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Department Seal

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968
Volume IV
Vietnam, 1966

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

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VIETNAM, 1966

321. Memorandum From Richard Holbrooke of the White House Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Komer)/1/

Washington, December 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075, Vietnam--1966. Secret. Also sent to Leonhart. On December 1 Komer sent copies to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Vance, Katzenbach, McNaughton, and William Bundy. (Ibid.) The source text is marked "Sec Def has seen."

SUBJECT
Vietnam Trip Report: October 26-November 18, 1966

Returning to Vietnam after an absence of five months, I was first struck by how little things have changed. Sitting in on discussions within the Mission and hearing the same tired old arguments, visiting the Delta and listening to the same recital of difficulties and shortcomings, getting a constant refrain from each part of the Vietnam mosaic produced as if by rote--all emphasized the glacial pace at which real events happen in Vietnam, as opposed to the wild fluctuations in mood that grip the U.S. Government.

Political

The most encouraging developments were unquestionably political. The September elections were important primarily because they took place. The first hesitant steps of the Constituent Assembly, while they give no clear picture of the future course, hint at the encouraging possibility of a new and younger leadership emerging for Vietnam--not tied to the old French ways, and less reliant on the dangerous covert and conspiratorial methods of politics which are a Vietnamese tradition. While I was in Saigon the C.A. chose its "blocs," and the delegates began tentative groupings. The most observant members of the Political Section were impressed with the process.

But the dangers in the political situation are still very near the surface. Both regionalism and the growing civilian-military split are issues now out in the open. If they ever reinforce each other through some unfortunate combination, then the delicate balances that now exist could tumble. It is still not unfair to say that there is no real government in Vietnam, in the sense of a functioning administrative and political structure which can pass the word out, and get the job done. This is not merely because the GVN lacks good leaders; it is also the result of a political structure still so fragmented and weak that division commanders can choose those orders they intend to obey, and Ministries can follow their own paths regardless of the desires of the Prime Minister. With such fragmentation as a backdrop it is difficult to get the GVN to swing its entire weight behind a single program (Revolutionary Development, Hop Tac, and the efforts to break the port bottleneck are recent examples). When all the factions agree on something, they can do it, as demonstrated September 11. A final danger to an evolving political process is the American presence, which can be both a beneficial catalyst and an oppressive burden. While we often play a vitally constructive role--as we did in encouraging the elections--or an essential preventive role--in stopping coup attempts--our massive presence creates some dangerous vulnerabilities (see last section).

The US Mission

In the almost four years I have worked on Vietnam, and served in the Mission, I have never seen the Americans in such disarray. This is the result of a rapid buildup, great pressure from higher headquarters, rapid personnel turnover, poor results in the effort against the VC and great personal frustration, poor leadership, fatigue, the absence of families and the resulting abnormal social life. MACV and the civilian mission have been steadily drifting apart. The Ambassador has tended to allow this to happen, showing little inclination for the difficult job of welding together the entire mission./2/ In this atmosphere, with the Vietnamese getting further away every day from a mission turning steadily inward, a reorganization along the lines of your paper of August 7/3/ could only serve to strengthen and streamline the Mission, and provide the tools with which to exert greater influence over the GVN. Such a reorganization is now taking place, along lines virtually identical to Alternative Two of the August paper. (Most significant difference: Westmoreland has so far rejected a Deputy Commander for Pacification/RD.)

/2/In a November 9 letter to Rufus Phillips, Lansdale stated: "There's such a dirty power-struggle going on behind-the-scenes among Americans that it's time that someone talked plain turkey to them about the war and Viet Nam. Incidentally, the civilian vs. military aspects are getting ludicrous--in Mission Council meetings, Porter's bi-weekly meetings, etc." (Hoover Institution, Lansdale Papers, Correspondence, Phillips, Rufus)

/3/Not further identified.

I think the reorganization plans look good. They will put every American civilian in the provinces into a single operational chain of command, reporting directly to the Deputy Ambassador. USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS will no longer have their own men in the provinces; rather, they will assume a staff relationship to Ambassador Porter and the field, and all communications to the provinces will go through a new Office of Operations, to be headed by Wade Lathram, who will be a member of the Mission Council. His headquarters staff will consist of the combined staffs now called USAID/Field Operations, USAID/Refugees, USAID/Public Safety, JUSPAO/Field Services, and OSA/Cadre Operations. Porter intends to regroup these offices, now spread out across the city of Saigon, into a single building, USAID #2 (the building next to the Xa Loi pagoda on Ngo Thoi Nghiem street), and he will locate himself there.

In each Region/Corps, Porter will select a Senior Civilian Repre-sentative, who will command all US civilian operations in the area. His staff will be the merged staffs of the existing agencies. At the province level, a senior civilian representative will be chosen, who will also command the US civilians in the province. The Senior Civilian Province Representative, who will be chosen by Porter on the basis of merit regardless of parent agency, will write the efficiency reports of all the American civilians in the province, and will be the sole US civilian advisor to the Province Chief--the equivalent of the MACV Sector Advisor. The present system of multiple advisors, often giving conflicting advice, will cease.

Porter gives every indication of digging in and taking charge. He is definitely looking forward to the new organization. Its importance is substantial. For the first time since the buildup, American civilians in the field will look to one office in Saigon for guidance. At the same time, the job remaining to the agency chiefs--MacDonald, Hart, and Zorthian--is substantial. MacDonald will retain control of the technical divisions of USAID, and be responsible for programs operating through the technical ministries such as Agriculture, Health, and Public Works. He retains primary responsibility, along with Wehrle, for the economic stabilization program. He must administer the huge CIP program. Zorthian is still responsible for elements of advice to the Ministry of Information, although his Field Services Division and the advice for VIS and Chieu Hoi both pass to the new organization. He remains the channel for technical assist-ance and advice. He still handles directly for the Ambassador the delicate problem of the U.S. correspondents in Vietnam. Hart remains in control of the covert operations of his agency. Special arrangements are now being worked out to safeguard covert and unilateral activity, particularly those of the Special Branch. All this is quite hopeful. Within the next ninety days, it is unlikely that measurable results will be available showing that this new structure is going to enable us to win the war any faster. But within ninety days we will be able to see whether or not this new organization holds promise of more effective management of the US Mission. I believe it does, and that it could have been accomplished months ago. But at least the Mission has finally made a start; now it needs support in Washington. This will include support for a better and more responsive personnel recruiting system here, drawing far more from the Foreign Service, finding better people from AID.

Ambassador Porter expressed particular concern over the difficulty of finding good people for the senior positions in the new Office of Operations, including the jobs of Senior Regional Representative. He wants you to give him any suggestions you can think of.

Personnel

The problem of personnel is going to get more serious in the next six to eight months, and it is not too early to start thinking about it. Many of the better "old hands" have served as long as they are going to serve without their families. They simply cannot extend their tours again, except at the risk of a broken family. It is not generally realized that so many people of quality will leave but it is true. Only now are the tours of the first post-evacuation group of people beginning to come to an end, and it will prove impossible to keep any of them if they cannot have their wives with them. Examples are easy to find: Phil Habib, Roy Wehrle (the exception which proves the rule: only the special arrangements that were made kept him on), George Jacobson, Len Maynard, Bob Oakley, Ev Baumgardner. There is a saying now in Saigon that you can't be a good counterinsurgent unless you have wrecked your marriage. There is a grim truth to it. The situation forces people to choose between their commitment to our effort in Vietnam and their families. Most men can only choose Vietnam for a limited period of time. If our commitment in Vietnam is indeed a serious long-range one, we are going to need a cadre of superior officers who are willing and interested to serve extended tours out there, and see the war through. We cannot build such a cadre from unmarried and divorced men alone. The visitation program is no solution; trips every month to Bangkok or every six months to the States create a difficult situation, and frequent gaps in the staffing pattern. This is a growing problem, and deserves high-level attention. My recommendation is similar to one once made by Ambassador Lodge: Permit people who have served 18 months and who are needed for another tour bring their wives--no children--with them for the second tour. I think this is reasonable, does not cause unsurmountable housing problems (this is a minor issue), and does not cause undue security problems.

US Relations With the Vietnamese

The reaction of various elements of Vietnamese society to the continuing U.S. military and civilian buildup is baffling and contradictory. On one hand there are vague and elusive signs of growing annoyance on the part of many Vietnamese with American behavior. This can manifest itself in many ways. There are the continual complaints of General Nguyen Duc Thang, who feels that the U.S. simply does not understand Vietnam. (Despite these complaints, there is no question now of Thang's continued pro-American attitude.) There is the growing chorus of urban Vietnamese who see their cities being changed by the American presence. Ironically many of those who complain are also profiting from the buildup. There are the surprisingly strong neutralist statements of many student leaders in Saigon, who despite their family positions do not seem to feel any sense of commitment to the anti-VC effort, and blame the U.S. for every problem in their own country. Only a few of these anti-American sentiments are of value to the VC at this time; the great majority of the people are still not ready to turn grumblings of discontent into open action that would precipitate an anti-American crisis. But there is enough latent feeling about the Americans so that if the war continues for too long without victory in sight, war-weariness could merge with anti-American feelings to produce a reaction among the population. A clear-cut issue does not now exist, nor has a leader yet emerged to articulate and intensify these feelings. But the danger exists, and it may eventually create a strange sort of time limit for us, so that we must either win the war fast for the GVN or else face a reaction from the very Vietnamese whose original shortcomings caused us to increase our involvement.

On the other hand, there are many other Vietnamese who are consciously deciding to cast their lot with the Americans, and become "our Vietnamese." For the Vietnamese, if they understand anything, understand the colonial relationship, and no matter how hard we try to avoid it, as the buildup proceeds, more and more Vietnamese will assume that we are indeed becoming the new masters of Indochina. This does not mean that we behave like the French did; but in a situation in which many people do not take the GVN seriously and in which most Vietnamese think that we (i.e., the CIA) control events, many Vietnamese are going to see quick profits and possible power if they can become popular with the Americans. By our very presence, we are therefore creating a group of people--some totally sincere, some wholly devious--who are making a commitment to the American Marines, or the Army, or the "Embassy." Despite the theories VIPs get in briefings, this commitment cannot be transferred from the Americans to the GVN.

People who make this commitment and cast their lot with the Americans--be they village chiefs or farmers in the Da Nang TAOR, or government officials, or covert agents or VC defectors--are choosing Americans, not the GVN. We have given such people something to hope for, either security or a chance for quick profits. Whatever the reasons for their choice, the majority of those making this choice have decided that we are going to be in Vietnam for a long time no matter what we say publicly. People in this category--including 2 VC defectors and a village leader--told me that the VC would win in a matter of weeks if the U.S. even thought of withdrawal. They based this feeling not only on the military power of the enemy, but on his political sub-structure.

So if the war drags on, we may find ourselves cast increasingly in the role of the only governing force in a given area, more and more embroiled in the business of running that area. This may sometimes be unavoidable, but we should minimize the area in which it happens. We are not trained or equipped to do what must be done in rebuilding government in the villages; moreover, it is an open-ended commitment in terms of both time and men, and could well lure us unwillingly and unwittingly into a strange sort of "revolutionary colonialism"--our ends are "revolutionary," our means quasi-colonial. As this happens, we can be caught in the trap of trying to get the least revolutionary Vietnamese--"our Vietnamese"--to carry out programs with which they are in basic disagreement. (National Reconciliation and Land Reform are recent examples.)

Thus, our very presence may prevent the emergence of a new leadership which would be willing to carry out the revolutionary programs which we are advocating and which are vital to our success--unless we exercise a rare combination of self-restraint and gentle covert encouragement to selected younger civilian leaders.

Richard Holbrooke

322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 11:04 a.m. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at the LBJ Ranch on December 2 and commented in a separate telegram to the President, CAP 66134, December 2, that both Rusk and Thompson believed the message was of importance and that he himself was impressed by several factors, "above all, by the phrase 'as fast as possible.' As you know, I have felt that if Hanoi was ever serious they would want a quick complete deal, not a slow negotiation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 16)

12247. A. When I arrived at D'Orlandi's apartment December 1 at 6:15 for our meeting with Lewandowski, D'Orlandi met me in the hall, saying that something big had happened. When we went into the room where Lewandowski was waiting and we sat down around the table, D'Orlandi said that it was imperative that continued secrecy be assured. Hanoi, he said, had made a specific point of leakage. If there should ever be any leak, there will be an immediate denial by Hanoi and by the Polish Government.

B. I assured him that I was totally in sympathy with the policy of secrecy and that so was the United States Government. They could absolutely count on our leaving no stone unturned to preserve secrecy.

C. Lewandowski then began his statement. He first thanked me for coming today. He then said: "My trip to Hanoi was very important. You should understand that what has been reached up to now in our conversations in Saigon and in my conversations in Hanoi may be decisive. Both Mr. Rapacki and Mr. Gomulka think so.

D. "I presented to Hanoi my understanding of the U.S. position based on our conversations of November 14 and our previous conversations." He indicated the numbers of the paragraphs as he went along, as follows:

"1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.

"2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the United States in Viet-Nam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam must be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam, and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to national pride and prestige.

"3. That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having a permanent or long term military presence in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the conflict has been reached. That is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the liquidation of American bases should be considered in all seriousness.

"4. The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated settlement, to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of U.S. troops.

"5. That the United States, within a general solution, would not oppose the formation of a South Vietnamese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through free democratic elections, and that the United States would be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery to secure the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results of such elections.

"6. The United States hold the view that unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese themselves for which the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the people in South Viet-Nam is a necessary condition.

"7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam.

"8. The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so, the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-Nam have negotiated in exchange for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings would not involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-Nam.

Comment: At this point Lewandowski cited Phase A and Phase B of our last conversation in which I quoted para 3D of your 83786./2/ End comment.

/2/Document 305.

"9. I have informed the proper governmental sources that at the same time, the United States, while not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam, would not agree to unification under military pressure.

"10. While the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would be unrealistic to expect that the United States will declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Viet-Nam's four or five points." End of statement.

E. He then stopped and said, "I ask you whether this is a correct statement of the United States point of view."

F. I said that obviously on a matter of such importance, I would have to refer to my government for a definitive reply, but I could say off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping with the spirit of our policy.

G. Personally, I would like to have a closer definition of the language in his paragraph 2 stating that the "present status quo in Viet-Nam must be changed in order to take into account the interested parties opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam." He said that he would be glad to change the word from "must" to "would." I said that this was obviously something which could be discussed.

H. Another point which I felt might need some clarification would be the first sentence in paragraph 8 which stated: "The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will facilitate a peaceful solution."

I. In general, it was correct to say that we were interested in a peaceful solution, we wished to humiliate nobody, we did not wish anyone to lose pride or prestige, and that our offer at Manila was made in good faith.

J. Lewandowski then said that what he had just read was "very firmly based on conversations with the most respectable government sources in Hanoi" and that it was in addition "vouched for by Mr. Rapacki." He said that he made that statement so as to "avoid any belief on your part that this was not a serious proposition."

K. He added: "I am authorized to say that if the United States are really of the views which I have presented, it would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw."

L. He then repeated once again that "in case of any leak, a denial would be issued." He repeated that "secrecy is of fundamental importance in this case. In fact, it is an essential element of the whole proposition."

M. He then said: "The United States should stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam apart from all other things."

N. He stated: "I was also informed by Hanoi and Warsaw that I should be ready to place myself at your disposal for any comment that you might wish to make."

O. I said that I would be interested in knowing who was the "responsible government source in Hanoi" with whom he spoke. After some hesitation, he said that it was Pham Van Dong, who spoke after "collective debate among all the proper authorities." In other words, this had "the Presidium behind it." He then said:

P. "If you agree that my presentation is in accord with yours and are ready to confirm it with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow, I would ask for another meeting to clear up things of a practical character." I asked what these were, and he said "the identity of the U.S. representative." He added that both Rapacki and Gomulka attached great importance to his talks with me. "They specifically want to convince you of the importance which should be attached by the United States," he added.

Q. I assured him that we did attach great importance to this. He added that Moscow had been informed.

R. He then said that he hoped we would get at this as "fast as possible." The more delay, the greater the danger. The dangers were two-fold--1) the danger of a leak, and 2) that there would be someone "working against a solution." He felt that we should "keep the present channel" and that we should "not try other channels." To do so would not only create the danger of a leak but also the danger of misinterpretation./3/

/3/In telegram 94660 to Saigon, December 1, the Department of State told Lodge that telegram 12247 was "receiving urgent consideration with virtually no distribution" and then asked for clarification of several points, which Lodge provided in telegram 12323, December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

Lodge

323. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, John Roche. Secret.

In going over my memos to you on Vietnam, I realize that they have a somewhat disjointed, ad hoc character. Each was addressed to some specific issue, and nowhere have I pulled together the main aspects of the problem as I see them.

Let me try to put the pieces together in coherent fashion. I trust you realize my bluntness implies no disrespect for you or for those involved, I am desperately concerned with the institutional dimension and to the extent that individuals are criticized, it arises from their failure--in my view--to fulfill their institutional obligations.

The heart of my critique involves the character of the American Mission. The Mission is a shambles. The Ambassador does not provide forceful leadership himself but at the same time makes it impossible for his subordinates to act forcefully.

--item: Deputy Ambassador Porter did not want Zorthian as Mission Coordinator for National Reconciliation. Porter is theoretically in charge of operations, but Zorthian was imposed upon him by the Ambassador. This is a bad beginning, particularly since the first man assigned as Coordinator (Double-Deputy Ambassador Koren) was hastily dumped shortly after he held his first briefing.

The Mission is thus stalled at dead-center and policy slippage is appalling:

--item: The National Reconciliation program, scheduled for announcement on November 1st, is not yet off the ground and the Vietnamese seem to be pushing it off still further: "General Tri said . . . he had found a good deal of sentiment for initiating reconciliation campaign at time of promulgation of constitution sometime in March."--Saigon 11814./2/

/2/Document 316.

--item: local elections are being pushed off: "we doubt that GVN has any firm idea of election date . . . so date may come anywhere from March to June 1967."--Saigon 11763./3/

/3/Dated November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18-1 VIET S)

--In short, the GVN is welshing on the firm commitments they made to you at Manila. And while the State Department finds this "disturbing" (State 93272),/4/ nothing can really be done by cable.

/4/Dated November 29. (Ibid.)

Indeed, the Mission seems to think that we are lucky to be as well off as we are. When Tri said, in the best French tradition, that he, of course, supports the launching of the National Reconciliation before Tet, but cannot vouch for Ky and Thieu, the Mission noted soberly:

"We encouraged Tri to maintain this stand, but we should also be aware that any proclamation prior to January 1st would be difficult to obtain in view of these pressures for further postponement." (Saigon 11814)

--This is the oldest form of political blackmail in the world: "I am on your side, but look at the pressure I am getting from the others." I have no objection to the Vietnamese trying it out (I have used it myself on occasion), but I do get furious when they consistently get away with it.

Furthermore, the Mission loves to project itself as a few wise men beleaguered by mad utopians in Washington. The Evans columns reflect completely the localism that pervades the top echelons. If they could just be left alone (without constituent assemblies, elections, reconciliation programs, etc.) with their man Ky and a military blank check, everything would be fine.

At the same time, presumably to make the utopians happy, the Ambassador can cable the following sentiments (Saigon 12113)/5/-- to which I have added a running commentary.

/5/Not found.

1. "Progress towards a constitutional democracy also makes for stability."

Comment: This is simply untrue. The introduction of representative institutions into a military government is obviously destabilizing in short run terms.

2. "Anyone tempted to make a coup must now consider the reaction both here and abroad toward interference with the democratization process. The chances of a coup may be really lessened by the awareness that any frustration of the movement toward constitutional government would be extremely unpopular."

Comment: The kind of men who make coups are seldom deterred by the knowledge that they will be chastised in the editorial pages of the New York Times, they are not competing in a popularity contest. The one sure deterrent is the knowledge that MACV will not permit a coup.

3. "Even if there were a coup, it seems actually likely that the coup makers would feel compelled to endorse the assembly and allow it to continue working on the constitution."

Comment: "Even if there were a coup. . . " What comment could be adequate?

Conclusions:

1. At the moment we have a Mission in Saigon which is far closer in viewpoint to Ky than to Washington.

2. The Mission thus unconsciously (I am not for a second suggesting duplicity) sympathizes with the Ky government and uses Vietnamese "sovereignty" as an excuse for permitting sabotage of United States foreign policy, e.g., the silent death of Ky's Manila commitments.

3. The Mission is beyond control by cable. Implementation of presidential policy, in my judgment, thus requires a new chief of mission who appreciates the fact that the war in Vietnam is not being fought to make the countryside safe for Ky, but rather as part of a diplomatic, political and military confrontation with Communist power, a confrontation with worldwide implications and consequences.

4. Moreover, in immediate terms, there will be a dangerous gap even in what authority we do exercise over the GVN when Ambassador Lodge leaves for a month about December 12th. No one else in the Mission has been permitted to deal with the top levels of the GVN.

--A number of things will be coming to a head in the next few months. In particular, the GVN has so far refused to compromise with the Constituent Assembly (Saigon 11876)/6/ and does not seem interested in working out a viable reconciliation. In my opinion, the Assembly has proposed a very reasonable bargain; the Directorate (and the Mission) have simply not responded.

/6/Dated November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 VIET S)

The Directorate could, for example, make the Constituent Assembly very happy by providing that between the time it finishes the Constitution and the establishment of the new constitutional government, the Assembly shall remain in session for "consultative" purposes. This ducks all the juridical issues, gets both sides off the hook, and increases civilian prestige without undermining the status of the Directorate.

5. At the risk of sounding slightly paranoic, I would even go so far as to suggest that Bill Bundy be left off by Secretary Rusk in Saigon for a month. We are playing for huge stakes in Vietnam and we need a wholesale reform of our civilian team.

Aside from myself, nobody in policy circles in Washington has recently spent any sustained period of time in Saigon. The experts at State suspect me of hysteria, but my guess is that if Bundy spent a month there he would make me sound calm and moderate./7/

/7/Roche's memorandum is attached to a note that indicates that, upon reading the memorandum on December 4, the President instructed his secretary to have the following message passed to Bill Moyers: "I like this last paragraph, and I don't think we can get in a problem with Lodge, and I don't want to get in a fight with him right now, but I sure do think it would be good if we could keep Bill Bundy there for a while." The message was relayed to Moyers by telephone on December 5.

John P. Roche

324. Editorial Note

On December 2, 4, 13, and 14, 1966, U.S. aircraft carried out strikes on two targets in the Hanoi area that had been authorized on November 10 as part of Rolling Thunder 52 (see footnote 4, Document 299) but had not been previously struck. The Van Dien vehicle depot, located 5 nautical miles south of the center of Hanoi, was a military transportation center for trucks and other vehicles moving men and materiel to the war in South Vietnam. The Yen Vien railroad yards, located 5 nautical miles northeast of the center of Hanoi, controlled North Vietnam's railroad traffic north of Hanoi. Both targets were outside Hanoi's city limits. (Telegram 103849, December 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Van Dien vehicle depot was struck on December 2, 13, and 14 by a total of 66 strike aircraft. The Yen Vien railroad yards were struck on December 4, 13, and 14 by a total of 58 strike aircraft. (Memorandum from Major General John McPherson to Admiral David McDonald, December 15; Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rolling Thunder 52, 9155 (18 Feb. 65) Section 13)

On December 3, following the December 2 strike, the North Vietnamese Government filed a protest with the International Control Commission, stating that U.S. aircraft had "bombed and strafed a populated area in the southern suburb of Hanoi and attacked two residential quarters inside the city." On December 14, following the December 13 and 14 attacks, the North Vietnamese Government issued a statement claiming that U.S. aircraft had attacked "a number of places in Hanoi, including the foreign embassy quarter and the suburbs of the town, killing or wounding over 100 people." (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pages 883, 885-886)

U.S. officials responded in public statements that the attacks were against the same kinds of military targets that had been under air attack for more than a year and did not represent an intensification of the bombing. A spokesman for the Department of State did indicate at a December 22 news conference, however, that the possibility of an accident could not be ruled out completely. (Ibid., pages 884, 886, 890-891) The Department of State provided information explaining and defending the air strikes to all diplomatic posts on December 16 and to British Foreign Secretary George Brown on December 30. (Telegram 103849; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; and Material to be passed to Mr. George Brown; ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) Much the same information was used by Ambassador Gronouski in his meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki on December 19 (see Document 345).

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, December 2, 1966, 6:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon.

95711. Lewandowski has told Lodge that he has presented to Hanoi a ten point statement of our position on a possible Viet-Nam settlement. He has suggested that we confirm his statement of our position directly to the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw.

If talks should take place in Warsaw we would wish you to guide them. It is of the highest importance however that there be no leak and we are most anxious to avoid arousing any suspicion that we are in direct contact with North Vietnamese. We therefore believe that it would be too conspicuous for you personally to contact North Vietnamese if in fact they agree to talk in Warsaw. We would like your judgment as to whether Jenkins would be suitable to carry on these important discussions after appropriate briefing here or whether we should arrange to send someone with requisite background from Washington.

In any event Jenkins or any officer you select should endeavor to see North Vietnamese Ambassador on December 6 or as soon thereafter as possible. If received by him he should state that he has been instructed to inform North Vietnamese that Polish Representative in Saigon Lewandowski has informed our Ambassador that he had informed North Viet-Nam Government of our position on Vietnamese problem in a ten point statement based on his knowledge of our views. He should say that while Lewandowski's report of what he says he told the North Viet-Nam Government is basically correct, certain of the points as phrased by him are subject to important differences of interpretation.

He should say that if North Viet-Nam is prepared to discuss the matter we would be glad to arrange to do so anywhere that is suitable to them. If they prefer Warsaw we would arrange for suitable officer to be briefed authoritatively to carry on discussions and inform them directly of our position./2/

/2/In telegram 1359 from Warsaw, December 3, Gronouski proposed that he, rather than Jenkins, make the initial contact and carry on subsequent discussions. He also proposed that Rapacki be asked to serve as an intermediary, given the considerable risk of detection and publicity if a U.S. Embassy officer made direct contact with the North Vietnamese Ambassador. (Ibid.)

Rusk

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 3, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:55 a.m.

12428. 1. I met D'Orlandi and Lewandowski Saturday afternoon/2/ pursuant to your 95709,/3/ and stated:

/2/December 3.

/3/Dated December 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

2. "I am instructed to tell you that the United States Government is instructing the American Embassy in Warsaw to contact the North Vietnamese representative there on December 6. Our Embassy will be able to confirm that the ten points outlined by you broadly represent our position. We will have to say, however, that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."

3. Lewandowski said he assumed from what I had said that some of the ten paragraphs in our opinion need clarification and that this interpretation will be done in Warsaw, to which I agreed. He asked whether the U.S. would be ready on December 6, and I said that we would be ready to make contact.

4. He said: "Probably for the first meeting we will extend to you some help in getting in touch with the North Vietnamese. Someone from the Ministry will be in touch with the Embassy and will effectuate a contact."

5. He then said that he was under instructions from Rapacki to tell me that on December 2, there was the most heavy bombardment of Hanoi since last July. Rapacki thinks, said Lewandowski, that when we are on the brink of such a delicate undertaking, it is wise to avoid anything which would create the impression that the United States interprets anything in Hanoi as a sign of weakness. To do this would be a most unhappy interpretation.

6. I said that I was confident that the event of which he spoke was undertaken for military reasons having nothing to do with the matter on which we had been working, and said that I would transmit what he said to the U.S. Government.

7. Lewandowski then referred to the paragraph of his statement which dealt with the cessation of bombing, and asked whether that was right.

8. I said that it was my understanding that broadly speaking, it gave a fair picture of our position, in that we agreed with them in not linking the cessation of bombing to anything but the broad cause of getting peace.

9. Lewandowski then said that if we reached no progress this time, it might be a long time indeed before there is another opportunity. He added, "I am not excluding the possibility that we three will be occupied with this again. I strongly believe that at the next stage, we may be useful in opening another channel, Not necessarily through Hanoi but to the representative of the 'Front.'"

10. I said that there is nothing about that in anything that I had said. Lewandowski agreed and said he mentioned this on his own personal initiative.

11. D'Orlandi then said that it is obvious that this matter would come up, and that it was very complicated and it would be more easily dealt with by men who were here on the ground and knew all the ins and outs than by men in a distant place who had no first hand familiarity with Viet-Nam. It might have been useful for us to have been authorized to proceed one step further. It is difficult for those who don't know what we know. But then, he said, "We wanted speed and we stressed speed, and we certainly got it, and our work has really led to a very significant result. We can congratulate ourselves."

12. Lewandowski said that it was not for him to dwell on what he had said about the Front. He was not raising it under instructions, but he felt that it was a question which would arise.

Lodge

327. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:43 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 275-277.

1363. Department pass at its discretion to Saigon./2/ Ref: State 96235./3/ For the President and Secretary.

/2/A note on the source text indicates the telegram was not sent to Saigon.

/3/In telegram 96235, December 3, the Department of State discussed procedures for the first contact with the North Vietnamese in Warsaw. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

1. I was called to FornMin 11:30 a.m. Dec. 5 by DirGen Michalowski who, after determing that I knew what meeting was about, took me in to see FornMin Rapacki.

2. Rapacki remarked that Poles are again trying to play constructive role in ending Viet Nam war and expressed hope and wish that this attempt will bear fruit.

3. Rapacki then recounted prior events, beginning with two November meetings between Lodge and Lewandowski in which Lodge expressed USG desire for political settlement and described USG attitude toward basis of peaceful settlement. Because during second talk Lodge said he was expressing not only his views but those of "decisive center of authority in Washington," Poles have concluded that Lodge expressed official USG position.

4. Rapacki continued that on Dec. 1, after return of Lewandowski from Hanoi, Lewandowski had third meeting with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as he had understood it from the two previous conversations. After Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resume, Lewandowski said contact of USG and North Vietnamese Ambassadors in Warsaw would have support of Poles.

5. Continuing his account of prior events, Rapacki said that on the afternoon of Dec. 3, at a fourth meeting between Lodge and Lewandowski, Lodge, on the basis of the President's instructions, read a statement as follows:

A. The President will instruct the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to contact the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw on Dec. 6 or as soon as possible thereafter.

B. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw will be in a position on Dec. 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese Ambassador that the Lewandowski Dec. 1 resume of the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations broadly reflects the position of the USG.

C. "We must add that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."

6. Rapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec. 3 meeting to precisely say which points were subject to differences of interpretation and what the nature of these differences of interpretation might be.

7. Rapacki then stated that question of interpretation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place. He expressed grave concern as to how equivocation will be read by Hanoi. He added that Poles must transmit USG position to NVN Govt., and that rather than a general reference to differences of interpretation it would be better if position transmitted contained statement defining differences of interpretation we have in mind. He said such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoi's attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw and the whole problem.

8. Rapacki then asked what can be the position of Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the conversations which were held and statements made there still remains this doubt? He asked again how this reservation will be read by Hanoi, particularly with intensification of bombing near Hanoi subsequent to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations? He said these questions had already been raised by Lewandowski during his Dec. 3 conversation with Lodge.

9. Rapacki said that it would be desirable if last para of Lodge's Dec. 3 statement (on differences in interpretation) had not been formulated in the first place. He suggested that this para be deleted on the basis that it was inserted as a result of misunderstandings which have now been clarified.

10. Rapacki said that if Poles were to transmit to Hanoi statement as read by Lodge on Dec. 3, the most favorable response that could be forseen as reaction by Hanoi is a reexamination of whole matter again from the beginning. This would mean, he added, that the contact in Warsaw would have to be postponed.

11. Rapacki said that Lewandowski has been asked to contact Lodge for clarification of Dec. 3 note./4/ He said that the Poles are holding up conveying information to Hanoi in hopes of obtaining improved version, but observed that they have no right to delay too long conveying information to Hanoi.

/4/Lodge reported on this meeting with Lewandowski in telegram 12601, December 6, indicating that he responded by paraphrasing telegram 97016, Document 329. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

12. Rapacki asked that I transmit to the President the Poles deep concern caused by modification of USG position which has been signaled by the Dec. 3 declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds that it was based on misunderstandings which have since been clarified.

13. I told Rapacki that I would immediately convey his concern and proposal to the President and Secretary and contact him as soon as I received a reply.

Gronouski

328. Editorial Note

On December 5, 1966, Walt Rostow forwarded to President Johnson a 16-page memorandum on "The View from Hanoi," which Sherman Kent, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, had sent to Director of Central Intelligence Helms on November 30. The memorandum discussed Hanoi's current evaluation of: a) the course of the war; b) the political situation in South Vietnam; and c) the international climate, including U.S. domestic opinion. It noted that from a military viewpoint, Hanoi must have found the previous 12 months "fairly discouraging," while on the political front Hanoi was confronted with the "surprising durability of the Ky government despite repeated crises."

The memorandum then considered Hanoi's future strategy and concluded with the following paragraph:

"Our best judgment is that faced with the defeat of its present strategy and confronted with unpalatable options, Hanoi is procrastinating. Next spring, after the dry season, is a more likely time than now for modifications in strategy. But if Hanoi is now reconsidering its fortunes, then the two live options are a modification of military tactics toward guerrilla operations or a shift toward the political track, with all its hazards. Our view is that the military option--i.e., some new combination of guerrilla and large unit operations--is still likely to be the preferred course; and given time to work out the consequences and problems, Hanoi may move this way. But this is by no means certain, and for the first time in the last two years, there is a chance of a serious political move from the Communist side." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII)

329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, December 5, 1966, 8:58 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Katzenbach, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon for Lodge and to Tokyo for Rusk.

97016. Ref: Your 1363./2/ You should tell Rapacki we believe we have gone quite far in stating our position without anything directly or indirectly from the other side other than the monotonous repetition of their four points. Lewandowski's statement to Lodge was an oral one and we presume this was also true of his contact with Hanoi. The points he described covered matters of great complexity and of the highest importance. They were, moreover, stated in very general terms and subject to the imprecision of multiple translation. We might expose ourselves to charges of bad faith in any subsequent negotiations if we did not make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by Lewandoski.

/2/Document 327.

Lewandowski's formulation broadly reflects the position of the US Government on the issues covered and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with the North Vietnamese if they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter, and if they are informed that latitude for interpretation of such general language is inevitable.

We greatly appreciate the personal interest and efforts of the Foreign Minister and it is for this reason that we wish to avoid any possible misunderstandings on matters of highest importance./3/

/3/In telegram 1375 from Warsaw, December 6, Gronouski reported on the discussion that ensued after he conveyed the contents of telegram 97016 to Rapacki at a meeting on December 6. Rapacki disagreed with the U.S. position regarding "room for interpretation" but indicated that he would transmit the information to Hanoi. Rapacki and Gronouski then discussed the substance of the first U.S.-NVN meeting, should it take place. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 275-277)

Katzenbach

330. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/

Washington, December 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a draft with extensive handwritten corrections. In a memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on December 7, Llewellyn Thompson reported that he handed the letter to Kosygin, who read it carefully and indicated that he would carry it back to Moscow. (Ibid.)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Ambassador Kohler has reported to me on his recent conversation with you in Moscow./2/ I have studied your remarks carefully and appreciate the frankness of your observations.

/2/Kohler's farewell conversation with Kosygin on November 14 was reported to the President in telegram 2238 from Moscow, November 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, vol. XIII)

[Here follow comments on the non-proliferation treaty.]

I believe that it is important for us to search out every possibility of agreement, whether on large questions or small questions. We are prepared to consider seriously any thoughts which you might have about the improvement of bilateral relations.

With respect to Viet-Nam, it is clear that we have important differences in our views of that problem.

You accuse us of flagrant aggression. We consider that we are helping a small nation resist outside aggression which is contrary to existing international agreements such as the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. When the authorities in Hanoi decided to launch their attack against South Viet-Nam, they were fully aware of the fact that we had entered into treaty commitments which required us "to meet the common danger" if a protocol state of the Manila Treaty were attacked and asked for our assistance.

Without polemics, but in order that you can understand what we think, I would draw attention to the fact that we did not bomb North Viet-Nam until after the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese regular army moved into South Viet-Nam. American combat forces did not move into South Viet-Nam until after substantial movements of regular army units from North Viet-Nam were moved into the South. Long before that time, we had ample evidence that the effort of the so-called Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam was directed from Hanoi. Moreover, the transit of the territory of Laos by military infiltrators proceeded steadily after the Geneva Accords of 1962 came into effect in violation of that agreement. I would note the special obligation assumed by the Soviet Union, as a Co-Chairman under Article 8 of the Protocol to that agreement . . . an obligation elaborated upon by the Soviet Representative, the late Mr. Pushkin, to the American Representative, Mr. Harriman.

These are our views and the basis of our policy. Our sole objective is to permit the South Vietnamese to decide their own future for themselves within the framework of the Accords of 1954 and 1962. We cannot have that future imposed upon them by force from the North.

From your remarks to Ambassador Kohler, it is clear that we both agree on the most important objective--that the fighting should be brought to an end as quickly as possible. I quite agree with your remarks about the dangers in the present situation. I know that you will not misinterpret the earnestness with which we seek peace to mean that we are prepared to abandon our commitment to the people of South Viet-Nam. On the contrary we shall do all that is necessary to meet that commitment. Nevertheless, I have tried by every means I know of to seek a peaceful solution of this problem.

As we see it, there are two major possibilities for achieving peace. One path would be that of negotiation, and we are prepared to take this course either by direct contact, through an intermediary, or by means of a formal conference, or any combination of these. Our aim would be to permit self-determination for South Viet-Nam. This would enable us to withdraw our combat forces entirely from South Viet-Nam. Do not be misled by the enormous investment we have made in bases in South Viet-Nam. I can assure you that we are prepared to give them up and to withdraw our troops. At the Manila conference, I tried to respond to Mr. Gromyko's suggestion that we should be more precise about our willingness to withdraw. I stated that we were prepared to carry out such withdrawal within six months--the minimum time required physically to carry out such an operation.

I can understand that it may be difficult for North Viet-Nam to agree to formal negotiations, particularly in view of the pressure which they are evidently under from Peking. It was for this reason that I endeavored to see if they would agree to secret exploratory talks either directly or through an intermediary.

We have also made far-reaching suggestions on the substance of the issues involved. For example, we have stated that the kind of government which could exist in Saigon and what the result might be on the question of reunification are matters to be decided by the South Vietnamese people themselves. We have supported Prince Sihanouk's request for stronger assurances of his own neutrality. We support action by the ICC to demilitarize in fact the zone along the 17th Parallel. We accept the 1954 and 1962 Agreements as the basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

Another possible path to peace might be a simple tapering off of military action on both sides, including the campaign of terror against the Government of South Viet-Nam. To this end, we have unsuccessfully tried to enlist the interest of the other side in such a mutual de-escalation of the violence.

Neither of these paths to peace involves any injury to North Viet-Nam; we do not ask them to surrender an acre of ground or a single man; we only want them to stop shooting at somebody else.

I draw your attention to the many efforts toward peace which have come from our side. In the advance of negotiations or any quid pro quo from Hanoi, I have made the public commitment to withdraw our troops and give up our bases. I have publicly stated that arrangements could be made for the NLF to express its point of view. I have twice suspended our bombing of North Viet-Nam. I have refrained from using much of the power available to the United States in order to minimize the risk of widening the conflict. All we have heard from the other side is a reiteration of a position which they know amounts to the surrender of South Viet-Nam.

You remarked to Ambassador Kohler that you could develop your thought further but preferred for us to think about your observations since the problem was most complex. I should be most grateful for any further observations you may have and any efforts you may be able to make to bring to an end this conflict which appears to us to be without justification and which carries the risks which you have pointed out.

Objectively considered, Mr. Chairman, there need be no basic conflict of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States on this matter. We fully recognize and respect the interest of the Soviet Union in the security of North Viet-Nam. We know you understand our interest in and our treaty commitments to the security of South Viet-Nam. Surely it is to the best interests of both of us as well as both South and North Viet-Nam to find a way to stop the fighting and let any outstanding questions be settled by peaceful means.

Since writing the foregoing, our Ambassador in Saigon has forwarded an important message from the Polish representative, Mr. Lew-andowski, about which I am told you have been informed./3/ We shall be giving this urgent consideration.

/3/Presumably a reference to Document 322.

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, December 7, 1966, 12:03 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Read, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 283-286.

97930. Ref: Warsaw's 1375./2/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 329.

1. Your reference telegram will receive urgent consideration here tomorrow and you will receive further guidance from us then./3/

/3/Document 333.

2. In the meantime, you should take no further initiative with GOP.

3. In the unlikely event that, before receiving further instructions, you should receive notice that NVN representative is ready and available for talks with us, we submit the following for your interim guidance.

4. If such a meeting with NVN representative should occur, you should follow prior instructions. If desirable, you are then authorized to read to him Lewandowski's 10-point presentation of USG position as set forth at end of this cable, stressing that it is Lewandowski's formulation.

5. You should then inquire whether points as presented by you are the same in all particulars as those passed on to Hanoi by Lewandowski.

6. For your information only, one of our principal concerns about the ten points is set forth in the next following paragraph, but even if pressed you should avoid discussing the substantive problems relating to these points with the NVN representative at this stage and stress that such discussions should be the subject of actual negotiations. We would assume that NVN representative would have no authority on this first contact to do more than report your presentation to Hanoi so we would not anticipate such probing at this time. Further cable tomorrow will spell out our thinking in greater detail and may suggest initiative to be taken if you have heard nothing, after additional lapse of time.

7. Lewandowski's point two relating to change of present status quo in SVN is obviously most troublesome. This point could be interpreted variously to mean (a) NLF must be put into government of South Vietnam forthwith or (b) simple endorsement of election process under constitution now being drafted. If it is necessary to point out ambiguities in Lewandowski's statement, however, you should not refer to this point but allude to less contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement.

8. Lewandowski's 10-point statement follows:

"1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.

"2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the United States in Viet-Nam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam would be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam, and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to national pride and prestige. (FYI: Lewandow-ski's original presentation states status quo "must" be changed but when Lodge questioned this point Lewandowski said he would be glad to change word from "must" to "would". End FYI.)

"3. That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having a permanent or long term military presence in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the conflict has been reached. That is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the liquidation of American bases should be considered in all seriousness.

"4. The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated settlement, to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of U.S. troops.

"5. That the United States, within a general solution, would not oppose the formation of a South Vietnamese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through free democratic elections, and that the United States would be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery to secure the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results of such elections.

"6. The United States held the view that unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese themselves for which the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the people in South Viet-Nam is a necessary condition.

"7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam.

"8. The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so, the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-Nam have negotiated in exchange for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings would not involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-Nam."

At this point you should interrupt recitation of Lewandowski's points and state as follows: "Mr. Lewandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that in Hanoi he had given his presentation in connection with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in accordance with Ambassador Lodge's earlier formulation, which was as follows: A package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the United States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable measure of de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North Viet-Nam's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to United States actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension." You should then resume the recitation of the ten points.

"9. I have informed the proper governmental sources that at the same time, the United States, while not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam, would not agree to unification under military pressure.

"10. While the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would be unrealistic to expect that the United States will declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Viet-Nam's four or five points." (End of Lewandowski's statement)

9. If NVN representative probes further on cessation of bombing, you should merely state that as you have already indicated Mr. Lewandowski has suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing and timing which could be the subject of later discussions.

Katzenbach

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:31 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 281-282.

1394. Reference: Warsaw 1376./2/

/2/In telegram 1376 from Warsaw, December 7, Gronouski reported on a discussion the previous evening with Michalowski, during which Michalowski indicated that Rapacki had conveyed the U.S. position to Hanoi earlier that day. Michalowski also stated that the Poles had been "in frequent contact with Hanoi," and that the "NVN Govt. and even some in Polish Govt. are suspicious that recently stepped up bombing outside Hanoi is the work of some elements in the USG who are trying to undercut President's peace move." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 280-281)

1. FonMin Rapacki called me to his office at 1800 hours Dec. 7. As in previous two meetings with Rapacki, DirGen FonMin Michalowski took notes and chief North American Sec FonMin Janczewski acted as interpretor.

2. Rapacki opened oral presentation by saying that misgivings, warnings of which he had informed us, are materializing. He stated that the "interpretation clause" conveyed by Lodge coincided with intensified bombing of NVN, in particular in the vicinity of Hanoi, and have been understood accordingly. He said this has led to impression that this new stage of bombing is either the work of those who are trying to complicate and undermine the peace effort or constitutes an effort to bring pressure on North Vietnam. He added that "in these circumstances I wouldn't see a possibility of fulfilling by Poland of its role in a fruitful way."/3/

/3/In telegram 12953 from Saigon, December 9, Lodge and Rusk reported that D'Orlandi had just informed them of a conversation on December 8 with Lewandowski during which Lewandowski expressed "grave concern" over the bombing. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

3. Rapacki then said that Poland could not continue in its role unless it is convinced that we have or will put an end to this intensified bombing. He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this score, and if it so happens that contact in Warsaw between the USG and NVN Govt. will occur, then "I avail myself of this opportunity to state" that it is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the NVN representative its whole position as described by Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side could no longer fear that the USG position as formulated might subsequently be changed through recourse to Lodge's "important differences of interpretation" clause. Rapacki concluded by saying that "it is necessary to gain clarity on these two points fairly early."

4. I asked Rapacki if it had occurred to him that there might be a third reason for what appeared to him to be an intensification of bombing. I said that if I recall correctly, there was a lull in bombing flights in late October and early November simply because of bad weather conditions, and what appears to him to be an intensification of bombing may simply be a resumption of bombing to its normal level.

5. Rapacki responded that "policy is more important than weather." He added that what Poles are trying to do is create the proper conditions for peace negotiations, and if we don't want NVN to think we are attempting to exert pressure "one avoids everything which creates that impression" even if the other side is not entirely justified in harboring that impression. (He quickly added that in this case there is justification.)

6. Rapacki went on to say that at the very time when Lewandowski stated to Lodge that it was advisable for USG to restate its position to NVN in Warsaw, bombing against the whole of NVN was intensified and also was more directed to Hanoi. This, he added, clearly appears to be provoking.

7. I asked Rapacki if he were expressing to me the reaction of the NVN Govt. He replied, emphatically, that he was expressing the Polish position, and only that of the Poles. He added that nothing he said came from or was inspired by the NVN Govt. or anyone else. (Comment: Despite this statement to the contrary, Rapacki's calling me in at an unusually late hour today to express a much tougher position than he did yesterday could very well reflect Hanoi's response to the message transmitted by Rapacki to Hanoi yesterday afternoon.)

Gronouski

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, December 7, 1966, 10:33 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Rostow, Thompson, and McNamara; and approved by Katzenbach. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp 286-288.

98754. Ref: State 97930./2/

/2/Document 331.

1. If a meeting with North Vietnamese is arranged, you should proceed in accordance with instructions contained in State 96235/3/ and State 95711/4/ except as modified below. As regards the presentation to the North Vietnamese representative of our position, you should follow closely the following formulation:

/3/Telegram 96235 to Warsaw, December 3, stated that Gronouski could make initial contact with the North Vietnamese if security permitted. However, the Department of State indicated continuing concern over someone at Gronouski's level carrying on extended discussions without discovery. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

/4/Document 325.

"a. Lewandowski has informed us of his discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the position he communicated to them as that of the US, based on Lewandowski's prior oral discussions with Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. We assume that his discussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally as they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of paper have been exchanged which purport to state government positions. We are prepared to enter into direct discussions with your government on the basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed us he presented to your government in Hanoi.

b. The position was stated to us by Lewandowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten points as contained in State 97930, para 8 with the additional point about bombing covered under Point 8).

c. We wish to emphasize that this language is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States. Nevertheless it presents a general statement of the US position on the basis of which we would be prepared to enter into direct discussions."

2. FYI. The North Vietnamese and perhaps the Poles as well appear to be seeking a reformulation of our position in order to compare it with what Lewandowski has said. While we are entirely prepared to have Lewandowski's formulation stand as "presenting a general statement of the US position", we are anxious to avoid a restatement of our position in our own words because (a) this would oblige us to take some harder positions than those put forward by Lewandowski which apparently have gone far enough to make the North Vietnamese ready to consider talking with us and (b) any formulation which can be attributed directly to us could be used to embarrass the GVN or to embarrass us in our relating with them. In other words, if we stand on Lewandowski's formulation through the first step in discussions with the North Vietnamese, we can always say with regard to any specific point that we don't accept just those words used by Lewandowski and thus maintain some room for maneuver at least until we know the discussions are really under way. End FYI.

3. After reading the ten points you should point out to the North Vietnamese that some matters, because of their complexity and the danger of varying interpretation, would be the subject of further elaboration by us as soon as discussions were to get under way. One of these has to do with the package agreement containing the so-called phases A and B with respect to bombing and a program of de-escalation. The second relates to certain points which directly involve matters of basic concern to the people of South Viet-Nam (as for example points 2 and 5). Whatever detailed arrangements are made on those matters would have to be acceptable to the South Vietnamese people, however this could be ascertained through consultations and negotiations there.

4. If the North Vietnamese refer to the earlier point made by us that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation, you should explain that this is not intended to suggest that the statement as it stands is any less a general statement of the US position but rather that it is inevitable with matters as complex and controversial as those covered in the ten points that they would be subject to interpretation and that their clarification would be the normal function of the discussions which we hope we will be embarking on. If the North Vietnamese press for an illustration you might refer to the phrase "long-term " in Point 3, noting that it was specifically to clarify this point that the Manila Communique specified a six-month period.

5. Otherwise you should be guided in your discussion with the North Vietnamese by the limitations set forth in para 6 of State 97930, stressing that further discussion of substantive questions should be the subject of the actual direct negotiations which we hope can be got under way promptly.

6. In conclusion you should say that your government is prepared to enter into secret discussions with the North Vietnamese Government at any time and we regard this as a mater of the highest importance and urgency.

7. We understand from your latest reports that the next step, if all goes well, will be the opening of the direct discussions with the North Vietnamese and if this in fact materializes you should avoid any further substantive discussions with the Poles. We, of course, are anxious for direct and private discussions with the North Vietnamese and hope that the Poles have no idea of participating therein.

8. Have just received your 1394/5/ and will reply soonest. Meanwhile, if the Poles reopen the question of our position, before an answer is received from Hanoi you may tell them that you have now consulted with Washington and are prepared to confirm to the North Vietnamese Government the position of the US with respect to negotiations in terms which will be consistent with the discussions which Lewandowski has had with them and with us. You may add that we are looking forward to an early opening of talks with the North Vietnamese in order to reduce the possibilities of leaks and resulting publicity which none of us desires.

/5/Document 332.

Katzenbach

334. Editorial Note

From 4:35 to 5:02 p.m. on December 9, 1966, President Johnson met in the Cabinet Room with Secretary of Defense McNamara, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, Vice President Humphrey, General Earle Wheeler, and Special Assistants Walt Rostow and Robert Kintner. (Johnson Liabrary, President's Daily Diary) According to a note prepared for his Daily Diary, the President "considered the problem of next steps in hitting targets in North Vietnam." "Broadly speaking, the decision was made to carry forward with what was necessary but at this particular moment not to expand our targeting." (Ibid., Meeting Notes File)

On December 10, General Wheeler reported in JCS telegram 7591-66 to General Westmoreland that he had met the previous day with President Johnson "to discuss Rolling Thunder withheld targets" (pre-sumably the four targets authorized but deferred on November 10 and 11; see footnote 4, Document 299). Wheeler's message continued: the President "declined to make an affirmative decision at that time because of certain political problems; however, he stated that he wished to renew the discussion in about a week." (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)

Also on December 10, the Department of State notified Ambassador Gronouski in telegram 100627 to Warsaw that "for the immediate future the bombing pattern will remain unchanged from what it has been over the past several weeks. This may well involve some targets which Rapacki will insist represent further escalation, just as in the past he took to be escalation certain variations in our bombing pattern which in fact represented no real new departures in the pattern as a whole." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

335. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 9, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:57 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 293-295.

1421. Reference: State 98924./2/

/2/Dated December 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 288-289)

1. Met Rapacki at my request at 1600 Dec. 9. Michalowski and Janczewski present.

2. My opening remarks, based on reftel, were as follows:

A. "I have requested today's meeting as a result of consultations I have had with Washington since our meeting Wednesday afternoon./3/

/3/December 7; see Document 332.

B. I can now assure you that at the time of the first Warsaw meeting with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government, I will be prepared to confirm to the NVN Govt the position of the USG with respect to negotiations. I can also assure you that this confirmation will be consistent with the discussions Mr. Lewandowski had with them and with us.

C. With respect to the question you raised Wednesday on bombing, I can state flatly that the pattern of our bombing in NVN has nothing to do with the current effort of the Polish and USGs to get underway the projected US-NVN talks. The pattern of bombing is dictated solely by military considerations and is, of course, always subject to operational considerations such as vagaries of the weather. The record will confirm that there have been numerous variations in the bombing pattern over time. There is no basis whatsoever for attributing any changes which you believe you have detected in the recent period to an effort on our part to bring pressure on NVN with respect to these talks.

D. You will recall that the subject of bombing NVN was one of the matters discussed in Hanoi by Mr. Lewandowski. After his return from Hanoi Mr. Lewandowski clearly implied to Amb Lodge that he had discussed this matter in Hanoi in accordance with Amb Lodge's earlier formulation. Amb Lodge had suggested that a package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the US and NVN would agree to as reasonable measure of de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. The first phase, Phase A, would be a bombing suspension. Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalation actions. NVN's actions taken in Phase B thus would appear to be in response to US actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension. Inherent in this formulation is the package approach to de-escalation which I assume you had in mind when you referred to 'a new package deal' during our conversation last Tuesday./4/

/4/See footnote 3, Document 329.

E. I would like to conclude by saying that we are looking forward to an early opening of talks with the North Vietnamese in order to reduce the possibilities of leaks and resulting publicity which none of us desires. We again express our appreciation to the Polish Govt for the constructive role it has played, and hope it will make every effort to move forward what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace."

3. Rapacki responded by saying that the contents of my remarks do not advance us and if first impressions are correct could mean a step backward. He added that there appears to be no advance on the two points which were subject of our last talk (Warsaw 1394)./5/

/5/Document 332.

4. However, with respect to my first point (presentation of USG negotiating position to NVN) he said if this is done in a way which will dispel doubt on invoking interpretation clause, then one of the difficulties has been reduced.

5. On bombing question, he said there is nothing new in my argument and he is loathe to transmit to Hanoi our interpretation that we are carrying on military business as usual and abstracting from any political considerations. He said Poles had asked avoidance of steps that would have to be considered provoking to Hanoi. He said he takes note of our intentions but he doesn't know if this will be convincing. Adding that bombing was clearly intensified at the precise time it would create provocation, he said what Poles had in mind in their presentations on this subject was, "Do not create new elements of tensions particularly when critical decisions are at stake." He added that the USG is ignoring this consideration in making its military decisions.

6. Rapacki read what he said was Nov. 14 statement by Lodge: USG understands that the Liberation Front and Hanoi have deep-seated distrust of USG; that is why USG is willing to take practical measures to show good intentions, and would be willing to hear any suggestions. Rapacki said this statement by Lodge was treated as addressed "only to Polish ears," adding Poles have been proved right in treating it so because in the case of their bombing suggestion they have not found such readiness to listen to suggestions as Lodge indicated.

7. Rapacki expressed concern over my use of term "de-escalation," noting that Lodge said Washington was convinced that not much can be accomplished in getting talks under way with partial de-escalation. He said Lodge's accent was on the package deal which would cover all problems, including withdrawal of US troops. If my use of de-escalation represents a short-cut for a package deal including cessation of hostilities and the resolution of a variety of other outstanding problems, then his concern over my use of the term is simply a matter of semantics. He asked if my use of the term was consistent with Lodge's declaration on a package deal.

8. I said I did not clearly understand what he was driving at but referred to my opening text and pointed out that the degree or manner of de-escalation is not subject to unilateral determination. I said that this would have to be resolved in negotiating sessions between the USG and NVN. I said I could not tell him in advance nor could anyone else how de-escalation will be defined in the ultimate package deal. I said one must assume that both parties entering negotiations will enter them with the objective of ending the war in Vietnam and that through negotiations directed toward that end the package deal will include whatever is possible for the two sides to agree upon. I concluded that the package deal idea was suggested by Lodge in context of our failure to elicit from NVN an answer to our question, "How will you respond if we quit bombing?" I went on to say that the conception of a package deal involving two steps was designed to solve the problem of achieving mutual de-escalation without treating NVN de-escalation as a direct response to the cessation of bombing. I concluded that only time will tell exactly what the negotiators will include in the final package; that the definition of de-escalation will be a product of negotiation.

9. After this long dissertation, I was surprised to hear Rapacki say that inasmuch as the term de-escalation is used in Phase B, his concern has been resolved.

10. Rapacki returned to the question of "important differences of interpretation." He said if this merely meant hammering out greater precision in negotiations then he could perfectly well understand what we were getting at; but if this is the case why did we mention it at all? But if we have important substantive reservations, and that would seem to be the most logical reason for inserting the clause, then Poles still do not know what is meant by "important differences" and are still concerned about the suspicions of Hanoi that this clause will be invoked during the actual negotiations to reverse USG position as stated by Lewandowski. He asked for my comment.

12. I said whether the differences that are bound to exist are simply a refinement or would fall into the category of important differences cannot be determined until the matter is tested in negotiations. What one side at one point may judge to be a refinement to gain more precision, the other side might regard as a very important departure from the original intent. I cannot predict the kind of differences that will arise in negotiations because the resolution of this question will be a product of the negotiations.

13. Recapitulating his position, Rapacki said that we still have not achieved clarity on the manner of presentation of the USG position in the first Warsaw meeting. He added that Poles are also disappointed in having to draw the conclusion that in intensifying bombing the U.S. took into consideration only military factors, rejecting consideration of suspicions that the intensification is designed either to exert political pressure or to undermine the peace effort.

14. I replied that I have felt during the year I have been here, and have expressed this feeling to my govt, that Mr. Rapacki was genuinely interested in helping to advance a negotiated solution to the Vietnam war. I said I felt that at no time since I have been here has the possibility appeared so hopeful to me, and that it behooves all of us to bend every effort to induce Hanoi to begin the Warsaw talks. I said that no one knows whether these talks, once begun, will succeed or fail but that this is a risk well worth taking. I said if they succeeded, nothing that he or I could do in a lifetime would have been quite so important. I added that it is inevitable when we are attempting to start negotiations between two who have been military adversaries that there will be doubts on both sides as to the good will of the other. I said I can understand how the NVN may have doubts about our good intentions as I hoped he could understand how we could have doubts about their genuine interest in wanting to come to the conference table and negotiate with good faith toward a peace agreement; these doubts will linger until they are finally resolved through the HACC process of negotiation. I continued by asking him to view our intentions in terms of the whole series of discussions in Saigon and here that began almost six months ago. I said I am convinced that no reasonably objective man could have any serious doubt, if he looked at the overall picture, including those suggestions advanced by Lodge on Nov 14 and 15, and the comments we have made recently here in Warsaw, that the President and the whole USG is genuinely interested in moving forward toward a negotiated settlement. The fact that doubts exist and will persist should not be permitted to blind anyone to the overwhelming evidence of our deep and genuine interest in finding the basis for a negotiated settlement.

15. I concluded by saying that it is essential that we take the first step. Nothing will be accomplished unless we begin the meetings; what will happen once they begin, I cannot predict. All I can tell, I said, is that the USG will enter the negotiations in good faith and with the intention of coming out of the negotiations having found a mutually agreeable solution to the problem. I added that the fact that we cannot predict how the negotiations will go is no justification for not getting them started; it would be criminal if after having reached this point their efforts and ours to get the two parties together failed. I hoped and trusted that the Poles would do their best to bring about a commencement of negotiations.

16. Rapacki concluded by saying that you are attaching great importance to this first meeting./6/ It is not easy, however, and we will have to wait and see what happens. He said he would be in touch with me if there is anything to report.

/6/In telegram 1422 from Warsaw, Gronouski added a clarification to paragraph 16 at this point, based on a review of his notes, that included the following: "He continued, it looked as if we could move forward. You know the reasons for our concern: what basis do I have in our conversations to dispel suspicions of other side arising out of intensified bombing, bombing of Hanoi, the 'important differences of interpretation' clause? In such circumstances it is difficult for me to get a reply, to move the matter forward." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

17. Comment: Rapacki's position was much less intransigent today than during Dec 7 meeting. I thought it significant that when I stressed importance of initiating talks Michalowski, Rapacki's major adviser on Vietnam war, nodded his head affirmatively three or four times. Because I found no threat to break off talks that was implied Dec 7, I did not use para 2 of reftel./7/

/7/Paragraph 2 of telegram 98924 to Warsaw reads "If Rapacki attempts to nail us to anything on bombing beyond our first contact with the North Vietnamese, or again threatens to break off the operation, you should inform him in no uncertain terms that if he maintains this position he will have to accept the full responsibility for the breakdown of what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace."

Gronouski

[end of document]

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