conditions should be created permitting moving in the direction of future re-unification.

/2/Attached but not printed.

The Foreign Minister commented that it was difficult to judge the significance of the talks although it was interesting that a moderate tone characterized both of them. It was impossible for the Swedish government to assess the value of the information given to Ambassador Petri. An analysis of these exchanges in both Warsaw and Hanoi, however, might show them to contain elements justifying carrying on a discreet dialogue with the North Vietnamese government. The DRV Foreign Minister had concluded his conversation with emphasizing that he expected the conversation to be handled with absolute discretion. Foreign Minister Nilsson observed that although they had contacts with the Front and Hanoi since 1965, until now they had received nothing of interest but that a study of the recent exchanges had led them to feel that the atmosphere had begun to change and they felt it their duty to inform us.

The Secretary prefaced his reply by underscoring the need for extreme accuracy in reporting such conversations and knowing the exact language that was used on the other side. Great issues were at stake. We receive many reports about Hanoi's attitudes and positions which when tested proved to have no substance. The Secretary went on to note that there were one or two positive and one or two negative elements in what had been told to the Swedish representatives. On the positive side, Hanoi's interest in a political rather than a military solution represented a small step forward.

Foreign Minister Nilsson, describing the background of Ambassador Petri's mission, said he had been received by the head of the political department of the DRV Foreign Ministry and had several two-hour conversations and three dinners all within the space of three days. These had revealed nothing new in Hanoi's position. After all this, Trinh had sent him an invitation to come see him; Petri had not asked to be received by Trinh. While there was no discussion of conveying Trinh's remarks to the United States, neither did Trinh say Petri could not do so and he emphasized the importance of maintaining secrecy. The Swedes interpreted Trinh's attitude as a tacit indication that his remarks could be conveyed to the United States.

The Secretary, continuing his commentary on Trinh's remarks said the missing element was what Hanoi would in fact do on the military side. At least 19 regular North Vietnamese regiments were in the South and three North Vietnamese divisions were in the DMZ and north of it. They could attack our Marines at any moment. If we committed ourselves to stop bombing permanently, we must know what would happen on the ground militarily. We could not possibly make a commitment on the ground unless we knew what Hanoi would do with those 19 regiments. Trinh had used the phrase, "We know what we will have to do" in the event their conditions were accepted. The Secretary said we would want to know what that phrase means.

Mr. Bergstrom, noting that Petri's report had been in the form of one written and one telegraphic message, said they had queried him for clarification on the formulation regarding the National Liberation Front and the paper read by Foreign Minister Nilsson represented as accurate and precise a summary of Ambassador Petri's reports as they knew how to prepare. Ambassador Petri had observed to Trinh that if the two conditions were fulfilled, the North should follow suit. Bergstrom did not indicate whether there had been any comment to his remark.

The Secretary said that Hanoi had denied, even to the Soviets, that they had troops in the South. However, we must have corresponding action on the ground; we could not be children in this matter. As to the role of the Front, we knew who their leaders were including North Vietnamese Generals in the South using a variety of names. The Liberation Front is Hanoi. Some southern individuals with other associations were included in the Front, but they had no influence. When Trinh said the Front was the most valid spokesman for the South Vietnamese people and that the situation must be consistent with moving toward reunification, he was expressing Hanoi's political objective of permanently unifying the country on a Communist basis. We were prepared to have South Viet-Nam decide on a solution through elections but so far Hanoi was not prepared to do so. The Secretary said we could not impose a coalition government on the South; we could not turn our men around and start them shooting in the other direction to impose a coalition government. If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on this it was up to them and we would abide by the result, but a coalition would not be imposed by our arms and our power.

The Secretary asked what resources the Swedes had to continue this conversation; would the Ambassador be returning to Hanoi? It would be useful to get greater precision on the meaning of Trinh's phrase "they knew what they must do." The Secretary told the Foreign Minister for his personal information that last fall the Soviets suggested that we suspend the bombing for 15-20 days in order to permit further explorations of Hanoi's positions. We had suspended the bombing twice as long as the Soviets had requested. During this time, Hanoi multiplied the number of trucks it was sending South and poured men and arms into the South on a 24 hour a day basis.

On the 34th day of the pause, Hanoi had asked us to accept the four points, recognize the Liberation Front as the sole spokesman of the South Vietnamese people and get out of South Viet-Nam. Hanoi had not even used dilatory tactics as they might well have to embarrass us; they had simply asked us to surrender. This had been stupid of them. They could have made considerable problems for us if they had been more sophisticated or clever. Every week since January, we had tried to get an answer to the simple question: if we stopped the bombing as step 1, what would be step 2? Of course things would be better in the North, but what would happen in the South? We were vitally interested in this. Any further clarification as to the meaning of Trinh's phrase would be of some interest. The Secretary added that the other side had made clear we must end the bombing permanently, since they insisted that a suspension would imply an ultimatum. This represented an increased demand on their part and we must have something in exchange for a permanent cessation.

The Swedish Foreign Minister noted that they had contacts with the Front or Hanoi in Algiers, Warsaw, Moscow and Hanoi as well as Peking. The Secretary noted that the only serious interlocutor was Hanoi--not the Front. The Secretary said that we did not discount the importance of any third party channels. In past crises, we never knew which channel would be important. In this case, we did not know whether Hanoi would say something important through the Swedes rather than through someone else. We did not wish to close any channel of communication but we did wish to know what Hanoi meant by the particular formulation Trinh had used. The Foreign Minister said that they also did not know about Hanoi's intentions in this respect, but were certainly prepared to ask for greater precision. The Secretary commented that since Hanoi was terrified of being caught by Peking talking with us it would be important for the Swedes to stress they were seeking these clarifications solely on their own.

The Secretary went on to say that the Eastern European countries would probably be interested in settling for the status quo ante at the 17th Parallel but on account of Peking, were unable to move forward. We are prepared, he said, to accept the Communist world's interest in North Viet-Nam if they are prepared to accept our interest in the South. Until Hanoi abandoned its objective of seizing South Viet-Nam, there could be no peace. It was as simple as that. We were prepared to cooperate in finding ways for Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over the South but not in finding ways to abandon our own effort in the South. The Swedish Ambassador commented that Petri's impression was that the North Vietnamese were deeply concerned over developments in China, were essentially North Vietnamese patriots and that because of these Chinese developments there were better prospects of negotiating than before. The Secretary said that Hanoi undoubtedly did not desire to be taken over by China nor did the Soviets wish this to happen. But they could not expect us to do anything about this if it meant giving South Viet-Nam up to them. If the Chinese wanted war over this, they could have it. We would not abandon South Viet-Nam under any circumstances. The Secretary continued that two things were vital: (1) Hanoi must abandon its attempt to seize South Viet-Nam by force, and (2) the people of South Viet-Nam must have a chance to decide what government they want and to express their views on reunification without being subjected to force by the North. This principle was true for Korea, for Germany and for Viet-Nam. The Swedish Ambassador pointed to Trinh's implication that reunification could be a long term proposition and the Secretary countered that the thrust of that passage meant a Communist regime for the South. This was one of the negative aspects of Trinh's remarks. The Secretary pointed out the lack of reciprocity in the position of the other side. If we were to say we would not negotiate until the North stopped bombing in South Viet-Nam, people around the world would protest that we were being belligerent. We had suspended bombing in the DMZ to see if there would be any response, but there was none and the ICC had been denied access to the area under the North. Nevertheless the Trinh statement could be important if we had more precision.

Ambassador Unger called attention to the reference by the North Vietnamese in Warsaw to "no military action being undertaken in the demilitarized zone." He suggested, and the Secretary agreed, that this was also a point on which the Swedes might make further soundings in Hanoi. We were certainly ready to see the zone truly demilitarized and would welcome an end to violations of it by North Viet-Nam.

The Foreign Minister mentioned possible differences of opinion between the Front and Hanoi and pointed out that all elements of the Front were not Communists. The Secretary responded there was no problem about contact with the Front; the South Vietnamese were able to communicate with its representatives. South Viet-Nam could take care of the indigenous problem through reconciliation and bringing the dissidents back into the body politic. United States troops had only entered when North Viet-Nam regulars had come down. If the Swedes were in the same position, they would not accept a coalition government thus imposed on them.

In answer to the Foreign Minister's question as to how long the conflict might go on, the Secretary said that peace could be had by 6:00 this afternoon if the North told us they would stop trying to take South Viet-Nam by force. But we were not looking for a face-saving formula to permit us to abandon South Viet-Nam and some of the Communist states appeared at last to recognize this. The Secretary noted three channels to Hanoi: the direct one through which little was said because of Hanoi's fear of Peking; the channel through Moscow to which we attach importance because of Moscow's attitudes and influence--but here again Hanoi was probably afraid of Peking; and finally a channel through a third party, which could be Sweden. But, he continued, this represented perhaps 50% of the question; the other 50% was the possibility of resolving the problem by de facto action on the ground in the pattern of the Greek insurrection and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis. Ho Chi Minh might prefer to pull back troops rather than enter negotiations, calculating that Americans might go home and could not come back, although, the Secretary said, we can get back faster than they can. We would be prepared to try this route. There need be no confessions that they have 19 regiments in the South.

In response to an analysis by the Foreign Minister of Hanoi's problem, the Secretary noted that we had reports from Eastern European sources that confirmed this precisely: Hanoi feared the effect of negotiations on the morale of the Viet Cong and Hanoi's present leaders feared that they could not survive a failure to achieve their objectives. However, the Secretary said on this we cannot help them; they are in places they have no right to be.

Further, on the point of gradual de-escalation, the Secretary said that since January we had made clear our interest in responding to actions on the ground--what we call a process of "mutual example"--without evoking thus far any interest on Hanoi's part. If Trinh's phrase pointed in the direction of positive Hanoi response, this could be important.

As to Trinh's own alignment in the regime as between hawks and doves, Mr. Bergstrom commented that the French considered him pro-Chinese but that Ambassador Petri did not have that impression.

The Foreign Minister asked whether it would be necessary to specify how long we would halt the bombing. The Secretary said that under our system the press and Congress would force us to answer this question. A permanent bombing halt would require a very important reciprocal action. Ambassador Unger commented that Trinh's remarks implied some readiness to discuss now not only conditions for negotiation but also the terms of an eventual settlement. The Secretary agreed that Hanoi was hesitant about discussing the first step until they saw how the negotiations would end. He indicated that another reason for keeping further inquiries on the basis of a Swedish-DRV dialogue was to avoid having to bring Saigon into the picture, which we were disinclined to do at this stage.

The Secretary suggested as a technical point it might not be wise to pursue the dialogue with Hanoi through other capitals. In order to protect Trinh's position if there are divisions within the leadership it was important not to have communications from abroad available to too wide a group in Hanoi. Foreign Minister Nilsson agreed with this suggestion. The Secretary emphasized the importance of examining very carefully all indications bearing on Hanoi's position but as he had told the press on another occasion, we could only negotiate with those who could stop the fighting. If we entered into too great detail on our conditions for settlement, the other side would just put that in their pockets and then propose to split the difference. We were not worried about real southern insurgents--16,000 of them had defected this year--but the Northern Generals must go home. We would even be prepared to give them a villa on the Riviera!

Responding to a question by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said that Premier Ky was not particularly popular as an individual but that the majority of the population had strongly rejected the Viet Cong and supported the move towards a constitutional government. Even Tri Quang, opposed as he was to Ky, wanted us to bomb China. The trouble with the Vietnamese was the influence of the French "fourth republic mentality" where every man had his own party.

Reverting to the paper given us by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said we would wish to put it under a microscope and give a more systematic answer. Ambassador Unger would go to New York before Nilsson's departure next week and give him our further comments. In any event, these statements from Hanoi did have a certain resonance. Responding to a final question from the Foreign Minister about Hanoi's difficulty of believing that the United States could abandon such expensive United States bases, the Secretary pointed out that the United States' capacity in this regard should not be underestimated. We had built roads in India, over the hump, and Alaska during the war which we had never used, and we had demobilized 100 divisions after World War II. In the last five years we had closed 600 bases. As the President had said, we had no intention of leaving our soldiers in South Viet-Nam as tourists.

Following the general conversation, Ambassador Unger privately mentioned to Minister Nilsson and Mr. Bergstrom our concern over reports that Ambassador Petri had spoken rather openly about his contacts in Hanoi. They agreed and said that recently they had twice communicated with Petri and instructed him to treat this subject with maximum discretion.

304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 12, 1966, 2:02 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by McNamara, Helms, Gaud, Marks, and Komer; and approved by Rusk and Katzenbach. In telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15, Rusk told Lodge and Porter that telegram 83699 "was discussed today at highest levels, who wished to emphasize that this represents final and considered decision." (Ibid.)

83699. For Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. Ref: (a) Saigon's 10204; (b) State's 78865./2/

/2/See Document 290 and footnote 2 thereto.

1. We appreciate your views in reftel (a). Your review of organizational problems has been helpful to us.

2. We would like now to proceed immediately with measures on US and GVN side to get RD program moving forward effectively.

3. Re para 20 reftel (a),/3/ realize you were not in position discuss our proposal in sufficiently wide circle. You are authorized now to discuss this and reftel (b) with Ambassador Porter and General Westmoreland and, once plans mature, inform members Mission Council.

/3/In paragraph 20, Lodge requested authority to discuss the proposal in telegram 78865 with the "heads of the different mission agencies involved here."

4. Following steps need to be taken promptly if we are, in the time available, to give adequate test to organization which is intended to keep RD civilian functions under civilian management, an objective to which we know you attach considerable importance. These steps have already been discussed reftel (b) which should continue to serve as general guide. We would like you to prepare articulated plan to put these meas-ures into effect as soon as possible, carefully delineating and defining US civilian and military responsibilities, with particular attention to most effective relationship among Ambassador Porter, his new military deputy and Gen. Westmoreland and his new RD/P deputy or special assistant.

A. Mission directive should be issued providing that Ambassador Porter, working under your general supervision, should, pursuant para 1 reftel (b) take explicit operational charge of all personnel and programs carrying out RD/P civilian functions, including public safety, province reps and any other pertinent USAID elements; JUSPAO; CIA cadre and other RD/P programs; and military to the extent that civilian functions have been assigned to them.

B. Mission directive should include new organizational pattern at regional, provincial and district level, putting premium on effective coordination with each province of all activities related to RD/P.

C. Mission directive should also reiterate that Ambassador Porter is freed of any Mission duties other than RD direction and that provision is made for the direction of all other Mission business during your absence (for example, during your coming leave) by a designated officer, whether or not it is considered essential that Ambassador Porter be nominally in charge. Same directive should create staff for Ambassador Porter adequate to support him in discharge of these responsibilities.

D. You and Ambassador Porter will wish to work out with General Westmoreland most expeditious means of accomplishing following, calling on Washington for additional authority or funds as necessary:

(1) Assignment of principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, being general officer of two or three-star rank. This would require immediate consultation with General Westmoreland to secure most appropriate officer.

(2) Designation by General Westmoreland of separate Deputy or Special Assistant for Pacification to MACV.

(3) Preparation of realistic and detailed plan by MACV with assist-ance Ambassador Porter for bringing about change in mission for bulk of ARVN to responsibility for local security and coordination of such activities with RD Ministry priorities and plans. This should utilize MACV relations with leading GVN military officials, including use of all leverage provided through MAP and Adviser Program, and should draw on maximum support as necessary from yourself and high-level officials Washington. We are aware of resistance among top-ranking GVN military, including Corps Commanders, but believe time has come to take on this problem and find successful way to press ARVN to devote sufficient military muscle to accomplish this task, which, as you say, is the foundation of the RD/P program. This is task for entire Mission. Load inevitably falls most heavily on MACV and on you who must keep heat on Ky and Thieu. Your election analogy (para 8 reftel (a))/4/ suggests that when Vietnamese wish to take on task analogous to what we are advocating, they can do so.

/4/In paragraph 8, Lodge noted how U.S. troops, working in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces, provided protection for voters on election day, September 11.

(4) Should either you or General Westmoreland have reservations concerning these actions, please raise specific alternatives with us immediately.

(5) Re para 3 reftel (a), we understand General Westmoreland plans use of limited number US forces in buddy system principle to guide and motivate ARVN in RD/P. However, we have serious doubts about any further involvement US troops beyond this in straight pacification operations. We fear this would tempt Vietnamese to leave this work more and more to us and we believe pacification, with its intimate contact with population, more appropriate for Vietnamese forces, who must after all, as arm of GVN, establish constructive relations with population. Hence we believe there should be no thought of US taking on substantial share of pacification. The urgent need is to begin effectively pressing ARVN.

Rusk

305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 13, 1966, 3:37 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 263-264.

83786. Ref: Saigon's 10714./2/

/2/In telegram 10741 from Saigon, November 13, Lodge indicated that he had agreed to meet with D'Orlandi and Lewandowski on November 14 and would appreciate any further guidance the Department might have. (Ibid.)

1. Agree you should meet with d'Orlandi and Lewandowski. We hope this way lead to the latter's being able carry out useful mission in Hanoi by securing better understanding there of our position and bringing back to us some clarification North Vietnamese position, although past exchanges with Lewandowski, received thorough d'Orlandi filter, have not yet persuaded us Pole is in a position to provide effective line of communication.

2. We believe your meeting Monday/3/ should be devoted primarily to asking questions so that we can get a better picture directly from Lewandowski of what he thinks can be accomplished through him. After we have had a chance to digest his replies, if they justify a further exchange, we will send you our more substantive suggestions immediately for an additional exchange with him prior to his departure for Hanoi.

/3/November 14.

3. These are queries to be put to Lewandowski:

a) What role does he envisage for himself? Is he, on the one hand, seeking merely to facilitate a better understanding on each side of the other's position in order to pave way toward some kind of direct contact, and, if so, does he have reason to believe Hanoi will agree to such contact? Or, on the other hand, does he contemplate serving as an intermediary, conveying a series of proposals and counterproposals between two sides to try to achieve agreement on specific issues?

b) What does Hanoi consider to be his role? Has Hanoi entrusted specific messages to him and, if so, to whom were they to be conveyed?

c) As we understand it, Lewandowski wants an overall agreement and says Hanoi will buy something that is "final," he doesn't want a truce just to "allow conversations." How does he propose to get from here to there? How would he envisage overcoming our considerable reluctance to modify our position on one point or another without having any indication of what if any helpful response this would evoke from Hanoi?

d) We understand that considerations of face inevitably play a role in Hanoi's thinking. Does this perhaps explain, in Lewandowski's view, why we are unable to get any meaningful response to the question "what would happen if the bombing on NVN stopped?" Does Lewandowski see any way around this? Could some package deal be worked out which in its totality represented what both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension.

4. Lewandowski should understand that none of the foregoing represents a position which he is authorized to put to Hanoi on our behalf. We will review his replies to our questions and will then wish to determine what we wish to propose concerning his forthcoming visit to Hanoi.

Rusk

306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:06 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 266-268.

10856. 1. I met Lewandowski at D'Orlandi's apartment at 3:00 p.m. Saigon time.

2. Lewandowski began by saying that he was "grateful" to me for being "so responsive to my request" that he see me today on the eve of his visit to Hanoi. What he was about to say was not "official" in the sense that he was not instructed by Hanoi to do it. But before his departure, he wished that "some things could be clear." He added, "you may not be prepared to answer right away and, if so, I will understand." He had four questions, as follows:

A. "Regarding the offer at Manila concerning the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam on the condition that the troops of North Viet-Nam would withdraw (and, he said, "North Viet-Nam, of course, doesn't admit that they are there at all), does this condition mean the United States withdrawal depends on control by the present South Vietnamese Government of territories not now under the control of Saigon?"

B. "In case of a cease-fire, would the United States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and not to interfere in the creation of a new Government of Viet-Nam? The question of how the new Government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise."

C. "In case of a cease-fire, would the United States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish, whether by referendum or by election?"

D. "In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the United States be ready to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery of the International Commission in bringing peace to Viet-Nam, and if so, would the United States publicly declare its intention to this effect?"

3. I said that these were questions which I would have to refer to the U.S. Government, and that I would do so and provide answers as soon as I could.

4. I then said I had some questions to ask, and I asked him the four sets of questions listed in your State 83786./2/ When I had finished reading him these questions, which I did slowly so that he could take it all down, I added that none of what I had just said represented a position which he was authorized to put to Hanoi in our behalf. We would, however, review his answers and then decide what we wished to propose.

/2/Document 305.

5. I then became silent, thinking that perhaps this would be the end of the meeting.

6. Without any prodding at all from me or D'Orlandi, he said, "Well, some of your questions cannot be answered now. As to your question no. 1, my present role is in accord with the instructions of my government who would be prepared for me to take any role which would bring peace nearer. The two roles set forth in your question, that is, on the one hand, to work to facilitate a better understanding and pave the way to contact or, on the other, to be an intermediary, do not exclude each other. In fact, they could be done together. If the ideas which can be developed are not too far apart, then there can be talks, and if the ideas then start separating, both sides can withdraw. On the other hand, if I am successful in bringing the two sides together and they agree on something together, I can withdraw feeling that I have achieved something useful."

7. As to the second question, Lewandowski said "You have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize that diplomacy in Viet-Nam is different than what it is in Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers are very difficult to get. One has to be very patient and look for indirect symptoms." He was not, he said, an agent of the Hanoi government, but "if and when they decide they want you to know something," he said, "they would tell me. Of this I am confident. Each time I go, the Prime Minister asks me about Americans and what the Americans think."

8. "On your third question, it is a frame without a picture. It is very theoretical."

9. "As to the fourth question, it recognizes that you can't trade bombing suspension for something else. The question of bombing suspension in the first instance could be discussed informally. But if well founded hopes developed for reaching some agreement, then the bombing suspension could be brought in in the second phase."

10. D'Orlandi remarked that in the beginning of our talks, Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing suspension would not be a precondition.

11. Lewandowski said, "Yes, there must be positive steps--not speeches or declarations. A package deal is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is the only one. The A and B in your fourth question are the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful. We must go right through to Z, including everything that needs to be in the package deal."

12. I remarked that we would certainly be willing to accept the formula of a package deal as a way of doing business without, of course, committing myself to the substantive elements which might be in it.

13. D'Orlandi thought that the package deal idea was a "positive step forward." He regarded it as a "very substantial concession." He saw the two distinct parts with no direct link between. The first, he said, gives full satisfaction. Phase B, he said, is very reasonable indeed.

14. The atmosphere was much the best that it has ever been since we have met. He had plainly asked for the meeting and said so. As I was about to leave, he said very much as an afterthought and in an extraordinarily mild tone of voice that he had forgotten to say something that he had meant to say which was that there should be no further escalation because to do so would "freeze the atmosphere." I noted the casual tone and said equally casually that one could assure that that applied both ways.

15. Comment: Lewandowski is due to take off at 11 a.m. Tuesday, Saigon time. If you can get me a reply into my office by 9 a.m. Saigon time, I will try to get it to him if you desire. On the other hand, we have the perfectly good basis for saying there wasn't much time to give him an answer. End comment.

Lodge

307. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and Wheeler.

SUBJECT
Anti-infiltration barrier between North and South Vietnam

I recommended in my October 14 trip report/2/ to you that we install south of the 17th Parallel a barrier against infiltration from North into South Vietnam.

/2/Document 268.

We are now preparing to proceed to install the ground portions of this barrier. The easternmost portion will be a continuous ground barrier of fences, wire, mines and sensors, supported by artillery, aircraft and mobile troops, and will extend from the South China Sea westward approximately 30 kilometers, as far as the land remains relatively flat. To the west of this continuous ground barrier will be intermittent ground barriers placed in the ravines or defiles through which men and supplies are forced by the terrain to move. These barriers are supported by General Westmoreland and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

West of the ground barriers there is a clear need for an air barrier. The exact character of the air barrier has not been decided. It may be an intensification of the present program of air strikes on infiltration routes, a form of the Air Force "Beaver" proposal involving continuous bombing of three or four lines of choke points, or some other air method of denying transit to enemy trucks, men and supplies. We are now taking steps to acquire the munitions, sensors and other equipment and facilities necessary to implement the air portion of an anti-infiltration barrier./3/

/3/In two memoranda to Katzenbach, November 16 and November 26, Rosenthal summarized and discussed two briefings on the barrier provided to Department of State officials by General Starbird and Richard Steadman. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Robert S. McNamara

308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, November 14, 1966, 6:03 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold [1]. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Cooper and Heywood Isham of EA/VN; cleared by Harriman, Unger, and William Bundy; and approved by William Bundy. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 268-269.

84238. Ref: a) Saigon's 10856; b) State 83786./2/

/2/Documents 306 and 305.

1. You should convey following to Lewandowski before he departs for Hanoi:

2. We will be awaiting with great interest Lewandowski's account of his forthcoming visit. What he learns there may have an important bearing on how effectively he will be able to pursue his efforts to facilitate a better understanding and pave the way for further exchanges.

3. In connection with Lewandowski's observation about the need "to be patient and look for indirect symptoms", we believe we have exercised what in all objectivity can be called a high degree of patience. We would be prepared to be even more patient if we knew that something of importance was at the end of the road. We have listened to literally scores of well-intentioned persons who in varying degree have claimed to be reflecting Hanoi's views, but we have not yet had authoritative word from Hanoi itself as to its real conditions or how it would envisage reaching a peaceful settlement by any means other than our complete accept-ance of its terms.

4. If during Lewandowski's forthcoming visit to Hanoi, the Prime Minister should again ask him "what the Americans think", Lewandowski should convey the idea, as his impression of our views, that while we remain intent on finding a path to a reasonable and honorable settlement, we are not prepared to withdraw and find that armed subversive elements from the North have moved in again. We are serious in expressing our willingness to remove our troops, to dismantle our bases, and accept a non-aligned South Viet-Nam so long as it is genuinely non-aligned. We do not regard the genuine neutrality of South Viet-Nam as opposed to our interests. With respect to our efforts to find an approach toward reciprocal actions of de-escalation, we are aware that Hanoi must assign weight to considerations of face, and we have said that so long as we were certain that the elements from the North were removed, we would not insist on any acknowledgment that these forces had ever been in the South.

5. In addition to the foregoing, we have the following specific comments on Lewandowski's four questions:

A. The Manila formulation on withdrawal was considered and worded with the greatest care. It was included in the communique in the light of specific indications from Eastern European sources that such a mention of a definite withdrawal period would help in establishing an acceptable basis for negotiations. The mechanics of a phased withdrawal would probably have to be a matter for negotiation although the initial de-escalatory steps might be taken by mutual example.

B. We have often said that we supported free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese people a government of their own choice. We are prepared to abide by the genuine manifestation of that free choice. We support the emerging constitutional process in South Viet-Nam. The orderly formation of a responsive and representative government based on free elections will receive our support.

C. We are on record that the question of the reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese of both North and South through their own free decision, without any interference from outside. How soon that can take place depends on a number of factors, above all the restoration of peace and order in South Viet-Nam so that South Viet-Nam will be in a position to treat freely with NVN on this matter.

D. We have already declared our view that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. Since 1954 there have been many developments which have revealed sharply the need for an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision and control. We would be prepared to discuss all matters bearing upon this complicated problem.

6. We would also observe that what Lewandowski terms our "theoretical" third question of how we get from here to there bears most directly upon his proposal for a "package deal" including, as he put it, not only A and B but all the other letters of the alphabet. These range all the way from the reciprocal measures of de-escalation to the components of a final settlement. The immediate issue is to find out precisely and concretely even if quite privately what steps Hanoi would take if we stopped bombing. Lewandowski would be rendering great service if during his conversations in Hanoi he is able to bring fresh light on the answer to this question. (You should refer again at this point to item 3d) of reftel b.)

7. Finally you might tell Lewandowski that the remaining aspects of the questions raised by you yesterday, i.e. those not discussed above, are also still of real concern to us and any light he can shed on them by virtue of his forthcoming visit will be helpful. We are proceeding on the understanding, of course, that Lewandowski in Hanoi will be speaking throughout for himself, on the basis of what he understands to be our position./3/

/3/In telegram 10955 from Saigon, November 15, Lodge reported that in a meeting with Lewandowski and D'Orlandi he had twice read the full text of this telegram, both men had taken copious notes, D'Orlandi had indicated that he was "rather encouraged" by the U.S. response, and Lewandowski had stated that he shared that view. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

Katzenbach

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-3 VIET S/LOUISIANA. Secret. Drafted by Bundy.

SUBJECT
Additional Contributions in Vietnam and Your Trip

We have now received replies and reports from all our Embassies,/2/ leading to the following judgments:

/2/See Document 302 and footnote 2 thereto.

1. Australia and New Zealand. If the elections come out right, both will do more. But they need no urging and your arrival right after the elections would be badly misconstrued.

2. Korea. Park has now announced the formation of a service force, and is being vigorously attacked by his opposition for this. The Embassy believes it crystal clear that this is the maximum to be expected before the elections next March. With the decision made and the issue controversial, a stop by you in Korea would be a great mistake in my judgment.

3. Japan. Alex thinks the Japanese may be willing to undertake civilian assistance on a few projects but not on a broad basis. While a Japanese stop by you could be pegged to broad discussions, it could not be expected to produce more than very modest results in terms of any additional Japanese contribution.

4. GRC. The Embassy feels there is a distinct possibility of more civilian help in fields of engineering, agriculture, and health, subject to agreement on financing. However, it is my judgment that these contributions can be obtained without a visit by you, and that any such visit would in any event have to be directed to some other clear objective--lest we appear to stir up the question of GRC military forces.

5. Philippines. The Embassy feels it is definitely premature to seek additional military contributions, and that any further non-military assistance should arise from clear GVN initiative. There are various possibilities, but the slim pickings and the strong chance of negative reactions to a visit by you--which could hardly have any other purpose at this moment--lead me to recommend strongly in the negative on your stopping there.

6. Malaysia. The Embassy believes GOM would not now consider a military contribution. There is a fair chance they might be willing to send police and development advisors to a relatively secure Vietnamese province, but Bell doubts they have enough manpower to fully "adopt" a province. A stop by you might be some help, but the pickings would again appear slim.

7. Thailand. Martin is just in with the judgment that the President's pitch will take some weeks to sink in. He reports a strongly negative reaction by Dawee. While Martin gives no judgment on your stopping, my own would be negative in the next 2-3 weeks, while the matter is obviously under intense private discussion.

8. Singapore. The Embassy thinks there is no chance of any kind of assistance for the present.

9. Burma. Byroade believes the Burmese would not be prepared to do anything.

10. India. The Embassy believes that GOI might be persuaded to consider some form of humanitarian help but might well feel compelled to offer similar contributions to North Vietnam. Bowles recommends against pressing the issue.

11. Pakistan. The Embassy believes GOP would consider civilian as well as military contributions to SVN to be beyond the realm of their political-military capabilities at this time.

12. Iran. The Embassy rates chances of getting any military element as infinitesimal. Tehran believes there would be an even chance of persuading the Shah to enlarge the Iranian civilian medical effort, but Saigon recommends against this on usefulness grounds for the moment. Meyer does recommend you stop in Tehran if you go to any neighbors.

13. Turkey. The Ambassador is not optimistic regarding a new approach to Turks for manpower contribution to Vietnam. If we are to approach Turks at a high level, the Ambassador suggests the best opportunity would be when President Sunay visits Washington in early December.

14. Greece. The Embassy doubts that GOG is now willing to become involved even marginally in the Vietnam issue.

In terms of these responses and judgments, I find great difficulty in suggesting a meaningful itinerary for a trip by you./3/ For the various reasons given above, I would be clearly negative on Seoul, Taipei, Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, New Delhi, Rawalpindi, Ankara, and Athens. Burma, Malaysia, and Iran are at best make-weights and would create a very confusing picture of the purposes of the trip. Even a "search for peace" motif would have little bearing in these places, as likewise in India and Pakistan in view of their attitudes and the recent Harriman visits.

/3/In circular telegram 83500, November 11, the Department noted that Rusk's upcoming trip in connection with the NATO meeting on December 15 might be directed in part to obtaining additional manpower contributions for Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-3 VIET S/LOUISIANA)

In short, my own conclusion is that the only stops that make real sense would be Japan--always justified on broad grounds--and Saigon itself. If you did this routing to Paris, you could refuel in Tehran and stop briefly if you wish. This is not of course a trip that will raise new forces, but it does make other kinds of sense.

As an alternative, I suggest the possibility of your doing a Tehran-Saigon-Tokyo itinerary after the NATO conference. This would be short enough to be compressed into the period between the NATO conference and Christmas, and might fit better with your other commitments and the possible importance of preparing carefully for the NATO conference itself.

I hate to seem negative, but a highly selective contribution-seeking tour seems almost worse than none. I cannot imagine what the press and other capitals would make of it. Hence, the middle ground seems to me the only feasible kind of trip that would have any merit.

310. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge)/1/

Washington, November 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Drafted by Komer and cleared by McNamara and Rusk. In a back channel telegram, November 18, Komer gave Lodge "advance flavor" of the President's reaction to Lodge's November 7 letter, Document 294: "He said I agree with Cabot that pacification is the heart of the matter, I've given him every support I know how and will give him more if he needs it. But I wish he'd make his people stop arguing about the organizational instructions we send, accept them cheerfully, and get on with the job." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables)

Dear Cabot:

I have carefully digested your letter of 7 November on pacification,/2/ as I did your memorandum at Manila./3/ In fact, I have consistently sought to encourage an accelerated pacification program ever since you were among the first to call it the heart of the matter some months ago.

/2/Document 294.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 294.

There does not seem to me to be any major difference between your ideas of what is needed to make pacification work, and those of my chief advisers and myself. Bob McNamara and the Joint Chiefs realize, as does General Westmoreland on the basis of the dispositions he is increasingly making, that a limited number of U.S. combat forces must be detailed to be the catalysts for the Vietnamese.

What worries them is rather that if the U.S. takes over too much of the job, the ARVN will tend to sit back and let us fight that "war" too. I'm sure that you are no more eager than we are to let this happen. As a matter of fact, getting the U.S. military more heavily engaged in refocussing ARVN on the heart of the matter is one reason why we here have seriously considered charging MACV with pacification. I hope you will ponder whether this is not in the end the best way to achieve the aim you seek.

I genuinely believe it is--however, I am willing to try out for a time a compromise solution, and warmly endorsed the recent instructions sent to you./4/ For this scheme to work, it is essential that there be a clearcut assignment of pacification responsibilities to Porter and MACV now, including a clear delineation between their respective responsibilities, and then that Porter and MACV each organize as effectively as possible to carry out the tasks assigned. If showing ARVN the way on pacification can take up to ten percent of our troops, it also deserves the full-time attention of some of our best generals. So I have asked Bob McNamara to send you the best men he has here for assignment to the civilian as well as military sides, in the event that Westmoreland cannot spare enough top talent for the key spots proposed.

/4/See Document 304.

You have our full support and backing. In turn, we here depend on you not to let your people spend too much time in arguing details but to make them get on with the job.

Warmly,
Lyndon B. Johnson/5/

/5/Below his signature the President wrote, "Written from Hospital--but I applaud your comments in your personal note and when this reaches you it will be about a month since Manila and perhaps 500 of our boys are gone. Make them all follow your orders & let's get going. With admiration & thanks."

311. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

Pacification Organization Moving at Last. Your Tuesday blast led Rusk to send a tough cable/2/ which finally unfroze Lodge and Porter (I did a few back channel words to the wise myself)./3/

/2/Telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15; see footnote 1, Document 304. The President presumably delivered his "Tuesday blast" during his luncheon meeting on Tuesday, November 15, with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Komer, and Moyers. The meeting lasted from about 2:05 to 3:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found.

/3/See footnote 1, Document 310.

Lodge is now in with three long replies (attached)/4/ which essentially buy our proposals. Suggest you read only sidelined portions. The only significant resistance is that Westy refuses to assign a top Deputy for pacification but is otherwise strengthening his staff. I don't worry about this because Westy is really turning around and will in time see the logic of a Deputy. He told me privately he intends to put Major General Weyand (who's tops) in as J-5 on pacification--a big step in the right direction.

/4/Attached but not printed are telegrams 11124 and 11125, November 17. The third telegram from Lodge has not been identified.

I hope you'll forgive me if I feel pretty good about all this. It took four months of backstairs wheeling and dealing to get us even this far (plus some bruised feelings), but the fact that you showed everyone you backed me turned the trick.

I think (as you do, judging from your latest letter to Lodge)/5/ that even the new civilian organization won't really be able to do the job, and that if we want solid results by end-1967 we'll have to give it to Westy./6/ But at least we've already gone 25% of the way in the right direction. Your letter will set Lodge himself to thinking about whether to go the rest of the way.

/5/Document 310.

/6/In telegram WDC 13803 to Westmoreland, November 23, General Johnson stated: "The more I ruminate about the rate of progress in Vietnam and the inevitable relationship to our own elections in 1968, the more convinced I am that you will be given full responsibility for the program [revolutionary development] sometime after the first of the year." (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)

If he doesn't, the time to take the next bite may be when Lodge leaves. I'm sure he'd like to switch no later than next spring (he'd dearly love Rome and the Vatican as a reward), though I believe him when he says he'll stay as long as his Commander-in-Chief wants him. However, I strongly believe that decisive results in 1967 demand an Ambassador who can take hold and manage that sprawling empire. I'm sure McNamara would agree.

If you switched Lodge next February (after the 90-120 days are up), this change in ambassadors could cover up the shift of pacification responsibilities. I wish I could offer you a top notch name (a McNamara, Mac Bundy, or Katzenbach type). I'll keep thinking, as I doubt that you'll have any more important appointment to make before November 1968. If I'm getting over my head, just tell me so.

R. W. Komer

312. Editorial Note

In a 34-page draft memorandum for the President, November 17, 1966, Secretary McNamara recommended that a supplemental appropriation request totaling $12.4 billion be submitted to Congress in January 1967. He also recommended that "forces totaling 469,000 be approved, for planning and budgeting purposes, for deployment to SVN by June 30, 1968." A copy of Secretary McNamara's memorandum is in the Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII. A substantial portion of the first 22 pages is printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume IV, pages 133-135, 365-385. In explaining the operational concept that underlay his recommendations, Secretary McNamara first discussed "Military Strategy in Vietnam" (pages 7-17) and then "Consolidation and Extension of GVN Control" (pages 17-22), incorporating and developing many of the points made in his October 14 memorandum to the President (Document 268). In a final section (pages 23-24), he provided his reasons for specific program recommendations and the costs by major area of activity.

The opening paragraphs of Secretary McNamara's discussion of "Military Strategy in Vietnam" read as follows:

"The war in Vietnam has two highly interdependent parts: (1) the 'regular' war against the main force VC/NVA battalions and regiments, and the interdiction of their men and supplies flowing down from North Vietnam, and (2) the 'Pacification' or revolutionary development war to neutralize the local VC guerrillas and gain the permanent support of the SVN population.

"The infiltrated men and supplies serve to bolster the regular units whose function is to support the local VC guerrillas and infrastructure by defeating the GVN forces in the area and generally exposing the GVN's inability to protect the rural populace. The local guerrillas and infrastructure maintain a constant VC presence in their area and support the offensive efforts of the regular units by providing intelligence, terrain guidance, supplies, and recruits. In addition, the guerrillas conduct many of the thousands of incidents of terror, harassment, and sabotage reported each month. The principal task of U.S. military forces in SVN must be to eliminate the offensive capability of the regular units in order to allow the GVN to counter the guerrilla forces and extend permanent control over areas from which regular units have been cleared.

"We now face a choice of two approaches to the threat of the regular VC/NVA forces. The first approach would be to continue in 1967 to increase friendly forces as rapidly as possible, and without limit, and employ them primarily in large-scale 'seek out and destroy' operations to destroy the main force VC/NVA units.

"This approach appears to have some distinct disadvantages. First, we are finding very strongly diminishing marginal returns in the destruction of VC/NVA forces. If our estimates of enemy losses (killed, captured and defected) are correct, VC/NVA losses increased by only 115 per week (less than 15%) during a period in which we increased friendly strength by 160,000 including 140,000 U.S. military personnel and 42 U.S. and Third Country maneuver battalions. At this rate, an additional 100,000 friendly personnel deployed would increase VC/NVA losses by some 70 per week. Second, expanding U.S. deployments have contributed to a very serious inflation in South Vietnam. Prices increased 75-90% in FY66. An extra 100,000 U.S. forces would add at least P9 billion to our piaster expenditures, doubling the 1967 inflationary gap in SVN. Third, the high and increasing cost of the war to the United States is likely to encourage the Communists to doubt our staying power and to try to 'wait us out.'

"The second approach is to follow a similarly aggressive strategy of 'seek out and destroy,' but to build friendly forces only to that level required to neutralize the large enemy units and prevent them from interfering with the pacification program. It is essential to this approach that such a level be consistent with a stable economy in SVN, and consistent with a military posture that the United States credibly would maintain indefinitely, thus making a Communist attempt to 'wait us out' less attractive.

"I believe that this level is about 470,000 U.S. and 52,000 Free World personnel and less than half of the ARVN.* The remainder of the ARVN, plus a portion of the U.S. force, would give priority to improving the pacification effort. The enemy regular units would cease to perform what I believe to be their primary function of diverting our effort to give security to the population. This, plus the effects of a successful interdiction campaign to cut off their other support, would effectively neutralize them, possibly at the cost of far fewer casualties to both sides than the first approach would allow.

"*Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 U.S. strength of 570,000. However, I believe both he and General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of inflation will probably force a 6/30/68 deployment limit of about 470,000. [Footnote in the source text.]

"I believe it is time to adopt the second approach for three reasons: (1) if MACV estimates of enemy strength are correct, we have not been able to attrite the enemy forces fast enough to break their morale and more U.S. forces are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future; (2) we cannot deploy more than about 470,000 personnel by the end of 1967 without a high probability of generating a self-defeating runaway inflation in SVN and (3) an endless escalation of U.S. deployments is not likely to be acceptable in the U.S. or to induce the enemy to believe that the U.S. is prepared to stay as long as is required to produce a secure non-communist SVN. Obviously a greatly improved pacification campaign must be waged to take advantage of the protection offered by the major friendly forces. Alternatively, if enemy strength is greatly overstated and our 'seek out and destroy' operations have been more effective than our strength and loss estimates would imply--a possibility discussed below--more than 470,000 U.S. personnel should not be required to neutralize the VC/NVA main force."

313. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 17, 1966, 1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Rusk and Katzenbach.

Mr. President:

This memorandum suggests that the optimum form of negotiation with Hanoi may be:

--a secret negotiation of a total deal;

--a dramatic joint announcement followed by a complete end of hostilities, infiltration, and the beginning of troop withdrawals.

1. A Possible Problem

It is certain that the men in Hanoi have not yet decided that their best option is to negotiate. And there is still a probability that they believe that the burden of the war on the U.S. will give them a better resolution in the future than they could get at present, although that conviction may be waning.

But there may be another problem. They may be willing to accept the outcome we have outlined; but they may not be able to see how they can get from here to there without a complete collapse in their negotiating position along the way. Therefore, they may think a different outcome than the one we promise would result. That is why they may, with some candor, call our proposals "trickery"--or worse.

Their problem is this: If they stop infiltration and if they stop terror in the South, two things are likely to happen:

--the Viet Cong movement will quickly collapse;

--they will then lose their international bargaining position.

This is because the Viet Cong are so dependent on northern supplies, men, and leadership and because the ability to disrupt and to terrorize is the only serious bargaining leverage they have--or believe they have.

Once the Viet Cong movement collapses, it is almost impossible to envisage its starting up again. For example, they may well feel that any substantial de-escalation by Hanoi--in infiltrated men, supplies, etc.--would be immediately recognized by the Viet Cong as the beginning of the end. The Viet Cong might scramble for their place in the society of South Viet Nam. On the other hand, we could sustain various degrees of de-escalation without a collapse in our position or that of South Viet Nam.

With a patent collapse in the Viet Cong they may feel Saigon and we could claim a "new situation" and ignore prior commitments. Communists, as a matter of doctrine, are trained to rely on effective power, not verbal promises or good will.

In this context we should remember that, quite contrary to a popular cliche in the West, guerrilla wars have been won or lost clean: mainland China; Malaya; Philippines; Greece. The only compromise solutions were not political but territorial; e.g., the split of Indo-China at the 17th parallel. (I do not count the Laos solution because it is not a solution--the war continues, awaiting the outcome in Viet Nam.) We are, thus, up against a tough problem in trying to talk our way to a satisfactory resolution of a guerrilla war--with no clear precedents.

2. A Possible Solution

If I have correctly described a part of Hanoi's problem in ending the war by negotiation, the answer may lie in communicating to them a solution which takes that problem into account and making it credible.

Specifically, we must communicate three things:

--an end position which Hanoi and the Viet Cong could live with;

--a way of making our guarantee of that position credible;

--a way of getting there which would minimize the significance of Hanoi's and Viet Cong's weak bargaining leverage along the way.

Now each element in turn.

3. An End Position

We can offer the Viet Cong only two things in South Viet Nam and the substance of one of them is dependent on how soon they move towards peace:

--a guarantee against slaughter, as in Indonesia.

--a right to organize politically and to vote, but only after arms are laid down. They cannot mix terror and political status.

The meaning of the second offer is contingent on when it is picked up; for example, they have already missed the constitutional assembly; if they want to get in on the next round of village and provincial elections, they had better move fast (before early 1967), and this could prove important in establishing a local political base for them; if they want to influence the presidential elections under the new constitution, they have only between now and September 1967.

Since they know that their prospects on a one-man-one-vote basis are not good in South Viet Nam, the Viet Cong may not find a role in domestic politics worth much; it may be more important to Hanoi which could be concerned to save some face for their proteges and protect them from the reprisals that could come if they persist in violence once the game from the North is called off.

As for Hanoi, we can only offer them our withdrawal six months after they are out and violence subsides, plus a free Viet Cong run at peaceful politics plus the promise of an ultimate plebiscite on unity under peaceful conditions plus economic assistance in reconstruction as part of Southeast Asia if they want it.

[It may, incidentally, be important to communicate to them soon that we do not intend to let the war drag; that we plan to up the ante; and our present offers to them may not hold indefinitely.]/2/

/2/Brackets in the source text.

4. The Problem of Credibility

The credibility problem can only be fully solved in conjunction with the bargaining leverage problem discussed in Section 5 below. But two things could contribute:

--negotiating in secret the end position while the war goes on;

--announcing it publicly (and perhaps registering it before the UN)--the process described in Section 5 begins.

Specifically, the U.S. and the fighting allies would join the government of South Viet Nam in guaranteeing the amnesty to the Viet Cong. If the Viet Cong wanted promptly to participate in peaceful elections--for example at the local level--we (and the government in Saigon) would accept international supervision. If asked what our sanctions would be in the case of violation of the amnesty, we could point out that the South Vietnamese would remain for a long time extremely dependent on our assistance and on the political support of the rest of the world. But no guarantee to the Viet Cong as an organization could be secure unless they cut out violence and did not revive it.

5. The Bargaining Leverage Problem

There is only one answer to the Communist bargaining problem: speed. Once the end position is negotiated in secret and announced, then the war--North and South, main force and guerrilla--must stop dramatically; the North Viet Nam units must immediately begin heading home (from Laos, too); and we must begin immediately some withdrawals. All infiltration and supply movements south must stop on a given day--100%.

The drama of the joint announcement of the agreement by ourselves, Hanoi, Saigon, and the NLF is the best facesaver they could have, with symmetrical movements promptly following.

Then a Geneva conference could take place on the details of the international aspects of the deal--a beefed up control commission; straightening out Laos, etc.

6. How to Probe the Viability of this Concept

The probe should be a direct U.S.-Hanoi gambit, with no intermediaries.

It should be conducted in great secrecy, and evident seriousness, by a completely credible U.S. official. He should leave behind an aide-memoire for communication to Hanoi./3/

/3/In the agenda prepared for the President for November 19 (during Johnson's stay at Bethesda Naval Hospital), Rostow included an item entitled "Direct Hanoi Probe" and noted: "Sec. Rusk is thinking about my suggestion. I believe we should try it as a supplementary track." (Ibid.)

W.W. Rostow/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden/1/

Washington, November 19, 1966, 5:46 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ASPEN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 662-663.

88128. 1. At luncheon meeting November 11 Foreign Minister Nilsson assisted by Mr. Bergstrom presented to the Secretary an account of Swedish contacts in Warsaw with North Vietnamese representatives and of the late October visit of Swedish Ambassador Petri to Hanoi and his conversations with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh. Memcon of that conversation together with Swedish precis of these recent contacts with North Vietnamese/2/ and our analysis of Hanoi's positions as reflected therein/3/ being pouched.

/2/See Document 303.

/3/Apparently a reference to a memorandum from Fred Greene of INR to Unger, November 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/ASPEN)

2. On November 17 Unger conveyed to Minister Nilsson, Bergstrom, Oberg and Ambassador de Besche in New York Secretary's formal thanks, results of our analysis of message transmitted by Swedes and "Points for Clarification" which we would like to have Petri discuss with North Vietnamese Foreign Minister on next visit to Hanoi, speaking always of course for Swedish Government and without reference to conversations with us. Text of "Points for Clarification" follows:

"1. What does the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister intend that his government would do when he says 'We know what we will have to do' [i.e., if US stops bombing of NVN]?/4/ Mr. Trinh named two conditions which the United States must fulfill to bring about a climate for negotiations. It is understood of course that if those conditions were fulfilled, negotiations could promptly be undertaken, but since the fulfillment of those conditions would represent significant steps for the United States, what would be the reciprocal actions by North Viet-Nam? It is encouraging to know that the North Vietnamese apparently recognize this reciprocity but it is essential, if their position is to be accurately evaluated, to know what it is that they recognize they 'will have to do'.

/4/Brackets in the source text. Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, quoted the text of a paper provided by the Swedish Government stating that, in further talks with Petri, he "has now made clear that he repeatedly tried to make Mr. Trinh elaborate on this statement. Mr. Trinh, however, avoided to do so." (Ibid.)

"2. What is the significance of the FNL being characterized, as Mr. Trinh put it, as 'the most valid' spokesman for the South Vietnamese people? What is this intended to convey concerning the status of the FNL vis-a-vis other spokesmen?

"3. With reference to the question of reunification, Mr. Trinh referred to the necessity of creating conditions in South Viet-Nam 'to permit a move in the direction of a future reunification'. The conditions in South Viet-Nam as Mr. Trinh himself implied would grow out of general elections held in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy. Would Mr. Trinh not envisage that the question of unification would be resolved at that time in accordance with the mandate given a new government by the people through those general elections?

"4. If Mr. Trinh should mention the point raised by the North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw, namely that 'no military actions should be taken in the demilitarized zone', Mr. Trinh might be asked whether this is intended to be in effect a proposal for the strict observance of the Geneva Accords in the demilitarized zone north and south of the demarcation line with the full functioning of the ICC throughout the zone."

3. In reply to Nilsson's request for any additional comments Unger referred to Secretary's letter/5/ which mentions possibility that Petri might be asked by North Vietnamese about our knowledge of his contact there and of his conversations, and our suggestion that he respond with a query as to whether North Vietnamese Government would wish Swedish Government to inform us of these matters, in which case Swedes would be happy to explore question./6/ Unger explained that while there are many channels to Hanoi we have thus far been unable to set up any significant dialogue, and if North Viet-Nam should show a disposition to begin to communicate with us substantively, we would be happy to consider this. It was agreed that Petri and the Swedes in general might not turn out to be most suitable intermediary and that in fact the North Vietnamese might choose to turn to direct contact with us, but it was considered nonetheless useful for Petri to explore the matter of communication if he had any opening from the North Vietnamese.

/5/Not further identified.

/6/Telegram 652 from Stockholm, November 29, stated that, according to Swedish officials who had had further "exhaustive talks with Petri to doublecheck accuracy his reports," there was "no doubt at all in Petri's mind that Trinh meant and expected what he had said to be passed on to US." (Ibid.)

4. Petri will of course be reporting his conversations directly with Stockholm and it was agreed that our further communications with the Swedes on this subject should be carried out through Ambassador Parsons there. This will be channel for conveying to us Petri's reactions to exchanges which have taken place during Nilsson's visit here, instructions he is given for his next visit to Hanoi and any other follow-up.

5. Unger indicated we would hope that Petri would again visit Hanoi as soon as this can be done without raising suspicions about any special role he may be playing. Swedes agreed and said that as soon as he makes visit to Stockholm, expected soon, on export questions as well as his Hanoi contact, he can then again visit Hanoi and this will be logical in view of his having reported on his previous visit to his own Foreign Office and presumably received instructions. They thought early December would be a likely time./7/

/7/Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, indicated that it was intended that Petri would return to Hanoi about December 10. (Ibid.) However, Petri did not return to Hanoi until January 1967.

6. There was some substantive discussion of the issues which might arise in Petri's next conversations in Hanoi, it being understood that this exchange was between the Swedes and ourselves and not for discussion in Hanoi. Unger mentioned Goldberg formula's reference to private and other assurances about a response to bombing cessation and illustrated the kinds of de-escalatory actions by Hanoi which we would take to be appropriate responses, such as a cessation of infiltration, a reduction of the level of military activity and/or terror in South Viet-Nam or some troop withdrawal from South to North. In response to further Swedish probing as to what would come next after these first steps toward de-escalation and their mention of a possible ceasefire, Unger said it was not possible, without knowing more of Hanoi's views, to carry the process further. We would hope that once a beginning has been made it would be possible to establish some mode of communication with Hanoi to arrive at some understanding of the next phases of de-escalation, although it was not to be ruled out that this might proceed by mutual example. He also made clear our recognition of the problem of face for Hanoi and our readiness to consider ways to meet with problem. With reference to the fourth point in the "Points for Clarification," Unger emphasized that we were suggesting this be raised only if the North Vietnamese themselves refer to the DMZ problem. He added that it would always have to be understood that any arrangements that might conceivably be worked out for the DMZ would have to provide for a reasonably reliable means of detecting and dealing with violations; we could not agree to putting American and Vietnamese forces in jeopardy, exposed to surprise action by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong.

7. The Swedes referred to their contacts with NLF representatives outside Viet-Nam and it was agreed that there was no reason not to continue these but at the same time no mention should be made in that channel of the contacts with the North Vietnamese or ourselves. Unger said we would of course be interested if there were any indications from NLF representatives of a desire to talk about bringing the conflict to an end or of any divisions within the VC. It was considered unlikely that the latter would come through these channels which are all outside the country.

8. The need for absolute secrecy concerning the present exercise was emphasized and the Swedes were particularly intent on keeping word of this out of their UN mission in New York.

9. We anticipate that Bergstrom will be in touch with Ambassador Parsons early this coming week to reopen contact on this matter but we envisage no further action required until Petri is in Stockholm and preparing for a return trip to Hanoi. At that point we will of course wish to be kept informed and have an opportunity to pass on our thoughts before he again leaves Stockholm. You will note this traffic is being handled Nodis and identified with the code word "Aspen".

Rusk

315. Report Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/

Washington, November 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. Secret. Harriman forwarded the report to the President and Rusk on November 28, and Rostow forwarded it to the President under cover of a November 29 memorandum stating that "Governor Harriman obviously did a first-class job." (Ibid.) See Document 281 for information on Harriman's trip.

REPORT OF POST-MANILA TRIP

In my talks with Heads of State and Ministers, I found, everywhere, that the Manila Conference and the President's Asian trip had made a most favorable impression. It was evident that several points in the communique and declarations were viewed as being of particular significance, and I stressed these in my presentation:

1) The fact that the President sat at a round table with six Asian leaders as equals;

2) The favorable military developments in South Vietnam;

3) Agreement that objectives were limited to giving South Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide their own future;

4) The desire to reduce hostilities as soon as possible and undertake negotiations for a peaceful settlement;

5) Agreement that when aggression from the North had ceased, Allied troops would be withdrawn within six months;

6) The fact that the only discussion of escalation dealt with increased effort on pacification;

7) The commitment by the Government of South Vietnam to complete the Constitution, hold national elections next year, and village and hamlet elections in January. (In this connection, the September elections had made a favorable impression, and the commitment to take these further steps increased the prestige of the Saigon Government);

8) The further commitment of the GVN to undertake a program of national reconciliation giving hope that discussions would eventually take place between all political factions within South Vietnam;

9) The pledge for regional cooperation in social and economic development in which the US would participate;

10) Although a number of these points had been previously stated by the Government of the United States or South Vietnam, the fact that they were agreed to at this meeting of seven nations gave them greater weight and credence.

I found uniform acceptance of the President's sincerity in seeking a peaceful solution. In response to my request all government leaders stated their willingness to do everything they could to bring about private or public negotiations. Particularly in Italy and in London, the Ministers were interested in discussing this subject in detail. In other countries, good will was expressed but no specific suggestions emerged.

There was also considerable opinion that it would probably be more practical to get negotiations started through private conversations between the United States and North Vietnam rather than through a Geneva-type conference. Some thought that the North Vietnamese would want to know where they and the NLF would come out in a settlement before agreeing to engage in public negotiations. In addition, some suggested that since Red China would continue to oppose negotiations, Hanoi might wish to face Peking with a fait accompli rather than an argument as to whether or not to negotiate.

In almost every conversation the subject of a suspension of the bombing was raised, particularly now that the military situation had improved. Almost all expressed the belief that talks could be gotten under way if we would stop the bombing, but no one could give any positive assurances. In most cases the opinions expressed were based on contacts with Eastern European countries, although in India there had been direct discussions by Indian representatives in Hanoi./2/

/2/A memorandum of Harriman's conversation on October 31 with L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, and T.N. Kaul, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Exernal Affairs, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.

I expressed as my personal opinion that calls for unilateral action on the part of the United States, as proposed by President de Gaulle in Phnom Penh,/3/ did not further the cause of peace but, in fact, increased Hanoi's intransigence. I suggested that if anyone had proposals to make, a call be made to both sides to reduce hostilities.

/3/For more information on de Gaulle's speech of September 1, see footnote 4, Document 229.

I explained that the President had expressed his willingness to stop the bombing, but only if reciprocal action were taken by Hanoi. I pointed out that the same people who were now asking for a cessation in bombing had done so last year, and were again holding out the hope for a favorable reaction from Hanoi. The suggestions last year had been for a pause of at most two to three weeks, whereas, in fact, the President had continued the pause for over five weeks. The only reaction from Hanoi was to take military advantage of the pause by substantially increasing shipments to the South, rebuilding bridges, constructing detours and repairing roads. I furthermore explained that the bombing was a military necessity and had to be continued unless there was parallel deescalation of hostilities on the part of North Vietnam.

Although these discussions helped clarify the situation with the governments, they brought out the fact that bombing was extremely unpopular among the people everywhere. The bombing is thought of in terms of experiences of World War II with the heavy civilian casualties and suffering. In addition, the idea of a great power such as the United States hitting a small country was repugnant. Fear was also expressed that bombing would expand the war to a confrontation with China or the Soviet Union.

I emphasized both in talks with the governments and with the press the restricted nature of the targets and the care exercised to avoid as far as practicable, civilian casualties. I pointed out that although the President was determined to achieve his minimum objectives, he had stated that he had no intention of enlarging the conflict. Nevertheless, in every country I visited I found the strongest hope that some way could be found to stop the bombing in the North, and particularly that there would be no further escalation. I gained the impression that the favorable reaction from the Manila Conference would be dissipated if there was an evident escalation of the bombing. George Brown, who has done much to keep the Labor Party in line on Vietnam, stated flatly that any further escalation "might well lose you the support of all your friends in Europe like me who are trying to help."

I took advantage of the opportunity to state to the press, and on television and radio where available, on my arrival and departure at the airports and at special press conferences the salient points I made to the governments. I had a remarkably good press, even in Pakistan where the press usually distorts anything an American visitor says. I believe this good reaction was primarily because of the good will the President had generated by the Manila Conference and his Asian visits.

[Here follow specific reports on each of the ten countries visited by Harriman.]

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, November 27, 1966, 1315Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.

11814. Ref: Saigon 11790./2/

/2/Dated November 26. (Ibid.)

1. Subsequent to various discussions with Vietnamese officials described in reftel, Zorthian and Habib held lengthy discussion with Minister of Info and Chieu Hoi Nguyen Bao Tri Saturday afternoon to obtain latest GVN thinking on national reconciliation campaign and to stimulate action.

2. Tri said GVN discussions on basic principles to be incorporated in effort are now under way and reported on various talks he has had with Thieu, Ky, General Khang of III Corps and others. He said that present prospects are for proclamation by Thieu about one month before Tet, to be followed up with nation-wide radio and TV speech by Prime Minister.

3. Proclamation would outline government's proposals in terms of intent and appeal to Viet Cong to join hands with government. Prime Minister's speech would provide more specifics, including commitments on rehabilitation into Vietnamese society, political rights and other specific measures designed to absorb VC into active government programs at level roughly equivalent to their present status.

4. Tri said in his talks with other government officials he had found a good deal of sentiment for initiating reconciliation campaign at time of promulgation of constitution sometime in March but that he personally felt period before Tet was preferable in order to exploit Tet sentiment.

5. We encouraged Tri to maintain this stand but we should also be aware that any proclamation prior to January 1st would be difficult to obtain in view of these pressures for further postponement.

6. Tri also said that his thinking, on which he believes he has Thieu's and Ky's concurrence, would include explicit opportunities for VC middle and high level cadre to assume responsibilities in Vietnamese society commensurate with their experience and present status. He said there would undoubtedly be a requirement for some sort of review of qualifications but subject to this screening process, military personnel would find opportunities in Vietnamese army, civil administrators would be able to obtain appointment, in the first instance, as contract employees for the Vietnamese Government, doctors would be able to practice their profession after period of national service in Vietnamese hospitals, teachers would be utilized as required in many educational institutions, etc. He also said that present thinking would permit all such returnees to enjoy full political rights, including the right of participation and voting in the forthcoming national elections.

7. Tri also outlined the highlights of his Ministry's exploitation campaign, which was described in reftel and on which we are working closely with the Vietnamese.

8. Meanwhile, we are accelerating our own efforts within U.S. Mission to provide Vietnamese with necessary support in this effort. To replace Koren, I have appointed Zorthian as overall Mission director for our support of the reconciliation campaign. He now has the time to devote to this effort because JUSPAO field operations have been taken over by Porter. Specific assignments in fields of psyops, follow-up actions, Chieu Hoi camps, policy direction, approaches to middle level and high level cadre and the various other arrangements necessary for conduct of this campaign have now been made and detailed document incorporating US ideas in all these fields are under preparation. This will serve to crystalize our own thinking and to provide a coordinated US approach to the Vietnamese as they prepare their own plans. Central to the whole effort, of course, is the necessity for the Vietnamese to be in the forefront of this effort, with the US role kept as much in the background as possible.

9. These various developments will be further pursued and refined in the coming weeks. As necessary, I will undertake further discussions with General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky in the course of the days to come and certainly I expect to have a long talk with both on the major elements of the program before my departure for Washington. We expect to provide more detailed information on the contents of the anticipated proclamation and speech in the near future but at this point Vietnamese thinking has not progressed to a stage where draft texts are available. We will, however, have more progress on preparations in general to report by the end of next week and will continue to inform you as events unfold. At this stage, however, believe it would be unwise to press Vietnamese for more immediate surfacing of campaign than they visualize or to draw more than cursory public attention to this effort.

10. As General Tri has indicated, the Vietnamese are going about this effort with deliberation and considerable advance preparation and I believe this sort of solid foundation is far preferable to any hasty announcements on their part which would be premature in terms of actual follow up actions and which would have been true had they made announcement on November 1. Given the sentiment described by Tri for postponement of the effort until the promulgation of the constitution, I would suggest it is far wiser on our part to push for actual public proclamation the first week of January rather than at an earlier time.

11. Meanwhile, we will of course continue to press for detailed preparations so that campaign may be conducted effectively and vigorously once it is initiated. I believe we are now moving in the right direction on this effort at a pace which will bring along the Vietnamese but not outpace them.

Lodge

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/

Washington, November 27, 1966, 2:18 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

91787. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: London's 4337, para 3./2/

/2/The reference to telegram 4337 is in error; it should be to telegram 4377, paragraph 3, in which Bruce asked about Brown's message to Rusk. (Ibid., POL UK-USSR)

1. Following text message to me from George Brown delivered by UK Embassy here. "Gromyko gave me the thumbs up sign as I went aboard the 'plane at Moscow this morning. I am not sure I can give the same to you, but I am satisfied that my journey was fully worthwhile. I would like to be able to tell you about it in detail at once but see no chance of doing so before Paris. If however you could spare one of your trusted people to come here within the next few days I would happily give him my impression whilst it is fresh in my mind.

On the first day/3/ I tried hard to get Gromyko to lay off his gramophone record and get down to the question of the three issues (paragraph 10 of your message)./4/ However, he gave no ground but his interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to give him an outline of the package (paragraph 14 of your message)./5/ This I did orally before dinner on the first evening, giving it to him as my own proposal. Next morning, purely for the sake of clarity, I gave him a piece of paper. The actual words used are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised to pass it on to Kosygin only.

/3/November 23.

/4/Paragraph 10 of telegram 86196 to London, November 16 (see footnote 7, Document 300), introduced the following three issues, each of which was then discussed at some length: "What degree of assurance should there be that Hanoi will take appropriate reciprocal action? How soon might a response from Hanoi be expected (and, perhaps, how can it be verified)? And what sort of action would we regard as reciprocal?" (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

/5/Paragraph 14 of telegram 86196 discussed the Phase A-Phase B formula, using the same language as that used in paragraph 3d of telegram 83786, Document 305.

It was on the basis of this piece of paper that I talked with Kosygin this morning. He was very friendly and after being at pains to establish my credentials and the status of the paper I had given to Gromyko we had a full discussion. I told him that in my view the time was ripe for progress, and given a little help from him, we could perhaps get the result we both wanted. He listened carefully but was totally non-committal. I had to satisfy him that what I had proposed was no substitution for negotiations on the substance but only a way in. On his side after a lot of the usual stuff, pretty muted, about American aggression, he said that they were prepared to make the North Vietnamese four points and the NLF five points 'a basis for discussion.' When I said that I had interpreted a basis of discussion as meaning that they would be flexible neither he nor Mr. Gromyko contradicted me. Their package would seem to be an unconditional stopping of the bombing, some de-escalation in the South and then negotiations on the basis as above. I reminded him that I would be seeing you in Paris in mid-December and that Christmas itself might give some opportunity. On leaving I asked him if I could expect to hear from them again. To this he was pretty cool and said that they would hardly have anything to add unless Gromyko had some foreign policy of his own. However, he characterised our discussions as 'very useful.'

I cannot really tell what this music means. Greenhill, who was with me and has been at our other meetings with Gromyko and Kosygin over the past year, says that without being able to quote precise words from either Kosygin or Gromyko as a basis for his impression feels sure that their interest in what I had to say was both earnest and profound. He doubts if they have yet made up their minds where to go from here but would not be surprised if in the end we get some bonus. You may hear of this before I do."

2. Text enclosure to message, headed "Text of Unsigned Piece of Paper Foreign Secretary Handed to Mr. Gromyko on 24 November, 1966," reads "The following plan is suggested to meet the situation in which the North Vietnamese require the cessation of bombing to be unconditional while the Americans require some assurance that a measure of de-escalation would follow.

Consideration might be given to the possibility of the parties agreeing secretly on mutual measures of de-escalation which would be put into effect once the bombing had stopped. In this the first step would be to stop the bombing and the second step would be further action of de-escalation by the American side to which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would respond by similar acts of de-escalation: but with both phases forming part of a firm prior understanding.

The order of events would therefore be: phase A. stop the bombing, while phase B., which would follow, would see the execution of the other agreed measures of de-escalation by both sides."

All this would require careful study in which you and I might have to help before there was direct contact between the two sides.

Rusk

NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 31: PLANNING FOR 1967; MARIGOLD AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER BOMBING

318. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, November 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaughton. Secret; Eyes Only. Komer forwarded a copy of the attachment to this letter to Rostow the same day, noting in his covering memorandum that "while it gives less weight to bombing NVN than does your paper [attachment to Document 319], and more weight to creating a bandwagon psychology in SVN, we are basically on the same track. We both see 1967 as crucial, and the key to success in 1967 as developing, then effectively managing, a multi-faceted strategic plan." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy)

Dear Bob:

Here's the personal prognosis of events in Vietnam 1967-1968 which you requested. Sorry to be late, but I hope you'll find it worth the delay.

On re-reading, I see it as less my view of what will happen than of what reasonably can and should happen--other things being equal--if we play our cards right.

My prognosis seems to me quite consistent with the proposals in your October memorandum to the President,/2/ even though it makes a rather more hopeful estimate.

/2/Document 268.

Whether or not it is over-optimistic, however, it does suggest the sort of orchestrated strategic program we ought to pursue in 1967 to optimize our prospects. This won't just happen, so I for one strongly favor drafting such a program (perhaps initially in the Katzenbach "non-group") for submission to the President. In my view, it should include not only policy and program guidelines for 1967, but the necessary management corollaries to give them life.

I'd greatly appreciate your reactions.

R.W. Komer/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original.

Attachment

Washington, November 28, 1966.

VIETNAM PROGNOSIS FOR 1967-68

I. WHERE WE ARE TODAY. Any prognosis for 1967 must start with one's premises about end-1966, which I daresay are quite "optimistic." But let me make my case:

A. Westy's spoiling strategy (accelerating search-and-destroy operations) has already succeeded in throwing Hanoi's phase III strategy way off balance. Thus we are well past the first turning point where we stopped losing the war.

B. My guess, though I can't prove it, is that we have also passed a second major turning point. I suspect that we have reached the point where we are killing, defecting, or otherwise attriting more VC/NVA strength than the enemy can build up. I'd support this by citing kill ratios, weapons loss ratios, the decline in enemy-initiated attacks, and the fact that even J-2 MACV's current O/B estimates now indicate a slight decrease in total enemy strength. I'm also impressed with the increasing evidence of VC recruiting difficulties, food shortages, and sickness. There is also enough inconsistency between our estimates of VC/NVA strength and what the VC/NVA have been able to do over the last several months as to justify the inference that either they do not have as many troops as we estimate, or they are a lot less effective than we've estimated. Our O/B estimates, especially of VC main force and infrastructure strength, are so flabby that my guess may be as good as anyone's--and consistent with actual VC/NVA performance. Granted that the enemy may be increasing NVA infiltration, but he may well have passed the peak on VC southerner strength.

C. We may also have passed a critical psychological turning point, in that the bulk of SVN's population increasingly believe that we're winning the war. This to me was the chief significance of the 80% voter turnout on 11 September. Even if one regards it as an exercise in competitive coercion, the fact is that 80% of those who could vote (in daylight) listened to the GVN rather than the VC. The ever-increasing weight of the US commitment, now felt literally everywhere in SVN, contributes greatly to this growing attitude.

In sum--slow, painful, and incredibly expensive though it may be--we're beginning to "win" the war in Vietnam. This is a far cry from saying, however, that we're going to win it--in any meaningful sense.

II. WHAT ARE THE CHIEF IMPONDERABLES FOR 1967-68? To me these make prognosis very difficult:

A. Will Hanoi materially increase its infiltration rate? I gather this is feasible (though will the barrier make a major difference?).

B. Will the enemy escalate? Aside from increasing infiltration, I see little more Hanoi itself could do. Or Moscow. Peking could intervene in Vietnam or widen the area of hostilities in SEA, but this seems quite unlikely.

C. Will the enemy revert to a guerrilla strategy? This could be a serious complication before we get a major pacification effort underway. But the evidence suggests that the VC are still attempting to organize regiments and divisions. I'd also agree with Doug Pike's conclusion in his new book "Viet Cong"/4/ that such de-escalation would shatter VC morale.

/4/Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966.

D. Will Hanoi play the negotiating card, and how? If I'm right about the trend line, Hanoi would find it wiser to negotiate. The only other options are escalation, growing attrition, or fading away. If Hanoi decides to talk sometime in 1967, a whole new calculus intervenes, involving questions of cease-fire, standstill, bombing pauses, etc. In this case we'll have to do a new prognosis.

E. Will the GVN fall apart politically? While it was a risk worth taking, we've opened Pandora's box by promoting a political evolution to representative government. A series of coups or political crises in Cochin China or Annam could so undermine GVN cohesiveness as to cause a major setback or popular revulsion in the US. I expect plenty of political trouble, but would hazard that a crisis of such magnitude can be avoided in 1967 if we work hard at it.

F. Will our new pacification program work? This too is a major imponderable. But we've nowhere to go but up. We're at long last planning a major new resource input plus the necessary focus on improving US management and redirecting ARVN assets. So to me the chief variable is how much progress we can make how soon. Will it be enough to make a significant difference in 1967 or even 1968?

G. Last but not least, will the US appear to settle down for a long pull if necessary? This is hardest to predict, yet crucial from the standpoint of SVN and NVN reactions.

III. THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF EVENTS IN 1967. Netting out the imponderables, I see the odds as better than even for a gradual acceleration of present trends in 1967--with gains outweighing setbacks enough to show major progress in achieving our aims by the end of the year. But this prognosis is based on the assumption that the US will make a maximum effort to influence these trends in the desired direction--as a matter of systematic, orchestrated US policy and the more active use of leverage on the GVN.

A. Trends by Mid-1967. Even so, I doubt that within the next seven months we could demonstrate such progress as to force Hanoi to negotiate or to convince most observers that we're "winning" the war. But we could lay enough groundwork to offer reasonable confidence of such demonstrable results by end-1967.

1. We can expect continued success in spoiling the VC/NVA main force effort. What we had achieved by October 1966 with 80-odd maneuver battalions, we should do much better in 1967 with the added flexibility 120-odd will give. Despite possible increase in NVA infiltration, I believe it will be increasingly offset by an increasing enemy loss rate, a decline in VC recruiting and an upswing in returnees (I'll guess at least 15,000 in January-June 1967). Once the barrier is in, it should also help. As a result we should be in a position to increase our control of critical communications routes (Routes 15 and 20 should be early targets).

2. But pacification will not show a substantial upturn so early. Both ARVN and US forces will still be on a learning curve. The critical element will be the speed and effectiveness of ARVN retraining. Even so, we should begin to get rolling--if only because we'll deploy more resources while VC guerrilla and infrastructure strength will probably decline (as the VC raid it for main force replacements). The civil side will become marginally better, as cleared and held territory increases, but it will still be small potatoes.

3. With luck (and hard pushing) we should get at least some of the Manila program through. Despite a lot of political jockeying, we've a better than even chance of getting village-hamlet elections started, a national reconciliation program begun, some land reform, a renewed, if low-level, anti-corruption drive, and a start on postwar planning. The new Constitution should be promulgated, and some workable division of power has begun to emerge between military and civilians, and between northerners and southerners. These last are most important--and most questionable.

4. We should at least hold our own economically. Despite some price rises, I think we can prevent the kind of runaway inflation in January-June 1967 that characterized January-June 1966. Easing port congestion will help. But the key will be the enforcement of a tough across-the-board stabilization program. Its outlines are now in hand: a GVN budget held to P-75 billion, US spending to P-58 billion, an import program of $725 million annually and port throughput of four million tons of non-military cargo.

5. We will continue bombing the North (perhaps at a reduced level) to impose a cost on NVN.

6. If the above prognosis is reasonably accurate we'll also get some upswing in SVN morale. This intangible is most important, as emergence of a bandwagon psychology would help erode VC strength and give new confidence to the GVN. I doubt that we'll see a real surge of confidence as early as mid-1967 (enough things will go wrong to fuzz the issue), but the people in the cities already see the tide turning.

7. If the above trends occur, they will register in Hanoi too, and may just lead to negotiating feelers before June 1967. I'd see no more than a 1 in 3 chance of this, and if it comes it may be an attempt to throw us off balance rather than to strike a bargain. But Hanoi will start reassessing its strategy of waiting us out if it sees the US settling down for the long pull, increasing US forces by another 35% and building a barrier, VC southerner strength eroding, NVN losses mounting, the GVN building at least a partial base of legitimacy, and pacification at last beginning to be undertaken seriously.

B. Trends by End-1967. By this time, if not before, I see a better than even chance that the trends described above will have shown results demonstrable to all. At this point the key issue will become one of whether the US appears prepared to stick it out as long as necessary or to be tiring of the war.

1. If Westy can't clobber the large units with 470,000-odd Americans, plus ROKs, plus barriers, plus bombing, plus an even better logistic base, something unforeseeable will have happened. Indeed, my hunch is that he'll have enough left over for 20-30% of his maneuver battalions to help ARVN in pacification if needed. By then we should have small US combat forces in the Delta too, which I think would start making a difference. Since we're asked to be bold, I'll estimate enemy end-1967 strength at not over 220-250,000 despite NVA infiltration. This is consistent with the thrust of CIA's 22 August 1966 study on The Vietnamese Communists' Will to Persist.

2. Pacification ought to show quite visible progress by end-1967, even if only the corridors between many of the towns plus some of the countryside is secure. (I don't equate security with total absence of incidents.) Many key roads should be reasonably secure for unescorted traffic (at least Route 4 to Can Tho, Route 15 to Vung Tau, Route 20 to Dalat) and the Saigon environs largely cleared. VC capability to recruit, tax, and collect rice in the south should decline significantly. Returnee totals should approach 45,000 for the year, and special operations should have turned up some higher quality defectors. The contrast between living conditions in GVN and VC areas should work increasingly to our advantage.

3. There is a 50/50 chance of a representative GVN emerging with a presidential system, an elected assembly, and reasonable checks and balances between the military and civilians. It won't be a strong government (perhaps even weaker or more erratic than the present one), but its very existence will be a major political plus. I'd also hope to see further progress on land reform, local elections leading to a better administration in the countryside, etc. In fact, if the erosion of southern VC strength has gone far enough by mid-year, I'd consider asking the GVN to let the NLF run in the elections (a gesture of confidence which most experts think the NLF would refuse--to its cost). This ploy would also help split the NLF from Hanoi--if this is at all possible.

4. If the above trends occur, I'd predict a growing shift to a bandwagon psychology on the part of SVN's people. I believe that it will be stronger than war-weariness at this point.

5. Logically, Hanoi would start negotiating or withdrawing somewhere along this curve--if only to (a) preserve southern assets by slowing down the attrition; (b) prevent consolidation of GVN authority; and (c) secure a bombing halt. But I'd put the odds at only 50/50, the other real options being (a) to revert to a guerrilla strategy (forced on them) and still wait us out; or (b) to fade away for the time being. If I'm right about a growing erosion of southern VC strength, those NVA battalions will look a bit naked by end-1967.

IV. PROGNOSIS FOR 1968. The farther ahead one tries to predict, the greater the role of the imponderables. So, other things being equal, I'd foresee more of the same for 1968--with enough declining VC southerner strength and improved ARVN performance that we might even be able to begin redeploying some forces.

But to be realistic, I'd prudently allow for six months' slippage in my end-1967 projection. Even if we reached that point only by mid-1968, it would still be apparent to everybody--including Hanoi--that we were indisputably "winning." Again, the critical variable will probably be less what Hanoi (or Peking, or Moscow) does than the US popular and Hill reaction and their impact on Administration policy. And, finally, though the above might seem grossly optimistic, even I am not prognosticating that by end-1968 (or 1969 for that matter) we will have "won" the war. If the enemy retains the will to persist despite the trends I see as likely, Vietnam could still be with us for some years.

V. THE LESS LIKELY CASES IN 1967-68. I won't spell these out in detail, because they would simply be a different weighting, and/or time-phasing, of the trends and imponderables outlined above. Pacification could go more slowly or more rapidly, for example. We might have another military coup. We might get into serious negotiation, which could change the name of the game.

VI. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN. My prognosis of what is more likely than not to happen in Vietnam is reasonable only if we and the GVN mount a maximum effort in 1967-68 to make it so. The key is better orchestration and management of our Vietnam effort--both in Washington and Saigon. To me, the most important ingredient of such an outcome is less another 200,000 troops, or stepped-up bombing, or a $2 billion civil aid program--than it is more effective use of the assets we already have.

A. The war will be "won" (if we can use that term) in the South. Now that we are successfully countering NVA infiltration and the enemy's semi-conventional strategy, what needs to be added is increasing erosion of southern VC strength (it has probably already peaked out).

B. Assuming the above is broadly valid, the key to success in the South is an effective pacification program, plus a stepped-up defection program and successful evolution toward a more dynamic, representative and thus more attractive GVN. These efforts will reinforce each other in convincing the Southern VC and Hanoi that they are losing.

C. Our most important under-utilized asset is the RVNAF. Getting greater efficiency out of the 700,00 men we're already supporting and financing is the cheapest and soundest way to get results in pacification.

D. By themselves, none of our Vietnam programs offer high confidence of a successful outcome (forcing the enemy either to fade away or to negotiate). Cumulatively, however, they can produce enough of a bandwagon psychology among the southerners to lead to such results by end-1967 or sometime in 1968. At any rate do we have a better option?

319. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 30, 1966, 9:20 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy. Secret. On November 17 Rostow forwarded to the President a 9-page paper by Edward Lansdale, "The Battleground in 1967," which presented Lansdale's views on strategy in Vietnam for 1967. In his covering memorandum, Rostow called the paper "Lansdale at his best--worth reading." (Ibid., Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15)

Mr. President:

You may be interested in the attached paper I wrote to clear my own mind and to share with my colleagues on the special committee you set up, chaired by Nick Katzenbach and including Cy Vance and Bob Komer along with myself.

It is a map of the problem with, I believe, the right action headings.

On reflection, we need three things to make it move:

--Westmoreland must allocate more of his own military resources to pacification as well as press the ARVN forward into this task; and he should work up a plan for the military side of pacification for 1967.

--We shall need in Saigon a vigorous Ambassador with great managerial skill, to drive forward hard this kind of program at that end.

--As suggested on pages 24-25,/2/ we need to tighten the back-stopping of this whole program in Washington.

/2/Part V. "Organization."

I am also considering, but did not put into this paper, further ways in which military power might be used in the course of 1967 to force a decision on the other side without excessive risk of escalating the war.

Walt

Attachment/3/

Washington, November 28, 1966.

/3/Under cover of a November 28 memorandum, Rostow sent copies of the paper, which is marked "Draft for discussion; Limited distribution," to Katzenbach, Vance, and Komer. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

A STRATEGY FOR VIET NAM, 1967

I. Object. The object of the plan outlined below is to maximize the chance that we force a decision by Hanoi in the course of the calendar year 1967 to end the war in Viet Nam on terms compatible with our interests; that is, an end to hostilities in Laos as well as in Viet Nam; the accept-ance of the Geneva framework for Southeast Asia; acceptance of an essentially independent South Viet Nam that can determine its future on a one-man, one-vote basis or a reasonable approximation thereof.

The paper concludes with a discussion of the problem that will be posed for us if the war continues well into 1968.

II. The problem: the Hanoi equation. We must assume that Hanoi will accept something like our terms only when a combination of factors makes it clear that it is more in Hanoi's interest to end the war than to continue. Hanoi remains in the war now because, on balance, each of the factors listed below has not tipped far enough, individually or in combination, to make it urgent and desirable to stop hostilities; the advantages and costs of continuing the war still outweigh the advantages and costs of getting out.

A. The Situation in the South. The VC infrastructure in the South, although damaged, is still in being and capable of continuing to impose a heavy cost on South Viet Nam and to require the presence of massive allied forces to prevent a VC victory. In addition to this technical fact, Hanoi is thus far unwilling to take the decision to cut off support in men, supplies, and leadership to the South for reasons of ideology, self-respect, and, presumably, Chinese Communist pressure or threat. It does not now pretend to cherish the high hopes for early military victory of 1964 and 1965; but it clings to a position like that of 1962-63, when it believed that its staying power would be greater than that of the U.S.: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars--and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win" (Pham Van Dong, autumn 1962)./4/

/4/See Document 232 and footnote 3 thereto.

B. Damage in the North. There is no doubt that the bombing in the North constitutes a heavy burden on Hanoi. This is the principal difference between its view of the endurance doctrine of 1962-63 and its view in 1966-67. Thus far, however, with the support of other Communist nations it has been able to cushion the results of this bombing to some extent and has thus far accepted stagnation or decline in its over-all domestic development plus a massive diversion of manpower to fend off the most dangerous consequences of the bombing. What we do not know is whether the effects of the bombing are judged in Hanoi a major degenerative factor, with a time limit on what is endurable, or a stabilized factor, given the level of external assistance. Evidence runs both ways. What can be said is this: At its present level and targetting, bombing appears to involve the same kind of painful but endurable pressure on the North as small-scale guerrilla warfare in the South.

C. Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Just as Hanoi is unwilling to take the ideological and political decision of cutting off the VC in the South, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are unwilling to take the decision to cut off military and economic aid to Hanoi. This is true despite the fact that the costs of economic aid to Hanoi are rising rapidly and are an awkward marginal burden on economies where resource allocation is, in any case, a difficult matter. In part, this reluctance is due to the ideological competition with Communist China and the fear that Chinese Communist influence might become decisive in Hanoi if the Soviet Union were to cut off economic aid. Nevertheless, the net influence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on Hanoi is probably towards a negotiated end to the war: to counter Chinese Communist influence; to remove a situation which is both a demonstration of relative impotence and a threat of escalation; and to cut aid costs.

D. Communist China. Hanoi has already permitted a substantial number of Chinese Communist engineering and anti-aircraft forces to enter North Viet Nam. It wishes, for purposes of its own long-run future to maintain a relationship with Communist China which is supportive but not dominating. It does not feel free, probably because of geographical and logistical circumstances, to move toward the kind of independ-ence of Communist China which North Korea felt free to assert because of the proximity of the Soviet Union and the credibility of Moscow's security as well as economic guarantees. Nor does it now appear credible to Hanoi to seek greater independence of Communist China by an understanding with the other major power which might offer that guarantee; that is, the United States. Communist China has thus far thrown its weight in Hanoi towards continuing the war. It may, in addition, exercise some direct influence over the leadership of the VC--almost certainly more direct influence than Moscow and Eastern Europe.

It is probably true that Hanoi can make peace without risking a Chinese Communist invasion; but Chinese Communist influence is evidently an inhibiting factor of some importance.

E. The Political Situation in the South. Although undoubtedly disappointed by the outcome of the I Corps crisis of April-May 1966 and by the outcome of the election for the Constituent Assembly, Hanoi may maintain hopes of either a political breakdown in the South which might permit it to join dissident non-Communist elements in the seizure of power, or the emergence of a civil government with which it could more easily negotiate a favorable solution than with the present military government in Saigon. Such hopes of a popular front or coalition government may be countered by fears that the potential VC role in South Vietnamese politics may progressively diminish if the constitutional process moves forward on present planned lines.

F. Free World Diplomacy. With the assistance of other Communist nations, Hanoi has conducted a massive political and psychological campaign in the Free World with minimum and maximum objectives. The minimum objective is to restrain U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam to targets which constitute thus far livable levels of damage, given the outside assistance available to Hanoi. At the maximum, the objective has been to press the U.S. unilaterally to cease bombing the North and, even, unilaterally to withdraw from support of South Viet Nam. Although Hanoi has failed in its maximum objectives, it must judge that it has succeeded tolerably well in its minimum objectives and will continue the effort.

G. The United States. Thus far Hanoi has avoided all direct negotiation with the U.S., while leaving many channels open for contact and negotiation should the equation shift in ways which made such negotiation desirable in Hanoi's interest. It may judge that knowledge of direct negotiation with the U.S. would leak and damage morale among the VC, notably at a time when the VC are on the defensive. Therefore, so long as the Communists are on the defensive, an indicated willingness to negotiate directly may signal a willingness to end the war soon.

H. Conclusion.

In short, while it has suffered a profound setback from its hopeful position in 1964 and early 1965, Hanoi has found, thus far, a rationale for continuing the conflict and a domestic and foreign policy strategy which permits it to continue. The most important factors holding Hanoi in the war appear to be:

--the continued existence of the VC infrastructure and the VC capacity to continue guerrilla operations;

--the possibility of rendering bombing of the North with existing targetting endurable by its own measures and expanded external assist-ance;

--Chinese Communist influence, pressure, and (conceivably) threat.

The other factors in the equation are either neutral or argue that the war should be ended.

III. The Situation: the United States Equation. The equation for U.S. policy is, essentially, the other side of the coin of the seven variables which enter the Hanoi equation. We have been operating and we shall have to continue to operate in such a way as to shift these variables to a point where Hanoi concludes that it is its interest to end the war rather than to continue it. It is not a question of simply "proving that they cannot win." In a military sense that has already happened; and what follows assumes we shall continue to keep the initiative against and impose heavy attrition on VC and NVN main force units. It is a question of creating a situation in which they feel there is more to gain (or less to lose) by ending the war now than by continuing it on current and foreseeable terms.

In any situation as complex as this, the answer lies in acting on all of the variables available to the extent that one has a grip on them, rather than on any single variable; and, in any case, we can only guess at the weights attached to them in Hanoi's calculations. Some may prove more critical than others. Some may be more susceptible to our initiative and action than others. But if the picture of Hanoi's equation is correct, the object of U.S. policy is to produce in 1967 a sense that all the factors judged relevant by Hanoi are moving unfavorably--or as many of them as we can move.

The following action program is based on this judgment about our task plus the concluding assessment in paragraph III, H, above.

IV. The Proposed U.S. Program.

A. Action against the VC.

The relatively viable state of the VC infrastructure was judged in para. III to be a major factor keeping Hanoi in the war. Given Communist doctrines about guerrilla warfare--and especially the doctrine of superior endurance in protracted conflict--it is clear that perhaps the most important task in 1967 is to produce a setting in which the VC appear to be disintegrating. This would make the rationale for continuing to accept the costs of bombing in the North less persuasive. It would increase the leverage of Moscow and Eastern Europe over Hanoi. It would undercut the position of the Chinese Communists. The major headings for such a policy for accelerating the disintegration of the VC are familiar and appear to be the following.

1. A dramatic and sustained political and psychological appeal to the VC to join in the making of a new South Vietnamese nation

a. an amnesty offer in which the Constituent Assembly might be associated with the government

b. enlarged and sustained efforts to defect VC leaders

c. a radical expansion in Chieu Hoi efforts

2. Accelerated pacification

a. new organizational arrangements

b. converting ARVN forces to pacification functions

c. rapid pacification of certain key areas

3. A workable land reform scheme

B. Increasing the cost in the North. The object of our bombing, against the background of A, above, is to make Hanoi feel that it is paying a higher and higher price to preserve a probably diminishing asset. To do this, three measures should be accelerated.

1. The barrier. The coming in of the barrier would promise Hanoi that the cost of infiltration is likely to increase and that it might, even, find difficulty in withdrawing its regular forces now in the South. Since the barrier will come in slowly, it is to be assumed that Hanoi will seek and find limited countermeasures. The barrier will evidently not work 100%. It is, however, an important cost-increasing tool.

2. Attrition against infiltration routes. We do not yet know the dispositions of Hanoi with respect to infiltration in 1967, either with respect to scale or routes. In particular, we do not know the extent to which the Laos routes will be used as opposed to direct crossing of the DMZ or various seaborne efforts. Given our experience with attacks on infiltration routes in 1966, it should be possible for us to mount in 1967 a more purposeful and effective attritional campaign against infiltration than we did last year, including the extension of close-in attack of coastal shipping in North Vietnamese waters.

3. The attack on high priority targets in Hanoi-Haiphong area. At various times we have already hit oil targets, power plants, SAM installations, docks, coal mines. Without drama or sudden escalation, we should gradually, steadily, hit more such targets where the problem of replacement requires time and expense, and the costs of the war economy are substantial. We should continue as an important insurance policy the attack on oil. Power plants appear particularly attractive because of the wide dependence on them.

So long as the situation remains as it is within Communist China, the mining of the sea approaches to Haiphong should be ruled out because of the dependence on Communist China that would result; but this judgment should be periodically reexamined in the light of all the circumstances.

In the meanwhile, ways of blocking access between Haiphong and Hanoi should be studied, including the possibility of systematic interdiction--the object being not to close off access to the USSR and Eastern Europe but to render the delivery of such supplies increasingly costly.

C. Diplomacy via the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It is a fact that Moscow and the Eastern European capitals have in recent months become more activist with respect to Hanoi and the ending of the war. We do not completely understand this shift. It may stem from some combination of these three elements:

--A sense that the forces in Hanoi willing to end the war are gathering strength.

--A sense that Hanoi is more willing to listen to Moscow due to the troubles inside Communist China.

--Increased interest in peace (and increased leverage) due to the radical rise in aid to Hanoi required from the USSR and Eastern Europe because of our bombing the North.

It is also clear that the influence of Mosocw and its friends has its limits in Hanoi. We cannot count on this influence and leverage alone to bring peace. We have to operate on all the other elements in the equation which might bring Hanoi around. But we should maintain as close and direct a dialogue with the USSR and Eastern Europe as we can, and, especially, try to understand better the reasons for their recent activism.

In this connection, we should be prepared to discuss with Moscow, as soon and as explicitly as Moscow is prepared to discuss with us, the character of a Southeast Asian settlement, including what we believe our role and the role of the Soviet Union in that area might be over the long run. There are great inhibitions in discussing such matters explicitly. The Soviet Union has preferred to move in parallel and implicitly in similar circumstances; for example, the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, it is an area in which the Soviet Union evidently intends to maintain an influence in competition with both Communist China and the U.S.--an influence with which we can live to a certain degree.

D. Communist China. Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam may be one consideration at stake in the struggle within Communist China. Our direct influence on the outcome of that struggle is exceedingly limited, although our indirect influence has been considerable via our policies in various parts of the world which have contributed to the failure of Mao's expansionist plans and tactics. We do not know enough about the so-called moderate forces inside Communist China to understand whether, if they gained the upper hand, they would join the Soviet Union in encouraging Hanoi to seek a settlement and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet Nam. Mao has clearly taken the view that the pinning down in Southeast Asia of massive U.S. forces was good for Communist China because it would lead to failure and a once-and-for-all withdrawal in humiliation of U.S. from the Asian mainland. It is conceivable that moderate forces might emerge which would settle for a negotiated withdrawal of the U.S. from its Viet Nam bases and the neutralization of South Viet Nam and Laos, implicit in the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. This kind of shift is a matter to which we should be sensitive; but it is in the hands of domestic Chinese Communist politics rather than U.S. diplomacy or communication.

Of all the variables, the Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam and the nature of its influence over Hanoi is least in our hands except to the extent that we and the Vietnamese succeeded in producing erosion and disintegration of the VC infrastructure--a fact which will undoubtedly impress Peiping, given the experience of its leaders and, indeed, the nature of its doctrines of protracted warfare.

E. Political situation in the South. Here we have two major tasks with minimum and maximum objectives. At the minimum we must assure that the political life of South Viet Nam moves forward on the constitutional path to which it is committed, without conflict and disorder which would leave major openings for the VC, or produce, through instability and recurrent crises, a sense of hopelessness within the U.S. As part of this effort, we must contain inflation at the minimum within limits that are tolerable and do not produce social and economic disruption in the life of the country.

At the maximum we must play for the emergence of a political and economic situation in South Viet Nam which is inherently attractive to the VC and projects to the world a vision of forward movement. On the political side, the key problem is clearly this: to develop a relationship between the military and civil politicians that would permit a constitutional government to emerge in 1967, which has legitimacy before the world and sufficient linkage to the military establishment; for the military will remain the heart of South Vietnamese organized nationhood for the foreseeable future. We must avoid either acute military-civil conflict or a military takeover which aborts the constitutional track.

In cases where these conditions have been met at similar stages of history (for example, Turkey in the inter-war years, Pakistan since 1958, Korea since 1961), the key to the transition has been the emergence of a political leader or leaders who have the confidence of both the armed forces and a sizeable proportion of the civilian politicians. This is so critical an issue that we cannot afford to be passive with respect to it.

A second maximum objective is to open the ports and roads at a pace which gives a short-run lift to the Vietnamese economy while pressing forward rapidly and dramatically with the formulation of a postwar development program.

F. Free World diplomacy. The two critical elements here are:

--An expansion--even a modest expansion--in Free World forces fighting beside us in South Viet Nam.

--Pressing out to the world systematically the dual concept; a new and vital Free Asia is emerging; it is with us in our intent to see the war in Viet Nam through to an honorable peace.

We have made progress with this doctrine as a result of the President's trip to Asia. It must be systematically projected by every device of communication at our disposal.

G. The United States base. The outcome of the Congressional election of 1966 has given us a base to pursue the strategy outlined above for 1967. The object of that strategy should be to shift the variables during 1967 to the point where Hanoi is willing to end the war. For 1967--and as a hedge against a continuation of the war into 1968--we face, nevertheless, certain fundamental, unsolved problems with domestic opinion:

--The need to give our citizens a better sense of how to measure progress in a war of this kind. All our people now have is a bewildering statement of daily and weekly casualty figures plus accounts of occasional pitched battles on the ground and of raids on the North. These are accompanied by evidence that the VC still have the capacity to shoot up U.S. installations, throw mortars into the center of Saigon, etc. We have not found a way to make clear, even, the character of our progress against main force units, let alone a way of showing what progress we may make in the countryside towards pacification and development. A special task force in the government should take this problem in hand, coordinating with Saigon, so that in 1967 we get more mature and shapely reporting of the war.

--We must drive home systematically the message of the President's trip to Asia; that is, a new and vital Asia is emerging, which is determined to work together and is with us on Viet Nam.

This must be, again, a steady campaign in which we find and project all the concrete evidence of forward movement in Free Asia and evidence of Asian attitudes towards Viet Nam.

--By every device we can conceive, we should make the war a bipartisan venture in domestic political terms, reaching out to the Republicans for advice and engaging them with the fullest possible briefings.

H. Negotiating with Hanoi. Our basic tactic with Hanoi has been to pick up their desire to have us stop bombing in the North and move them towards the conference table by asking them what compensatory de-escalation in the South they are prepared to undertake. Since various other nations, notably in Eastern Europe, are apparently prepared to talk to Hanoi along these lines, it should be pursued. But it should be pursued with a consciousness that it may have arisen not from an authentic desire of Hanoi to negotiate, but from a desire to lift from North Viet Nam and its allies the burden of bombing so that the war can be pursued in greater confidence with greater prospects of North Vietnamese success.

It is also possible that the de-escalation formula poses a great danger to Hanoi because a cutback or end to infiltration might produce very serious consequences for the VC, both technically, in terms of supplies, and psychologically, in terms of a conviction that Hanoi was deserting the VC and making terms at their expense. Therefore, we should mount a parallel line of communication with Hanoi directly. The object should be the discussion of the end position--a complete package deal--while the war goes on; with the object of ending the war briskly and completely when the end position is agreed.

V. Organization. The premium which attaches to ending the war in 1967 is obvious. The nature of the problem is such that if we are to maximize the chances that the war will be ended in 1967, we must force the pace of movement in a coordinated way along each of the lines of the program set out above. This requires:

--A common understanding of the concept of working intensively on each of the elements of the equation, shared fully by Saigon and Washington.

--The most vigorous possible leadership in Saigon, both by the Ambassador and MACV--and both in coordination.

--Centralized drive and direction in Washington of all the elements of the program, cutting to the minimum normal delays in making decisions here.

Under Secretary Katzenbach and his committee should undertake the latter assignment; but it will only work if the Under Secretary himself can allocate the time to lead the enterprise.

It would be disastrous if present centers of initiative felt they were layered by such an undertaking--and the buck had passed somewhere else. The Under Secretary's committee should:

--spot delays in implementing the agreed plan and end them;

--spot gaps in implementing the agreed plan and fill them;

--re-survey the evolving situation and make recommendations for changes in the plan.

VII. 1968

If the war cannot be ended in 1967 and runs through the election of 1968, the task will be:

--to have achieved maximum progress;

--to be able to demonstrate the reality of that progress persuasively to our people;

--to achieve maximum bipartisan support for continuing our Viet Nam and Asian policies.

We must be able to hold a position of: don't throw away a winning effort and defeat a position of: don't throw good men and money after bad.

In seeking a decision in 1967 we must, as an insurance policy, lay the groundwork for such a stance in 1968.

320. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret.

A Top Manager for Saigon. I've talked this over with our little sub-cabinet "war cabinet" of Katzenbach, Vance and Rostow (and only with them).

Except for the few obvious candidates who are probably unavailable, we have some differences as to who or even what type of man ought to replace Lodge. For example, they tend to react in terms of imagery--we need a "public presence" and preferably a Republican. To me, Vietnam itself has become so big an issue as to dwarf the role of any ambassador in Saigon. The only imagery that will really count in 1967-68 is whether we seem to be winning the war. So it's much more important that we get the man best capable of producing than whether he is suitably prominent. First and foremost, this means a top manager who can run a $20-25 billion show, make the military perform, and quietly lead the GVN by the nose.

It also means, if we want early results, an insider who already knows his Vietnam. We don't have time to break in a totally new man.

Where I think we all agree is that your choice for Vietnam might well be the single most important appointment you make in 1967-68. It is my own belief that the right "top manager" in Saigon could make a major difference between success and lack of it in 1967-68. This is frankly based on a more optimistic appraisal of our Vietnam prospects than McNamara's, for example, but I think he underplays the political and psychological factors.

The only two candidates who would almost unquestionably meet all non-political criteria are McNamara and Mac Bundy. If neither is in the cards, I'd think next of a DOD-type manager who'd know also how to move the military. You say Vance is out, so I'd suggest McNaughton. He may grate on some people, but he's a first-class doer. Nitze would be a poor third in this category. Ros Gilpatric would also be well qualified, but could we get him?

Tough-minded managers are harder to come by at State. Katzenbach would be great but--. Doug MacArthur or Alex Johnson would be the only pros I'd even consider. Everyone I know agrees that Ellsworth Bunker has all the judgment needed, but he like Harriman may be too old (even though we could back them with a strong staff).

When we get to others on the outside I'm on less firm ground. From the Cabinet there are Goldberg, Freeman, and John Gardner You know their management abilities far better than I, but they'd all need at least six crucial months to learn the ropes. If Lodge left in February, this would mean September before they really found their feet.

The same is equally true of non-government people. To mention some names, however, Doug Dillon looks perhaps most interesting. Vance speaks highly of Governor Connally's managerial ability. Nelson Rockefeller is certainly public-spirited. Tom Gates is probably not good enough. Clark Clifford is, but would he go to Saigon? Scranton may be available, but Nick says he hasn't got it.

Rather than a largely unknown quantity (can we afford one if results are what we want?), I'd opt if necessary for McNamara's solution--give Westy the job. I'm out of my element on the political calculus, but hazard that it would be a popular appointment with most Americans (as was Max Taylor's); the "intellectuals" are against us anyway. Westy knows the drill, has real clout with the GVN, would take orders (unlike MacAr-thur), and would listen to political advice from the bright State types we could put at his side.

On the other hand, even an unknown quantity from the above list of 19 would in my judgment be better than keeping Lodge on. Cabot really wants to come home (not because he smells defeat or is disgruntled) but because he's done two tours (now 26 out of the last 30 months). He actually feels that overstaying his time increases the odds of physical harm--he's a nut on security. If you have not already done so, I'd urge you have Dean Rusk sound Cabot out and give an independent confirmation.

Whoever replaces Lodge, it is important that Porter stay--not just for continuity but because he's good. If you agree, Rusk should also tell Porter this (it will save having to do so later).

R. W. Komer

P. S. I attach two long papers which I hope you'll read. The first is my prognosis of how we can "win" by 1968 if we really sweat it./2/ The second is my outline plan for how to do so./3/ If we can decide on some such plan before 1 January and pick the right man to carry out the mandate, I believe we'll have chosen the optimum road to solving the biggest (and messiest) problem on our plates for 1967-68--and the prerequisite to solving all the others. My recipe does not guarantee success but, as I wrote Bob McNamara, does anybody have a better one?

/2/Attachment to Document 318.

/3/"A Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam," dated November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaughton) In an introduction to his Strategic Plan, Komer stated that it should be read in conjunction with McNamara's October memorandum (Document 268) and Bundy's and his papers (attachments to Documents 318 and 319). "All three have a common central thrust, even though they differ in detail and emphasis, and in the prospect they foresee as likely." Komer's Strategic Plan provided the basis for a draft NSAM, Document 336.

[end of document]

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