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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

55. Summary Notes of the 556th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, January 29, 1966, 1:20-2:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) Valenti also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File)

Vietnam

CIA Director Raborn, reading from notes, briefed on the military situation in Vietnam. Six hundred trucks are reported in the south--twice the level of a year ago. They are carrying men and equipment.

The North Vietnamese are taking actions in anticipation of a resumption of the bombing. They have improved their air defense. Equipment is being airlifted to Dien Bien Phu. The Chinese are moving forces up to their border with North Vietnam. The infiltration of North Vietnamese troops is heavy. Total North Vietnamese forces number 22 battalions. They are obviously girding themselves for battles yet to come. A cyclical lull usually follows a period of heavy activity.

Secretary Rusk reported on the peace offensive, lightly referring to one comment alleging that "McNamara tries to keep us in and Rusk tries to get us out."

The enormous effort made in the last 34 days has produced nothing--no runs, no hits, no errors.

The Ho letter (copy attached)/2/ was the hardest yet. It did not even include a confusion ploy. Hanoi has done nothing. In all conversations--and we have a telephone on every line--the other party has merely hung up.

/2/Attached but not printed. Dated January 24, Ho Chi Minh's letter was sent to several Communist heads of state and broadcast over Hanoi Radio in English on January 28. The letter called the U.S. peace offensive a "sham peace trick" designed solely to conceal the U.S. "scheme for intensifying the war of aggression."

We now need to make a report to the UN Security Council and consider whether the Vietnam problem should be taken to the UN.

Ambassador Goldberg: The tone of the Pope's letter is favorable to us. The peace offensive has had a good effect on world opinion. However, we have received no encouragement from any source. We have talked to everyone at the UN--113 representatives.

The President: We should have one last report from our allies to be certain that they have heard nothing.

General Johnson briefed on Operation Masher. (A summary of this operation is attached.)/3/ We are apparently at the beginning of a major engagement. We now have 197,000 men in Vietnam.

/3/Attached but not printed. Operation Masher, retitled White Wing, began January 25 when U.S. and allied troops moved into northern Binhdinh Province.

The President: What do you want most to win?

General Johnson: A surge of additional troops into Vietnam. We need to double the number now and then triple the number later. We should call up the reserves and go to mobilization to get the needed U.S. manpower. This involves declaring a national emergency here and in Vietnam. The bombing should be resumed at once to hold down infiltration. By resuming the bombing, we divert North Vietnamese manpower to repair their LOCs, put pressure on their infiltration and their government, and destroy their equipment, especially trucks.

General McConnell: There is nothing unusual in the air effort recommended. It involves 330 sorties weekly, B-52 sorties at the rate of 300 a month, and 1200 weekly sorties into Laos./4/ When we resume the bombing, our losses will rise because North Vietnam now has a greater anti-aircraft capability.

/4/According to Valenti's notes, McConnell stated: "In South Vietnam attack sorties 1,000 a week and 300 a month for B-52's. In Laos 1,200 a week."

Secretary McNamara: Our plane loss is now running 5 per 1,000 sorties.

General McConnell: We can get better results from bombing North Vietnam than bombing either in Laos or in South Vietnam.

General Greene briefed on the current Marine Corps operations, including Double Eagle, which involves the landing of two Marine Corps battalions north of Operation Masher (maps attached)./5/

/5/Attached but not printed.

Air strikes should be resumed by a sharp blow as soon as possible. POL storage areas should be struck at once. Armed reconnaissance is not enough.

CIA Director Raborn: Our bombing cuts by 50 percent the amount of supplies being trucked from the north./6/

/6/According to Valenti's notes, the President asked: "Suppose we had been bombing every day. Would we have had 600 trucks coming down? How many?" Green responded: "Convinced we could have stopped half of them." Raborn then stated: "With good bombing could have cut down flow by 50 per cent."

The President: We need evidence for Senator McCarthy.

Secretary McNamara: We have destroyed 400 trucks and damaged 250 since the bombing began in February. The bombing will not hurt the infiltration of men, but it will reduce the number.

Admiral McDonald: There has been no major infiltration via water of men or materials. We must resume bombing as soon as possible in order to do what we can to slow down infiltration by land.

The President said he wanted the hardest proof.

General Taylor implied that we cannot get firm proof. He recommended the resumption of bombing as soon as possible--heavy bombing to slow down infiltration as much as we can. He favored striking POL supplies, the port of Haiphong, plus railroad lines.

The President said we need to know what we think about how much North Vietnamese traffic increased during the lull. Planners should go to work now on deciding what we can do if we resume the bombing./7/

/7/According to Valenti's notes, President stated: "(1) Let's see what we think is happening in increased traffic since the pause; (2) see what we can do to stop that traffic; (3) see if we are really being effective."

Secretary McNamara: Four weeks from now we can answer these questions.

The Vice President: General Taylor, commenting on his experience in Korea, pointed out that bombing did slow down the North Koreans. We should tell the Senators this because some Senators think our bombing in Korea was poor. We cannot win over Senators by merely citing numbers, but we can win them over by discussing our overall strategy.

General Wheeler: We should resume the bombing as soon as practicable on infiltration-associated targets which we have advised on the basis of evidence from the North Vietnamese.

General McConnell: Our bombing is ineffective because of the restrictions placed upon the Air Force. We should lift these restrictions and we would then get results.

Bromley Smith

56. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 29, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret; Nodis; Pinta. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Bringing Viet Nam to the Security Council

On the assumption the bombing of the North has been resumed, Arthur Goldberg and I are agreed that an almost simultaneous request for a Security Council meeting would help demonstrate that we want to stop not just the bombing but the whole war by seeking an honorable settlement. Furthermore, the Pope's appeal for UN mediation provides the United States with a favorable opportunity to convene the Security Council promptly on the Viet Nam problem. We recommend therefore that you approve a US move to convene the Council. You could announce this decision on Monday morning;/2/ Ambassador Goldberg would about the same time submit a formal letter to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting, and the Security Council could meet on late Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning.

/2/January 31.

Our plan is to have the United States preempt the situation in the Council in two ways: (a) a detailed speech by Ambassador Goldberg laying out the full record of our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, the lack of constructive responses by the other side, and their continued aggression; and (b) a resolution calling for unconditional discussions among the participants of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962./3/

/3/Regarding the resolution submitted to the Security Council on January 31, see Document 59.

It is true that our frequent soundings over the past year, including the last one two weeks ago, on the desirability of bringing the Viet Nam question to the Security Council have produced almost uniformly unfavorable responses. U Thant said in his press conference January 20:/4/

/4/See footnote 4, Document 33.

"I felt, and I still feel, that at this stage the UN cannot be involved in the conflict". The Soviets and French whom we consulted as well as the British, Australians, and New Zealanders were decidedly negative.

The unfavorable reactions have been based primarily on the fact that Hanoi and Peking, because they are not UN members, have explicitly and repeatedly rejected any UN jurisdiction or involvement in the Viet Nam problem, and would therefore presumably refuse to participate in the Security Council debate or accept any decisions the Security Council might take. Consequently, it is assumed, no doubt correctly, that the Soviets would oppose any Security Council consideration or action, would feel obliged to attack the United States viciously during the debate, and would veto any substantive resolution that might be proposed. A debate could further reduce whatever capabilities the USSR may have as an eventual mediator and could further reduce their freedom to deal constructively with the United States on other matters such as disarmament. An additional argument against reference to the Security Council has been that it would cut across whatever moves toward negotiation were being made as a result of our peace offensive.

Nevertheless, there are two strong reasons for convening the Security Council, one psychological and one substantive. First, once our bombing of the North has resumed, it will be especially important that it be clear to the world that our peace offensive is still being vigorously pursued; also such a move would meet the persistent domestic criticism that the full resources of the UN have not been brought to bear on the Viet Nam problem.

Second, while we can assume strong Soviet opposition, a Security Council debate focusing on the need to move the Viet Nam problem to the conference table should at least help stimulate further peace moves (the Pope, the non-aligned, free world friends) through diplomatic channels whether or not the Security Council is able to adopt a formal resolution.

This course is not without risks. We can expect that resumption of the bombing of the North will have dissipated to a degree the present favorable international climate and support for our position. The risks are threefold:

a. there would be pressure to include in the resolution a call for a ceasefire;

b. we will also be pressed to agree to a formulation on NLF participation in any negotiations which goes beyond our present publicly stated position; and

c. those who would be willing to support a call for unconditional discussions in some appropriate forum are also likely to insist that such a proposal be made in the context of further suspension of bombing.

The way to meet this is for the United States to preempt the situation with a resolution which formulates a number of key points in a manner acceptable to us. The attached resolution/5/ is submitted for your approval. We estimate there is a majority in the Council for such a resolution. Moreover, because of our peace offensive we should be able to prevent a majority being mobilized in the Council for a resolution or an amendment calling for another suspension of the bombing by the United States without any reciprocity by the other side.

/5/Attached but not printed.

There are two principal likely results:

1. Hanoi and Peking will deny Security Council competence and it may be that as a consequence the members would decide against pressing any formal resolution to the vote. Such an outcome would be satisfactory to us since it would then be clear to world opinion and our own that we seek peace but our adversaries do not.

2. If the members prefer to vote on a resolution, we are likely to have the requisite majority./6/

/6/At 4:30 p.m. on January 30 Rusk spoke by telephone with McGeorge Bundy, who stated that the President had asked if Rusk was certain that going to the United Nations was the right course. According to notes of the conversation, Rusk "replied 'yes, he thought so.' Let the Security Council take it on to see if they can do anything." Asked by Bundy if his "subordinates were on board," Rusk said, "Goldberg and Sisco think it is all right." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)

Dean Rusk

57. Editorial Note

The United States resumed the bombing of North Vietnam on January 31, 1966, following a 37-day pause which began on December 24, 1965. President Johnson's statement announcing the resumption of air strikes was broadcast over radio and television from the White House Theater at 10 a.m. on January 31. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pages 115-116. Later the same morning Secretary Rusk made a statement on the resumption of the bombing and held a news conference. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 14, 1966, pages 223-229.

On February 3 the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry released a long memorandum in which it attacked Washington's "sham" peace negotiations during the bombing pause and defended the DRV's refusal to respond to U.S. overtures. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In an analysis of the memorandum prepared for Secretary Rusk on February 5, Thomas Hughes noted that it contained "Hanoi's most official and definitive rejoinder to the US 14 Points to date." (Intelligence Note 71; ibid., EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives--North Vietnam)

JANUARY 31-MARCH 8: THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE; CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON THE WAR

58. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 31, 1966, 3:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. No classification marking. Valenti sent a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy on February 2 at the President's direction.

I think that your statement/2/ of today makes it all the more important to begin immediately on one peace move right after another. Meanwhile, at the same time, we keep up our military pressure.

/2/See Document 57.

Here are some suggestions about peace initiatives:

1. You write a letter to the Pope in which you thank him for his efforts and suggest your readiness to dispatch Goldberg or someone else to the Vatican to discuss with the Pope his idea about non-aligned nations taking an active role in peacemaking efforts.

2. Brief the members of the House and Senate in small sessions as you did in the early days of your Presidency. As Senator Clinton P. Anderson told me, there are many Senators and Congressmen who have not had the opportunity to hear the briefings of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

3. Begin almost immediately the series of task forces on-the-scene in Vietnam--Secretary Freeman and agricultural experts--Dr. Hornig and health experts--Secretary Gardner and education experts--some well-known U.S. Mayor and public administration experts. As I outlined in an earlier memorandum, these task forces could go into Vietnam at two-week intervals to do substantive studies of how to increase the civil effectiveness of South Vietnam.

4. Have Walt Rostow gather a group of political scientists like James McGregor Burns, Dick Neustadt, and others to develop a viable political party system in Vietnam.

5. The President travel to Honolulu and meet with General Westmoreland and Prime Minister Ky. Here the President could get first-hand information on the military campaign. But most important, the President could appear with Prime Minister Ky and stress the political, economic, and social future of South Vietnam once the fighting has stopped. Perhaps economic news could be announced here--some specifics on the Mekong River project--housing projects--land reform--such a meeting could serve as a focal point for showing how bright the future for South Vietnam could be--and indeed a future for all of Southeast Asia.

Moreover, it would be very helpful for the world to see the cordial relations between Ky and the President and their combined faith in the kind of world that can be built without fighting in South Vietnam.

6. Why can't the President write a personal letter to the heads of governments all over the world telling them why we are in Vietnam, what we hoped for in Vietnam and how the fighting can be stopped in Vietnam?

These are some ideas which may or may not be worthwhile.

Jack Valenti/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Below Valenti's signature the President wrote: "Talk to Bundy and get him to recommend & supplement."

59. Editorial Note

Implementing the plan recommended to President Johnson by Secretary Rusk in Document 56, Ambassador Goldberg submitted a letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council on January 31, 1966, requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Vietnam. At the same time, Goldberg submitted a draft U.S. resolution calling for "immediate discussion without preconditions . . . among the appropriate interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia." Goldberg explained and defended the U.S. proposal at a meeting of the Security Council on February 1.

On February 2 the Security Council voted to place the Vietnam question on its agenda. The Council then decided that informal and private consultations be held to determine the most appropriate way of continuing the debate and adjourned to that end. For text of Goldberg's letter, his statements on February 1, and the draft resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, February 14, 1966, pages 229-239. Documentation on U.S. efforts to secure a favorable vote in the Security Council and on the ensuing consultations is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Regarding the outcome of the consultations, see footnote 2, Document 85.

60. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to the President at 11:30 a.m. (Memorandum to the President, February 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)

2761. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Bombing resumption.

Resumption of bombing renewed confidence in Vietnam. The govt understood why we had to have the "peace offensive," but they were relieved when it was over.

I agree that the 37 day pause has indeed "made a record"; and that we should rub this in and make the most of it, as we plan to do at the U.N. Also I am gratified by the way in which Secretary Rusk took my views into account. I believe our U.N. resolution is in good shape.

Undoubtedly the fact that we are for peace and they are not is helpful with the U.S. public, with people in the United Kingdom and some other Western countries.

I doubt if it does us much good with the so-called non-aligned countries--in which I include France. I don't believe there is a greater waste of time than to try to carry out literally what the non-aligned countries advise. Even when we do precisely what they specify, they will for many reasons never applaud us and rarely approve. As was once said of a certain American politician, they are no help to their friends and no threat to their enemies. Obviously, we must consider their interests and our interests, but we should not give too much attention to their whims and attitudes.

The bombing pause, however, has created a much bigger opportunity than simply making a showing that we are for peace and they are not. I wonder if it does not create an opportunity to bring about additional enthusiastic popular support for your policy in Vietnam. To do this, we need something more than to prove that we are for peace and they are not. A colorful, somewhat emotion-stirring showing is needed to dramatize the fact that the Communists are in truth flagrant aggressors and not the moralistic, patriotic civil war fighters which Communist propaganda has, with considerable success, made them out to be.

The Security Council meeting provides a great chance for this, and, as I have reported, we have dramatic materials here in the way of NVN uniforms, Chinese firearms, etc. with which to document a strong speech by Amb Goldberg that this is a clear case of aggression--and that suppression of aggression is the rock on which the United Nations is founded.

In 1956, at the time of the Suez incident, Dag Hammarskjold said to me that the United Nations must always condemn the use of force except in self-defense if "it is to be a respectable organization--and I use the word respectable in the literal sense as meaning worthy of respect."

We face two kinds of aggression here: the Viet Cong with its rank and file recruited by terrorism in the South, but officered and directed from the North. This is the old aggression which has been with us for five years. And then we face a new and even more obvious aggression in the form of the Army of North Vietnam, which wear NVN uniforms, carry NVN identity cards, speak Vietnamese with northern accents and have Chinese firearms. This second aggression is absolutely flagrant, classic and conventional, and I don't believe we should be gingerly or apologetic about saying so.

Since writing the above, I have learned of Zorthian's wire to Marks,/2/ which, of course, he has the right to send, since I hold that Zorthian, like all U.S. Agency Chiefs here, has and should have an open channel to his agency. It is a statement of Zorithian's opinion which, of course, was sent without my approval or direction. I want to assure you that I am in no sense a candidate to do this, that I have a great deal to do here and that I believe Amb Goldberg would handle this whole thing beautifully.

/2/Not further identified.

I believe that the bombing pause also has created other opportunities to educate U.S. public opinion so that Americans will not make utterly unreasonable judgments, using such asinine phrases as "a no-win" policy and expecting neat, gaudily packaged solutions. In most of the world today, there are no solutions, but there is the question of whether these tough problems will be well-managed or not. You should be judged on the extent to which you enable the United States to have some choice and not be pushed into a corner with a choice of being "Red" or "dead," which is no choice at all. Your decision to move into the seaports and your decision to bomb the North has given the United States some real choices.

It would also be well to accustom the public to the idea that in the modern world you work through a balance of defense and diplomacy or of military and civil, and that while occasionally a decisive action at the right time is possible and desirable, there are some things which we must simply weather out.

In his biography of the late President Kennedy, Sorensen cites the case of the British statesman William Pitt, who was asked in the House of Commons in 1805 what had been gained by the war against France. He said: "We have gained everything that we would have lost if we had not fought this war." This is even truer of our war in Vietnam than it was of the British war against France, and, as far as Vietnam is concerned, what we would have lost had not we fought it is nothing less than a climate in which we as a free nation can exist at all.

2. Basic political.

We now have the figures for the number of returnees into TTA Chieu Hoi camps for the month of January. It is 1,426. This compares with a figure of 406 for January 1965 and 446 for January 1964--a three-fold increase.

Of possibly even greater interest is the fact that since Tet, which fell on January 24, the daily rate of returnees is 84. The daily rate of returnees in December was 36. If, as some people think, the Tet campaign should be regarded as a start of a new trend rather than the culmination of a campaign, this figure of 84 per day could be tremendously significant.

Many of the returnees are coming in with Tet campaign leaflets, but we cannot tell how many.

There appears to have been a significant increase during the past three months of popular willingness to provide information on the Viet Cong to the GVN. While difficult to ascertain in terms of numbers of reports, the volume of usable information emanating from the police informant effort has increased 50-75 per cent since approximately October 1, 1965.

3. Current political.

The reporters spent a lot of time listening to coup rumors and some of them filed stories based on these rumors. The most extreme story of this sort was a UPI item of January 7 suggesting that Prime Minister Ky had mysteriously disappeared. Ky knocked this down by strolling through the streets of downtown Saigon the next day.

Ky has told me that he knows about what plotting has been going on and that a few people have been arrested including one Nguyen Bao Kim who was involved in the February 1965 coup which Ky suppressed. They were aiming either to kidnap or assassinate him--and myself.

The Directorate is expected to meet on February 2 to pass on the membership of the "Democracy Building Council" whose formation Prime Minister Ky announced in his January 15 speech./3/

/3/See Document 24.

Lodge

61. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-76-66

Washington, February 3, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Consequences of an Enclave Strategy (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. Your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 January 1966, on the above subject./2/

/2/Not found.

b. "A Communication on Vietnam from General James M. Gavin," Harper's magazine, February 1966./3/

/3/Published January 16. Gavin proposed that the United States stop the bombing of North Vietnam and the escalation of the ground war, limit U.S. troops to the defense of several enclaves along the South Vietnamese coast, and renew efforts to "find a solution through the United Nations or a conference in Geneva."

c. JCSM-652-65, dated 27 August 1965, subject: "Concept for Vietnam."/4/

/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, pp. 356-363.

d. JCSM-811-65, dated 10 November 1965, subject: "Future Operations and Force Deployments with Respect to the War in Vietnam (U)."/5/

/5/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, vol. I)

e. JCSM-16-66, dated 8 January 1966, subject: "Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U)."/6/

/6/Document 13.

f. JCSM-41-66, dated 18 January 1966, subject: "Air Operations Against North Vietnam (NVN) (U)."/7/

/7/Document 27.

2. (U) In response to your request, reference 1 a, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the proposals outlined in General Gavin's letter to Harper's magazine, reference 1 b. Their analysis of the military consequences of the adoption of such an "enclave" strategy follows.

3. (S) For this analysis, it has been assumed that the United States would continue to seek a stable, noncommunist government in South Vietnam (SVN) and would assist the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to defeat the Viet Cong (VC) and to extend GVN control throughout SVN.

4. (TS) Coordination of current strategy with the GVN is essential to successful operations. If forced to accede to such an "enclave" strategy, the political/military structure of the GVN is likely to collapse under the resulting stresses. For example:

a. The GVN would probably lose its existing support and measure of control in areas outside enclaves.

b. Experience to date has established the fact that without military presence the communication among and movement of people between enclaves, the maintenance of commercial activities and economic programs, and the day-to-day functions of government would essentially cease.

c. If the RVNAF were to remain In areas beyond the enclaves, they must then combat the increased VC/PAVN forces essentially without the aid of the United States and other Free World ground forces and perhaps also without their direct advice and logistic support. Military coordination between the United States and the RVNAF could collapse.

d. If, on the other hand, the RVNAF were to withdraw to the enclaves, they would abandon the paramilitary forces, as well as all province, town, and hamlet officials, in areas outside the enclaves to the enemy and permit the communists to consolidate their control over the entire countryside beyond the enclaves.

e. The obvious and prolonged concentration of US forces in defensive enclaves could incite anti-US sentiment.

5. (TS) An essential element of the "enclave" strategy advanced by General Gavin is the requirement for fewer US forces, presumably not exceeding current in-country strength of about 200,000. CINCPAC estimated/8/ that this force level could defend essential base areas and key LOCs and secure 10 per cent of the land area (encompassing about 40 per cent of the population) against the enemy threat existing at that time. In view of the increased VC/PAVN threat, commitment at the above level of forces to such an "enclave" strategy would not now insure the military security of essential base areas and population centers nor protect sufficient food-producing land to feed the population. Thus, a determined defense of enclaves of adequate size and number could now require US forces well in excess of 200,000.

/8/Appendix C to JCSM-811-65. [Footnote in the source text.]

6. (TS) Such an "enclave" strategy would not necessarily reduce casualties. Ultimately, a defensive posture in the enclaves might well result in casualties on at least the same scale as a more balanced strategy. In the '"enclave" strategy, loyal Vietnamese, particularly local officials, must either flee to the enclaves or face VC reprisals. Permitted to consolidate their forces, their supply system, and their base areas, the VC and PAVN units would be in a position to launch more carefully-planned and highly-selective attacks--probes or large-scale efforts--against the enclaves. To the degree we surrender control of the countryside to the VC/PAVN, we facilitate their capability to employ longer range weapons. In addition, there probably would be a heavy influx of refugees, thus offering a channel for VC infiltration difficult to close. Such infiltrators could increase casualties.

7. (TS) General Gavin's letter implies that the expansion of our present actions would lead to a direct armed confrontation with the Chinese communists (ChiComs). In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such a confrontation is more likely to occur from a gradually increasing ChiCom involvement which leads almost imperceptibly into such a war than through a deliberate and abrupt decision to take on the United States. The defensive nature of the enclaves might further stimulate rather than discourage the ChiComs to exploit what they could regard as a weakening of US resolve in Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a deliberate ChiCom decision to risk direct armed confrontation, including the magnitude, character, and time-phasing of the introduction of ChiCom forces, will result from their assessment of US resolve and inherent risks to the attainment of Chinese objectives. Such a decision would not be the direct reaction to the deployment of sizable US forces to SVN nor to air operations against North Vietnam (NVN) which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed. Moreover, the ChiComs would be invalidating the basic premise of communist "Wars of National Liberation" by bringing major powers into direct confrontation. However, as US force buildup continues, the likelihood of ChiCom support of the VC/PAVN will increase, especially as the United States approaches attainment of its objectives in SVN.

8. (S) The balanced strategy outlined in references 1 c and 1 d is designed to achieve US national objectives and to assure that, if the United States enters into negotiations to achieve these objectives, it does so from a position of strength.

9. (S) The Gavin "enclave" strategy, on the other hand, appears to depend upon two underlying implications: (a) that the withdrawal of US forces to enclaves would bring the communists to the negotiating table; and (b) that the United States is willing to negotiate itself out of SVN by forfeiting its objectives. These implications are highly questionable. In contrast, the US/GVN would be bargaining from a position of weakness due to the cessation of offensive operations in SVN, with only that leverage afforded by such bombing as might be continued in NVN to persuade the VC/DRV to yield the gains they acquired by default. Additionally, the VC, having undisputed control of the predominant land areas in SVN, could seek world recognition as the de facto government of SVN, or, alternatively, annex their holdings to NVN.

10. (S) General Gavin also proposes that the United States desist from bombing NVN. The serious consequences of halting air operations in NVN, set forth in references 1 e and 1 f, would be in addition to those foreseen for an "enclave" strategy in SVN. If the "enclave" strategy were implemented without air operations in NVN, this remaining major inducement toward negotiations and source of leverage would thereafter be forfeited, and the VC/PAVN would have unimpeded access to support from the north. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the offensive air operations against the DRV are an essential element of a balanced US strategy. They consider it no less so in an "enclave" strategy. These air operations are a principal military means for inhibiting the buildup and support of communist forces in SVN and for persuading the DRV to cease its aggression.

11. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not support such an "enclave" strategy since it contains significant deficiencies, and the advantages claimed are more illusory than real. By forfeiting the initiative, abandoning solid negotiating leverage, conceding large land areas to the enemy, and alienating the GVN and other friendly governments, the "enclave" strategy, in effect, abandons national objectives. The military consequences would, in their judgment, lead to US/GVN defeat in SVN or ultimate US abandonment of Southeast Asia.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/9/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/9/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.

62. Editorial Note

In telegram [document number not declassified], February 3, 1966, Director of Central Intelligence Raborn sent the following message to the CIA Station Chief in Saigon:

"1. Under Secretary George Ball has asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to undertake ultra sensitive covert political action program targeted against National Liberation Front. Project designed to turn myth of NLF against its creators by playing on and exacerbating regional tensions within Lao Dong/NLF control apparatus and attempting to induce ethnic Southerners within this mechanism either to act as if they were independent or, at least, to chafe at heightened awareness of the fact that they are not.

"2. Objectives this program include (1) exploiting and increasing tensions between indigenous Southerners whose names and faces are necessary to preserve fiction that NLF is spontaneously created South Vietnamese political group and Tonkinese Lao Dong cadre running show both in South and from party and DRV reunification committees in Hanoi, (2) inducing outright defections of key NLF personnel to the GVN, (3) inducing NLF personnel to complain about Northern control even though they do so within the fold and do not break away to join the GVN, (4) where possible, doubling such personnel to serve as additional sources of information and centers of political agitation within the NLF, (5) inducing detachment from NLF, if not outright defection or switch to GVN, of key groups or individuals at provincial and district levels to fragment NLF in local areas.

"3. HQS well aware difficulty and complexity this program, its high risk and flap potential and its limited chances of success. These have all been stressed to Messrs. Ball and Alexis Johnson and acknowledged by them, but they want us to try anyway."

Raborn then discussed implementation of the project. (Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80-R01720R)

In a follow-up telegram to the Saigon Station, [document number not declassified], February 10, Raborn amplified the fourth objective, stating that the persons mentioned therein "might perhaps also be useful as discreet channels for future political communications from the US and/or GVN." Raborn also outlined the groups to be targeted:

"(1) Upper echelon NLF figures whose names are in some measure known to the world at large (e.g. Nguyen Huu Tho, Huynh Tan Phat, Phung Van Cung, Nguyen Van Hieu, and Tran Buu Khiem). (2) NLF overseas representatives outside the bloc. (3) Middle echelon figures such as lesser known members of the Central Committee and staff officers in COSVN or regional headquarters elements. (4) Actually or potentially affiliated groups or organizations, particularly ones composed of ethnic or religious minorities such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao factions, Khmer Krom, and Fulro. (5) Provincial, district, village and hamlet leadership and cadres." (Ibid.)

In a telegram sent through CIA communications facilities on February 15, Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson notified Ambassador Lodge that the Department of State had developed with CIA "some new thoughts" on channels through which approaches to the National Liberation Front might be attempted. Johnson indicated that the Saigon Station Chief could brief Lodge on the details and asked the Ambassador for his comments and suggestions. (Ibid.)

In a March 18 memorandum for the record, George Carver of CIA's Vietnamese Affairs Staff noted that the project "had been approved at highest levels within the CIA and the Department of State." (Ibid.)

63. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, February 3, 1966, 4:25 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.04, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

LBJ: Hello? Dean?

DR: Yes sir.

LBJ: I don't want any other human to know this--I've talked to you and Bob [McNamara]--but I fairly think I would like to go out to Honolulu on Saturday night/2/ with you and Bob and meet Westmoreland, who is there now, and have Sharp give me a briefing on U.S. military matters on Monday and probably ask for Lodge to come up and, if he can, bring Ky and Thieu with him, the Chief of State, and talk to them about some of the non-military matters, pacification, and have with me, probably, Freeman and Keppel and the Surgeon General of Health, to kind of, as a cover and discussion on--we've been thinking of sending these educational, agricultural, and health missions out there. And I think it would give me a chance to visit with Westmoreland and get a little bit closer to his problems and what he envisages out there. And certainly let them see me and let Sharp see me. And I think at the same time, if I had the proper political diplomatic group with me, I could talk to them about what we could do to increase our pacification efforts and our economic aid that's pending and so on and so forth. I rather think, too, that in the briefings that will follow that it would be good to have just visited with Westmoreland some. Now he's gonna be there for two or three or four days. I know of nothing urgent that's keeping me here Saturday night. We could leave Saturday night and be there--leave here Saturday evening--be there at midnight and then stay over 'til about Tuesday and come on back. I want you to give it a little thought. Unless you have very violent objections, I would like you to send Lodge a cable without a bunch of secretaries over there knowing it, because I don't want anybody to know it. Just the most secret thing that we can have in the State Department, if we can have anything secret. And ask him if he could meet us there. I would be there Sunday on, if he could come up Monday. And for him to ascertain if he could bring these other two fellows with him. I rather think it might help this fellow in his own country and I think we'd have a little insurance having Thieu, their Chief of State, so if something happened to Ky, well we wouldn't necessarily be tied to Ky too much. And I would like for us to be in a little contact with what's happening as well as Mansfield.

/2/February 5.

DR: Are you alone in your office here?

LBJ: No, I'm alone in my bedroom.

DR: Oh, I see. May I have a word with you about this after our briefing session./3/

/3/The President and Rusk met with the Congressional leadership at 6:17 p.m. for a briefing on the Indian food situation. Rusk did not meet afterward with the President but did speak with him by telephone at 8:06 p.m. The conversation was not recorded. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

LBJ: Sure. Sure you can any way. I just want to be sure we get a cable out to Lodge asking him if he can go.

DR: Well, I'm here at the White House now so I can do this when I get back to the office.

64. Editorial Note

On February 4, 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held the first of five televised hearings on President Johnson's request for $400 million in supplemental foreign aid funds for Vietnam for fiscal year 1966. Earlier, on January 28, at an untelevised preliminary hearing on the supplemental appropriation, the Committee questioned Secretary of State Rusk about the war. Following its decision on February 3 to hold public hearings, the Committee heard testimony about U.S. involvement in Vietnam from the following witnesses: Agency for International Development Administrator David Bell on February 4; General James Gavin on February 8; former Ambassador George Kennan on February 10; General Maxwell Taylor on February 17; and Secretary of State Rusk on February 18. Transcripts of the hearings are printed in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966--Vietnam (Washington, DC, 1966). Extensive excerpts are printed in The Vietnam Hearings (New York, 1966). For background information on the hearings, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965-January 1968 (Princeton, NJ, 1995), pages 222-230 and 239-251.

At 8:27 a.m. on February 5, the morning after the first day of televised hearings, President Johnson telephoned Larry F. O'Brien and expressed his extreme displeasure at the hearings, calling them "a very, very disastrous break." A recording of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and O'Brien, Tape 66.04, PNO 1.

65. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, February 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80-B1676R, V-1 Vietnam 1966 (Jan.-Feb.). Secret.

SUBJECT
The Managing Hierarchy of the NLF and the Current Political Goals of the Viet Cong

At lunch on Wednesday, 2 February, I mentioned that, by and large, the upper echelons of the National Liberation Front's managing hierarchy are staffed by second-raters with very little public prestige or personal following. This is a point to which insufficient attention has been paid in current public debates about Vietnam and allied current discussion about the NLF's stature as a "southern" political group.

When Hanoi set up the Front in the summer and fall of 1960, it instructed the VC to select people for overt positions who would lend prestige to the NLF and, by their very names, be capable of winning some measure of active public support. The Communists, however, had a great deal of difficulty in meeting this requirement. The first NLF Central Committee, not announced until March 1962, had places for 52 members but the announcement gave only 31 names, most of them virtually unknown even in South Vietnam. The second Central Committee, announced in January 1964, had only 41 members, with no significant improvement in the caliber or personal renown of the announced members. There may have been additional reasons for leaving vacant slots on the Central Committee (e. g., bait for the politically ambitious who had not yet joined the NLF, or concealing the identity of covert members); but even so, the fact of such vacancies--which still exist--demonstrates in some degree that the Communists have been unable to get the use of the names of the kind of people they want.

How far down in the barrel the Communists were forced to reach becomes apparent if we take a look at the backgrounds and stature of some of those who now hold senior positions within the NLF, such as the Chairman of its Presidium, Nguyen Huu Tho; its Secretary General, Huynh Tan Phat; its Public Health Commissioner, who is also a Central Committee member and Chairman of the NLF's "Committee for the Protection of World Peace," Phung Van Cung; its External Relations Committee chairman (also a Central Committee member), Tran Buu Khiem; its principal Traveling Representative (and original Secretary General), Nguyen Van Hieu; and its Representative in Algiers, Huynh Van Tam.

Nguyen Huu Tho (born in Cholon in 1910) studied law at a provincial university in France during the 1930's, began practicing in Saigon in 1934, was admitted to the Saigon bar in 1939, and practiced law in Vinh Long in 1947. Some sources claim he was "President of the Tribunal" in Can Tho in 1949, though this is not certain. His legal career, even at the provincial bar, was far from distinguished, and he is frequently categorized by his former professional colleagues as a "lawyer without briefs." His career as a left-wing agitator seems to have begun about 1947, though his Communist associations may have commenced considerably earlier since he appears to have been a school companion of a number of well-known Communist figures, including Tran Van Giau (the leader of the Cochin-Chinese Communists in the 1945-46 period). Tho was Hanoi's dictated choice for Chairman of the NLF Central Committee in 1962. He was not, however, a person of any particular prestige or prominence and, indeed, was regarded by many South Vietnamese intellectuals and professionals as something of a joke.

Huynh Tan Phat is usually described as an "architect" though we doubt if anyone could point with certainty to any building he has designed or built. He is supposed to have been born in My Tho in 1913 and educated at the College of Fine Arts in Hanoi, graduating around 1936. He has been a left-wing political agitator and activist ever since his student days and held posts in a variety of Communist and Viet Minh front organizations and political splinter groups. Though apparently articulate and possessing a considerable clandestine organizational skill, Phat was virtually unknown even in South Vietnam when he became Secretary General of the NLF.

Phung Van Cung was born in Vinh Long Province in 1909 and is said to hold a medical degree from the University of Hanoi. He has practiced medicine in Rach Gia and in Cholon and appears to have been mobilized as a major in the medical corps of the French-controlled Vietnamese Army in 1951, though there is some doubt as to whether he actually served in this capacity. NLF sources claim that Cung was a high-ranking government official under Diem before he moved his family into a Viet Cong-controlled area in 1960, but this is simply not true. Cung was never a leading light even in the limited circle of South Vietnam's doctors and has almost certainly become considerably better known since he was named Chairman of the NLF Peace Committee and the NLF "Red Cross" than he ever was before.

Tran Buu Khiem was born in Can Tho in 1921 and is said to have studied law at the University of Hanoi, though there is no record of his ever having practiced or having become a member of the Saigon or Hanoi bars. He is a long-time Communist activist and appears to have been a senior member of the "Nambo Resistance and Administrative Committee" in the 1945-1949 period. The record on him is sketchy. Though it suggests considerable competence as a clandestine organizer and political agitator, it certainly has not given him any general stature or personal standing in Vietnamese political or intellectual circles.

Nguyen Van Hieu was born in Camau in 1922. Available details about his educational and professional career are confused and contradictory. He seems to have studied agriculture or law, or both, at Hanoi and Saigon universities and is generally described as a "former teacher" (sometimes of biology, sometimes of mathematics) and a journalist, though it is hard to locate much that he has written. He has almost certainly been a Communist-Viet Minh activist and propagandist since about 1945. He was the NLF's first Secretary General but since 1963 has served, in effect, as its principal traveling salesman abroad. Like his colleagues in the upper echelons of the NLF, Hieu could hardly be described as a non-Communist Vietnamese of independent professional or political stature.

Huynh Van Tam was born in 1919 somewhere in the southern part of Vietnam and was probably educated at a Catholic school in Saigon. He seems to have been a secondary school teacher in Saigon until about 1942 when he began devoting most of his time to Communist political activity. He was named to the NLF Central Committee when it was first formed in the summer of 1960, but is now the NLF Representative in Algiers, and, apparently, no longer a Central Committee member. Tam is fluent in French, knows a good deal of Latin, and is quite polished and articulate. He has made a very strong, favorable impression on a number of Western journalists who have interviewed him, most notably Joseph Kraft. In South Vietnam he is little known except as a long-time left-wing agitator.

The above list represents the best that the Communists have been able to come up with, and their best--in terms of political appeal--is not very good. Some, if not all, of these persons are undoubtedly competent as clandestine organizers or agitators but none can be described with any measure of accuracy as a leading South Vietnamese professional or political figure, let alone as a non-Communist leftist or liberal.

Given the facts of Vietnamese political history over the past two decades, there are very few people in South Vietnam who command the kind of general stature and reputation of, say, such well-known Americans as Governor Rockefeller, Thomas Dewey, Walter Lippmann, or even Professor Morgenthau. Even names fairly well-known in the hothouse salons of Saigon do not make magic in the countryside. The Communists in the NLF, however, have never been able to crack the circle of such "notables" as do exist, at least not in the sense of being able to persuade any such person to lend their names or prestige to the Communists' front organization. Nguyen Huu Tho, for example, was far less well known and regarded as a lawyer than, say, Maitre Trinh Dinh Thao, a political leftist and almost certainly a VC sympathizer but one who has never been willing to take the public step of joining the Front. All of Diem's more celebrated political opponents--Phan Quang Dan, Phan Khac Suu, Nguyen Van Can, Pham Huy Quat, etc.--were united in opposing the VC and the pretensions of the NLF (even if they could agree on nothing else) and usually justified their opposition to Diem by claiming that they could combat the Communists more effectively than he. South Vietnamese intellectuals and professionals have a considerable measure of political sophistication and South Vietnamese interested in political life have had twenty years of firsthand experience with Communist manipulation of front organizations. Few are fooled by the NLF's claim to be either "spontaneous" or "indigenous". Within South Vietnam it is hard to find anyone interested in politics who is not perfectly well aware that the NLF is something set up by and manipulated from Hanoi. This has made [it] extremely difficult for the Front to attract innocent or non-Communist political "names" to serve as window-dressing and, so far, that particular political objective has simply not been achieved. In fact, the Front has not yet been able to include in its overt roster a single South Vietnamese figure who can accurately be described as a non-Communist of significant personal, political, or professional standing.

We do not know precisely how much discretionary authority Hanoi has delegated to or allows the NLF leadership, but the broad lines of NLF policy are patently dictated and rigidly controlled by its DRV masters. NLF statements on settlement or negotiation conditions have displayed some variations in emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi but none of substance. Over the past year or so, public NLF pronouncements have paid rather more attention to the transition phase of "coalition government" in the South than DRV statements, which generally focus on the ultimate goal of "reunification" (i.e., total political domination by the Hanoi regime). The NLF, however, has always dutifully echoed Hanoi's theme that "Vietnam is one" and has consistently depicted "peaceful reunification" as the ultimate objective of its political endeavors. Some of these differences in emphasis have probably been dictated by tactical considerations and some have almost certainly been deliberately devised to support the myth that the NLF is an "independent" political entity indigenous to the South, not a puppet mechanism controlled from Hanoi.

The Front's most recent pronouncements are just as unyielding as those of Hanoi and play the same themes. The NLF's 30 January commentary on Ho Chi Minh's 24 January "letter" to various heads of state/2/ stresses that

/2/Ho Chi Minh's letter was printed in The New York Times, January 29, 1966.

"If U.S. Imperialism stubbornly keeps on intensifying and expanding the war, the South Vietnamese people will resolutely struggle until the end to liberate South Vietnam, protect North Vietnam, and reunify the fatherland."

Basically an "us-too" attack on President Johnson's recent diplomatic peace campaign, this Front statement harps on the current Communist claim that the NLF is "the sole genuine representative of 14 million people in South Vietnam", plays the line that U. S. disregard of the 1954 Geneva Agreements is the source of all of South Vietnam's present woes, and insists that peace can never come unless the "U.S. Imperialists recognize the Front's correct platform"--i.e., its Five Point Program of March 1965. (The Front's "Five Points, the DRV's "Four Points" and the actual relationship of both to the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords were analyzed in detail in CIA Research Memorandum No. 0483/66, 5 January 1966.)/3/ The NLF's 31 January comment on the U. S. approach to the U.N. (broadcast by Hanoi radio on 2 February) is equally intransigent. It condemns the resumption of aerial strikes on the North and "solemnly declares" that the U.N. "has no right at all to decide problems of the South Vietnamese people", adding that the NLF will consider "all decisions of the U.N. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void". The statement concludes by emphasizing that:

/3/Not found.

"The only correct solution to restore peace in South Vietnam is that the U.S. Imperialists must withdraw all troops and weapons of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam, dismantle all U. S. military bases there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own internal affairs by themselves. Should the U.S. Imperialists refuse to abandon their aggressive ambition, they will in no way be able to avoid complete and most ignominious failure, whatever barbarous and perfidious maneuvers they may resort to."

There are undoubtedly some regional stresses at least latent in the relationship between the VC/NLF apparatus and its directing supervisors in Hanoi. Within this complex there are almost certainly differences of opinion between persons with some measure of authority, and varying assessments (at least private ones) of the risks and probable outcome of continued struggle against the U.S.-supported GVN. We see no present signs, however, of what could accurately be termed a developing "VC" or "NLF" position on negotiation, peace or ultimate political objectives that differs in any material way from the line laid down by Hanoi.

Richard Helms/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

66. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 10-1-66

Washington, February 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Vietnam Intelligence. Top Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

Raborn forwarded the estimate to McGeorge Bundy on February 4 together with a 25-page study, dated January 28, on "The Impact of Intensified Air Attacks Against Economic Targets in North Vietnam," prepared by CIA's Office of Research and Reports in response to a request from the Department of State. (Ibid.)

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED US COURSES OF ACTION ON DRV CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Problem

To estimate how DRV capabilities to support the insurgency in the South would be affected by increasing the scope and intensity of the bombing of North Vietnam, and how long it would take for the impact to be felt in the South./2/

/2/In a February 11 memorandum, CIA's Office of National Estimates examined the possible short-run effects and the advantages and disadvantages of four different bombing programs against the DRV. (Ibid., Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20)

Concept of the Courses of Action

The immediate aims of the bombing would be:

1. To destroy those resources already in North Vietnam that contribute most to support of Communist forces in the South;

2. To block external assistance to the DRV;

3. To harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material through the southern DRV into Laos and South Vietnam.

Course A: The enlarged bombing program would include aerial attacks designed to:

1. Destroy all known POL facilities in the northern DRV;

2. Destroy all large military facilities in the northern DRV, except airfields and SAM sites;/3/

/3/Constant surveillance of the airfields would be maintained and their destruction undertaken whenever interference with our planned air operations, or any offensive air actions against our military forces in SVN, might be initiated. Any SAM installations threatening to interfere with these operations would be attacked. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Interdict the land LOCs from China and close DRV ports by various means including mining;

4. Put and keep electric power facilities out of action;

5. Carry out armed reconnaissance against land and water LOCs and all identified military facilities. South of the 20th parallel, such reconnaissance would be particularly intensive and carried out day and night.

Course B: The program above, but without closing DRV ports by mining or otherwise.

Note

This estimate considers only how DRV physical capabilities to support the insurgency in South Vietnam would be affected by certain assumed US bombing attacks on North Vietnam; it does not deal with the possible effect of these attacks on DRV will to continue the war.

Conclusions

A. The combined impact of destroying in-country stockpiles, restricting import capabilities, and attacking the southward LOCs would greatly complicate the DRV war effort. The cumulative drain on material resources and human energy would be severe. The postulated bombing and interdiction campaign would harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material into South Vietnam and impose great overall difficulty on the DRV. However, we believe that, with a determined effort, the DRV could still move substantially greater amounts than in 1965./4/

/4/Major General Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, believes that this conclusion and the tone of the estimate reflect an under-estimation of the overall impact of the postulated bombing program and closing of the DRV ports. He believes that the cumulative interacting effect of such bombing and port closure on the economy, the military structure and the political and psychological fabric of North Vietnam would degrade the DRV capabilities to support the war in the south to a greater extent than this estimate indicates. By excluding consideration of the North Vietnamese will to continue the war, a very important effect of the postulated bombing and port closing has been eliminated. [Footnote in the source text.]

B. However, the cumulative effect of the campaign would almost certainly set a limit to the expansion of PAVN and VC mainforce units and activities in South Vietnam. There are too many uncertainties to permit an estimate of just where that limit would be set.

C. If the main ports were not closed, supply of DRV needs from the outside would be greatly simplified, and the problem of moving goods within the DRV would be eased.

[Here follows the 9-page "Discussion" section.]

67. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, February 5, 1966, 5:08 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, President's Honolulu Conference. Secret. The President and Rusk were on board the airplane en route to Honolulu; see footnote 2, Document 68.

CAP 66043. The following rather tart message from General de Gaulle was brought this afternoon by Lucet. It is a reply to the President's personal message of January 31 informing him of the resumption of bombing./2/ This message hardly calls for an answer.

/2/Transmitted in telegram 3575 to Paris, January 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

"Dear Mr. President:

Your Ambassador in Paris has passed me your message of January 31 in which you explain to me the reasons that make you consider it indispensable to resume the aerial bombing of North Vietnam.

I am grateful for the care which you are taking once again to inform me of the situation and of the purposes of your action.

As far as France is concerned, I think I should make her opinion of this clear to you, taking account of the experience which she herself went through at an earlier time.

For years now we have believed, first, that only a political solution is possible; further, that this solution can only be obtained by a negotiation undertaken on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954; and, finally, that there would be no way to open this negotiation if the United States has not taken and announced a decision to withdraw its military forces from Vietnam and to end all intervention in the internal affairs of the country.

Anything which could tend to delay such a result or make it more difficult should, we think, be avoided. On the contrary, the interest of world peace and the friendship which we feel for the United States make us wish eagerly that the United States would accept the above conditions as soon as possible; they are the only ones which would allow an effort for a settlement. As soon as this should happen, you can be sure that France would be certain to assist in the opening of the necessary negotiations.

With best personal good wishes,

C. de Gaulle"

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/

Washington, February 5, 1966, 6:07 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Canberra and Wellington and repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for U. Alexis Johnson.

810. 1. Addressees should convey to host governments, with timing and levels at your discretion, assurance that Honolulu conference will not be aimed at any significant changes in the conduct of the war, much less at any discussions in depth of the negotiating situation. Primary purpose is, as President has stated,/2/ to give him opportunity to meet with GVN leaders and to go over with them major non-military programs including particularly such key elements as rural construction program, economic difficulties and inflation, and possibility of additional effort concerned with education, health, and agriculture. Latter elements account for presence of Secretaries Freeman and Gardner and former is expected to proceed to Saigon with agricultural delegation after meeting.

/2/The President announced at his news conference on February 4 that he planned to attend the Honolulu Conference, flying to Hawaii on February 5 and returning to Washington on February 8. He stated that the conference would consider both "nonmilitary and military matters," with "a good deal on the pacification matters, particularly on agriculture." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 144-146 and 148)

2. President is of course also taking advantage of Westmoreland's concurrent visit in order to discuss with him the military outlook and to get a general reading on necessary force increases during the year. However, no decisions are expected in this area,/3/ and we will continue to stay in close touch with addressee governments as our views and plans mature. Military matters may also arise with GVN, but we do not expect discussion on this subject to receive nearly as much emphasis as the crucial non-military programs.

/3/Regarding the military discussions at Honolulu, see Document 70 and footnote 2 thereto.

3. In conveying above, you should make clear that we remain well aware of major interest of addressee governments, as suppliers of military forces, both in respect to strategic decisions and major issues in conduct of negotiations. As addressees know, bombing suspension ended with no significant change in outlook, and we do not at present have any reason to believe that UN initiative will produce anything immediate. We shall continue to stay in close touch.

3. Bangkok may use above in its discretion.

Ball

69. Editorial Note

The first plenary session of the Honolulu Conference convened at 10 a.m. on Monday, February 7, 1966. The U.S. delegation included President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Gardner, AID Administrator Bell, Ambassadors Harriman and Lodge, and Generals Wheeler and Westmoreland. The South Vietnamese delegation included Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Huu Co, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Do, Minister of Economy Truong Thai Ton, and Minister of Rural Construction General Nguyen Duc Thang.

During the first plenary session, members of both delegations made presentations on the situation in Vietnam, placing particular emphasis on the importance of pacification and other non-military programs. Prime Minister Ky enunciated four goals: defeat the Viet Cong, eradicate social injustice, establish a viable economy, and build true democracy. After lunch four working groups convened to discuss rural construction, economic stabilization, health and education, and the diplomatic track. That evening the President held private talks with Thieu and Ky, which are described in Document 75.

At the second and final plenary session on February 8, the working groups presented their reports, and the President summed up the work of the conference and outlined follow-up measures. The conference's "Conclusions and Decisions for Further Action" are described in Document 83. For text of the Joint Communique and the Declaration of Honolulu, released in Honolulu on February 8, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pages 152-155.

Plenary session records, working group reports, public statements, and other documentation of the conference are in the Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 305, Honolulu Meeting. Comprehensive documentation on the conference, including background and follow-up material, is also located in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the Honolulu Conference; and ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Honolulu Meeting Papers and President's Honolulu Conference. Audiotape recordings of the plenary session on February 7 are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts. For President Johnson's impressions of the conference, see Document 71. Although the conference emphasized non-military issues, military discussions also took place during the U.S. delegation's stay in Honolulu; see Document 70 and footnote 2 thereto.

Upon arriving in Los Angeles from Honolulu on February 8, President Johnson announced that Vice President Humphrey would fly to South Vietnam the next day, accompanied by Secretary Freeman, Ambassador Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy, to carry forward the mission agreed upon at the conference. The Vice President was then to visit other Asian capitals to report on the conference. For text of the President's remarks in Los Angeles, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pages 155-157. Regarding the Vice President's Asian trip, see Document 84 and footnotes 3 and 6 thereto. Reaction in Vietnam to the conference and to Humphrey's visit are described in Document 74. After discussing non-military organization with U.S. officials in Saigon, McGeorge Bundy presented his observations and recommendations to the President on February 16; see Document 77.

70. Paper Prepared by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)/1/

Washington, February 10, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files, McNaughton VII. Top Secret; Sensitive. McNaughton forwarded the paper to McNamara on February 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: "Here is the corrected 'Honolulu Sheet.'" McNaughton also sent copies to Vance and Goodpaster. A draft of the paper was forwarded to Unger by Blouin on February 12 under cover of a memorandum that called it "a draft of the US/GVN military objectives for 1966 which were developed at Honolulu." (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, JCS Working Papers, 1966-1967)

1966 PROGRAM TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ANTICIPATED RESULTS THEREOF

A. Increase the strength of South Vietnamese, US and 3rd-country forces in South Vietnam/2/

/2/In his "Historical Briefing," dated February 16, Westmoreland stated that he spent February 6 with McNamara, at which time McNamara "made the decision that we would go for the full package of combat troops that I had asked for, namely 102 total battalions, but that there would be no reserves called." (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, #4 History File) For McNamara's report of his February 6 meeting with Westmoreland, see The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 312-313.

1. South Vietnamese National Military Forces

End '65

--Maneuver battalions, 139/**/

--Regular forces, 302,600

--Regional forces, 132,000

--Popular forces, 136,400

End '66

--Maneuver battalions, 162

--Regular forces, 325,000

--Regional forces, 150,000

--Popular forces, 192,500

2. U.S. forces

End '65

--Maneuver battalions, 35

--Strength, 184,300

End '66

--Maneuver battalions, 79

--Strength, /*/429,000

3. Third-country forces

End '65

--Maneuver battalions, 10

--Strength, 22,400

End '66

--Maneuver battalions, 23

--Strength, 45,000

4. US strike sorties per month (includes for end 1966 CAP, SAR, etc.)

End '65

--Tactical air, 16,500

--B-52, 300

End '66

--Tactical air, 27,000

--B-52, 600

/*/30,000 less than MACV's II-A-Revised

/**/Breakdown = Reg 108, Ranger 20, Abn 6 = 139

5. All units are to be at full strength at End '66. (This will require continued programs to stimulate recruiting, enforce conscription, and minimize desertions.)

B. Expand the offensive actions of such forces while providing essential defense

The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, in coordination will:

1. Defend military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now under government control.

2. Open and secure lines of communications required to support military operations and for essential support of the civilian population.

3. Conduct clearing and security operations to provide military security in the four selected high priority national construction areas.

4. Conduct intensified offensive operations against major VC/PAVN forces, bases and lines of communications--almost doubling the number of battalion-months of offensive operations from 40 to 75 a month.

5. Increase the level of attack on the infiltration routes through Laos and North Vietnam by more than 60 per cent--from 5,400 to 9,000 attack sorties a month.

C. Achieve the following results in 1966:

1. Increase the population in secure areas to 60 per cent from 50 per cent.

2. Increase the critical roads and railroads open for use to 50 per cent from 20 per cent.

3. Increase the destruction of VC/PAVN base areas to 40-50 per cent from 10-20 per cent.

4. Ensure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now under government control.

5. Military security needed for pacification of the four selected high-priority areas--increasing the pacified population in those areas by 235,000.

6. Attrite, by year's end, VC/PAVN forces at a rate at least as high as their capability to put men into the field.

[end of document]

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