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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

42. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Top Secret.

Let me capsule some thoughts on the problem confronting you.

Recommendation: That the bombing resume--on a surgical basis--picking out strictly military targets, and avoid, if we can, any target that summons up a direct response from the Chicoms or NVN Air Force.

Why Resume?

--We lose an option, a bargaining point, when we stop the bombing without any equal concession on the part of the VC. Now, with resumption, we are back at the playing table, with chips to use if it looks like a conference table can be had.

--If casualties mount or continue, we are hard put to explain our softening attitude, politically to our own people, when the VC still kicks us, refuses to talk with us.

--It's common sense, confirmed a thousand times in the history, that we never win at the conference table what we have lost on the battlefield. It is not now in the best interests of the VC or Hanoi to talk to us. The Chicoms want us to bleed--the VC believe we will tire and grow weary--and Hanoi remembers the story of the French. Unless we hurt them, why should they talk?

Dangers to the resumption:

The minute we resume, there will be two vital points we must nail down, else the doves, the Lynd-liners and the Times will shriek:

1. Did we have a response? The Secretary is on record as saying no "serious response." What is serious? Does it mean we rejected something? Thus, it is absolutely imperative that we close every circuit, and close it tight so our record is visibly clean.

2. Did we have to start bombing again? We need evidence--hard, photographic, verifiable evidence that the infiltration, the reconstruction, the unimpeded training of troops really hurts us--and puts our own troops in jeopardy. This must be clear so that anyone who denounces the resumption is saying in effect, "I don't care what happens to American troops, I just don't want to bomb again."

What's Ahead:

The Lynd-line--on page A7 of Tuesday Post/2/ is going to be the new line, i.e.

/2/"Lynd Urges Talks With Viet 'Front,'" Washington Post, January 25, 1966.

Stop the bombing forever--recognize the Viet Cong--(and soon, it will be: organize a Popular Front or coalition government, then get out troops out and let the Vietnamese decide their own fate. This surely will come next as the line).

After this will come cries of anguish over our place losses, and ground casualties. I suspect we will hear a number of those who want the pause to continue, cite the horrible cost of resumption.

Then you will hear "why not accept the four VC points" because "they don't really mean what they say." I have a hunch this will be the next real thrust on our position.

Pell, Fulbright, McGovern and Lippmann are advocating the Gavin "retire to the enclaves" thesis as well as the Lynd-line . . . more will take up this line because it looks like an easy way out.

So it is all of a piece. Slowly, but like lava pouring over a volcano, the flow is resistless--first, one concession, then another, and then another, and as we adjust to each new position, the Lynd-liners go onto the next retreat point.

Perhaps we must harden ourselves to the realism of the problem:

There is no easy way out. We can never achieve a settlement that is honorable until we have demonstrated to the VC and Hanoi they can't win--and we are hurting them.

If we resume, consider this as a scenario:

1. A re-statement of the long list of peace moves we have made.

2. A re-statement of our objectives: why are we there--what do we want to happen before we get out.

3. A clear declaration of what happens if we allow the Hanoi "Liberation Front" to win in Vietnam. As Mr. Durant said, the loss of S. Vietnam will lead to the loss of Malaysia and Singapore, restore the subserviency of Indonesia to China, weaken our positions in Formosa, Philippines and Japan, cause the Australians to live precariously, allow the funds of a strengthened Communist bloc to pour into South America, and for a long time force us to live with hostile governments.

4. The President, within a week (or earlier) after resumption, go before a TV press conference--and state our case to the nation. Only the President can really nail our case to the sticking point . . . and expose the phony arguments of the Lynd-liners.

43. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 25, 1966, 5:30-7:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

PRESENT
Bipartisan Congressional Meeting from Republican-Democratic Leadership. Chairman and ranking members of Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs. Senate and House. President, Rusk, McNamara and Valenti/2/

/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that Ball, Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, Raborn, Wheeler, and Taylor were also present. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing

Rusk recounted peace efforts--and their fruitlessness.

McCormack: Must protect our soldiers. Use means available to do it. Time has arrived--unless other side does something.

Ford: What are the alternatives you face right now?

President: Could pull out.

Bomb on heavier scale.

Sit and do nothing.

Decision: When to resume bombing.

Ford: What do your advisers suggest?

President: State, Defense, Joint Chiefs all agree to resume in near future.

Ford: What kind of bombing do they recommend?

President: Security problem. Don't want to telegraph our shots.

Ford: If your advisers say bombing is necessary--I'm for it.

Mansfield: Does McNamara say that infiltration reached 4500 a month?

McNamara: This is dry season. Usually associated with larger infiltration. Indications of larger infiltration.

Mansfield: Instead of 22 per cent under control, only 18 per cent is under control of VC.

Bombing lull should be continued. We have little to lose by lull. Time is on the side of the enemy. Best chance of getting to peace table is to minimize our military action.

President ought to issue statement: "Favor cease-fire now. Call for meeting of all interested parties. Call for elections within three to six months. Contemplate withdrawal of our forces after secure amnesty. Favor resumption in conjunction with Geneva Accords."

Lull is to be preferred:

1. Our casualties go up with escalation.

2. Bombs mean civilian deaths--possibly gas or atom bombs.

3. Increase isolation of U.S.

4. More we destroy North Vietnam, the more we treat with China instead of North Vietnam.

Dirksen: (Recounted Wilson's declaration of war, and how people applauded his declaration of death.)

I am sensitive to young blood as any man.

You can withdraw. This would be a disaster.

You could let this be a war of attrition. Keep what we have. Be patient. But this is expensive and wearing. It doesn't reduce casualties. Country wouldn't support you. Patience is like a holiday in war.

Or you can fight. You go in to win. If we are not winning now, let's do what is necessary to win. I don't believe you have any other choice. I believe the country will support you.

The enemy would be foolish not to use every pause to build up his forces.

Russell: This is the most frustrating experience of my life. I didn't want to get in there, but we are there. I don't think the American people take this war seriously. I don't credit the polls on Vietnam. Those people have been ground under so long, all they want is peace.

I don't know if our Defense Department is adequate enough to meet all our obligations around the world.

We are prepared to fight a war we are not fighting.

I think we have gone too far in this lull--although I recognize the reason. This pause has cost you militarily. We are going to lose a lot of boys as a result--casualties of our care for peace.

For God sakes, don't start the bombing half way. Let them know they are in a war. We killed civilians in World War II and nobody opposed. I'd rather kill them than have American boys die. Please, Mr. President, don't get one foot back in it. Go all the way.

Saltonstall: It's clear to me if we have our boys there, we have to go forward with bombing. Don't want to broaden the targets so much as to include civilians, but there are enough targets there.

I believe we must take risks--but we must take them. All four Chiefs believe the Chinese will not come in. That's a risk that must be taken. You must give our boys full support. I will support you in any decision you take.

Albert: You and your advisers have my trust.

Arends: You have proven to the world you want peace. Should resume in future, near future.

Fulbright: One comment about Russell that the lull cost us. It helped us, too, in matter of supply. (McNamara said this didn't matter at all for us.)

Fulbright continued: Concur in Mansfield statement. This is not similar to World Wars I and II. We have never tried to reimpose colonial power on anyone before. We undertook to help France with her colonies. Precedents don't appeal to me. We are in a false position now. We are properly accused of taking the place of the French.

We ought (to find?) a way to negotiate a way out. No possibility of negotiation except with the help of the Russians. Need their help. They could reconvene the Geneva Conference.

Maybe our dialogue with the Russians has been exhausted. If we win, what do we do? Do we stay there forever?

There has never been a war where there has been American discontent like this.

Therefore, I think we should play for time. Nobody believed the Chinese would come in in Korea--but they did.

Hope we would not resume the bombing--and try to find a way out. After large casualties, we will come to a negotiation.

President: Perhaps if we took the Majority Leader's paper/3/ point by point--and see what it says.

/3/Not further identified.

McNamara:

1. Bombing lull should be continued--minimize military activity.

At what level should military action be continued to bring peace? At present the lever to negotiations is continued military action. If we adopt the Gavin line,/4/ the initiative would pass to the VC. The balance of opinion is that minimal military action would be costly--and not lead to peace.

/4/For an analysis of Gavin's enclave strategy by the JCS, see Document 61.

Rusk: Under guerrilla action, it is difficult to get a frozen cease-fire. We have said to the other side that we will try for a cease-fire.

President: We can't get anyone to the table. If you produce them, we'll meet them.

Fulbright: What have the Russians been told?

(President:) They can't deliver the Hanoi (people?).

(President read letter from Shastri.)/5/

/5/Transmitted in telegram 1218 to New Delhi, January 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Rusk: At New Delhi the Vice President asked the Russians what they could do. They had nothing to offer.

Russell: Of course, the Russians cannot do anything. They are vying with the Chinese and can't bring any pressure. But the problem is, not to fight this war with one hand behind us. The American people won't stand for it. This is an unpopular war but the people want us to win.

Rusk: We are prepared to rely on the Vietnamese people in free elections. Perhaps the cease-fire would cause a little procedural difficulty.

President: We have said we would talk about their four points, but we won't agree to preconditions.

(Fulbright and President had a little exchange about the four points and the Russians. What did we say and vice versa?)

Boggs: North Vietnam knows they can't run us off. If it were just a localized war, we wouldn't be there. The colonial argument is fallacious. They have tried the same thing in Thailand and there is no colonial history in Thailand.

If ever been a demonstration of dedication to law and rule of law, it is what we have been doing.

Decision: a military one. We are going to stay there, and I'm for whatever is necessary to bring an honorable peace. We have made progress in the last six months. And we will defeat them.

Bill Bates: From military standpoint--support our troops.

Bow: I agree.

Morgan: I'm for resumption of bombing.

Rivers: Senator Russell has stated my position. The American people are afraid of land war in Asia. We need air protection. We need to stay there. It would be disastrous to leave. The American people will not follow indecision. Win or get out. Let the military select the targets. My Committee will follow you. Be decisive.

President: Always seek counsel of military.

Hickenlooper: If only Vietnam were concerned, I'd get out. But we are confronting the Communist world. Either get out or lick them. I've been restless with our light bombing. If we win, we must take out their ability to make war.

Don't go for this enclave philosophy. It doesn't make sense.

Get out and get ready to fight somewhere else. Or go lick them. It involves risk but all war requires risk. If we are in it to win, resume bombing and win.

Fulbright: If we follow Hickenlooper's advice, it will get us into World War III.

Mahon: In Congress, we have been oversimplifying. We are there for a long time. No easy answer.

I think we ought to resume bombing, but we are oversimplifying. I will follow your leadership.

Hayden: Proceed promptly to bomb all areas in North Vietnam that contribute to carrying on the war--and do it quickly.

Long: We get into some trouble by letting the communists believe we are weak. Only way China will keep out is that we'll lick her, too. Unless we let them know we aim to be strong, and to win, we are in for trouble. When the communists take one country, they'll take them all over. Every democratic leader will know he is doomed. All Southeast Asia will fall.

President: Thank all of you. Senator sent me Never Call Retreat. Read passage from one page. Disturbed not by differences but by the interpretations placed on these differences by the enemy.

(Picked up an intercept--read it to the assembly of those present.)

Ready to talk to anyone, at any time. Goldberg has urged U Thant to take any initiative. We have tried to take it to the Security Council.

Appreciate your advice and views. Will take whatever action is necesary. I always keep your resolution in mind. I know you can take it away from me anytime you want, and I can't veto.

Mrs. Bolton: My people feel as I do. We have let our enemies think we wouldn't fight, as we have so many times. We must bear in mind we build an image of cowardice. Can't we fight? Don't let them think we won't fight.

Saltonstall: Keep that resolution in your pocket. We won't take it away from you.

President: I urge you to let me [not] jeopardize our options by discussing this in the newspapers. Too many lives depend on our security.

I want to discuss with you further my problems. I hope you will not discuss this. At appropriate times, decisions will be made. I want to feel that I can talk Top Secret matters without (their) being divulged.

44. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

RFE-3

Washington, January 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

SUBJECT
Why Is Hanoi Reluctant to Negotiate?

It is a commonplace observation that Hanoi has responded inadequately to our peace offensive and pause because of its confidence that time is on its side and that victory is ultimately attainable through persevering on the path of aggression. Less discussed, however, are inhibiting factors which may delay Hanoi's hand should it be tempted to seek through a mixed political-military strategy that which it no longer sees as attainable through military efforts alone. Because the men in Hanoi are professional military planners whose lives have been almost wholly devoted to the battlefield, we believe they must, by now, have a fair appreciation of what faces the Viet Cong even should US force levels remain at 200,000 in South Vietnam--to say nothing of what is foreshadowed by authoritative reports of planned increases to 400,000. Therefore we have turned our attention to the possible factors which inhibit Hanoi's willingness to embark on systematic discussions with the US or intermediaries. This query assumes, of course, that at least some weighing of this alternative has occurred in Hanoi, however limited and recent such deliberations may have been.

Negotiations: More Risk Than Gain

The advantages of making some concession to US demands, of entering into some sort of discussions, however informal, are so obvious that Hanoi's reluctance is puzzling. Even the most indirect and insubstantial dialogue, once begun, would raise serious obstacles to a resumption of US bombings and would have disquieting repercussions in Saigon. The North Vietnamese are not stupid; they see the possibility of these tactical gains even if they have no intention of themselves sincerely working for a negotiated settlement or do not in the least credit us with such a sincere intention. Why then do they not seize the opportunity to advance their cause? Clearly they perceive grave dangers when they analyse the negotiatory track.

The most fundamental obstacle probably lies in their understanding of the nature of "negotiations." They look on diplomatic deals as dishonorable haggling or what is now called a zero-sum game: anything that A gains must be exactly what B loses. Moreover, as Marxists they are idealists (though they can be very pragmatic) and they look on every concession made to the imperialists as a derogation from the ideal course of history, a detour on the road to the perfect society. It is their duty to reject all detours unless absolutely unavoidable. Thus they are deadly serious when they say that matters of principle are not subject to bargaining; only the "details" can properly be compromised. These philosophical positions combined with the profoundly suspicious character and instrumental attitude toward "truth" which foreign observers of the Vietnamese have long remarked (most recently Professor Kissinger), make the very word "negotiations" an extremely negative one for the leaders in Hanoi as well as those in Saigon.

Past Experience: Negotiations Never Work Out

On top of this underlying distrust of diplomacy has been superposed a series of bitter experiences with negotiations. From 1945 to 1947 the Viet Minh reached a series of agreements with the French, all of which certainly worked out badly for the Viet Minh, whether or not one agrees that the French simply violated them. The subsequent military successes against the French led to Geneva where the Viet Minh were pressured by the Soviets into accepting much less than they thought they had won. And even the terms of Geneva were, they feel, openly violated in 1956 by their adversaries, notably the Americans who by then were Diem's principal support.

These general arguments against any negotiations are reinforced in present circumstances by a number of specific considerations. For one thing, it is at least as difficult for Hanoi to conceive of a middle course (neither victory nor defeat) as it is for the US/GVN side. Their objective has always been victory--not some modest reform of the Saigon government but its outright replacement by a regime in fundamental rapport with Hanoi. Reunification under Hanoi might not come immediately, a Front government might maneuver slowly and carefully in that direction, but the direction would not be in any doubt. With an objective framed in such terms, anything less is defeat and to accept anything less is capitulation. What then is there to negotiate? The Hawks in Hanoi are saying to the putative Doves: "If we are beaten, we simply withdraw. At least that way we do not publicly acknowledge our defeat and we have a better posture for another try later."

We may presume, however, that not all the policymakers in Hanoi categorically rule out an "indirect" or "political" approach to their objective in the South. Some of them must be entertaining the idea that the US can be enticed or duped into withdrawing and leaving Saigon open to another, perhaps more subtle subversion effort. But even these more flexible minds show real concern over the problem of a US withdrawal. Can the US possibly be trusted to keep any promise to withdraw? Will not its desire for bases, its neo-colonialist impulses, make it as treacherous as the French?

Hostages Against Negotiations: The NFL/VC

Still another very practical concern in the minds of the Vietnamese communist leaders is the hostility toward negotiations among those most directly involved in the insurgency in the South: the military and political cadres who have been the backbone of the effort. These are the officials whose policies would be most sharply repudiated if Hanoi shifts to negotiations. It is they who miscalculated in 1964 that the Saigon government was in its death throes, who urged the introduction of PAVN forces to give the VC more punch, who then advocated a PAVN escalation to meet the increased American presence, and who have insisted that the Ia Drang Valley battles were a communist victory. An eloquent statement of their position by General Nguyen Chi Thanh was made public just before Christmas. (Thanh is reputed to be Hanoi's commander in the South.) To what extent the policymakers in Hanoi have their freedom of action constrained by these Hawks is not clear--there is no evidence at all on which to identify the leaders of this group or to gauge their strength--but at least the Politburo must move circumspectly and avoid impairing its authority and control.

Military morale and the esprit of all elements of the Viet Cong operation are still another factor to be carefully weighed by Hanoi. Forward momentum and the conviction that victory will come--and will come within a year or two--are important, probably vital elements in such a movement. Already there are intelligence reports that the expressed determination to "fight 10 or 20 years" has impaired VC morale. A switch to a radically different, possibly very extended political effort could not fail to have grave repercussions among the VC. Yet even after entering on a political track, Hanoi would want to retain as long as possible its option of reviving the insurgency--certainly until a considerable measure of American compliance with the terms of any accord had been registered. A very careful preparation of its cadres for any such shift in strategy is thus of primary importance for Hanoi. Hanoi must be able to present whatever it agrees to as a "victory" when it explains its shift to its supporters. This concern for VC morale is at least part of the explanation for the extremely rapid and vigorous denials which all DRV and Front representatives automatically issue whenever the press attributes some softening to one of them.

China: Anchor to Windward

Finally there is China. The DRV is no doubt capable of deciding unilaterally whether or not it wants to begin negotiations; but does it want to assert its independence so bluntly? Peking is Hanoi's nearest neighbor, a gigantic power which has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to dominate the Red River valley. It is thus something to be feared. But it is also something to be loved: the Vietnamese communists have clearly shown that ideologically (one could almost say spiritually) they are closest to the Chinese. Many of them spent years in China, generally in the heroic Yenan period. The essential aid that defeated the French came from China. And it is Peking with its massive armies which, far more than it threatens, ultimately guarantees the survival of the North Vietnamese regime against even the most total US ground invasion. Compared to China the USSR is very remote indeed. It is therefore only common sense for Hanoi to make every effort to keep its position in line with that of Peking. There is no doubt, of course, where Peking stands on negotiations, and we should perhaps be surprised at the gap that has developed between the positions of Hanoi and Peking, rather than disappointed that there has not been an outright break.

As the US knows very well, junior partners also have their leverage against their more powerful allies and in the end Peking must accommodate to Hanoi's decisions on matters which directly involve Hanoi; there remains a question of how Peking is to accommodate and when. Moreover, the discrepancy between Hanoi and Peking has even a certain tactical utility to the former. Having decided (if it does) to negotiate, Hanoi might want Peking to drag its heels, to play the reluctant dragon, to extract whatever additional concessions the US might have held back from Hanoi. Then with the bird in its hand, Hanoi would signal to Peking that the moment had come to change to a new strategy.

This complex of problems--their conditioned reflex against "negotiations," their inability to envisage any acceptable compromise, their problems with their hard-liners and with VC morale, and the question of the Chinese--is complex indeed, so tangled that a decision to negotiate may be impossible for Hanoi. Yet such a decision is clearly under consideration: there has been no acceptance of our invitation to negotiate, no unambiguous signal has come through any of the many channels available, and at the same time there has been no rejection of our invitation, either. It would have been very easy for Hanoi in the early stages of the pause or at any time since to slam the door even more resoundingly than last May. And if a negative diplomatic response proved inconvenient, there have been other channels available: a vigorous offensive in South Vietnam by PAVN forces, for example. (We do not look on the inaction of the PAVN as a positive "signal" that negotiations and de-escalation have been chosen, but rather consider the inaction as a negative indication, a sign that Hanoi does not yet want to close the door to negotiation.) While Hanoi wrestles with these problems, we can expect a certain amount of confusion, inconclusive, even contradictory evidence as to what course they are selecting. In fact, they may try to have their cake and eat it--for example, to engage us in negotiations while they go on the offensive in the South. Until a clear decision is made--if indeed one ever is--we can only be sure that their irresolution is producing strains in Hanoi, and particularly acute problems with the VC and Peking.

45. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:40 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

I think you will want to read this important cable from Bangkok before our luncheon meeting/2/--it represents the summary of the view of Lodge and Westmoreland, Sharp and Bill Sullivan, General Stilwell and Ambassador Graham Martin, as they survey the prospects for 1966.

/2/Following a meeting in the Cabinet Room (see Document 46), the President met for lunch at 2:01 p.m. in the family dining room with Rusk, Ball, Raborn, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers. No record of the discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

Bob McNamara is very annoyed by the reference to the shortage of iron bombs./3/ He says there is no shortage except in the context of a perfectly fantastic rate of B-52 drops.

/3/Iron bombs are unguided high explosive bombs.

But this is not the main point. The point is rather that this cable gives the best summary we have had from the field of the plans for the next year as the men in the field see it.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 are of particular interest in the context of the decisions immediately ahead, but the whole telegram is worth reading.

McG. B.

Attachment/4/

/4/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, vol. IV. Top Secret. The telegram was transmitted from Bangkok at 5:36 a.m. on January 25 and retyped in the White House on January 26 especially for the President. The Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.

(Text of cable from Embassy Bangkok 1470)

1. During the course of a restricted session of the Southeast Asia Coordination Meeting we examined the limitations facing both the U.S. and North Vietnam in prosecuting the Vietnam war. As far as the U.S. is concerned, we defined our limitations as those imposed by:

A. The current mobilization base;

B. Current and foreseeable weapons shortage (e.g., iron bombs);

C. The marginal capacity for logistical and air bases in Southeast Asia;

D. U.S. public opinion;

E. Free world attitude;

F. Political and military considerations affecting Vietnam's neighbor countries, and

G. The fact that, although improving, the Government of Vietnam is still ineffective by western standards.

As far as North Vietnam is concerned, we defined the limitations as:

A. Logistical;

B. The requirement for clandestinity;

C. Consideration of Sino-Soviet differences; and

D. Morale.

2. In light of these evaluations, we attempted to project our view of the manner in which we expect the war to develop over the next year. As far as enemy action is concerned, we expect we may see a shift in his strategy. Rather than attempting to pursue his earlier campaign to seize control of the highlands from Pleiku to Qui Nhon, we may find him instead concentrating on Quang Tri and Thua Thien in the First Corps Zone, attempting to bite off the consolidated piece of territory immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone.

3. We feel that the enemy may have been impelled to move to this strategy as a result of several factors:

A. Difficulty of maintaining forces in the Kontum-Pleiku complex against increasing concentrations of U.S. forces;

B. Difficulties encountered in operating a long Line of Communication through Southeast Laos in the face of increasing air attack;

C. Relative sparsity of U.S. and South Vietnam units in the northernmost regions of South Vietnam;

D. Relatively simple logistic lines across western regions of the Demilitarized Zone and the adjacent territory of Eastern Laos;

E. The need for some demonstrable military success to give a political stimulus both to Hanoi and to Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.

4. Consequently we would expect to see the enemy concentrating infiltration effort on a rather limited area of terrain, partly within the Demilitarized Zone and partly in a shallow sector of Eastern Laos. While other more traditional elements of the Ho Chi Minh trail will continue to be used, we have evidence which suggests that an immediate concentration of effort will be in this strip of territory contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone. The enemy's motivation in this concentration is largely political, in his hope to precipitate an equivalent of Dien Bien Phu by taking significant territory, which we would have great difficulty in wresting back. The enemy would hope that this development would deliver such a blow to our public opinion and to our will to continue that we would be prepared to accept North Vietnam peace terms.

5. As for ourselves, we believe that the limitations imposed on us do not permit many imaginative options beyond those which already govern our current operations. With troops on hand or deployable, we cannot contemplate large scale ground operations outside South Vietnam territory, even if political considerations should permit. In any event we do not foresee any changes in those political considerations.

6. As far as air actions are concerned, we recognize that the sortie rate may have to be curtailed because of existing and foreseeable shortages in the supply of iron bombs. Although these sorties are not concentrated within South Vietnam and Laos, we assume their pattern will have to be realigned again when and as Rolling Thunder operations are resumed. In the resumption of Rolling Thunder, we expect that there will be a removal of previous restrictions and an expansion of allowable targets to include a number of North Vietnam installations directly affecting the enemy's ability to sustain the infiltration effort. Among these are the Port of Haiphong, petroleum facilities, power plants, etc. While we do not believe that hitting these targets will have an immediate dramatic effect upon that enemy's ability to continue the war in the South, we nevertheless feel that the cumulative effect will be significant. Therefore, in moving to these new targets we should avoid giving the public impression that this is a panacea, but merely indicate that it is part of the bombing pattern required to reduce infiltration effectively.

7. Given these assumptions, we foresee the war in 1966 as a mutual effort to make the most of the resources at hand within the known limitations of both sides. For the U.S. this means three general features:

A. A more effective bombing campaign in North Vietnam and in Laos. Less resort to random sorties, especially in Laos. We must make the maximum use of intelligence assets in target acquisition and selectively control air strikes through the greater use of forward air controllers.

B. We must continue to destroy enemy forces wherever they can be found, attempting to make his casualty rate greater than his ability to replace casualties by infiltration and recruitment.

C. We must press forward actively with pacification and rural reconstruction efforts in expanding areas of South Vietnam.

8. We believe that if we can demonstrably increase enemy casualties well over and above his abilities to replace them, if we can significantly hamper his logistics system, and if we can prevent his seizure of any major new territorial gains, then we may effectively break his will to continue. If such a development could be combined with genuine pacification progress we might expect a rather rapid disintegration of the enemy's campaign in 1967.

9. At the same time we must expect, if and when the North Vietnam campaign begins to falter, that the Chicoms will turn to other fronts in order to occupy our attention and dissipate our strength. Their ability to stir up trouble in Thailand is not yet fully exploited and they can seriously harass Laos through direct support to Pathet Lao elements there. These areas therefore will require constant attention as we move through 1966.

10. The eventual cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam is unlikely to diminish the need for a U.S. presence in Thailand. On the contrary, for an indeterminate period there may be a reaction from Thailand that diminution would be evidence of U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, which would in turn permit renewal of Chinese Communist pressures. U.S. planning should, therefore, assure the need for a continuing military investment in Thailand, as a premium for maintaining the U.S./Free World position in Southeast Asia. In this connection it was emphasized that whatever future arrangements or official statements may be made by the U.S. regarding its willingness to withdraw from military bases, should be strictly limited to those in South Vietnam and the formulation "Southeast Asia" should be avoided. Care should be taken to avoid the implication that we would not continue to fulfill our SEATO commitment to Thailand.

46. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 26, 1966, 1:25-1:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing

PRESENT
The President, Rusk, McNamara, Mac Bundy, Raborn, Ball, Valenti/2/

/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that Moyers was also present. (Ibid.)

Rusk: Souvanna has problem--possibility of NVN coming back this weekend.

Considerable strength if you resume the bombing as much in sorrow as in anger.

You've thought very hard about everything they said.

And beneficial to let Michael Stewart get out of town before bombing.

We are a little thin about VC activity on the ground. This may cause some trouble when we start.

If you think you can stand the pressure--recommend you wait until Sat./3/

/3/January 29.

President: Worried not about pressure--am worried about another Souvanna item. Each time they will bring up something to delay us. J.S. Cooper (Senator from Kentucky) wants to wait. I asked him if he could deliver VC if I gave him more time. He couldn't answer.

Rusk: But the central policy issue is embarrassment over some thin issue--

McNamara: We can't start before Friday their time--and according to Dean he wants Saturday their time. Only a matter of 24 hours.

President: Must emphasize how sorrowful we are--we must let this be known. If you understand Fulbright he wants us to get out. Mansfield wants us to hunker up.

Rusk: Am disturbed as much by other statements as much as M. and F.

President: I agree.

Rusk: No one can look you in the eye and tell you where we are going if we don't get peace.

President: Do you really belive Souvanna will pull something off?

Bundy: No. Odds are nine to one nothing will happen. We ought to lean on Souvanna hard and tell him we're his friends and we'll wait til Saturday.

President: I'm afraid they'll give us some peace treatment that will be phony--and put us in a box.

McNamara: It is only 24 hours--and we ought to wait. We need that 24 hours.

President: Could you go tomorrow if we had to?

McNamara: Yes, we can--12 hours from now, but it may be a little ragged. Better on 24 hour lead.

President: What's your answer to PM Wilson telegram/4/ (Prime Minister Wilson)?

/4/Wilson's message was transmitted in telegram 4352 from London, January 26. Stating that he thought the Johnson administration had made an honest and commendable effort to avoid further conflict, Wilson indicated that he would support a decision to resume the bombing and suggested that the United States help those who wished to defend its actions by releasing as much evidence as possible about the military use to which the North Vietnamese had put the bombing pause and the two holiday truces. Telegram 1447 to all diplomatic missions, January 31, summarized enemy military activity in South Vietnam and infiltration from North Vietnam during the pause. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

McNamara: He accepted our view, it seems to me, putting it on a military basis.

(Bundy read Wilson telegram.)

McNamara: What disturbs me is feeling the fire of the heavier bombing boys. I'm not sure we can shut off supplies with bombing.

President: Bring me all you have of military evidence during the pause.

Ball: Let the Ambassadors show it to governments and not put it out to the American press.

President: That's good. Let's do it that way.

McNamara: When should we have this evidence (compiled by CIA)?

Bundy: In 24 hours.

President: When will we hear from Souvanna?

Rusk: Friday night our time.

Bundy: He's supposed to go Thursday and come back Friday.

(Discussion about Fulbright and his position.)

President: I don't want to be in Asia but if we tuck our tails and run . . .

How do you answer Ball's memo on China (coming) in the war?/5/

/5/Document 41.

McNamara: I believe we can tell China we do not intend to destroy the political institutions in NVN.

Ball: What we need is a philosophy of the bombing. We don't have any now.

McNamara: I disagree.

(McNamara had to leave to testify on the Hill.)

President: There is something wrong with our system when our leaders are testifying instead of thinking about the war.

Let's re-write the "Why Vietnam" booklet./6/ Bring it up to date.

/6/Why Vietnam, containing statements on Vietnam by the President, Rusk, and McNamara, was printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1965 and widely distributed.

47. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
U.S. Prisoner Exchange with NLF

The NLF has closed the door on prisoner exchange by reversing its position. It has informed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that it will not meet with U.S. and ICRC Representatives to discuss prisoner exchange.

Following is the chronology leading up to the present negative NLF position:

1. December 12, 1965, Ky approved U.S. proposal of exchange, under auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of prisoner Hai (one of two terrorists who bombed our Embassy) for USOM civilian employee Hertz./2/

/2/Gustav Hertz had been captured by the Viet Cong in February 1965 while working in Vietnam for the Agency for International Development.

2. In response to our request, ICRC sent a representative to Algiers to convey Hertz-Hai exchange proposal to NLF representative Tam./3/

/3/Huynh Van Tam.

3. January 4, ICRC representative met with Tam for two hours; Tam rejected the Hertz-Hai exchange and countered with proposed meeting under ICRC auspices of NLF, ICRC and USG representatives to discuss "broad prisoner exchange."

4. NLF willingness to discuss prisoner exchange with us was confirmed from a private source, Sanford Gottlieb, Washington representative of SANE, who saw Tam in Algiers January 13. Tam told Gottlieb: "The Front is prepared to discuss the exchange of all prisoners, including Mr. Hertz" and if the U.S. wants to discuss prisoner exchange it should contact Tam.

5. Ky's concurrence was sought to the NLF offer to meet with U.S. and ICRC representatives to discuss prisoner exchange. At a meeting with Secretary Rusk on January 15 Ky expressed his concurrence to our proceeding with meeting with NLF on subject of prisoners under ICRC auspices.

6. January 15, we informed ICRC Geneva of our willingness to meet, preferably at ICRC Geneva Headquarters, with ICRC and NLF representatives to discuss questions relating to U.S. prisoners, including broad prisoner exchange as suggested by NLF representative Tam in Algiers.

7. January 18, ICRC dispatched its representative to convey our response to Tam in Algiers.

8. January 19, ICRC representative was received by Tam in Algiers. Tam accepted from ICRC representative an ICRC Geneva letter indicating U.S. willingness to meet with NLF and ICRC representatives, preferably at ICRC Geneva Headquarters, to discuss broad prisoner exchange. Tam told ICRC representative that he must now wait for definitive instructions from the Front which might take up to fifteen days; and requested ICRC representative to handle this matter with the "utmost discretion and secrecy".

9. On the evening of January 25 ICRC Geneva received a letter from the NLF representative Tam dated Algiers, January 21, which was two days after his meeting with ICRC representative on January 19 at which Tam stated that he now had to receive definitive instructions from the Front which may take up to fifteen days.

10. Tam's letter of January 21 reflects a complete change of attitude and is completely negative. It has four main points:

(1) Refers to January 4 meeting between Tam and ICRC representative; states that Tam had said to ICRC representative that NLF would not accept nor even consider a meeting with representatives of the U.S.

(2) Refers to a press release issued by Red Cross of NLF of October 2 and states that according to the press release the NLF is not authorized to entertain any relations with ICRC and therefore NLF representative Tam returned to ICRC the letter which ICRC representative delivered to Tam on January 19 (that letter advised the NLF that the USG was prepared to meet with representatives of the NLF and the ICRC to discuss broad prisoner exchange, as suggested by Tam to the ICRC representative on January 4).

(3) A general statement warning the ICRC to make no announcement on the exchange of letters and indicating that the NLF will deny the entire matter if it becomes public.

(4) States that Tam already indicated to the ICRC representative that the NLF cannot receive visits from the ICRC or accept letters.

Benjamin H. Read/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Read signed the original.

48. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 26, 1966, 7:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. Secret.

I talked to McCloy and Lovett. Acheson is in Antigua and Art Dean was on his way to the West coast by air. I have asked for him to call me early in the morning. Though they differ from each other in important ways, McCloy and Lovett are in favor of prompt resumption and a prompt Presidential statement thereafter.

McCloy thinks the pause has been good and useful on political and military grounds, but it has had no response. It makes no sense now to let the highways and bridges be repaired and put in use again after we have spent so much time bombing them. He thinks the risk of escalation is low and cites a recent conversation with Dobrynin to indicate that the Russians would also try to keep things cool.

McCloy favors a low key statement but thinks that it should come from here. If it came from anywhere else the people would think the President was ducking it.

Lovett wishes we had never got into Vietnam because he has such a painful memory of Korea. He says he was a charter member of the Never Again Club. But now that we are in he would go a long way. He was against the pause in the first place, and he wold favor a prompt and fairly massive air action in the North. He thinks we simply must give adequate support to the massive forces we have placed in Vietnam. In addition to air activity he would consider what he calls "a friendly blockade" of North Vietnam. He thinks keeping the pressure on is a kind of negotiation. He thinks the risk of escalation is low but he does report that his French contacts think the top Chicom leadership is getting a little edgy. (This conflicts with what the French Ambassador Chauvel reported from his trip to Peking and may reflect Couve's stern instruction to Chauvel to say nothing in public that would give any comfort to the Americans.)

Both Lovett and McCloy would find it extremely difficult to come down here tomorrow because each of them has an important board meeting. But they agreed to telephone me in the morning if they have any second sober thoughts and of course they will come if you want them to. Rusk and McNamara are pretty well pinned down with the British all day tomorrow from 10:00 until about 5:30 but could be pulled out for about half and hour about 12:30 if you want them.

I myself see no need for a meeting until 6:00, when we ought to issue orders subject to a later confirming execute message on Friday afternoon./2/ At that time I will try to have necessary diplomatic messages and a preliminary outline of the content of a statement for use on Saturday/3/ if you choose./4/

/2/January 28. Bundy added "or later" in handwriting.

/3/Bundy added "or later" in handwriting.

/4/Bundy added a handwritten note: "I still notice that we have only 'incidents,' not 'attacks' in South Viet Nam--Mortars and sabotage, not attacks by military units on military units. And Vientiane is still loose, in N.Y. Times terms." Regarding the Vientiane contact, see Document 51.

McG. B.

I have also talked to Clark Clifford and he feels that the pause has now clearly failed with Hanoi as we all thought it would. He concedes that it has been helpful here and abroad. He says he wants to get out of Vietnam more than any other man he knows but the only way to do it is to use enough force and show enough determination to persuade Hanoi that a political contest is better than a military one. He would resume promptly with carefully measured attacks at first, and he would keep up the pressure until the other people decide that we are not the French. Clifford thinks the French experience is overwhelmingly important to the thinking in Hanoi.

I have not reviewed with any of these gentlemen the delicate problem of day-to-day timing that relates to Vientiane and the level of VC activity in the South.

McG. B.

49. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 27, 1966, 10:55 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. No classification marking. In response to a request from the President, General Wheeler prepared a 2-page commentary on the message from Pakistani President Ayub Khan, explaining why he disagreed with Ayub's major points and noting that the Joint Chiefs had "previously given such alternatives full consideration" and had "rejected them." (CM-1146-66, January 31; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Vietnam 381, Jan-Sept 66)

Mr. President

Here is an extraordinarily interesting dispatch from Ayub which makes the best case against the resumption of bombing that I have seen. I still don't agree with it but I am sure you will want to read it.

McG. B.

Attachment/2/

Washington, January 27, 1966, 10:25 a.m.

/2/Secret.

Text of Message from Ambassador McConaughy--Karachi 1510

I met on the evening of January 25 with President Ayub at my request. Our half-hour discussion was devoted entirely to Vietnam.

The meeting was at the Ayub residence, and he appeared informal, cordial, and candid in a manner reminiscent of our conversations prior to the rocky course of Pak-U.S. relations during 1965. In discussing Vietnam, President Ayub appeared desirous of imparting through me to President Johnson the views of a sympathetic and concerned friend who, while gratified at having been consulted in a matter of such serious import, also sought to offer as straightforward and responsible a response as possible.

Noting the seriousness and criticality of Vietnam, I said President Johnson and Secretary Rusk had instructed me to inform him that we had received no indication whatsoever of interest from Hanoi in our current effort to promote the cause of peace in Southeast Asia. Quite the contrary, there had been considerable Viet Cong military activity even during the Tet New Year, continued infiltration from North Vietnam, and an evident wish to continue hostilities without regard for the suffering and welfare of the Vietnamese people, and a generally threatening and provocative posture. The U.S. has tried through a large number of approaches, including the initiative which Ayub had kindly taken with Premier Kosygin at Tashkent, to open a constructive dialogue with Hanoi. Now in view of the great seriousness of the problem, the U.S. Government is undertaking last minute soundings bearing on the question.

President Ayub agreed the Vietnam problem is an extremely serious and critical one which he had hoped might have been reviewed in light of some constructive Hanoi response. He assumed President Johnson's military advisors must now be pressing him very hard to resume bombing North Vietnam. Nonetheless, "As I told you before, I have a personal conviction, based on no evidence but a strong feeling, that among Vietnamese Communist ranks there must be some desire to talk. I say this for your and our own sake, once you resume bombing there will be a desperate situation and escalation. I would still advise waiting with the hope of getting some response. The Chinese are telling them not to negotiate, but it is the Vietnamese whose lives are at stake. You can bomb hell out of them or just sit tight, but they can't throw you out. Looking at the situation as a statesman as well as a soldier, I would say 'Come on you bastards, what can you do to us!'"

I remarked that to sit tight would still mean numerous allied casualties. Ayub agreed but responded, "What can you do to that enemy in any event. The Vietnamese terrain doesn't lend itself to quick military decisions." Ayub then implied his understanding and sympathy for the criticism to which his recommended sit tight policy would subject President Johnson by remarking, "Look, I am being criticized for Tashkent, which I agree was a very important decision. But people are emotionally aroused and don't understand." With feeling and stress Ayub continued, "If you could get this message across, it is not in your own interest to escalate. Personally, I think you have such a large military force in South Vietnam the Communists couldn't do anything to you. Their boast to throw you out is nonsense. I still advise that you not start things up again. As Kosygin said to me at Tashkent, "Yes, we are giving a bit of aid there, but you cannot fly aircraft off a penny, and it takes months to get into the front lines whatever we may decide to send." In my opinion if you start bombing again, you won't see them coming to the conference table. On the contrary, those inclined to negotiate would be silenced, and you would have to fight on for three or four years. If you just sit tight there, in six months or a year that will convince them. But if bombing starts again, moderate elements will be silenced and you will have to move up the scale of military operations."

I asked Ayub if he thought we could stand idly by and allow supply routes to be built up and thereby expose our forces to that buildup. Ayub argued that U.S. could interdict supply routes within South Vietnam as effectively as in North Vietnam. When I mentioned Laos, Ayub admitted that is a difficult problem, but he stood by his view that concentrated interdiction is possible within South Vietnam. I referred to the military doctrine of attacking a problem at its source, but Ayub maintained such a doctrine during the present situation would require isolating North Vietnam not only from South Vietnam but from China as well. Commenting again that he was speaking only as a friend, Ayub pointed to the extreme military difficulties of solid interdiction and reiterated his opinion that, "If you want to convince them they must come to the conference table, let them throw themselves against your superior fire power and sooner or later they will see the light."

I asked Ayub if he didn't think the Viet Cong could spin out indefinitely a U.S. sit tight policy such as he proposed, and bog us down inconclusively in Vietnam for years. Ayub pointed to the limiting factor of Viet Cong logistics which cannot support a major fighting force without air and sea supply routes. Despite being a soldier, Ayub again deprecated the primacy of the military factor in Vietnam, arguing that history has proven repeatedly the fallacy of seeking to enlarge one's area of operations for military reasons. It is necessary, he continued, to work backward from political-strategic considerations to the conference table. "Sit it out. Why present targets? Why move out into the country in vulnerable files? I spent six years under such conditions. You can't win on their terms; they always get in the first shot. You can't search a jungle area with fire. Therefore, I would adopt a different course and wait them out."

I referred to our experience in Korea and the critical role of our heavy military pressure in forcing negotiations beginning in 1951 which culminated in 1953 Armistice Agreement. Ayub agreed military pressure had been successfully employed in Korea. But he argued that the Vietnam situation was much different from Korea, what with larger armies, visible military actions, essentially non-Communist South Korea, distinction between friend and foe. He concluded, "In Korea you had to bring them to the conference table by fighting hard; in Vietnam you should wait them out." Commenting on the American penchant for resolving the dirty business of war quickly and decisively, Ayub said, "Your enemies expect you to be impatient, to commit more and more forces, and finally to weaken your resolve in the face of unsatisfactory military results and your own democratic pressures." While acknowledging there is always room for debate in such a matter, I suggested that General Westmoreland apparently had different ideas on the necessity of keeping down the military back-up activities in Vietnam. At the same time, I assured Ayub that President Johnson would give greatest care to all considerations as he contemplated the painful decisions facing him in Vietnam. Ayub then cited successful strategy in the Greek-Turkish War in 1922 in which Mustafa Kemal Pasha insisted upon remaining on the defensive and wearing down the enemy as they came in. This was an extremely unpopular strategy, particularly among his soldiers who wanted to seize the initiative and attack, but Mustafa waited for his opportunity and was successful.

I referred to the full report on Vietnam given to the Foreign Minister by Stull on January 25./3/ I noted that the report made it quite clear there had been no real let down in Viet Cong military activities. Ayub indicated he had studied that report carefully and had it with him at the time. He said he assumed that Viet Cong military activity during the Tet period indicated the Viet Cong did not have complete control of all such activities throughout South Vietnam. He then reiterated his view that the U.S. has only the basic alternatives of sit tight until negotiations, or escalate and fight on for years.

/3/Not further identified.

I said that I took it he had no word from the Soviets or any other Communist Source of interest to the U.S. Peace Initiative. Ayub replied there had been nothing other than what he had related during our January 18 meeting about the talk with Kosygin at Tashkent. I remarked that this absence of constructive response was the same in all quarters. Ayub said, "Those who want the war to go on must nonetheless be worried by your initiative. They must be hoping that the bombing will start again in order to win over those who may wish to stop fighting." I then drew Ayub's attention to Secretary Rusk's January 23 internationally-televised interview./4/ I gave Ayub a transcript of Rusk's remarks relating to Vietnam, and drew his special attention to the Secretary's observation that the U.S. does not consider itself "Gendarmes of the Universe," but we do have commitments on which we are determined to make good.

/4/Rusk appeared on "Meet the Press" on January 23.

50. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 27, 1966, 6:20-8:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing

PRESENT
President, McNamara, Rusk, M. Bundy, General Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti

Rusk: Nothing to report on diplomatic front. Plane to Hanoi has been delayed from Vientiane.

I can't honestly say I see any taker from the other side. One thin thread that hasn't played its course--from Souvanna.

President: Did you ask McNamara and Bus Wheeler to see Ayub letter?/2/

/2/Document 49.

Bundy: Yes.

Bundy or Rusk (not clear): From a diplomatic view only, the general reaction to a few days more pause would be good--balanced off against the military.

Don't know how much you think the 15 Senators' view/3/ will take hold.

/3/Fifteen Democratic Senators sent a letter to President Johnson on January 27 opposing resumption of the bombing. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI)

President: What do you recommend?

Rusk: Resume bombing--but bombing policy be kept under firm control. The dangers of the Chinese coming in.

Very little initiative on part of Viet Cong.

Resume this weekend.

President: What significance do you attach to low level of VC initiative?

Rusk: If it went on longer perhaps it would be significant--reports are they will draw back to guerrilla type warfare. Perhaps if this continues, we can let our bombing intensity reflect this.

Wheeler: Westmoreland said he is afraid of what is developing in First Corps area--may be getting ready to mount major effort in northern provinces.

Also reports of sizable concentration in Quag Ny (probably Quang Ngai). ROK battalions are there.

Fact there haven't been number of sizable attacks is meaningless.

Bundy: It is unusual for (so) few attacks so long.

(Wheeler:) Not so, really.

McNamara: Rate of activity is off since Tet. Don't know why nor will we for at least a week. but they are continuing to reinforce at rapid rate.

President: Don't know "why"--but the "why" is probably not to our advantage.

McNamara: I agree. Further delay on resumption of bombing can polarize opinion in this country. I feel we should resume--and send execute order tonight.

President: Does it make any difference if we start on Sunday?/4/

/4/January 30.

McNamara: No, not really.

Rusk: Senior officers in my Department would vote holding off a while longer. Can't find any solid basis, however, to recommend to you we refrain.

Wheeler: Dean, how much would it take to get a definitive answer from Souvanna's man?

Rusk: Probably a week--or never.

Bundy: We won't get this man to make any definitive . . . odds are very long if he came back in a week, he would have anything.

Only reason for prolonging is the low level of VC activity--and opinion of Ayub and others that it would create confusion on the other side.

Rusk: But with these trucks coming South, how do you justify refraining?

President: What are the latest facts on infiltration?

(President read report on ______)

(Agreed we would not send execute order until we are absolutely ready to go.)

President asked: "What's different in bombing on Saturday as compared to Monday?"

McNamara: There's a difference in number of perishable targets. They might be off the roads by Monday.

President: Are we doing any good on our bombing in South Vietnam and Laos?

McNamara: Yes, we are. Running 1900 sorties a week in Laos.

Wheeler: In area just opposite Laos, in the Delta area, destroyed 5 trucks, took out anti-aircraft plus others. This is the only day we haven't hit a secondary explosion.

Rusk: Can planes going to Laos bring bombs back?

Wheeler: Yes, they can bring bombs back. They don't like to bring ordnance back to carriers.

McNamara: Cable/5/ came in saying operations have been limited by bomb shortage. Laotian planes . . .

/5/See Document 45.

Wheeler: But the cable didn't make sense--

McNamara: Cable came out of meeting in Bangkok--of a meeting of military personnel. Sent out cable saying I wasn't informed of any shortage in bombs./6/

/6/Not further identified.

Only shortage is 750 pound (bombs) used in B-52s. Nobody in right mind thought we'd drop these bombs in B-52 on Vietnam. But we are working hard on this.

President: What's wrong with Ridgway?

Wheeler: He's probably bitten by bug that we should never get involved in land war in Asia.

President: Do you think our failure to bomb the North will materially affect the balance out there?

Wheeler: Yes, Sir. We should decrease by every pound we can to stop movement of supplies. In interdiction, you start at the beginning and go all the way through to finally stopping it in-country. Is like stopping water after it comes out of the hose.

President: What are we cutting off?

Wheeler: We hit the power plant. Hitting LOC (lines of communication)--and have raised the cost to them of moving supplies southward. We cannot apply interdiction to stop the supply of troops they are supplying today--about 80 tons a day. But we can stop the supplying of a larger force.

McNamara: This is a very important question but I'm not sure of the figures. They need up to 80 tons to supply them--but if they increase troops they will need 165 tons but they have capabilities of 200 tons a day. But these figures are very rough. Our Air Force has learned all over again to do iron bombing. There is much to learn--

President: We really pay a price--if we are not getting a payoff.

(Either Wheeler or McNamara): We know it is costing them--and to feel pain. But I cannot tell you today that our bombing will cut down their operations in the South.

Rusk: Purpose of bombing ought to directly help our troops and break the will of the other fellow. My own priority would be to concentrate on operational connections in the South.

President: When you go back in here, Dean, we're going to have to go in closer--and do more risky bombing than we have before. You could see that the other night./7/

/7/Presumably a reference to the January 25 meeting with the Congressional leadership; see Document 43.

Are we getting closer to danger points by resuming our bombing--and shoving it--or by not resuming it?

McNamara: By resuming, we increase military action with Communist China (presume he meant risk of military action). We must seek to avoid this at all costs. The burden is on us. Some of the programs recommended cause excessive risk.

If we don't resume, the risk is more political than military. I personally think this is a high risk.

The CIA estimators feel this way.

Bundy: All estimators say that cessation will strengthen the will of the enemy.

McNamara: People in this country believe that supplies will demand we protect our boys.

President: Did we make a mistake in starting to bomb in the North?

McNamara: No.

Bundy: I share the view that we don't need to take the suggestions of those around the table the other night. We never said we would bomb cities.

Wheeler: I must take issue. I agree with the political argument. But I think it is important to bomb militarily.

We never had a heavy enough interdiction program. It has to be heavy. Day after day. We have had only 86 a day. Nothing at night. Now we can do a better job at night.

POL is absolutely vital to interdiction.

But the problem is not the 155 battalions they will have; it's what they could have if we allow them to continue supplying. The only industrial target is the iron works in Hanoi. We ought to take that out.

But we need to expand our interdiction campaign.

President: Will that materially increase the danger of pulling China in by increasing bombing program?

Wheeler: Highest possible danger is if we make amphibious landing in North Vietnam. I could be wrong but I don't believe it. Don't think the Soviets will get involved.

McNamara: Don't think we know how many sorties we need to stop the flow of supplies. We could apply quadruple intensity on certain targets. We need more facts.

President: Do we need another 35 days of pause to get them?

McNamara: This has nothing to do with resuming bombing.

President: What have we lost during these 35 days? What are we getting out of these bombings? What reports do we get out of North Vietnam?

Rusk: We get no real reports except from reconnaissance. We are old-fashioned in our spying.

We ought to hit only those targets directly involved in support of troops.

President: Who are people in your Department--their background--and what are their reasons for not resuming?

Rusk: Ball, Thompson. Thompson wants at least two more weeks--to confuse [?] each other. Each of the enemy is afraid to get caught laying down their commitment. Thompson is concerned about Russian involvement.

Bundy: His fundamental point is that Russians know they have a constraining influence on us.

President: Doesn't it worry you that Russia might heat up the world somewhere else?

McNamara: No. I think Russians are less a risk than China. And we are strong enough to handle other commitments. I don't agree (that) Senator Russell is right.

Wheeler: I think we are strong enough.

McNamara: He may be saying this in context of being a world policeman.

Rusk: Bill Bundy is ready to go--but is worried over the Souvanna thing.

President: What will U Thant say?

Rusk: Some danger. U Thant will say "too bad". "Some negotiations were in progress and they could have worked."

Goldberg and Sisco are hoping for holding off. Harriman would be more comfortable with some more time.

President: What is the logic of Goldberg's position of three weeks more?

Bundy: He says no damage militarily. Makes no claim that we would get peace.

President: Does he want to pull out?

Bundy: No. He wants to compromise it out.

President: But the only way to get a fellow to talk to you is to show strength. To show daring and imagination and find a way to get to the table.

Are we doing any good playing with the Viet Cong?

Bundy: VC never said they would sit down and talk about prisoners. The door was slammed in our face.

Rusk: It's true we can give wrong decisions to Hanoi. But we don't know what they would do with the right signal.

Bundy: One thing the bombing has done is to serve as an umbrella for 200,000 men.

President: I think if you stop bombing they will go for something else. If you let them run you out of your front yard, they'll run you out of the house.

I don't want war with Russia or China. I feel less comfortable tonight than I felt last night. I don't want to back out--and look like I'm reacting to the Fulbrights.

We must realize the price we pay for going back in. We will lose a good part of the Senate. I thought of chucking that resolution back to them.

Do we want to take on the Senators--or let others take them on?

McNamara: I think the longer we delay the more controversy we produce.

Bundy: We ought to be sure we hit only trucks and highways until later.

President: We don't have anyone defending us.

Bundy: Yes, that's right, and we don't have anyone of stature.

President: Douglas/8/ could do it. He's got the standing to do it.

/8/Presumably a reference to Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL).

What I don't have is evidence.

--Turn loose 115 nations and having them shout at us. Suppose we would not announce a resumption. We would keep the nations off us. Can we take this same firepower and use it in the South?

McNamara: Why wouldn't we be better off applying all the sorties in the South?

One, we don't need them in South Vietnam.

Two, are we using them in Laos? I don't know. They are blind bombing and I'm sure we are getting benefit from this.

President: We have to be sure--we must be sure.

McNamara: I am sure we need to resume bombing.

President: What did Bobby/9/ say?

/9/Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY).

McNamara: He says the burden of proof is on us.

President: What will he say when we resume?

McNamara: I don't know. I'll see him 10:30 Saturday/10/ morning.

/10/January 29.

President: I think we'll carry a big burden when (we) resume with the Senate, peace lovers, ministers, etc.

McNamara: We cannot use the same firepower elsewhere. I can prove that.

President: I don't think we have the case made to resume bombing. What will the papers say?

What I think we ought to do is to be prepared with statements--let the wise men chase it around.

Ought to talk to all the people we need to talk to Saturday.

And will send order--prefer Monday.

McNamara: Will do it so it will be announced on Tuesday.

51. Memorandum/1/

Washington, January 28, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. The source text is unsigned but the memorandum was presumably prepared by William Bundy.

DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING

A. Third Country Situation

1. We have sent a circular message during the week which has now been delivered to all countries with which we have had any meaningful exchanges during the suspension. This has covered every country except for the Soviet Union and two other very minor ones. We have every indication that the Soviets have received word of the contents through the Poles or Hungarians. In essence, this message served notice that we had not had a response and that we could not continue to refrain from steps required to protect our forces. It has been widely construed as our notice of imminent intent to resume.

2. We have had even closer exchanges with such key countries as the UK, Canada, and Australia.

3. Our various messages have been received with remarkably little protest and with considerable understanding. The British and Australians are solidly aboard. Among significant countries, only Japan, Canada, Poland, Pakistan (a very fervent plea from Ayub),/2/ and about five lesser countries have expressed the hope that we could continue the pause to give something a chance to develop. None of these has indicated that they have any concrete expectation or grounds for belief that it will.

/2/See Document 49.

U Thant fully understands that we may be resuming shortly. However, he has appealed publicly for a virtually indefinite continuation, and will doubtless be critical in almost any event.

4. There is no pending third country initiative which hinges on delay in resumption. U Thant is working on a proposal to have the ICC members propose a conference, and the Japanese and Canadians are considering sending high-level emissaries to key countries. Nkrumah has also concocted the idea of his going to Hanoi. However, all of these are well aware that we may resume before these actions were underway.

B. Status of Contacts with Hanoi

1. Rangoon.

We had originally delivered a message there on December 29 simply informing Hanoi that the suspension was underway and could be extended if there were a response. The message was accepted. On January 21, we sent Byroade back to see the Hanoi man, who said he had no instructions and made certain other comments, not calling for reply./3/ On January 24 the Hanoi man sent Byroade a written aide-memoire, pre-dated January 21, which simply repeated the same points./4/

/3/See Document 33.

/4/Byroade transmitted the text of the aide-memoire in telegram 370 from Rangoon, January 24, which is printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 138-139. McGeorge Bundy forwarded telegram 370 to President Johnson at 10:45 a.m. on January 24 under cover of a memorandum stating that Byroade had "received a very tough memo from the Hanoi Charge which pretty well closes that circuit." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)

On January 26, Byroade acknowledged the written message. He asked again whether the Hanoi man had any instructions, and said he would remain available./5/ There has been no response./6/

/5/Byroade reported this information in telegram 374 from Rangoon, January 27, printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 139.

/6/The DRV representative responded on January 31, presenting an aide-memoire to Byroade during a meeting that began 10 hours after resumption of the bombing. Byroade transmitted the aide-memoire in telegram 392 and reported on the meeting in telegram 394, both dated January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 140-142) William Bundy analyzed the timing of the January 31 DRV approach in a memorandum to Rusk, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 150-151)

2. Moscow.

Based on Shastri's report that Kosygin had suggested direct contact in Moscow, Kohler sought an appointment with the DRV Charge on January 19, and the DRV Charge finally accepted the meeting on January 24. We gave Kohler substantive instructions,/7/ particularly inquiring whether this confidential contact might be used for Hanoi to make clear what military actions it was taking. Kohler also raised Hanoi's Four Points but was able to make only general comments.

/7/See Document 25.

The over-all reaction of the DRV Charge was completely negative./8/ He reiterated the Four Points and standard statements of Hanoi's position and attacked the sincerity of our suspension.

/8/See Document 37./8/

At the end of the conversation, the Charge said that he had nothing further to add. Kohler replied that he still had points he could discuss, but the DRV man showed no enthusiasm for a further meeting. He finally suggested twice that we could talk in Rangoon if we wished. The initiative was left to the DRV man to request a further meeting, and there has been no further word.

The DRV man's mention of Rangoon led us to the Byroade reply of January 26, nailing Rangoon down tight as well.

3. Vientiane.

On January 17, the DRV Charge called on Souvanna at the Charge's request. Speaking from notes, he raised rather niggling questions about the meaning of our Fourteen Points. Souvanna pressed him whether Hanoi was asking Souvanna to act as an intermediary, and the Charge replied that he had no instructions.

On the 20th, Souvanna went back to the Charge with a message from us commenting briefly on the questions raised concerning the Fourteen Points, and saying that we would accept Souvanna as an intermediary, or that Ambassador Sullivan could meet directly with the DRV man. The DRV man then made certain "personal observations" about accepting the NLF and the Four Points./9/

/9/Sullivan reported this conversation in telegram 788 from Vientiane, January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

On the 25th, Souvanna conveyed to the DRV man a fairly substantial statement on the NLF and Four Points, pointing out among other things that we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva Accords and that this might be the answer if Hanoi insisted that its Four Points were "authentic interpretations" of these Accords. Souvanna himself thought this response quite "forthcoming."

The Hanoi man continued to say that he had no instructions. On January 28, he took the ICC plane to Hanoi but did not return. The next regular plane would not return until February 4./10/

/10/The DRV Charge did not respond until his meeting with Souvanna on February 8, during which he read a lengthy demarche. The meeting was reported in telegram 870 from Vientiane, February 8. (Ibid.)

This episode remains puzzling. The substance of the original remarks was quite peripheral, although Souvanna thinks that there was some serious intent behind it. Since we have now waited twelve days with no validation of any message, it seems hard to believe that anything significant was intended. Although the Charge has only limited air communications, we know that he has available cable communications and has used them. Souvanna himself on the 26th, asked only that we hold off to the end of the week.

There are some complications to the Vientiane matter in that Souvanna indiscreetly mentioned it to third country representatives on January 18. U Thant and the British definitely know about it, and we believe the Soviets, French, and probably the Poles and Thai also do. However, none of these probably know more than the first conversation.

In sum, we have clear deadlines in both Moscow and Rangoon, and only an unvalidated nibble, now eleven days old, in Vientiane. The fact that the Moscow and Rangoon negatives were both received after the Vientiane approach give us a tremendously strong public case, if it should ever be required, that the total picture was negative.

C. Saigon

Ambassador Porter talked to the Foreign Minister on the 25th, telling him about the Vientiane matter and saying that it might hold us up for a few days to make absolutely sure. The Foreign Minister expressed understanding, but also concern that we should not be drawn into a delaying gambit. Our over-all reading is that Saigon would begin to get seriously edgy if we waited many more days, but that we are not under pressure in terms of 1-3 days. We would plan to let Saigon know a day in advance of the planned date of resumption.

52. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 28, 1966, 1:20-3:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President was out of the room from 2:40 to 2:55 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

SUBJECT
Resumption of Bombing

PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Harriman, Mac Bundy, Bill Bundy, General Taylor, General Wheeler, Ball, Goldberg, Marks, Valenti. Also the Wise Men--McCloy, Dulles, Dean, Clifford

President: Because of large range of judgment and experience you have, I want your evaluation of this. Fresh approaches can do much sometime. The President's difficulty is not doing what is right--but knowing what is right.

I see each day serious difficulties, mounting of pressure. It may result in deep divisions in our government.

A year ago, by 504-2 the Congress told the President to do what was necessary in Vietnam. Today they could muster probably 40 votes. The Majority Leader and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee are against the general policy of that resolution.

McGeorge Bundy: Situation not essentially different from what is in the press. While we did not expect any serious response to the pause, we have no answer--only nibbles of an undefined source to confuse the record.

We have comprehensive evidence of continuing reinforcement from the North.

Clear that PAVN units continue in VN. True, there have been no large-scale operations initiated by the VC.

The President is not disposed to do anything in a hurry. We need your comments.

McNamara: (President asked McNamara to give military assessment of situation.)

Objective of VC to conquer in 1965 and 1966. US troops defeated this. VC has 27 battalions of PAVN. Capable of infiltrating 4,500 men a month, about three times the rate of last year.

Our bombing objectives:

1. Lift morale of South Vietnam.

2. Cost the NVN and reduce their supply route.

Perhaps we have reduced the flow by 50 percent.

600 trucks in four-week period beginning December 27. Twice the level of a year ago. Records don't show, because of lack of accuracy, if this is increased over before the pause.

President: Assuming we were bombing NVN, is it your opinion that fewer trucks would be coming through?

McNamara: We would eliminate some trucks--but they would probably use human backs.

Ceiling on movement is about 200 tons a day. Can't tell you if air attacks limit movement in toto. They are reactivating routes, roads through reconstruction. Camouflaging trails and routes. (McNamara used a number of photographs to show evidence of substantial infiltration.)

We do know they are steadily expanding forces in the South.

President: Any questions for Bob?

Dean: Resume bombing? As we were before or step it up to deter their supply movement?

McNamara: Don't think we can affect their will through bombing. The pressure on VC in the South will affect their willingness to talk. What kind of bombing should we have. Did have 700 sorties a week. We could direct more sorties against supply lines by doubling the sorties. No matter what bombing we do we need more men.

Dean: Assuming not bombing large centers of population. Would you bomb POL? Power stations? etc.

McNamara: Right now that's not as important as infiltration routes.

McCloy: What can we accomplish by doubling sorties? Would this bring us victory?

McNamara: To avoid a weakness, we'll need to increase our forces. A chance that doubling our force over a period of six months might be sufficient to break their will.

McCloy: Are we on offensive?

McNamara: Yes, we are on offensive.

McCloy: Would this kind of thrust bring about pacification?

McNamara: No, this can't make peace until Vietnam has organized a pacification effort.

Rusk: If there was general drift toward Hanoi, we'd know about it.

McCloy: How about morale of Vietnamese Army?

McNamara: High desertion rate of about one sixth. But they go back to their farms--and not to VC. Rand Corporation report/2/ shows VC morale problems.

/2/See Document 26 and footnote 5 thereto.

Goldberg: What is meant by "increased cost of bombing?"

McNamara: This does not include China. It does mean . . .

Dean: What effect on bombing installations near Hanoi--mine the harbor of Haiphong?

McNamara: If we mined Haiphong, we would cut off petroleum supplies--don't know if we would markedly cut down supplies to the South.

Dulles: How do you appraise the Vietnamese Government?

McNamara: Evidence we have is good.

Rusk: Government draws strength from the fact most of the country doesn't want Communism.

Dean: Would it be possible to carry out Gavin's theory?

McNamara:--unstable military situation--also proposed by men who believe it is not against Communists taking over Southeast Asia.

Carrying on a bombing program against North Vietnam carries risks. Could escalate. And response from China. Think it is danger that can be avoided--but must consider it.

If not bomb, it is risk. Don't think the American people will long support a government which will not support by bombing 400,000 troops there.

South Vietnam will not understand why we don't bomb the enemy supplying enemy troops.

Telegraphs the wrong signal to Hanoi, China. Universal opinion of our estimators that cessation of bombing would cause the enemy to believe their cause was right.

At some appropriate time, we should resume carefully controlled bombing.

Wheeler: We should resume. Reasons about the same as McNamara--although I would place greater weight on the part bombing would reduce supplies. Campaign against North should be increased more substantially. I think POL should be attacked. Basic to ability to move trucks and water craft.

Westmoreland reports a continuing buildup in VC forces in, the North area.

President: Is it because of the pause?

Wheeler: Can't tell. On other hand, infiltration has continued. Pause permitted them to move more freely.

President: Did the infiltration go up?

Wheeler: Don't know.

President: I'm trying to find out if this infiltration has increased.

Wheeler: I think so. But can't tell. But they are moving in daylight now--and before the pause we didn't see any daylight moving.

President: And if we bomb again, would daylight movement end?

Wheeler: Yes.

President: What proof do you have that our bombing has been effective?

(Source of answer not identified): The very stridency of the screams from the enemy is pretty good evidence. Diverted large number of laborers to fix up lines of communication.

You estimate 150,000 to 200,000 repairing bomb damage.

We know two Chinese construction companies are in Vietnam to do construction. They would accept Chinese only under dire circumstances. Reports from defectors indicate disruption to transportation and general havoc because of bombing.

Figures of actual destruction are impressive.

Vice President: Do I gather that bombing targets should be enlarged from the report of the Secretary?

Wheeler: You hear a lot about industrial targets. There are no worthy industrial targets except for one: steel and iron works. But even that is low return item in bombing.

Others that are worthy:

1. POL system. Most located at Haiphong.

2. Next storage area near Hanoi.

In my judgment these are vital. Also have thermal power plant system that is not too vital. In Haiphong and Hanoi area (within 30 miles) certain ammo and other terminals.

Clifford: Can you bomb every target you want to bomb without endangering civilians?

Wheeler: Yes. POL in Haiphong is located on the outskirts of the city. Great majority of bridges can be attacked without damage to civilians.

President: On the theory that "a hit dog howls" is that evidence that we are hurting?

Wheeler: Yes, Sir.

President: What (do) prisoners tell you?

Wheeler: One thing they cite for defection--the bombing. Afraid of B-52s because they don't know about it until the bombs fall.

President: If you stopped in North Vietnam, do you think the next step will be to stop in South Vietnam and finally stop fighting?

Wheeler: Yes, Sir. This always happens.

President: Assuming not bombing civilians, what is argument against bombing in North Vietnam that wouldn't be true for the South?

Wheeler: Don't know of any.

Rusk: In terms of issues posed to North Vietnam and Moscow and China, there is difference. Russia feels there is no problem in bombing in South Vietnam.

President: I agree. But if we refrain, will not peace lovers exhibit same instincts towards South Vietnam as they do towards North Vietnam?

Goldberg: If bombing has caused Chinese construction workers to come in, will not more come in with more bombing?

Wheeler: Not necessarily. They are there because the railroad they are rebuilding is important to the Chinese.

Vice President: Considering Moscow's concern over bombing in the North and not in the South, how many North Vietnamese do you estimate now in South Vietnam?

Wheeler: At least nine regiments--about 12,000-15,000 men. But we are not sure this is all. These are the only ones positively identified.

Vice President: Then there is little punishment being inflicted in North Vietnam but only in South Vietnam--which means, what pressures are we bringing on North Vietnam?

(Wheeler:) I think this is true. Until North Vietnam introduced his own men, Ho was fighting this war cheaply. No trouble in North Vietnam.

Goldberg: Can you bring about an interdiction in Haiphong without retaliation in Saigon port?

Wheeler: They have capability of doing this--and have already caused trouble in this respect. We are on alert against this kind of attack.

In December we had 87 ships waiting to be unloaded. Now down to 76.

We think we will be out of the woods by end of year.

President: What are U.S. casualties in a month?

Wheeler: Last week 28 or 29 killed. Heaviest month was November--250 plus.

President: How many lost last year?

Wheeler: 1300 plus in 1965.

20,000 VC killed--Vietnam lost about 9,000.

President: How long can they take such losses?

Wheeler: Not too long--or indefinitely. Morale of troops won't stand up to it. VC are having substantial trouble on their part.

President: Think possible it will break this year?

Wheeler: Don't think so. If people in the South want to continue, might break in next year. Within the next two years we ought to get favorable results.

President: That means continuing the bombing and doubling the forces.

Taylor: I was with you on the pause, I was against the length.

I don't think Hanoi will ever come forward unless our home front is strengthened. It works against all our efforts in the war.

President: Our enemy gets great encouragement from the opposition voices here. Is that right?

Taylor: Yes. It's true. Hanoi lives in another world. They really believe we have lost 1200 planes.

President: We've lost 1400 to 1500 men in five years?

Wheeler: Yes.

McCloy: Anything developing in the way of tactics or weapons that give you hope.

Wheeler: Yes, Sir. From a flat start, we inserted 100,000 in Vietnam in three months. No other country in the world could do this.

Airlift Red Ball Express to bring vital items quickly. Asked every commander if any shortages--and in every case, no shortages were evident.

Counting on weapons:

1. Choppers

In late May, 400 plus

Today, 1800

At end of year, 2000

2. Using fighter bombers for close support

3. Artillery in quantities--North Vietnamese have never run into before

4. B-52s running close support missions

Vice President: Next argument will be noises to quit using B-52s.

President: Do you think cessation will prolong the war?

Wheeler: Yes.

Rusk: If it were not for the Chinese dispute, Russians would settle for the Geneva Accords. But they are immobilized. Greatly complicates their problem with China. Peking is completely adamant on this. They will not talk or do anything. Peking has actively intruded on any talks between Hanoi and U.S. Hanoi appears to be somewhere between Moscow and Peking--but closer to Peking.

Sufficient differences among them to make them look over their shoulders at each other--so that other nations find it difficult to bring about a consensus. We've asked every nation, "Have you heard anything?" The answer is no.

Dulles: If they are willing to stop the subversion, would the bombing cease.

Rusk: This has been talked ad nauseam. But if they respond in some way, we can respond likewise.

McCloy: Puzzled Hanoi hasn't thrown us off balance with some phony probe.

Rusk: We were prepared for this but they haven't been as imaginative as they might have been.

President: Allen, what is your reaction to the pause?

Dulles: Helpful here--but I'm not sure about the other side.

President: What about others? Will they say it is too short?

Dulles: Don't think they can make a case out of it.

McCloy: Been convincing we are eager to talk. But paid a price abroad. Thought this was done largely for political purpose.

Hasn't been conducive to bringing about talks--we've been too excited, too panicky--an indication of weakness to the enemy.

General impression abroad is we overdid it. But I'm not criticizing it. It helped us here at home.

I think I would resume the bombing. After having made these efforts--and saying we would if we didn't get response--talks would be diminished if we don't resume.

Insofar as Hanoi is concerned, they are confirmed in their estimate that we are weak and feeling the pressures at home.

Dobrynin said that we have complicated Russian objectives. The whole issue of leadership of the communist world is at stake. He wanted to avoid escalation as much as we did.

Dean: I would resume without question. If you don't American people won't support you--and casualties will rise. In Korea, we lost more men after truce than before. I would do more than bomb infiltration points--and at same time keep up peace moves.

Clifford: Only way to get out of Vietnam is to persuade Hanoi we are too brave to be frightened and too strong to be defeated. We must persuade them we cannot lose--and they will never talk until they are so convinced.

U.S. attitude is misunderstood in Hanoi. They hear Senators and protests and they are convinced we are losing the support of our people.

War must be made more costly to Vietnam. If we can accelerate military pressures to the point where the North Vietnamese people wonder if it is all worth it.

I want to resume the bombing--before we get a phony peace bid.

If we don't bomb, China will be more bold than us. If we keep the strength of our Air Force before them and make them feel we can destroy them if we come in.

We must fight the war where we are strongest and we are strongest in the air.

Dulles: I would resume the bombing--but we have left impression that bombing has been ineffective.

Our bombing did two things:

--Limited forces VC could put into the field

--Limited momentum of their attacks

Goldberg: Am in disagreement with Clifford.

We have been helped overseas with the pause.

The pause has not been an indication of weakness--we have strengthened our position, particularly in the communist world. That could not have been done without the Soviets.

Accelerating military pressure in the North has advantages--and great risks--involving China and Russia. And this would defeat one of our objectives: to keep the split open with (meaning between) Russia and China. I suggest: don't bomb tomorrow. Think there is a way to handle public opinion. Therefore: out of deference to world opinion, continued deliberations and have decided to give another short period--but not under the setting of this one. Think would have great impact on the Hill.

Vice President: The Congress is without leadership. We must take a firm position. The longer you delay, Congress will run all over the lot.

President: I was the first Congressman to speak up for the Truman Doctrine.

I am not happy about Vietnam but we cannot run out--we have to resume bombing.

53. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 29, 1966, 11:35-12:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the President's office.

PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Wheeler, Moyers, and Valenti/2/

/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that General Taylor was also present. (Ibid.)

Rusk: I talked to Thompson about the Soviets. Not worried about pushing them into a corner right now. Thinks we ought to break the suspense--it will give Hanoi wrong signal, combined with Fulbright and his Senators.

Ball would like more time. Think hard about bombing policy, massive support of our troops--stay away from those things which cause risk. Very careful about immediate Hanoi and Haiphong area. Make it clear it is the other side who will escalate--not us.

President: Are we trying to hold down statements from other nations?

Rusk: We are sending out wires to Ambassadors.

President: Do we have to let the Canadians know?

Rusk: Would cause them less embarrassment.

McNamara: Believe we should resume--whether Monday/3/ their time or Tuesday their time. Would recommend Monday their time.

/3/January 31.

Recommend targets south of Hanoi.

President: When is the first we could do it without announcing on Sunday?

McNamara: On Tuesday morning their time. Bombing wouldn't occur until 5 p.m. Monday our time. On the air probably 7 or 8 Monday night.

Rusk: If we had working day--Monday--to notify governments, it would be better. Need to get embassies set. Wouldn't tell more than four or five exact time.

Wheeler: When will we tell the South Vietnamese?

Rusk: Tell Ky the evening before.

Wheeler: Would hate to see it go any below that. Leaks would occur.

Rusk: The 11 p.m. news would have it Monday night.

President: What trouble if announced on Sunday?

Rusk: Not consider it a problem.

President: If announced on Sunday, it would close up debate--but Ministers might get noisy.

Moyers: Don't think the Ministers will cause trouble. Problem of waiting till Tuesday will open up more sores here with questions.

Bundy: Would rather go Monday.

Moyers: Lodge could make the announcement--"began Monday Saigon time." Being Sunday makes it easier for us.

Bundy: We don't announce until planes are back, do we? Announce midnight Sunday.

President: As soon as you can . . . desirable for Lodge to announce to press there. Prepared statement by me before cameras. Followed by a prepared statement by Rusk--emphasizing pause--work and failure--answer questions--getting us far away from bombing--and going back to where we were before. Might keep us away from nuclear war--people like Gore.

Picked out about five men around the country--one man said "have you and Rusk gone crazy--you've been sitting around doing nothing."

Had talk with Fortas. Net of what he said was that whole communist world was working to prolong the pause.

Rusk: If that's their object, the communists have been stupid.

President: Don't think we ought to discuss military plans with Senators. Problems with Senate and 76 in the House. But the thing that worries me are the others who want to go after it.

McNamara: That worries me, too. We must not add fuel to this fire--not to discuss how much they have done so we can knock hell out of them.

Taylor: I would suggest a joint announcement by the Vietnamese Government and U.S.

Bundy: As soon as first bomb is down, we can announce.

Drafted message to CINCPAC to get any time after 0001 on any day President determines. We can't sit here and predict when first bomb goes down. Time will vary from early morning til mid-day. It could be a small operation if weather is bad.

Rusk: Important to hit those infiltration routes--where we lose the fewest planes.

(Wheeler showed armed reconnaissance routes.)

Wheeler: We should mount 500-strike effort--a later 300-strike effort. Weather has been bad.

President: Is it desirable to go in with that heavy an effort?

Wheeler: We've been seeing larger convoys of trucks on these routes. 500-strike sorties is not too heavy to put on this.

Rusk: I would hope if they see a 50-truck convoy and stay with this target until they finish it off.

Wheeler: They will.

McNamara: I would recommend a lesser quantity, such as 200. I doubt the effect of the advantage of 500 over 200.

To be quite frank, I would be hard pressed to show trucks on the road. Also it may be difficult for the jets to hit them. Vietnamese are on alert. Problem is exactly what you have outlined--we must control ourselves without violating the military requirement.

Wheeler: We can go in with any number you want, Mr. President. We need more than targets--pontoons and other targets. These are hard to see. Pontoon bridges are in place now.

There are a number of truck rest stops--and these will be targets.

President: But if it created a clamor around the world--

Moyers: There is a general belief that if you go in with four times the number it will look like escalation.

President: How many can you mount without moving in another carrier?

Wheeler: 300.

President: Let's do that and bring up that carrier later.

Wheeler: Do you authorize us to continue at a rate of 300 a day?

Bundy: What day, Mr. President?

President: I think Monday.

Bundy: Lodge would announce about midnight.

McNamara: Lodge announce after return of first aircraft.

President: Let's get a summary of all we've done and be ready to go with this--so Lodge can background the press.

Taylor: Will you leave to Lodge to work in the Saigon government?

Rusk: U Thant may scream if we report this to the Security Council. Under the SEATO Treaty we are obligated to report to SC (Security Council). If we offer a resolution and it is vetoed, Morse will say the UN has rejected us--and we ought to get out of South Vietnam.

Two difficult points:

1. Pressure to take cease-fire without recognition of other side

2. Recognition of VC.

President: Morse will go to repeal the resolution.

Rusk: If on Monday morning we announce we're reporting to the Security Council, that would mute Morse.

Moyers: Send message to Pope and say plan seems possible and will work at it. Include this in your statement.

President: You want to ask for a vote in the Security Council? Don't we want to take initiative in peace efforts? Maximum initiative on our part.

Rusk: I have statement I want to go over with Goldberg.

President: Was Clifford right about talking about peace as a deterrent to peace?

McNamara and Bundy: Disagree with Clifford.

Wheeler: I agree with Clifford.

President: We have to demonstrate to people we are not Goldwater.

But we must make it clear that our military program will go forward vigorously.

But we can't talk about peace on Saturday morning. We must do it all the time.

(President talked about Morse electing Hatfield because Hatfield is against Vietnam.)

We have to keep shoving on peace. I want Wheeler to have running room. Rusk has got to keep moving on peace--let's keep Goldberg busy on peace resolutions.

If you can do more than report to the Security Council, I think we ought to do so. Do we have the best resolution possible?

We would make statement about 9 a.m. Monday. Rusk would have news conference at 10 a.m.

What should we do in Security Council meeting?

Bundy: Intelligence reports--don't tip hand. Don't discuss level of bombing. Report on military and political situation.

54. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 29, 1966, 12:45-1:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the President's office.

PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, Goldberg, Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti

Rusk: It's up to you and me, Arthur, to draft a first class resolution to the Security Council.

President: Let me tell you my views. I was against the first pause, and the second pause. It has created a situation of doubt. I don't want to fail to explore every possible avenue. I don't want to fail the men out there.

After the 12-hour and the 30-hour truce and the Pope's message/2/--I decided on the pause.

/2/See footnote 7, Document 3.

We should write the Pope, encourage him--we must figure out what to do in reporting to the UN--in accordance with SEATO Treaty.

What can we ask the UN to do? I want the diplomats to keep moving now.

First, letter to the Pope.

Second, a report to the UN.

Third, how can we keep the initiatives going? Don't want to be constantly reacting to Ho.

Goldberg: We have already good reporting on our peace efforts.

Two other moves:

1. Go to Security Council. I favor going because it is demonstration of desire for solution. But don't think it will get anywhere. Whatever you do there are risks. Wilson did it cleverly. He presented the resolution. If the resolution did go far, we still have enough strength to defeat a resolution we don't want.

Rusk: The Japanese are dying to do something for peace, so they will be eager.

President: This afternoon and tomorrow figure out what we need to do to emphasize peace.

Goldberg: Our friends will tell us not to go, but we shouldn't let them rule us. The dominant theme is disengagement between us and the Soviets.

President: I've played out my pause--not from 115 countries have I gotten anything. I want you men to evolve for me political and peace moves--initiatives of my own.

--Letter to Pope.

--Report to UN--and advocate peace.

Because I certify that the Fulbrights and the Morses will be under the table and the hard liners will take over--unless we take initiatives.

I can see lot of things developing in the future to distress us. So let us keep peace emphasis on.

[end of document]

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