The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

71. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Indian Ambassador (Nehru)/1/

Washington, February 10, 1966, 6:14 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Nehru, Tape F66.04, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Here follows discussion of U.S.-Indian relations.]

BKN: I hope you had a very successful visit in [Honolulu].

LBJ: We were very, very pleased in several respects. One, I knew very little about Westmoreland, and you're having to act on a man's cables here. And it's good, I think, for the commander in chief to know the man whose cables he has to act upon every day. Second, I knew nothing about Ky and Thieu, the Chief of State, and what I learned was quite favorable. The impressions, the titles, the military backgrounds, the generals, the air marshals, the field marshals, so on and so forth. They never have been very impressive to civilians in Johnson City, Texas, cause we didn't have many storm troopers out there. And we haven't had many of them in our government. And I was amazed, as Alex Johnson said, whatever else may be, he [Ky] certainly knows how to talk. Whether he knows how to do as well as he knows how to talk is different. The declaration/2/ that we wrote was really his speech and it said in effect that we are going to act to prevent aggression, to defeat aggression. He didn't take in any more territory. He was defeating aggression. And we're going to defeat social misery, with considerable details along the line of his January 15th speech./3/ And Ky was a young man who was going to lead the revolution in his country and build a new society and a stable society, and he was going to seek and obtain an honorable peace. And there's not anything in those four points that any country, I think, wouldn't apply to themselves: to prevent an aggressor, and try to defeat social misery, and establish a stable society, and seek an honorable peace. And it was so eloquent and so simple and so young, [but] we have no illusions and we've seen a good many governments come and go and we don't know what'll happen that night. It was quite different from the General marching around with a sword at his side. And when we had the technicians, sixteen of 'em, with Orville Freeman, sit down and meet with him, they all, every Ph.D. there, came away rather stimulated at this man's exciting interest in the quality of the rice seed and how you're going to increase its production. And his demand that we get eight million more school books in there next year. And his telling us how to handle the economic aid that Dave Bell has given him. And he just traded back and forth with Dave Bell for an hour on how to build classrooms. And he said that the American contractors come in and put 'em up overnight, and the Viet Cong come in and burn 'em down a week later. And they say, "We burned down American schools." But he said, "You gave me some materials. We took the materials and put our own people to building the schools and when the Viet Cong came in to get the school they said you cannot touch our school."

/2/See Document 69.

/3/See Document 24.

BKN: That is very important.

LBJ: It becomes our school if they built it. In any event, my point--we have tried for two years to get these people to thinking in terms of building a better society there and not just strictly a military operation but a political one, too. And you can't do it unless you can get Lodge and Westmoreland and the Prime Minister to adopt the baby as their own. And we did that. So they went back to put in the Lodge-Ky-Westmoreland program. And I sent along the Vice President and the Secretary of Agriculture, and in about a month from now I'll send out the Secretary of Education and Health. And then I'll send out the Surgeon General of Medicine. And then I told him we'd meet back in Honolulu six months from now to just see what we've done in this period of time. So, I'm gonna stay on it and if it's impossible I'll find it out, but I'm gonna try.

[Here follow closing remarks.]

72. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/

Washington, February 11, 1966, 9 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.05, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Here follows discussion of a telegram from McGeorge Bundy concerning the U.S. Mission in Vietnam.]

LBJ: I would wish that you would put the best lawyer--this Meeker's been spending his time over here worrying about what's gonna to happen to the Visa Division. I wish that he'd get busy on something substantive like analyzing the testimony as a lawyer and making the basic points that Gavin made and that Kennan made./2/ And they both seem to be unaware that we have a treaty/3/ at all or that we have a resolution/4/ at all or that we have a commitment at all. And they both would just rather not be troubled with Asia. And they'd just like to be content in Honolulu if somebody would leave them alone.

/2/See Document 64.

/3/Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954; for text, see 6 UST 81-86. The treaty established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

/4/Reference is to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Joint Resolution 1145, "To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia," passed by the Senate and the House on August 7, 1964, and signed by the President on August 10, 1964. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 991-992.

UAJ: Yes, yes.

LBJ: And I would like for Meeker or some real expert to prepare for me forthwith today or tomorrow at the minimum, first--I asked for it yesterday--the shifting positions on the loyal opposition.

UAJ: Yes, Bill Bundy's doing that.

LBJ: Then second, I want somebody to analyze the opposition testimony and just take their whole thing and say, "Now here's what a lawyer would brief it as and a rejoinder--here's what they have said." And take the toughest things they've said and say, "Now here is the answer to 'em as we see it." And I would sure see that somebody follows these television things very, very carefully. I doubt that anybody with any political sensitivity in the State Department's doing that. Do you know?

UAJ: I don't know if anybody's looking at the television, we're getting the transcripts.

LBJ: Well now, it's very important to watch that and watch the hearing, watch the reaction to it and what the folks are doing and things like that. [Senator Frank] Church takes the position that we are [in a] very dangerous position and that we've got to surrender. That's his position this morning on the "Today" show, Frank Church.

UAJ: Oh, he was on this morning?

LBJ: Yeah and rather effective. They're doing a real job each day now. I don't think that, when you analyze, if they [were] ever answered--I think it'd just go over like a puff of wind can blow 'em over. Everything that he said can be just answered in one sentence [which] is that we have a SEATO treaty and Senator would you ignore it?

UAJ: Yes, yes, yes.

LBJ: And if so, how and what do you do about it? And what effect does it have on the world? And he acts like he never heard of it. I think that also somebody ought to brief that SEATO Treaty for me. So let's get about three things for the President and get some staff officers busy doing that instead of interviewing the press. First thing I'd have 'em do is give me the shifting positions. The second thing I'd do is have 'em take the position of Gavin and the position of this guy [Kennan ?] and answer 'em. And the third thing I'd like for 'em to do is brief the SEATO Treaty hearings, particularly for any comments of members, who are now members of that, with quotes./5/ And particularly people like Fulbright and Sparkman and folks who apparently were members of the committee at the time it was adopted. And along with that I'd like to have a good brief of the resolution and what they said about the resolution. I would gather that we're getting--if we're not, we ought to get--a brief that Rusk or somebody can put in the record on our legal position. And I think our legal position ought to be that the Commander in Chief has a right to respond when his forces are attacked and that the Commander in Chief powers--we've taken that position all along. But then we got the treaty commitment, then we got the resolution specifically. And we ought to have that legal position ready to put in the record. But in developing that, I want to see what Fulbright said when SEATO was up. I want to see if he ever asked a question or answered one. I want to see what questions he asked and what he answered and what he said on the floor of the Senate when the resolution was up.

/5/The Department of State's 18-page memorandum, February 11, responding to this request was forwarded to the President by Bromley Smith on February 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20)

UAJ: We started work on that yesterday.

LBJ: And I think that you ought to have the most astute politician you've got in the Department watching this thing very, very carefully. They're out to destroy Rusk and destroy the Department and destroy our position. And they're taking the position that what they're doing is going to change the foreign policy of this country. Now I don't know how they're gonna change this treaty or change this resolution. But Gore says that we are going over the President's head to the people, that the President has gone over the Senate's head to declare war without our declaration.

UAJ: I saw him on that yesterday.

LBJ: We're going over the President's head, too.

UAJ: Yes, yes.

LBJ: Now, that's what they're doing and I think that we've got to take a little time and develop this position. First, I think we've got to develop it pretty clearly in Rusk's statement./6/ And before he goes he's gonna have to background people on what he's going to say. He's gonna have to summarize what Kennan said and what Gavin said. "Now this is the substance of what these two men have said and here are the transcripts, if you want 'em, of what they've said. Now here's the answer to 'em" and let 'em have their stuff before they go up there. And when he goes in he ought to give 'em copies of his statement so they can really write because, by and large, these writers up there are unfriendly to our position.

/6/Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18; see Document 64.

UAJ: Yes they are.

LBJ: The infiltration in the networks and in the press on this is rather serious, I think, and I think it's more serious than any of us realize.

UAJ: Yes, yes. Wonder about motives on some of this.

LBJ: Yes, I think there's no question but what [1 minute 58 seconds deleted by the Lyndon B. Johnson Library under the donor's instrument of gift]. I think that they think--the opposition to our system--that they're gonna win this thing right here in Washington.

UAJ: Yes, yes. I feel that very deeply, Mr. President, as I told you yesterday. That's what they're betting on.

LBJ: Well now, do you think we've got our first team out working on it?

UAJ: I do sir. Dean got some of these assignments made yesterday. He was already working on this.

LBJ: That's sure what I want done.

UAJ: I think that he's gonna be well prepared to handle them, insofar as they can be handled.

[Here follows further discussion of Vietnam.]

73. Editorial Note

In a telephone conversation with Senator Abraham Ribicoff that began at 4:25 p.m. on February 14, 1966, President Johnson stated the following regarding negotiations with North Vietnam:

"They are under three illusions, our judgment is: first, they think they can win it in Washington like they did in Paris (we think they think that); two, we think that up until the last ninety days they think they have been winning; three, we think they have the illusions that we may go a year, may go two years, but we won't go the distance; four, they think that we can't go the distance if we wanted to because we are spread thin in the world and we have malaria and we have root rot and we have long supply lines and we have shipping problems that they read about--at least are talking about--and just general things; and we think that they are indulging themselves [in] these illusions just like Hitler indulged himself. Now we may be wrong but that's what our best men think. Now we think until we get over that hump of illusion that they are not going to talk." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Ribicoff, Tape F66.05, Side B, PNO 1)

74. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:25 a.m. and passed to the White House at 10:30 a.m.

2985. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Honolulu aftermath.

We think that a large number of Vietnamese throughout the country knew of the Honolulu Conference and the events associated with it, including the final Vietnamese-American joint statement and the subsequent visit to Viet-Nam by Vice President Humphrey.

Among less sophisticated Vietnamese--the farmer and the cyclo driver for example--the focus was almost entirely on Prime Minister Ky and the Vietnamese delegation. The dominant attitude appeared to be one of national pride, because the Vietnamese sat as equals with the leader of the world's most powerful nation. The more knowledgeable were conscious that conference took place at a halfway point between Saigon and Washington rather than in the American capital.

Among the sophisticated but generally non-political Vietnamese--merchants and provincial capital businessmen--there was a feeling that the Honolulu Conference, by the mere fact that it was held, somehow meant that the war in Viet-Nam was destined for an early end. Some members of this group even said that the war would end by mid-year as the result of decisions, unspecified, taken at the meeting. Exactly what particular event or statement from the conference should have left this feeling is not clear. Undoubtedly, the attitude represents wishful thinking rather than a sober, thought-out judgement.

Among the better-informed Vietnamese--civil servants, middle class and newspaper editorial writers, for example--the Honolulu Conference had a favorable impact. There was a strong reaction that the non-military aspect of the war--the "other war," as Vice President Humphrey expressed it--had at last gotten the attention it deserved and that as a result of the meeting, new social welfare and economic development programs could be expected.

The Vice President's visit contributed heavily to this feeling. It favorably influenced Vietnamese attitudes toward Americans in general and by all measurements can be considered a singular success. The Vice President made a particular impression on the average Vietnamese whom he contacted personally, and struck the rank and file as a man seriously interested in the problems and sympathetically understanding of their aspirations.

Herewith local press summary for February 6-12:

Tia Sang and Tieng Viet wrote about the "spirit of Honolulu" and urged the government to implement as soon as possible the programs adopted there. Dan Chu, Tieng Viet, and Ghanh Do applauded the Honolulu declaration's call for social justice and the building of democracy as priorities in the Viet-Nam conflict.

Tieng Viet and Xay Dung wrote that the conference was a major step in closer cooperation between Washington and Saigon. Tieng Vang saw it as reassurance by the United States that she respects South Viet-Nam's sovereignty.

The papers viewed Vice President Humphrey's visit as an indication of the importance President Johnson places on the three pledges--building democracy, creating social justice and continuing to seek peace.

2. Basic political.

Chieu Hoi program figures are almost complete through February 10 (one province not yet recorded for both February 9 and 10). As of that date, a total of 789 returnees have been reported for February. If this rate continues, the record high of 1,672 achieved last month will be exceeded on February 22. In the 18 days since the end of the official Tet period (midnight January 23), 1,455 returnees have been recorded for an average of 81 per day. This compares with 41 per day as the average for September through December 1965.

3. Current political.

During Thieu and Ky's absence in Honolulu, General Chieu, the Secretary-General of the Directorate, and number 3 man in the government, started contacting the nominees for the "Democracy Building Council", which will draft the new Constitution. The Directorate approved part of a list of about 80 nominees at its February 2 meeting, but the names have not been announced.

Low level rumors continued to circulate that certain groups were interested in organizing demonstrations against the government to take place near the end of the month. These people would key their demonstrations to protests against the high cost of living. It would be hard to get such demonstrations going on a significant scale because those who are usually potential demonstrators are doing too well. The cyclo drivers, taxi drivers and day laborers who usually could be easily persuaded to take to the streets in the past are all beneficiaries of the full employment resulting from the American build-up. In a sense they "never had it so good." Junior civil servants and others on fixed incomes, unfortunately, are another story.

The government apparently has not yet made up its mind regarding the Montagnard problem, which is still tense and potentially dangerous. But Prime Minister Ky made a speech at Kontum on February 12 in which he restated the government's determination to extend equal treatment to all Vietnamese citizens regardless of religion, region or ethnic origin and promised to give greater consideration to the Montagnards in 1966.

4. Economic.

Secretary of Agriculture Freeman met the Vietnamese Agriculture Minister, received extensive briefings on agricultural programs and visited a variety of agricultural projects. His trip was a real plus.

Saigon retail prices dropped substantially from the post-Tet high level. Rice deliveries from the Delta increased slightly but imported stocks continued to make up the bulk of the stocks on hand in Saigon. Wholesale and retail rice prices were rising slowly. Both Viet Cong interference and slackened activity by merchants hoping for higher prices seemed to be contributing to this situation.

5. Inflation.

Our recent talks with Vietnamese officials convinced me that your message in Honolulu on the importance of measures to stem inflation was understood by Prime Minister Ky and General Thieu. They have told top Vietnamese officials, including Ambassador Vu Van Thai, that the economic problem is now top priority. The next step is that the other Vietnamese Generals understand the necessity of bold action. We are working closely with the Vietnamese to assure effective action. The Honolulu meeting has given us a good push forward and we intend to make the most of it.

The economic situation overall has become critical during the last two months. The greatest danger is that a series of wage increases would be granted which would lead to further price increases and move into a second and even more dangerous phase of the inflation. This can be prevented if our economic program can be launched quickly, including appointment of capable personnel by the GVN, increased imports, increased port capacity, larger tax collections, and a lowering of the black market rate.

The latter step is rather unorthodox but the Economic Counselor feels the rate of 170 piasters to the dollar must be brought down in order to give hope to the Vietnamese that prices can go down as well as up. If this price is brought down by U.S. Government purchases of piasters in Hong Kong, he believes this will have a salutary effect on overall prices in Viet-Nam and, most important, it will give a real psychological boost to the Vietnamese. In fact, it will be interpreted (somewhat erroneously) as being evidence of increased Vietnamese confidence in a successful outcome of the war, partly stemming from the historic meeting in Honolulu. These measures to bring the black market rate down will require concurrence from Washington and a separate message is on the way requesting specific approval.

6. Pacification.

The first class of rural construction cadre graduated from the National Training Center at Vung Tau after ten weeks of paramilitary and political training. The 3,095 graduates included 119 women, and represented 15 southern and 9 central provinces. This class had started training in November 1965.

MACV reports that the greatest single request from the Vietnamese provinces, of all the requests for U.S. personnel, is for public safety advisers. This would appear to me to indicate the pressing nature of the criminal (as distinguished from the military) side of Viet Cong violence, requiring police type measures to cope with it.

7. Military.

Allied forces continued on the offensive with a high rate of activity but major Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units evaded significant sustained contact in these operations.

Zorthian reports that most Vietnamese were unaware that there had been a 37-day cessation of the air strikes in North Viet-Nam. Those who were aware of the halt generally did not approve and welcomed the resumption.

Latest reports on RVNAF desertion rate continue to be unsatisfactory.

Lodge

75. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/

Washington, February 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential.

At the private meeting between the President and Generals Ky and Thieu in Honolulu on Monday, February 7:

1. The principals agreed that their economists would study again the question of the exchange rate and make recommendations for resolving the issue.

2. The President pressed Ky and Thieu to implement the measures designed to improve the economic stabilization of SVN. Ky agreed to announce some of the measures "upon my return and no later than next week."

3. Ky said he intends to split the Ministry of Economics into a Ministry of Trade and a Ministry of Industrialization in order to weaken the present Ministry which "has too much power and is prone to corruption."

4. The President urged stronger support of the "Open Arms" program and Ky and Thieu agreed to place greater emphasis on it.

5. The President strongly urged Ky to urge the defection of "three or four" prominent VC or VC supporters and use them on radio for prop-aganda and psychological purposes. He pressed Ky and Thieu to develop better contacts with the VC in order to gain increased understanding of the movement.

6. President stressed specific implementation of economic, social, and political steps agreed upon during Bell's visit to Saigon in January and at the Honolulu Conference.

7. The President urged a strong program aimed at the "very young members of the VC."

8. The President told Ky and Thieu they should study more carefully and consistently the criticisms and policies of anti-Vietnam Americans, including "journals like the New York Times and members of the Foreign Relations Committee." The President said: "You need to know what our pressures are just as we need to know what yours are."

9. The President and the Secretary of State made strong appeals that "we all should list those reasons we think Hanoi believes it will win, and go after them one by one to change their mind about the prospects of succeeding."

10. The President urged further internal reforms in the South Vietnamese military. He urged Ky to spend more time in the countryside "acting like a politician instead of just a general."

76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma/1/

Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:38 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Ball and Bromley Smith, and approved by Rusk. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 154-156.

267. You should seek appointment with DRV Consul General to deliver following aide-memoire:

Begin Text:

1. The USG has taken note of the Aide-Memoire delivered to American Ambassador in Rangoon on January 31, 1966./2/

/2/See footnote 6, Document 51.

2. The USG fully respects the basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. As the USG has repeatedly said, it believes that these Accords, together with the 1962 Accords concerning Laos, are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia or for negotiations looking toward a peaceful settlement.

3. The USG has repeatedly stated and hereby reaffirms that it is prepared to withdraw its forces from South Viet-Nam when peace is restored. The US has never stated that it must be the sole judge of when this condition exists. Plainly, the restoration of peace requires the adherence of all concerned to the essential provisions of the Geneva Accords dealing with the regroupment of opposing forces to their respective areas, and dealing with the obligations that the two zones shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. It is the view of the USG that the DRV, in introducing armed forces, military equipment, and political cadres into South Viet-Nam, has breached the provisions of the Accords, and has thus made necessary the actions undertaken by the USG in support of the legitimate right of the Republic of Viet-Nam to self-defense. The withdrawal of US forces would be undertaken in the light of the actions taken by the DRV in this regard, and would necessarily be subject also to the existence of adequate measures of verification.

The USG seeks no military bases of any kind in South Viet-Nam and has no desire whatever to retain its forces in South Viet-Nam after peace is secured.

4. With respect to the third of the DRV's four points, the US takes note that Chairman Ho Chi Minh in his letter of January 29/3/ described the program of the NLF as seeking "to achieve independence, democracy, peace and neutrality in South Viet-Nam and to advance toward peaceful reunification." If this is all that is intended when it is stated that the affairs of the South Vietnamese be settled "in accordance with the program of the NLF," the third point would not be an obstacle to negotiations.

/3/Printed in The New York Times, January 29, 1966.

However, it appears that in referring to the program of the NLF the DRV may contemplate that the NLF arbitrarily be accorded integral participation in a coalition government or be accepted as the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people" prior to, and without regard to, an election. If this is what is meant by the third point, we would consider it in contradiction of the very objectives specified above, and quite without warrant in the Geneva Accords of 1954.

It remains the essence of the USG view that the future political structure in South Viet-Nam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through truly free elections. The USG is categorically prepared to accept the results of elections held in an atmosphere free from force, intimidation or outside interference.

5. In the light of the foregoing and to make clear our understanding of a possible basis for discussions leading to a peaceful settlement, we submit for consideration of the DRV the following:

Point I--The basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. Obtaining compliance with the essential principles in the Accords is an appropriate subject for immediate, international discussions or negotiations without preconditions. Such discussions or negotiations should consider, among other things, appropriate means, including agreed stages, for the withdrawal of military and quasi-military personnel and weapons introduced into South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam from one area to the other or into either area from any other outside source; the dismantling of any military bases in either area, and the cancellation of any military alliances, that may contravene the Accords; and the regrouping and redeployment of indigenous forces.

Point II--Strict compliance with the military provisions of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in accordance with schedules and appropriate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions or negotiations.

Point III--The internal affairs of South and North Viet-Nam must be settled respectively by the South and North Vietnamese peoples themselves in conformity with the principles of self-determination. Neither shall interfere in the affairs of the other nor shall there be any interference from any outside source.

Point IV--The issue of reunification of Viet-Nam must be decided peacefully, on the basis of free determination by the peoples of South and North Viet-Nam without outside interference. End Text.

6. In delivering text, you should take care not to go beyond its terms in providing explanation to any questions asked. Naturally, we would be most interested in any comments he may care to make then or at future date.

7. FYI: Bundy will bring to Baguio some additional material for your background in case of future contacts. However, for time being, we do not wish to be drawn into extended oral discussion which might be misunderstood. End FYI.

8. In arranging appointment, you should avoid any impression of undue urgency./4/

/4/In telegram 433 from Rangoon, February 19, Byroade reported that he presented the aide-memoire to DRV Representative Vu on February 18, who responded that because the United States had resumed the bombing, it was "inappropriate to continue our contacts." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 28-29) In telegram 436 from Rangoon, February 21, Byroade transmitted an aide-memoire from Vu, dated February 19, explaining why the DRV was discontinuing contact. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 29-30)

Ball

77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 16, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20. Secret. In a covering memorandum to the President, Bundy indicated that he had written this memorandum on the airplane, presumably while returning from his Asian trip following the Honolulu Conference. (Ibid.) Bundy provided an interim report on his visit to Saigon, during which he discussed "strengthened administrative arrangements with Embassy officers," in a memorandum to the President on February 11. (Ibid.)

Non-Military Organization for Vietnam--in Saigon and in Washington

1. The Ambassador

Lodge has weaknesses and blind spots, but their effects can be minimized by proper staff support. He has outstanding qualities which are not easily replaced. They make him a very valuable man in Saigon. He is 64 and he talks of resignation when he is tired or irritated. Since we have to accept the risk of bothering him on the big things, he should be humored on the little ones

His qualities are these: First and foremost, he is a determined, perceptive, and disinterested servant of the President and the Secretary of State. He has no axes left to grind. This direct and disciplined loyalty is of great importance. It means that he always backs up a clearly explained decision and never tries to undercut. He can be less helpful when he does not know just what is wanted, but that is only to say that we need to be sure to keep him fully informed. On matters marked as truly sensitive, I believe him to be reasonably discreet.

Second, Lodge has a clear and strong--if somewhat simplified--view of the war. He knows and respects its military aspects, but he also knows that it is fundamentally a political and social struggle. He is receptive to good advice when it comes from men he trusts. He gives strong men wide discretion.

Third, Lodge is trusted and admired by the Vietnamese. He is popular because he stood up to the hated Diem (this may or may not have been wise as a matter of U. S. policy, but Diem had few Vietnamese friends in his last days--he had become hated, and his family more so.) He is respected because of his personal dignity and courtesy (he has never affronted their pride as Max Taylor unintentionally did.) If he does not make full use of his influence, he does at least work hard for continuity, and he avoids the error of forcing splits by undue pressure. He is entitled to much of the credit for the relative stability and good sense of the Ky Government.

Fourth, Lodge has unusual human rapport with the U. S. military. In a country where fully 90% of all U. S. resources are under Westmoreland, this easy relationship is of great importance. It is not automatic. When Lodge was first appointed, in 1963, one important point in his favor was that he was presumed to be able to get along easily with his old friend General Paul Harkins. In fact, the two men did not get on at all, because they had radically different views of the real situation in Vietnam. (Lodge may not have been right, but Harkins was surely wrong, and his prolonged tenure was one of our major mistakes.) But now, with Westmoreland, all is changed. The two men see eye to eye on all fundamentals. They like each other as well. And now Lodge gets the full advantage of the fact that he did well in World War II, and knows the Army's ways. He gets much more cooperation from them than he would if he began with a chip on his shoulder, as too many civilians do.

Fifth, Lodge has the real--if exasperated--affection of nearly all of his staff. His weaknesses can make him a very difficult boss, but his dedication and decency come through.

Finally, Lodge understands the care and feeding of important visitors, especially Congressmen and U. S. newspapermen. He spends too much time on this--as he does on diplomatic luncheons--but he does it well, and he is right about its importance.

His weaknesses are equally real.

First, he has little taste for the hard work that lies between a general assertion of purpose and a concrete administrative achievement. The only things in Saigon that he really administers are the arrangements for comfort and security at his own house (they are excellent). He does not manage the U. S. program himself, and he does not insist that others do it. Because he does not watch details, he thinks many things are easier than they are (although he is more realistic today than he was a few months back).

Second, his energy level is not high. He can spend two days on a single cable, with time out for social activity and a daily swim and a couple of diplomatic visits.

Third, he gravely underrates the importance of economics. The subject bores him, and he does not make it easy for his senior economic advisers to press their concerns. As a result, the voice of the U. S. is slow and weak at the highest levels on what is now a problem of the first urgency.

Fourth, Lodge frets over trivia. Many great men have this weakness, but Lodge is not a great man, and he does not have the strength to spare. Seen against the stakes of Vietnam and the sacrifices of the fighting men (not the Saigon staffs), the matter of wives is a small one, at least for a man whose wife can take it, but it is never out of his mind and seldom out of his talk. He is loyal to the Rusk-Lodge understanding, but he frets about it. And the same characteristic shows in many other smaller matters.

This combination of qualities and defects makes Lodge the very model of a man who needs staff support. He needs a chief of staff; he needs a handholder on political affairs; he needs a second-level factotum; and he needs a bright young personal assistant--and he needs the sympathetic understanding of all the top men on the American team. The wonder of the matter is that with the arrangements that the President has successfully pressed upon him, Lodge will now have exactly this kind of help (with a single exception noted below).

The first indispensable man in this enterprise is William Porter. Porter is shrewd, cool, strong, experienced and determined. He understands the war. He is admired throughout the mission. Lodge trusts him entirely. He knows and is known by Washington. He likes and understands management.

The second indispensable man is Westmoreland--and if I put him second it is only because he has now set the shape of MACV so firmly that any successor will be guided by many of his standards. Westmoreland has made 200,000 Americans understand that they must make the Vietnamese be glad of their presence and not hate it. He has also made his large and strong-minded military command remarkably responsive to the needs of half a dozen other agencies, all of which would be gravely hampered if MACV should give them only grudging support. Finally, Westmoreland has never neglected the critically important task of persistent effort to strengthen the forces of the GVN (in this last respect his officers are not all as determined as he, and if he were replaced by a more single-minded U. S. fighting man, the future of the GVN forces could become bleak).

The appointment of Porter to be Chief of Staff for all aspects of pacification/rural construction is a major forward step. Several valuable secondary changes are already planned. The most important will put Philip Habib and Sam Wilson on Lodge's small floor of the revamped chancery, in place of Porter (who will have a staff of his own) and Chadbourn (transferred). The more gently these changes are handled, the less Lodge will fret--and the less the Vietnamese will gossip about "coups" among the Americans (the rapid turnover among senior Americans--especially in AID--has been a topic of Vietnamese talk). But the fact of change is more important than its manner, and the most important thing is speed. Lodge will fuss about all this until it is done. Then he will like it very much.

The one remaining weakness in the Saigon staff is in Economic advice and resource management. No easy remedy is at hand. The present head of USAID is Charles Mann, and he is the best officer to hold this assignment so far. Moreover, he has an excellent economic deputy, Roy Wehrle, who is fully competent to give good advice both to Mann and the Ambassador. But neither Mann nor Wehrle is really able to make Lodge listen. Economics irritate him, and so do Mann's teutonisms and Wehrle's dire warnings (though the latter are fully justified). It would be a mistake to change Mann now (he has many virtues and would be hard to replace), but Wehrle leaves in June and it is a matter of great urgency to find an economist to replace him who will have the tact and rank and persistence to make Lodge do what only he can do--keep a steady and top priority pressure on the GVN. Meanwhile in this field (unlike others) there is a continuous need for prodding from Washington.

2. Organization in Washington

The best way to attack this problem is to look at it first from Saigon.

The new arrangements in Saigon make a triangle. At the apex is Lodge. He is the President's representative and the senior American in Vietnam. In particular, he is charged with political advice both to Washington and to the GVN. He has direct access to the President, but he normally communicates through the Department of State. The staff agency which supports him is the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department. He is currently well served.

One line of the triangle goes from Lodge to Westmoreland. West-moreland is the top military commander and he has a special responsibility to the President through the Secretary of Defense (the charts make it more complicated, but on major policy matters this is how it really is and how Westy thinks of it). He is responsible for U. S. military operations and for military advice to Washington. On day-to-day matters, he gets his support from CINCPAC and from the JCS. He too is well served.

Porter will now be at the end of the other side of the triangle. He will get overall guidance from Lodge and from the President. He will have local authority over agency heads. But who will give him prompt executive support in Washington? That man does not now exist. It cannot be done by any one agency alone--not AID and not the State Department; it cannot be done by a Committee of Assistant Secretaries; it cannot be done by the President himself; it certainly cannot be done by the Pentagon (though all of these means have been tried at one time or another).

My own belief is that we need a Director of Non-Military Operations in Vietnam (DINOMO?) appointed by the President and responsible to him through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense together--with advice from the Director of CIA, the Director of USIA, the Administrator of AID. This officer should keep his military flank clear with DOD and his diplomatic and policy line clear with State--but as far as possible he should stay out of both areas. His responsibility should be for non-military operations only. He should have the right of direct communication with Porter, and he should be charged with assuring that no needed action is delayed, for any reason, without a prompt report to the President. He should be an officer who prefers action to excuses and management to contemplation. He should count himself successful when both the President and Porter are happy. He will not be successful at once.

I recommend that the President request the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to prepare and submit a list of candidates for this appointment before the close of business on Friday, February 18./2/

/2/In his covering memorandum, Bundy indicated that this procedure was deliberately designed to give Johnson "a Presidential result," since both Bundy and McNamara had reluctantly concluded that "this operation cannot be managed through State Department channels alone."

McG. B./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Yes/4/

No

/4/The President checked this option and wrote: "This is excellent."

78. Memorandum From George Reedy to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Ex CO 312. No classification marking. Reedy served on Johnson's Senate and Vice Presidential staffs and was Press Secretary to the President from March 1964 to July 1965.

1. The unfortunate aspect of the current public debate on Viet Nam is less the impact it is having on Peking and Hanoi than the effect that it is having on the American people. Persons are being swept by the force of the debate into categories where they do not belong and if the current trend continues, deep divisions will result which will hamper the President in the conduct of foreign policy and perhaps make it impossible to act intelligently.

2. At the present time, the debate is being conducted in the tone of a "hawks" and "doves" clash with the "hawks" convinced that anyone outside of their ranks is a "chicken" and the "doves" convinced that anyone outside of their ranks is a "vulture." In reality, this is a very subtle problem with many fine shadings of emphasis and it is probable that except for the extremists on both sides it would be difficult to find a clear cut position that commands a national majority on all major points. In a situation like this, however, people who are in between find themselves pushed into one camp or the other. And it really does not matter which camp wins--because either way, the Nation loses.

3. The current debate has also, to some extent, limited the Administration's freedom of action. At the present time, the "doves" are having their innings and therefore the Administration is being presented to the public as a "hawk." Somewhere along the line the "hawks" will come up to bat and at that point the scene will shift and the Administration will look like a "dove." Nothing good can come from this as in either role the Administration is forced on the defensive and distracted from its primary purpose--finding an honorable way to close out the situation in Viet Nam.

4. In this case, the situation is not helped by the unanimity among the President's advisors. This is an honest unanimity but to the public it presents the picture of a President who is listening only to advice from a group of men who are so deeply involved themselves in an enterprise that they have no alternative other than to agree with him. It would, of course, be foolish to create an artificial discord among competent and conscientious men where it does not, in fact, exist. But it would be reassuring to the public if it were thought that the President was giving a real audience to the more respectable and responsible voices of dissent.

5. The testimony of General Gavin and George Kennan before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee/2/ offers an excellent example of men being placed in categories of opinion which they do not really hold. In reality, they approached the issue from a moderate standpoint and in a sensible tone. They made clear their uneasiness and expressed some opinions that are worth considering. They did not indulge in any personalities or vituperation. Yet, they have become the darlings of the "doves" who are anxiously hoping that the Administration will blast Gavin and Kennan and thus drive them into the "dove" camp, which now lacks really respectable leadership.

/2/See Document 64.

6. It would appear (although it is difficult to discern amidst the current partisan bickering) that the Gavin-Kennan concern really centers about one point--whether the operation in Viet Nam is being conducted properly as an integral part of an overall United States world strategy. It is possible that they have a point, in which case somebody should listen to it quietly and reflectively and come up with a reasoned evaluation. It is possible that they don't have a point--and if this could be demonstrated to them in a calm, orderly atmosphere, they would be removed as a potential rallying point for the "doves." In either case, however, neither one of them has said anything unforgiveable and both are responsible, reputable men to whom any President can turn for advice without demeaning himself.

7. It would have a good effect upon the country if the President were to invite Gavin and Kennan to the White House for a quiet, but lengthy and thorough, luncheon conference./3/ It may be that out of such a conference there could come a continuing arrangement in which their advice would be available to the Government on a continuing basis. If this could be arranged, it would have the following benefits:

/3/The President did not meet with either Kennan or Gavin during 1966. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

a. They might have some thoughts that are well worth having.

b. They might have even better thoughts if they had continuing, day-to-day contact with the realities of the situation.

c. The country would have an example of a President seeking, on a personal basis, advice from men of demonstrated independence of thought.

d. The "doves" would lose a rallying point that could present some difficulties.

e. The frantic tone of the present debate would be ameliorated and Viet Nam could be discussed in a calmer atmosphere.

79. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 19, 1966, 10 a.m.-1:30 p.m

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B0125A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65-31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 22.

SUBJECT
White House Meeting, 19 February

PRESENT WERE
The President
For State: Mr.Rusk (part time) and Mr. Ball
For Defense: Mr. McNamara and General Wheeler
For the White House: Messrs. Bundy and Moyers and General Taylor
For CIA: Richard Helms

1. The meeting convened at 10:00 A.M. and adjourned at 1:30 P.M. without interruption.

2. The following matters were among those discussed.

a. Relations with the Congress on the whole problem of Vietnam. In this connection, there was considerable discussion of difficulties caused for the Administration by speeches of individuals such as Senator Stennis which had the effect of scaring other members of Congress./2/

/2/According to McGeorge Bundy's personal notes of the meeting, the President stated: "Real source of our trouble is Stennis. The wild figures in the papers come from him & that's what scares Mansfield & Fulbright." Johnson continued, "the problem is that he gets our figures." McNamara stated: "We have not indicated our plans." Johnson responded: "The real plans do get to Stennis & let's try to prevent it." (Johnson Library, McGeorge Bundy Papers)

b. Senator Robert Kennedy's responsibility for the first pause in the air bombing of North Vietnam.

c. A detailed discussion of the motivation of those Senators, fifteen in number, who signed a letter to the President/3/ opposing any escalation of the war in Vietnam.

/3/See footnote 3, Document 50.

d. Constitutional problems connected with presidential authority to wage the war in Vietnam.

e. The President's desire to have cheap TV sets placed in Vietnam for purposes of education and indoctrination, the cost of this program to run around $3,000,000.

f. A discussion of how to handle the build-up of United States forces in Vietnam.

g. A schedule of meetings with congressional leaders./4/

/4/According to McGeorge Bundy's notes, at one point in the meeting Johnson said, speaking of Congress, "maybe we consult with 'em too much--that and the press may be the root of our trouble."

h. The problems posed by the testimony of General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan.

i. The advisability of using the White House for large meetings of Senators and Congressmen.

j. A poll on Vietnam taken in the State of Rhode Island and certain counties in New York and New Jersey.

k. Telegrams to the White House from citizens around the country on General Taylor's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

l. Discussion of a possible candidate for the back-up job in Washington on the non-military aspects of United States programs in Vietnam, this individual to be the Washington counterpart of Ambassador Porter in Saigon.

RH/5/

/5/Helms handwrote the following note below his initials: "A recurrent theme of this meeting was the question of a Congressional resolution, although no decision was reached. The President is weighing in his mind whether to stand on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution or push for a new one in this Session which would reaffirm his authority." For a discussion of Senator Wayne Morse's amendment, introduced on January 29, to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and of growing interest among some Senators in a new resolution to augment or replace it, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 251-259.

80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 21, 1966, 7:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Read; cleared by President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, and Rusk; and approved by Read. Drafts of the telegram with the President's handwritten revisions are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Attached to the drafts is a note stating that the President read the telegram to Goldberg and Moyers for their approval while they were in his office on February 21.

2478. Eyes only for Lodge and Westmoreland from the Secretary. We are sure you will have been watching the discussions in the Foreign Relations Committee and also the statement of Senator Robert Kennedy,/2/ with public reactions to it. We are sure that your own understanding of the Administration position will not have been affected by comments of critics, but it seems important here that Thieu and Ky should be informed not only of debates and discussions, but of this Administration's position. We therefore hope that you will make sure that the essentials of the position presented by General Taylor and myself are fully understood by the government in Saigon. In particular it can be assured that our position on the NLF has not changed. We do believe that their views can be considered (see President's statement of July)/3/ but we do not believe that the United States should force a place for them in a coalition government. We share the hopes and purposes of the GVN for elections with safeguards which will permit a really free choice without coercion or fraud.

/2/In a statement at a press conference on February 21, Kennedy stated that admitting "discontented elements in South Vietnam"--including the National Liberation Front-- "to a share of power and responsibility is at the heart of the hope for a negotiated settlement. For excerpts from Kennedy's statement, see The New York Times, February 20, 1966.

/3/Reference is to the President's remarks on the Viet Cong made at his press conference on July 28, 1965. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, p. 803.

What we hope you can communicate to the GVN, in short, is a full understanding of both our own firmness and determination and of the real problems created by critics here who seize upon any minor difference to exploit. The government in Saigon can rely on us, and at the same time they can help us by implementing and accelerating the policy and purpose of progressive social action set forth by them in Honolulu and afterwards./4/

/4/In telegram 3061 from Saigon, February 22, Lodge responded that "Thieu and Ky are well aware of administration's position arising out of current debate in Washington. Coverage of your statements and those of General Taylor is good here and I will see to it that they are aware of all you are saying and what it means." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Rusk

81. Telephone Conversion Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, February 22, 1966, 8:52 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 6602.05, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Rusk: I will call Mac [Bundy] and see whether he feels that he's been over the testimony and knows your view on these matters.

President: What's your evaluation of the Kennedy statement?/2/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 80.

Rusk: I think it's bad myself. I was surprised at what it had after Bob told me that he thought it wouldn't cause us much trouble.

President: I think it's tragic. I just think it's tragic. Everybody I've talked to thinks the same thing. It's so presumptuous. Some of the things he says--one of the first things is, he says that he doesn't want the Russians and the Communists to be over-gleeful and expect him to be elected President because if he were elected President it wouldn't mean that he'd have an easy surrender himself. Ever hear of anything that presumptuous? Listen to this [reading]:/3/ "The Senator in effect warned Russia, China, and North Vietnam not to anticipate a turn of events in which he would become President and quickly end the war on terms more favorable to the Communist side." Well hell, he don't have to become President to do that--that's what he's trying to do now.

/3/What the President was reading has not been identified.

Rusk: No, I think it has greatly weakened our position with Hanoi and it prolongs the war actually. It's another one of those things that keeps the other side going.

President: And I think it means a majority in the Senate against us, Dean. I honestly think that. I think that the Bayhs, and the Tydings, and the two Kennedys, and the Muskies--the general Catholic operation there--when the chips are down they will pick up enough Cases and perhaps a Javits, with the New York Times leveling that way, and maybe a Scott, he hasn't yet, but I see the way the ADA and the liberals and how it flows--the ball--and if the Times keeps hitting us this way, why we're just really going to be murderous [murdered]. I talked to Clark Clifford a long time last night. He thinks that we would just be idiotic to ask for a new resolution. He says that that resolution/4/ cannot be plainer than it is, that it is unlimited, that what you do, you imply that you have questioned yourself about what you've been doing. You imply to the people that well, hell, you didn't have authority all along. I [He] said that first thing you've got to do is make abundantly clear that you've got all the authority you need as commander in chief--160 times you've gone in. Number 2, you've got to make it clear that this treaty/5/ requires you to stand up to your commitment. Number 3, you've got to make it clear you wouldn't exercise any of these troops--wouldn't put them out there, wouldn't start the bombing until they said they'd go in with us and we're all together and we're one nation united indivisible. Now then, he says, you come along and say, well, I want a new resolution. You imply that there's something wrong with this one and [he ?] said would this [new] one just last 18 months like the last one? And where the hell would you be?

/4/Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; see footnote 4, Document 72.

/5/Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954.

Rusk: Well in the floor debate in the Senate, it was pointed out that the President has this authority and that this is the case of the Congress joining with the President. A hell of a lot of them made that point.

President: That's right. I think that would be one good thing though, for George to point out--that there are 160 times the President has gone in without a declaration of war to protect the interests of the United States--the President has this constitutional power.

Rusk: The figure I have is 125, Mr. President.

President: Well whatever it is--they told me 163--or 23, I don't care. Just assert that he has it, number 1; then, number 2, that the treaty comes along and everybody debates that. Foster Dulles--the liberals that were against him are not ever going to be with us anyway but we've to show that this was some of his handiwork, that he says that we have got to stop subversion and we've got to stop the Communist aggression and if we notify them ahead of time, we've got a chance to do it. May not do it. We may have to stop them finally in their boots but we ought to tell them ahead of time so they'll know what they're doing. And that was generally his position.

Rusk: And that is what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in its conclusion.

President: That's right. Now then they did that and Mansfield and all of them signed it. So we have an obligation there and the President wouldn't be worthy of his salt if he didn't do it or else why have a treaty. What would the Senate think about a President that wouldn't live up to a treaty. That's number 2. But this President says now he knows the Senate pretty damned well. I don't think any of you all [who] would want to be nice to them can afford to say this bluntly but the net effect is that he knows you so damned well, he knows you're going to run when the going gets tough and therefore he wants you tied, bound, and delivered beforehand and he says to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense he will not pee a drop until you come in with a resolution that says, number 1, direct me to respond to armed attack; number 2, authorize me to enforce this treaty; and number 3, direct me to prevent any aggression. Now, that's what they did; now he is in the process of doing that and if you don't want any of those things done, we've provided you a remedy. Anytime you want to change your mind and do a flip-flop, you can do it. But until you do, why we've just got to move. I think that ought to be stressed a good deal so that the people of the country know that this dammed Senate that's wandering around--I was just talking to a good lawyer in New York and he says what they're doing, they're confusing the people. The people don't see their alternatives; they can't find what would you do. They don't get it one time. When you just say it once on television: what would you do if you were President of the United States--that doesn't get through to them. You've got to repeat it like Hitler did, 20 times and then maybe they do. And I think we've got to repeat this resolution and say, now we don't say you can't debate, we don't say you oughtn't to debate, and we don't say you oughtn't to discuss it all you want to. But we do say this is what you've done. Now if you don't want to do this, if you want to seat Communists, if they want to surrender to the Communists, if you want to let them go on and have aggression, if you want to abandon the treaty, or if you do not think this is good national policy you enunciated, then repeal it. And the President's got no voice in it. Now he'll go on fighting if he wants to, because he has that power anyway. I don't know, but I'm afraid that Mac and George could today, with this thing as vicious as it is, with the Kennedy infiltration all over the place, I'm afraid that out of that will come some commitment that will be a little bit difficult for us. I have a hunch this morning that they're going to say something like Averell said, that we ought to sit down with the Viet Cong. Now, I thought Averell just made a mistake but in light of Bobby's statement, he may have kind of been paving the way a little because they're awfully close and Joe Kraft's awfully close, and every damned time I call Averell to compliment him, he's at Joe Kraft's house. I don't know how much of this is kind of a wing. You know Bob McNamara has felt that while we ought to have limited objectives, that we ought to make it abundantly clear that we did not necessarily have to have everybody of our own choosing in this government, that it could be a Communist government and we could have some doubtful characters like we had in Laos. And he's said to me not once but I guess a dozen times that if we would moderate our objectives and what we're fighting for there, we'd have more chance of succeeding. And he's also felt, which is a very dangerous position to me (and there's not a man in the government I'd say this to but you, not another one), but he has said to me a number of times that he thought that we ought to give serious consideration to this. And then when he said the other day that we only have one chance out of three of winning, it just shocked me and furthermore it shocked everybody at the table. It shocked Bill Moyer

Rusk: Well Bob, quite frankly, Mr. President, he hasn't had too much experience in dealing with crises, and I just don't believe that, and I can't pull out a slide rule and prove it, but the boys out in the field are proving it and are proving that we can do better than that. I am absolutely sure myself that the other side is going to make some new decisions on this thing.

President: They must be getting great encouragement though. If this is causing us this much trouble, don't you know that they're enjoying it.

Rusk: Yes. Well I'll get hold of George and Mac right away.

President: And what do you think that our official response is going to be to the Kennedy statement?

Rusk: Oh, I think we ought to go right back to your July statement,/6/ just stay with that.

/6/See footnote 3, Document 80.

President : Well, they'll just say "do you agree with Senator Kennedy that we ought [to] appoint some Viet Cong ahead of time?" I'm inclined to say--I may be wrong on this--but I'm inclined to say that we have made it abundantly clear that we're for free elections, that we're willing to let the United Nations supervise them or anybody else that'll give us an honest free election and we're not in the business, that's just not our occupation of the moment, going around appointing Communist governments.

Rusk: That's right. That's right.

President: And we believe in self determination and we don't believe in trading with the Communists and appointing them. Now, what's wrong with that?

Rusk: I think that's right.

President: OK.

82. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 22, 1966, 11:45 a.m.-1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65-31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 23.

SUBJECT
White House Meeting, 22 February

PRESENT WERE
The President
For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, and Rostow
For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance and General Wheeler
For AID: Mr. Gaud
For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Komer, Moyers, Smith, plus General Taylor and Mr. Clark Clifford
For CIA: Admiral Raborn and Richard Helms

1. The meeting convened at 11:45 A.M and adjourned at 1:30 P.M.

2. In addition to the items set forth on the printed agenda, attached,/2/ the following items were discussed at this meeting:

/2/The attached agenda lists three items: 1) Vice President Humphrey's return and the Congress; 2) Handling any new policy resolution in Congress--alternative administration resolutions and alternative tactics with the resolutions of others; 3) organization of non-military efforts in Washington. Prior to the meeting the President discussed the agenda with McGeorge Bundy during a lengthy telephone conversation. A recording of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, February 22, 1966, 9:04 a.m., Tape 6602.06, PNO 3.

a. The President decided to have the congressional leaders meet with the Vice President at 8:00 A.M. on Thursday morning followed by a 9 to 10:30 meeting with him for the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House in the East Room.

b. A decision was made to have General Taylor make a public statement clarifying the Administration's disagreement with Senator Kennedy on the subject of a coalition government in South Vietnam.

c. Central points which the Vice President should make in his talks with Congressmen were enumerated:

(1) That this is a limited war.

(2) That the United States is being successful in its prosecution.

(3) That we are receiving help from SEATO countries in the battle.

d. There was a lengthy discussion of non-military programs in South Vietnam with particular reference to the role to be played by Secretaries Gardner and Freeman. It emerged that the President wants to make South Vietnam a showcase for Asia as to what the United States can do to make a better life for the Vietnamese people. He is pushing for a variety of programs, including new teaching techniques, temporary hospitals, an increased flow of medicines, etc. Concern was expressed over the United States proceeding too fast and overloading the capacities of the South Vietnamese Government.

e. The resolution question was again discussed at considerable length. Mr. Clark Clifford argued that the Administration should stand on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution and should not go for a new one. He was supported by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and appears to have carried the day./3/

/3/Helms' handwritten notes of the meeting, recorded on the attached agenda, include the following:

"Resolution Question

"a) Stand on '64 resolution, or

"b) Go Morse route, or

"c) Joe Rauh moderating resolution"

"Clifford re resolution problem

"a) admin should go on doing what it's doing

"b) Pres thinking we should guide events

"c) Clifford disagrees--this is Cong problem."

f. Mr. Moyers described a dinner conversation which he had had with Senator Fulbright on Monday evening.

RH

83. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, February 23, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret.

HONOLULU MEETING

RECORD OF CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION/2/

/2/As recorded in public communications, records of plenary and working group sessions and notes on restricted sessions. [ Footnote in the source text.]

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Explanation

The Consensuses recorded in the following text were those jointly reached by the U.S. and Vietnamese delegations at Honolulu. In some cases these represent a specific form of words as adopted; in others they are an effort to record the sense of one or several general discussions.

The Further Actions noted are based on specific discussions which involved both Vietnamese and U.S. representatives. In the parentheses following the action there is noted which agency is primarily responsible for follow up on this matter; this means in many instances a responsibility is placed on the U.S. Mission Saigon to keep the Vietnamese Government moving on the agreed action.

I. Diplomatic Track

Consensus: The United States Government and the Government of Viet-Nam will continue to press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum and explore every path to peace. They will stay in close touch to proceed internationally as closely together as possible.

Further Action

1. U.S. and GVN leaders agreed on full consultation on further action at Security Council. (Resp: State)

2. The Secretary and FonMin Do reportedly agreed on language for Japanese consensus statement./3/ (Resp: State)

/3/Not further identified.

3. It was agreed everything possible will be done to prevent an independent VC role at any future negotiation. (No more precise decision taken.) (Resp: State)

4. All measures possible will be taken to increase pressure on Hanoi to bring them to the conference table or persuade them to stop aggression by their tacit acceptance of the fact they cannot win. (See II. Military Program.) (Resp: DOD, State)

5. The President asked for the GVN's suggestions on further peace initiatives we might take. (Resp: GVN, Embassy)

6. Vice President Humphrey and Governor Harriman will visit Asian capitals to explain our position and describe the Honolulu meeting. (Action taken)

II. Military Program

Consensus: U.S. and GVN leaders announced a policy of "growing military effectiveness and still closer cooperation." We will act with all possible regard for the rights of civilians and respect for the territorial integrity of peaceful neighboring countries, and will adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1949 on treatment of prisoners of war.

Further Action

1. Among the measures to be considered to induce Hanoi to move to the conference table will be Ambassador Thai's idea of feints by GVN sea forces against North Viet-Nam to preoccupy and pin down North Vietnamese armed forces and to create uncertainty there. (Resp: DOD, State)

2. The Secretary of State will take another look at various possible measures for bringing pressure on Hanoi which were mentioned, including bombing dikes or water gates in the pre-flood period. (Resp: DOD, State)

3. The GVN was urged to carry out further internal reforms within the RVNAF. (Resp: GVN, Mission)

III. Free World Assistance

Consensus: The GVN, with strong U.S. support, will press for a maximum number of contributors and a maximum number of types of assist-ance.

Further Action

1. Free World assistance activities should be more closely coordinated. In addition to close coordination in Saigon, Washington is to be kept fully informed so that GVN Missions in Washington and New York can take initiatives with foreign representatives located there. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, all Washington agencies concerned with FWA)

2. Study will be given to increasing Free World assistance to the GVN agricultural cadre program. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID with Dept. of Agriculture and State)

3. Study will also be given to increasing Free World assistance to the GVN's medical programs. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID and Dept. Health, Education and Welfare and State) (See also IV-F.)

4. Top level U.S representatives will be sent to Australia, Korea and New Zealand to thank them for their assistance and to the Philippines to press for further assistance in the form of an engineer battalion with an adequate security force. (Resp: White House, State)

5. Ways of gaining further Latin American assistance will be studied. (Resp: State)

IV. Internal Vietnamese Programs

IV-A. Rural Construction Program

Consensus: Building democracy in rural areas is as important as military battles--rural construction is the central instrument in bringing about the social revolution on which Viet-Nam is now embarked. For 1966, program should concentrate on four priority areas.

Further Action

1. Assure that province chief actually retains operational control over necessary military forces to support program in his province. (Resp: U.S. Mission Saigon, with reports to Washington if problems arise)

2. Areas where program under way, and four priority areas in particular, should be placed under superior province chiefs who should not be removed while program being developed without serious cause. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

3. Move forward with elected village executive councils as rapidly as feasible. (Resp: GVN & U.S. Mission)

4. Assure that all Ministries concerned with pacification work out effective coordination among themselves. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

5. Adequate military priority should be given by ARVN commanders to priority rural construction areas. (Resp: GVN, MACV to follow up)

6. General Thang stated provinces should achieve 75 percent of their 1966 plans by the end of the year. This would involve the pacification of 963 new hamlets, consolidation of 1,083 existing hamlets, and the building of 2,251 classrooms, 913 kilometers of roads, 148 bridges, 57 dams and 119 kilometers of canals.

7. Emphasis will be given to increasingly effective cadre training, with emphasis on political indoctrination and winning the people's sympathy. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

8. Greater emphasis is to be put on U.S. and RVNAF troop indoctrination to assure better understanding of how to win over population, with U.S. to study additional support requirements. (Resp: GVN Political Warfare Directorate, DOD, JUSPAO)

9. Develop more agricultural cadre for greater emphasis on agricultural development, especially in priority areas; study increasing Free World assistance in this area. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID with Dept. of Agriculture and State) (See also III: Free World Assistance.)

10. Expand the development of handicraft and light cottage industries, emphasizing priority areas. Handicraft industries should be encouraged to hire refugees, veterans and, in Minister Ton's words, "people whose livelihood comes from the presence of allied forces in Viet-Nam." (GVN, U.S. Mission and AID) (See also IV-B. Refugees.)

11. Study formation of a land reform organization in each priority area. (GVN and U.S. Mission)

12. Expand rural electrification program, adding at least 50 new stations if feasible during 1966. (GVN, USAID, Secy Freeman to investigate)

13. Study improved credit facilities for farmers, and place emphasis on more efficient production. (Resp: GVN, USAID, Dept. of Agriculture)

14. Study possibilities of joint training program for village and hamlet chiefs, who would presumably be elected. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

15. An agreed name for the program should be selected as among pacification, rural construction and social construction (see Saigon Embtels 2967,/4/ 2997/5/ and 3063)./6/

/4/Dated February 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/5/Dated February 17. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)

/6/Dated February 22. (Ibid.)

IV-B. Refugees

Consensus:

The care of refugees is highly important as a means of including in the social revolution now going on in South Viet-Nam the large numbers of people who have courageously, of their own free will, left the Viet Cong. The refugees must be prepared to resume a useful role in society. U.S. aid for refugees is an important demonstration of the humanitarian aspects of U.S. aid to Viet-Nam, and the U.S. will provide full support for GVN plans in this area.

Further Action:

1. Special effort will be made to provide schools for refugee children. (Resp: GVN, AID with HEW)

2. In addition to the school effort, the President urged special attention to other refugee projects such as vocational training, small loan programs and the like. (Resp: GVN, AID with HEW)

3. Refugees should be given employment in light industry and given training in handicrafts. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

IV-C. Political Development and Current Politics

Consensus: The GVN affirmed its intention to proceed with the building of democracy and encouraging a widened and more active popular participation in and contribution to this process. The U.S. affirmed its support for free elections.

Further Action:

1. The GVN will appoint an advisory council consisting of 80 members selected from a cross-section of society and all regions of the country. Appointment will be made by the end of February. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy to monitor)

2. Advisory Council will draft a constitution, which will be taken to the people for discussion and modification and submitted to a referendum in late 1966. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy)

3. The Council will also discuss electoral laws and political party formation. On the basis of elections, rooted in the constitution, the GVN will create an elected government. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy)

4. Ambassador Lodge will continue to carry on a dialogue with the GVN on this subject.

5. A Washington representative or group will go to Saigon at some point in the future to discuss political development with GVN leaders. (Resp: State)

6. The President made it clear we are not pushing the GVN to move more quickly than would be wise or to change its ideas on the subject. (Resp: U.S. Embassy)

7. General Ky was urged to spend more time in the countryside in the role of a political leader. (Resp: U.S. Mission)

IV-D. Montagnards

Consensus: General Thang stated that in the new society the GVN was trying to build all groups, including Montagnards, would be treated equally.

IV-E. Chieu Hoi

Consensus: The GVN is making an appeal to the enemy to leave VC ranks and join with South Viet-Nam in the "national, revolutionary adventure" on which it is embarked. The U.S. pledged its full support to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural construction.

Further Action:

1. Generals Ky and Thieu agreed to place greater emphasis on the Chieu Hoi Program. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, especially JUSPAO)

2. President Johnson urged a strong program directed at "very young" members of the VC. (GVN, U.S. Mission, especially JUSPAO)

IV-F. Economic and Social Programs

1. Health

Consensus: The GVN will intensify efforts to meet at least its basic needs in context of mounting demands upon scarce resources. The U.S. hopes to expand its health program considerably to assist the GVN to meet these goals.

Further Action: (For details, see Saigon's Toaid 4985.)/7/

/7/Dated February 15. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam, Misc. Notebooks)

a. A team of experts under Secretary Gardner will go to Saigon to clarify specific future goals and agree with GVN on action assignments. (Resp: HEW)

b. Both governments agreed to make increased efforts to train health personnel. (GVN, USAID, HEW)

c. A more effective medical logistics system will be established. (GVN, USAID, HEW)

d. Increased medical manpower to be sought through the dispatch of U.S. and Free World medical teams to the provinces. (GVN, U.S. Mission, State)

e. Attempts will be made to stem drain of manpower through adjustment of wage levels, and to gain manpower through incentive systems, and possibly a release of health personnel with long service in the Armed Forces. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

f. Improvement will be sought on epidemic reporting system; U.S. (and hopefully Free World) will assist in providing modern immunizing equipment. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, State)

g. Increase assistance to refugees, including surveillance, immunization, etc. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

2. Education

Consensus: Strong emphasis should be put on vocational and technical education, and on assistance to refugees.

Further Action: (For details, see Saigon's Toaid 4985.)

a. GVN will inform USG of appropriate time for visit of team headed by Secretary Gardner to go to Saigon. (Resp: GVN, HEW)

b. Efforts will be made to increase vocational training for students finishing primary education. (Resp: GVN, USAID)

c. Agreement to strengthen cooperation in building elementary schools as rapidly as possible, paying particular attention to priority areas and refugees, and in training teachers. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) (See also IV-B.)

d. U.S. will continue supply of textbooks to schools, with 7 million more scheduled for 1966. (Resp: USAID)

3. Agriculture

Consensus: Increasing food production is a fundamental part of the GVN's effort to create a better life for its people, and U.S. assistance in this is a fundamental part of U.S. efforts to help the Vietnamese people build while they fight. It is also part of the U.S. pledge to attack hunger wherever it is found.

Further Action:

a. Secretary Freeman and team of experts to develop enlarged program of agricultural cooperation from visit to Saigon. (Resp: GVN, USDA)

b. It was agreed that a special effort will be made to move agricultural know-how--particularly new species of rice and corn and vegetable seeds--from the experimental station to the farmer. (Resp: GVN, USAID)

c. Steps for more rapid land reform were reviewed and will receive further study. The U.S. pledged its full support for land reform. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission)

d. Production in the agricultural sector will be increased. Top priority will be given to expansion of agricultural industries such as processing of agricultural products and production of fertilizer and agricultural implements. (Resp: GVN, USAID)

4. General Economic

Further Action:

a. US agreed to increase its project assistance to the level of at least 150 million dollars. (Resp: USAID)

IV-G. Financial Stabilization

Consensus: South Viet-Nam faces a serious problem of inflationary demand during the current year, but with appropriate stabilization measures the situation is manageable. The GVN will follow a policy of economic austerity.

Further Action: (see February 8 Minutes of Understanding, and report on February 7 meeting--Annex IV G--for details.)/8/

/8/Not attached.

1. U.S will increase commodity import and PL 480 Title I assistance to at least $400 million in CY 1966, subject to market demand and port capacity. (Resp: AID)

2. Subject to market demand and port capacity the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam agreed to increase imports to a level compatible with a policy of using its foreign exchange earnings in 1966 to help combat inflation. (Resp: GVN, USAID, Embassy to monitor)

3. Advance deposits by importers will be required. (Resp: GVN, USAID and Embassy to monitor)

4. The 90-day grace period on payment of duties will be eliminated. (GVN, AID and Embassy to monitor)

5. The customs force will be enlarged, with U.S. technical assistance. (GVN, AID, Treasury)

6. Overall import procedures are to be simplified. Study to be made of the entire system of import procedures, to begin in the next few weeks. (Resp: GVN, AID)

7. U.S will eliminate present barter requirements with respect to procurement from less developed countries of commodities other than petroleum products. (Resp: AID)

8. AID will reduce the time required to produce bulk items. (Resp: AID)

9. The GVN will appoint a master port director, responsible directly to the office of the Prime Minister, and give adequate authority to a single Saigon port director. (Resp: GVN, USAID to monitor)

10. The U.S. will supply technical assistance in port management. (Resp: AID)

11. Security stockpiles will be established as quickly as port facilities allow. Plans will be drawn up at once for warehousing and management of stockpiles. (Resp: GVN, AID)

12. The U.S. will remove PX supplies from port area warehouses as expeditiously as possible. (Resp: MACV)

13. The GVN will increase revenues, both from increased taxes and better tax collection, as well as from other sources. The target for increased tax receipts in 1966 is approximately 4 billion piasters. (Resp: GVN; USAID to monitor)

14. Non-tax receipts should be increased by greater promotion and sales of GVN lottery tickets, including sales to U.S. forces, and by flotation of piaster bond issues of approximately 2 billion piasters in 1966. (Resp: GVN, MACV; USAID and Embassy to monitor)

15. Foreign exchange earnings accruing in 1966 to the Republic of Viet-Nam, will be used promptly to help combat inflationary pressures, by financing imports or by other appropriate means. (Resp: GVN; USAID to monitor)

16. The U.S. will support the Vietnamese request to the IMF for technical assistance in the financial area. Mr. Bell will talk to Mr. Schweitzer of the IMF to press for an IMF group's visit to Saigon by the end of February. (Resp: AID)

17. High level political consideration of raising the exchange rate for import duties from 35.1 to 60.1 will be initiated promptly, with a view to activating this measure at the beginning of the second quarter of 1966. It was agreed that this would be the most appropriate and equitable additional measure to reduce liquidity, expand GVN revenues and reduce excessive wartime profits. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID, State)

18. Discussion will be held and recommendations made before the end of February on modifying the Special Currency Fund rate of 118 piasters per dollar and on the GVN's possibly increasing and using the gold component of its international reserves. (Resp: GVN, AID)

19. The U.S. will provide technical assistance where appropriate in support of GVN anti-inflationary measures, and will moderate the demands of U.S. expenditures in the Vietnamese economy. (Resp: All agencies)

20. Prime Minister Ky will announce some of the economic stabilization measures to be taken by no later than mid-February. (Resp: GVN; U.S. Mission to monitor)

21. The GVN agreed to carry out promptly the measures to which it had agreed with Mr. Bell in early January. (Resp: GVN; USAID and Embassy to monitor)

V. Public Affairs

Consensus: The U.S. and the GVN will both lay stress on their joint efforts to carry out a social revolution and build a new society in South Viet-Nam.

1. The U.S. and GVN will both publicize the Honolulu meeting. (Resp: GVN, all U.S agencies)

2. The President urged GVN officials and Secretary Gardner to stress at every possible opportunity work being done in increasing school enrollments, building schools and increasing the number of health teams. (Resp: GVN, HEW)

3. Generals Ky and Thieu should be encouraged to make more American TV appearances. (Resp: JUSPAO)

VI. General and Miscellaneous

Further Action:

1. It was agreed that GVN and USG leaders will have similar meetings in the future "for the continued execution of the policies and purposes of the Declaration of Honolulu." The first such meeting will take place about June, for the purpose of assessing progress on agreements reached at the Feb. meeting. (Resp: GVN, all U.S. agencies concerned)

2. The U.S. will try to formulate a way to better our organization in support of the Vietnamese effort.

84. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 24, 1966, 8 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No. classification marking. Valenti took these notes and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security File, Bromley Smith Files) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

PRESENT
President, Vice President, Harriman, as well as Congressional Leaders: McCormack, Albert, Smathers, Ford, Arends, Kuchel, Boggs, Long, Dirksen/2/

/2/Also attending this Bipartisan Leadership meeting were Rusk, Ball, Goldberg, McNamara, Wheeler, Vance, Rostow, Taylor, Komer, Bromley Smith, O'Brien, Marks, Gaud, Raborn, and Helms. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

President: The Vice President made report to me./3/ Governor Harriman and Vice President are in general agreement. Make brief report to you and me now. Make himself available to all members of Congress.

/3/Vice President Humphrey returned to Washington on February 23 following a 2-week Asian trip during which he reported on the Honolulu Conference to officials in South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea. Humphrey reported orally to the President at a White House meeting on February 23, which is briefly summarized in the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) A 48-page draft report to the President on the trip, dated March 1, together with a covering memorandum from Unger to S/S, March 2, discussing the drafting of the report, are in Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272, Vietnam No. 7. A much briefer final report to the President, March 3, was released to the press on March 6 and is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, pp. 489-491.

Had letter from General Westmoreland. Very reassuring. Didn't have shortages--nothing to impair operations or health of troops.

In due time, Lodge and Westmoreland to come back and make report. Will ask leadership to talk frankly with them--and various committees also.

Vice President: Objectives are clear. Stop aggression--bring a better life to all people. No one saw easy solution. No one predicted speedy end. Aggression can be defeated, subversion could be stopped, social revolution can be started.

Difficult to talk of victory in this country. Some people resent victory. I went as researcher, not as advocate.

If we don't veer--don't weaken--help South Vietnam build a better society, our objective can be accomplished.

First two years of the Marshall Plan, six changes of government in France.

While we didn't select the battlefield, it isn't the best place for R.C. (presumably Red China) either, Westmoreland is great soldier. Backed by high caliber civilian team.

Thieu and Ky are men of high leadership. Don't know how long they will survive. These men are trying to do what is right. Ky has reorganized Cabinet to deal with problems that need solving. October will be plebiscite on Constitution.

Went over skeptical about B-52s. They are doing superlative job in blasting VC redoubts that haven't been reached for 10 years.

When ports are all working this summer, we will be doing much better.

Have plan of pacification--as soon as an area is secured, these pacification teams move in. Training of cadres to do this goes on.

Philippines will soon be sending engineer construction battalion. Koreans will be sending 25,000 more men.

Chicoms are pushing hard in Thailand. They (the Thai) are cooperating with us and less said about this cooperation the better.

In Laos, Souvanna Phouma said he would fight to the death. Army of 80,000--but equipment for only 60,000. If Pathet Lao move to the Mekong, our plans for that river will go away. Talked to Indians and Pakistanis about implementing Tashkent Agreement.

Famine is real in India. They're trying hard.

President: More people will die this year from hunger in India and Pakistan than all of the people now living in North and South Vietnam.

Vice President: They are improving agriculture standards and techniques. Indians know that Red China is the enemy.

Australian Government is with us 100 per cent. Are studying ways to increase our [their?] aid to Vietnam.

Spent time in New Zealand with opposition. They pledge to keep in Vietnam the battalion already there.

In Manila, found Marcos a real leader. Put his entire political life on the line. Dastardly are the news stories coming from U.S.--"Philippines are human mercenaries."

Marcos made strong statement--courageous statement--in which he came down firmly on side of U.S.

In Korea, Pak hopes to have more troops there by first week in March. Spent time with government party and opposition. Not one act of hostility on part of the Koreans.

Vietnam is immediate battleground--part of larger struggle. Tide of battle has turned in Vietnam. We need to understand that this battle can be won. Realization that improving the lot of the people is the way to the future.

President: Will ask Gene Black to go back and make another visit to this area where he brought into existence the Asia Development Bank.

Vice President: No doubt in Asia who the culprit is blocking peace talks--Hanoi. Your peace offensive showed that.

Only concern about U.S. is our perseverance to stick it out and stay. I tried to persuade them that our commitment was deep.

If you want to see hopes of people come alive, you must go see those people and their hopes. I did that.

I don't think we have to hold back--and not talk of beating the VC. We can beat them--and are beating them.

President: Believe non-communist people are willing to resist aggression.

Also believe the communists are ready to take it over.

Dulles signed SEATO Treaty in Manila--which spoke our resolve to resist aggression--82 to 1 (Langer) in the Senate.

Before we went in, ground forces--and began to bomb--I remember Senator Taft saying Truman should have gotten resolution from Congress. So I went to the Congress after Tonkin. Wanted Congress to join me--in "preventing aggression." SEATO ought to be enforced. Resolution was debated after hearings. I believe that the Congress knew what they were voting on. I've done everything I know how to bring them to the conference table. They don't want to talk.

We ought to be ready to meet Westmoreland's requests. I intend to carry out the resolution. If you choose, you can repeal the resolution. I think I have the authority without the resolution.

We aim to do all that's prudent to bring this from the battleground to the bargaining table.

McCormack: Resolution repeal wouldn't get to first base.

Dirksen: Repeal wouldn't get four votes.

Ford: Agree with Speaker. What was impact of those who want to withdraw?

Vice President: I explain when this question is asked that dissent is part of our society. I told them that when the chips are down the people are firmly resolved to see it through. People in the world need to know of our unity.

We need to let communists know of our resolve.

It doesn't help.

President: Ambassador Lodge report last night./4/ (Incidentally this is secret and should not be taken out of this room.)

/4/Reference is to telegram 3075 from Saigon, February 23, major portions of which Johnson read aloud and which are covered in the next five paragraphs in the notes. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Visited First Cavalry. They just had been through bloody campaign. VC in the 2nd priority area are virtually cut off. Our boys showed them how to fight hand-to-hand.

Can't understand why Americans who dissent can't do their dissenting in private. Once we are committed to a program of action, there never has been public dissent. You have to go back to the Civil War to find this public dissent. Men can't understand why prominent men in the United States continue to criticize our policy. Our men understand why we are in Vietnam even if our Senators can't.

Government in Vietnam could not survive if VC were brought into Government. What Hanoi wants is for us to meet their conditions. They have made no concessions whatsoever. We want peace. They want conflict.

They regard us as weak. Therefore, they think they will win. To treat VC, who are murderers and assassins, as legitimate government would disintegrate all that we have in Vietnam.

Honolulu Conference has focused attention on the "other war". Now the eyes of a major campaign have been opened to ending poverty. Newspapers in Saigon are full of comments on the social revolution going on in Vietnam.

Harriman: Most fortunate you sent the Vice President out at this time. Leaders in all countries were worried about our commitment. I share everything the Vice President has said. Our allies want to be sure we're going to stick. Lippmann and The New York Times have contributed to this feeling.

Kuchel: Laos. Another example of how the communist word doesn't amount to much?

Rusk: Much in Vietnam is based on fact we can [not] have a Laos agreement in Vietnam. Look at Laos agreement--if you want to test what can be done in dealing with communists, look at Laos.

Boggs, Albert (presumably speaking together): Vice President did great job.

Long: Hope Vice President can come before the Foreign Relations Committee and tell this story.

President: Statements about Vice President making commitments:

Congress gave me authority to commit money. We held up India and Pakistan money until Tashkent./5/

/5/In the Declaration of Tashkent, January 10, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed on the withdrawal of troops in Kashmir and the normalization of diplomatic relations. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 681-682.

Following Tashkent, I told both I would send someone out to talk to them. After Tashkent it was time to reopen talks. It was decided that it was wise to grant India $100 million, Pakistan $50 million.

I told Ayub, "Are you with us or not--can we depend on you or not?" He said: "As long as I am in charge in Pakistan, I will do nothing inimical to the United States Government."

I said, "Okay, we'll make no announcements now."

Vice President: I have been accused in editorials of making conditions.

I merely said:

1. Implement Tashkent.

2. Quit throwing dead cats at the U.S. If you disagree, tell us in private.

President: I hope I can talk to you in private--and keep this secret--you are part of this policy.

Smathers: What about the average citizen in Vietnam?

President: No Vice President has ever testified before a Committee--but will talk to any groups you want to meet with informally.

Vice President: There is no evidence of defection to VC of average Vietnamese people./6/

/6/The meeting ended in time for the President to attend a Congressional briefing in the East Room at 9:07 a.m, during which Humphrey reported on his Asian trip to members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) On the last page of his handwritten notes for the 8 a.m. meeting, Valenti recorded the following: "At briefing in East Room--Pres: I don't know when this will end. During the battle of Britain, Churchill said we'll fight in the alleys and in the streets but he didn't say how long."

[end of document]

Return to Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume IV, Vietnam
Return to the State Department Home Page.
This is an official U.S.-Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.