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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

VIETNAM, 1966

85. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bromley Smith Files, Meeting on Vietnam. No classification marking. Drafted by Bromley Smith. For Valenti's notes of the same meeting and an attendance list, see Document 86. Helms also took notes. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65-31 Dec 72)

Meeting with the President on Vietnam, Saturday, February 26, 1966, at 12:45 P.M. in the Cabinet Room

The President joined the group at 1:10 and suggested that the group might meet every Saturday for an hour and also during the week, depending on whether the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense felt a meeting would be useful.

There was a discussion about naming a czar to coordinate the Washington end of all non-military programs in Vietnam. The President, turning to the Secretary of Defense, said he thought the czar should be a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Secretary McNamara replied that that was agreeable to him. The President said that a candidate would be picked within the next three or four days.

There was a discussion about the TV program for Vietnam. Both Mr. Gaud and Mr. Marks commented on the agreement reached between AID and USIA to initiate this program. They noted that the Japanese might be prepared to give some TV receivers for use in Vietnam.

The President was asked whether he would approach Robert Nathan to persuade him to accept the job of economic czar in Saigon. The President replied that he would like to have the Vice President take this on and he would come in if it were necessary in order to persuade him to accept. The job would have the rank of Minister. The economic czar would not be under the Saigon AID Director, Mr. Mann, but report directly to the Ambassador. The holder of this position would work on the economic problem directly rather than with Vietnam officials.

Secretary Rusk said that it was clear the UN Security Council would not be making a statement on Vietnam. He said that the parliamentary situation in the Council was such that it could do nothing./2/ Even a special session of the General Assembly would not be able to do anything.

/2/On February 26 the Security Council President informed the Secretary-General and Council members by letter of the results of the private consultations on Vietnam authorized on February 2 (see Document 59). The letter noted that serious differences of views remained unresolved, particularly as "to the wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Viet-Nam at this particular juncture." These differences "had given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time." For text of the letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 791-792.

The President then suggested that Ambassador Goldberg explain the full situation on TV this afternoon and that he give background information to the press about our unsuccessful efforts to involve the UN in the Vietnam problem./3/

/3/For text of the statement released to the press by Goldberg on February 26, see Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1965, pp. 547-548.

Secretary McNamara said that he was drafting a statement which he hoped would appear in the New York Times rebutting the allegations made by Hanson Baldwin in his New York Times article./4/ He thought that most of the charges had been answered but more needed to be done to overcome the false impression which many got from the Baldwin piece.

/4/Baldwin reported in the February 21 issue that U.S. forces were "spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere" and that there were shortages in uniforms, clothing, ammunition, and equipment. At a March 2 news conference, reported in The New York Times on March 3, McNamara stated that U.S. armed forces were neither overextended nor suffering shortages and were "fully capable" of meeting their commitments.

Upon being asked about what our position was on a congressional resolution supporting the administration's policy in Vietnam, the President said that nothing more need be done now. It was agreed that Senator Morse's motion to repeal the August 1964 resolution should be allowed to go to a vote but that Senator Russell's suggestion to get an affirmative vote of support in the Senate should not be followed up.

CIA Director Raborn reported that his hearing with Fulbright/5/ had been rather rough in that Senator Fulbright was primarily interested in matters other than intelligence. Mr. Raborn said the intelligence community did not get into the policy field.

/5/Raborn testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 25 and again on February 28, mainly concerning the Soviet Union and China. For text, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 333-409.

The President asked how we keep retired military officers briefed on the developments in Vietnam. He mentioned particularly Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway and Bradley. He asked that we get a list of retired Generals who may be making public statements and keep all of them currently briefed.

There was an exchange about General Gavin. General Wheeler said he thought we had heard the last of General Gavin for the time being but acknowledged that Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance did not agree with him.

There was an exchange between the President and McGeorge Bundy on George Kennan. The President could not understand why Kennan testified on Vietnam despite the fact that he had never been in the area and acknowledged he knew nothing about the situation there. McGeorge Bundy defended the contribution which Kennan had made in Europe, pointing out that Kennan's motivation may be explained by his extreme Europe-first attitude.

The President discussed the suggestion that an Asian Task Force be organized which would list the potentialities of the area and recommend solutions to some of the problems. He thought we should direct intense public attention to Asia such as was done on the civil rights issue. Now that Europe is restored to economic health and military strength the U.S. should turn to Asia. He thought the Task Force should study food production, for example, and come up with recommendations. The Asian Development Bank should be linked to this endeavor.

Mr. Rostow suggested that we should persuade the Asians to come up with their own plan which we would then say we could support.

Mr. Marks commented that Ambassador Reischauer would be the perfect man to get the Japanese to come up with their own plan for Asian development. The President responded by saying we ought to get the Asians to ask us to help them and named in this connection Nehru and Marcos.

Mr. Moyers suggested that a group be organized in Washington to plan our long range strategy toward Asia.

The President thought that a group of five men should be asked to undertake this task. He said that McGeorge Bundy should work this out with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara./6/ He added that there were not enough dreams in the foreign field.

/6/Rusk outlined his proposal for an Asian Development Task Force in a March 2 memorandum to the President, which Komer forwarded to the President on March 5 under cover of a memorandum giving his own views. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, vol. 21)

The President commented that Senator Russell was insisting on a vote in the Senate to reaffirm the congressional resolution of August 1964. He then discussed public support of the administration's policy and cited a Paris [Harris] poll to indicate that the extremists consisted of about ten percent doves and sixteen percent hawks. He said he thought that the rising cost of living was a major element in determining public attitudes.

The President concluded the meeting by asking that more effort be placed in working out sales of commodities now in our strategic stock- pile. He mentioned rubber specifically and suggested that Tom Mann be assigned to do whatever is required to get on with the reduction of U.S. stockpiles even though some foreign countries would be unhappy with our actions.

86. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting is from the President Daily Dairy. (Ibid.) For Bromley Smith's notes of the same meeting, see Document 85.

PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Marks, Bundy, Vice President, Raborn, Helms, Gaud, Johnson, Rostow, Unger, Komer, Valenti/2/

/2/"Johnson" refers to U. Alexis Johnson. According to the President's Daily Diary, Moyers and Bromley Smith also attended. (Ibid.)

President: Want to meet in limited time on Vietnam--maybe every Saturday--during week--(make) sure we're doing everything we need to do.

Going to pick someone to be assistant to President or Secretary (of State) to be Porter's counterpart on peace. Special Assistant to Secretary, probably. Assume no irritation from Pentagon. Will pick him in next three or four days.

Lots of talk about pacification. Thrilled about General Walt. What he's doing makes you proud. Work being done by Marines on health, reconstruction, schools.

General Greene was very cooperative. Tribute to military. Need this special assistant in Washington to carry out peace plans.

Any requests from Freeman?

Bundy: Will come in Monday./3/

/3/February 28.

Need organization to match Porter's. We need that here.

Marks: Gaud will put up money to get TV going in Vietnam.

President: What about TV sets?

Marks: Hope to assemble sets there. Hope Japanese will contribute sets.

Bundy: Need senior American to advise on economic (matters) and inflation. Robert Nathan is our choice.

President: Vice President talk to him.

Bundy: He ought not to be under Charles Mann. Report directly to Lodge and Porter.

Rusk: President of Security Council at UN has letter to U Thant--amounts to resignation of UN from problem./4/

/4/See footnote 2, Document 85.

Had hassle over paragraph on mutual reduction of arms. Africans didn't want mutual because of our bombing. That is now out.

Morse will call for meeting of Assembly but Assembly will do exactly what Security Council did.

President: Let Goldberg find forum to explain this.

Rusk: Would be inopportune to hold debate.

Bundy: Get Goldberg to hold press conference next week with State Department auditorium.

President: Think it ought to be this afternoon, otherwise newsmen will draw conclusions./5/

/5/See footnote 3, Document 85.

Bundy: One loose end in public opinion. Hanson Baldwin article./6/

/6/See footnote 4, Document 85.

McNamara: Statement will be ready Monday. Have to get Times. To be printed in entirely.

Vice President: If statements are ready ahead of time, I can do work quietly with key Congressmen.

Bundy: Resolution matter--President put rose on Morse--willing to have that issue joined.

Raborn: Meeting didn't go as planned./7/ Committee members interested in what I had to say. But Chairman cut it off and asked questions aimed at finding out how we got our intelligence. Need to equate intelligence with sources of intelligence. McCarthy tried to get me to admit that F.R. (Foreign Relations) members ought to be on Russell's committee. Pell interested we didn't overdo covert action. Hickenlooper and Symington came to my rescue.

/7/See footnote 5, Document 85.

Gaud: Have you read my memo?/8/

/8/Not further identified.

President: Haven't read it yet. Didn't want to predict at press conference any length of time--or victory.

Wheeler: Military actions at same tempo in past. Several satisfactory events--though nothing dramatic to herald a change.

Rolling Thunder in North hampered by bad weather lately.

President: Want Goodpaster to be in touch with Ike. Want Goodpaster to know what you know. Ridgway seemed to support us. Yet Fulbright used Ridgway letter to hit us.

McNamara: I think Ridgway letter is a difference.

President: Why don't we send bright colonels to see Bradley and others--and get their statements out.

Wheeler: Gavin wants no part of this anymore. He's ready to retire. It's one of these things where he's a writer and didn't realize it was going to cause a stir.

President: He thinks he's an authority or geo-political expert. Thinks we can't afford to keep commitments around the world.

Rusk: Kennan had the same view when he was on Policy Planning Staff. Believes Asia is not worth it.

Bundy: He got in trouble with Russia and Yugoslavia. Wholly unfit for operational duty.

President: Why don't we do a real study on brown men--and Asia--Task Force on Asia--heavy thinking on Asia--potentialities and solutions--build it up--Asian Task Force. That group ought to be getting up recommendations on what we ought to be saying and doing.

Rostow: In wake of Asian Development Bank--Asia CIAP--ought to challenge that group of Asian planners. Would force this Asia CIAP over and above the bank. Need challenge from you to get it going.

President: Perhaps a number of Asian leaders coming here could request us to join with them. Have our group staff an Asian Task Force. Then try to allow Asians to do these things on their own./9/

/9/See footnote 6, Document 85.

Rusk: Might want to bring in Arthur Dean, and let him take over.

Komer: New York business community feels if we are going to spend $10 billion--let elections take place--and then bug out--then we ought to get out now./10/

/10/Komer summarized the views of the New York business community on Vietnam, as reported by Arthur Dean, in a February 23 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos)

President: It was shocking to RFK that after conferring with LBJ aides, he was judged to be wrong.

Vice President: Jack and I agree with Rostow's assessment--they want to do something on their own. Maybe by the time Black goes out, the Task Force will have something to give him.

McNamara: Russell feels strongly about three things:

1. Resolution giving President the power.

2. Calling up the Reserves.

3. Bombing Haiphong POLs.

Rusk: First thing in Korean war to unleash Stu Symington.

Vice President: Morse repeal resolution will not get four votes. Morse, Gruening--maybe Burdick, Young. Counter-resolution will lose more votes.

Moyers: Latest in Harris Poll. American people want honorable end. Two to one to see it through. More in a split--hawks and doves. Support has dwindled--63 per cent to 49 per cent.

Fifty-one fair or poor handling. Policy fails to satisfy either group. Sixty-seven (January) to sixty-two (February) in job rating.

Gallup--59 to 62 in job rating.

Doves--10 per cent. Hawks--16 per cent, up from 12 per cent.

Great bulk are in between. As result administration is being criticized from both ends.

President is either not moving strong enough or too strong.

January '65--41 per cent excellent or good.

March '65--60 per cent. Pleiku.

May '65--57 per cent.

July '65--65 per cent.

September '65--66 per cent.

October '65--65 per cent.

December '65--66 per cent. Dec. pause.

January '66--63 per cent.

February '66--49 per cent.

In February:

Disagree with policy (carry war to North Vietnam)--16 per cent.

Agree with policy (increased military effort in South)--33 per cent.

Agree with policy (negotiate)--34 per cent.

Disagree (pull out)--9 per cent.

Not sure--8 per cent.

Those who changed--big shift: those who agree but want more bombings--those who agree but want negotiations.

First signs of American impatience with long war.

President lost five points in popularity:

--Vietnam

--Cost of living

87. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield/1/

Washington, March 1, 1966, 9:42 a.m

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.10, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

LBJ: Mike, Dick Russell called me and I told him, he said that he wanted to offer his substitute, but you'd talked to him about this tabling,/2/ and that he thought that I was making a terrific mistake by agreeing with that because he thought there would be doubt left as to my authority and it would be an open sore and be coming up--the Fulbrights and the doves all the way through. I told him, I didn't think so, that I would favor letting Morse make his case and try to rescind it, and then, without hurtin' anybody or getting personal, get up and make a statement that the question's whether you want to rescind it or whether you don't and this direct vote on it can be had by tabling. But, I sure don't want the motion to table to imply any dilution of that resolution because if it does I'm in a hell of a shape as head of the Commander in Chief and with other nations, too.

/2/It was anticipated that Senator Wayne Morse was going to make a motion on March 1 to rescind the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 10, 1964. Senator Richard Russell proposed making a substitute motion to reaffirm the resolution. An alternative response under consideration was a motion to table Morse's motion. Russell called the President at 9:20 a.m. on March 1 about the issue but his conversation was not recorded. (lbid., President's Daily Diary) Later on March 1, the President discussed the issue by telephone with Senator Gale McGhee (at 12:49 p.m.) and Senator Russell Long (at 2:40 p.m). Both conversations were recorded and the recordings are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 6603.01, PNOs 2, 5, and 6. The Senate voted later in the day to table Morse's motion by a 92 to 5 vote. For more information, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, pp. 257-258.

MM: I don't think that it would in any way.

LBJ: Well, it will unless you make a case for it when you make the motion to table or get somebody to do it. Either make Russell or somebody say, "Here's what the authority of this resolution is." Now, Morse wants to take that away. Now, our position is that we're not gonna take it away, because if we leave me in doubt there, whether I have authority or not, hell I'd rather turn the authority over to Fulbright. I've got to know what authority I have, and I believe I have unquestioned authority as Commander in Chief--162 cases according to the Attorney General--

MM: Without the resolution.

LBJ: Without the reso[lution]--with the resolution, I've got them in there with me. But is this motion to table in any way, in the light of what they said, diluting it? Now, if it does, I'm against it.

MM: No.

LBJ: I think the case ought to be made that Morse wants to rescind it and we're not gonna rescind it and thereby, by not rescinding it, it stays just as it is.

MM: That's right.

LBJ: And that we want every dictator in the world to know, we don't want Peking--

MM: The case is made, Mr. President, without even saying a word. [indecipherable] two or three votes.

LBJ: I don't agree with you without saying a word. I think it ought to be in that record before that roll call. And, that's the case he makes. And, I'm for tabling it. And I don't what to rub anybody's nose in it like he does with Nelson and the rest of them. But I do think that they oughta say, Morse wants to repeal this; now, we're not gonna repeal it; I am gonna move to table it. If you want to repeal it, you vote for Morse. But, if you want to leave it just as it is, with all the authority that it contains, why, you vote to table. If you don't, why you go on and vote with Morse. I just don't want some would-be fellow that's waiting to see what to do, depending on the Senate, to misinterpret this, because I know what happened to us in a couple of wars by their misjudging our intentions. I'm controlling this thing just as carefully as a human can. I'm watching it just [indecipherable] but I cannot have them in doubt about my ability as Commander in Chief.

MM: No, but you have you that responsibility and authority even without a resolution.

LBJ: I agree with it. But all the play, Mike, all the editorials is, what's going to be done this Senate--what this group of twenty or thirty or forty Senators--are they gonna take away authority? Are they gonna hold it back? And, they may interpret this--and the propaganda in all the morning papers is--that they've kinda agreed. So, I think that when we make a motion to table, please see that someone points up the fact that this leaves the President without a bit of his authority changed or diluted.

MM: Ok, Mr. President.

LBJ: Thank you, Mike.

MM: Yes sir.

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:16 a.m. and passed to the White House.

3159. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Concerning Senators.

1. From a CIA source, I learn that Prime Minister Ky is writing to Senator Robert Kennedy disputing his thesis that the Viet Cong should be put in the Government of Viet-Nam, and in effect asking him, "Why don't you come out here and see the truth?"

2. Rev. Tam Chau, Chairman of the Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith, said Senator Kennedy's proposal had renewed uncertainty about U.S. objectives in Viet-Nam and would undermine anti-Communist morale.

3. In the February 25 issue of The Reporter magazine, Douglas Pike gives an account of the true situation of the Viet Cong, which I recommend that you read as I believe it will interest and encourage you. It should be put into the Congressional Record. In this article, he makes this statement:

"Viet Cong theoreticians have traditionally held that there are three routes to victory: (1) the Khoi Nghia, or general uprising; (2) the famed Mao-Giap three-stage revolutionary guerrilla war; or (3) coalition government."

It is not so surprising to learn that the Viet Cong themselves regard the creation of coalition government as one of the three principal routes to victory, since we in USG have long realized that to put the Viet Cong into the Government of Viet-Nam would disintegrate everything we have worked so hard to accomplish here and would gravely endanger the security of our own troops. But Communist skill in selling this idea to distinguished and patriotic Senators is surprising.

4. U.S. Senate debate on Viet-Nam drew heavy attention to American role in the Viet-Nam press. Quyet Tien asked if Senators Fulbright and Kennedy would accept Communists' price for peace--a disgraceful American surrender in Southeast Asia. Tien Tuyen wondered what Mr. Fulbright would do if, Viet-Nam having been abandoned, Communist aggression turned to Thailand, the Philippines, India, and even the United States. Tien Tuyen labeled Senator Kennedy's proposal for coalition government violation of principle of self-determination and uncalled for interference in Viet-Nam's affairs. Tieng Van commented that "While many people think White House cannot ignore . . . Messers. Fulbright, Wayne Morse, Robert Kennedy, best informed observers think that defeatist camp cannot shake determination of U.S. number one citizen L. B. Johnson."

B. Communist propaganda success.

5. Persuading U.S. Senators unwittingly to support V.C. victory formula is on a par with Communist successes in convincing the non-Communist public that:

A double standard about aggression is all right that is--if Israelis attacked Egypt in 1956 it was dreadful, but for North Viet-Nam to commit aggression against South Vietnam is fine.

Or that the words of the U.N. Charter calling for "suppression of aggression" are somewhat disreputable.

6. I suggest publicity be given to the statement which you made in Honolulu in which you mentioned the word "aggression" fourteen times in a row. You really put your finger on something very crucial and for this reason:

7. In the propaganda war, we have been on the horns of a dilemma. If we stressed peace negotiations, we pleased certain elements in the West but we aroused contempt in Asia and probably hardened the Communist will to fight. But if, on the other hand, we decided to "play it cool", we would increase the chances of impressing the Asians with our toughness and improve the chances of peace, but we appeared bellicose and indifferent to human suffering in the West.

8. The way out is, I think, to stress the idea of aggression and the corollary that we are fighting a limited war. The thought to get across is that "The North Vietnamese must get out of South Viet-Nam. Then the war will be over. They are the escalators; we are fighting a limited war."

9. I realize that this has been said many times, but the Communists repeat and so should we. Your stress on aggression at Honolulu, therefore, hit the bull's eye.

C. "Revolutionary development".

10. Porter is doing superbly in his new job, sharpening the whole U.S. approach to "revolutionary development". He is boldly and rapidly pulling all the strings together. I frankly admit that I had not realized that giving him this added status would make such a tremendous difference. My congratulations for having thought of it.

11. Under your leadership, a corps of men and a body of ideas and procedures are developing here [that] will be available for use elsewhere to overcome subversion and terrorism and carry out the true revolution, in freedom, which will be more potent than the Communist revolution. If we succeed here, we will have men and measures for use in underdeveloped countries anywhere in the world and the downward spiral of world Communism will have begun. The year that this blow at Communism is struck in Viet-Nam may well be, in the history of Communism, on a par in importance with 1917--the year of its birth.

12. We are watching the national priority areas in Quang Nam (no.1) and Binh Dinh (no.2) even more closely than usual because the GVN changed chiefs of both provinces this week. We are uncertain as to the effect these changes will have on the revolutionary development effort, though Americans generally in Binh Dinh feel that the departure of Col. Tuong, the Province Chief and Major Be, his chief deputy and the guiding hand of provincial revolutionary development efforts, may have an adverse effect on the program there. But it is too early to tell.

13. Lansdale visited Quang Nam and found General Thi much more involved in revolutionary development than in conniving against Prime Minister Ky.

14. General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, spent most of last week visiting provinces in the IV Corps area checking progress against provincial plans. He plans to continue trips of this sort until he has visited every province.

15. Prime Minister Ky has issued a decree making trainees at the National Institute of Administration available for work in the Revolutionary Development Program for one and one half years of their total three and one half year training program. It is hoped that this arrangement will help meet needs for trained personnel.

D. Military.

16. Contacts with the Viet Cong increased in both number and intensity and the enemy mounted one regimental attack and at least three attacks employing one or two battalions. As a result of this harder fighting, allied casualties reached a new high for the war.

E. Economic.

17. Retail prices in Saigon, including rice prices, increased slightly but the USAID index showed the general price level three percent below the level of a month ago. The free market price of dollars remained unchanged and the price of gold rose very slightly. Imports increased rice stocks in the Saigon area but deliveries from the Delta remained low.

Minister of Economy plans to announce new economic program on March 17.

F. News from Hanoi.

18. Hanoi reports indicate that, while the hold of the Communist government is as ironclad as ever, the government is disappointed by the failure of the people to have an enthusiastic attitude towards the war. Apparently the "prospect of protracted conflict with no foreseeable assurance of victory" has created "lack of confidence", even "pacifism" and perplexity". The pressure of pursuing an expanding war in South Viet-Nam, while defending the North, and maintaining economic progress is apparently a problem.

19. For the first time, I note reports from Hanoi that all our military activities plus our psychological activities have "created much difficulty for the political struggle movement". There are reports of "confusion about the political struggle", the political movement not developing "apace with the arms struggle".

20. This undoubtedly does not indicate big trouble, but it is the first time that I have seen reports that they were having any political difficulties at all. We are accustomed to military success and political failure. It is cheering to read that we are finally giving them political troubles, however small in number.

21. After talks with North Vietnamese political and military prisoners, General Thi (I Corps) was struck by the immunity they felt they had. They were "sure there would be no U.S. or GVN invasion". Therefore, he told Lansdale, "They could afford to send a great mass of their manpower into South Viet-Nam rather than keeping them North for the defense of the homeland, and simply to inundate South Viet-Nam." They were no longer even pretending to "liberate South Viet-Nam but were quite nakedly setting out to put their own people in place."

22. Question: Might it not be well to take some action which would make Hanoi think we were planning an invasion?

Lodge

89. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, March 7, 1966, 9:25 a.m

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.12, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Here follow opening comments.]

LBJ: What's happening in Vietnam?

RSM: Oh, I think we're getting along pretty well. I haven't actually checked up this morning. I did yesterday and we were getting along pretty well. This big engagement is very favorable to us. And I keep my fingers crossed but actually the progress is better than I thought it would be at this time. We're engaging more Viet Cong and the fatalities are Viet Cong.

LBJ: Looks like we're killing a thousand. How many does North Vietnam have? 250,000?

RSM: They have about 250,000 in their regular force, but they also have an ability to expand that very substantially--I was going to say from reserves; they're not really reserves--to mobilize additional manpower. But, as I said, we're killing more VC than I thought we would at this time.

LBJ: Now, Bob, you sure you're shooting 'em as fast as they can take 'em, just as quick as we can get 'em out there?

RSM: Absolutely. I'm just sitting here right now with Cy [Vance] and that's exactly what we're working on.

LBJ: Well, ask each one of your services now, quit belly-aching and do it now or for[ever] hold your peace. Because there'll be times here when we want to say stop, look, and listen.

RSM: I know that. I know that.

LBJ: And let's get some more men in there, if we can, right now. I think it's a good psychological time to get 'em in.

RSM: I completely agree with you and that's just exactly what we're doing, Mr. President. We're just going to send out another instruction today in writing to be absolutely sure that this is clear because they're conjuring up all kinds of problems that stand in the way of meeting the manpower requirements out there and there's a tendency to hold back on some unless you're sure you can send all. But our instructions are very clear. We've made it personally and in writing that we want to accelerate in every way the movement of men there. Again, I'll call 'em myself personally today.

LBJ: And then make also this notation, do everything we can to cut some lead time off the Australians and Koreans any way in the world we can, because that'll help us if they are in there when you're gettin' these big bills through up here along the middle of the year. If they've moved, it'll be some help.

[Here follows a brief discussion of Senator William Fulbright.]

LBJ: Have you ever got settled down on your reserve policy yet? Are they still--?

RSM: Reserve and Guard reorganization?

LBJ: No, on reserve--

RSM: Oh, call up the reserves? Well, we're still fighting the battle on that.

LBJ: See you announced that you don't have to, but have you got them to where they're not agitating you on it?

RSM: No, no. But everyday we're getting a little stronger in our opposition to those that want to call up the reserves. And this is just exactly what we're working on now, right in my office at the moment. And I, myself, am convinced, Mr. President, that we will not have to call up the reserves to support some 350,000 or so strength in South Vietnam. And I don't think we'll get much above 350,000 before the end of this year. So my view is we won't have to call up the reserves before the end of this year.

[Here follows a short discussion of briefings of the President and the public by military personnel from Vietnam.]

90. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 8, 1966, 3:45 p.m

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Chrono. Secret.

Vietnam civil czar: I am not up on where this matter stands, but think the attached worth passing on. Bundy, Bell, and Alex Johnson all agreed that for such a concept to work, the man involved must have full authority to operate--and not end up at just the assistant secretary level in State. Also, to get the calibre of man we want and to enable him to operate effectively, we have to give him the proper base.

True, this goes against the grain of the new State alignment./2/ The counter-argument is that Vietnam deserves to be treated as an exception which calls for exceptional measures. One way to compromise would be to designate the czar as both a Special Assistant to Sec State and a Special Assistant to you, thus making clear that he would have direct access to the President as well as Rusk.

/2/In National Security Action Memorandum No. 341, March 2, the President assigned the Secretary of State "authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas." NSAM No. 341 and Komer's March 2 memorandum to the President regarding the location of the "Vietnam civil czar" are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.

R.W. Komer/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment

Memorandum From Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/4/

Washington, March 5, 1966.

/4/Secret. Sent through Komer.

SUBJECT
Management of Vietnam Policy

For the past 18 months I have spent much of my time pushing, prodding and needling the various elements of Government with responsibilities in Vietnam. I have long felt strongly that something more than a committee arrangement was necessary if we were to win the pacification battle. (I attach a brief memorandum on this subject that I wrote in March 1965.)/5/

/5/Attached but not printed.

Now that the issue is on the front burner, but in danger of being buried in the State Department, may I urge the following views:

1. "Mr.Vietnam" should not be located in the State Department, but in the White House complex: the operating, public information and policy management programs cut across many agencies; they are of the utmost importance to you personally; they require for efficient, effective and expeditious implementation the kind of leverage that can only come from the knowledge that "Mr.Vietnam" and his staff are directly responsible to you. With all due respect to the Department of State, it has never had any experience in running a war--and your Mr. Vietnam will be spending his time running a very large chunk of the Vietnamese war. Also, if attached to the White House, he will not be forced to spend time before Congressional Committees--a matter that might become increasingly important.

2. If the management function is nevertheless assigned to State, it should be regarded as an exception and not incorporated into General Taylor's reorganization plan. The problems to be dealt with relate primarily to fast and effective interagency implementation of established policy rather than the development of interagency policy. Furthermore, if the management of Vietnam policy is to be incorporated into the Taylor plan, Mr.Vietnam will, in actuality, rank only as an Assistant Secretary of State. I submit that a "Bureau of Vietnam Affairs" will inevitably become a routine State Department organization operating under routine State Department procedures. As I understand it, this is just what you don't want to happen.

3. So if the assignment is made to State, your "Mr.Vietnam" should also be designated, as was Tom Mann, a "Special Assistant to the President" with direct access to you. In State he should work directly under the Secretary. Interagency guidance and the resolution of interagency problems should come from the Saturday Vietnam Group, of which he should be a member. There are few precedents for this, but there are no precedents to the Vietnam war. Four names that occur to me as candidates are Bob Nathan, Paul Nitze, Dave Bell and Robert Nelson (Litton Industries).

As one deeply committed to your Vietnam policy (and in many respects the originator of the "Vietnam Czar" concept), I feel compelled to urge these views.

Chet Cooper

MARCH 9-JUNE 28: BUDDHIST "STRUGGLE MOVEMENT"; EMPHASIS ON NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS; ESCALATION OF THE BOMBING

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 9, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

3260. 1. General Ky's office called at 11:55 and asked whether I could call at 12:15.

2. When I entered, he first told me he had decided to appoint a woman as the Mayor of Dalat. He then said he wanted to talk to me about his troubles with General Thi. He was speaking to me in my capacity as a "friend", and having in mind that he, Ky, is the same age as my son, he spoke as follows:

3. Thi was becoming more and more difficult. His judgment was poor, he had delusions of grandeur, he did none of the things that were expected of him. For example, he had done nothing about pacification/revolutionary development. He was deliberately insubordinate; he would receive orders from the government and return them, scribbling on the order "this crazy government". It was obvious that one fourth of the country was exempt from the control of the national government. As long as this condition obtained Viet-Nam could not really call itself a nation.

4. He had had a meeting with all of the Generals this morning, less Thi, Vinh Loc and Quang, and had told them that he intended to share this burden with them, and asked them to take appropriate steps for removal of General Thi. If not, he, Ky, would go back to commanding the air force and someone else could be Prime Minister. He could not go on this way. The Generals this morning had wanted to know what I thought.

5. A meeting of all ten Generals with Thi present is scheduled for tomorrow, Thursday, morning. He asked my advice.

6. In reply, I said that as U.S. Ambassador, I could not, of course, interfere in what was essentially an internal affair, and that for the record I could not say much more than that the United States Government very much desired the stability of the Government of Viet-Nam which we regarded as indispensable to successful prosecution of the war.

7. General Ky had, however, said he wished my comments as a friend and that in that same spirit the Generals this morning had wanted to know what I thought. Speaking in this unofficial and friendly capacity, I submitted the following thoughts:

8. This was obviously a question of major importance. Being as important as this, it was absolutely indispensable that every step be carefully prepared so that there could be no possible hitch, and that General Ky would not stumble and fall flat on his face.

9. If the charge of insubordination was made against General Thi, I asked, could it be substantiated? Did you have names and dates and specifications to support charges of nonfeasance as well as charges of insubordination? Were your charges so well documented that they would command the support of public opinion? Better still, were your charges good enough so that they would stand up in court of law, and so that General Thi would realize that the jig was up and he had better leave? Did you have plans made for his successor? Did you feel that you knew how to remove him and install his successor? Can you put it across? Can you make it stick?

10. Could you insulate I Corps effectively enough so that the removal of General Thi would not result in a chain reaction in which the other corps commanders and all the members of the Directorate might not find their tenure shaken?

11. I advised him to get some bright lawyers to go to work immediately and go through all of the instructions and paper traffic between him and General Thi, and see whether they could document a case of insubordination and nonfeasance. I thought this was the best way in which the afternoon could be spent. I agreed to think about the matter and if I had any further views to call on him again later in the afternoon.

12. Comment: I hope that this search for proof will cool him off and persuade him back away from the confrontation tomorrow. It was also clear to me that I was being brought in long after a decision had been made to try to do something. Ky had taken the preliminary steps this morning and was definitely committed to going ahead with it tomorrow.

13. One must sympathize with his view that he cannot accept responsibility without being able to give orders that are carried out in all the different corps. As the Department knows, I have long disapproved of the corps system, although recognizing it as one of the facts of life. Thi, in his recent actions in the DMZ, reminds one of the Chinese warlords whom I first encountered when I visited China in 1929. Subordination of corps commanders to central authority may be part of Viet-Nam's march toward nationhood.

14. In response to questions from me, Ky said (a) that there was no suspicion of Thi playing with Communists and (b) that Thieu was supporting Ky. If Thieu is supporting Ky wholeheartedly and actively it might mean much since no one is more expert at elimination of troublesome persons.

15. Had lunch with Marine Generals and the U.S. military all spoke well of Thi, his cooperativeness and devotion to pacification.

Lodge

92. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 9, 1966, 7:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library National Security File, Memos to the President--Robert Komer, vol. 21. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.

1. Likely showdown between Prime Minister Ky and I Corps Commander General Thi. This trouble is apparently reaching a climax. Ky has called a special meeting of the ruling military directorate for 1000 hours tomorrow (9 p.m. tonight our time) to seek Thi's removal. Ky is convinced that there is no alternative other than to remove Thi./2/

/2/In telegram 3277 from Saigon, March 10, Lodge reported that the Directorate meeting had ended about 4 p.m. and that Thi had been relieved of his duties. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

2. Thi is to be accused of insubordination, "war lord" behavior, alienation of the population and general obstruction of the pacification effort. Recent CIA reports indicate that Thi may have begun conspiring with such retired officers as General Tran Van Don,/3/ and this may have influenced Ky to seek Thi's dismissal.

/3/This report appeared in Intelligence Information Cable TDCS-314/02963 from Saigon, March 4. According to the cable, Ky told several members of the Directorate after its meeting on March 2 that he had disturbing reports about Thi's activities and that Thi "was attempting to make I Corps his personal fief." (Central Intelligence Agency, EA/DDO Files: Job 85-00329R, 137-9-23, Government Activities in SVN)

3. Lodge had two urgent meetings with Ky today. He told Ky that he was not in a position to give advice on such an internal political matter. But he warned Ky of the disastrous consequences of any government crisis at this time particularly in the wake of the Honolulu conference. He told Ky that if there was any possibility whatever that the ruling directorate could not enforce the removal of Thi, then the confrontation should be put off.

4. But Ky remains adamant, and claims that the removal will be painless since all the generals are with him. Thi would be given the graceful exit of either a study tour in the U.S. or the post of Ambassador to Bangkok.

5. State is worried too. If Thi is alerted to the action contemplated he may refuse to attend the March 10 meeting and take unilateral action in his area. Tri Quang and the Central Vietnam Buddhists are also known to be close to Thi and unsympathetic to Ky's government. Ky has sent an emissary to speak to Tri Quang, apparently to mollify him in advance of Thi's removal.

6. So State told Lodge to do all possible to avoid a showdown. If Ky and the directorate still choose to proceed, Lodge is to insure that they handle Thi's removal, to the extent possible, as a normal change in corps commanders, with Thi's next assignment announced simultaneously. Lodge has clearly done as much as feasible, and State's instructions/4/ give him the leeway he needs to attempt to cope with the situation. We will keep you posted.

/4/Transmitted in telegram 2653 to Saigon, March 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S)

R.W. Komer

93. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 11, 1966, 12:35-1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security File, Bromley Smith Files)

PRESENT
President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Komer, Gardner, Marks, Helms, Raborn, Bell, Ball, Bromley Smith, General Goodpaster, J. Valenti/2/

/2/Moyers also attended. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

Goodpaster: March 4-10 ground operations (briefed group on latest military action).

President: What accounts for substantial difference in KIA (killed in action)?

Wheeler:

1. Heavier fire power--fighter bombers and artillery.

2. Mobility--choppers.

3. Good troop leadership and aggressiveness.

Killed around 8,000 men since first of year--close to 30,000 casualties.

Taylor: Fair to reduce casualties from 3 to 1 to 2 to 1 because of seriously wounded.

President: How many casualties before they feel it?

Taylor: When casualties are above infiltration./3/

/3/Smith's notes state: "General Taylor pointed out that when we are really hurting the North Vietnamese is when we are destroying a larger number of their forces than are being infiltrated into South Vietnam. In answer to the President's question as to when this situation will be realized, Secretary McNamara predicted it would take more than a year."

McNamara: What parts are coming from main force units? Others are porters, messengers, etc.

Number of battalions are increasing in spite of casualties.

President: If this keeps up for the year?

McNamara: Don't think so. His strength at end of year should be stronger.

They can increase from 105 to 155 (presumably battalions) at this rate.

Rusk: It would require 10,000 a month casualties. Is that right?

McNamara: They are infiltrating at rate of 8,000 a month.

Taylor: All our plans are based on road nets in Laos--and difficult to know about forward supplies.

Marks: (Read report of defectors saying food and material was short--malaria (35 per cent carrying malaria).)

McNamara: But they carry malaria and fight. They will continue to fight hard.

President: What about malaria for our people?

McNamara: Down dramatically. About 25 per cent rate. Meningitis has dropped, too.

President: Spreading out camps do it?

McNamara: No. Medical help mostly.

Goodpaster: (Continued on air operations.)

McNamara: First time we've had attacks by IL-28s. Shows they're more aggressive and are attacking. They have not attacked in South Vietnam. Would not recommend knocking out IL-28's now. They are not that much of a threat.

Goodpaster: As of March 5, strength was:

216,400 (presumably U.S. strength)

690,900 (presumably South Vietnamese)

23,000 (presumably other free world forces)

930,000 Total

225,000 Viet Cong

13,100 North Vietnam

President: Gardner will be leaving tomorrow.

Rusk: How specific can we put to other governments medical assist-ance and health? More detail on kinds of personnel needed.

Gardner: Assembled 22 people--ready to go. Covers all health and education facilities./4/

/4/Smith's notes state: "Secretary Gardner commented that the trip his group was taking was the first step in a continuing effort to see how measures of education and health could improve the situation in South Vietnam."

Komer: Have General Williamson on hand. Should he brief the Governors?/5/

/5/Smith's notes state: "There was a brief discussion of the Vietnam briefing to be given by Rusk, McNamara and General Wheeler to the Governors who will be attending a conference in the White House on Saturday [March 13]."

President: Yes. Outline agenda and have him speak and answer questions.

McNamara: General Thi has been removed as I Corps commander./6/ Under control, looks as though it's coming out alright. I believe he will come out.

/6/According to Smith's notes, McNamara stated that Thi was removed because he "did not cooperate with the Directorate and was running the First Corps area as if it were his fief."

Helms: GVN paratroopers marched in Saigon in Thi's favor.

McNamara: Some bad taste in mouths of our people. Looks like we're weak in GVN Government.

President: Do our people want him to leave?

McNamara: I do.

Taylor: He's a bad character and good riddance.

Wheeler: General Walt got on well with him. But a conniver. Had to keep eye on him.

President: How do we get Lodge and Westmoreland to stop giving out Top Secret information? The press is saying they have to go to Saigon (for) Top Secret information and it's available there.

Rusk: Will get a wire off to Lodge.

President: What about inflation problem there?

Bell: They're carrying out some of our ideas, but not enough. New man in charge is bright. Has announced one step--but not enough. Reaction to first step is good and the Minister is encouraged.

IMF to take mission out there. One assurance from IMF: If this mission finds that radical steps are needed, will we back him up?

Fowler and Bell believe log jam may be beginning to break. Some evidence of good chance but still insufficient.

[Here follows discussion of China and NATO.]/7/

/7/According to Smith's notes, prior to the close of the meeting, "Secretary McNamara noted that he felt that we had broken the back of congressional criticism of shortages of material in Vietnam and he predicted that critics would now try to prove that there were shortages of personnel."

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to CINPAC for POLAD. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:26 a.m.

3321. Ref: Embtel 3319./2/

/2/Dated March 13. (Ibid.)

1. Following is unofficial translation full text communique issued at Buddhist Institute press conference Saigon 1700 local time March 12:

"In recent days the country has been in a state of crisis. Since the November revolution, our country does not yet have effective institutions to inspire prestige at home and abroad, nor to settle the fundamental problems of an independent and democratic country. And also since November 1963 we have witnessed disputes and purges within our ranks.

"This state of affairs has created disunion and friction in the ranks of the army and obstacles dividing the people and the army, thus causing harm to the efforts of national salvation and reconstruction and more suffering to the people who have already borne untold hardships.

"Realizing the danger of destruction, and faithful to the fate of the fatherland, the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam recognizes the following points:

"1--The Generals and officers who have contributed to the revolution should be restored to their positions so they can take part in the reconstruction of the country.

"2--To avoid political frictions which can create disunion and cause harm to the spirit of unity within the army, the Generals serving abroad or at home should return to their purely military duties.

"3--The nation urgently needs fundamental institutions characteristic of independence and democracy, a National Assembly, and a government of national solidarity.

"4--The government should implement without delay what it has promised--even a small part of its promises--for the revolution, particularly the social revolution related to the life of the masses.

"Faithful to the spirit of union in this historic period, the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam eagerly hopes to contribute along with other civic organizations, religious groups, all classes of people and particularly with the army, toward carrying out the above-mentioned aspirations."

2. While question-answer period was in progress a so-called "proclamation from the movement of the youths, students and school children, Saigon" was circulated. This document, which bears no Buddhist Institute seal (as communique does), is sharp attack on Chief of State Thieu, the Directorate, General Nguyen Huu Co, Can Lao remnants, government's failure to execute Chinese merchant Ta Vinh. Document was disowned at press conference so it seems likely that certain individuals took advantage of audience press conference provided to distribute tract.

3. Institute declaration itself is interesting but not necessarily incendiary document. The four points have obviously been drafted with extreme care and certainly avoid any head-on confrontation with Ky government. No gauntlet is thrown, no deadline for action is set. No mention is made of Thi's removal and in fact, during question-answer period, it was stated that there was no connection between conference and that event. Point one of communique could be read as not necessarily relating to Thi in view of fact that he was in exile in Cambodia when 1963 coup took place.

4. Nevertheless, point one is most interesting aspect of entire document. It certainly reads as a call for reinstatement of ousted southern Generals "Big" Minh, Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim. Point may very well represent bid for southern Buddhist support for UBA. As Dept aware from our reporting, southern Buddhist elements have become disenchanted with USA to point where leading southern layman Mai Tho Truyen refused to participate in last UBA biennial convention in December 1965. Point one may stem from Tri Quang who, though he did not participate in press conference probably had hand in drafting communique. He had nice things to say about Minh, Don and Kim in mid-February (see para 5, enclosure 1, Embassy airgram 489, Feb 17)./3/

/3/Not printed. (Ibid.)

5. As for point three case could be made that Ky government is already making progress in this direction with blueprint for political development outlined by Ky January 15 speech. As for point four, all Vietnamese can agree with the sentiment.

6. In sum communique appears as cautious testing of political wind. Institute has been politically mute for some time--to the point where some of its more influential lay and clerical members have complained about its impotence and inaction. To those critics Chau and his colleagues can now reply that they have done "something". They have let government know they are still there and that due attention must be paid them.

7. Ky and Chau have had at least two separate private meetings over past few days. Ky has indicated his confidence that organized Buddhists are not supporting Thi.

Lodge

95. Editorial Note

In his weekly telegram to President Johnson, dated March 16, 1966, Ambassador Lodge reported on the events that followed in the wake of the March 10 decision of the Directorate to relieve General Thi of his duties:

"Unfortunately, many of the subordinate officials and commanders in I Corps are Thi appointees and when they heard that their commander had been relieved, they began to fear for their own futures. When certain political elements began to organize demonstrations in support of Thi in I Corps, these officials gave tacit approval and support. So far the demonstrations have consisted of mass meetings and general strikes centered in Danang, the largest city of I Corps and second largest in the country. But there have also been smaller meetings elsewhere in such cities as Hue and Hoi An.

"Now a new and more significant element has been added. The political Buddhists and other elements who have their main strength in I Corps have now begun to agitate against the government using the Thi removal as pretext and take-off point. These elements have been quiescent for some time. They have had no great affection for the Ky government; but neither did they dislike it to the point where they openly opposed it. It has not, however, been a government subservient to their commands. They obviously read the new political situation in I Corps as an opportunity to bring pressure on the government hoping either to transform it into a creature subject to their will or to replace it with a government to their liking." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, March 16, 1966, 4:13 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Unger and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Moyers, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.

2736. Statement attributed Thich Ho Giac, reported by UPI, pledging Buddhist struggle "to last drop of blood, to last breath" to achieve four-point program,/2/ including replacement present government, has been noted at highest levels./3/ We must find way to make Buddhists understand that, with profound US involvement in defense their country against Viet Cong take-over, to say nothing of deep commitment their own government and armed forces, this is not the time to overturn everything and set back efforts now beginning to show results. Furthermore US, as well as Ky Government, has also pledged itself to economic and social progress which Buddhists are also insisting upon but these things cannot be achieved overnight and certainly would not be achieved at all if the Viet Cong were to win out. Moreover, their achievement can only be delayed, not hastened, by starting over again with a new government. Buddhists must be told in fact that our possibilities of continuing to help the Vietnamese to defend themselves and develop their country depends heavily on their readiness also to put aside differences among themselves and work together.

/2/See Document 94.

/3/UPI-80, March 16, reporting Thich Ho Giac's statement, was forwarded to Rusk by Read the same day under cover of a memorandum stating that Moyers had advised Unger "that the President would like to hear from you by the end of the day concerning the attached ticker." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

In your discretion you are authorized to convey or have conveyed to Thich Tri Quang and such other Buddhist Institute and lay leaders as you consider desirable the President's considered view that, if they persist in their present irresponsible and destructive course, not only will they lose the US public and official sympathy that they have heretofore had, but they may well bring about a situation of chaos and anarchy in which USG support to Viet-Nam could no longer be effective. The President hopes that they will most deeply reflect on this, not only as patriotic Vietnamese interested in the future of their country but also as religious leaders interested in the future of their believers and the religious tenets for which they stand.

Rusk

[end of document]

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