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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

336. Draft National Security Action Memorandum/1/

Washington, December 10, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S. Secret. Rostow forwarded the draft to Katzenbach and McNamara under cover of a December 12 memorandum stating that the President wanted to issue an NSAM "embracing guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam" and wanted comments on it "if you believe it constitutes a basis for such a NSAM." This draft was based on a paper by Komer, "A Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam," November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaugton; see footnote 3, Document 320) In a December 5 memorandum to Katzenbach, Komer proposed that Katzenbach's "non-group" prepare a strategic plan for the President, working from his paper. "All it really needs is a preamble, and a bit of cleaning up." (Johnson Library, Komer Files, Katzenbach) On December 10 Rostow forwarded the draft NSAM to the President, who wrote on Rostow's covering memorandum: "It's good. Come in with Bob on Monday." (Ibid., Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy) The President met with Rostow and Komer on Monday, December 12, from 12:20 to 1:03 p.m., presumably prior to circulating the draft NSAM to McNamara and Katzenbach, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

SUBJECT
Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam

Now that the extensive deployment and skillful use of U.S. forces has greatly improved our military position in Vietnam, it is imperative that we mount and effectively orchestrate a concerted military, civil, and political effort to achieve a satisfactory outcome as soon as possible.

To this end, I approve the following guidelines for such an effort, and for ensuring that it is effectively carried out.

I. Our Strategic Aims. These must be to:

A. Maximize the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam by December 1967 or, if this is not possible, put us in the best position for the longer pull.

B. Be equally suited to (a) forcing Hanoi to negotiate; (b) weakening the VC/NVA to the point where Hanoi will opt to fade away; or (c) at the minimum, making it patently clear to all that the war is demonstrably being won.

C. Complement our anti-main force campaign and bombing offensive by greatly increased efforts to pacify the countryside and increase the attractive power of the GVN--all these to the end of accelerating the erosion of southern VC strength and creating a bandwagon psychology among the people of SVN. This strategy is also well suited to exploiting any possibilities of a Hanoi/NLF split.

II. Action Programs for 1967. To achieve our strategic aims will require a maximum continuing effort in the following nine program areas:

A. Press a Major Pacification Effort, employing the bulk of the RVNAF.

1. Devise a concrete and detailed US/GVN pacification plan for 1967 which will: (a) set realistic goals by region and by province, with emphasis on areas or LOCs where early results are possible; (b) provide for adequate force allocations and time-phasing; (c) properly dovetail the military and civil programs.

2. Retrain, re-motivate and deploy a steadily increasing proportion of ARVN in supporting the RF and PF in clear-and-hold operations as the key to pacification.

3. Progressively open essential roads, railroad and canals on a planned schedule.

4. Revitalize and accelerate the civil side of pacification.

5. Devise improved techniques for measuring pacification progress and presenting them to the public.

B. Step up the Anti-Main Force Spoiling Offensive, as made feasible by the increase in FW maneuver battalions.

1. Introduce modest US forces into certain key Delta areas.

2. Stress offensive actions to clear VC base areas and LOCs around Saigon.

3. Lay on a major re-examination of our intelligence on VC/NVA strength.

C. Make More Effective Programs to Limit Infiltration and Impose a Cost on Hanoi for the Aggression.

1. Refine the bombing offensive with respect to both efficiency of route harassment and quality of targets.

2. Press forward with barrier system.

3. Examine other ways to apply military pressure on the North.

D. Mount a Major, Continuing National Reconciliation Program, designed to maximize the inducements aimed at eroding VC strength.

1. Expand and revitalize Chieu Hoi Program to handle 45,000 lower level defectors a year.

2. Press a sustained middle and high level defector program under appropriate auspices.

3. Ensure that new Constitution is consistent with reintegration of VC into the national life.

4. Develop a US contingency plan on how to handle VC/NLF in the next local and national elections, examining options of allowing VC to vote or perhaps even inviting NLF to run as a party in next national election.

5. Enlarge efforts to establish contacts with the VC/NLF.

E. Press for the Emergence of a Popularly-Based GVN, with adequate checks and balances between the civilians and the military, and between northerners and southerners.

1. Make clear well in advance to the Directory that the US cannot accept a retrogression to military government, another coup, or blatant election rigging.

2. Press home to all--civilian and military--the importance of national unity and pulling together, as a minimum US condition for continued US support of SVN.

3. Use all our influence behind the scenes to bring about a smooth transition to a representative GVN, but one in which the still indispensable military role is not submerged.

F. Press for Other Key Elements of the Manila Program which will enhance the GVN's attractiveness.

1. Encourage better local government, including elected hamlet, village, and district/province officials.

2. Insist on a workable scheme of land reform, land tenure, and rent moratorium.

3. Vigorously attack corruption and misuse of US aid.

G. Maintain the Civil Economy and Keep a Firm Lid on Inflation.

1. Enforce a vigorous stabilization program.

2. Definitively lick the port bottleneck--both movement into the warehouses and movement out.

3. Maintain an adequate import level.

4. Generate more rice from the countryside.

5. Accelerate the creation of infrastructure for economic development.

6. Mount an imaginative postwar planning exercise.

H. Devise a Pre-Negotiating and Negotiating Strategy Consistent with the Above.

1. Take such initiatives as will credibly enhance our posture that we are always ready to talk and ever alert for new avenues to negotiation.

2. Vigorously pursue serious negotiating leads.

I. Mount a Major Information Campaign to inform both the US electorate and world opinion of the realities in Vietnam, finding ways credibly to measure progress./2/

/2/The NSAM was never issued. State Department and Defense Department comments on the draft (and on a revised draft circulated in January 1967) are discussed and excerpted in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 490-494, and The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 392-440. Several internal Defense Department documents commenting on the draft are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 381 Vietnam, filed under December 23 and 27. In telegram 14767 from Saigon, January 3, 1967, Porter stated that he did not understand the need for such a document: "It does not provide guidelines, and it does not include priorities. Instead, it sets out a series of desirable objectives, all of which are already known and accepted." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

Bangkok, December 11, 1966, 0701Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Rusk was in Saigon on December 9-11, following visits to Tokyo (December 5-7) and Taipei (December 7-9). He then proceeded to Bangkok (December 11-12), New Delhi (December 12), and Tehran (December 12-13), prior to attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris December 13-16.

7466. Secto 38. Following were highlights of Secretary's discussions with Thieu, Ky, and Do. (Third country assistance and Cambodia being covered septels.)/2/

/2/Telegram 7467 from Bangkok, December 11. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

1. In all conversations, Secretary stressed great importance of showing real progress in 1967 and demonstrating clearly that we were on right track. Not only would such progress avoid any political problems in U.S., but it was particularly vital to try to achieve successful conclusion of conflict while Communist China continued to be engaged in major power struggle. If Mao and his cohorts emerge on top in that struggle, dangerously militant policy might result, while victory for more pragmatic group tending to "peaceful coexistence" might create different dangers even including reconciliation between Peking and Moscow. These arguments seemed to impress GVN leaders, who concurred in sense of urgency.

2. ARVN pacification role. Both Thieu and Ky profess themselves completely in accord with devoting ARVN wholly to pacification. Both had just spoken top military leaders and corps commanders in this sense, and Thieu particularly stressed to Secretary that ARVN could and should regard clear and hold missions as real central job to be done in conflict and natural division of labor, with allied forces concentrated on search and destroy operations, which Thieu described as "really secondary." Both further agreed with Secretary's observations, based on several reports, that Hanoi believes true test of its success or failure will be fate of subversive infrastructure in South. Thieu indicated he and other leaders would personally undertake to "brainwash"officers still influenced by ideas of prestige and glamour (perhaps implying a considerable indoctrination along these lines was necessary).

3. Leadership changes. Ky referred to recent shakeup (Quang) as helpful, and said three to four corrupt province chief would be removed in near future, with full agreement of corps commanders. (Another symptom of the committee at the top.)

4. Future Popular Forces and Combat Youth. Thieu initiated long discussion of problems GVN would face at end of hostility. He said Popular Forces (which he still calls SDC) could not be maintained financially at adequate levels and also indicated that they were not too good at dealing with local population. Moreover, there were not enough PF to protect all the hamlets and recruiting for the PF was more difficult now. Hence, he thought it useful to develop something larger along the lines of the old Combat Youth--despite the Nhu label--i.e., giving arms to village inhabitants under 18 and over 45 to provide security now and to deal with future threats when major hostilities had ended. Ambassador Lodge commented that combined action teams in I Corps seemed to fit this general concept, and Thieu agreed. Nonetheless, he was apparently trying out a more far-reaching idea. (While his purpose can only be surmised, fact that he referred favorably at one other point to the old spirit in 1963 might indicate that he has a political design in mind as Nhu most certainly did at that period.)

5. Chieu Hoi. In response to Secretary's question whether defections would increase in future, Thieu responded that if GVN had strong government and army by 1968, and controlled 60-70 percent of country, lower level VC might become discouraged on large scale. (Secretary noted this made major progress in 1967 all the more crucial.) As to specifics of Chieu Hoi program, Thieu expressed concern that 32,000 out of the 40,000 total Hoi Chanh to date had gone back to their villages and were now totally out of GVN control. He thought progress to date was still not major and would not be so long as defector motives were primarily hardship and difficulty rather than positive appeal of GVN. For future, he thought GVN must offer better assurance of appropriate jobs and must likewise find better ways to control Hoi Chanh and see that they did not revert to VC. Finally, he noted that heavy military pressure would have major effect in increasing defections.

6. On same topic, Ky made virtually same points. Secretary suggested one control method might be to have Hoi Chanh report once a month to some designated official to be sure what they were doing.

7. Reconciliation. Secretary stressed great importance of this, along side Chieu Hoi increase, as part of overall pressure on VC. He also mentioned recent Eastern European inquiries about amnesty program, suggesting that it took the place in their minds of dangerous coalition ideas. While Ky appeared to agree, specifics and timing of reconciliation plans were not discussed.

8. Post hostilities prospects. Thieu devoted substantial discussion to this topic. He thought (as did Ky) that Ho might maintain the hope of victory until 1968. After that, if the U.S. showed itself still determined, Ho's attitude might change. However, Ho would then act so as not to lose too much, simply fading away, asserting that infiltration had stopped, perhaps pulling out divisions, and thus trying to get the U.S. out. If the GVN was not then capable of coping with its affairs, there could be a subdued conflict for many years, with the DRV possibly sending back more subversives, or aiming at a coalition or a "pink" National Assembly. Thieu reverted to the need for adequate armed manpower to cope with this kind of situation, and said that GVN must never repeat 1954 error of immediate sharp reduction in military forces. At same time, they could not afford to maintain VNAF at full strength. Hence, he had thought of the idea of converting discharged veterans to civilian employment for the GVN, which would provide good lives for these men, while at the same time there would have to be enough armed strength to control the country. Secretary responded that there would almost certainly be a rather long period of transition after hostilities have ceased. While the U.S. would withdraw its forces if the Manila conditions were met, U.S. interest would most definitely go on toward effective reconstruction. He agreed with Thieu that there should be no sharp reduction in GVN forces until we were really convinced of Hanoi's attitude.

9. Constitutional timetable. Both Thieu and Ky agreed with Secretary's stress on importance of smooth transition to new constitutional government. Thieu implied that Directorate still holding to Article 20 but hoped to persuade CA that amendment provisions would not have to be used "too much;" he said CA making sound progress and that form of government appeared virtually agreed. (Ky made same point, saying majority now clearly favored President/Prime Minister executive with strong powers along Korean model.) Thieu said CA and Directorate really had co-responsibility for constitution. He said at least 50 percent of CA were able men, with only few extremists. Government could work with them and, he concluded quite frankly, there was no intent to maintain military power. Secretary asked about local councils, and Thieu responded rather vaguely that Peoples Army Council should act soon on local elections. Ky said more specifically that constitution should be definitely completed by end of February, then elections within six months. He agreed fully on vital importance of big participation in elections.

10. In informal closing exchange, Ky remarked that constitution as such did not mean much to common people of SVN. However, he then agreed fully with Secretary's observation that political process could play vital role, not only for GVN image in eyes of world but in bringing about cooperation among divergent SVN groups. In relaxed and frank way, Ky then stressed that most important single aspect would be selection of a single leader who would unify the nation.

11. Negotiating prospects. To Thieu inquiry whether there was any sign from Hanoi, Secretary responded that we had had no such indication, and specifically no indication on the point so stressed by Soviets and Eastern Europeans, of what would happen if we stopped the bombing. Secretary thought Kosygin declaration in Paris/3/ contained little new, but did note our relations with Soviets not really stymied by Viet-Nam issue (referring specifically to civil air and space agreements), and that he attached importance to Soviet reference to Geneva agreements in Bucharest Communique last July. We believed that Soviets and Eastern Europeans would accept return to Geneva agreements, but were immobilized, perhaps by concern for Peking, from bringing effective influence to bear on Hanoi.

/3/For text of the Joint Declaration of Kosygin and de Gaulle, issued at Paris on December 8, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 422-425.

12. Conversation with Ky touched specifically on the Christmas truce. Secretary noted we must be alert against betrayal, including possible use of truce period by other side for maneuver. He reiterated firm U.S. position on bombing cessation. Ky responded that much peace negotiating talk had been futile and that this was Communist game which could affect GVN morale badly. Hence, he had welcomed stand-firm declarations at Honolulu and Manila and appreciated Secretary's attitude toward truce and bombing cessation.

13. Anti-American feeling. Both Thieu and Ky said they saw no significant signs of this, and specifically no belief that the U.S. had any selfish designs in SVN. Ky said that the majority of articulate Vietnamese understood why we were there, and that common people were deriving substantial economic benefits from U.S. presence. He said that of course there were some critics, but these same people were the first to protest when the U.S. moved its forces, for example out of the cities. In the countryside, he said U.S. personnel were well received and liked, and in general there was not the slightest resemblance between the U.S. position and that of the French.

14. Economic situation. This came up only with Ky. He said port problem should show improvement in 1967 with target of 2,000 tons per day (sic). Black market problem should be less because of recent strong measures. On piaster spending level, he said GVN would hold to 75 billion level, despite pressures from Ministries. Tax revenues were not as large as expected but were improving slowly; he had been startled to find many manufacturing concerns provided no records of their revenues, and he had introduced a new system to get such figures and to try to tax them at the source. At another point, Ky made general reference to rice price question, saying that key objective must be to prevent rice going to VC and Cambodia, and that rise in price, even if it caused loss and expense, would be worth it. (He did not indicate any specific plan of action on this point.)

Rusk

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0035Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Limdis. Received at 8:56 p.m. on December 11.

13122. 1. Following is current status Mission and GVN efforts on national reconciliation campaign:

2. Preliminary papers have been developed by Chieu Hoi Director Lt. Col. Pham Anh with assistance and cooperation Mission representatives. These include basic concept paper transmitted to Washington as Saigon 11958/2/ and suggestions on basic themes for inclusion in national proclamation. We have also prepared list of necessary administrative actions which we are now reviewing and will present to Colonel Anh during coming week.

/2/Dated November 29. (Ibid.)

3. General Tri, MinInfo, has been in Taipei for most of this week but is planning review of proposals over weekend in anticipation presentation entire project to Cabinet on December 15th. Anh's plans will be presented in form of national reconciliation action plan.

4. December 15th meeting is critical meeting in progress on these proposals. As of now, only top-level GVN leadership and Col. Anh have done any real thinking about reconciliation effort. Presentation to Cabinet will represent first exposure of detailed proposals to other ministers. Until Cabinet endorsement is obtained, national reconciliation remains a concept in minds of Thieu and Ky and Tri rather than a GVN Government program. We will make every effort, therefore, to obtain strong endorsement these proposals by Cabinet.

5. SecState discussed subject with both General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky during course of calls Saturday and found both still committed to idea, although expressing some reservations about problems raised by such concepts as guarantees for employment at appropriate levels in Vietnamese society and restoration full political rights. We intend continue to work on these points with Thieu, Ky and Tri in order to ensure firm presentation to Cabinet next week.

6. On US side, our own preparatory planning continues and various elements of Mission have proceeded about as far as possible without actual endorsement of plan by GVN. When this endorsement obtained, we will urge GVN to inform corps and province officials promptly and we in turn will brief our own field personnel.

7. Col. Anh proposals to Cabinet recommend national proclamation by Chief of State on January 7 and all-media speech by Prime Minister Ky promptly thereafter. We believe this is earliest date on which we can expect public announcement in view continuation some sentiment to delay entire project until "Constitution Day," presumably in March. Basic themes we are suggesting to GVN for inclusion in national proclamation, which we expect to be included in Cabinet presentation next week, transmitted by septel./3/

/3/Telegram 13123, December 11. (Ibid.) In telegram 14681, December 31, Porter reported that he had been advised by South Vietnamese officials that National Reconciliation would not come before the Cabinet until the first week of January and thus "some brief slippage in timing of proclamation will be inevitable." (Ibid.)

Lodge

339. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0330Z.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Personal. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.

MAC 10822. 1. The past several weeks have witnessed emergence within US civilian circles here, notably among senior State Department personnel, of allegations that the ills of revolutionary development may be laid at the feet of ARVN and MACV. According to the proponents of this theme, ARVN was organized improperly at the outset by its US military sponsors. The basic error is said to have been creation of a so-called conventional force instead of one tailored to excel in the counter-guerrilla role. The argument goes on to assert that the basic error, having been compounded over the years by short-sighted advisors, has produced today an ARVN that is powerless in terms of organization and attitude to cope with the security tasks incident to destruction of Communist infrastructure and guerrilla forces.

2. This body of opinion reflects a condemnation of the military, both Vietnamese and US. Particularly disturbing is the suggestion that MACV is delinquent in having failed to reorient and reeducate ARVN in the course of yesteryear's assistance programs. I do not rule out the possibility, let me add, that projects such as the Enke-Aspin study entitled, "Cost-Benefit Among Armed Forces in South Vietnam,"/2/ which dwells on the notion that ARVN may be "a poor buy," are associated directly or indirectly with this proposition.

/2/Not further identified.

3. In an effort not only to set the record straight with respect to evolutionary development of ARVN, but to counter a potentially dangerous groundswell of misguided reasoning, I addressed the Mission Council meeting on 6 December. My presentation embraced the following approach:

A. As opposed to residing in organizational and doctrinal problems, real or imaginary, ARVN's structure and capabilities have been moulded by the necessity for its employment against major conventional enemy forces as well as against guerrillas. It will be remembered, in this regard, that as recently as the Spring of 1965, victories by enemy regulars produced a state of near defeat for the Republic. If ARVN had been organized as a lighter force, the results could have been disastrous.

B. Only through maturing of the US/Free World buildup has it been possible to contemplate major reemphasis on ARVN capabilities from operations against enemy regular formations to security tasks in support of revolutionary development.

C. Without a visible indigenous mobilization effort, expansion of US assistance to Vietnam would have been unacceptable politically during this decade. As the one viable organizational entity within the Republic, RVNAF provided the only feasible framework for mobilization of a major segment of RVN manpower. With the zenith of mobilization having been reached, emphasis can and is being shifted to improving the quality of the Vietnamese armed forces.

D. Irrespective of organizational patterns and assigned missions, the fundamental weakness within RVNAF continues to be inadequacy of leadership at all levels. Although various measures are being applied to overcome this problem, leadership deficiencies will continue for an extended period./3/

/3/In a December 23 memorandum to the President, Roche summarized the gist of a CIA study, "The South Vietnamese Army Today," December 12, which, Roche said, called the ARVN poorly trained, understrength, short of experienced leaders, and at a serious disadvantage in firepower. Roche concluded: "If this is the case now, the disruption of ARVN into battalions and companies to pacify provinces could lead to complete disintegration of the ARVN order of battle." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII) The CIA study is ibid.

4. Although I have tried to forestall widespread circulation of the unfounded and uninformed thesis discussed above, I would not be surprised to learn that it had reached Honolulu and Washington. On the premise that it has or will, you may wish to consider counter actions.

340. Editorial Note

During a telephone conversation with President Johnson that began at 12:36 p.m. on December 12, 1966, Secretary McNamara informed the President that he was sending General Starbird to Vietnam to talk with General Westmoreland about plans to build a barrier. McNamara continued:

"Westmoreland would like to do it, I think, but he wants additional forces to monitor it, so Starbird's going to go out and talk to him and see what he thinks, and he'll be back the end of this week or early next and I'll be able to give you a much better report at that time. Basically the military leaders, with the possible exception of Westmoreland and Wheeler, are opposed to it because philosophically they are opposed to static defense. And this of course is static defense, and they use the analogy of the Maginot Line and so on. There are some who are opposed to it because they think it might in some way or other reduce the arguments in favor of bombing of North Vietnam. But, Mr. President, when we don't have a winning plan for you, and we can't tell you how and when we're going to win, it seems to me we need to buy a little insurance, and that's the way I look upon this, and I think we definitely should go ahead and take this preparatory step so that you later can have the option of putting it in, and basically that's what I've asked Starbird to try to work out with Westmoreland. I don't want to have us sit here in the position of ordering this to be done over the objection of all the military leaders. We're trying to avoid that situation."

The President then said "OK," and the conversation ended. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.01, PNO 001)

341. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 1:36 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 296-297.

1458. Ref: Warsaw 1429./2/

/2/In telegram 1429, December 12, Gronouski notified the Department of State of a meeting with Rapacki scheduled for December 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

1. At 1400 Dec 13 meeting (attended also by Michalowski and Jan-czewski) Rapacki opened by observing that today's meeting was not urgent but he felt it was good for us to meet frequently to transmit information and recapitulate attitudes. (Comment: At outset and throughout meeting Rapacki struck me as being in relaxed and reflective mood.)

2. He stated that as result of our conversations, Poles have informed Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRNVN) that our conversations took place, and have transmitted those parts destined for transmittal.

3. Rapacki then recapitulated present situation: In mid-November Lodge presented the American view on possibilities of solving problem; Lewandowski then carried these observations and opinions to Hanoi. On basis of Hanoi conversations, Lewandowski was able subsequently to transmit to Lodge idea of Warsaw meetings.

4. Rapacki continued "We thought at that point that the meetings could be held soon and we were generally hopeful." However starting with Lodge's interpretation clause, complications have since arisen. On Dec 3 suburbs of Hanoi were bombed and NVN bombing intensified. Poles immediately and without asking anyone at that point presented their opinion to US. Thus, he concluded, in December new elements appeared on the scene which were negatively assessed in Hanoi. Not surprisingly, therefore, with this new situation and considering UGS's reaction to Poles' concern, there was reappraisal by party most directly involved. As a result, we are faced with this postponement of Warsaw meetings./3/

/3/In telegram 102298 to Rusk in Paris, December 14, Katzenbach stated that he did "not interpret Rapacki's statement of December 13 to Gronouski as a negative reply from Hanoi in effect closing the Marigold door." (Ibid.)

5. Rapacki said he was not insensitive to USG's expression of appreciation for role Poles were playing; however he was afraid US does not understand nature of Poland's role. He said he feels we are assuming that all of his words come from Hanoi and everything we say to him goes to Hanoi. He said this is not the case; "True, we have our own views and we are friends of Hanoi, but our role is neither that of postman nor advocate; what we want is peace." He said that having knowledge of views of both sides, which neither of participants have, "we think we can play a contributing role."

6. Rapacki continued, saying that Poles are sincere and in this sincerity they must say that they are not sure what USG wants: talks, or to get soundings as to how far DRNVN is ready to yield under pressure. He added that Poles assume that prevailing intention of USG is to bring about talks. He said this is why they are engaged; they are acting on this working hypothesis.

7. He continued that if this working hypothesis reflects reality then he must say that USG did great harm to its own objectives in December. The USG cannot afford a repetition in future, especially at time when this matter is reassessed. He added that if we want peace then we must realize that the carrot-and-stick approach does not work with DRNVN.

8. Rapacki added that we should realize leadership of DRNVN does not want to and cannot yield under pressure; every step from our side that evokes impression that NVN is acting under pressure would be interpreted as sign of weakness and be utilized by all those who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in Warsaw. (Comment: Rapacki repeated this point with emphasis and was, I believe, making a clear reference to Communist China.)

9. Rapacki said that in first position expressed by Lodge it appeared that this truth was grasped by USG and this is why Poles were so hopeful. However the events of December mean, if the working hypothesis Poles are using is sound, that US does not fully appreciate this situation. He added that recent statements by USG officials leave the impression that USG wants to evoke pressure. He quoted from Reuters news story of Dec 12 US Navy spokesman's statement that US intends gradually to increase air raids on NVN; Rapacki interjected at this point his realization that the Navy spokesman may not have known all that was going on and this could very well be an old idea. But he added that the Navy spokesman's subsequent reference to escalation and to new targets having been recently placed on bombing list represented current information. He said "You can assume what effects such statements have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent weeks new targets have in fact been added."

10. Rapacki then said that he even must allude to a statement by Secy Rusk, who has full knowledge of current developments, made in Saigon Dec 9./4/ He quoted Secy Rusk as saying that he did not detect on side of NVN "any indication which allows me to entertain hope, but this indication will come one day; it must come; NVN cannot win here, we are much stronger." Rapacki asked me to visualize how this would be interpreted in Hanoi.

/4/Not further identified.

11. In summary Rapacki said that in judgement of Poles the US did a lot of harm in December and it would be good if no more harm is done in future. This, he said, is advice of Poles. He added that he did not expect me to respond immediately to his remarks.

12. I said that I would convey his comments to Washington but that I would like also to make one general observation. I said that in situation where war is going on and neither side is sure that peace talks will eventuate, it is understandable, if perhaps unfortunate, why both sides continue their operations in whatever manner appears to them to provide military advantage. I added that the NVN in recent weeks have shown no decline in their military aggressiveness. I mentioned the attempted bombing of the Italian Embassy in Saigon (which caused Rapacki and Michalowski to look at each other in surprise and then break out in broad smiles), attempts to bomb bridges, a movie theater, to kidnap and assassinate leading citizens of Saigon, and other kinds of war activities. I said I was raising these points simply to bring out that there has been no relaxation of the war effort on NVN side and we did not expect it to happen until peace negotiations actually commence, after which I would hope that a sharp change in the picture could result. I added that this is reason I feel it so important to do everything we can to begin Warsaw talks.

13. Rapacki said he did not intend to suggest that there had been an armistice and realized that the war was still going on, but he said, "Recognizing this does not change anything that I have said up to this point." He added that we should also realize that bombing of NVN is the really sensitive point. He then concluded with a smile that this was what he had to say and he will wait for our response.

Gronouski

342. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 15, 1966.

/1/Source : Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:30 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 302-304. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:50 a.m. on December 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 17) Gronouski amplified his comments in telegram 1475 from Warsaw, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

1471. For the President from Ambassador Gronouski.

1. I met with Rapacki (Michalowski and Janczewski present) at Poles' request at 1800 Dec 14. (In contrast to previous meetings, Rapacki entered the room unsmiling, and during entire meeting maintained a calm, serious and matter-of-fact attitude.)

2. Rapacki said that first he would like to bring some precision with respect to our conversation of yesterday (Warsaw 1458)./2/ He said that this conversation took place before Poles were aware of last bombing of Hanoi. He said, "If I had had this news then, our conversation of course would have had different character than it did."

/2/Document 341.

3. Rapacki continued, "Today I must state the following facts. First, that the U.S. had to be conscious of and realize the importance of establishing direct contact with Hanoi." He added, "You had stressed the unique possibility of a peaceful settlement that the Warsaw talks with Hanoi presented." He continued, "We thought so too, ever since we obtained the signal for which the USG had asked for for so long in so many official statements." He added, "In this instance we received more than a signal; we received a direct, positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of talks in Warsaw."

4. Rapacki said that immediately after this direct response was transmitted to the USG the US reserved the possibility of modifying their attitude and, of far greater importance, entered a new stage of escalation.

5. Rapacki continued that the USG was bound to be conscious of the reaction which its conduct would evoke and of the consequences of such action. He added that the Poles have done everything in their power to dispel any illusions, noting that on six occasions in Warsaw and Saigon "we have warned the USG side in all seriousness and with the greatest emphasis of the consequences of their actions."

6. "Yesterday," Rapacki continued, "the US Air Force engaged in a new and particularly brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi precisely at the moment when the USG knew that the matter of a Warsaw contact with Hanoi was actively being considered. This," he added, "was the last drop that spilled over the cup. From that moment, in Hanoi and Warsaw, all doubts as to the real intentions of the USG disappeared, including doubts not only in the present case but with respect to all other instances in the past when the US has advanced positions which it has described as peaceful initiatives."

7. Rapacki then said, "We understand therefore and fully share the wish of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, which was transmitted to us today, that we terminate all conversations begun months ago in Saigon. The Polish Govt states that the whole responsibility for losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war rests on the USG." He added, "I would like to express more than regrets because of the utilization by the USG of our good will. Once again it becomes clear how difficult it is to believe in your words." He added "In future only facts can be taken into consideration."

8. I said that I would have no comment except to say that I regretted this turn of events and would immediately convey these observations to Washington.

9. Comment: If Moscow dateline account of latest Hanoi bombing published in Dec 14 Paris edition of New York Times and Herald Tribune, and recounted to me tonight by Rapacki, is true then we are in an incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the current peace initiative--and it surely does unless we take decisive and immediate action--then the Soviets, the Poles and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere. If we treat this turn of events as anything less than a crisis in our world leadership role then I believe we are making a tragic mistake.

10. I am convinced that up till now the Poles, accepting the genuineness of our interests in negotiation, have used whatever influence they have in Hanoi (in all likelihood with Soviet backing) in an effort to initiate US-NVN peace talks. I also am convinced that Rapacki was expressing genuine concern when he warned that the increase in bombing was destroying what appeared to him a good chance that NVN would overcome Chinese influence and engage in Warsaw talks.

11. We have no choice but to take immediate action to try to get discussions back on track. For any chance of success this would require, in my judgment, conveying to Poles that we are willing to accept Rapacki's Dec 13 reasoning (Warsaw 1458) and are prepared now to assure the Poles that we will take care not to create impression of bombing intensification in NVN during the period of delicate negotiations over the holding of Warsaw USG-NVN peace talks. We would also assure the Poles that we do not intend to bomb in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during this period. We would again express our deep desire for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts.

12. I do not know whether this presentation will achieve its purpose, but I am deeply convinced it is imperative that we try. The alternative is not only to lose an opportunity for initiating negotiations, but also to do serious damage to the credibility of the USG's stated objectives.

Gronouski

343. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 53-66

Washington, December 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO

Conclusions

A. Over the last 18 months, there have been a number of favorable developments in the South Vietnamese political scene: the Ky-Thieu regime has successfully ridden out a series of crises; it has shown an ability to fashion reasonably acceptable compromises of troublesome issues; a Constituent Assembly has been elected; the military and civilian leaders have demonstrated an increasing willingness to work together. The longer the process continues, the more difficult it may become to reverse it by a single sudden move. Finally, the US presence has contributed significantly to stability, and the improved military situation adds generally to a better political climate.

B. Nevertheless, South Vietnam is still plagued by important political weaknesses: divisive regional animosities, religious enmities, civilian-military rivalries, and factionalism within the military. Over the next year, crises are bound to occur, particularly as the process of developing a constitution and moving toward a more permanent form of government unfolds. No assurance can be given that some crisis might not undo the political progress made to date.

C. On balance, we believe that the Constituent Assembly will succeed in drafting a constitution. If so, political maneuvering for new national elections may actually exacerbate the basic factors which threaten political stability. Nonetheless, we believe the chances are better than even that national elections will be conducted successfully during the period of this estimate.

D. If presidential elections are held, the military would probably find it easier to maintain unity behind a military candidate (or a military man who resigned in order to run). It is not clear, however, whether the military consider it essential that a military leader occupy the presidential seat or whether a civilian would be acceptable. Much would depend on which civilian. The election of a candidate who was opposed by the military leadership would raise the chances of a military coup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded, political development would have received a serious setback.

E. Even if a relatively smooth transition to an elected government can be achieved, continuing political stability cannot be maintained without military unity and support. The military is probably more cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military support and almost certainly under strong military influence.

Discussion

I. Introduction

1. When South Vietnam achieved independence in 1954, it was already burdened with certain basic liabilities. Despite a deep sense of Vietnamese identity, there was no corresponding commitment to a concept of national government. Virtually no preparation for self government had been made during the decades of French rule. Not only was the country partitioned at the 17th parallel, but South Vietnam itself was also divided by ethnic, religious, regional, and other conflicts. Under the Diem regime, though some political stability was for a time achieved, little progress was made in resolving these basic problems. Moreover, a new threat emerged as it became apparent that Hanoi was determined to wage a revolutionary war against the South. Thus, when the Diem regime was toppled in late 1963, its various successors found no adequate base on which to build a stable government and faced a rapidly deteriorating military situation. One regime after another rose, quickly floundered, and fell.

2. By early 1965, the South Vietnamese Government--beset by military defeats, deprived of control of large sections of the countryside, incapable of effective bureaucratic performance, and ruling over a population in varying degrees indifferent, resentful, and deeply divid-ed--seemed in danger of imminent collapse. The vastly expanded US presence in South Vietnam, civilian as well as military, has retrieved this situation. In particular, the buildup of US combat forces was viewed by South Vietnamese as evidence of US determination to see the war through and to prevent a Communist victory. Thus bolstered, the Ky regime which assumed power in June 1965 has had more room to maneuver and has retained control far longer than any other regime since the fall of Diem.

3. These circumstances have given the government new strengths, although it remains subject to most of the same stresses and weaknesses as its predecessors. Like them, it must operate within the limits of a domestic political situation established as the result of Diem's downfall. On the one hand, the military leadership assumed the reins of power while lacking the cohesiveness and single-mindedness that had enabled the Diem regime to establish its tightly-knit, centrally-controlled power structure. On the other hand, Diem's overthrow also unleashed still other political forces--the religious sects (principally the Buddhists), the students, labor, and a variety of politicians and intellectuals. Since Diem's overthrow, political developments have focused on two basic issues: the relative roles and power positions of these forces in the new body politic, and the pace and nature of the transition to a more broadly-based constitutional government. In varying degrees, these issues precipitated or underlay each of the political crises since 1963.

II. Major Sources of Weakness

4. Regionalism. South Vietnam has long been plagued by regional animosities. Native Southerners (Cochinchinese) generally regard those of Northern (Tonkinese) origin as "carpetbaggers," who wield power within the government and the military establishment far out of proportion to their numbers. In addition, those native to Central Vietnam (Annamites) are viewed with suspicion by both Northerners and Southerners. The regional antipathies hamper efforts to forge truly national South Vietnamese institutions. In one way or another, regional biases intrude into most of South Vietnam's problems and touch all groups, including the military, where factionalism is often on regional lines. In short, regionalism remains a basic weakness of Vietnamese politics and shows no indication of becoming less divisive in the near future.

5. Religion. Political developments during the Diem period and particularly since 1963 have created deep suspicions between South Vietnam's badly split Buddhist majority and its active but less factionalized Catholic minority. The Buddhist and the Catholic mistrust each other's influence in government and each fears the emergence of a government dominated by the other. This rivalry is of less immediate importance, however, than the political role of the militant wing of the Buddhist movement led by Thich Tri Quang, an adept and wily political tactician./2/ Although the militant Buddhist were weakened by their failure to topple Ky last spring and by their unsuccessful boycott of the Constituent Assembly elections, they remain a likely source of trouble. They still seem to constitute the largest body within organized Buddhism and may in time be able to reunite the Buddhists under their control. In any event, they still possess a substantial political base in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, from which they could reenter the political arena if they wished. In the shorter run, there remains a possibility of a new round of militant Buddhist demonstrations, given their assets among the students and the remnants of last spring's "struggle movement."

/2/Tri Quang's base of power is in Central Vietnam, particularly around Hue. The more flexible wing of the Buddhist Institute, led by Thich Tam Chau, is strongest in the Saigon area; much of its strength is based on Buddhists originally from North Vietnam. In addition, there are many Buddhists, including most of those from the southern provinces, who do not participate in the Buddhist Institute. [Footnote in the source text.]

6. Civilian-Military Rivalry. The relationship between the military and civilian elements is fragile; neither group particularly respects the intentions or competence of the other. As the ultimate arbiter of power, the military is sometimes prone to ignore civilian interests. For their part, the civilian politicians tend to overreact to real or imagined provocations and thereby run the risk of needlessly precipitating reaction by the military. Frictions between the military and various civilian groups are unavoidable. There will almost certainly be occasional events which will threaten to burgeon into a serious civilian-military confrontation./3/

/3/In a December 23 memorandum to Rusk, Denney discussed NIE 53-66, summarizing a number of factors that needed to be taken into account in deciding on a U.S. response should a serious civilian-military confrontation develop. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 53-66)

7. Military Factionalism. Factionalism has been chronic among Vietnamese military leaders, and plots and counterplots, personal rivalries, and jealousies have been common. This lack of cohesiveness among the military leaders has presented nonmilitary opponents of the government tempting opportunities to strike alliances with discontented commanders. The command structure itself is conducive to factionalism, since it has allowed the Corps Commanders to run their areas as personal satrapies.

8. Lack of National Awareness. As a result of the factionalism and parochialism which characterize politics in Vietnam, there is little awareness of broad national issues. There is nothing approaching a national political party. Most politicians think primarily in terms of advancing their own or their group's interests. Moreover, activity by the multiplicity of political groups is generally restricted to urban areas, with the rank-and-file support seldom extending beyond personal and group loyalties. The rural peasantry, which constitutes the bulk of the population, has been largely unconcerned and unaffected by political developments in Saigon.

9. Inflation. Among the many economic problems, inflation presents the greatest threat to governmental security. For over a year, South Vietnam has been gripped by severe inflation, caused in part by the large war-related budget deficit and in part by heavy US spending also caused by the war. Since January 1965, the cost of living has increased by over 125 percent. Despite the salutary effects of the regime's recent currency devaluation, the cost of living during 1967 will jump by at least another 20 percent, and probably by much more. Although the effects of inflation fall most heavily on the urban population, the rural areas also suffer difficulties which are often compounded by disruptions in the supply and distribution system. In general, inflation has increased dissatisfaction with the government and has provided the Viet Cong and other opponents with an exploitable popular issue.

10. Bureaucratic Inadequacies. South Vietnam has failed to develop an effective bureaucracy and administrative apparatus. There has been a separation of authority from responsibility; military officers administer most programs at the province and district levels, and the ministers have little control over them. Government procedures tend to be both rigid and cumbersome. Moreover, many trained individuals have been reluctant to work with the government, preferring instead to remain uninvolved. The succession of regimes and coups has resulted in frequent reorganizations, many of them inspired by political considerations rather than concern with increased efficiency, and has made many competent administrators politically unacceptable. It has also made them hesitant to commit themselves to a regime, out of fear that its tenure and their own were likely to be of short duration. In addition, corruption is rampant throughout the system, and its corrosive effect not only impedes government activities but adversely affects attitudes toward the government.

11. The War. These various problems would obstruct political development even in peacetime. The war, however, exacerbates every problem, magnifies every weakness, and makes even the simplest tasks of governing exceedingly difficult. Viet Cong control of large parts of the country, and varying degrees of insecurity elsewhere, greatly restrict the ability of the government to carry forward programs of social and economic development. Finally, the refugees who have fled from the country-side to the cities, and who may number a million in Saigon alone, add to the administrative burdens of the regime and may provide an object for exploitation by its enemies, including of course the Viet Cong.

III. Major Sources of Strength

12. Consensus on the War. A significant and often overlooked source of strength in South Vietnam is the consistently anti-Communist attitude of the country's politically active elements. Despite concern over various GVN policies toward war and peace and over the impact of the large US involvement in Vietnamese affairs, none has called for an end to the fighting or a withdrawal of US forces. The many governmental shakeups that have taken place have not been over basic policy concerning the continuation of the war or over the GVN's steadfast refusal to deal with the Communists. Thus the Communists have been denied the opportunity of gaining power through the back door in league with other South Vietnamese groups. Anticommunism is strongest among the Catholics and military, many of whom fled from communism in North Vietnam in 1954.

13. Continuity of Government. The Ky regime has now survived for 18 months. This remarkable longevity, reversing what appeared to be a persistent trend toward ever-changing, short-lived governments, has had positive psychological effects at home and abroad which have been reinforced by the impact of US military operations. The government has at least had time to begin implementing a number of major programs which heretofore had progressed little beyond the planning stage. Progress has been limited, and much of the emphasis and initiative have come from the US and US prodding. Nevertheless, Ky and his advisors have demonstrated greater insight into the issues facing them and have shown greater flexibility in adopting remedial measures.

14. Political Continuity. Politically, the regime has also profited from its ability to maintain itself in power, especially from its success in facing down both militant Buddhist opposition and military plotting. Most politically active Vietnamese viewed the September elections for the Constituent Assembly as an earnest of the regime's willingness to sanction a larger civilian role in the government; about 80 percent of those registered and over 50 percent of the total adult population of South Vietnam voted, despite the opposition of both the militant Buddhists and the Viet Cong. The cabinet crisis in October demonstrated the persistence of regional rivalries, but the regime managed to dilute the impact of this episode. In any event, increasing numbers of politicians are probably coming to feel that there is political advantage in coexisting with the Ky regime as long as they see reasonable prospects for a transition to elected government.

15. Political Development. For the first time since Diem's downfall, political activity is manifested more in legal channels than in demonstrations and coup plotting. This political activity, while creating a raft of new frictions and problems, is essential and healthy in terms of political development. Moreover, the military leadership, which will remain the final arbiter of power in any case, is actively taking part in this political evolution. Borrowing from the experience of the South Korean military, the Ky regime is seeking to find political means to insure the military's participation in any future government. With this insurance, they appear to be prepared to accept an elected government with a constitutional mandate; such a development would be a promising step toward the creation of a government with a popular national base.

16. US Support. Obviously crucial in the military and economic fields, the greatly increased US presence has injected a new element of major importance into the South Vietnamese body politic. The US role carries great weight among the Vietnamese, so much so in fact that even inaction by the US is a form of involvement or, at the very least, has the same impact by being seen as such. For example, several previous regimes became vulnerable when their opponents suspected that US support was weakening. Ky's regime is strengthened by the fact that most Vietnamese consider the US to be solidly behind it. The expanding US presence has obviously increased the disruptive effect of the war on the Vietnamese economy, and there are some latent anti-American sentiments. These negative factors are likely to be aggravated by the infusion of larger numbers of US troops into the more heavily populated areas of the country. Nevertheless, the overall effect of the US presence has thus far been to contribute significantly to stability.

IV. Current Situation

17. The Directorate. During the past year, the Directorate strengthened its position within the military establishment, enhanced its standing in the country, and preserved a considerable degree of cohesiveness. The successful removal of two deeply entrenched Corps Commanders, Generals Thi and Quang, added to the stature of both Ky and Thieu. The precise relationship between these two leaders is not clear, but Ky certainly has the leading public role. He also draws strength from the aura of US support, from the air force which he still commands, and from a group of younger officers called the Baby Turks. This latter group includes General Loan, Director of Police and Chief of Military Security and a close confidant of Ky's, and General Khang, Commander of III Corps and the Capital Military Zone. This combination has provided physical security for the Ky regime.

18. There are persistent rumors of friction between Thieu and Ky, though we see no evidence that such friction is now of serious proportions. But the future cohesiveness of the Directorate depends to a great extent on the cooperation, or at least continuing mutual tolerance, of these two officers.

19. The Constituent Assembly. Except for the Buddhist Institute, all the traditional political, regional and religious groups are reflected in the 117-member Constituent Assembly. The Assembly includes professional politicians, representatives of the Dai Viet and VNQDD parties (badly split themselves), regionalists (such as the militant Movement for the Renaissance of the South), and a large number of young and inexperienced delegates. Four political "blocs" were formed for the election of Assembly officers and committees, but each is a conglomerate of differing interests, and their membership and the lines between them continue to shift.

20. For the next few months at least, the Assembly will be the source of the issues on which the civilian politician and the regime will confront one another. The Directorate has not yet shown its hand, but its military members would almost certainly resist any move which would deprive them of a constitutional role in a new government. The precise goals of the civilians are not clear. In general, however, they distrust the Directorate and appear to believe that the time is ripe for the creation of a constitutional government with a much larger role for the civilian elements. The September elections whetted their political appetites, and since the military gave up some political power then, the civilians are pressing for more. Their motives range from parochial self-interest to genuine concern for a legitimate government. The many divisions and rivalries within the Assembly will impair its ability to present a solid front against the Directorate.

21. There are a number of potential problems that could lead to an open break, either by design or by accident, between the Assembly and the Directorate. The Assembly will continue to interpret its mandate for constitution-drafting broadly, while the Directorate will be suspicious of incursions into its domain of power. There is considerable resentment in the Assembly over the power of the Directorate to change items in the draft constitution, reversible only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The regime, for its part, is reluctant to relinquish this power until it has a fairly good idea of what will be in the constitution. The desire of some Assembly members to retain the Assembly in being until the convocation of an elected legislature may also cause friction with the Directorate.

22. There are, however, factors that could lead toward compromise. The majority of the Assembly members probably are not interested in pursuing a collision course with the government, in large part because they realize that if the Assembly fails, they are unlikely for some time to have another chance of sharing power. Moreover, there may be many who will advocate caution in the expectation that the very establishment of a constitutional system, even if it is not fully in accord with their desires, will provide new opportunities for change. The Directorate also has reason to try to avoid a showdown. It probably believes that the real test is not so much the question of a constitution but that of power afterwards, and it is aware of the US concern that there be a constitution. Within limits, the regime will probably try to be forthcoming on this matter. On balance, we believe that an open break between the Directorate and the Assembly will be avoided and that a constitution will be produced.

23. Although we consider it unlikely that the Ky regime will be overthrown during the near future, its downfall could seriously endanger the promulgation of a constitution as well as the political progress made to date. Much would depend on how Ky was overthrown and what sort of regime succeeded him. Progress would not necessarily be wholly lost, for example, if Ky were overthrown by an internal palace coup with a minimum of violence and disruption, or if the new regime were no less disposed to work toward constitutional government. Should the coup be violent, however, or should there be a series of coups and countercoups, the whole structure created by past political development would almost certainly disintegrate.

V. Problems and Prospects Over the Next Year or So

24. Judgments concerning the course of political development in South Vietnam must be highly tentative. The country is in the throes of political evolution, the course of which will be disputed even after a constitution is adopted. In a very real sense, political development in South Vietnam will be a day-to-day, month-to-month phenomenon for some time to come, and periodic upheavals and crises will threaten the entire process. Indeed, as the pace of political events quickens, the factors that work against stability may actually be exacerbated. Regionalism in particular is likely to be a politically volatile factor. The Southern elements are resentful of the Northern/Central coloration of Ky's regime and fear that Ky and Loan are conniving to perpetuate it at Southern expense. No assurance can be given that some crisis might not prove to be the ultimate undoing of the government.

25. A falling out among the military leaders could have serious consequences. As political activity increases, the possibility of frictions between Ky and Thieu also increases. Ky has thus far been skillful and fortunate in his efforts to contain the political power of individual Corps Commanders; on a future occasion, he might be less successful. The question of how much political power is to be shared with the civilian elements might become a cause of contention within the military, particularly since the Baby Turks appear to be less inclined to compromise with the civilians than is the Directorate.

26. The prospect of negotiations could introduce unsettling influences into the political situation over the next year or so. At present, no significant Vietnamese group publicly advocates negotiations and the military leaders are quite opposed to them except on terms that amount to Communist capitulation. Hence, any government that, in the near term, agreed to negotiations would increase its vulnerability to attack by its political enemies. On the other hand, the large US presence may encourage the Vietnamese to believe that the US will agree to no settlement that does not effectively insure the survival of a non-Communist SVN. The degree to which this confidence would remain as a counterweight to disruptive effects would depend heavily on the circumstances in which negotiations seemed an imminent possibility.

27. Nevertheless, there are developments which tend to make us cautiously optimistic about the prospects for a more stable political situation. These include the continuity of the Ky regime, its success in riding out a series of crises and potential crises, and its ability to fashion reasonably acceptable compromises without resorting to outright repression. In addition, the election of a Constituent Assembly, and the willingness of both the military leadership and civilian elements to attempt to work together augur well for continued political progress. The longer the process continues and is reflected in the development of new institutions and working relations, the more difficult it may become to reverse it by some single sudden move. Finally, the improved military situation contributes generally to a better political climate.

28. During the next year or so, the successful holding of national elections would be an important indication of growing political stability. Actually, events are moving in this direction; a constitution will almost certainly call for presidential elections, and probably legislative ones as well. Political maneuvering among the various civilian elements is already underway in anticipation of elections and will grow more intense. New political alliances will eventually emerge, although it is too early to determine what they are likely to be. The Directorate's final decision concerning elections will depend on its assessment of the situation at the time; if the military felt that elections seriously threatened their basic interests, they might move to postpone them. But we believe the chances are better than even that national elections will be conducted successfully during the period of this estimate.

29. If presidential elections are held, there will probably be a military candidate (or a military man who has resigned in order to run), perhaps Ky or Thieu, as well as civilian candidates. It is not clear whether the military considers it essential that a military leader occupy the presidential seat or whether a civilian would be acceptable. Much of course would depend on the civilian. The military would probably find it easier to maintain unity behind a military candidate. The election of a candidate who was opposed by the military leadership would raise the chances of a military coup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded, political development would have received a serious setback.

30. Even assuming a relatively smooth transition to an elected government, continuing political stability cannot be maintained without military unity and support. There is little evidence of any significant growth of a sense of national commitment that would submerge special interests. Civilian-military and other rivalries will persist and will manifest themselves in recurring conflicts over the distribution of power within the government. Any government, particularly a civilian one, will almost certainly be subject to debilitating bickering and jockeying for influence, and vulnerable to plots from within and without. As long as the military leadership remains relatively united, it will have the upper hand over others. It is probably more cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military support and almost certainly under strong military influence.

344. Notes of Meeting With President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files. Top Secret. Prepared by Rostow on December 19. Rostow states incorrectly that the meeting was held on Friday, December 17, in Austin, Texas. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting was held on Friday, December 16, at the White House, prior to the President's departure for Texas that evening. (Ibid.)

PRESENT
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Ambassador Harriman
Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Goldberg
W. W. Rostow

The President asked Amb. Lodge for his views on the situation in Viet Nam./2/

/2/Telegram 7472 from Bangkok, December 11, contained a memorandum, prepared by Lodge for Rusk, which also provided Lodge's views on the overall situation in Vietnam. (Ibid., Memos to the President--Walt W. Rostow, vol. 16)

Amb. Lodge stated that many of the worries they had in Saigon a year ago they did not have now.

--They no longer feared the Viet Cong might cut the country in half.

--They no longer feared that regionalism backed by the Buddhists might tear the country apart.

--They no longer feared a Communist coup from within.

The President's commitment announced July 28, 1965, to put major U.S. forces in South Viet Nam had made this progress possible and also denied the "great edge of Asia" to the Communists--from Korea to Malaysia. This region was moving forward with confidence based on our commitment in Viet Nam.

On the other hand, we haven't won. The military war against the main force units had gone well. The Ambassador "expects brilliant results in 1967." The constitutional process is evolving. The writ of the Saigon government runs throughout all the regions, except those directly controlled by the VC. They are moving well towards the making of a constitution and he expects it to be promulgated by February 9. Like everything in South Viet Nam, the political process is precarious; but there is progress.

Inflation has been contained in the economy, although it is an endless struggle. On the other hand, no one in South Viet Nam is starving.

The weakest point is failure to deal with terrorism, and this problem touches others. To get at terrorism, the retraining of the ARVN is critical. They must become a constabulary. The job will best be done by the soldiers if they operate where they live. They would then be more inclined to leave the chickens and the girls alone.

General Westmoreland understands this but all the officers in MACV do not. He cited a U.S. general in II Corps who didn't appear to realize that 39 village chiefs had been assassinated in II Corps in the past year. The military do not think in terms of the police measures now required to achieve security in the countryside. He believes they need direct word from the President that this is their job. At present Amb. Lodge's view is that a basic reorganization of the ARVN is required. Gen. Westmoreland is not sure. It is the kind of issue where judgment from outside might be helpful.

With respect to third country participation, we have made progress and should make more. We have about reached the limit of generating such assistance by exhortation. For example, we need the kind of British policemen who have worked in Kenya. We ought to pressure the British to get some--perhaps by holding up shipments of scotch whisky to the U.S.

U.S. AID does not have enough people. It could use some good foreigners.

Latin Americans who trained with our Navy could help with Operation Market Time./3/

/3/Operation Market Time referred to U.S. Navy counter-sea-infiltration operations along the coast of South Vietnam.

He cited an old friend of his, Tom Pappas, who helped in the rehabil-itation of Greece. He believes Greece ought to send some troops to South Viet Nam. Mr. Pappas says he will pay for this as well as organize it.

Mr. Rostow asked if it would not be wise for Thieu to get into the field and lead the ARVN in the process of pacification, stressing the dignity of the job and its importance to the future of the country.

Amb. Lodge said this was something he might do. He is conscious of the problem and he may do it if he decides he cannot run for the presidency.

With respect to corruption, he said, we are still dealing with a country where relatives are important. For example, Chin cannot be removed because he is Thieu's brother-in-law. In that culture if one lets down a member of the family, one loses face.

The generals around Saigon are weak, partly because the government does not want strong leaders controlling troops too near Saigon for fear of a coup. Those are things one must take into account in Asia. But with Americans beginning to engage in pacification in the Saigon area, things may improve.

The President then turned to Gov. Harriman who described his probing of peace feelers in Algeria/4/ and Paris. The Algerians are prepared to follow up in Hanoi. He talked with Sainteny/5/ and recommended Sainteny be given permission to probe in Hanoi. He feels either the Algerians or Sainteny would do better job than East Europeans. The people in Hanoi are suspicious. They feel they have been twice fooled in negotiations.

/4/Harriman reported on his 3-hour talk on December 9 with Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika in telegram 1863 from Algiers, December 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/5/A memorandum of Harriman's conversation with Sainteny on December 2 is ibid. Bohlen reported on the conversation in telegram 8474 from Paris, December 3. (Ibid.)

In Paris he found Mana'ch constructive this time and also had a good talk with the Director of North African Affairs who said he thinks the U.S. should play an active part in Africa.

Gov. Harriman found Franco full of plans for the future of his country and also for settling problems in the disputed areas of Africa. He was contemptuous of de Gaulle. He believes we have been too friendly with the French. When Gov. Harriman cited our ties to Lafayette, he replied that we "have milked that cow dry."

In general, he found Spain moving ahead very fast and recalled his opposition to Jimmy Byrnes' negative attitude towards Spain when Byrnes followed Molotov's line. President Truman followed Byrnes on this matter because he hadn't liked the way Spain treated the Baptists. They are now treating them better.

He underlined the urgency and importance of South Vietnamese moving in the campaign for national reconciliation.

Under Secretary Katzenbach then commented the most difficult thing is to get a handle on the ARVN in the pacification problem. How to convert the ARVN was the problem. In terms of organization, the division commanders and corps commanders controlled the military now when what was needed was unambiguous control by the province chiefs and the political system. Amb. Lodge said we need senior Vietnamese leadership for pacification. We need the argument about ARVN reorganization settled: Westy saying it was unnecessary but Thieu feeling the ARVN has to be rebuilt from the bottom up; and we need a talented man from the U.S. military to lead our side of pacification--a three-star general. Gen. Wyant/6/ is the best man in Lodge's view.

/6/Apparently a reference to Major General Frederick C. Weyand.

We shall learn something out of the Long An experiment, with Sam Wilson in effect leading both the military and civilian teams.

Amb. Goldberg asked Amb. Lodge what is the view ahead: Can the North Vietnamese maintain their ability to infiltrate; can the VC maintain their ability to conduct terrorist operations? Amb. Lodge replied that he expected brilliant results in 1967 in conventional military operations; we would move ahead politically; we would hold inflation although it would be a great struggle; we would make limited progress in pacification. Ho would not decide to end the war until, in his own phrase, the "guerrilla infrastructure" was destroyed. This embraces about 150,000 people. It might take 5 years to complete the job. But it ought to be clear during 1967 that we were on a winning track. He expected U.S. casualties to be way down by the middle of 1967.

He returned again to the ARVN and said they were disliked by the people. The proper pattern was the kind of combined force he had seen when outside Danang, with 25 U.S. Marines and 50 local Vietnamese working together in local security operations. The regional forces and the popular forces killed more VC than the ARVN. We should be moving to convert the ARVN to RF and PF. That was only way to disengage them from bad habits derived from their training under French colonial rule.

As for the national reconciliation program, this had taken hold at the top of South Vietnamese government. Zorthian was doing a good job and there should be an important announcement at the time of Tet concerning the national reconciliation program.

The President then asked Secretary McNamara to report on the bombing situation in North Viet Nam and the NATO meeting. Secretary McNamara said that two targets outside Hanoi had been attacked on December 2d, 3d, 13th and 14th: a railroad yard and a vehicle depot. Some photos were available on 14th which showed the railroad yard had been hit, with some but not extensive damage. Some civilian buildings near the railroad yard were hit. There were no photos of the area within the city limits.

There was some possibility that a SAM had fallen in the city limits. On the evidence, McNamara doubts that U.S. bombs fell within the city limits; but there were probably some civilian casualties near the targets.

As for the Peking Embassy, we have no evidence that we hit it. Nor the Rumanian Embassy. It is exceedingly difficult, however, to prove a negative. A great deal of antiaircraft debris falls on the city during our attacks nearby.

[Here follows discussion of NATO and United Nations issues.]

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 19, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:44 a.m.

1508. Ref: Warsaw 1506./2/

/2/In telegram 1506 from Warsaw, December 19, Gronouski briefly discussed his meeting with Rapacki set for later that day. (Ibid.)

1. To save time of transmission after 1400 Dec. 19 meeting with Rapacki, following is advance text of my oral presentation to Rapacki (as derived from State's 102960,/3/ 103342,/4/ 103586,/5/ and 83786)./6/ Any variations or interspersed comments by Rapacki will be included with report of meeting.

/3/In telegram 102960 to Warsaw, December 14, the Department of State responded to telegram 1458 (Document 341). The Department wondered whether the Poles "ever had any NVN commitment to a meeting in Warsaw." In any event, in further conversation with the Poles, the Department wanted "to keep the door open as long as there seems to be any possibility of talks developing" while refuting the Polish contention that U.S. actions and statements had thrown a roadblock in the way of talks. Gronouski was instructed to ask for a further meeting with Rapacki and present him with the position statement spelled out in the telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 300-302)

/4/In telegram 103342 to Warsaw, December 14, the Department of State notified Gronouski that telegram 1471 (Document 343) did not alter the basic assessment conveyed in telegram 102960. Therefore its arguments should be conveyed to Rapacki as soon as possible, supplemented by several points discussed in telegram 103342. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 305-306)

/5/Telegram 103586 to Warsaw, December 15, provided material on the air war used by Gronouski in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 A-F of telegram 1508 printed here. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

/6/Document 305.

2. "I would like to begin with a brief recapitulation of recent events. Before Lewandowski went to Hanoi we had discussed with him quite fully and frankly our position with regard to undertaking of negotiations, bombing suspension and other types of de-escalation, terms of settlement, and related matters. After his return from Hanoi, Lewandowski outlined to us on Dec. 1 what he said he had conveyed to Hanoi as the U.S. position. Amb. Lodge confirmed to him that this statement, despite the general language in which it was couched, represented our position, subject of course to interpretation which, to use your own terms, meant merely hammering out greater precision in negotiations. Following this, Lewandowski proposed, and we agreed, to meet with North Vietnamese representatives in Warsaw, something which it was strongly implied the North Vietnamese were prepared to do.

3. Before, during and after all this was taking place, the conflict in Viet-Nam continued, including the bombing of NVN, the infiltration of NV men and supplies into SVN, Viet Cong terrorist bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and so on. In the conversations in Saigon leading up to the proposal to meet in Warsaw, nothing was said to relate this continuing waging of the war to efforts to get underway talks to work out a peaceful settlement. Those talks, of course, were expressly intended to bring the fighting, bombing and terrorist activities to an end. It was precisely for this reason that we had been at such pains to elaborate a possible procedure, the package proposal with Phases A and B, to facilitate the arranging of a process of de-escalation as soon as possible after we and the NVN began to talk.

4. In any case, in a desire to promote a peaceful settlement, we responded quickly to Lewandowski's suggestion, on Dec. 3, and were ready to talk in Warsaw.

5. As soon as we began to talk with the Polish Govt in Warsaw, pre-sumably preparatory to our meeting directly with the NVN representatives, we found that new terms and conditions seemed to be put forward, with the opening of direct talks contingent on our fulfilling them. It was stated that we had escalated our bombing during these most recent conversations, in contrast to a de-escalation which the Poles through the NVN had detected and favorably noted during Lewandowski's last visit to Hanoi.

6. Regarding your recent comments on intensification of bombing of NVN, we wish to remind you once more that there has been no such escalation, or de-escalation; that there are variations that result from weather conditions and other technical factors; and that continued Polish references to the bombing have introduced a new issue which was not involved in the arrangements leading up to the opening of discussions in Warsaw.

7. There has been neither escalation on our part, allegedly to put pressure on Hanoi, nor has there been any de-escalation in NVN's infiltration and terrorist activities in the South. In fact, if there has been a change in the South it has been an increase in mortaring of not only military but also civilian targets and in assassinations, including that of an important individual. The bombing of NVN has proceeded on essentially the same pattern as before with no significant changes in intensity, proximity to Hanoi or type of targets. All targets are military and a good number of those struck recently had also been struck before; as long ago as last June a target closer to Hanoi than any of the current ones was struck. Great care has been and is being exercised to avoid civilian casualties. No raid has taken place on "a residential area in Hanoi." Absolutely no target within Hanoi city limits was bombed. The nearest target was more than two miles from city limits and more than five miles from the point where it is claimed damage was done. We have inspected with the greatest care all our reports of the pertinent bombing missions and find no evidence to support your charges.

8. The latest strikes near Hanoi were Yen Vien railroad yard and Van Dien vehicle depot, which are five nautical miles northeast and south of Hanoi respectively, and well outside of Hanoi city limits. Both of these targets were struck on Dec. 13 and 14 but this was not the first time in either case. The Van Dien vehicle depot is a major military transportation center for operation, storage and support of trucks and other vehicles used for movement of men and materiel to the war in SVN. The Yen Vien railroad yard is the largest railroad classification yard in NVN. It controls all of the country's rail traffic north of Hanoi and so represents a vital transportation link for all military equipment and supplies coming into NVN from this direction. This important yard services over a third of the nation's military cargo handling capacity. Our effort against both targets is part of our continuing program to strike against major facilities that support Hanoi's war against SVN. These strikes represent no departure from policy. The types of targets are in categories struck previously and this targeting constitutes no change in purpose or procedures. The Hanoi oil facility struck last June is closer to Hanoi than either of these two targets.

9. I want to comment specifically on the allegation that our aircraft bombed a built-up area of Hanoi at the west end of the Red River Bridge and the suburb of Dhatram to the southwest. Nothing received in detailed follow-up reports has substantiated this; this area of the alleged attack is nowhere near the areas targeted for attack. It is important to note that there was heavy surface-to-air missile, anti-aircraft and MIG activity and that our aircraft took action against these missile sites. Missiles were fired at our aircraft; an objective observer should not overlook the possibility that stray missiles or anti-aircraft shells could have caused the damage cited.

10. Careful review of specifics, as well as the general pattern of our bombing attacks against NVN over the past several months, brings out the following points which must be quite clear to Hanoi:

A. U.S. bombing is directed against military and military-related targets, with an obvious effort to avoid civilian population centers, large and small. This, I might add, is in stark contrast to Viet Cong activities in SVN, which expressly include terrorism against civilian population as part of their tactics to gain control.

B. U.S. attacks against NVN have consisted entirely of tactical, precision bombing against military and military-related targets, avoiding (except on a few occasions against infiltration routes at the NVN frontier which is away from settled areas) "carpet bombing" technique such as was used in World War II. This clearly shows that our intention is not to bring the Hanoi regime to its knees, but rather to direct attacks solely at destroying Hanoi's capability and willingness to support and supply the Viet Cong effort in the South.

C. There is no basis for charging U.S. with escalation of the conflict over the past few days, either in geographic terms or as to types of targets. Hanoi's oil facility three nautical miles from the center of Hanoi was struck on June 29, and oil facilities on the edge of Haiphong were struck on June 29, July 7, and August 2. The two targets of Dec. 14 are both five nautical miles from Hanoi's center and both had been struck earlier.

D. U.S. aircraft have attacked a number of targets close to Hanoi and Haiphong (ranging from 33 to 3 nautical miles away from the center of Hanoi) since early July and even before. These targets have been struck repeatedly, at least since early July. U.S. aircraft have not at any time struck cities themselves or civilian populated areas.

E. The Hanoi-Haiphong area is heavily defended by surface-to-air missiles and regular anti-aircraft defenses, reflecting the concentration of military and military-related installations. Our aircraft are authorized to strike these installations in self-defense and have frequently been required to do so since early July and even before.

F. It must be as clear to the NVN as to us that weather factors affect our pattern of air activity, and that this pattern in December and late November could not reasonably be interpreted by Hanoi as escalation or conscious effort to exert pressure on the NVN authorities. In comparable periods of good weather, such as Nov. 22 and 23, Dec. 2, 3, 4 and 5, and Dec. 13-14, essentially the same type of targets were struck and the same intensity of air activity in and around Hanoi took place as has frequently been the case during the last six months, and the same general areas of NVN were affected.

11. When you referred on Tuesday, Dec. 13, to complications having arisen, these have been introduced by the Polish side which has in Warsaw changed the basis of our discussions from what had been worked out with Lewandowski. This applies not only to the question of escalation and de-escalation of military activity but also to the exaggerated importance attached to Amb. Lodge's perfectly natural statement about interpretation and also to the observations about statements of American officials--the Navy spokesman and Secy Rusk./7/ If the Polish Govt is concerned about public statements, it should review the monotonous consistency with which Hanoi has publicly declared its total unwillingness to take even the first minor steps toward opening up explorations for possible peaceful settlement.

/7/See Document 341.

12. We have been waiting now in Warsaw for almost two weeks to get started on discussions, and your govt must bear the responsibility for the fact that these have yet to get underway. You well know that one important subject for such discussions would be to arrange for mutual de-escalation, including bombing of NVN. You also know that in all of the discussions leading up to the Polish proposal and our agreement to meet with the NVN in Warsaw, there was no condition relating to bombing. All of the increasingly indignant charges we have heard here, including the threat to terminate the conversations, are based on events subsequent to the agreement reached with the Polish Govt on Dec. 3, events which are extraneous to what was the basis of our agreement at that time.

13. We are deeply concerned over the gravity of Polish actions which serve the basic, long-run interests of neither of the parties whom you say you mean to be helping. We regretfully find ourselves being led to the conclusion that the Polish Govt, whether on its own or in response to promptings from the NVN Govt, is seeking to make a case which is based on false premises and does not relate to the facts as we know them. This gives us concern not only because of the damaging effect it could have on prospects for working out a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam but because we would find it difficult not to have our attitude about our relations with the Polish Govt also affected.

14. But our desire is to move toward peace and our conviction is that the best road to take is one of direct discussion with Hanoi's representatives. We are somewhat confused as a result of our conversations here as to what Hanoi has said and what represents the views of the Polish Govt. Our strong impression is that, in spite of our readiness both in Saigon with Lewandowski and now in Warsaw to present quite fully and frankly our position, we have not received any communication at all from the NVN Govt. The issues that stand between us and a peaceful settlement are exceedingly complex and difficult and we despair of progress being made until the way is open for an exchange of views rather than a unilateral declaration from our side.

15. Nevertheless we want to leave no stone unturned in our search for peace and would like to turn for a moment from the total picture to one sector of it in which conceivably we might begin to move. This is with respect to the possible beginning of de-escalation through a two-phased arrangement referred to in Lewandowski's eighth point. This, you will recall, involves a package deal, to be worked out, which in its totality would represent what both we and Hanoi could agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension.

16. We are ready to sit down with NVN representatives tomorrow to see whether an arrangement along these lines could be worked out. On the other hand, the NVN may prefer in the initial stages to deal through the Polish Govt. In that case we are ready to consider whatever proposals the NVN would wish to put forward as to the elements which would go into such a two-phase package arrangement. Agreement here would solve beyond cavil the problems, real or imagined, which you present repeatedly.

17. On the other hand, if Hanoi officials wish to proceed promptly to a total agreement representing the terms of an agreed settlement, we are prepared to move along that track, including de-escalation as the final item.

18. Perhaps the coming holidays and the truces associated with them offer an opportune occasion to take some useful steps along these lines. This in turn should make it easier for the authorities in Hanoi to proceed then to discuss the other matters standing between us and a peaceful settlement."

Gronouski

346. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 19, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:06 p.m.

1513. Ref: Warsaw 1508./2/

/2/Document 345.

1. I opened by saying that my presentation was going to be unusually lengthy but that I felt it important at this stage to have before the Polish Govt as full a statement of the USG position as possible. I then commenced reading statement in reftel.

2. After para 9, Rapacki asked where the missile sites are that our pilots are authorized to hit. I answered that I did not know their specific location but I presumed that they were in vicinity of vehicle depot and railroad yards.

3. When I finished reading the first sentence of para 12 reftel (saying Polish Govt must bear responsibility), Rapacki banged his fist on the table vigorously and in great agitation said, "Stop! I will hear no more of this." In angry tone, Rapacki said he categorically rejected this attempt to shift responsibility to Poles, that responsibility is squarely on us for destroying chance for peace talks, and that our attempt to shift responsibility is wholly unprecedented and unwarranted.

4. I started to fold my notes but Rapacki, the storm having receded, said that he was keenly disappointed in what I had said so far because he had anticipated, when I asked for appointment today, that I had information to present to him that would be helpful in reducing the suspicions in Hanoi that had led to their asking the Poles to break off these discussions. I said I wanted to express our continuing desire to move toward peace and our conviction that best road to take is one of direct discussions with Hanoi's representatives. (Thus I resumed reftel remarks starting with para 14 and continuing through para 18.) (Comment: Inasmuch as Rapacki had gotten point on responsibility and given his reaction to the first sentence, I thought it best to pass over remarks from second sentence para 12 through para 13.)

5. Rapacki referred to our last meeting in which he had said it was difficult to believe words of USG representatives as they relate to position of USG and that in future Poles would be influenced only by facts. "Yet I find in your remarks," he said, "no facts." He said that USG, after nullifying that possibility of meeting NVN representatives in Warsaw, is ignoring everything that has happened and maintaining that nothing has happened; this in total disregard of everything that brought on nullification. He said, "Nothing in your statement is a new fact, even the last paragraph referring to holiday suspension of bombing." He added, "You must realize that this suspension of bombing is taking place during a period of escalation; that taking up Warsaw talks during holiday suspension, immediately after intensification of bombing and in midst of escalation, could give rise to misgivings and suspicions in Hanoi that such meetings were result of military pressure." He alluded to the statement he had previously attributed to Lodge that US wants to avoid impression that talks are response to bombing suspension. Yet, he said, all USG actions are contrary to Lodge; "What you have said to me today does not dispel the concern that negotiations now would be the result of bombing pressure." He noted that after experience of first part of this month, we have to take account of sensitivity of Hanoi.

6. Rapacki said that only conclusion he could draw from our assertion that our bombs did not fall on residential districts of Hanoi is that military has not informed the govt of the character and facts of the bombing. He said, "I could admit to this idea, but I also must assume that you transmitted to your govt accurately our concern about the negative impact that bombing of Hanoi and the escalation of bombing of NVN would have on the possibilities of Warsaw talks. Having been warned of this and having accepted responsibility for the bombing intensification that occurred, there is no basis whatsoever for allegations that it is our responsibility."

7. Rapacki added that in Saigon Lewandowski had declared in a most formal way that bombing should be stopped in any case. He added that in subsequent Warsaw meetings they had told us that we had weakened our position because of the interpretation clause; that we had changed our position. "Now," he said, "you want to shift to Poles responsibility for introducing new elements."

8. "As to bombing," he said, "we have warned repeatedly against escalation at precise time discussions are under consideration; yet you went right ahead and escalated your bombing. Having done so you assumed responsibility and your attempt now to shift it to us is unprecedented and cynical."

9. With respect to bombing of Hanoi, he said bombing of railroad yards was presumably more important to USG than chance for peace. He said not just Poles but the whole world press is outraged by this. He repeated what he had said during previous meetings that this Dec. 3 resumption of bombing "came precisely when we received more than a signal from Hanoi." He added that Poles did not put forth new conditions but "recalling speeches of Goldberg, the President, Secy Rusk and others, once we received the signal we did we would have had every right to call for a stop in the bombing." He said, "You have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoi; however, we did not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it."

10. With respect to bombing of city of Hanoi, Rapacki read from what he referred to as "on the spot report from ICC in Hanoi" saying that a workingman's residential district called Fukton (phonetic) was completely destroyed; two trade union buildings, university, and Chinese Embassy were damaged, and bombs fell 200 meters from Polish Embassy. He said in face of this evidence it is hard to take seriously the assertion that there is no evidence our bombs fell in Hanoi.

11. I said that since our last meeting I have consulted with Washington on all matters relating to our last two conversations, that we had made an exhaustive study aimed at determining whether or not our bombs landed in residential sections of Hanoi, and that not one shred of evidence had turned up to indicate that they did. I said I am further personally convinced that we have never during this war selected a residential area as a bombing target. All of our targets had been related to military activity and we have avoided many targets that could be designated as military simply because they were located in built-up areas. I said I served on a bomber during World War II and I know it is inevitable that occasionally the target is missed and a bomb goes astray, but we found no evidence that this happened on Dec. 13 and 14.

12. Rapacki said, "Your whole presentation today cannot be described except as confirmation of fears that USG has decided to withdraw from attitude expressed by Lodge, has chosen a brutal way to do this, and is now trying to twist facts and shift responsibility to Poland. I reject categorically," he went on, "as outright cynical the statement on Poland's being responsible for postponement of Warsaw meetings. The Warsaw meetings were bombed by the U.S."

13. Referring to suggestions I made in paras 16 and 17 reftel, he said, "I am astonished that at same time you accuse us of stalling talks, you ask us to help you get them going again." He added that Poland rejects categorically our analysis, our accusations against Poland and the NVN side, and sees no new elements in last part of my statement. Inasmuch as NVN asked Poles to discontinue these discussions, what was new to justify returning to NVN on this matter? Rapacki continued, "I suspect that if we did approach Hanoi their response would be that USG has proposed nothing new which would overcome the reason why Hanoi asked for discontinuation of talks in the first place."

14. I said it wasn't a question of something new as much as it was a question of bending every effort to bring two govts together to negotiate the end of this war. I continued that we should not deny the elementary fact that both sides in this war are continuing their military action, and neither side will let up until such time as they find some basis for gaining confidence that the other side prefers a negotiated peace to continued war. I added that the only way I know for the development of such confidence is for both sides to lay their positions side by side on a conference table, see how far they are apart, and make an attempt through negotiations to bring them together.

15. I said the longer we wait the worse the situation becomes, adding that reasons can always be found to keep negotiations from happening. I said that we must face the fact that unless we find some way to cut through and get negotiations started bombing and military action will go on and on, making it increasingly difficult to find a solution.

16. I said we should realize that antagonists in a war are naturally suspicious of each other. I added that I have a firm knowledge and personal conviction that President Johnson is deeply committed to negotiating a peaceful solution to the war, but I cannot frankly say that I have the same confidence in Hanoi's desire for negotiations. Many people in the U.S. and elsewhere believe that Hanoi is not interested in negotiation; that NVN officials want to continue the war because of their expectations that the U.S. will eventually lose its will to continue and Hanoi will thereby win by default. I added that from our conversations I gained some hope that Hanoi wanted to enter negotiations, but frankly I was not confident that this was the case.

17. I said that until we can get both sides together this confidence will never develop. I continued, this is your basic reason for trying again with Hanoi; to convince them to at least start the negotiations. If the peace negotiations fail we haven't lost anything, but we cannot hope to gain until we get the two sides together.

18. Rapacki referred again to absence of anything new and asked how I expected Hanoi to change its position of last week when Poles were asked to break off discussions. I said I hope there was somebody making as strong a presentation and putting as much pressure on Hanoi to come to the negotiating table as the Poles were putting on us. Rapacki replied with reference to those who are attempting to convince Hanoi to come to the negotiating table, saying whenever they feel that they are making progress the U.S. bombs their efforts.

19. At the end Rapacki had mellowed a bit, saying that of course if we convey to Hanoi everything you told us today we will destroy any possibility of their engaging in negotiations. Rapacki did not say Poles would take any further action; neither, however, did he say they would not./3/

/3/The Department of State responded to this telegram and telegram 1508 (Document 345) in telegram 105909 to Warsaw, December 20, proposing that Gronouski return to Washington for a day or two of consultations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

Gronouski

347. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, December 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret.

1967 AND BEYOND IN VIETNAM

The Rostow and Komer papers/2/ provide a basis for a very large area of agreement on the action programs we should attempt to follow during 1967. These could be summarized in a single action program, subject to the vital caveat of maintaining flexibility at all times. Nonetheless, the general outlines of what we want to do seem fairly clear.

/2/Attachments to Documents 318 and 319.

However, these two papers do not fully consider three inter-related factors that must enter into our present thinking:

A. The prospect of the 1968 US elections and their impact on our ability to maintain a prolonged struggle.

B. The question of negotiation, including specifically the possibility of attempting a direct "package deal" negotiation with Hanoi--and above all the question any such deal would necessarily raise of just what risks we might be prepared to assume in connection with a VC/NLF role in South Vietnam.

C. The vital importance of developing a responsible and effective GVN, and whether this argues in some ways against certain types of US involvement and action that might, in the short-term sense, appear to make sense.

These three factors are the subject of this memorandum. However, it must start with a median prognosis of what we can hope to achieve by the end of 1967 and mid-1968, when the impact of the US election will start to become really acute.

In brief, such a median prognosis, in our judgment, is not comforting. 1967 will be slow going at best on the pacification front, as the Komer paper admits; however effectively we organize the US side, ARVN will take time to do a passable job of security for pacification, and the mainspring of GVN government performance--already showing signs of slowing down because of a pervading "caretaker" spirit--is most unlikely to have shown really sharp improvement by the end of 1967 at least. The very existence of a timetable for a new type of government is bound to create continuing uncertainty, at least until late in the year, in the tenure and position of key government and province officials on whom any real progress in pacification ultimately depends. In short, even if the GVN and we both do the best we possibly can, the odds are on the whole against a major strengthening of the GVN position or a true crack in NVA/VC/NLF morale during 1967. The possibility of such a morale break is present, but its chances cannot be rated better than about one in three for 1967.

We believe that it is against such a prognosis that we must weigh the three factors stated above.

A.

We are not the proper experts to appraise just what the 1968 election campaign would be like if the situation reaches that date without clearly evident signs of major progress. On the merits, it seems unlikely that an opposing candidate--be he Romney/3/ or anyone else--will be able to present the American people with a clear and convincing alternative to the policy we will have been pursuing. On the whole, we will probably see a Republican strategy of trying to have it both ways--claiming that more might have been done (although with emphasis on bombing the North alone probably rather muted), while at the same time arguing that possibilities for peace have somehow been neglected and that a Republican administration, as would be alleged of Korea, can find the right handle of threatening greater force and thus bringing about peace.

/3/George W. Romney, Governor of Michigan and a Republican.

The point really may be much less what the Republican Party appears to offer than the basic fact of a prolonged and diffuse national debate. Whether or not such a debate brings the Republicans to power--however important in itself--may be secondary to the effect of the debate alone in weakening and dividing Americans. However the election comes out, a sharp deepening of the kind of malaise so clearly evident in the 1966 Congressional election would leave any repeat any newly elected administration in a much weaker position to carry the conflict forward.

Worst of all, this is almost certainly the way Hanoi would calculate it. In a revealing remark only the other day, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris said in effect that Hanoi had only to hang on through the 1968 elections, and that only a Republican, or Conservative, administration could liquidate "wars or empires."/4/ Apart from this being the way Hanoi would interpret a possible Republican victory, they would almost certainly interpret a Democratic victory, after a sharply divisive campaign, as indicating that we would weaken in due course.

/4/This remark by Mai Van Bo has not been further identified.

In short, under the median prognosis given above, mid-1968 and beyond looks all too likely to be a period when the US position will be substantially weakened.

B.

These thoughts alone must lead us to the question of seeking in the meantime, and indeed as soon as possible, to find a negotiated answer. Yet we must reckon, at the same time, that a negotiated "settlement" that involved major early risks of Communist takeover--whether or not this had come about before the 1968 elections--would in itself virtually doom the Administration to defeat and might well set off a wave of isolationist revulsion against all of our now-promising efforts in the rest of East Asia. Thus, we are not talking at all about "negotiation at any price" even from a domestic political standpoint.

Yet, the need for seeking a negotiated solution is still acute, and we must reckon that the bargaining factors may now be very close indeed to a situation where both sides would see advantage in negotiation. A recent detached paper by the Office of National Estimates/5/ points up the pressures and difficulties not only in Hanoi but between Hanoi and Moscow and Peking. It concludes flatly that for the first time in the last two years the present may be a time in which the other side would be prepared to talk seriously about a peaceful settlement falling well short of its maximum objectives.

/5/See Document 328.

More specifically, whether the recent negotiating nibbles by third parties were authorized by Hanoi or not, they most certainly indicate how very seriously the Soviets and Eastern Europeans are working toward this end. They are very tough indeed--and some of them are slippery--but in the last analysis they at least want Vietnam to end and would accept, we can be reasonably sure, a return to the Geneva status quo, albeit with some measures for protecting the lives and the political role of present members of the NLF and VC.

In short, the time is ripe. Moreover, the recent negotiating nibbles and the views of such responsible third persons as Sainteny all point in the direction of discussions being initiated on the basis of the outlines of a total settlement, i.e., what we have called the "package deal." The recent Cooper paper/6/ comes very close indeed to the kind of package we might try to work out, although it is very much open to question whether we should table the whole thing as flatly as that paper indicates, at the outset.

/6/Memorandum from Cooper to Katzenbach, December 1, entitled "A Package Deal for Hanoi," which was discussed at the December 1 meeting of Harriman's Negotiations Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET)

From the standpoint of our over-all pattern of action, there is one clear implication that must not be overlooked. If we are to pursue a serious negotiating track on a "package deal" basis, we simply must accept that we will not hit politically sensitive targets, and specifically the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, while we are pursuing such a track. Whether or not the nibbles of November and December 1966 were actually author-ized, their present status has undoubtedly been communicated to Hanoi with the conclusion that the US cannot be serious as long as it even appears to escalate the bombing in this politically sensitive sense. Moreover, there is rather more murky evidence from August of 1965 that Hanoi is sensitive to apparent escalation. We have brought them to the point where they may understand and accept continuation of the bombing at its present levels and target patterns, but they simply will not enter into serious discussions if we appear to be escalating, particularly during key periods of contact.

The second major implication of seriously pursuing a negotiating track is that we must face as nearly exactly as possible the risks that we are prepared to run of an ultimate Communist takeover. Right from the beginning, and specifically in the planning papers of 1964, our analysis in the Department--then regarded as heretical by our military--was that there was a certain irreducible minimum possibility of Communist takeover that could not be avoided in the best of circumstances. The Manila commitment for withdrawal--and the practical reality behind that commitment that we simply cannot effectively occupy South Vietnam for any long period--simply underscore that at some point we have to accept, say, a 20% chance that the South Vietnam we leave behind will so mismanage its affairs that it will eventually fall prey to the highly disciplined NLF and VC organization, even if the latter is then receiving only the most covert assistance from the North.

The issue is whether we should be prepared to accept a settlement that increases the irreducible 20% to perhaps 30%, or more. As of now, a guaranteed institutional NLF role in the government appears to raise the risk to something on the order of 60 to 70%, and we would now reject it as unacceptable. But, short of this point, the question of safeguards at successive stages, and possibly the question of accepting NLF individuals into the political structure at a senior level, raise these marginal issues of acceptability that might turn out to be the very crux of getting an agreement.

This paper does not assess exactly what concessions we might make that involve these greater degrees of risk. But it does flag the vital importance of our looking hard at this issue, as indeed we are doing in the analysis of the Cooper proposal.

C.

Finally, there is the question of building up the GVN. All of us, in mid-1965, foresaw a danger that a massive American presence would simply smother the GVN, and inhibit the very development of responsibility and effectiveness that is the object of the whole exercise. To some degree, this has plainly already been the case, and continued massive infusions on the US side, or especially the US taking over where it does not absolutely have to (as it may on the economic front), will simply deepen the problem. The marginal issues in the assessment of our action programs for 1967 must be weighed heavily from the standpoint of this intangible factor, and not merely on the basis of such clear and concrete inhibiting elements as the piaster budget ceiling (although we think our conclusions from the latter have been wise).

The point--and a most difficult one--is that, unless an added US element really changes the prognosis very markedly, we should be leery of such added elements wherever possible. This might be true in any event and on any timetable of the GVN being on its own. But it is particularly acute if we visualize a serious effort to work out some negotiated arrangement that puts the GVN in this position by mid-1968.

348. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:07 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 311.

1535. Reference: State 105909./2/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 346.

1. I saw Rapacki 1800 Dec. 21 and explained trip to U.S., economic discussions excuse for trip, and fact that DCM is fully briefed on our discussions and would be available to continue discussions during my absence.

2. I asked Rapacki to clarify for me the role that Hanoi played in our discussions. Rapacki replied that the message Lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred to "three sentences") upon his return from Hanoi expressing NVN positive response to Warsaw talks, Rapacki's warning after the Dec. 3 bombing, that Hanoi would have to reassess the situation, and the decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw were all decisions by NVN which were conveyed to us by the Poles. He said further that comments Poles made regarding danger of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were comments of the Polish Govt, but the fears that Poles expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by Hanoi. He also said that during process of Warsaw discussions there were a number of other exchanges between Warsaw and Hanoi, adding that the Poles are confident that what they expressed on their own initiative accurately reflected Hanoi's opinion.

3. Rapacki then made the point, in reference to our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions since talks shifted to Warsaw, that interpretation clause question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec. 3. He said "Clearly you know that we felt this was a matter of concern from the very beginning; it wasn't something interjected as a new condition afterwards." He added, "Our concern was well taken because the reaction to interpretation clause from Hanoi turned out to be what we predicted."

4. He expressed pleasure that I was going to Washington, noting that telegraphic communication is less than completely satisfactory in conveying all the nuances of positions and attitudes, and expressed hope that I would convey to Washington Poland's dedication to solving the VN war. He also observed that the critical problem of bringing Hanoi to the conference table involves question of pressure; that Hanoi could never respond to pressure or give the impression that it was responding to pressure. This, he said, is the reason why the bombing issue is so important.

5. Rapacki added that the main problem at this point is the lack of confidence developed in Hanoi subsequent to the Dec. 3 bombing. He added that at time Lewandowski left Hanoi NVN officials were convinced that USG was genuinely interested in a negotiated settlement, but that after Dec. 3 and subsequent bombing attacks on Hanoi NVN concluded that U.S. was attempting to bring pressure on them to negotiate, to improve its tactical position in order to win greater concessions from Hanoi, or to sabotage the whole peace effort. He said what is needed now is to restore the degree of confidence in U.S. intention that existed in Hanoi at the time Lewandowski was there. He said, "If you genuinely want to initiate negotiations, this is the problem you face."

6. Re State 106358,/3/ I have appointment 0100 hours December 22 with Minister Rapacki. Will report following meeting. Intend to maintain Warsaw 1529 schedule unless advised to the contrary./4/

/3/See footnote 2, Document 349.

/4/In telegram 1529 from Warsaw, December 21, Gronouski indicated that he planned to leave Warsaw for Washington on December 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD) Gronouski left Washington to return to Warsaw on the evening of December 23, arriving in Warsaw on December 24. (Telegram 107809 to Warsaw, December 23; ibid.)

Gronouski

349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/

Washington, December 23, 1966, 4:21 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted and approved by Read. In a telephone conversation with the President at 1:01 p.m. on December 23, McNamara informed Johnson that Wheeler had agreed to the action authorized in this telegram. Johnson then asked McNamara, "Would it give you any problem, do you think, before the hawks later on in your testimony?" McNamara responded, "I don't think so. We wrote this first to try to get these things [talks] started but secondly, in the event they don't start and this thing all leaks, to have a reasonable position with both the hawks and doves." Johnson then said, "All right, it's OK with me." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.03, PNO 1) At 4:08 p.m. on December 23, the JCS notified CINCPAC in telegram 2135 that "until further notice from JCS you will not conduct air operations that involve attacks against targets within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi." (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52)

107911. The following four paragraphs are intended to replace paragraph 2 of State 106358/2/ and are transmitted for Ambassador's use tomorrow after his return and to obviate his carrying sensitive message on flight.

/2/Paragraph 2 of telegram 106358 to Warsaw, December 21, informed Gronouski that the United States was "prepared to state that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center . . . for an indefinite period if talks with North Vietnamese can be gotten underway shortly." It also stated that "reciprocal action with respect to bombs, mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of Saigon . . . would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD) In telegram 1537 from Warsaw, December 22, Gronouski reported on Rapacki's reaction to the U.S. proposal. Noting that it linked U.S. action to an appropriate step by Hanoi in the Saigon area and appeared to make U.S. action dependent on a signal from Hanoi that contact would be established, Rapacki stated that he preferred to delay a day or two before transmitting the proposal to Hanoi. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 313-314)

Begin Text: In our discussions you have repeatedly stated that bombing in the vicinity of Hanoi during the first half of December has created the impression in Hanoi that we are attempting to pressure Hanoi into beginning negotiations. This suspicion on Hanoi's part, you have stressed, has created a serious impediment to the beginning of the projected Warsaw talks.

We have pointed out that this is not the case; that there is no basis for concluding that our pattern of bombing has been altered in any way with the intention of creating such pressure. However, we want to leave no stone unturned to get negotiations started. We are assuming that you share our interest in the early commencement of direct negotiations between the United States Government and North Vietnamese representatives.

With this in mind we have removed what you regard as the major impediment to the initiation of direct United States Government-North Vietnamese negotiations. We have issued orders to insure that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds north, 105 degrees 51 minutes 21 seconds east, for an indefinite period. If we have understood you correctly, this action by us will permit the Warsaw talks to begin promptly.

Let me add, Mr. Rapacki, that in judging as to whether Hanoi is as interested in successful negotiations as we are, we would be impressed by similar restraint on their part. This could take the form of a suspension of incidents in the area of Saigon, or a redisposition of North Vietnamese forces in the area of the DMZ, or action affecting infiltration. Perhaps other examples will occur to the other side. End Text.

Rusk

350. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Washington, December 24, 1966, 2142Z.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Repeated to General Westmoreland.

A. JCS 2135/232114Z Dec 66./2/

/2/See footnote 1, Document 349.

1. We were just starting to put some real pressure on Hanoi. Our air strikes on the rail yard and the vehicle depot were hitting the enemy where it was beginning to hurt. Then, Hanoi complains that we have killed a few civilians, hoping that they would get a favorable reaction. And they did, more than they could have hoped for.

Not only did we say we regretted it if any civilians were killed but we also stopped our pilots from striking within ten miles of Hanoi. Hanoi has been successful once again in getting the pressure removed. They will be encouraged to continue their aggression, hoping to outlast us.

2. With nearly 400,000 U.S. fighting men in RVN it must be apparent to Hanoi that they can't take over the country by force. But they can fight a protracted guerrilla war, terrorize the countryside, make revolutionary development very difficult, and kill a lot of people, including Americans. This kind of war can go on for a long time if we let them get away with it.

3. My limited sounding of public opinion, including the thoughts of quite a few members of Congress, leads me to believe that we had better do what we can to bring this war to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible. The American people can become aroused either for or against this war. At the moment, with no end in sight, they are more apt to become aroused against it. It's up to us to convince our people and Hanoi that there is an end in sight and that it is clearly defeat for Hanoi. However, our actions these last few days can only encourage the enemy to continue.

4. When Hanoi complains about civilians being killed, is it not possible to say, "Perhaps some were killed, we try to avoid that, but this is a war and some civilians are bound to get killed. Hanoi can prevent it by calling off the aggression in SVN."

5. If the enemy avoids major engagements in SVN and gets back to Phase II of their plan, the guerrilla phase, then it becomes urgently important to step up the pressure in the North by hitting targets that hurt them. And if some civilians get killed in the course of these stepped up air attacks, we should recognize it as part of the increased pressure. This war is a dirty business, like all wars. We need to get hard-headed about it. That is the only kind of action that these tough Communists will respect. That is the way to get this war over soonest.

6. Let's roll up our sleeves and get on with this war. We have the power. I would like authority to use it. We should be authorized to hit all RT 52 targets. The restrictions of Ref A should be removed. And then when Hanoi screams in anguish, we should hit them again.

7. I realize that there are other considerations which are important in Washington. It is my duty, however, to report to you my strong belief that we need to change some aspects of our current posture as the enemy must view it. This I have done. Warm regards.

351. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/

Warsaw, December 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:20 p.m.

1555. Reference: State 107911./2/

/2/Document 349.

1. At 1900 Warsaw time Dec 24, accompanied by DCM, I called on Rapacki (Michalowski and Janczewski were present). After opening pleasantries about Christmas Eve, I read text of reftel. I reiterated our willingness to talk with NVN representatives in Warsaw or, if NVN prefers, in another third country.

2. I then mentioned current discussion of the possibility of an ICC meeting in New Delhi,/3/ which I termed a good idea for two reasons: (1) they might be substantively helpful; and (2) if they took place, they would distract attention from the Warsaw discussions. I expressed our hope that Poles would give this proposal most serious consideration.

/3/In telegram 9077 from Paris, December 14, Rusk, who was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting, reported that Paul Martin told him that morning that Canada had received a proposal from the Indian Government for the ICC countries to meet shortly in New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD) In telegrams 105378 and 105380, December 19, the Department of State briefed six Embassies on the proposed ICC meeting. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S and POL 27-14 VIET, respectively)

3. After thanking me for trouble I had taken in going to Washington, Rapacki expressed regret that this action had not occurred Dec 4 or earlier. Had that been the case, he said, we might already have first Warsaw meeting behind us and have good results by now.

4. Rapacki referred to his doubts about our Dec 22 proposal (Warsaw 1537)/4/ stating that we now have come in with a concrete proposal which Poles will immediately transmit to Hanoi. While unwilling to directly predict when we can expect Hanoi's response, during later discussion of timing of my Garmisch trip, he referred to unlikelihood of response in next day or two in matter which leads me to believe he expects fairly quick response.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 349, for a summary of the December 22 proposal and Rapacki's reaction, which was reported in telegram 1537 from Warsaw.

5. I asked if he would permit me to express my personal views on reftel proposal. I said I had gone to Washington bearing in mind the problems which Rapacki felt were impediments to initiation of talks and that I believe Washington has responded very positively to Rapacki's views. I pointed out that our elimination of bombing around Hanoi had gone beyond his concern about intensification of bombing, noting that in the Hanoi area we had in effect implemented Phase A of the two-phase proposal, negotiation of which was agreed to be first order of business after the beginning of negotiations.

6. I added that in our Dec 22 proposal, by making stopping of Hanoi bombing conditional on a sign from Hanoi with respect to Viet Cong actions in area of Saigon, Rapacki had expressed concern that we were still trying to put pressure on Hanoi. I said that the present proposal eliminates this concern, because the order to stop bombing was ordered yesterday and thus could not be regarded as a contingent action. I added that our proposal for Hanoi to take some reciprocal action as an indication of good faith should be read in the context of the basic necessity of both sides taking reciprocal actions once negotiations get underway.

7. I concluded by referring to Rapacki's Dec 22 hope that I could bring back a message to convey to Hanoi which would be easier for him to give his blessing. I said I hope he agrees with me that this is the case.

8. Rapacki replied that present proposal has eliminated problem as far as bombing of Hanoi is concerned and modified his objections to the second point (Saigon). He noted, however, that we must distinguish between NVN and actions around Saigon which are an NLF matter, adding that he can well imagine Hanoi's response to this suggestion. I pointed out that we had not limited our present proposal to Saigon, but had noted that many alternatives are available to Hanoi.

9. Rapacki then said that he would like to look for other ways to get a more favorable start to talks but at this point any comments would be in his own name and not appropriate. He did not exclude the possibility that after hearing Hanoi's response the Poles might make proposals to both sides. (Comment: Rapacki gave no hint but could conceivably have reference to second sentence para 16, Warsaw 1508:/5/ "On the other hand, the NVN may prefer in the initial stages to deal through the Polish Govt.")

/5/Document 345.

10. Rapacki then expressed hope that U.S. order terminating bombing around Hanoi was more than simply a gambit to get negotiations started, and that it pointed way to an attitude that other drastic steps elsewhere would not be taken which would interfere with getting negotiations started. When asked for clarification, he repeated that he hoped that drastic action would be avoided elsewhere as well as Hanoi--possibly action initiated by those opposed to negotiations--so that Hanoi bombing cessation could be viewed as symbol of a trend toward a future broader approach.

11. I replied that I hope he was not looking on our cessation of the Hanoi bombing merely as one phase of a trend in our actions to get negotiations started. I regard it as a measure which removed the impediment to initiation of negotiations which you yourself had singled out. I said there are two sides to the picture, and in Washington there are those who have real questions about drastic actions around Saigon during the critical phase of discussions in the first half of December. I emphasized that the quicker we get talks going, the better the opportunity to avoid such problems in the future. (Comment: At this point, Michalowski nodded his head affirmatively, as he had done on a previous occasion when I made a similar remark.)

12. I discussed briefly advisability of my joining family in Garmisch for Christmas, noting fact DCM Jenkins could notify me, at moment's notice, if something comes in from Hanoi. Rapacki concurred that this would work out all right.

13. I am leaving for Garmisch morning Dec 25 and returning Dec 27 unless DCM informs me of necessity to return sooner./6/

/6/On December 25 the President and Rusk had the following exchange regarding Marigold during an 11-minute telephone conversation that began at 7:45 p.m.:"President: I've never thought it was anything but propaganda but maybe we're wrong. I gather you are more hopeful."Rusk: Only marginally because I don't think the intermediary is very good on this. I think he's playing a separate hand there and I don't like the way he's handled it very much." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F6612.03, PNO 2)

Gronouski

352. Editorial Note

On December 25, 1966, The New York Times published the first of 15 dispatches from North Vietnam by Assistant Managing Editor Harrison E. Salisbury. The dispatches reported on the situation in North Vietnam and the effects of U.S. bombing, implying that U.S. aircraft were regularly striking civilian areas. During his 2-week stay in North Vietnam, Salisbury talked with North Vietnamese officials and private citizens and toured Hanoi and a number of towns and villages. Salisbury's last dispatch from North Vietnam appeared in The New York Times on January 9, 1967, but upon departing the country he filed an additional eight dispatches from Hong Kong "summing up observations on his visit to North Vietnam." These articles appeared in The New York Times between January 11 and January 18, 1967.

For Salisbury's account of his trip to North Vietnam, published in 1967, see Behind the Lines--Hanoi, December 23, 1966-January 7, 1967. For a description of the controversy in the United States touched off by Salisbury's dispatches, see William Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), pages 274-279. The Department of State discussed the dispatches in a 7-page telegram to all diplomatic posts, December 31, stating that they were "based to a large extent on official North Vietnamese information" and contained inaccuracies but could not "be dismissed out of hand." (Circular telegram 111162; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department provided material discussing Salisbury's articles to British Foreign Secretary George Brown on December 30. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) For President Johnson's response when asked about the Salisbury articles at a news conference on December 31, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pages 1461-1462.

353. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret.

SUBJECT
Visit to Vietnam--December, 1966

Report and Recommendations

Most of this visit--my third in 1966--was spent outside Saigon in working sessions with US field teams at the four regional/corps headquarters and at a province in each region--Thua Thien, Pleiku, Binh Duong, Vinh Long. I also had useful talks with Porter and Westmoreland and their staffs, but my impressions and recommendations in this memorandum are largely views from the field not Saigon.

My main purposes were (1) to consult with our field staffs on the non-military projects on which Bob Komer and I have been working (2) to see what effect the civil side reorganization has had on field operations (3) to find out more about what is being done to speed up pacification, including redirection of ARVN assets to the hard tasks of local security which underlie Revolutionary Development.

1. Non-Military Programs

The main lines of our policies are moving ahead in all but one area--pacification. We have had a minimum of strains in the massive and necessary build-up of US forces and economic assistance. We have checked ruinous inflation, installed a basic set of stabilization controls, have a better understanding of the Vietnamese market. We have made some improvement in the management and coordination of our civil operations. We have helped launch a promising constitutional process which thus far the Vietnamese have managed competently. There are stirrings toward a modern party system which, if fostered skillfully, should reduce the religious-sectarian rivalries, North-South tensions, and civil-military suspicions that have riddled Vietnam.

But the GVN, as matters now stand, is likely to be an increasingly uncertain instrument in the first half of 1967. On the tough policies which support our main lines, the GVN seems both less effective and more reluctant to act.

At Saigon, despite continuing exhortation, the Mission has been unable to bring the GVN to decisions on the stabilization agreement, port clearance, rice policy. Land reform, national reconciliation, anti-corruption, new revenue measures remain on dead center. Little has been done to give content to the GVN's Manila Declarations./2/ The Mission says that it is now holding 21 matters of importance which Washington has instructed it to take up with the GVN and on which it has not been able to obtain meaningful action.

/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1260-1261.

In the field, the situation may be worse. Our people complain of increasing GVN inertia or resistance even within agreed policies. They say that, more than before, there are unnecessary delays and unexplained evasions, lost files, inconclusive discussions, buck-passing of problems to Saigon--with few results. They speak of the "porcupine tendency" of their counterparts: when prodded, they roll up and when approached they shed needles.

What seems involved in all this is the lame duck psychology now strongly at work in Saigon and the field. The 1967 elections will replace the Military Directorate, the Cabinet and most regional and provincial officials. The spin-offs are familiar: at the political level--jockeying for election odds; at the ministerial--difficulties in recruiting first-rate men; at the bureaucratic--reluctance to take decisions or even deal with the papers.

As matters now stand, the prospect is that the gap will widen between a US sense of urgency that the first six months of 1967 should be used to the full and GVN impulses to waffle until after the next election. The basic question is--do we wait for a new GVN?

The stakes are too great for us to waste half this year. Moreover, we have no necessary reason to suppose that a new GVN will act on matters which the Directorate has put off. It may be more reluctant to do so on the grounds that it is more "nationalistic" or "independent" than its predecessor. So we should press hard for what is crucial to us and for what we believe will shorten the war. We should try for as many irreversible commitments to social change as we can obtain from the present GVN. If persuasion and inducements are not enough, we must look to a more active use of leverage and influence to accomplish what we consider important to us over the next six months--in terms of impact on Vietnam and US public opinion.

On our own side, staffing at the Mission in Saigon and in the new Porter organization in the field will require urgent attention this spring. Many of the key officers in Saigon and the field are now short-termers. Among them: Habib (Political Counselor), Wehrle (Economic Counselor), Zorthian (JUSPAO Director), Heymann (Regional Director--IV Corps). The turnover among middle grade officers in substantive work and junior officers with Vietnamese language capability will be high. Few replacements have yet been named.

Additionally about 1,200 US civilians are in process of being transferred to the new Porter organization. Many of them will be in place only shortly before their tours are up. Moreover, we now have, or can expect, requests for about 60 additional positions needed at regional and provincial levels.

Recruitment of first-rate people or voluntary extensions of duty remain severe problems, more difficult perhaps because of the no-wife policy than for any other reason. We will need special priorities to meet these requirements.

2. Civil-Side Reorganization and the Field

Whether Porter's new Office of Civil Operations (OCO) is viewed as a final organizational solution or as an inevitable intermediate step it is achieving a number of useful purposes. It establishes, on the civil side for the first time, unified inter-agency direction with a chain of command and communication from Saigon to the regions and provinces. It centralizes US-GVN field coordination of civil matters in one US official at each level. It affords a civil-side framework which can work more effectively with US military for politico-military coordination and more integrated pacification planning.

At the time of my visit, OCO's impact had been felt mainly in Saigon. Its headquarters organization was largely completed. Three of the four Regional Directors had been named, all were at work, and one was in full time residence in his region. Regional staffs were being assembled but not yet in place. At province level, teams were being interviewed for the selection of Provincial Representatives. Porter expects them to be designated by January 1. Some slippage is possible, and it may be 90 days or so before the new organization is functioning. I participated in the initial briefings of the province teams I visited, passing along and emphasizing Bob Komer's admonitions against over-bureaucratization of effort and for fast and hard action. These were well-received. Morale was good. All the GVN Province Chiefs with whom I talked thought the new structure a great improvement.

But OCO's first test will come in the coordination of the out-of-phase GVN Revolutionary Development Plan with the military's Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 and in the influence it can bring to bear on the redirection of ARVN assets to the clear-and-hold operations which underlie RD. The next section reviews the status of these matters.

3. Pacification: 1967

The lack of progress in pacification remains the crux of the Vietnam problem, largely determining duration and extent of the war, persistence or fade-away of the NVA/VC forces, and the likelihood of negotiations. We may get negotiations without an internal resolution of Vietnam's security situation. We are unlikely to have negotiations or withdrawal without some significant progress toward genuine pacification. Despite the substantial results our arms have achieved against the enemy's main force in 1966 and our civil successes, we have not yet found a way to assist the GVN to achieve continuous local security below the provincial level--or to impose its obverse: continuous local insecurity for the VC guerrillas. This is the gap in our line. Closing it is a major task for 1967.

The crucial inputs seem to me to be two: targetted civil-military planning at corps and province; redirection of ARVN to clear-and-hold.

a. Civil-Military Planning

The lack of detailed, coordinated, and focused civil-military pacification planning is appalling. The GVN's RD plans are built from the village level up. The military's Combined Campaign Plan (AB-142) from the national level down. Different time schedules compound the problem. Scatteration of security resources, RD cadre placement, economic development projects is the accepted order. At local levels we lack a systematic means for reinforcing situations of strength or exploiting opportunities presented by vigorous local leadership or favoring circumstances.

The critical factor is the interface between civil and military programs. In the field this does not yet exist. AB-142 has been sent to Corps for detailed corps and sector planning. Final corps plans were due in Saigon on December 15 but had not yet been examined by any civilian agency for compatibility with RD cadre and police positioning, other GVN inputs, or the distribution of US economic projects and commodities. None of the civilian Regional Directors or provincial staffs with whom I talked knew of GVN plans for the time-phasing and deployment of the retrained ARVN battalions that are to be assigned to clear-and-hold in the regions or provinces of their responsibility.

The need is to convert the largely separate functional planning of the past into integrated area planning based on provinces, districts, villages and lines of communication. The new plans should set concrete and detailed local goals, concentrate resources for their achievement, be developed on predictable force allocations and time-phasing, and coordinate civil and military means. This concept is generally accepted at Saigon. But at no corps or province I visited has this type of planning process been begun.

b. ARVN Redirection

In my report to you on August 30, I referred to the MACV effort to improve the quality and effectiveness of GVN forces as "the most significant event now taking place in Vietnam." The effort has since gained some momentum. Manila provided a powerful new impetus.

At the top of the GVN, there seems complete agreement. Thieu and Ky are abundantly on record. The Minister of Defense, General Co, spoke to me privately and eloquently on the need for a change in ARVN attitudes towards the civil population, retraining in tactics, new pacification medals and promotion criteria based on RD accomplishments, and tighter discipline and mobile court martials (to try offenders in the locale of their misdeeds). The rhetoric could not have been improved. And all is not words. At II Corps, I was told that General Vinh Loc had submitted his 1967 campaign plan using all of his 22 battalions on search-and-destroy. He was called in to Saigon, put on the carpet successively by Ky and Co, and told to redo it. His plan now assigns 10 of his 22 battalions to retraining for clear-and-hold.

Yet in the field a different view emerges. None of the MACV advisers I met at sector or sub-sector level believes that the job is being attacked with sufficient urgency, comprehension or scope. They have much skepticism about retraining plans based on 14 ARVN teams, one for each division and corps, each receiving a two-week training course and sent out to lecture individual ARVN battalions from January through August 1967. They speak of long-standing reforms in attitude, behavior, and tactics needed and unlikely to be produced quickly by troop indoctrination courses. They note resistance developing on the part of ARVN officers who feel they are about to be downgraded from combat to secondary missions. They suspect this attitude is not dissimilar to the preference for combat over pacification or advisor duty held by many US officers. Generally, they favor a more comprehensive approach: improvements in ARVN living standards and dependent care, more use of combined US/ARVN units for clear-and-hold, an upgrading of advisor rank, and greater participation by MACV to speed up the redirection process.

Underlying these matters, there was a deeper division of US opinion on priorities in the Vietnam war than I had previously found. The split was more in evidence in the field than in Saigon where daily relationships cushion acerbities of opinion. The controversy concerns the relation between the main force and the guerrilla threats, tends to polarize on civil-military lines (although there are dissenters on each), and centers on differences in estimates of NVA/VC order-of-battle, infiltration, and recruitment in the south.

a. The military generally argue the unresolved and increasing main force threat and view the guerrillas and their political infrastructure as a supporting arm which can be readily dealt with once the main force war is won. They accept a main force O/B of 175 NVA/VC battalions, substantial deployment of main force units inside Cambodia, monthly average rates of infiltration from the north at 8,600 for calendar 1966, and steadily rising, VC recruitment in the south at 3,500 a month, and have much skepticism about reports of declining VC morale and capacity. These projections dictate an emphasis on one kind of war.

b. The civilians stress the VC guerrillas and their political apparatus as the decisive enemy; view the NVA main force as a supporting and reactive arm; question the current intelligence estimates. They argue the Maoist theory that in highly developed nations, control of the central government and the cities ensures eventual control of the countryside; but that in Vietnam, as in most weak and underdeveloped states, the opposite is the more likely case: domination of rural areas will strangle the cities and eventually wear out the center. They emphasize that none of the indices of pacification progress shows much advance: secured hamlets, cleared roads and canals, collected rice, destroyed enemy infrastructure, arrested subversives. They center on Viet Cong assassinations of village officials and hamlet chiefs which will total more than 3,500 for 1966 and on forcible abductions which will be over 6,000. (For the month of November, the respective figures were 123 VC assassinations and 503 abductions.) In their view the shortest route to the enfeeblement or withdrawal of the NVA/VN main force is the destruction of the totalitarian revolutionary apparatus in the south and its replacement by a broad base of popular support for the GVN in the districts and villages and hamlets of Vietnam.

It will be useful to end or narrow this cleavage quickly if it is possible to do so. There will be no black or white choice. But it is central to planning, strategy, training schedules, deployments (both US and GVN), an appropriate mix in the allocation of resources, and the emphasis to be applied to ARVN retraining. It is producing stresses and strains between the civil and military establishments at Saigon and in the field. These may grow worse. More importantly this unresolved difference, if prolonged, will impede concentration on the main vulnerabilities of the enemy.

(I think it right that you have my personal view on what is implicit in this entire section. The civil-side reorganization is a move in the right direction. It should be fully supported and given every opportunity over a reasonable period to succeed. If it works it will have other advantages as well. But I remain doubtful that we can get pacification moving quickly or effectively enough with the present organization or that we will have the requisite planning, retraining, and leverage applied to ARVN until MACV is tasked with a single responsibility for the pacification program.)

4. Recommendations

a. The Next Six Months: Reduce the number of items now being negotiated at Saigon. Reset our priorities in terms of what is crucial for us. My own choices would be: ARVN redirection, economic stabilization, a national reconciliation program, local elections.

b. GVN Inertia: Reexamine and recapture the leverage of our aid programs, regain MAP control, reestablish flexibility in counterpart disbursal, commodity deliveries and budget support.

Our threats to use such pressures in 1966 have been too ad hoc and sporadic. If you approve, Komer and I will organize an interagency lev-erage study to develop a system of graduated pressures and a scenario for applying them to our priority purposes within the limits of our legislation and our agreements with the GVN. The aim would be to produce a set of well-ordered contingency actions whenever decision is made to invoke them. But this will be a painful process and we will need your support.

c. US Staffing:

--Reissue your June 6, 1964 inter-agency directive/3/ on the importance of an affirmative response by US officials recommended for service in Vietnam.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, p. 205.

--Reexamine the no-wife policy, at least during a second tour.

--Resubmit to the Congress last year's Vietnam provisions of the Hays Bill for additional hazardous zone benefits for civilian employees.

--Request the prompt compilation of an all-agency list of critical positions with designated replacement for each. Saigon should not be asked to absorb staffing gaps because of transfer or assignment delays. And security and health conditions may require unexpected reliefs.

d. Pacification:

Priorities--Require a basic reexamination of our intelligence on NVA/VC force levels, infiltration and recruitment rates. The estimates involved are embedded in specialized fields. You may wish to consider a broader special blue-ribbon committee of inquiry--without publicity and with a mandate to report to you by the end of February.

Planning--Insist on combined provincial RD/P plans by February 1 at the latest, coordinating civil and military programs and containing specific and detailed provincial goals for 1967. Request a prompt report to Washington of any major RD revision required for military security factors.

ARVN Redirection--Press for an accelerated schedule for ARVN retraining. Insist on rapid and full implementation of ways and means, now identified, to increase ARVN effectiveness, including expanded use of US/ARVN combined units in pacification operations.

William Leonhart

[end of document]

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