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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

30. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

OCI No. 0490/66

Washington, January 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam--Intelligence Estimates. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. A copy is also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV.

COMMUNIST REACTION TO THE US PEACE OFFENSIVE

Attached is a brief assessment of Communist views of the present state of the conflict in Vietnam. Attached also are compilations of selected Communist statements on the current US diplomatic campaign and the lull in bombing North Vietnam./2/

/2/Attached but not printed.

Attachment

COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM

North Vietnam

The halt in US air strikes on North Vietnam, coupled with intensive US efforts to elicit a positive response from Hanoi on negotiating an end to the war, have thus far produced only biting denunciations of US motives by the North Vietnamese and a stiffening of previously stated North Vietnamese demands. Hanoi's failure to show interest in discussions with the US on any but its own terms probably stems largely from its belief that the military situation in South Vietnam is still in its favor. Based on this belief, the North Vietnamese apparently feel that ultimately the US will be forced to accept Communist demands.

The North Vietnamese apparently see the current standdown in US air attacks mainly as a welcome opportunity to repair bomb damage and to step up the shipment of supplies to depots which support Communist operations in South Vietnam. Hanoi probably hopes that by delaying an official response to the US peace overtures it can prolong the lull in air strikes.

The North Vietnamese public response to the US "peace offensive" also appears to be calculated to reassure the Chinese Communists and the Viet Cong of Hanoi's determination to continue the fight. To this end a series of propaganda statements out of Hanoi during the past three weeks have set forth three "actual deeds" which the US must perform to "prove" its acceptance of North Vietnam's "four points." These deeds are: unconditional cessation of air strikes on North Vietnam, unconditional withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam, and US recognition of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) as the representative of the South Vietnamese people. In its propaganda statements, Hanoi has come closer than ever before to suggesting that these "actual deeds" are preconditions for negotiations.

Hanoi is doubtless also concerned over the success of the US peace effort in convincing world opinion of US willingness to seek a quick and reasonable end to the war. To counter this, Hanoi has attempted to impugn US motives. A constant stream of propaganda since the standdown in air strikes began has stressed the theme that the bombing lull and the "peace offensive" are only a "cover up" for further US escalation of the war.

NFLSV

The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam has largely ignored the US moves. In its limited response, it has echoed Hanoi's attacks on the US peace effort, characterizing it as a "trick" designed to cover up further escalation of the war. Front spokesmen have defiantly reaffirmed the determination of the Viet Cong to continue fighting. The Front central committee has voiced its full support for Hanoi's position on the US peace moves.

Communist China

Peking has responded to the US peace campaign and suspension of bombing with a mounting propaganda attack which suggests that the Chinese are uneasy about the possibility that their position is being undercut in the non-aligned world--and perhaps also in Hanoi. The Chinese have pumped out a flood of caustic editorials denouncing the US effort as a "peace hoax" designed to prepare for further escalation of the war if the Vietnamese Communists do not knuckle under to US "blackmail." Hanoi is repeatedly urged to continue the fight until victory, and to reject any negotiated settlement except on Communist terms.

This public position which is almost certainly being conveyed privately to Hanoi, reflects Peking's view that if the Communists press on resolutely, the war in Vietnam can only end in victory. Such a victory would take the Chinese a long way toward their ultimate goal of driving the US out of Asia, and at the same time strike a heavy blow at Moscow--Peking's other principal enemy--by validating Mao's formula for world revolution through "people's war."

USSR

Moscow has assumed a notably cautious attitude with regard to the US "peace offensive." Soviet party secretary Shelepin's speeches during his recent visit to Hanoi provide a good illustration of Soviet reserve on this point. Despite the North Vietnamese leaders' repeated and virulent denunciation of Washington's diplomatic efforts as "deceitful," Shelepin let pass the opportunity to echo this view. He did point out, however, in keeping with standard Soviet propaganda treatment, that the "so-called peace initiative" coincides with a continued US buildup in South Vietnam.

If, as seems likely, Shelepin encouraged the North Vietnamese to give more serious consideration to recent US moves toward a political solution, he was apparently unable to persuade them to modify their tactics. The lack of any reference in the communique following Shelepin's visit to recent US probes is a sign that the two parties were unable to achieve a consensus or even a compromise.

Soviet party chief Brezhnev, at a 15 January rally in Ulan Bator, expressed doubt over Washington's "sincerity" and maintained that if the US really wanted to end the war in Vietnam, it need only agree to the "just demands" of the Vietnamese people.

Soviet propaganda has generally avoided any extensive commentary on US diplomatic efforts, but has accompanied factual reportage of the travels of US envoys with a moderate amount of routine remarks alleging they were "cover" for further "aggression." In reporting North Vietnamese statements on the US diplomatic offensive and the bombing standdown, Moscow has toned down Hanoi's particularly abusive commentary. Privately, Soviet leaders have adopted a generally non-committal stance on US peace initiatives, avoiding the sharp, negative reaction Moscow has expressed over such moves in the past.

While reacting with caution and reserve to the "peace offensive," the Soviet leaders apparently have not been overly optimistic regarding its chances for success. Soviet president Podgorny is reported to have told the French ambassador on 30 December that he was skeptical that current US diplomatic efforts would induce Hanoi to negotiate.

31. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, January 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Also sent to Ball.

SUBJECT
Length of the Pause in Air Attacks on North Viet Nam

There has been a background assumption lying behind the pause in air attacks on North Viet Nam: that a pause lasting through the period of the lunar New Year would allow sufficient time to pursue the US peace offensive to a conclusion, whether affirmative or negative. A reading of the current situation indicates to me that more time is required. I think we are not now in a position to decide that the pause should end. There are a number of efforts in train at the present time which need to be completed:

(a) Ambassador Kohler has sent word to the DRV charge in Moscow requesting a discussion with the charge. The DRV Embassy is evidently now seeking instructions.

(b) In Vientiane the DRV representative has undertaken a substantive discussion with Premier Souvanna Phouma, evidently on instructions from Hanoi. A cable has been sent to Bill Sullivan to prepare for further developments in this dialogue./2/

/2/For a summary of the cable, see Document 29.

(c) We have not directly questioned the Soviet Government about the end results of the Shelepin visit to Hanoi, after Moscow would have had a chance to digest the outcome. Through Ambassador Kohler, we should put some questions to Premier Kosygin as soon as feasible.

(d) Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina has been in Moscow since Saturday. He was to have another discussion on Viet Nam with Gromyko today. We need to talk with Shiina as soon as he has returned from Moscow.

(e) Secretary General U Thant has discussed with Ambassador Goldberg some procedural ideas for launching an international discussion on Viet Nam. The Secretary General has now been given US comments. He is in the process of refining his thoughts and considering in what way his proposal should be launched--perhaps by someone other than the Secretary General.

A review of the available information does not disclose any military reason why the pause needs to be terminated now rather than sometime hence. The INR review of Viet Cong activity indicates that the level of activity has not changed materially since the Christmas truce. The level may have been somewhat higher in early January than the weekly average for 1965. It appears to have been a little lower than in the three or four weeks before Christmas. The locations and activity of PAVN units is unclear. There have been no confirmed PAVN attacks since November 1965, although a POW interrogation suggests that a PAVN battalion may have been involved in the January 17 attack in Binh Dinh province. We may assume that resupply and reinforcement of the Viet Cong from North Viet Nam has been proceeding during the period of the pause. Reconnaissance indicates that such activity has continued. During the same period, the United States has, of course, augmented its own forces in the South. The available evidence does not show that there are military reasons why we need to end the pause just now in order to prevent the Communist side from obtaining some marked advantage. Conversely, there is nothing to suggest that a prolongation of the pause would require us to forgo some significant military opportunity in the immediate or near future.

On the other hand, there are powerful political reasons for deferring, for the present, any decision to terminate the pause in air attacks on North Viet Nam:

(1) While four weeks may seem to us a lengthy period in which to await an answer to our overtures, we should bear in mind the likelihood that the debate in Hanoi, and between Hanoi and Moscow and Hanoi and the Viet Cong, has probably been extensive. That debate may not yet have run its course. In this connection, we should remember that it took the United States nearly nine months--from the President's Johns Hopkins speech last April until December 1965--to formulate its own statement of an approach to peaceful settlement. Now that we have been through this process, it may be unrealistic to expect the Communist side to coordinate fully with our timing and to respond promptly after the fourteen points have been communicated.

(2) We want to know, ourselves, the answers that will be produced by the initiatives still in progress. If we do not wait to get these answers, our action may not only prevent the answers from being given, but also wipe out the practical possibilities of further efforts at peaceful settlement for quite some time to come. A whole new phase of escalation and much higher military costs would ensue.

(3) Terminating the pause now would probably end the efforts at prisoner exchange which have been started in Berlin and Algiers,/3/ and thus also cut off whatever hopeful developments might flow collaterally from the prisoner discussions.

/3/See Document 47 for a summary of the negotiations through Algiers.

(4) One of our great disabilities around the world in the Viet Nam situation has been a lack of agreement, and even understanding, on the part of many governments and large opinion groups, in regard to our policies and actions. President Johnson's peace offensive has had major political impact in building both understanding and confidence for the United States. We ought not to jeopardize any of this gain, or fail to maximize it, by coming to a decision too quickly on the length of the pause. It is known around the world that the peace offensive is still actively in progress. It would be harmful to our political interests to end the pause before the returns are in and the result is plain to the rest of the world. We have been criticized in the past for impatience in regard to the pause of May 1965 and for lack of sufficient interest and responsiveness to earlier moves characterized at least by some as peace initiatives. We need to take special care this time.

(5) It is greatly in our interest to have the onus for a failure of peace efforts placed on the Communist side. If we were at this moment to resume bombing of North Viet Nam, the United States would probably incur, justly or not, a large share of the onus for bringing peace efforts to an end.

(6) Within the United States there is very strong support for the President's peace offensive. In the interest of having the country united so far as possible behind him, the President would be well advised to carry the peace offensive a further distance before concluding that it has failed. People in this country also will want to be convinced that the possibilities of a reasonable peace settlement have been exhausted before the war is fully resumed and in all likelihood escalated./4/

/4/On January 19 Sisco sent a similar memorandum to Rusk and Ball, outlining a number of "compelling" reasons "why the pause should continue at least a while longer." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) Meeker sent a supplemental memorandum to Rusk and Ball on January 22, arguing that public pressure to resume the bombing was slight and proposing eight steps to consider "before the peace offensive is judged to have run a full course." (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam, Misc. Notebooks) In a January 25 memorandum to Ball, which Ball drew on in preparing Document 41, Meeker contended that resumption of the bombing entailed a high risk of Chinese intervention and rendered illusory "for a long time" any meaningful peace efforts. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Misc. Viet-Nam, Vol. VI)

32. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 20, 1966, 5:54-6:31 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

Return of Rusk and Harriman

PRESENT
The President, Rusk, Harriman, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, Valenti/2/

/2/Moyers was also present. (Ibid.)

President: Assuming we are going to stay there--and that's a safe assumption. Want in order of priority all we should do--go after this railroad--that POL, this trail, would take so many planes--and here are estimated results.

If our military can say if we do certain things we can interrupt their supplies and hurt them--or at the end of 8 months they will need reinforcements, etc. In other words, I want the coach to give me the season's schedule--what the other teams will do--and what we will do.

Bob, you need to get from Westmoreland his plan for using our resources and what results--what happens July--and next January. What is estimate of NVN response?

Rusk, give much thought to this--think we'll be subjected to immense propaganda over next weeks from peace lovers. They told us bombing cease would help us--now they'll say "another month or so."

Don't want to be impetuous. Must be careful and cautious. Honestly believe we all talk too much. Only useful purpose is it might confuse Ho so much he'll go crazy. The newspaper articles only serve no useful purpose. Tom Wicker says he has it on high authority that President will wait 10 days and then let them have it.

(What President wants Rusk to tell press)

"It's been 26 days since cease bombing. Harriman has been to 11 Capitals. Goldberg and I, too, plus 113 nations. We know we've done everything we can do and should do to talk rather than fight. Adequate time to reply--nothing encouraging--we don't want to mislead American public."

Then stop there. Don't say any more. We have done everything that is within the bounds of self respect--we will not grow weary. Then you have given a signal--but without dramatics. Then I would hope they would break out--show their bottom before we showed ours.

When other nations come in asking more time, tell them to go talk to the other side. It takes two to tango. I read we have a commitment that we will not bomb until H. Wilson has departed Moscow.

We're going to have to double our manpower. At the same time, we must surface all our peace moves. We can't hold much longer than 30 days. I've told State to tell all other nations we've heard nothing.

Bundy: Since that order, U Thant and Vientiane had intruded. My own curbstone reaction is that a "no answer" ought to go on the record.

President: Rusk, now that you are back, you tell the press that whatever the hopes, there has been no response. We think 26 days is long enough. The aggressors don't want to talk.

Rusk: Can see some advantage in starting with Baltimore/3/--the 5-day pause--and go on through all the other moves--

/3/Presumably a reference to the President's Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.

But the whole question is the bombing pause. They want me to tell them about the pause. I have to say nothing has happened. What am I going to do? They ask. I have to say I can't say except our men will give a good account and will not run.

Bundy: Would strongly say that these 26 days have proved that we have done all we can do--and the other nations in the world know this.

President: These Russians are the same ones who told us there were no missiles in Cuba. They let us believe good would come from pause. But we can't endure this indefinitely. McGovern and his crowd always want you to go further than you do.

Bundy: You'll have two pieces of paper--Ball on the case against resumption--also an intelligence report on the pros and cons of bombing resumption./4/ Hope you won't start bombing the day after Tet.

/4/McGeorge Bundy forwarded the two papers to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. on January 20. Ball's memorandum, dated January 20, argued that resumption of the bombing would "substantially increase the risks of escalation" but would not "substantially contribute to persuading Hanoi to stop the aggression." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 10) The intelligence memorandum, dated January 19 and prepared by CIA's Office of National Estimates, estimated probable reactions both to resumption of the bombing and continuation of the pause. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV)

President: I'm not going to start now. I just want McNamara to get the decks clear. We have to think about getting our story out quickly.

Rusk: Having a press conference tomorrow./5/

/5/For text of Rusk's news conference on January 21, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1966, pp. 189-197.

President: It would be good if you can do in the Senate what you are doing in the House. Get the hawks and the doves together at the same time. Perhaps get Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations.

McNamara: Let Rusk ask Fulbright to bring in other committees.

President: Main thing is to drive the nail in. They have had sufficient time and have not responded. None of the nations we have talked to have anything to report.

Rusk: But U Thant will probably say that Souvanna Phouma talked to him--and will say we threw it out.

Ball: I'll make a prediction this will get a dirty answer from Hanoi.

Rusk: Even a dirty answer is better than nothing.

Moyers: Story I'd like to see on Monday is that though Rusk has spoken, the President hasn't decided.

President: I'd like to see "the peace jig is up." We don't have to say everything we know to newspapers. I might be turned around tomorrow, so we have to be able to talk to each other.

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State/1/

Rangoon, January 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:46 p.m. and forwarded to President Johnson by McGeorge Bundy at 4:15 p.m. with the observation that "the man from Hanoi has nothing to say." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)

365. Eyes only for the Secretary.

1. Called upon DRV Consul General Vu at his residence at 8:00 p.m. tonight./2/ Participants on both sides the same as at our Dec 29 meeting/3/ and atmosphere of our talks was much the same as reported at that time.

/2/In telegram 227 to Rangoon, January 20, Rusk instructed Byroade to seek an appointment with the DRV Consul General "as part of our effort to close all circuits." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 135-136)

/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 736-737.

2. Vu did not wait for any introductory remarks on my part but remarked as soon as we were seated that I had delivered an aide-memoire to him recently which I had said I would keep confidential. He said he had transmitted document to his government as he had promised. He wanted me to know however that in his own personal opinion the tone and contents of the aide-memoire were such that he considered it an ultimatum.

3. I said I was sorry to hear him say this as I could assure him that this was a misunderstanding on his part and that no such impression had been intended. Told him that for my part I had kept our meeting secret even though I had been pressed by several Ambassadors for information. I told Vu that exact understanding of his remarks most important to me and asked if his opening remark was also the view of his government. He repeated again that it was only his personal view. (This I wonder about.)

4. I reminded him that when I last saw him I had said I would stand by for a reply from him. So far none had been received and there was no indication of any response either related to military action or to obstacles to negotiation. I asked if he had any reply for me. He said he had had no instructions from his government to reply. He said that in the meantime his government had issued public statements which indicated its position.

5. I said my government wanted me to make sure, through direct contact with him, that there was no misunderstanding and no chance of mishap on this very important matter in any attempt they may have made to contact us. Vu shook his head and sat silent for a while. I told him for my part I would continue to stand by for any contact he wished. He nodded his understanding.

6. I said there was one other aspect I would like to mention. The world's attention was focused on Vietnam. The press of most capitals of the world was alert to any new sign and in this atmosphere it was probably expecting too much to think our contacts could long remain secret. (I had learned of U Thant's Jan 20 press conference remark/4/ minutes before seeing Vu but did not mention it and he apparently had not heard of it.) I said if leaks occurred that we had met that this should not discourage us. We need not admit what we talked about. Rangoon would still be a quiet place and we could still meet secretly. I said that I would find a place where we could meet with complete secrecy and he might wish also to give this some thought.

/4/For a summary of U Thant's comments at his January 20 press conference, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, pp. 146-147.

7. Vu said he had read press reports from the White House which hinted at our direct contact. I said I was aware of this statement/5/ but Rangoon had not been singled out. He said "such news should not have been disclosed, if you sincerely wish to exchange views." I said I understood and would do all I could to preserve secrecy our contacts.

/5/See footnote 8, Document 16.

8. I said I wished to revert to his opening remark. Told him I know President well personally as well as his important advisers. From this knowledge and based upon the most intimate knowledge US policy, I was absolutely certain that President was sincere in wanting peace to come to Vietnam. I said it would be a great tragedy in the end if there was any misunderstanding on this point.

9. I made remark that I hoped I received a telephone call some day from him and was preparing to depart when he said he was ready to listen if I had anything more to say. I said I had no instructions to say more but would make one more comment. I said from Washington viewpoint it was obvious that VC initiated military activity in South Vietnam had remained at a high level. We also had reliable evidence of major truck movements continuing to South Vietnam through Laos. It seemed we had no alternative but to assume that DRV was continuing to support large scale military effort in South and send regular units there.

10. Vu said that as we were now speaking informally he would comment. He said that immediately after the US made its 14 points public, 4000 US soldiers had landed in South Vietnam. He also mentioned the figure of 9000 more arrivals (but I never got period of time to which he referred). He said there are reports that 20,000 more South Koreans may come. This was ample proof that our President was not sincere.

11. I said we both had had military experience, and therefore we both knew the advance planning that had to go into major movements of military units. Certainly it was obvious that the actual decision to move these troops was made long before the time they arrived. This however was not the major point. Anyone who understood the President's position clearly would not be surprised that more troops should be sent to help the South protect itself. We are constantly faced with military action against the South. There was evidence of unrelented build-up from the North. Our youth were being attacked and killed. The President had made himself quite clear as to what he considered his obligations to be as long as this situation continued.

12. I said I hoped he and his government would study most carefully our 14 points and the President's more recent State of the Union message. Vu said our 14 points contained nothing really new. I said I hoped he would find it a useful summary of our views for study.

13. I said while it was obvious we could not agree on many things I thought that it was good nevertheless that we could talk together in this fashion and that I hoped we could meet again in the future. He was personally quite friendly in escorting me to my borrowed Volkswagen and in saying goodbye.

Byroade

34. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 22, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret.

SUBJECT
Your noon meeting today

I think we have three basic problems, two of which need not concern us much today. The first is whether to resume bombing. The second is when to resume bombing. The third is what targets to bomb.

I think question one should clearly be answered in the affirmative, and that question three can be pushed ahead of us, although I think it would be helpful to decide today that this is a very important question and should be most carefully reviewed. The easiest way to do this is to resume bombing on a pattern very much like that which existed before the pause. The Chiefs will not like this, but they will sit still for it in the context of a definite decision to resume.

The immediate problem and the hard one for today is when and how to start the bombing again. My brother Bill is bringing a timetable of diplomatic and political actions./2/ I have not seen it, and he has been so busy that I have not wanted to interrupt for an advance description. But I think that the following questions are those that need to be considered.

/2/"Scenario and Checklist for Possible Resumption of Bombing," January 22. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI)

1. Have we given adequate public warning that the pause is failing? I do not think we have, and I attach a paragraph/3/ that Harriman or Rusk or both might work from tomorrow, on television.

/3/Attached but not printed.

2. Are we doing everything we can to close all the circuits? It is already clear that Hanoi is trying to pretend that its Vientiane demarche was a serious response. Joe Kraft telephoned me this morning to say that he has reliable information from Paris that there has been a request for clarification from Hanoi on the 14 points. This can only refer to Vientiane and he admits that it comes from a Frenchman (whom he refused to name) who has talked to Bo in Paris.

3. How much private warning should we give to friends before the bombing actually begins? I think it is most important that men like Wilson and Pearson and Sato have advance notice even at the risk of leaks. This diplomatic advantage conflicts with the desire of CINCPAC and others to catch Hanoi off guard with a surprise resumption, and thus hit some rewarding targets in daylight.

4. What degree of Congressional consultation should there be before resumption? My own suggestion is that we should make it very clear that the pause has failed through such devices as the Tuesday leadership meeting but not engage in any formal consultation about any resumption any more than we did about starting the pause.

5. In addition to special friends who get a day or two of advance notice, we must have diplomatic notice to everyone at the time the bombing resumes. I assume this item will be in Bill's scenario.

6. There should probably be a major statement on the results of the pause and on our continuing purpose of peace by the Secretary of State as it is on the record that the bombing has begun.

This memorandum does not address the question of the date of resumption. I think you will want to keep a free hand on that. I think you will find that Goldberg and Harriman are strong for another two weeks of delay and that Bob McNamara wants to get cracking. My own view is that once we have made the definite decision that we will resume, we are not in a hurry about the particular day. On the other hand, if you don't give the State Department a deadline, I doubt if they will get all their homework and wire closing done as fast as you want. So I think I would tell them today that I wanted to be free to send out the bombers by Thursday,/4/ and that in fact I would plan to hold my hand for another few days and tell no one.

/4/January 27.

McG. B.

35. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 22, 1966, noon-2:12 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

PRESENT
President, Rusk, Helms, McNamara, Harriman, Taylor, Ball, Raborn, Thompson, Goldberg, Mac Bundy, Valenti/2/

/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that William Bundy was also present. (Ibid.)

President: Want to survey what has happened--and see what is ahead of us. Want to feel I have options to proceed on what is the best interest of the United States. Hope we can keep what we say totally secret. Want McNamara to give report on what happened in his testimony./3/

/3/On January 20 and 21, McNamara testified in support of a request for supplementary military appropriations before a joint committee composed of members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense.

McNamara: Generally 15 to 20 members present. Committee split--Gavin approach--and--the other: expand the bombing--even to taking on China.

Believe it is possible to bring the poles together--same thing can be done, I believe, with public.

President: Is there much criticism of what we have done?

McNamara: Not so much in the pause. Eight to twelve are critical of our bombing policy. My answer: not fundamental to what we do in the South. Difference between McNamara and Chiefs is very minor. POL and power plants are only difference.

Far too much time directed at these minor differences rather than direction of the war.

No changes in pattern of activity in pre-pause period. (What has happened in last 30 days.)

PAVN building up response for future. We'll have 220,000 by first of March. Commanders tell us they'll need 400,000 by end of year.

Westmoreland requests 75 battalions instead of 45--99 by end of year.

President: Anticipate Chinese coming in?

McNamara: No. This based on China not coming in. This month we'll drop twice the level of bombs as in peak Korean months. Will expand this further.

By end of year, we'll be in roughly same balance with VC as we are now. All this assumes China will not come in.

President: Rusk, what are we waiting to hear from? What suggestions do you have?

Rusk: Only live contact still open is Laos. DRV rep there seems nervous. This is delicate contact--has become known. Souvanna dropped it at dinner party.

Austrian Foreign Minister says he has high level Kremlin contact.

If US continues pause and discontinues force buildup, North Vietnam will talk.

But doesn't say what North Vietnam will do in regard to military side.

General advice from Yugoslavs is: take more time to do anything.

General international approval on pause period. But this is thin, and resumption of bombing would produce disappointment internationally.

Key point to be tested: whether or not there has been response from other side.

President: Admiral Raborn, any information you have? Movements in the last 30 days?

Raborn: Indications are North Vietnam is rebuilding all repairs--resumed normal daylight infiltrations to South--food, men, etc. 4500 a month. Roads improved to take 250 tons a day, roughly double the number of troops required in North Vietnam.

Some indication that VC are getting a bloody nose. Morale may be deteriorating. Commencing to feel effects of military actions against them. VC unhappy that Hanoi (unreadable) worldwide--frightens them.

Goldberg: I have confirmation of Rusk and McNamara. U Thant anxious to make a proposal. His public statement/4/ was not good but could have been much worse. He said he would like a coalition government reflecting his French conversations. Privately, he is willing to propose the five powers plus North and South Vietnam--including the National Liberation Front. This very best we can get him to do. U Thant has feeling something may come of all this.

/4/See footnote 4, Document 33.

Have checked Ambassadors at UN. UK wants pause continued. Italy has crisis. Moro has been loyal friend. Needs pause to shore him (up) domestically.

Canada for pause.

Thailand doesn't want U.S. to show weakness.

France pushes pause for three months.

Bloc countries need time, they say.

Latin Americans support pause longer if military situation permits.

Indians talk about initiative on their part.

Yugoslavs believe Soviets need more time.

U Thant places great importance on Laos move. Thinks it is definite forward step.

Friends want us to go along more--nonaligned want more then more.

Bloc countries stress you need more time from communist countries than other countries.

President: General Taylor, what do you think?

Taylor: Events have developed about as we anticipated. Profitable move but now at resumption point. I think the longer we wait to tidy up loose ends, the harder it is to resume.

President: Therefore, you recommend . . .

Taylor: We ought to resume bombing.

President: If we can, we ought to say to all countries--we have gone 30 days--and that's longer than any of us agreed to do or thought. Thus, tell them we've had no response--we are not obligated or well advised to keep one hand tied behind us. Without saying we are resuming bombing, we must get this across. We can talk to military people to find out how to exert maximum strength at minimum danger.

Do we have pledge to tell anyone what we do?

Rusk: Notify British, Canadians, one or two others if we resume.

President: Tell them today we feel free to move whenever we judge it to be required since others have not responded.

Rusk: Effect of my statement yesterday/5/ was that string has run out.

/5/For text of Rusk's news conference on January 21, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1966, pp. 189-197.

McNamara: Think it wise to send out message as President suggests to go on record.

Harriman: We must build up case of what has moved forward since cessation of bombing--need to show men and materiel moving down--or use some provocative act as reason. We have built much good will, we must try to preserve as much as possible. Try to get public opinion to isolate Hanoi.

President: Important before we take action we carefully consider every step we could take to hold what approval we can. Think we'll keep little because the countries don't want the war to go on. They really want unilateral disarmament. If other people respond at all, we could carry the pause further. I'm of the mind to continue it anyway--but we've had no indication of any success at all. We can't impose hardships on our soldiers much longer. How to do this is what I want State to work on.

Now I gather we gave no indication that we haven't done what we promised. I think we have gone much longer than we said.

Bundy: We said 12 to 20 days.

Goldberg: I want to add Pope and U Thant to those we consult.

President: Are we keeping in touch with the Pope?

Bundy: Yes within 48 hours.

Goldberg: I am told that there have been no North Vietnamese soldiers involved this month--or since November.

Bundy: That's a Times story.

President: What do you hear from Westmoreland and Lodge? Their fears from military standpoint?

McNamara: Unanimous view of military commanders we must resume bombing. If not, can expect higher level of infiltration.

My impression is Lodge feels this way. All officers from second level feel this way. Even getting emotional. They see North Vietnamese actions to reconstruct bridges, moving substantial units through Laos.

All indications are of substantial buildup during pause--and preparing for intensified action in South Vietnam. My own appraisal--they overestimate the effect of North bombing in stopping infiltration.

Helms: May I interrupt? We have report of economist. Increased bombing in the North would not stop movement of supplies to the South.

McNamara: We need to really search this out. I think it essential to resume the bombing. We've had good fortune with the pause. Consider more peace moves, but unless we resume bombing, we will give wrong signal to Hanoi, Peking and our own people.

Strongly recommend bombing resumption.

Raborn: Our reports support McNamara. View about wrong signal.

Thompson. We have given impression we would not continue pause unless something happened. Soviets told me pause wouldn't be considered sign of weakness.

How could we be weak when we are bringing in additional troops and money?

Raborn: Hanoi might believe domestic pressures and international opinion cause us to hold back.

Ball: Let me utter minority view. Only one systematic way to resolve this--list pros and cons.

President. I would think you are wrong. I read your excellent brief./6/ Is the pause continuation a sign to Saigon that we are pulling out?

/6/See footnote 4, Document 32.

Taylor: Yes. I think they are beginning to suspect things and it is causing them difficulty.

McNamara: Also my opinion. Seen signs of it in the cables. We haven't told Saigon anything at all about our buildup. They also see controversy in this country. They don't understand why we don't punish those who foster [protest?] the war.

Ball: If that is the case, why don't we sit down with Ky and tell him.

McNamara: Because it would leak. We haven't told the U.S. people.

Rusk: I think we'll see a drop in morale if we don't resume. Ky told me we talk about their country without telling them. It embarrasses them.

President: I have a feeling Ky, Lodge, Westmoreland were against the pause. We did it. Once done they were good soldiers and enduring it as long as they can.

I'm distressed when I see frantic attitude on part of some of our Senators and Congressmen. I've always known we're on thin ice. I'm aware of this. Go ahead, George.

Ball: Question: On evidence I've seen, bombing is not effectively going to interdict supply requirements. Needs are too small.

What effect bombing on will of Hanoi? Experience in the past shows it doesn't erode will of a people.

Comes down to this: most reasonable argument is that it gives a bad signal to Hanoi. That is a possibility.

1. Effect on morale in Saigon, hard to evaluate.

2. Wrong signal to Hanoi. This is persuasive.

We don't know what the flash point is if we escalate.

McNamara About flash point, we can carry on level of bombing of last November without hitting flash point. If we go beyond that point, we may draw them in.

President: If we go back in, the pressure will be on us to go further. Your Senators proved that.

McNamara: That's true. But I think I persuaded them that differences in bombing targets will not affect the course of the war. Our bombing has evolved slowly--slowly we were successful in interdicting rail lines between China and Hanoi.

President: What do we signal to the enemy if we resume?

Thompson: Peace moves may be more important than stopping bombing. What Russians do hinges on China. If we take out Hanoi airfields, pressure on China to use their fields. If China decides to let their fields be used, they will no doubt try to get Russians to come in.

Peace moves have eased pressure on Russians.

President: If we didn't resume it, would they assume we are weak at home and would have to pull out?

Thompson: No. The Soviets have indicated that what we do in the South doesn't affect them.

Bundy: How would Asian countries view it?

Thompson: Don't know.

Rusk: Sat around the table during Korean War. Was with MacArthur when he made mistake about China coming in. But because we have moved slowly, we have been able to do a great deal. If we don't resume, China will think a sanctuary has been approved and they can do more than ever. This could be important.

Goldberg: This move might involve more cooperation between Soviets and China, dampening their ideological conflict.

If we draw Soviets and China closer together, it puts a wedge at helping nonproliferation. I get much evidence of this in my talks. "Don't push us into cooperation," they say.

Ball: Must do what we can to make an independent peace with Hanoi. This is more difficult if North Vietnam becomes more dependent upon on China. Hanoi under pressure from China to do more. To extent we direct an attack on Hanoi, we build up pressure to continue war and achieve Chinese objectives.

Realistically, we are not going to let Ky make a separate deal with Hanoi.

Eventually, if we bomb, we'll see Chinese--not fighting men but coolie workers--all over Hanoi. There is a difference between bombing in the North and fighting in the South.

President: I feel that we have given away a trading point without getting anything in return.

Next, the cry will be not to bomb in the South.

Ball: There is a fundamental difference. We are in South Vietnam--we are helping them. But we bomb in the North to punish them. We are big, powerful; they have no air force and are small. It's like Italy bombing Ethiopia.

If we make clear this is not done from weakness, and that we are going ahead--it is supportable.

Taylor: If we give up bombing, we will seriously hurt the war effort. We should punish Hanoi, else we will (be) there 20 years.

Goldberg: But evidence shows that rate of infiltration continues with bombing.

Rusk: In the Korean War, we destroyed everything east of Yalu. Every time they attacked they had to wait and restock. Prisoners told us it took them five days to go 45 miles.

Taylor: I confirm the Secretary's comments about Korea. Bombing has an effect on the number of troops the enemy can commit on the front lines.

W. Bundy: I believe we should resume. Believe we need a few days to tidy up though I'm in sympathy with Taylor's remarks.

We need to run through the Vientiane thing. On January 17 the North Vietnam Charge d'Affaires went to Souvanna--and raised questions about 14 points. Went into detail about the points.

Souvanna asked him if he should pass this on. Said no.

Souvanna mentioned this at dinner on January 18 and it leaked. Sent message that Souvanna could act as mediator and answered questions about 14 points./7/

/7/See Document 29.

Souvanna called in North Vietnam Charge today and reported to our Ambassador. North Vietnam asked further questions such as why we are reinforcing our troops.

Until we probe further on this, we ought not start.

Ball: Problem of communication. Few planes going to and from Hanoi and Vientiane.

Bundy: Also have circuit to close in Paris.

Kohler has instructions to seek appointment with Charge in Moscow. Have no response. He has instructions when he sees him to make full statement of our position./8/

/8/See Document 25.

Rusk: The Vice President and I probed Kosygin hard on this and got no reaction. The Soviets have denied they mentioned Moscow as site of meeting place.

Bundy: I asked Dobrynin about Kosygin and Shastri. He had no information.

W. Bundy: General suggestion by number two Soviet man here was to be in direct communication with Hanoi.

President: Have Soviets retreated from what they told us?

Bundy: Not formally. But they don't assert they have tried to get Hanoi to the table.

Goldberg: Dobrynin says "I can't commit my government. You have made a good move."

President: Aren't you going back to Kohler and Souvanna and see if we can close that circuit?

Bundy: Yes, we intend to do that today.

Rusk: U Thant is a man of no principles.

Goldberg: Yes, but we may get a man of less principle.

If we get Sawicki (the African), U Thant will look like a shining star.

President: We ought to get out to all the countries we need to notify.

We haven't bombed in thirty days. But they have done nothing. They are reinforcing--rebuilding--reinfiltrating--

Even bombed us (unreadable) Saigon. We went into this in good faith. We wanted to examine every and any chance for peace. We have gone longer than anyone thought necessary. Now, this is what they have done.

Not telling them we will begin bombing again but here is the picture.

Now, George, go on.

Ball: You have made it clear we are searching for peace. I think there would be value for you to write the six governments and tell them Rusk is willing to meet with them. This would be a formal act by you--not just a speech.

President: Let the State Department get together and see if there's anything we can do along this line. And have this back at our next meeting.

36. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII, Late Vietnam. Top Secret. Neither the original nor a copy of the memorandum has been located in the White House files at the Johnson Library.

SUBJECT
The Military Outlook in South Vietnam

You have asked for my comments on the outlook for military operations in South Vietnam. This memorandum addresses that question.

1. Expansion of Forces and Levels of Operation. The following statistics summarize our best estimates of force levels and operational rates for the next twelve months:

Strength: VC & PAVN:

June '65

Men, 187,000

Batns, 63

Dec '65/a/

Men, 236,900

Batns, 107

June '66

Men, ?

Batns, 150

Dec '66

Men, ?

Batns, 155

Strength: RVN (excl police):

June '65

Men, 522,400

Batns, 128

Dec '65/a/

Men, 573,000

Batns, 133

June '66

Men, 631,457

Batns, 168

Dec '66

Men, 661,000

Batns, 173

Strength: US:

June 65

Men, 59,900

Batns, 9

Dec '65/a/

Men, 178,800

Batns, 34

June '66

Men, 277,800/b/

Batns, 46

Dec '66

Men, 378,800/b/ /c/

Batns, 75

Strength: 3d Country:

June 65

Men, 3,300

Batns, 1

Dec '65/a/

Men, 3,300

Batns, 1

June '66

Men, 22,400

Batns, 10

Dec '66

Men, 44,600

Batns, 23

Aircraft: US Fixed wing (in SEA)

June '65

886

Dec '65/a/

1,487

June '66

1,684

Dec '66

1,879

Aircraft: US Helicopter

June '65

508

Dec '65/a/

1,483

June '66

1,853

Dec '66

2,391

Attack Sorties per Month: NVN:

June '65

Sorties, 2,401

Losses, 9

Dec '65/a/

Sorties, 2,198

Losses, 12

June '66

Sorties, 4,000

Losses, 18

Dec '66

Sorties, 4,000

Losses, 18

Attack Sorties per Month: SVN

June '65

Sorties, 7,234

Losses, 6

Dec '65/a/

Sorties, 13,114

Losses, 9

June '66

Sorties, 12,000

Losses, 8

Dec '66

Sorties, 15,000

Losses, 12

Attack Sorties per Month: Laos

June '65

Sorties, 511

Losses, 2

Dec '65/a/

Sorties, 3,047

Losses, 3

June '66

Sorties, 4,500

Losses, 4

Dec '66

Sorties, 4,500

Losses, 4

Total

June '65

10,146

Dec '65/a/

18,359

Tons Dropped

June '65

30,510

Dec '65/a/

31,341

June '66

51,500

Dec '66

68,800

/a/December activity figures are reduced by Christmas Cease-fire and Pause.

/b/The JCS believe that it would be necessary to have a selective call-up of reserves and a selective extension of terms of service to achieve the personnel strengths shown at the times indicated.

/c/Would rise substantially above this if estimates of CINCPAC are accepted.

2. The Enemy Force Build-up. The Communists appear to have decided to increase their forces in South Vietnam both by heavy recruitment in the South (especially in the Delta) and by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces from the North. The infiltration from the North is mainly by truck. It is on greatly improved routes--routes, some of which are new and some of which have been widened, or upgraded for truck use, or all-weathered, or built to by-pass points vulnerable to choke-point bombing, or constructed under jungle canopy and bamboo-trellised camouflage to prevent aerial observation.

General Westmoreland estimates that, through 1966, North Vietnam will have the capability to generate and infiltrate 3 regiments (9 battalion-equivalents, or 4500 men) a month, and that the VC in South Vietnam (now with 85 battalion-equivalents) can recruit and train 7 new battalion-equivalents a month--together adding 16 battalion-equivalents a month to the enemy forces. Despite serious attrition--desertions and increasing combat casualties--the enemy can be expected to enlarge his present strength of 107 battalion-equivalents to more than 150 battalion-equivalents by the end of calendar 1966, when--by our deployments and aggressive strategy--hopefully his losses can be made to equal his input.

3. The Enemy's Supply Requirement. The 107 battalions of PAVN and VC forces in South Vietnam need only 20 or so tons a day of supplies from North Vietnam to sustain "1964" levels of activity and only approximately 80 tons' a day to sustain "light combat" (1/5th of the force in contact once every 7 days using 1/3d of their basic load). The requirements from the North after the expansion of enemy forces to 150+ battalions at end of 1966--assuming that the enemy refuses, as it can, to permit the level of combat to exceed "light"--should approximate 140 tons a day.

4. The Enemy's Supply Capability. As for the Communists' capability to supply their forces in the South, it is clear that our program of bombing North Vietnam has caused them difficulties. It has destroyed many of their infiltration-oriented facilities (e.g., bridges, roads, railroads, trucks, rolling stock, barracks, storage centers, etc.), increasing the cost and difficulty of infiltration of both men and materiel. There is evidence that the volume of infiltration that the system could otherwise handle has been halved; that approximately 50-100,000 men have been diverted from normal activities to defense and repair work; that government activities are being decentralized, causing inefficiencies and political risks in a totalitarian state; that mobility within North Vietnam has been reduced; and that the reduction in enemy initiatives in Laos may be attributable to their need to husband their resources for their South Vietnam effort.

Nevertheless, despite our anti-infiltration efforts at pre-Pause levels, it is estimated that the enemy is capable of generating in the North and infiltrating to the South not only the 4500 men a month mentioned above, but an average of 200 tons of supplies a day depending on the season--considerably more than the perhaps 40-140 tons a day required to maintain activities at "1964" to "light-combat" levels.

5. The US Interdiction Capability. It is not clear that the US 1966 bombing program will cut the flow of men and materiel from the North to the South to a point below the VC/PAVN minimum needs. It is clear that the success of the interdiction program is contingent upon a cumulative and sustained effort. The interdiction can be while the supplies are en route into North Vietnam from the outside world, inside North Vietnam, en route from the North by sea or through Laos or Cambodia to South Vietnam, or inside South Vietnam; it can be by destruction or slow-down; the effectiveness can be prolonged by exhausting the North's repair capability, and can be enhanced by complicating their communications and control machinery. At a minimum the bombing program against North Vietnam should include 4000 attack sorties a month as compared with 3125 in the month of November 1965 before the Pause, intensive day-and-night armed reconnaissance of road and rail lines of communication throughout North Vietnam (except for the cities and the strip alongside China), and destruction of POL storage targets. (The efforts in North Vietnam are to be added to intensified bombing of the lines of communication in Laos, tight surveillance of the sea, increased efforts on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers from Cambodia, harassment of the lines of communication in South Vietnam, and destruction of base areas in South Vietnam.)

Recognizing that the estimates as to enemy needs and capabilities and as to our interdiction results may be wrong by two either way, all that can be said now--before some studies are completed--is that the increased program probably will not put a tight ceiling on the enemy's activities in South Vietnam, but probably will reduce the flow of supplies to the point where the enemy receives too little for full flexibility and for frequent offensive actions, too little to defend themselves as often against aggressive US/GVN forces, and too little to permit Hanoi to continue to deploy forces with complete confidence that they can be supplied.

Furthermore, as very important by-products, the program will keep the pressure on North Vietnam--to condition them toward negotiations and an acceptable end to the war--and will maintain the morale of our South Vietnamese allies.

6. The US Force Build-up. The US force build-up plan is to deploy additional US and third-country forces, raising the battalion strength from 44 in December '65 to 98 in December '66. This should do several things. According to General Westmoreland's estimates, the deployments of the additional forces will:

a. Result in destruction of one-third of the enemy's base areas, i.e., in-country resources.

b. Permit friendly control of just under one-half, as compared with the present one-third, of the critical roads and railroads.

c. Attrite VC/PAVN forces at an increasing rate, leading to the leveling off of enemy forces at the 150+ battalion level mentioned above (provided the Chinese do not supply "volunteers").

d. Ensure that friendly bases and government centers are defended under any foreseeable circumstances (though some district towns may be overrun and have to be retaken).

e. Lead to government control of an estimated 50 per cent of the population.

(In this last connection, Prime Minister Ky has stated that the Government now controls 25 per cent of the population and that it will take two years to raise the control to 50 per cent. The Mission and the Government have just initiated a 4-area priority pacification effort--emphasizing the Danang (389,000), Qui Nhon (650,000), Hoa Hao (800,000), and Saigon (3,500,000) areas. They believe that, taking account of the concentration of effort and resources required to make progress in pacification, these quite limited areas are all we can hope to handle during the next year.)

7. Evaluation. The situation at year's end could be either better or worse than implied by the above information. The reported drop in enemy morale and in quality of his recruits together with interdiction successes and continuity of the Ky government could lead to the start of snow-balling in our favor before December. On the other hand, if the enemy force build-up is as predicted and if attrition of that force and of its supplies fall short, we could find ourselves "behind the power curve" going into 1967; we could be faced with the requirement to deploy at least an additional 3-division corps (27 battalions) in 1967.

Our intelligence estimate is that the present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. They continue to believe that the war will be a long one, that time is their ally, and that their own staying power is superior to ours. They recognize that the US reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US troops can be expected. Even though the Communists will continue to suffer heavily from our ground and air action, we expect them, upon learning of any US intentions to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test US capabilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties (US killed in-action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month.)

If the US were willing to commit enough forces--perhaps 600,000 men or more--we could probably ultimately prevent the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a significant level. When this point was reached, however, the question of Chinese intervention would become critical. (We are generally agreed that the Chinese Communists will intervene with combat forces to prevent destruction of the Communist regime in North Vietnam; it is less clear whether they would intervene to prevent a DRV/VC defeat in the South.) The intelligence estimate is that the chances are a little better than even that, at this stage, Hanoi and Peiping would choose to reduce the effort in the South and try to salvage their resources for another day.

It follows, therefore, that the odds are about even that, even with the recommended deployments, we will be faced in early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much higher level, with pacification hardly underway and with the requirement for the deployment of still more US forces./2/

/2/The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe "that the evaluation set forth in paragraph 7 is on the pessimistic side in view of the constant and heavy military pressure which our forces in Southeast Asia will be capable of applying. While admittedly the following factors are to a degree imponderables, they believe that greater weight should be given to the following:

"a. The cumulative effect of our air campaign against the DRV on morale and DRV capabilities to provide and move men and material from the DRV to South Vietnam.

"b. The effects of constant attack and harassment on the ground and from the air upon the growth of Viet Cong forces and on the morale and combat effectiveness of Viet Cong/PAVN forces.

"c. The effect of destruction of Viet Cong base areas on the capabilities of VC/PAVN forces to sustain combat operations over an extended period of time.

"d. The constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue a struggle which they realize they cannot win in the face of progressively greater destruction of their country." [Footnote in the source text.]

RMN/3/

/3/The source text bears these handwritten initials indicating McNamara signed the original.

37. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:30 p.m. and passed to the White House.

2306. Ref: Embtel 2297./2/

/2/In telegram 2297, January 24, Kohler provided a brief report of his meeting with the DRV Charge. (Ibid.)

1. I met with Le Chang at 11:30 this morning accompanied by Akalovsky. I attempted establish whether there was some common language between two of us. He seemed to understand some English but insisted that conversation be conducted through his Russian interpreter; thus bulk of one hour 35 minute meeting consumed by double interpretation.

2. I opened by noting we had suspended bombing of DRV one month ago and had notified DRV officially of this in Rangoon. Pointed out our message had made clear suspension might continue if there was no major provocation and further extension would depend on response and reaction of DRV Govt. Expressed hope willingness DRV Govt to have Charge meet with me today might mean he had some response to transmit.

3. Le Chang said DRV position had been repeatedly stated, most recently in Jan 4 statement by their MFA spokesman./3/

/3/For excerpts from the January 4 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 742-744.

4. I noted there had been many suggestions from Hanoi itself, as well as from many others including Soviets, that cessation of bombing would create opportunity and conditions in which moves could be made towards peaceful solution in Vietnam. In seeking this meeting today, we thought there might be two possible purposes in direct conversations between DRV and US Govts. One such possibility might be to explore whether or not there could be reciprocal reduction of hostilities. As we have said, we could continue suspension of bombing if there were reciprocal action by DRV. We prepared recognize that there might be difficulties for DRV to make public statements admitting cessation of certain actions or responsibility for them; therefore, we thought if two sides had direct and confidential contact DRV could communicate to us re actions it proposed to take so that they would be fully understood by us. If this of interest to DRV, we prepared continue contact for this purpose.

5. In response my direct question whether there was such interest, Le Chang said DRV position remained unchanged and his govt adhered consistently to Geneva Accords. DRV position and its adherence to provisions of Geneva Accords reflected in DRV's four points. Those points recognize basic right of Vietnamese people to peace, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In accordance with Geneva Accords, US Govt should withdraw from Vietnam all troops and all armaments of any kind, as well as liquidate its military bases in, and military alliance with, South Vietnam.

6. I asked Le Chang whether he was talking about Pham Van Dong's four points and got affirmative reply. Le Chang continued that US Govt refused accept this position. As to suspension of bombing, US Govt has no right to bomb or strafe North Vietnam, and DRV regards such actions as act of war against its sovereign govt and as gross violation of Geneva Accords. Although US has said it had suspended temporarily bombing of North Vietnam, US Govt has been sending reconnaissance planes for intelligence and provocative actions. All these actions severely condemned by DRV. Indeed, temporary suspension of bombing of North Vietnam is for purpose of preparing new stage of escalation and expansion of war in Vietnam. In conducting such maneuvers, US pursuing objective of forcing other side to sit down at table and of forcing Vietnamese people accept conditions favorable to US and based on position of strength. During past month, while conducting so-called peace campaign, US has taken other actions as well. It has actually expanded its effort and sent to South Vietnam about 13,000 additional troops; it has sent Generals there to develop new plan for widening war; US and South Vietnamese puppet forces have conducted large scale operations, including use of gas and other toxic agents; and B-57's have been used to bomb and destroy villages in South Vietnam. Can all these actions be called peaceful initiative? While conducting so-called search for peace, US continued reconnaissance and provocative flights into North Vietnam and sending additional contingents to South Vietnam. All this creates serious tensions in this area. Therefore DRV position remains as stated and has not changed. US Govt should recognize position DRV Govt because DRV four points reflect all basic provisions Geneva Accords. It should not only recognize that position but also prove such recognition through practical deeds. At same time, US Govt must cease, unconditionally and forever, bombing of DRV. Only on this basis can a way be found for solving Vietnam question.

7. I said we had to recognize fact there military conflict between North and South Vietnam, in which US committed help South against what we regard as aggression from North. Even during period of suspension of bombing, during past month, we have had evidence of further DRV forces infiltrating to South Vietnam through Laos. Thus there is state of conflict and this is what we discussing here today. This sending of troops is also regarded by US as infringement Geneva Accords, which specifically state there should be no such troop movements and no use of force. In suspending bombing, however, we discontinued one aspect of hostilities and, as I had said, we could continue discussions of reduction of hostilities if DRV Govt interested in exploring such mutual reduction. Far from seeking to widen war, very fact I here today shows we interested in reducing and limiting war.

Even better than that, we could, if DRV Govt ready, use this contact to explore more formal possibilities for moving toward peace in Vietnam. Suspension of bombing in no sense effort to force other side sit down; rather it responsive to many suggestions we have had even from North Vietnamese sources that such suspension could lead to creation of conditions for peaceful settlement. Thus this is opportunity and not ultimatum. Fact my presence here today intended to indicate to him and his govt that we sincerely want peaceful solution in Vietnam. I then handed him 14 points, State of Union message, and Goldberg letter to U Thant, noting that they public knowledge but I wished give him texts officially.

8. Le Chang said DRV had those documents. Referring to my remark that we defending South Vietnam from aggression by North Vietnam and that we committed to South Vietnam, asserted US is distorting fight of Vietnamese people in order create pretext for expanding war in Vietnam, for maintaining hold on Vietnamese people and for retaining South Vietnam puppets, who have no popular support, do not represent anyone, and merely small group of traitors their fatherland.

9. I then said I very much wanted hear what Le Chang had to say and myself had many additional points to discuss, including DRV four points. However, I had diplomatic luncheon at 1:15 pm and therefore wondered whether this conversation could perhaps be continued at 4:00 pm today, or perhaps tomorrow, or at any time convenient to Le Chang, either at his Emb or, if more convenient, at my residence. I pointed out that it very important keep these discussions confidential and my absence from luncheon would require explanations which I wished avoid.

10. Le Chang said their Emb suitable meeting place. However, he had said everything he wished to say and therefore saw no need for further meeting unless I had some additional remarks to make. Specifically, he wished to know whether I had anything new to convey. I said that among other things I also wished discuss DRV four points and believed what I had to say would be new and important to Le Chang and his govt. After repeated inquiries by Le Chang whether I had something new to convey, and repeated affirmative responses from me, he finally said they would call us when they ready to meet again.

11. Le Chang then resumed what seemed like prepared statement, saying Vietnamese people love peace, which necessary for building their life, but peace connected with independence and freedom. Vietnam and its people far away from US and Vietnam has made no aggressive action against US. Source of, and immediate reason for, situation now obtaining in Vietnam is aggression by US. For 11 years it has systematically violated all provisions Geneva Accords acceptance of which it had solemnly stated. US has no right send troops to Vietnam or bomb or strafe North Vietnam. Therefore, if US ceases aggression peace will prevail on Vietnamese soil. Repeated that DRV position as formulated in four points reflects all basic provisions Geneva Accords, and therefore only basis for solution Vietnam question is acceptance by US Govt of DRV position and cessation forever of bombing and strafing DRV. Only then could one count on finding way for settlement. Also reiterated US Govt must prove acceptance DRV position through practical deeds. Asserted if US did so, that would be in accord with interest and honor of US, interest Vietnamese people and peoples throughout world.

12. I said I would be glad continue discussion as soon as possible since I had many important points to make, some of them also relating to what he had said.

13. Le Chang then said that if US had anything to say it could meet with DRV reps in Rangoon in order to do so or to learn DRV position. DRV reps in Rangoon prepared clarify DRV position if necessary.

14. In response my question whether this meant Rangoon preferred place of contact, Le Chang said he wished repeat that if our Amb Rangoon wanted say something on behalf his govt or obtain clarification DRV position he could do so with DRV reps there. However, this did not mean that he, Le Chang, not prepared meet me, although such meetings difficult to set up; his Emb had a very heavy schedule these days and he had had to cancel some commitments to meet with me today. I said I would promptly report his remarks, particularly re Rangoon. He then returned three papers I had given him, saying that in addition to already being available to his govt they also referred to aggression by DRV. He could, however, accept any formal communication from my govt to his govt I might wish to give him. He repeated that there would be no point in having further meetings if I had nothing new to say and that DRV position had been consistent and remained unchanged. This position reasonable, and if US Govt recognized it and stopped bombing way for settlement could be found. He noted that he agreed our discussions should be kept confidential, as stated in my letter to him (Embtel 2239)./4/

/4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

15. In leaving at 1:10 pm, I told him I would await a call at his earliest convenience.

Kohler

38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. For text of Rusk's testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 133-187.

SUBJECT
Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 24, 1966

Thirteen Members of the Committee, including Senator Mansfield and excluding Senator Morse, were present for a large part of this morning's briefing, in which the atmosphere was frankly more friendly and less critical than I expected. A number of the Senators were complimentary about the "Meet the Press" TV show last evening. My opening statement was confined to the present negotiating situation and our assessment of the attitudes of the various parties, which I repeatedly cautioned was extraordinarily sensitive.

Senator Fulbright opened the questioning with a considerable discussion of the problem of dealing with the National Liberation Front, attempting to draw out, by a discussion of the history since 1940, that it might represent a continuity of the basic opposition to French colonialism, and that our willingness to deal with the NLF might be the key to satisfactory negotiations. This subject was referred to throughout the questioning by several other Members, and we had a full airing of the difference between recognizing the NLF on an equal footing with governments, and bringing it into the picture as just one minority element in South Vietnam. Senator Fulbright remained sceptical of the difference.

Senator Hickenlooper aired some concerns that the continued bombing pause, which he feared might be extended through Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Moscow in February, might give the enemy an undesirable chance to regroup and strengthen themselves. I informed him that Wilson had not asked us to postpone the bombing through his visit and that the decision would be taken on its merits after weighing all factors.

There was extensive discussion of alternatives of all sorts. In an obvious effort to be helpful, Senator Lausche asked where we would draw the line in Southeast Asia, if we don't hold it in Vietnam. The view was also expressed by Senator Case that we are getting in a position where we will have to shoulder the responsibility of containing every war of national liberation without assistance from our Allies. While I have no illusions of having changed any positions (although Senator Clark seemed a little less withdrawal-minded than usual), I again feel that the subject was thoroughly aired.

There was considerable discussion about our willingness to accept free elections without anything very much new having been added, and with Senator Fulbright quoting General Eisenhower's book to the effect that if there had been free elections in 1956, about 80% of the South Vietnamese would have voted for Ho Chi Minh./2/

/2/In his 1963 memoir The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, Eisenhower stated, "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai." (p. 372)

Senator Symington requested my estimate of whether the Chinese would be brought in if we bombed Hanoi or Haiphong and landed troops at Vinh to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail, saying that many of the American officials he consulted during his travels in Southeast Asia did not think they would. I replied that while it is difficult to predict with certainty what the Chinese would do, in my judgment such action would increase the chances of Chinese Communist intervention.

Several questions in a similar vein brought a reasonable degree of consensus on my statement that our present general course of measured action was ultimately less likely to provoke a nuclear war than either of the major alternatives of either abandoning Vietnam or a major escalation on our part.

Senator Pell advanced the Gavin theory of perimeter defense/3/ as an alternative to which I noted some objections, but the question was not completely explored.

/3/For an analysis of Gavin's theory by the JCS, see Document 61.

Senator Symington raised the question of adequate control of CIA, referring to the Sunday/4/ editorial in the Washington Post. He had earlier confided to me that his question would be designed to pre-empt and undercut a similar question by Senator McCarthy.

/4/January 23.

Senator Pell was somewhat obdurate in questioning the credibility of the Administration's view that there have been no peace initiatives by Hanoi and cited the Schoenbrun article last November/5/ to try to prove his point. I hammered the point that the original initiatives were taken by third parties and not by Hanoi, but Pell remained unconvinced.

/5/Not further identified.

Consultation: Perhaps the single matter most concerning the Members was the extent and method by which they would be consulted prior to taking crucial decisions on the conduct of the conflict. There was general agreement that we were right in not declaring war, but all felt we should bring the Congress in on major decisions. Several Members, primarily on the Democratic side, requested consultation by you with the whole Committee, before resuming bombing of North Vietnam. Senator Pell went so far as to suggest that you should also consult with the Committee, before substantially increasing our forces and also on the relative merits of holding a few enclaves versus more aggressive action by our forces in South Vietnam. Senator Mundt, on the other hand, favored consultation with you on policy, but opposed consultation on tactical questions, among which he characterized resuming the bombing in North Vietnam and Laos, the selection of targets, etc. He observed that the war could not be won by Committee quarterbacking. Nonetheless, almost all Members of both parties specifically mentioned the feeling that the Chairman of the Committee was not always included with the Leadership in consultation on key decisions. I was requested, and promised, to transmit their views to you.

Senator Case asked some questions about long-term objectives, if we were going to make a greater physical commitment. I offered to set up an informal session myself with those who might wish to discuss the broader philosophical implications, including such thorny questions as "spheres of influence" and our own posture in the world.

I came away with the impression that what most of the Members most wanted was a chance to sit down with you on a give-and-take discussion basis rather than for formal presentations and disclosures of pending decisions. While I am aware of the great difficulty of doing this with this Committee as a whole, given the several other Committees in both Houses, who would consider themselves entitled to equal treatment, I do feel that the time is perhaps ripe for us to take another look at the problem of Presidential consultation./6/

/6/On January 25 Rusk sent a memorandum to President Johnson summarizing his briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that morning, noting that both Chairman Morgan and Representative Zablocki raised the issue of Presidential consultation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII)

DR

39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 24, 1966, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. The memorandum was attached to a note from Juanita Roberts, the President's secretary, dated January 24, 6:10 p.m., that reads: "For your meeting at 6:15 p.m."

SUBJECT
Pros and cons of immediate resumption of the bombing

I think this question narrows to one of timing. The arguments for a complete end of the bombing are unacceptable, and no one wants to bomb Hanoi tomorrow morning.

The real question is whether it is better to resume within the next two days or to wait another week or two.

The argument for prompt resumption has the following elements:

1. We can get started just ahead of a chorus of restraining voices which talk of delay but which really will always oppose any resumption.

2. The Saigon cables tell us that we will have real trouble with the GVN if we wait much longer.

3. The enemy has it within his power to give us a troublesome and ambiguous signal any minute, and it is a wonder he hasn't done it already.

4. The Republicans will begin to make headway if we keep hesitating.

5. Every day of delay is that much of trouble to our own troops.

6. We have already done more than we set out to do, and we will show weakness in patience if we continue.

The arguments for a delay are more subtle but they are not feeble.

1. There are still a lot of people of genuine good will who think that another week or two might show real progress. They cite the discussions on prisoner exchanges, the Vientiane open wire/2/ the pressure from nearly all our friends abroad. (Goldberg rehearsed these points on Saturday.)/3/

/2/The following words were typed after "Vientiane open wire" but then crossed out: "(a pretty feeble one)."

/3/January 29.

2. It is quite possible that Hanoi really wants us to resume the bombing and is trying to push us into that position while pretending to keep the Vientiane line open.

3. There has not been any important military action by Hanoi in the South, and until there is, we can easily say to our friends in Saigon that the suspension of bombing has in fact lowered the rate of aggression.

4. The country knows very well that the President is not weak, and is quite ready to stay with him another two weeks on the present peace effort.

5. It is quite possible to delay from day to day with no real loss and to wait for the Communists to stir up the fighting by a more impressive outrage than the one in Danang today.

Whenever the bombing resumes, it seems to me that the case is persuasive for a very carefully selected set of targets which should combine, as far as possible, the following characteristics: (a) low risks; (b) consistency with previous bombing patterns; (c) immediate relationship to the aggression against South Vietnam.

McG. B.

40. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 24, 1966, 6:30-7:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, Valenti

Bundy: Westmoreland says (through Porter) that he can wait a few days after Tet before resuming, but not longer. Increasing risk. "Undue risk particularly in IV Corps zone."

President: What danger waiting for day or two?

Taylor: No danger in day or two, but no longer.

McNamara: I feel exactly that way. Don't see the political gain in waiting.

(Bob Anderson told me that Ike told the Koreans he was tired of nothing happening and he was ready to drop the A bomb. Sent word through Nehru that there would be no sanctuary.)

(Rusk gave President a memo to read from Doug MacArthur on Rusk's meeting with Senators.)/2/

/2/Not found, but see Document 38.

Rusk: Important problem as to whether you see Fulbright. You would shore up some opposition if you saw Fulbright. Committee would have no serious problem if you see Fulbright.

President: Today we had five leaders--four for us and Mansfield against us.

In the House we'd get Ford, Arends, and Mahon. Don't know about Bow. Rivers and Bates are with us. We'll lose only Fulbright and Mansfield.

How long does it take to communicate an order through Westmoreland? If we tell them we're ready, how long before target selected and ready to go?

McNamara: 24 hours, I'd say. It would be better if we gave them the kind of target.

President: Are they doing us any damage now?

McNamara: After Tet, I can't say. They have thrown mortars at us.

President: What do you recommend, Dean?

Rusk: Make firm decision to resume on Friday or Saturday./3/

/3/January 28 and 29.

Full report submitted to Security Council beginning with Laotian Conference in 1962.

Wilson's appointment to Moscow was announced before the pause, so he has no critical reason to hold us back.

President: Bob, what do you recommend?

McNamara: I'd go sooner. Political delay can be damaging. Start Wednesday. Don't feel strongly Wednesday or Thursday./4/

/4/January 26 and 27.

Taylor: The sooner the better. Wouldn't want longer than 48 hours.

Rusk: Reaction to our Ambassadors' cables is that most governments are expecting this.

President: I think we'll spend a good deal of political capital in resuming. I don't agree with Bob or General Taylor in that we'll gain politically from this.

I think we ought to--quietly--visit with Dirksen and see how he feels. Quietly talk to a couple of Republicans in the House. Then next morning, meet with leadership, when I'm ready to go--so they can't leak anything.

Suggest we talk briefly now about type of target and weight.

(McNamara?): (1) Small attack on infiltration point--advantage of directly relating to infiltration route. Disadvantage--it alerts the enemy--and ruins surprise. (2) Perishable targets. (3) POL. Advantage is surprise and antiaircraft will be less alert. Recommend against POL though, and recommend perishable targets. Recommend against targets north of Hanoi.

President: Why don't we tell the leaders that if we continue to get pictures of supplies coming down, we must stop them. It will make it difficult for Fulbright to argue against this. I won't say anything specific, but I will say I can't wait forever for these supplies to come down.

Bundy: I'm having a sanitized document prepared to show communist activity. It is a persuasive document (Bundy showed President the document)./5/

/5/Entitled "Evidence of Continuing Vietnamese Communist War Preparations," undated. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI)

Only problem is the one which we haven't closed down. All else shows nothing.

We are left with Vientiane. My brother went over it with the British and Australians. Both said, "You'll have to hold off until you hear more."

Rusk: If you are going to see Dirksen, I urge you to see Fulbright and Hickenlooper before you make a decision.

Taylor: On the bombing program, I hope we'll get back to hitting the key rail and bridges. POL will help stop the trucks, too.

Rusk: Think we ought to knock out the power stations and POL south of the 24th parallel.

McNamara: We have.

President: Be prepared to meet tomorrow afternoon. Bring Wheeler.

Rusk: Got to give thought to a statement with the communist world in mind.

Bundy: How many friends ought to get a pilot message that we have just about made up our minds?

Rusk: We probably already have done that with our previous cables.

(Decided--with the lead of Bundy--that a White House statement be issued--and Rusk to hold a backgrounder citing chapter and verse.)

President: When you go to Sharp, Bob, tell him we are thinking along these possibilities--and get their views.

Rusk: Tragedy about situation is that Fulbright statement urging extending the pause and recognizing the Viet Cong. Times will pick it up and applaud it.

Bundy: And denounce us for smothering debate.

McNamara: Ask Sharp to reply by 5 p.m. our time tomorrow. They can be ready after . . .

(Discussion on whether to send Vice President with Freeman to Saigon. Taylor, McNamara worried about security. Bundy and Rusk join in to advise against sending him.)

About leadership:

Instead of having all together, bring into Mansion the Senate group--and later in the day, bring in House group.

Meeting ended at 7:30.

41. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 25, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Secret; Nodis. During a telephone conversation at 9:20 a.m. on January 26, President Johnson discussed this memorandum briefly with Ball and Rusk and indicated that he had read it. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)

SUBJECT
The Resumption of Bombing Poses Grave Danger of Precipitating a War With China

In my recent memorandum to you/2/ I expressed the conviction that--if the war is to be won--it must be won in the South. In my view, the bombing of the North cannot win the war, only enlarge it. The most important item on the balance sheet against resumption of bombing is the danger of escalation.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 32.

I recognize the difficulty and complexity of the problem and I do not wish to add to your burdens. But before a final decision is made on this critical issue, I feel an obligation to amplify and document my strong conviction: that sustained bombing of North Viet-Nam will more than likely lead us into war with Red China--probably in six to nine months. And it may well involve at least a limited war with the Soviet Union.

This is necessarily a view based on personal judgment. It cannot be proved as one proves a mathematical proposition. But I have not arrived at it lightly. It stems from a conviction that there are forces at work on both sides of the conflict that will operate in combination to bring about this result.

I have tried in this memorandum to describe these forces as I see them.

I.

Why Our Bombing Will Escalate

No matter how firmly we intend to limit our air offensive against North Viet-Nam, we will move inexorably toward the destruction of increasingly sensitive targets. This is not a question of bad faith on anybody's part. It is part of a process demonstrated over time: that a sustained bombing program acquires a life and dynamism of its own.

There are several reasons for this:

A. Our philosophy of bombing requires gradual escalation.

Admittedly, we have never had a generally agreed rationale for bombing North Viet-Nam. But the inarticulated major premise has always been that bombing will somehow, some day, and in some manner, create pressure on Hanoi to stop the war. This is accepted as an article of faith, not only by the military who have planning and operational responsibilities but by most civilian advocates of bombing in the Administration.

Yet it is also widely accepted that for bombing to have this desired political effect, we must gradually extend our attack to increasingly vital targets. In this way--it is contended--we will constantly threaten Hanoi that if it continues its aggression it will face mounting costs--with the destruction of its economic life at the end of the road.

B. We have given effect to this philosophy in the pattern of bombing so far.

In the eleven months that we have been bombing North Viet-Nam, we have gradually shifted from military targets located in the southern part of North Viet-Nam and directly associated with infiltration to targets in the Northeast Quadrant associated more with the economy of the country and its lifelines to China than with the movement of men and supplies to the South.

This progression is graphically shown on the attached chart./3/ As the chart discloses, we have been bombing closer and closer to the Chinese border. At the same time we have been closing in on the Hanoi-Haiphong area, steadily constricting the geographical scope of immunity.

/3/Attached but not printed.

C. Chinese-Soviet and DRV action will force escalation.

The inevitable escalation of our bombing will result not only because of the dynamics of the process but because the enemy will not stand still.

Our bombing of North Viet-Nam cannot be conducted in a vacuum any more than it has been in the past. We began bombing as an act of response to an incident of terror in the South. More of those incidents will occur--presumably at an increasing pace as our deployments grow larger.

Chinese and Soviet aid will also tend to increase the pressures for bombing escalation. As more SAMs are installed, we will be compelled to take them out in order to safeguard our aircraft. This will mean killing more Russians or Chinese and putting greater pressure on those two nations for increased effort.

Each extension of our bombing to more sensitive areas will increase the risk to our aircraft and compel a further extension of bombing to protect the expanded bombing activities we have staked out.

D. The pressures to bomb sensitive targets will increase.

Unless we achieve dramatic successes in the South--which no one expects--we will be led by frustration to hit increasingly more sensitive targets:

1. to mine Haiphong harbor;

2. to destroy POL supplies;

3. to destroy the system of power stations; and

4. to attack airfields.

Each of these target objectives has already been recommended to you by one of your principal military or civilian advisers in Washington or Saigon; each has a special significance for the major Communist capitals.

The mining of Haiphong harbor would impose a major decision on the Soviet Union. Could it again submit to a blockade, as at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and thus lose its only link with Hanoi that does not cross Chinese territory or air space? Or should it retaliate by sending increased aid or even volunteers to North Viet-Nam or by squeezing the United States at some other vital point, such as Berlin?

Would North Viet-Nam accept the blockade of its harbor without launching some kind of attack against the crowded harbor of Saigon? Or would the Soviet Union feel compelled to provide surface-to-surface missiles with conventional warheads targeted on Saigon harbor or US fleet units?

The bombing of POL would put great pressure on North Viet-Nam (with the possible assistance of China) to launch some kind of attack against the exposed POL in Saigon harbor.

Any attack against Saigon harbor or our POL supplies would in turn put enormous pressure on the United States to retaliate with some further act of escalation.

The bombing of the airfields would very likely lead the DRV to request the use of Chinese air bases north of the border for the basing of North Vietnamese planes, or even to request the intervention of Chinese air. This would pose the most agonizing dilemma for us. Consistent with our decision to bomb the North, we could hardly permit the creation of a sanctuary from which our own planes could be harassed. Yet there is general agreement that for us to bomb China would very likely lead to a direct war with Peiping and would--in principle at least--trigger the Sino-Soviet Defense Pact, which has been in force for fifteen years.

To bomb the energy sources of North Viet-Nam would threaten the industrial life of the country. Yet, as noted by the Special Memorandum of January 19, 1966/4/ approved by the Board of National Estimates, none of these attacks--on the harbor or POL or the power stations--"would, in itself, have a critical impact on the combat activity of the Communist forces in South Viet-Nam."

/4/See footnote 4, Document 32.

It would not, in other words, impair the fighting capabilities of the Viet Cong. But it would profoundly affect the pressures on the major Communist powers to engage themselves more deeply in the war.

II.

How the War Can Start

We must judge the possibility of war with China not only in light of the forces that are at work to enlarge and intensify the bombing on our side, but the forces at work on the other, as well.

Quite clearly there is a threshold which we cannot pass over without precipitating a major Chinese involvement. We do not know--even within wide margins of error--where that threshold is. Unhappily we will not find out until after the catastrophe.

We did not measure the threshold adequately in Korea. We found out how low it was only after 300,000 Chinese descended on us.

I think it quite clear that both China and the Soviet Union recognize a major distinction between the loss of a War of National Liberation and the capitulation of a sister Socialist state under direct air attack by an "imperialist" power. We can do almost anything we like in the South, with little if any danger of directly involving the big Communist powers. But there are several things that we cannot, in my judgment, do in North Viet-Nam without the practical certainty of involving at least Red China.

a. I do not think that China can stand by and let us destroy the industrial life of North Viet-Nam without increasing its assistance to the point where, sooner or later, we will almost certainly collide with Chinese interests in such a way as to bring about a Chinese involvement.

b. At some point our bombers are likely to be so harassed by MIGs that we will feel compelled--to save the lives of pilots--to take out the North Vietnamese airfields and the planes that are on them. Recently, we have received reports of MIG-21s in North Viet-Nam. I cannot believe that we can go on much longer bombing more and more sensitive targets without increasing MIG encounters.

Yet when we do take out DRV air bases, we can reasonably expect Hanoi to ask assistance from the Chinese, either in the form of airfields in China or the actual use of Chinese planes and pilots. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize this possibility. They have already requested permission to engage in hot pursuit over Chinese Communist air space "in light of the increasing Chicom MIG threat" and because of "the likelihood that other hostile air forces will utilize Chicom bases as a sanctuary."

III.

Both the Soviet Union and Red China are Increasing Their Commitments to North Viet-Nam and Red China Is Making Active War Preparations

A. The Soviet Union

Mr. Shelepin's visit to Hanoi resulted in promises of increased aid. The exact nature of the aid was not specified. Less than a month before, on December 22, the Soviet Union had promised increased economic aid. Almost certainly Shelepin's promise contained a substantial component of military assistance. Our intelligence indicates that large ships are already en route.

B. Red China

Our resumed bombing will almost certainly bring stepped-up Chinese aid to the DRV. The Board of National Estimates has recognized this. They state, in their memorandum of January 19 (page 9), that "It is likely that [the Chinese]/5/ would respond to enlarged air attacks on the DRV with greatly increased logistic support, including large additional numbers of engineer and supply troops and, possibly, anti-aircraft units."

/5/Brackets in the source text.

Peiping has steadily increased its covert cooperation. It has sent regular army engineer units into North Viet-Nam, is sending Chinese Communist fighters over North Viet-Nam, and is improving both sea and land communication routes to North Viet-Nam.

War Preparations in China

Even more significant than its stepped-up aid to Hanoi are the increased signs that China is making materiel as well as psychological preparations for war, particularly in the South and Southwest parts of the country.

The Weekly Intelligence Digest (WID) 52-65 December 24, 1965, of the Pacific Command states (page 11):

"Current activities include increased military use of the railroads with concurrent restrictions on civil use, stepped-up efforts to complete vitally needed rail links in Yunnan Province, recall of railroad personnel to duty, military build-up, intensified indoctrination of the population and evacuation of women and children from the cities. Curfews and travel restrictions are in effect. Efforts to speed the development of air warning and installations of air defense systems, including emplacement of anti-aircraft guns, have been indicated. Some key industries are reportedly being relocated and the government is said to be developing contingency plans for the emergency evacuation of its offices from the cities. New airfields are also being built."

Air Fields and Air Defense

Communist China's military preparations since the Gulf of Tonkin have focused upon the correction of its major weaknesses, notably air facilities and air defense in South China.

The focal point of this effort has been an all-out drive to construct or radically improve half a dozen large airfields in South China. Some of these are clearly not positioned solely for the defense of China but appear related to the Vietnamese war. (See accompanying map.)/6/

/6/Attached but not printed.

Simultaneously with this construction program, a high proportion of Peiping's advanced jet fighters has been deployed to South China. Eighteen months ago there were virtually no MIG-19s or 21s in this area. As of January 1966, more than one-half of China's estimated 230 MIG-19s and one-third of its 35-odd MIG-21s were based in South and Southwest China. In all, some 350 jet fighters are based on Chinese Communist fields within two hundred miles or less from North Viet-Nam.

Accompanying these twin developments has come evidence of growing coordination between the air defense systems of North Viet-Nam and South China as well as of more aggressive air patrolling by Chinese fighters, not only along their southern border, but over North Viet-Nam as well.

Troop Deployments

Chinese ground forces already in South China are not only adequate for local defense, but they exceed the number that can be readily transported over existing lines of communication into mainland Southeast Asia. An estimated 151,000 troops are in the Kunming Military Region (Yunnan and Kweichow Provinces) opposite Burma, Laos, and western North Viet-Nam. Another 317,000 are deployed in the adjacent Canton Military Region (Kwangtung, Hunan and Kwangsi Provinces) bordering North Viet-Nam.

The Weekly Intelligence Digest of 24 December estimates that for a Chinese attack into Southeast Asia in conjunction with North Vietnamese forces, less than half of the nearly one-half million troops now located in the Canton and Kunming Military Regions would be required. Reinforcing divisions could be provided from elsewhere in China. Though there have been no indications of large-scale redeployments of Chinese forces toward Southeast Asian borders, this could be accomplished in a relatively short time with little strategic warning. The flow of military supplies to South and Southwest China is believed to have increased in recent months.

Improvement of LOCs

The same Weekly Intelligence Digest also points out (page 11) that it is the capacity of lines of communication for logistic support into Southeast Asia, not the size of forces available that control the magnitude of a Communist invasion. In Yunnan Province, the Chinese are improving logistic lines to provide better access to North Viet-Nam and to the China-Laos and China-Burma border areas.

Similarly the rail construction program in Southwest China has been greatly intensified in the past year. A new line between Kueiyang (Kweichow Province) and Liuchou (Kwangsi Province) which connects with the main railroad between the DRV and Central China became operational in late 1965.

While ninety percent of China's bulk storage of POL is in the eastern and coastal provinces, a separate military reserve storage program was recently identified of which a large proportion is in South China. Construction was begun on these facilities several years ago, but it was considerably increased in tempo during the past year.

Political Preparations

In contrast to military and civil defense contingency preparations which have been undertaken behind a curtain of secrecy, the psychological preparation of the population has been, in large part, out in the open. "War preparation" conferences and neighborhood briefings have been held in secret; apparently, however, they tend to take their cue from public pronouncements. Since Spring 1965, there has been a barrage of propaganda on the "people's war". These preparations and the level of warning have tended to increase in recent months.

Since year-end, there are indications that Peiping considers the prospects of war with the United States have increased. Chen Yi acknowledged that the Third Five-Year Plan to begin in 1966 would have to take into account both the war in Viet-Nam and its implications for China. Another regime spokesman, Liao Cheng-chih, in a January 20 message to overseas Chinese, stated: "We are planning all our tasks on the basis of the assumption that US imperialism will forcibly impose a war upon us." And a Peiping radio domestic broadcast on January 18, describing a recent military political work conference, stated in regard to the US imperialist threat: "A test of strength with us is inevitable and this will come only in a matter of time."

IV.

We Cannot Count on the Chinese Thinking as We Do

We face the real and present danger that we may miscalculate the threshold of Chinese intervention as we did in Korea by assuming that the Chinese think as we do. In dealing with a people as complicated and remote as the Chinese, logic is not enough, since it may rest on quite mistaken premises. We must look at the evidence as well.

This becomes sharply clear when we consider the usual arguments against the possibility of Chinese intervention./7/

/7/In analyzing the "usual arguments," Ball drew heavily on a January 24 memorandum from Allen Whiting of INR. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam)

A. "If Peiping were intending to intervene it would have done so by now."

It is constantly argued that since--by escalating slowly--we have got away with our bombing attacks so far, we can continue to escalate with relative impunity.

The argument runs, in a more sophisticated form, that if Peiping were prepared to intervene it would have done so long since. By standing down it has suffered loss of prestige--particularly in the face of increasing Soviet help--and has permitted North Viet-Nam to suffer severe damage.

The answer to this is that until recently--after the arrival of our massive deployments--we were taking a licking in South Viet-Nam. Now the situation has changed and the need for Chinese intervention has greatly increased.

Moreover, one should never forget the behavior of the Chinese during the first five months of the Korean War. No Chinese troops came to give North Korea the punch necessary to push UN forces from their toe hold at Pusan. The Chinese erected no defenses along the 38th parallel to stop a UN invasion when the Inchon landing turned the tide. Even Pyongyang was sacrificed, as was virtually all of the industrial and agricultural area of North Korea. The general estimate in Washington by October 1950 was quite logical: if Peiping had intended intervention it would have done so by then.

Yet Chinese Communist troops crossed the Yalu October 14, engaged UN forces October 26, and massively counterattacked General MacArthur's armies November 26.

Today only the most reckless will assure you that we know when Peiping will feel it necessary to intervene to safeguard its own military and political interests.

B. "Peiping fears war with the United States and seeks to avoid it."

Another popular contention is that the Chinese are unwilling to expose their hard-won industry and nuclear capability to US air attack. They, therefore, will avoid any measures that might lead to such retaliation.

The Chinese have, however, watched the slow escalation of our bombing for eleven months and they must assume that if bombing is resumed it will be at an increasingly higher level of intensity. If they were fearful of being put in a position where they might be compelled to intervene, one would expect them to encourage measures (a) to bring about a prolongation of our pause, and (b) to facilitate negotiations.

Instead, Peiping has done everything possible to prevent such measures being taken. It has denounced the pause as a "peace swindle". It has vehemently and incessantly attacked each of our Fourteen Points. It has gone much farther in vilifying United States actions and intentions than has Hanoi.

C. It would make no sense for Communist China to intervene with air support."

Another popular argument is that if China intervened it would use its massive ground forces and would not risk its relatively small obsolete air force against United States air power. Thus, it is contended, there is little chance that Peiping would either use its air to attack US aircraft over Viet-Nam or would provide safe haven for DRV fighters.

The logic of this analysis was shared by almost the entire Washington intelligence community until recently. Now, however, the increasing evidence that Hanoi and Peiping are preparing to cooperate in defending North Viet-Nam against air attack has led the representatives of NSA, INR and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, to conclude:

"That the chances are about even that the Chinese, if requested by the DRV, would permit DRV aircraft to intervene from Chinese bases, or would even do so with their own aircraft in the event of continued US air attacks near the Chinese border. They would not expect any of these measures, of themselves, to repel the US attacks militarily, but would hope to make our operations increasingly costly and possibly deter further US escalation while running high but acceptable risks of being bombed themselves." (SNIE 10-12-65, Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course of Action, 10 December 1965, p. 6)/8/

/8/Not printed. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)

D. "Even if the Chinese did intervene with air support we could take out the bases in South China with little trouble."

The consequences of our attacking Chinese bases would be far-reaching. In calculating Communist responses to such attacks, the United States Intelligence Board has stated:

"There is an almost even chance that the Chinese choice would be to break off the air battle and make political moves designed to dissuade the US from continuing its bombings of the DRV. On balance, however, we think it somewhat more likely that they would make a major military response to the continuation or expansion of US strikes against China.The exact combination and timing of military moves would vary greatly. If they had not already done so, Chinese Communist forces would probably move into North Viet-Nam. Chinese or additional DRV forces would probably move into Northern Laos. The DRV armed forces, with Chinese support, would probably open an offensive against South Viet-Nam. Thailand would be threatened, especially if its bases were used in air attacks against China." (SNIE 10-5-65, Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, 28 April 1965, pp. 8-9)/9/

/9/Not printed. (Ibid., INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 10-5-65)

V.

Have Been Burned Once Before

In October, 1950, in Korea, we faced a similar question as to Chinese intentions. The intelligence community at that time was confident that the Chinese would not intervene. We should never forget the implications of the following colloquy between President Truman and General MacArthur:

"'In your opinion,' President Truman asked General MacArthur, 'is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?'

"MacArthur shook his head. 'I'd say there's very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river our air force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas.'

"At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking, there were already more than 100,000 Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike--and the ROK, American and other UN forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over, the Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million men." (Lawson's "The United States in the Korean War," pg. 79).

George W. Ball

[end of document]

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