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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

354. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold II. Top Secret; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 321-322.

SUBEJCT
Reply to President's Letter to Kosygin

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson

I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any reply to the President's letter to Kosygin./2/ He replied that if he could speak completely off the record he could tell me that a reply had nearly been completed and that it was one we would have liked but then the bombing of Hanoi had occurred and this draft had been torn up and another one of quite a different character started. He said he had seen the report from their Embassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the Soviet minds as a result of this report that our bombs had fallen on Hanoi itself. He said his own recommendation had been that in view of this change of circumstance, it was better for the Soviet Government not to reply immediately but he said that a reply would be made in due course.

/2/Document 330.

I said I could tell him categorically that it was not our intention to bomb the civilian areas of Hanoi and we were sure that some SAMs had fallen on the city. I said that one of the targets was so situated that our planes came over the city after dropping their bombs and it was always possible that one of the bombs had been hung up and subject to a delayed release. The Ambassador remarked that even if a SAM missile had landed in the city it would not have left the kind of crater that had been caused there.

The Ambassador referred to our conversation with the Poles and asked if anything new had developed. I inquired whether he was aware of our action in stating we had stopped bombing within a certain radius of Hanoi. He said he was. I said that our Ambassador in Warsaw had an appointment with the Foreign Minister but I did not know yet what had transpired.

The Ambassador remarked that the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Government considerable hope and he said rather cryptically that they had other reasons for some optimism but that our action in bombing Hanoi had spoiled everything. I pointed out that our targets were selected several weeks in advance and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time.

The Ambassador said that his Government was frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-Nam and did not know how to judge our policy. He said there were many, and he was one of them, that wondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our policy really was one of military victory.

I said that I could assure him that we were genuinely interested in negotiations and that although there were some who felt that we should take a stronger action, this was not a question of military officers disobeying orders.

Toward the end of our conversation, which covered other subjects, the Ambassador asked if I thought there was real hope of getting the Viet-Namese affair settled during the coming year. I said that I was personally hopeful, although the difficulties were obvious. He remarked that perhaps during my stay in Moscow I would be able to have contact with a certain Ambassador, obviously meaning the North Viet-Namese.

355. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/

Washington, December 30, 1966, 2313Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold--Incomplete. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Marigold. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the telegram.

CAP 661394. Literally eyes only for the President. Herewith Hanoi's negative response via Warsaw.

We are at the end of a phase if not at the end of the line with Marigold.

We shall now have to pause and consider next steps.

Warsaw 1596

1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken further action on my statement of Dec 24,/2/ but unfortunately this step could not make up for damage done by previous actions, particularly Air Force, during first part of December.

/2/See Document 351.

2. Rapacki added that "we have to consider our role at this stage as terminated." He continued "We regret very much that matter took such a turn," adding that Poles think they did everything they could have toward objective of peaceful settlement.

3. Rapacki expressed appreciation for my personal efforts which unfortunately have not been able to make up for what happened before. He said "It has been said that work done in a good cause sooner or later will yield results. I don't know if this is always the case, but we hope." He added that this becomes possible only when proper conclusions are drawn for the reasons why this action did not succeed.

4. "As for the Poles," Rapacki continued, "what has happened only strengthens us in belief that only unconditional stopping of bombing DRVN might create atmosphere for peaceful solution."

5. Rapacki then thanked me for my cooperation, expressing regret that my holiday was ruined, particularly in that the results "we had hoped for" were not achieved.

6. I replied that it is not the holiday that matters, but I am keenly disappointed because after my Washington visit--during which the USG made substantial movement in the right direction--I had high hopes. I said I know there is a point where one gives up but I do not like to. What most concerns me is where we go from here. Having lost what I felt was a very good opportunity, and having personally full confidence in our keen interest in getting negotiations started, this development leaves me feeling that maybe we have been kidded from the very beginning.

I added that it seems to me we went a great distance to meet a critical problem. I know I am speaking from deep disappointment, but I hate to go to the end of the road without knowing where we go from here. However, if that is the case, I can only report it. I am sure there will be the same deep disappointment in Washington.

7. Rapacki said, "I understand your personal feelings, but I don't think that those authoritative people were kidding from the beginning. I don't make such an accusation against Lodge or anyone else. But how the bombing could start at just that moment is something which evades me. No, I make no accusations; I only repeat my personal view that if that step you brought from Washington (on 24 December) had occurred on December 4--admittedly after the first bombing of Hanoi--then I feel personally we would have had the first contact with the DRV behind us. Moreover, I think I have sufficient reasons for my personal feeling. Even between Dec 4 and Dec 13, the matter was again actively being reconsidered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. We know, because we had contact with the proper quarter. The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made after Dec 13. The bombing again took place on Dec 14. But this is history known to all of us and it is hardly worth returning to it. What next is the real question. On some occasion we may talk about it in a different capacity and not in the framework of our present efforts. We share common misgivings and concerns; but our views on a solution differ."

8. I said I know I may be repeating out of frustration. But despite what happened before, we made a very major step on the 24th of Dec--stopping bombing without requiring reciprocal action. What concerns me is that after taking this step we obtained a negative response anyway; this will influence many people to think Hanoi just does not want to negotiate.

I said I am reluctant to give up this opportunity; slowly but surely the conditions for negotiations were being created. To recapture this, we would have to go way back to recreate the conditions we now have. This is a tragic development.

9. Rapacki said that, "You must have sensed on Dec 24 that my first reaction, while mixed, was not negative. But it was very difficult to separate that step from what had already happened beforehand. Therefore I expressed the regret that this action was 20 days late. It seems to me that what you called an inclination towards talks was demonstrated quite clearly by the DRVN. You are right that arguments to the contrary could be made. This is the aspect of the situation that concerns us. There are many reasons on the NVN side to believe that your proposals were not sincere. It does not seem very good when events take a turn which create new difficulties to move ahead. But the key to the situation is in your hands. You are a great power. You can use this key to turn the situation back."

10. I replied that I thought we provided that key on December 24. But now there is no sense, as the saying goes, to cry over spilt milk. Particularly in light of these considerations, I hope you are giving serious consideration to the possibility of ICC talks in New Delhi where it might be possible to pick up a few of the pieces.

11. To Rapacki's query as to what could be expected from such talks, I replied that I did not know. However, I added there are three interested governments involved, each playing an important role and each with independent thoughts. I said it is very important to maintain contact. Whatever you think of the ICC, it is an existing agency, it may be weak but it is an agency involved in the Vietnam situation.

12. Rapacki replied that Poles cooperate with India and Canada in this organization, adding, "I cannot say that during the years of this cooperation that there have been any brilliant achievements: we are always ready to exchange ideas, primarily on the work of the Commission, as well as on other situations. The question is whether it is worthwhile at this moment holding another meeting on Vietnam, while there is still bombing. And if it takes place without a result--without a solution--its impact could really be negative." He added that second objection just occurred to him: "We (Poland and the U.S.) have had a common experience over the past six weeks. The two remaining members of the Commission are not aware of these events. In the conversations within the Commission the countries involved might be divorced from the realities of the situation."

13. I replied that I think that without divulging the last six weeks, the Polish Govt might present some insights and could make contributions. On another subject, I continued, we have maintained absolute silence regarding these talks. We have assumed that, except for Fanfani and presumably the USSR, which has a direct interest in the problem, your govt has not divulged the talks to any government or party./3/ Rapacki replied "What you say is in accordance with the fact, but probably the Pope is also informed." I said, "The Pope is informed? By whom?" Rapacki answered, "Possibly Fanfani, but I don't know, I am not saying it was Fanfani, I don't know, but the Pope probably is informed." I said I presume that unless we inform each other to the contrary, the rule of secrecy will prevail even though the talks are broken off. Rapacki replied affirmatively.

/3/In telegram 13640 from Saigon, December 17, Lodge reported that Lewandowski had leaked information on the negotiations and was "obviously loose-tongued." In telegram 14206 from Saigon, December 24, Porter reported that the Polish Ambassador in Rome had revealed "all details" of the negotiations to Pope Paul. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD)

14. Comment: In this moment of frustration it would be easy to conclude that Poles have led us down the primrose path. But I think this would be an unfortunate misinterpretation of events. If the Poles had been playing this kind of game they would have come in today asking us to sweeten the pot. Instead, they threw up their hands and bowed out.

15. The posture of both Rapacki and Michalowski today was one of regret. I am convinced that Poles have had at least limited authority from Hanoi to investigate negotiation and Warsaw meeting terms, that they felt that our Dec 24 position was a satisfactory one, and that since Dec 24 they did what they could to induce Hanoi to enter negotiations. Failing this, they recognized Hanoi's intransigence and bowed out.

16. I recommend that we immediately request Soviets to take over and that cessation of bombing around Hanoi be continued at least until proposed Soviet effort fails or USSR responds negatively to our request. I believe we now have the initiative and should exploit it with the Soviets, the Pope and U Thant with the alternative objectives of either moving along the path toward negotiations or, if this fails, leaving us in a strong public relations position. Hasty withdrawal of our Dec 24 position would, I believe, seriously compromise either objective. (In retrospect, I am not sure I should have suggested that secrecy be maintained, but my intention was to curb possible inclination for public propaganda by Poles. At any rate, it is clear that we can talk to Pope and Soviets, and possibly U Thant, without violating spirit of my suggestion.)

Gronouski

356. Editorial Note

On December 31, 1966, President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg had a 47-minute telephone conversation commencing at 8:45 a.m. A principal topic of conversation was Vietnam. Included were the following comments:

"President: I just think that Hanoi is not ready. Everybody thinks that Hanoi is ready; the Pope, the Poles, the Russians, but when you really get down to it, they just cannot make a budge there with this situation as it is.

"Goldberg: I don't disagree with that assessment."

Later during the same conversation:

"President: So I say OK, tell you [North Vietnam] what I'll do. You will not see a plane fly over Hanoi, and you won't see a plane fly over Haiphong. And we got a circle here, and we won't do anything. Now you give me some reciprocate action. And by God, they just shoot down one of my patrols immediately. They don't do one damn thing and they don't acknowledge it. And you can't hear from them and you ask the Russians why they can't deliver something and they say, well, they're not quite ready yet. Now I haven't been over Hanoi in days. I haven't been over Haiphong in weeks. And I'm just sitting here urging them. But I've got all the weight of the world saying for God's sake quit letting these trucks assemble there and come down here and just kill our people. I think I'm going to be tried not by Bertrand Russell but by Mrs. Goldberg for killing her boy without giving him the weapons to protect himself.

"Goldberg: Bertrand Russell has become a nut.

"President: No but do you heed my point, sir? I think my great danger is how can a commander in chief stop his men from fighting unless the other side is just willing to do something." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Goldberg, December 31, 1966, 8:23 p.m., Tape F6612.04, PNO 3)

[end of document]

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