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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
South Asia On January 6, 1964, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru suffered a stroke that affected his ability to discharge his responsibilities as head of the Indian Government. Nehru's illness prompted speculation within the U.S. Government concerning its impact upon India and upon negotiations with the Indian Government. It also opened speculation concerning Nehru's likely successor. On January 9 Department of State Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read sent a memorandum to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy assessing the consequences of Nehru's illness. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. I, Memos and Misc, 12/63-3/64) On January 16 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk analyzing the likely successors to Nehru from the perspective of U.S. policy. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA)
2. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 8, 1964, 10:30 a.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Charles W. Naas on January 9 and approved in S on January 19. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Integration of Kashmir Ambassador Ahmed called on the Secretary under instructions to express the concern of the GOP over Indian actions to integrate Kashmir into India. The Ambassador reviewed briefly the proposals made by former Prime Minister Bakshi in October 1963,/2/ the subsequent discussion in early October between Under Secretary Ball and Foreign Minister Bhutto,/3/ and Pakistan's protests to India and its letters to the Security Council. The Ambassador stated that the GOP was particularly disturbed by the November 27, 1963 debate in the Lok Sabha over the integration of Kashmir. Although the GOI has decided not to repeal Article 370/4/ at this time, integration is proceeding apace. Continued steps toward complete integration could create a serious situation in the area and he hoped the U.S. could intercede in some way. /2/ On October 3, 1963, G.M. Bakshi, outgoing Prime Minister of Kashmir, announced to the legislature of Kashmir a number of proposed constitutional changes designed to further the integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union. The United States expressed deep concern to the Indian Government over Bakshi's announcement, which was viewed as likely to complicate the task of promoting a climate in which progress could be made toward reducing tensions on the subcontinent. See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 344. /3/See ibid., Document 332. /4/ Article 370 of the Indian Constitution outlined the relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Union. Mr. Talbot told the Ambassador that we have made it perfectly clear to the GOI that the U.S. position was governed by the January 24, 1957 U.N. resolution./5/ The Ambassador remarked that it was only a small comfort to Pakistan to know that other nations did not recognize India's actions; integration was nevertheless taking place and India was consolidating its position in Kashmir. /5/ UN doc. S/3779, printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 11, 1957, p. 232. The Ambassador said that overall Indo-Pak relations were bad. At the recent Jaipur meeting of the Congress Party a resolution was passed which linked the Chinese Communists and Pakistan, charging that they were committing aggression against India. He quoted GOI Minister Subramaniam as stating that the GOI was taking steps to contain and to vacate this aggression. If these words are applied to Kashmir, he said, they are very ominous. The Secretary inquired whether there might be any benefit from informal, unofficial talks between knowledgeable Indians and Pakistanis on the problems besetting the two nations. Such talks might be one step toward improving relations. The Ambassador expressed doubt that talks of this nature could be fruitful; they would not carry much weight with either government. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador had read Chairman Khrushchev's "peace proposals"/6/ carefully, and whether the Ambassador saw in them any indication of possible changes in the Soviet position on Kashmir. He noted that we were examining the statement from many different vantage points; frankly, he said, we do not yet know whether the document is primarily propagandistic but it deserves careful attention. The Ambassador replied that he had not thoroughly studied Khrushchev's paper, but he had not seen any indication in it of a change in Soviet policy on Kashmir. /6/ Reference is to a letter sent by Khrushchev to various Heads of State on December 31, 1963, concerning the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. For text of the letter, as received in Washington, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 938-940. U.S. Military Aid to India; Chicom Intentions The Ambassador stated that it appeared to him that the "regional military situation" in South Asia had changed somewhat in the last few months. He said it was fairly clear that the Chinese did not intend to attack India; in fact, it appeared that the Chinese were moving some of their forces to the Sinkiang border area. President Ayub's assessment of the Chinese threat had proved correct, he said. In view of the changed situation, the Ambassador asked, is there any possibility the U.S. might review its policy with respect to arms aid for India. The Secretary stated that our position had not changed since General Taylor had talked with President Ayub. He agreed, on the basis of his own experience in the area in World War II, that an invasion of the subcontinent from the north was not in the cards. It also appeared, he added, that the Chinese may refrain from military efforts of any kind against India in the near future. The Chinese, however, had the capacity in place to take limited actions. More importantly, the Secretary said, we have seen no changes in the basic attitude of the Chinese Communists. They were violating the Geneva accord, sponsoring terrorism in Latin America, had refused to sign the Test Ban Treaty, were stepping up the war in Viet Nam by supplying large quantities of Chinese materiel (recently 7 tons of Chinese equipment were captured in the Delta), and were continuing to take the same belligerent line in the Moscow-Peiping dispute. In sum, he said, we see no evidence that the Chinese want to live in peace with their neighbors. We believe it is definitely possible that in the months ahead the Chinese will provoke further trouble somewhere along their perimeter. In closing, the Secretary stated that he would discuss with his colleagues the matters raised by the Ambassador and would talk to him again.
3. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 16, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 279, Military Assistance to India and Pakistan. Secret. SUBJECT /2/ For the report submitted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor on December 23, 1963, to Secretary of Defense McNamara concerning his trip to India and Pakistan in December, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 348. I have reviewed with General Taylor the results of his trip to India and Pakistan. He has come back with excellent ideas about future military assistance to those two countries. These supplement and refine the basic approach worked out by the Standing Group and embodied in my recommendations to you of December 11./3/ /3/See ibid., Document 342. General Taylor would fix responsibility on the Indians for coming up with a satisfactory five-year defense plan which would limit their force goals, hold down procurement from the Soviets and hold to a minimum the diversion of their resources from economic development. Within such a plan it would be up to the Indians to set the priorities among the competing needs of their own services. Such a plan might include a limited number of high performance aircraft from Free World sources. I believe the foregoing course of action would permit us to follow the roughly parallel course with India and Pakistan on high performance aircraft which we believe to be quite essential for political reasons. I recommend that you authorize us to proceed along the lines of my proposal to you as refined by General Taylor's findings. To move this matter ahead, the following steps are in order: 1. Inform the British and other Commonwealth aid donors fully about our military assistance planning for both India and Pakistan and obtain their continued cooperation and participation. 2. Tell the Indians that: --we are willing to provide longer run military assistance if they work out a satisfactory five-year defense plan, as defined above; --this plan would assume a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., Indian policies towards Pakistan and China); --for the purpose of preparing their plan they could use a planning figure of about $50 million MAP annually/4/ from the United States which, of course, is subject to Congressional appropriations; /4/ In his report to McNamara, Taylor proposed a planning figure of $50-$60 million. In an assessment of Taylor's recommendations, submitted in a January 13 memorandum to McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that in view of the decreasing military assistance funds available, a planning assumption of not more than $50 million per year for each country was preferred. (JCSM-15-64; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, 381 India) Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, concurred in the JCS conclusion in a January 14 memorandum to McNamara. (Ibid.) McNamara noted his approval of the revised planning figure on Solbert's memorandum. On January 15 Robert Komer of the NSC Staff sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy in which he argued for holding to the original $50-$60 million proposal as offering more potential for influencing Indian policy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables/Memos/Misc, 9/65-1/66) --we look to them to make the initial decision on priorities among the competing needs of their services, bearing in mind that an acceptable plan must not excessively strain Indian resources; --we intend to continue with an interim program over the next year at roughly current levels while they work out their plan. 3. Tell the Pakistanis that: --we are willing to support a satisfactory five-year Pakistani military plan within a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., fulfillment by Pakistan of its obligations to CENTO, SEATO and the United States); --we are willing to work with the Pakistanis in developing the priorities of this plan; --we want to resume discussions looking towards the expansion of our facilities. 4. Keep both the Indians and Pakistanis generally informed of our assistance activities in each country. General Taylor has already done much of this job with Ayub, drawing a surprisingly mild reaction. However, a long-term military program for India, including possibly some supersonics, and the provision of additional supersonics to Pakistan will very possibly create an initial storm in each country about our policy in the other. We shall have to find ways of riding this out. Dean Rusk
4. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 16, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63-5/64. Confidential. SUBJECT Current Situation The major scene of the Hindu-Muslim rioting has shifted to Pakistan where at Narayanganj, a few miles south of Dacca in East Pakistan, a minimum of 300 Hindus were killed on January 13-14./2/ Calcutta is calming down under rigid army and police control. Deaths are estimated in the neighborhood of 175 in the city and surrounding areas but the total may be three times this number. We cannot discount the possibility of a resurgence of violence in the Calcutta area or new outbreaks elsewhere in India in reaction to the deaths near Dacca. /2/Extensive reporting on these communal riots, which were triggered by the theft of a Muslim relic at Srinagar in Kashmir, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 INDIA. The principal danger to India and Pakistan from the riots is that they may start up again a massive flow of refugees between the two countries like those which took place in 1947 and 1950. President Ayub, in a strong letter sent to President Radhakrishnan January 13,/3/ said that already 20,000 Indian Muslims had crossed into East Pakistan since the Calcutta riots began. There are still 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan and over 44 million Muslims in India. The migration of even a small proportion of these would put enormous economic and political burdens on these two countries and do much to deepen the enmity which exist between them. /3/The text of this letter was sent to Washington in telegram 1303 from Karachi, January 14. (Ibid.) Background The current cycle of religious and communal disturbances began in Indian Kashmir in late December when Kashmiri Muslims demonstrated over the theft of a relic of the Prophet. The Pakistan Government and press cited these events in Kashmir as evidence of Indian failure to protect the rights of Muslims in Kashmir. This led to protest demonstrations all over Pakistan. One such demonstration in Khulna, East Pakistan, deteriorated into anti-Hindu riots in which at least 27 persons died. A factor which undoubtedly contributed to the atmosphere in which these riots took place was the Indian policy of expulsion from Assam of Muslim immigrants from East Pakistan. The press in Calcutta made much of the East Pakistan disturbances and Indian political leaders, particularly Krishna Menon, strongly attacked Pakistan on the issue of the Khulna riots at the Congress Party Conference in early January. Exaggerated reports by Hindu refugees from East Pakistan contributed to the inflammatory atmosphere in which the Calcutta riots broke out. Clearly, resumption of large scale migration would present a great setback to economic development and political stability in both countries. They undoubtedly realize this. The history of their relations indicates that at a time such as this, when the interest of both countries is so deeply involved, they have frequently managed to get together and work out ways of dealing with mutual problems. For example, Nehru and Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, met in 1950 and agreed upon a pact which stemmed the last major tide of migration. We believe some similar kind of joint Indo-Pak action may be necessary to end the present cycle of disturbances. It is unfortunate that Nehru's illness removes his restraining hand from the scene at this time. What We Are Doing We believe that the Governments of India and Pakistan will get together only when each is convinced that its interest requires joint action. Our influence to precipitate such a meeting is limited. We have proposed to the British that they use the Commonwealth framework to encourage joint Indo-Pak action./4/ If the British take this initiative, as we hope they will, we will strongly support them. We feel that our action should be informal and behind the scenes. Prospects for effective joint action would be damaged if the governments and peoples of India and Pakistan considered that it was being taken in response to Western pressure rather than the compulsions of the communal situation itself. We have already instructed our posts in India and Pakistan to urge restraint on both governments and, in particular, to suggest that India and Pakistan take steps to limit inflammatory press reporting on the riots./4/ /4/In telegram 4267 to London, January 15, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 1425 and to Karachi as telegram 921. (Ibid.) There is also a need for emergency relief, which will grow if the disturbances and migrations continue. U.S. voluntary agencies are already providing foodgrains and powdered milk in Calcutta, where our Consulate General reports there are no shortages of food for immediate relief work. We are studying what additional steps we might take to help. We believe we should be in a position to respond to governmental requests for emergency assistance, rather than take the initiative at this stage, since each country probably would prefer to handle this problem in its own way without having to call for help from foreign governments. Dan T. Christensen/5/ /5/Christensen signed for Read above Read's typed signature.
5. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, January 16, 1964, 9 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi and London. 1323. I saw President in Karachi for a half hour early evening Jan 14 at my request, for general exchange of views. FonOff DirGen Salman Ali present as very industrious note taker, which made atmosphere slightly less informal and relaxed than on some other occasions. 1. I expressed our concern at outbreak and spread of communal disturbances West Bengal and East Pakistan. Voiced earnest hope that everything possible would be done by leaders of both countries to extinguish communal passions and restore law and order. I expressed satisfaction at the useful instructions and the moderating effect of the President's message to the people of Pakistan of Jan 13. I also noted the several good points in his message of Jan 13 to Indian Pres Radhakrishnan,/2/ text of which just released by press. /2/ See footnote 2, Document 4. 2. President was incensed at West Bengal excesses against Muslims but his anger was well contained. He said his govt recognized importance of curbing natural retaliatory feelings of people of Pakistan and assured me every effort would continue be made to this end. He felt the thousands of refugees pouring into East Pakistan could not be prevented from telling their tales of horror and he feared the spread of these stories would compound the difficulties of restraining the people. He thought the prospects were good that the situation would not get out of hand in East Pakistan unless there should be new outrages against Muslims on a wide scale in West Bengal. 3. I told President that evidence available to us indicated Indian authorities both central and local, civil and military, were making honest and energetic efforts to restore law and order in Calcutta and throughout West Bengal. Five battalions of army troops said to have been brought in and signs indicated situation rapidly being brought under control. I said Amb Bowles was in close touch with GOI and was urging effective police and relief action by authorities, that they refrain from inflammatory public statements, and that Indian public be urged not to react violently to unfortunate communal incidents in Khulna and elsewhere in East Pakistan. 4. President doubted that Indian steps to restore law and order would be efficacious. He said GOP was seriously considering taking to UN entire question of mistreatment of Muslims by GOI in Kashmir, and in West Bengal and Assam. He expressed skepticism that Western countries would support a Pakistan UN complaint along this line and I did not comment on this speculation. 5. President in common with other Pakistani officials was inclined to dismiss outbreaks in East Pakistan against Hindus as relatively inconsequential and not to be mentioned in same breath with mass attacks on life, property and residence rights of Muslims in India. His posture was one of suppressed but deep indignation. 6. On prospective deployment of Indian Ocean task force,/3/ I found President technically noncommittal but privately still clearly critical of the concept. I could only get his assent that his govt will not take any public position on proposal before it is fully and officially defined. I called attention to various ways in which the proposal had been exaggerated and otherwise distorted by the press and some govts following the unfortunate premature and inaccurate publicity. I expressed confidence that GOP would perceive stabilizing and deterrent value small independent task force could have in area and would agree that its intermittent presence on high seas in area would pose no problems on any consequence for GOP. I said the force if activated would not have to put into ports of area in order to carry out its role, and we would not need any permission from any other govt for it to operate on high seas, but naturally we sought approval and cooperation of friendly countries and would like to feel that the vessels would be welcome as in past for periodic courtesy calls at friendly ports, including Karachi, and possibly Chittagong. /3/Documentation on the proposal to deploy a U.S. Naval task force in the Indian Ocean, which was developed and discussed during 1963, is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIX. 7. President said he still felt that task force could not fulfill role we envisage for it. It would be too far removed to have any effect on China and it would not be useful in dealing with what he called "local squabbles" of area, would create more problems than it would solve, and would certainly tend to spread any conflict. He thought there would be a better chance of avoiding intervention by other powers and of containing and liquidating local squabbles, if GOP forces were enabled with proper equipment to do job themselves. I observed that the primary objective of task force would be prevention rather than cure. I noted that his apparent discounting of the stabilizing and deterrent effect of such a naval presence did not seem very compatible with the deep misgivings frequently expressed to us by GOP about the possibility of aggression in area. The President said the harm resulting from the upsetting of established ratio of power in subcontinent by our arms aid program for India could not be offset by operations of a carrier task force. I asked the President to keep an open mind on task force and to continue to refrain from taking a negative position on task force until all point ramifications could be more fully explored and he indicated his assent. 8. Chou En-lai visit. I took oblique approach to impending visit of Chinese Communist leaders, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi. President had asked me about my travel plans for the next few weeks, and I mentioned likelihood that I would be in Lahore for horse show in early March. I half-humorously expressed the hope that I would not encounter Chinese Communists as guests at horse show. (This was prompted by persistent but unverified rumors that Chou En-lai may delay his travel here by a couple of weeks in order to compel Pakistanis to make him chief guest at Lahore horse show.) The President responded by minimizing any embarrassment if Chou En-lai were at horse show. He argued that the presence or absence of Chou En-lai would not be matter of any great significance. 9. With this opening, I told the President that in the view of myself and my government the pitch in which the visit was played would make considerable difference. I knew the GOP would feel the visit to Pakistan could not be cancelled now, and, of course, we know that the essential requirements of protocol and courtesy would have to be met. But there were many degrees of cordiality and recognition above this necessary minimum which could be invoked or withheld, depending on the desires of the host government. We hoped that visit would be played in as low a key as possible in order to minimize the harm. I remarked that the treatment accorded the Chinese Communist visitors in Pakistan would be closely observed in Washington. 10. The President said the traditions of hospitality in Pakistan went beyond minimum customary diplomatic requirements, and Pakistani tradition of special hospitality would have to be maintained. He hoped that not too much would be read into this. I said we know that a certain amount of red carpet would have to be rolled out, but we hoped the red carpet would be no wider than necessary and the pile of the carpet no deeper than necessary. 11. In response to some light probing, the President acknowledged that Chou En-lai would visit various places in Pakistan and would be exposed to the public on various occasions. I expressed the hope that he would not be given wide scope for public speeches or other good sounding boards for his propaganda efforts. The President said the effectiveness of Chou En-lai's contacts with the people of Pakistan would be up to the people themselves. The government could not control reaction of the people, and if they wished to respond enthusiastically to Mr. Chou En-lai that could not be helped. 12. The President said he felt it would be a mistake to get excited about a visit which was in the normal tradition of exchanges of official missions by neighboring governments maintaining diplomatic relations. There was nothing unusual about it, and he hoped we would not react unduly. 13. President assured me that his only objective was to "hold back the Chinese and keep them on their side of the line." He felt the pursuit of "normalization" was the best way of avoiding provocation and ensuring that the Chinese would stay where they belonged. He thought his method of dealing with them would be more successful than the Indian had been. 14. I told him that any opportunities offered Chinese which they could exploit were unfortunate at this time. We could not be happy about any evidences of acceptance of the Chinese Communists, considering their record. 15. Other topics of less urgent nature are being reported by airgram. McConaughy
6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, January 17, 1964, 10:25 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Turner C. Cameron, Jr., on January 13; cleared by Phillips Talbot, David Dean (FE), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Solbert, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved and initialed by Secretary Rusk. 931. Embtel 1281./2/ We agree that meeting between President and Ayub could be important for future course US-Pakistan relations. For meeting to have this impact, believe we must be sure Ayub will come prepared for constructive discussions of common policies for future, not to rehash old concerns and grievances. Therefore we would see meeting not as culmination past series high level discussions but as occasion for writing new chapter in US-Pakistan relations. /2/In telegram 1281 from Karachi, January 9, Ambassador McConaughy reported that Foreign Minister Bhutto had informally broached the possibility of a meeting between President Ayub and President Johnson, and he indicated that Ayub would be receptive to an invitation to visit Washington. McConaughy judged that Bhutto's feeler intimated that Ayub was preparing himself to accept the implications of a continued program of U.S. arms assistance to India. Given Ayub's predilection for president-to-president dealing, McConaughy recommended extending an invitation to Ayub "because of important favorable bearing it might well have on our relations at this troublous juncture." (Ibid.) During past year we have repeatedly put to Ayub and his principal lieutenants our analysis of situation in South Asia and requirements for action which this analysis imposes. Likewise Pakistanis have explained their position to us in detail and have supplemented these official expositions with public statements such as Foreign Affairs article./3/ /3/Reference is to Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan-American Alliance," Foreign Affairs, vol. 42, pp. 195-203. At conclusion of these exchanges we have impression that Ayub is beginning to move more realistically to accommodate himself to minimum requirements on subcontinent as we see them. We on our side are also moving to accommodate him in two principal ways. First, we are close to decisions on longer term military aid for his forces. Second, we recognize that we can live with some improvement of Pakistan-Chinese Communist relations and we understand that this is important element in Ayub's increasing domestic strength. We have thrown up danger signals from time to time, but over longer run we believe Ayub's continued need for US military and economic assistance will place acceptable limits to his "normalization" policy. Months ahead will give us opportunities to test these assumptions and to see just how far Ayub is adjusting to new relationship. By his handling of Chou En-lai visit Ayub can signal to us that he indeed understands dangers of going too far in his relations with Communist China. His reaction to our military assistance package can be a signal that he is indeed swallowing, though with difficulty, our continued military assistance to India. His reactions to suggested joint military exercise plan will be another signal. His reactions to a weakened Nehru will add another dimension to our assessment of how he sees future role of Pakistan in subcontinent. When we have made these and other readings we will be in a better position to say that a meeting of two Presidents will advance our common understandings and US national interests. Therefore we do not believe that you should follow up Bhutto's feeler in your next meeting with Ayub. We do agree that you and we should remain closely in touch on this subject. Because he made it clear that his feeler was without authorization, we assume that Bhutto may not want a negative indication from you which might involve his or Ayub's prestige. If, however, he does return to question, you should try to deflect him from his notion of an early meeting with President. You might say that you have taken informal soundings in Washington which indicate that while a friend like Ayub is of course welcome, reading of Washington scene is that it would be better to postpone consideration of specific date until later. Rusk
7. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)/1/ Washington, January 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles (cont.). Secret. Drafted by Komer and Johnson. Dear Chet: I appreciate both your good wishes and your thoughtful words on India and Pakistan./2/ Depend on it that I am fully aware of the importance of consolidating the gains we have made vis-à-vis India. You in turn will agree, I am sure, that we must do so in ways which will minimize the risks to our relationship with Pakistan. /2/Reference is to Bowles' letter to the President on December 27, 1963; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 350. Thus I share your feeling that we must move ahead with "the building of a new relationship with India which will bring her growing industrial and military potential into focus against the Chinese Communists." But you--and all of our key ambassadors--must bear with the limits of the possible in terms of what I can get the Congress to do back here. The attack on foreign aid restricts our freedom of maneuver until we can get the aid tangle straightened out. In fact, the problem of the moment is as much that of protecting the sizable aid investment we already make in India--by far the largest anywhere--as that of getting new military aid on the scale you suggest. We will simply have to stretch the resources of diplomacy to restrain Indian appetites, while still getting the forward movement we seek. For this, I count heavily on you. With your experience, you are the right man in the right spot at the right time. So I look to you to carry on the crucially important task of maintaining and strengthening our ties with India at a time when we may be temporarily unable to meet many justifiable needs. I shall expect you to let me know personally any time you feel our affairs are badly off the rails. With all good wishes, Lyndon/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates the President signed the original.
8. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 21, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 279, Military Assistance to India and Pakistan. Secret. Tab A is Secretary Rusk's proposal on how to handle MAP for India and Pakistan./2/ It is based on Taylor's recommendations following his December trip, and concurred in by McNamara and Bell. In essence, they say let's put the bee on the Indians to come up with a sensible five-year anti-China program, telling them that if it is satisfactory India can plan on around $50 million MAP per annum from us. Bowles thinks this sum much too small given the strategic stakes involved (Tab B)./3/ State, Bundy and I wanted to go a bit more his way; even with only $1 billion annual MAP we could easily find another $10 million by marginal cuts in other countries which are far less important. But we caved when DOD was adamant on $50 million. /3/ Telegram 2140 from New Delhi, January 14, not printed. We'd also work out a 5-year plan with the Paks, as a means of protecting our Pak assets. Of course, neither proposal really involves a big new outlay we wouldn't be undertaking otherwise. As long as we have a MAP, we'd presumably want to invest so much in India and Pakistan. So all that is really proposed is to package our MAP in five-year terms rather than annual increments in order to maximize the needed impact and get the most leverage. Moreover, we suggest in both cases only an opening gambit. Then we check our bets until we see their responses. And even if both agree to our terms, we'd make clear there can be no irrevocable five-year "commitments." We'd of course declare our Executive Branch intent, but make clear it is dependent on annual Hill action and Pak/Indian performance. The options are to: (1) remand the proposal again for further study if you have reservations; (2) simply delay action further on grounds that time is not ripe; (3) approve going ahead with initial approaches. The chief reasons arguing for (3) are to get a handle on the Indian buildup and to show India, now in disarray over Nehru's illness, that we're still backing it against China. The post-Nehru leadership could be far more pro-US than Nehru. These are big stakes. And if we go ahead with India, we also want to protect our flank with the Paks. You could either have a meeting or, in view of inter-agency agreement, just sign off along the lines of Tab C/4/ (which embodies certain cautionary words I think you'd want). /4/ Attached at Tab C was a draft of NSAM No. 279, Document 13. R. W. Komer
9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, January 21, 1964, 6:50 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Naas; cleared by James P. Grant, Carol C. Laise, and Joseph J. Sisco; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to London, New Delhi, Embassy Office Rawalpindi, and USUN. 960. At his request Pak Ambassador called on Governor Harriman January 21. Grant of NEA and Sisco of IO also present. Ambassador briefly reviewed developments last few months respecting Kashmir leading to GOP decision refer issue to SC./2/ He said GOP very concerned by rising tension in Azad Kashmir and believed Indian moves annex Kashmir must be stopped. He asked for full and positive US support in SC and assistance behind the scene. /2/ On January 16, Foreign Minister Bhutto sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with the Kashmir issue. The text of the letter was conveyed to Washington as an enclosure to airgram A-585 from Karachi, January 18. (Ibid.) Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed informed McConaughy on January 17 of the decision to take the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council. (Telegram 1331 from Karachi, January 17; ibid.) Governor Harriman replied that we believe GOP decision take issue to SC, a decision on which we had not been consulted, was unwise, could achieve little, and might be very harmful in present tense communal situation. He recalled strong US support in 1962 which followed President Kennedy-Ayub discussions in July 1961, but said we were not in position offer same support this time. US would vote for right kind resolution (if resolution proves desirable), but would refrain from active role in view our belief SC debate is wrong approach to problem. US believes bilateral talks to dampen current communal troubles necessary and best step take at this time. Ambassador was informed that we are very concerned that acrimonious debate on Kashmir and inevitable discussion communal strife could spark further massive disorders. (Ahmed appeared genuinely surprised learn scale East Pak disorders.) Also Nehru's illness contributes our view this is very bad time raise Kashmir in SC and Pakistan cannot expect our support if it moves ahead without getting our judgment in advance. Governor stated that over-all GOP policy of trying bring many pressures bear on India was increasing tension in area and would make solution problems more difficult. For example, Pak moves toward Chicoms last year helped scuttle bilateral talks. Ahmed stated that bilateral talks on Kashmir could achieve nothing. Bilateral talks on communal trouble could proceed at same time SC debate but essential thing was get at root of problem--Kashmir. SC debate, he said, would help cool atmosphere. He said he did not know anything about GOP plans or tactics for handling issue in Security Council. Governor repeated our view that SC debate unwise at this time but emphasized that we do not condone India's integration moves and had so informed GOI. Also, it is firm unswerving US policy help find solution Kashmir problem; we simply disagree with current Pak tactics. In our view solution more likely in atmosphere of goodwill than strain. Comment: Strong line here was necessary as we fear from Embtels 1354 and 1360/3/ GOP may be under misapprehension about extent of assistance we will give them in SC. Ambassador's reaction confirmed this impression. We hope Embassy will continue make clear to GOP as instructed Deptel 940/4/ that we will not play previous leading role. Both Karachi and Delhi should avoid indicating specific nature of any proposal we would be prepared support in SC since USUN will require flexibility in its discussions with principal parties and other members of SC. Further guidance re SC handling will follow./5/ /3/ In telegram 1354 from Karachi, January 20, McConaughy reported that, in accord- ance with instructions from the Department, he informed Aziz Ahmed that the United States would not actively support Pakistan's appeal to the Security Council. McConaughy observed, however, that the Foreign Secretary's response made clear that Pakistan was determined to highlight the need for progress on the Kashmir issue. Telegram 1360 from Karachi, January 21, reported another conversation between McConaughy and Aziz Ahmed on Pakistan's appeal to the United Nations. Ahmed expressed confidence that U.S. influence on the issue would be exercised on behalf of a constructive solution, but McConaughy noted that the United States could not be expected to get out in front in support of the independent Pakistani initiative. (Both ibid.) /4/ Dated January 18. (Ibid., POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK/UN) /5/ McConaughy reported on January 23 that he raised the matter of the referral of the Kashmir issue to the United Nations with President Ayub that morning. McConaughy questioned the wisdom of the course, pointing out that it would antagonize India without producing any progress if India did not wish to cooperate. Ayub remained firm in his determination. (Telegram 128 from Rawalpindi to Karachi, repeated to Washington, January 23; ibid.) Rusk
10. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 27, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Kashmir, Vol. I, 12/63-7/64. Secret. SUBJECT Pakistan has requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider "the grave situation that has arisen in the states of Jammu and Kashmir" and "the danger that it poses to peace in the region." Pakistan's case encompasses the steps taken by India to integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union./2/ These steps, Pakistan claims, violate the resolutions of the Security Council. Pakistan's case also emphasizes Indian denial of human rights in Kashmir and Indian failure to bring under control the communal riots in Calcutta. /2/ On January 21, President Ayub sent a letter to President Johnson arguing the necessity for Pakistan to take the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council. (Ibid., Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. 1, President Ayub Correspondence, 12/15/63-12/31/65) Events Leading Up to Referral to Security Council The present series of events leading up to Pakistan's return to the Security Council began with the failure of bilateral talks in the spring of 1963 and the rejection by both India and Pakistan of the U.S./U.K. mediation proposal. Thereafter, both sides reverted to previous uncompromising positions on Kashmir and Pakistan started its quest for new ways of "leaning on India." When, last fall, the Indians announced the latest in a long series of moves to integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union, Pakistan protested vigorously. India remained undeterred. Pakistan then sought to dramatize its case by playing up incidents along the cease-fire line at Chaknot and near Poonch. India carefully avoided being provoked. Pakistan also alleged the Indians were misusing U.S. arms along the cease-fire line. India, in the east, resumed the eviction of Muslims, many of whom had entered India illegally, from Assam into East Pakistan. Inconclusive discussions took place regarding possible Indo-Pak talks on this issue. Pakistan ordered the closing of the Indian consular office at Rajshahi, despite the adverse effect this had on the prospects for negotiations on the eviction issue. India continued a policy of relative restraint and did not retaliate. Against this background, the Kashmir demonstrations over the theft of a relic of the Prophet broke out in late December. (See our memorandum of December 31, 1963.)/3/ This mass display of feeling clearly indicated a lack of confidence in the local Kashmir Government, dominated by the Bakshi family, on which the Government of India had depended for ten years. Although information is scanty because of tight Indian control, available reports indicate, however, that the demonstrations were not in support of Pakistan. /3/ Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 351. Triggered by the furor in Pakistan over the Kashmir demonstrations and the Indian Muslim eviction policy, communal rioting in East Pakistan followed. The rioting spread across the border to Calcutta, where it became much more serious, and then back to East Pakistan in Dacca and Narayanganj. (See our memorandum of January 16, 1964.)/4/ /4/ Document 4. United States Action When the Indians announced their moves further to integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union we told them we considered such action unfortunate. As tension increased along the cease-fire line we urged both sides to exercise restraint and informally discussed the situation with the United Nations Secretariat. When the demonstrations over the theft of the relic took place in Kashmir we urged both countries to avoid making this a new issue between them. As communal rioting became serious we persuaded the British to propose Indo-Pak talks and we supported their initiative. This action was, however, overtaken by the Pak decision to go to the Security Council. Although we doubted we could dissuade the Paks from this course, we supported a British initiative to reverse this decision on the grounds that the best way to deal with the serious communal disturbances was to hold bilateral talks leading to joint action. Our experience during this period has thus shown that our leverage has been slight on these issues. Pakistan's Referral to the Security Council In coming to the Security Council at this time, Pakistan is continuing its policy of "leaning on India." As will be indicated in more detail below, India's position has been weakened by a number of factors, some related and some unrelated to its quarrel with Pakistan. By contrast, Ayub currently enjoys a strong political position and so probably feels he is in good shape to exploit India's weakness, although he probably finds the Dacca riots an embarrassment. Pakistan is probably seeking many of the same objectives in the Security Council it has in previous debates. These include focusing world attention on Kashmir and India's failure to carry out the U.N. resolutions, obtaining a reaffirmation of the Security Council's position on Kashmir, and reminding Kashmiris that there is hope for a change in status in Kashmir. There are new factors which form a background for Pakistan's move in the Security Council, however. Pakistan is concerned over the new U.S. relationship with India. It has begun a "normalization" of its relations particularly with Communist China but also with the Soviet Union and other bloc countries and initiated an effort to exert a more influential role in the Afro-Asian bloc. Pakistan did not consult us prior to its referral to the Security Council and it apparently was aware that our support might be considerably less active than in the past. It may be that Pakistan is considering how, without abandoning its present legal position, it can move the Kashmir issue into a new framework so that greater Afro-Asian support can be gained. The emphasis that Pakistan is giving to the human rights aspects of the question suggests such a possible new framework, one which might also be effective in the General Assembly. Pakistan may also be interested in testing Western and Soviet attitudes on Kashmir prior to Chou En-lai's visit. This is a factor we shall have to keep in mind in developing our strategy in the Security Council. India's Position Pakistan has brought India to the Security Council at a time of particular Indian weakness. India is greatly embarrassed by its troubles in Kashmir where the Indian-supported regime has been repudiated by the people. Its policy of expelling Muslims from Assam which was a contributing factor to the riots in Bengal, has the appearance of being inconsistent with India's own concept of a secular state. In Calcutta India has suffered the worst communal rioting at least since 1950. India has additional unrelated troubles to worry about. Its economy has become sluggish. It is anxiously eyeing the peregrinations of Chou En-lai, fearful that he may convince India's erstwhile Afro-Asian friends to support China's position regarding Sino-Indian border talks. The popularity of the Congress Party is declining. Finally, just at this time, India has been deprived of effective leadership by Nehru's illness, and is undergoing an intense domestic power struggle. (The appointment of Lal Bahadur Shastri to the Cabinet is not likely to lessen this struggle.) Under these conditions, it is difficult to predict how India will react to Pakistan's taking Kashmir to the Security Council. It seems most unlikely that India will respond with concessions on Kashmir. Rather, the danger is that India may feel impelled to take strong action to recoup its position in Kashmir. It might try to accomplish this by political moves to increase central control over Kashmir and by a strong, emotional line in the U.N. debate. Such moves could cause a resumption of communal rioting. Lurking in the background in India will be Krishna Menon, who has always made great political capital by attacking Pakistan. He will be quick to seize upon any opportunity, presented either by apparent Western support of the Pak position, or by too moderate an Indian defense, in order to continue to rebuild his political position. The manner in which various GOI leaders handle this question may noticeably affect their position in the struggle to succeed Nehru, which is now going on in India. This may both limit their flexibility and increase temptations to resort to demagoguery. It follows, therefore, that from the standpoint of India's future, and our relationship with India, we are entering a very critical period, and every action the U.S. takes must be calculated with this in view. United States Stance We believe we should "back off" somewhat from our previous active substantive role on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council, at least until we see more clearly what the GOP and GOI strategy will be and whether the climate of debate will admit of constructive action. Pakistan made its decision to take the issue to the U.N. without consulting us. We believe the move ill-advised and more likely to stimulate further rioting than to stem it. We discharged our obligation to Ayub to support him on Kashmir in the Security Council when the issue came up in the Security Council in the winter and spring of 1962. At that time it was only as the result of President Kennedy's personal intercession with the Irish Ambassador that we were able to obtain a sponsor for a resolution acceptable to Pakistan. Since that time developments in the bilateral talks and our abortive mediation efforts gave us opportunities to reiterate to the GOP that we saw quiet diplomacy as the only constructive way to move ahead but the GOP and the GOI were unreceptive. We certainly do not intend to abandon our previous position in support of Security Council resolutions on Kashmir, but neither do we see any purpose served by mere reaffirmation since it has become clear that this will not advance but instead, might retard a solution. In the bilateral talks Pakistan signified willingness to consider approaches other than a plebiscite and India recognized that the status of Kashmir was in dispute and territorial adjustments might be necessary. We see little or no prospect for progress toward a Kashmir settlement under the present conditions. Security Council consideration is likely to stiffen India's position at least for the time being. Our leverage is demonstrably low. The Chinese military pressure on India has eased. The Pak-Chicom relationship has become such that the Indians question what benefit they would get in terms of their national security from the major concessions they would have to make to reach agreement on Kashmir. The immediate problem which must be faced on the subcontinent is the communal tensions and the dislocations caused by the recent riots which still smolder under heavy military and police control. Interlarded is the festering problem of Kashmir which is the focus of the Pakistan Security Council complaint. Unless a satisfactory arrangement is made on the communal problem, massive migration could take place which could affect our interest in the area as well as those of India and Pakistan. The communal disturbances appear to be under control for the present, although they could erupt again at any time. We are working quietly behind the scenes to try to moderate the forthcoming debate in the Security Council, which otherwise might exacerbate the situation. We hope the debate can be brought to a rapid conclusion without passage of a resolution and that the Indians and the Pakistanis can be brought together in talks. The Secretary-General has indicated to Governor Stevenson his willingness to offer his good offices to the parties in whatever manner they might feel useful, but we do not yet know the results of the Secretary-General's efforts in this regard. At the same time, we expect our Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi to continue quietly urging talks leading to joint Indo-Pak action. Underlying our strategy is our view that the Hindu-Muslim problem is a deep-rooted one which must be faced squarely by India and Pakistan and that we should not inject ourselves in such a way that either party looks to us to bring about a solution. John McKesson/5/ /5/ McKesson signed for Read above Read's typed signature. [Continue with the next documents]
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