The U.S. Army School of the Americas
and U.S. National Interests in the 20th Century

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Abstract

The training of Latin American militaries at the United States Army School of the Americas has lasted through many stages of U.S. foreign policy. The training of approximately 55,000 Latin American civilian, military, and police personnel throughout the USARSA’s 54-year existence placed the United States in an influential position to achieve U.S. national interests. Prior to World War II, the training of Latin American militaries was intended to supplant German and Italian military missions. As the Allies neared victory in WWII, training programs formalized to sustain Inter-American military cooperation. The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the Soviet Union’s pledge to spread communism created a bipolar superpower conflict. As Cold War flashpoints arose such as the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, the school continuously reorganized to grant the United States a clear political advantage to influence rising military leaders, government leaders, and consequently its political system and the future relations with that country. This thesis will examine one element of U.S. foreign policy, formerly the United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA), now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation to determine whether this institution served U.S. interests, and if so, when and how did it accomplish its mission.
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Introduction

“Foreign policies are not built upon abstractions. They are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective.”

Charles E. Hughes, Former U.S. Secretary of State

The United States has always had a profound interest in Latin American societies and in its relations with those societies. It is in the United States’ national interest that there exist in its hemisphere stable, friendly, prosperous nation-states that permit the free movement of goods and services in and through the region and that no hostile foreign powers exercise influence there. Military assistance programs intended to counter outside influence have been at the heart of U.S. and Latin American countries bilateral relations. The training of Latin American militaries at the United States Army School of the Americas has lasted through many stages of U.S. foreign policy. This thesis will examine one element of U.S. foreign policy, formerly the United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA), now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation to determine whether this institution served U.S. interests.

The USARSA originated from jungle training operations in the Panama Canal Zone. After WWII, training operations were solidified in 1946 with the creation of the Latin American Training Center-Ground Division at Fort Amador in the Canal Zone. Four years later, it was renamed the U.S. Army Caribbean School and moved to Fort Gulick, where Spanish became the official language of instruction. It gained the name, U.S. Army School of the Americas, in July 1963. The Panama Canal Treaty and internal conflicts with Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega forced the school to move to its
current location at Fort Benning, Georgia in 1984. The USARSA graduated 60,428 officers, cadets, noncommissioned officers, police and civilian defense officials from 22 Latin American countries and the United States.\(^1\)

While military training programs were used as one element of a changing foreign policy, its underlying purpose has always been to maintain influence with the region’s militaries and governments. This influence shifted in the 1960s as the United States’ struggle with communism heated up. The U.S. pledged to support Latin American governments in the fight to combat communist insurgency. Soon, Latin American governments manipulated the intended purpose of training at the USARSA for their benefit. Latin American countries cried that “communist insurgency” could undermine their U.S. economically supported democratic (or “democratic authoritative”) governments. The United States was all too obliging to increase arms sales and the military training that accompanied the sales.

What follows is an examination of the military training programs at the USARSA, within the context of past U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. This study will examine the changing paradigms that altered the mission of training programs at the school, including the purpose behind military training programs for Latin America, the school’s history and growth to align its mission with White House directives, and the extra-hemispheric influence that forced the school to adapt and eventually make its own foreign policy for the U.S. Army. Did the school’s creation stem from a necessity

to defend the Panama Canal during World War II or did it provide justification for a massive arms buildup to attain military cooperation to create an Inter-American military system? Was the continuation of training programs after World War II necessary after the defeat of the Axis powers? Did U.S. military planners take advantage of the world situation to establish training schools for Latin American militaries to combat communist insurgency or maintain that each government align itself with the United States? The answers to these questions can perhaps explain the true origins of the USARSA, its role in twentieth century U.S. foreign policy, and why it is under intense scrutiny today for its past actions that were intended to serve U.S. national interests in Latin America.

Sources

Many historians and social scientists examine U.S. foreign policy in Latin America within the Cold War context. Martha Huggins is quick to point out that today no single all-powerful ideology explains U.S. assistance to foreign police and military, as did the Cold War containment doctrine from the 1950s through the 1980s. This study traces U.S. involvement primarily in the Panama Canal Zone, where the Army training school was located. To accomplish this, histories of the Panama Canal were necessary to determine the origins and growth of military training in the Canal Zone. Guarding the United States and Its Outposts by Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, describes

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the organization of the U.S. Army prior to and during World War II in the Caribbean. John Child’s Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System 1938-1978 establishes a sound foundation to understand the bureaucratic wrangling between the War and State Departments to attain Inter-American military cooperation. This allows me to develop an alternative thesis to the official history of the USARSA by Joseph Leuer concerning the purpose and establishment of training programs for Latin American militaries in the Canal Zone.

Martha Huggins’s insightful work on the evolution of Latin American police assistance training, Political Policing: The United States and Latin America helps to understand the politics driving the growth of military and police training programs like those at the USARSA during the 1950s and 1960s. Working from her thesis that internationalizing security makes the recipient governments of Latin America inferior to the United States, helped create the alternative theory that Latin American governments took advantage of the bipolar conflict to receive more arms and training from its “protectorate.”

As this work explores the changing international situation in the 1960s, Brian Loveman provides the dynamics between Latin American militaries and their governments. He highlights the growth of repressive regimes and the support they received from the United States as long as they did not go communist. Stephen Rabe’s look into the Kennedy Administration in The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America provides the response to
uncover the motives of the new administration pertaining to these wars of national revolution. This work made me question where the USARSA fit in to Kennedy’s renamed Eisenhower plan for economic development and internal security, the Alliance for Progress. Primary source material from the National Security Archives provides evidence that military training programs were a top priority for the new Administration and the creation of the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency testified to this. Chapter 2 refers to these documents to conclude that after a visit to the Caribbean School in 1962 by Robert Kennedy, head of the SPCI, the USARSA did not structure its curriculum based on the needs of the Latin American militaries. Rather, it restructured its organization to ensure that counter-insurgency doctrine was applied to all courses in accordance with SGCI directives.

Exploring the resources allocated to the USARSA and its predecessors demonstrates continuity or lack thereof of support for its continued operation. Placing these resources in context with the growth or decline of USARSA’s attendance indicates the priority that military training programs had on the “mood” of Presidential and Congressional support since the 1940s. Lars Schoultz’s work Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America presents expenditures of the military assistance program to demonstrate the reduced bilateral military relationship during the Carter Administration. This correlates to the congressional pressure concerning the continued operation of the USARSA. Post-Vietnam military expenditures were carefully scrutinized
and expenditures for Latin America certainly seemed non-essential. Furthermore, the training at the USARSA no longer seemed necessary.

Valuable interviews grant the ability to vividly describe the environment in which the USARSA was established and operated. USARSA instructors Dr. Russell W. Ramsey and Joseph Leuer were instrumental in gaining the school’s perspective on the allegations of atrocities by a small number of its graduates. Furthermore, Dr. Ramsey was the instructor at the U.S. Caribbean School for the first counter-insurgency course at the school in 1961. Joseph Leuer completed an official history of the USARSA in October 2000. In some cases, this study offers different hypotheses to certain particulars of the USARSA and its role in U.S. foreign policy. However, his study provides a valuable framework to model any study of a particular military institution.

Visits to the school and the city of Columbus, Georgia provide the necessary environment to determine the truth behind certain allegations posed by the detractors of the USARSA. The unrestricted access to the library and its helpful staff allowed me to gather information from the school’s course catalogs pertaining to courses, dates, number of students, and faculty. Chapter 2 uses the supplemental course catalog published after Robert Kennedy’s visit to demonstrate the restructuring of the school and its mission. The USARSA staff provided me additional access to the school and media briefings during the annual SOA Watch rally in November 2000. The benefit of being present and asking the detractors, including Father Roy Bourgeois leader of the SOA Watch, why they protested the school helped shape the thesis question, whose
interests does the School of the Americas serve? In addition to persons presently involved with the school, interviews with former instructors such as Otto Reich, former instructor of counter-insurgency and civic affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela who is now being considered to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs provided both first-hand and political viewpoints concerning the school’s mission.

**Evolving Stages of Growth**

The structure of the USARSA’s history is broken down into four stages that reflect evolving U.S. foreign policy paradigms. First, although involvement in Latin America dates back well into the 19th century, the creation of military training to secure U.S. interests in the region can be traced to the Panama Canal Defense Forces upon the Canal’s completion in 1914. When the Allies fought the Axis Powers, the United States sought Inter-American military cooperation for the protection of the Canal Zone. To accomplish this, U.S. military aid programs were implemented including the training necessary to operate the allocated equipment and arms. The “hemispheric defense” rationale soon expired as the Allies defeated the Axis powers. However, the training and aid programs were continued and formalized into the creation of the Latin American Training Center since the United States recognized that the professionalization of the military protected U.S. interests, including military bases and economic investment, not to the mention the influence the United States now had on
Latin American governments. As the Cold War heated up, the United States feared that internal communist insurgencies could upset the geopolitical balance of power.

During the Kennedy Administration and into the middle 1970s, the school grew, both in size and in importance to overall foreign policy aims. Counter-insurgency operations became the fundamental aspect of all courses at the renamed United States Army School of the Americas. The emphasis on counter-insurgency dwindled in the post-Vietnam United States. Public opinions changed concerning military spending and the impact of the Carter Administration on U.S. foreign policy drastically affected the school in size and overall mission. President Carter reflected critics’ views that felt that the United States should not support “bad governments.” Instead of training militaries under corrupt regimes with poor human rights’ records, he restricted 9 countries from receiving training at the USARSA. Furthermore, Carter signed the Panama Canal Treaty turning over sovereignty of the Canal Zone to the Panamanians. The school’s days in Panama were numbered. The school managed to continue operations in the late 1970s until a resurgence of aid and a reliance on training programs were renewed by the new Reagan Administration.

Geopolitical realities within the Cold War context forced the United States to once again thwart communism in the Western Hemisphere. The Reagan Administration allowed non-democratic governments to receive aid and training as long as they were anti-communists. However, once the USARSA moved to the United States in December 1984, the public and policy makers again felt that the training of
Latin American militaries was not necessary. After limited, but intense U.S. interaction with Latin America in the late 1980s, the Soviet Union collapsed ending the bipolar world power paradigm. The United States adopted a policy of engagement with Latin American militaries in the 1990s. Pressure from peace-activists and a non-governmental organization called the SOA Watch brought growing congressional and public pressure on the USARSA. Today, the school has once again changed its name and its mission. In conclusion, as U.S. foreign policy changes, the USARSA, or rather the WHISC continues to operate regardless of scrutiny while seemingly attaining changing U.S. interests in Latin America.

**Analytical Framework**

There is more than ample literature on U.S. involvement in Latin America, but it is almost always viewed as imperialist U.S. hegemony interfering in the politics of Latin American societies. John Child refers to the Inter-American military system as an “Unequal Alliance” and Peter Smith’s biased work, Talons of the Eagle, portrays the United States as the “Colossus of the North” (pg. 189) repressing Latin American governments. Without placing the United States as an imperialistic actor, Chapter 1, “The Basis for U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America” examines the origins of military involvement in Panama and the establishment of training programs for U.S. personnel and eventually Latin American militaries. It explains that U.S. military training was instituted to supplant German and French military influence. However, once WWII
erupted, hemisphere defense became the driving force for the massive buildup of military arms sales which substantiated the necessity of military training programs, like the Latin America Ground School, the predecessor of the USARSA.

This study relies on previous work done by John Child who explores the dynamics among the War Department and the State Department concerning arms sales and training programs for post-war Latin American governments. Primary sources from the Truman Administration demonstrate that Inter-American military cooperation was left in the hands of the military planners not State Department officials. Examining the international cooperative agreements such as the Rio Treaty and the Organization of American States places the training of Latin American militaries in perspective to attain U.S. national interests for the hemisphere. Finally, Chapter 1 shows the growth of the U.S. Caribbean School at Fort Gulick in the 1950s to demonstrate the evolving interests that the United States had in Latin America during the early stages of the Cold War.

Twentieth century U.S. foreign policy paradigms in Latin America have always been based on influencing Latin American countries’ policies. However, to consider that U.S. intervention only serves U.S. national interests is only half-correct. When the United States created foreign policy doctrines determined by its super-power rivalry in the Cold War, Latin American governments benefited greatly from their ability to “cry wolf” concerning communist subversion. Chapter 2, “The Counterinsurgency Heyday” examines the shifting priorities for U.S. foreign policy with the incoming Kennedy Administration. Using National Security Action Memorandums during Kennedy’s
brief, but productive time in the White House, the linkage between the training of Latin American militaries and the priorities of the President are made very clear. This study explains that the little studied Special Group for Counter-Insurgency (SGCI), headed by Robert Kennedy, made the USARSA a key element of its overall scheme for Latin American economic growth and stability. Furthermore, the USARSA placed an increased emphasis on counter-insurgency training for all Latin American militaries, including the training of Cuban nationals to align itself with directives from the SPCI, thereby ensuring its continued existence. Chapter 2 closes with the “Carter valley,” pertaining to the expenditures allocated for training programs like the USARSA and how U.S. foreign policy in Latin America in the late 1970s was based on Human Rights.

For the past 11 years, thousands of peace activists, social groups, students, and other non-governmental organizations gather each November to honor the deaths of Archbishop Oscar Romero and four United States churchwomen in hopes to close the USARSA, or as critics label it a “School for Dictators” and the “School of Assassins.” Allegations that graduates of the USARSA were identified as participants in various atrocities and human rights violations among other incidents provide a great deal of evidence to question whether the USARSA should remain a tool for U.S. foreign policy. Chapter 3, “Running from its History?” explores the changes the USARSA has made since its move to the United States in 1984. The collapse of the bipolar world power paradigm in 1991 forced the United States to alter many of its foreign policies. Military
training programs were not overlooked, but neither were allegations of atrocities committed by a small number of its graduates.

Congressional members backed by a non-governmental organization call the “SOA Watch” struggled to cut funding for the school for the past decade. Intense debates arose concerning the necessity of the USARSA in the post-Cold War world. Chapter 3 seeks to determine the origins for the conflict concerning the USARSA, the players involved and the ideologies behind their rhetoric. This study hopes to address whether the fight to close the school concerns overall foreign policy or whether the fight by the SOA Watch is a personal struggle that has gained Congressional support and national recognition from numerous peace activists and the media honing in on a U.S. institution being condemned by celebrities like Martin Sheen and Susan Sarandon. In conclusion, this study determines what difference the school made to U.S. foreign policy goals in Latin America and whether the training of Latin American militaries at the USARSA served U.S. national interests.
Chapter 1 “The Basis for U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America”

U.S. involvement in Latin America in the twentieth century has always been based on influence. Military assistance programs have been at the heart of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Latin American countries. There are two distinctly different periods that typify U.S. military assistance in Latin America during the twentieth century; 1914-1960 and from 1961-present. U.S. interests in Latin America date back to the early 19th century, but with the establishment of the Panama Canal in 1903, Central America and the Caribbean assumed an even greater strategic importance for the United States. First, U.S. military training was instituted to supplant German and French military influence. Secondly, once WWII erupted, hemisphere defense became the driving force for the massive buildup of military arms sales, which substantiated the necessity of military training programs, like the predecessor of the USARSA. After WWII, the Cold War containment ideology effectively allowed the continuation of military assistance training programs to combat the perceived Communist threat.

This chapter is a study of the purposes and history of U.S. military presence in the Panama Canal Zone and the eventual creation of military training programs there. Examining the center of U.S. military training programs in Latin America at the U.S. Army School of the Americas will suggest that the implicit goals and priorities of training indigenous military forces were always based on political influence thereby serving U.S. national interests.
Purposes of Latin American Military Training

With the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, the U.S. developed and clarified a coherent policy focusing on unilateral promotion of the stability of the regional governments in order to create favorable markets, enhance U.S. influence, and deter foreign competition in the region. The paramount ideology guiding U.S. interests in Latin America are the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, which maintains that any European influence in Latin America will be seen as a threat to the safety of the United States. However, in the eyes of Washington policy makers during the twentieth century, it was the lack of stability among Latin American governments that threatened United States national security.

In 1903, the Panamanians revolted against their Colombian “overlords” with the hopes that the United States would recognize their independence. The United States responded when President Theodore Roosevelt ordered the marines into the Panama Canal Zone. Soon after the show of force and suppressing a landing of Colombian soldiers, Roosevelt remarked that, “I took the Canal Zone.” In accordance with the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, U.S. forces were stationed in the Canal Zone for the continued defense of the Panama Canal. By June of 1915, that force had been increased by two additional Infantry regiments, a company of Engineers, a company of Signal

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Corps, an ambulance company, four more companies of Coast Artillery, and a detachment of the Hospital Corps, with a total strength of 6,248.5

In addition to protecting the Canal, Washington policy makers determined that the increase of German and Italian military missions in Latin America threatened the United States’ “protectorate” position.6 To supplant this extra-hemisphere influence, the United States established 32 military missions between 1920 and 1938 to assist Latin American nations build and professionalize their military organizations under U.S. doctrine. The U.S. established police-military constabularies in Haiti, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Panama thereby internationalizing U.S. security.7 These constabularies vied for influence with Italy’s, France’s and Germany’s police and military training programs. More importantly however, the influence that military training offered bilateral government relations superceded any other intentions of U.S. training of Latin American militaries.

It soon became evident that military training programs placed the U.S. in an influential position to alter local politics. For example, U.S. trained Rafael Trujillo Molina, rose through the ranks of the Dominican National Guard to later assume the presidency. In addition, when the U.S. withdrew from Nicaragua in 1933, they left Anastasio Somoza as chief of the National Guard, who later became a repressive

5 American Legacy in Panama.  
6 For a more in-depth discussion of Latin America’s view of the United States as a “protectorate” see Martha Huggins, 1998, Pg. 26.  
While the 1930’s political climate in Latin America began to flood with authoritative governments, Nazism spread across Europe and eventually penetrated Latin America.

**World War II threatens United States’ interests**

The Colombian airline SCADTA had plenty of reserve Luftwaffe pilots based within striking distance of the Panama Canal. In addition, when U.S. forces apprehended Fascist elements of the Abwehr spying on U.S. shipping and military maneuvers in the Panama Canal Zone, U.S. interests were threatened and the security of the Canal became top priority. Russell W. Ramsey and Martha Huggins have thoroughly documented the use of the FBI to counter Germany’s clandestine operations in Latin America. The War and Navy Departments sought Latin American cooperation, with the help of existing military missions, to establish bases in and around the Panama Canal. However, the Military Departments acted very independent of the State Department in “cooperating” with Latin American republics while creating radar posts to listen for an aerial attack and increasing the number of U.S. personnel in the Canal Zone.

To administer the rapid increase of new bases in and around the Canal Zone, and to quell issues of command between the various Army and Navy forces in the area, the Caribbean Defense Command was officially activated on 10 February 1941, and ten

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8 Huggins, Pg. 41
9 Ramsey, Russell. Guardians of the Other Americas, Pg. 174.
days later General Daniel Van Voorhis, then the commander of the Panama Canal Department, assumed command.\textsuperscript{10} The U.S. Caribbean Defense Command (CDC) was responsible for the defense of the Panama Canal Zone. The CDC was one component responsible for defending its section of the United States in accordance with the U.S. War Department’s plan to divide the United States into regional commands. The graph below shows the organizational defense structure for the Western Hemisphere.

\begin{center}
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The movement of materiel, troops and supplies through the Canal was a critical part of the war effort. While Panama and the Canal both escaped enemy attack, a damaging U-boat campaign was carried out against shipping in the Caribbean. From February through December 1942, some 270 ships in the area had been sunk by U-boats. The peak of the German U-boat threat came in the summer of 1942. In the month of

\textsuperscript{10} Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Vol. 12, pt. 2, Pg. 330.
June alone, 29 vessels were sunk in the Atlantic Sector of the Panama Sea Frontier.\textsuperscript{12} The Caribbean Defense Command reached peak strength of 119,000 in December 1942. Of these personnel, over half were stationed in Panama to protect the Canal from attack or sabotage.\textsuperscript{13} This massive increase fostered the need to establish more bases for the continued cooperation among the United States and Latin American republics.

The efforts to establish the Inter-American military system are well documented. Of the three Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Third Meeting of Consultation in January 1942 had key importance to the method that helped establish military assistance training programs. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor added extra drama as well as a sense of urgency to create a multilateral organization with hemispheric defense in mind, at least in the United States’ interests. This timely meeting led to the establishment of the controversial Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), which actually later substantiated the creation of Spanish Language training schools. The IADB was controversial since the War Department and the State Department did not agree on the method for Inter-American military cooperation. John Child’s Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System 1938-1978, explores the tensions growing between the State Department and the Military Departments attending the conference. However, the tensions that surfaced in this third meeting in Rio had already been determined a year earlier.

\textsuperscript{12} Ib\textsuperscript{id.} Pg. 424
\textsuperscript{13} Ib\textsuperscript{id.}, Pg. 414.
The Military Departments convened several bilateral relationships prior to the establishment of the IADB. Military officials understood that Latin American military cooperation came at a price. Several Staff Conferences (formal bilateral meetings conducted in the late 1930’s between the Military Departments and Latin American militaries) formulated plans to increase Latin American military and naval establishments as approved in a Joint Resolution authorized by President Roosevelt in June 1940 that allowed the Military Departments to sell arms to Latin American countries. This seemingly “arms in exchange for military cooperation and bases in American republics” motive was formalized in 1941.

The Lend-Lease Act of 21 March 1941, allowed Latin American militaries to purchase training and war materiel. Since Latin American governments could not purchase military equipment from Europe any longer due to the war, the United States became the primary supplier of arms and training for American militaries. Total Lend-Lease spending for Latin America reached approximately $400,000,000 by 1945. Interestingly, the President granted the Military Departments of the Caribbean wide-ranging authority to establish priorities for the administration of the Lend-Lease program.¹⁴ This diplomatic responsibility was usually granted to the State Department who contrarily stressed the value of the IADB to secure military cooperation rather than the more bilateral emphasis on arms transfers and military missions favored by the U.S.

War and Navy Departments.\textsuperscript{15} This prompted the State Department to accuse the U.S. Military Departments of making their own foreign policy.\textsuperscript{16} A 21 November 1944 State Department memo intended to review the steps to correct improper U.S. military practices in dealing with Latin America, but more importantly designed to bring these acts to the President’s attention, implicated CDC commander General George H. Brett for dealing directly with Latin Chiefs of Staff without State Department consultation.\textsuperscript{17} Another accusation was that military arms were being sent to American republics that were controlled by dictators such as Somoza of Nicaragua and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. This criticism became a recurring theme in the Military Assistance Programs in the 1950s. However, with the Lend-Lease program, the U.S. military achieved its objectives to acquire bases in American republics. Once the Lend-Lease Program expired in 1945, the question became how to keep the military installations?

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. Pg. 73.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, Pg. 48.
\textsuperscript{17} Cited in Child, Pg. 76. U.S. Department of State. \textit{Memo: Certain Activities of War Department and Army Officers in the Other American Republics, 21 November 1944, SWNCC Box 139, Record Group 353, National Archives.}
The Creation of Military Training in the Canal Zone

As early as May 1944, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) formally considered the problem of military collaboration with Latin America with a JCS paper recommending the need to engage in conversation with the Latin nations to determine and influence their views on post-war cooperation. The JCS wanted to persuade the Latin military establishments to employ U.S. weapons, doctrine and training instead of European arms and indoctrination. Additionally, the IADB produced the “Report on Post-War Military Problems” developed from a study in late 1943 on post-war military cooperation that built on existing training programs. One of its conclusions called for the “fellowship and exchange of personnel among the Armed Forces of the Hemisphere to encourage unified training and contacts among the general staffs of the Hemisphere.” The CDC commander reiterated this sentiment and argued for the post-war expansion of the training in the Panama Canal zone saying that, “the end of the War would be a key turning point in U.S.-Latin military relations at which the United States would either consolidate or lose all that had been gained through wartime military collaboration.” These attitudes substantiated the intentions of U.S. military planners to create a central training ground for Latin America militaries instead of relying on separate military missions.

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18 Child, Pg. 72.
19 Ibid, Pg. 73.
20 Cited in Child, Pg. 84. U.S. Army, Caribbean Defense Command, Commanding General, Letter to General Hull, 16 May 1945, Entry 418, Box 946, Rg. 165, National Archives.
The Chapultepec Conference in March 1945 solidified U.S. military planners’ objectives to create a permanent Inter-American military cooperative organization. Essentially, the conference called for a closer military collaboration among all the Governments and for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. This key meeting became, as Child argues, the “genesis of the Rio Treaty (collective security) in 1947.”

Once the Lend-Lease Act expired in June 1945 and the War had ended, the United States once again vied against European influence over surplus arms sales. In many post-war bilateral military to military conferences, the U.S. military felt that the standardization of equipment, training, organization and doctrine were essential to obtain, “true integration of Inter-American defense.” The U.S. military departments were prepared to continue supplying Latin American nations the necessary arms and training to achieve “hemispheric defense and solidarity” and more central to U.S. interests, military bases gained during WWII.

In order to maintain the access to bases in the Canal Zone, each service formalized existing training programs to instruct foreign militaries correct procedures for the purchased equipment. The State, War, and Navy Departments in a statement titled SWNCC 4/ 10 sought congressional authorization for a program to provide the needed military equipment and training. Pending the passage of specific legislation, the Departments decided to use the provisions of the Surplus War Property Act of 1944 to begin “the indoctrination, training, and equipment of the armed forces of the other

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21 Child, Pg. 80. Definition added.
American republics.”23 The Military Departments knew that the only way to substantiate the increased arms sales to Congress was to continue training programs from WWII. Training programs also legitimated to Congress that the United States was not giving Latin American governments arms without thorough indoctrination thereby heading off criticism that the arms could be used against the U.S. or other Latin American nations.

During World War II, as Latin American nations declared war on the Axis Powers, the United States military trained several elements of Latin American militaries for the war effort. For example, Peru requested training for 20 aircraft mechanics from the Army Air Corps. The Air Corps responded, provided the maintenance training, and created what became the Air Force branch of training known as the USAF School for Latin America at Albrook Air Force Base in Panama.24 Once the Axis threat subsided however, the training seemed unnecessary. However, instruction continued even after the war as the newly created U.S. Air Force benefited from establishing its training center to legitimize its retention of bases in the Canal Zone, especially Albrook Field.

Closer examination reveals that the training of Latin American militaries by the U.S. Army in the Canal Zone came well before the Axis threat. The defense of the

22 Ibid, Pg. 89.
23 Rabe, 1974, Pg. 136.
24 Morton, Glenn A. “The Inter-American Air Forces Academy,” Air University Review, n.d., 16. The USAF School for Latin America was established to “...provide training in Air Force occupational specialties in the students’ native languages for personnel of the Latin American Air Forces and provide
Panama Canal required U.S. forces to operate and train in the jungle. American experiences in conducting training and maneuvers in the jungle began in 1916 with a cross Panama Isthmus trek by a U.S. Army infantry detachment. The Panama Mobile Force of the Panama Canal Department of the United States Army became the expert in jungle operations. Once the Caribbean Defense Command replaced the Panama Canal Department in 1941, it expanded training in jungle operations after being tasked by the War Department to train 1500 replacements for the Pacific Theater. Furthermore, the numerous bloody campaigns in the tropics of the Burma-China-India Theater, and the South Pacific during WWII caused an Army-wide examination of its ability to conduct operations in the jungle. The CDC also placed an emphasis on training ground and air members of the Brazilian military and a Mexican aviation squadron since each waged war on the Axis overseas. The Fort Sherman Military Reservation became the home for jungle-terrain training operations in the Canal Zone. The Army formalized its training programs for U.S. personnel and Latin American militaries with the creation of the Latin American Training Center-Ground Division.

The Latin American Training Center-Ground Division was headquartered at Fort Amador from 1946-1947 since the necessary billeting facilities were already present and since the Headquarters for the newly created U.S. Army Caribbean Command moved to

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26 Ibid.
Fort Amador. Instruction at the Latin American Training Center was on a voluntary basis and courses were taught as needed. In an in-depth study on Spanish language military training schools, Barry Brewer reveals that quotas for the different schools were provided to the chiefs of the military missions in each country, who in turn filled the slots with assistance from that particular country’s minister of war. Training occurred by attaching Latin American personnel to U.S. units in the already existing military missions to provide on-the-job training. An example of this type of training took place when five Guatemalan officers were attached to the 295th Infantry from July to October in 1945 to learn about infantry weapons and jungle operations. According to a notebook prepared for the visit of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Canal Zone in August 1946, 442 officers and 555 enlisted men were trained by August 1946.

Though the majority of training was hands-on, the school was divided into three training departments. The Department of Communications taught the Radio Maintenance and Transmission Chiefs Courses, which were both 22 weeks in duration. The Department of Weapons and Tactics taught the 4-week Basic Infantry Tactics and the Infantry and Cavalry Heavy Weapons Courses, along with an 8-week Basic

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28 After the signing of the National Security Act of 1947, the school’s name was shortened to the Latin American Ground School since the newly created Air Force established the USAF School for Latin America.
31 Ibid, Ch. 3, Pg. 12. Cited from Crittendenberger, 1946: Tab F.
Weapons Course. The Department of Engineers taught the 16-week Basic Engineer Course. After the signing of the National Security Act of 1947, the school became the Latin American Ground School since there would no longer be a need for an air division at the former Latin American Training Center.

Just as military planners were formalizing training programs, they also wanted to find a more permanent substitute to the expired Lend-Lease Act funding instead of relying on the Surplus Act. Again, differences arose between the Military Departments and the State Department concerning military aid to Latin America. The State Department’s opposition to the bill was based on a resentment accusing the military departments’ of having an excessive role in U.S.-Latin American diplomatic relations. Once the Military Departments finally secured State Department approval late in the Congressional session in 1946, President Truman sent the “jointly” prepared proposal to Congress. The Inter-American Military Cooperation Bill (H.R. 6326, S. 2153) recommended the “standardization of the organization and training of the armed forces of the continent.”

Opposition to the proposal did not come from just the State Department, high-profile individuals such as Eleanor Roosevelt and ex-Vice President Wallace spoke out condemning the legislation, saying it would perpetuate military regimes in Latin America as well as place a heavy economic burden on their economies. This type of criticism pertaining to the support of military regimes will

34 Ibid.
again surface throughout the 1950s. The Bill failed to pass in 1946 ultimately due to the delay by the State Department.

Once the Bill was again proposed in 1947, Spruille Braden, the Assistant Secretary of State for American Affairs, recommended a moderate program of military cooperation providing for the maintenance of United States military missions in foreign countries and the training of foreign officers in the United States (to include Canal Zone schools).\(^{35}\) This attempt to pave the way for the formal continuation of Latin American military educational institutions failed to pass in Congress again, but in response to the criticisms in the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act hearings, the Secretaries of War and Navy admitted that, “An arms agreement guaranteed the maintenance of United States military missions and the continued flow of Latin American officers to United States military schools, and thus will our ideals and ways of life be nurtured in Latin America to the eventual exclusion of totalitarianism and other foreign ideologies.”\(^{36}\) This is exactly what the Military Departments had in mind all along with regard to military aid in Latin America; the sole ability to politically influence Latin American militaries and governments with arms sales and the training that accompanied them. In place of the failed Military Cooperation Act still stood the surplus arms agreements, which was extended from December 31, 1947 to June 30, 1948. By that time, the Truman government sold $137,180,000 worth of equipment for the

\(^{36}\) Rabe, 1974, Pg. 139. Fn 23.
price of $11,045,000. This supply and the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) on September 2, 1947, re-instituted the security regime for the hemisphere and established procedures for its operation.

The Growth of Military Training in the Canal Zone After Rio

By the 1930s it had been determined that, because of differing hospital requirements between military personnel and PCC employees, there was a need for independent hospital facilities. In 1939, Congress approved funding for the construction of three Army hospitals at Fort Clayton, Fort Gulick and Fort Kobbe. During the height of WWII, the United States military invested $13,327,911 developing Fort Gulick with $1,960,618 allocated to construct Building #400 for use as a military hospital for the recovery of wounded veterans. By the end of 1948, the requirements for the hospital waned and rather than lose the newly created property as well as the need to meet the expanding number of trainees, training operations moved to Fort Gulick’s vacated hospital. On 1 February 1949, the former Latin American Ground School was inaugurated on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal as the U.S. Army Caribbean School (USARCARIB). The school continued to operate in the same manner, but with the signing of the Rio Treaty, which guaranteed mutual security of American states, the United States took the lead in the newly created security regime.

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37 Ibid. Pg. 141.
Since 1945, formal economic military assistance to Latin America did not come until the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which permitted Latin American nations to acquire arms on a reimbursable basis. The spread of communism and the United States’ subsequent entry into the Korean Conflict in 1951, helped propel the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (NSC 56/2). This Act originated from the National Security Council to solidify Inter-American military cooperation with NSC 56/2, “United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration.” Essentially, Congress specifically declared that the United States Government could furnish military assistance to Latin American governments to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. According to G. Pope Atkins, the signing of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 became the basis for U.S.-Latin American military relations. This act, which essentially guaranteed the same conditions as the failed Inter-American Military Cooperation Bill for the signatories of the Rio Treaty, provided for direct grants, no longer on a reimbursable basis, of military equipment for selected states under bilateral agreements called Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements; a total of sixteen such agreements were signed in the 1950s. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements were signed with Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Chile 1952; Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay 1953; Nicaragua, Honduras 1954; Guatemala, Haiti 1955; Bolivia 1958; El Salvador, Panama, Costa Rica 1962; Argentina 1964. In 1951

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39 Estep Pg. 20.
40 Estep, Pg. 23.
Congress approved $38,150,000 for direct military assistance for Latin America, and in 1952 it added $51,685,750 to that sum.\textsuperscript{43} This formalized the newly created U.S. Army Caribbean School’s mission to educate Latin American military personnel, as well as create Military Assistance Advisory Groups to administer military equipment transfers.

In 1952 the Truman administration continued its initiatives to sustain inter-American cooperation with the signing of NSC-141. “In Latin-America we seek first and foremost an orderly political and economic development which will make the Latin-American nations resistant to the internal growth of communism and to soviet political warfare… Secondly, we seek hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policy and the cooperation of the Latin-American nations in safeguarding the hemisphere through individual and collective defense measures against external aggression and internal subversion.”\textsuperscript{44} From 1951 to 1961 the Military Assistance Program with military missions expanded considerably, involved the training of thousands of Latin American officers and soldiers in the United States, in the Panama Canal Zone, and in the host country, and included the extensive arms transfers and sales.\textsuperscript{45} Grants of U.S. Military Aid to Latin America during these years (FY 1952-1959) totaled $317 million, which was only 1.3 percent of Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement funds spent worldwide.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Loveman, Pg. 152.
The graph below shows the allocations under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and International Military Education and Training funds to each Latin American country. These funds are grant aid given by the United States to foreign countries who in turn purchase training at military schools. Furthermore, it shows the number of graduates of the U.S. Army Caribbean School and its predecessors in the Canal Zone.

### U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America, 1950-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total MAP Millions of $</th>
<th>Rank of 20</th>
<th>Total IMET Thousands of $</th>
<th>Rank of 20</th>
<th>USARCARIB Students</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Rank of 19</th>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>275.00</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>168.00</td>
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<td>352</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>164.80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,001.00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1954-1960</td>
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<td>48.10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,904.00</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1951-60</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>30.60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,839.00</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1947-60</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>5.00</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
<td>16 (ended 1958)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,023.00</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1951-58</td>
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<td>8.00</td>
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<td>464.00</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1957-60</td>
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<td>18.70</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>83.00</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>758.00</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>72.00</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>370</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1944-60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1,255.00</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1949-60</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>21.60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>1947-60</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>$392,120,000.00</strong></td>
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<td><strong>$23,549,000.00</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8,288</strong></td>
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Note: Total student numbers include those trained at the Latin American Training Center-Ground Division founded in 1946.

As the number of countries that signed into MAP agreements grew, the need to "reach a broader audience" was essential to the continuation of Inter-American military cooperation. The decision to cease English language instruction on April 21, 1956 at the
Caribbean School was a practical step that served the army’s intentions of training all Latin American militaries, not just those that spoke English. As shown from the Figure above, the school had graduated approximately 8,288 Latin American personnel by 1960.46

To accommodate the growing number of countries and students attending the USCARIB School in 1957-58, the school divided into three major departments. The Tactics Department taught six professional military-education courses: the Command and General Staff Course, Military Police Officer Course, Infantry Tactics Course, Enlisted Military Police Course, Artillery Officer Basic Course, and the Cadet Course. The Weapons and Mortars Department taught the Mortar Officer Course and the Small-Caliber Weapons Repair Course. The Technical Department taught and Engineer Basic and Engineer Officer Course, a Communications Chief Course, a Radio and Operator Course, as well as a Wheeled-Vehicle Mechanics Course.47

**Criticism of Military Assistance Training**

Truman’s legislation for an increase in training programs and military aid did not pass without several decades’ worth of opposition. As previously mentioned, Congress worried that the United States was simply arming Latin American nations creating an arms race. Senator Smith, NJ asked, “How will we be protected against

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46 Student records supplied to the SOA Watch under the Freedom of Information Act.
47 Cited in Leuer, 2000 from the 1959 USARCARIB School Course Catalog.
their using this equipment in a row amongst themselves?" He continued, “Will they not all come after us for a share in the pot on the theory that they may have a problem of their own of internal self-defense against one of their neighbors?” Following this line of questioning in the 1956 Mutual Security Act hearings, Senator Fulbright remarked, “These small amounts (of arms) which, if useful at all, are useful only to local regimes to keep in power or fight their neighbors who have only the same kind of arms, but utterly useless in fighting Russia … and Russia is not going to move in by arms. If they move at all, it will be internally.” Due to this criticism, the Military Departments began to shy away from the hemispheric defense rationale for military assistance programs. They increasingly expressed their concerns of threats to Latin American internal security propagated by communism. Certain Senators felt that the United States was in a position to choose a particular government with military assistance programs, including training. Senator Wayne Morse, D-Ore., reiterated this sentiment saying, “internal security assistance promotes dictatorships and represses civilian opposition.” Military planners responded that military training programs, like the Caribbean School, were designed to instruct Latin American militaries to be subservient to civilian authority. However, certain Congressmen still proposed the withholding of military assistance from Latin American countries that lacked “representative”

48 Estep, Pg. 87.
49 Ibid, Pg. 88.
50 Estep, Pg. 90.
51 Huggins, Martha. 1998, Pg. 92.
governments. These amendments to the Mutual Security Act failed, but did prompt President Eisenhower to consider withdrawing U.S. internal security assistance programs, including closing the Caribbean School.

The task of evaluating U.S. military assistance programs became the responsibility of the Draper Commission, named for its chairman William H. Draper, Jr. Their conclusions were that without internal security and the general feeling of confidence engendered by adequate military forces, there was little hope for economic progress: “insecurity is incompatible with economic development.” As Martha Huggins asserts, an important foreign policy outcome of this order-for-stability argument was to make foreign militaries and police into “nation builders.” The Draper Commission also affirmed that “military assistance actually promoted economic progress by improving the educational and administrative skills of military officers and men.” These conclusions are hardly surprising due to the overwhelming military composition of the Commission, comprised of three retired generals, a retired admiral, and an assistant secretary of defense.

Coincidentally, the same year as the Draper Commission’s findings, the Cuban revolution sparked the counter-insurgency movement in U.S. foreign policy. The defeat of the Cuban army by Castro’s guerillas embarked Latin America and the United States

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52 Ibid, Pg. 93.
53 Ibid. This discussion of the two Eisenhower Commissions is discussed further in Huggins, 1998, Pg. 91-95.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
on an era of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare that would change the region’s armed forces’ main concern to the threat of internal insurgency.\textsuperscript{56}

In response to the Cuban revolution, the Eisenhower Administration began the process of moving both Latin American militaries and U.S. policy away from external aggression oriented training. A renewed emphasis was placed on internal security and economic development. In August 1960, U.S. military advisors met in the Panama Canal Zone with officers from fifteen Latin American countries and instructed them that their duty was to play a major role in national economic development.\textsuperscript{57} Even before this meeting, in March 1960, President Eisenhower had already approved a CIA plan to organize and equip an exile army to invade Cuba, or perhaps to replay the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{58} However, the CIA plan was not enacted until a new President assumed command with his own opinions of military assistance for Latin America.

\textsuperscript{56} Loveman, Pg. 159.
\textsuperscript{57} Rabe, 1988, Pg. 147.
\textsuperscript{58} Loveman, Pg. 161.
Chapter 2 “The Counter-Insurgency Heyday”

U.S. foreign policy aims shifted from mutual defense agreements to combating wars of national liberation after the Cuban revolution in 1959. The United States backed repressive governments to counter communist insurgents and prevent “more Cubas.” The United States would lose even more credibility if another Latin American nation within America’s backyard fell to communism. The Kennedy Administration made Latin America a top priority within the Cold War conflict. He built on programs for Latin America started by the Eisenhower Administration, but his administration tasked the soon to be renamed, U.S. Army School of the Americas as an essential element to counter communist insurgencies. Committees were established and increased resources were allocated for the success of training programs for Latin American militaries. Evidence presented here will offer that after 1960, Latin American countries manipulated the international system for their benefit. U.S. military training and involvement originated from Latin American countries themselves crying that “communist insurgency” could undermine their economically supported democratic (or “democratic authoritative”) governments.

The conflicts that plagued U.S.-Latin American relations in the Eisenhower Administration, such as the harassment of then Vice President Richard Nixon in Caracas in 1958, generated the fear of mass revolution. The protestors in Caracas were outraged that the United States backed military tyrants like Marcos Perez Jimenez (1952-1958) of Venezuela. Anti-U.S. demonstrations also erupted the following year in
Panama, the Caribbean School’s backyard. Within weeks of the Cuban Revolution, Cuban guerillas were detained in the Dominican Republic and in the western provinces of Panama, frustrating initial attempts to export “wars of national liberation” to the rest of the hemisphere. This prompted Congress to “loosen the purse-strings” of economic aid in support of military assistance in the 1960s, since it was felt that Latin American militaries were the nation-builders. The Kennedy administration’s response to the Cuban revolution was the Alianza para el Progreso- Alliance for Progress, a program announced on March 13, 1961, created to promote economically prosperous, socially just, democratic societies throughout Latin America. The Kennedy administration decided to embark on this campaign to underwrite change and development in Latin America because they feared that the region was vulnerable to radical social revolution.59

There were primarily two schools of thought by United States’ policy makers during this time, known as the FOCO and Anti-FOCO theories. Supporters of the FOCO theory (revolutions) believed that subversives sought to export revolution by guerrilla warfare in Latin America. In the 1960s and 70s policy makers believed that this could create one, two or many insurgencies in the United States’ backyard. Supporters of the Anti-FOCO theory felt that the application of counter-insurgency and civic action principles could prevent or contain communist insurgencies.

This was a drastic shift in U.S. policy, from hemispheric defense to combating internal subversion that was experienced especially at the Caribbean School. Latin American personnel outnumbered U.S. graduates for the first time in 1958 with 8,019 U.S. trained and 8,324 Latin Americans trained since the school’s creation.\(^{60}\) The shift is even more evident just a year later with only 71 U.S. military personnel trained compared to the training of 753 Latin American personnel.\(^{61}\) The shift affected courses taught at the Caribbean School, and by 1961, the United States began its first official counter-insurgency operations course at the Caribbean School. Unofficially however, U.S. military personnel trained in counter-insurgency operations with Latin American militaries in neighboring Colombia since 1952.\(^{62}\) In both cases, the training was implemented to drown subversive influences and to counter communism.

**The Kennedy Administration’s Clandestine Wars**

John F. Kennedy inherited Eisenhower’s clandestine CIA plan to overthrow Cuba’s new anti-U.S. leader. Prior to the doomed April invasion however, President Kennedy requested in his first NSC meeting on Feb 1, 1961, an examination for “placing more emphasis on the development of counter-guerilla forces.”\(^{63}\) Even after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy still inquired about enlisting Cuban nationals to serve as counter-

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\(^{60}\) 1959 U.S. Army Caribbean School Course Catalog.
\(^{61}\) 1960 U.S. Army Caribbean School Course Catalog.
\(^{63}\) NSAM, No. 2, February 3, 1961.
guerrilla forces to overthrow the Castro regime.\textsuperscript{64} In NSAM 56, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy wrote on behalf of the President saying, “It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations.”\textsuperscript{65} To accomplish the requirements of this inquiry, administration officials focused its main attention on the training of Latin American forces with several National Security Action Memorandums and committees.

In NSAM No. 88, President Kennedy wrote, “I would appreciate hearing what steps we are taking to train the Armed Forces of Latin America in controlling mobs, guerillas, etc… the military occupy an extremely important strategic position in Latin America… we could have our military teaching them how to control mobs and fight guerillas. In addition to increase their effectiveness it would also strengthen their ties with the United States.”\textsuperscript{66} This document shows that Washington policy makers knew that training did not operate in a vacuum, but was a tool of the United States’ overall foreign policy. A substantial amount of documents written by the Kennedy administration concerned counter-insurgency operations and training. Two months after No. 88 was written, Kennedy wanted a continuing review “of the overall problem of the United States support of friendly police and armed forces and their training in riot control, counter-subversion, counter-insurgency, and related operations.”\textsuperscript{67} From

\textsuperscript{64} NSAM No. 43, April 25, 1961.
\textsuperscript{65} NSAM No. 56, June 28, 1961.
\textsuperscript{66} NSAM No. 88, September 5, 1961.
\textsuperscript{67} NSAM No. 114, November 22, 1961.
the content of NSAM 118 and NSAM 119 that followed NSAM 114 by just two weeks and four weeks respectively, he felt that U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces had to work together to attain common objectives. The Kennedy Administration dictated these "common objectives" however, for the benefit of the Alliance for Progress. NSAM 119 instituted a closer examination of civic action "for supporting economic and social developments." These proposals laid the framework for the creation of the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency (SGCI) on January 18, 1962 with NSAM 124.

Membership of the SGCI consisted of eight positions that was intended to be chaired by the Military Representative of the President, General Maxwell Taylor, but Attorney General Robert Kennedy ultimately maintained control of the group. The other members included Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, first McGeorge Bundy then Michael Forrestal, and finally the Administrator for the Agency for International Development. NSAM 180 added the director of the U.S. Information Agency to the standing group on August 13, 1962.

The stated functions of the SGCI were as follows:

a. To insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare.

b. To insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces and other U.S. agencies abroad and in the political,

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68 NSAM No. 119, December 18, 1961.
69 NSAM 124, January 18, 1962.
economic, intelligence, military aid and informational programs conducted abroad by State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. Particular attention will be paid to the special training of personnel prior to assignment to MAAG’s and to Embassy staffs in countries where counter-insurgency problems exist or may arise.

c. To keep under review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with actual or potential situations of insurgency or indirect aggression, making timely recommendation of measures to apply, increase or adjust these resources to meet anticipated requirements.

d. To insure the development of adequate interdepartmental programs aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency and indirect aggression in countries and regions specifically assigned to the Special Group CI by the President, and to resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation.

“The organization,” recalled Justice Department aide John Nolan, “which was set up at RFK’s suggestion, was supposed to counter what at that time were called wars of national liberation, which made up the key facet in Krushchev’s strategy for prosecuting the Cold War and keeping America off balance. Bob Kennedy was up to his eyeballs in all that counter-insurgency stuff. I’d gone to the Naval Academy and had been in the Marine Corps, so one day he said, ‘Come on, we’ll go over there (Executive Office Building). I want you to keep an eye on it.”

Although Robert Kennedy did not contribute much to the discussion of the meetings, it was known that he was almost always the first person to see the president after the meetings, obviously discussing what had just transpired. Demonstrating that the seniority of the group did not concern Robert Kennedy, one member of the group admitted that, “We picked through the issues and Bobby was the one by whom the group’s recommendations

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moved forward to the president.”  This insured that the counter-insurgency agenda found in National Security Council memorandums can be traced directly to the wishes of the President. It is apparent that President Kennedy did not want to have another failed “Bay of Pigs” counter-insurgency operation be dictated from a non-trusted source.

Following various recommendations from the Special Group, the President oversaw a National Security Council meeting that produced NSAM 131. NSAM 131 called for “a school at the national level to offer instruction on the entire range of problems posed to the United States in dealing with developing countries, to include special area counter-insurgency problems.” Many recommendations were made concerning a national school, however the administration decided to rely on the decentralized military services. The U.S. Army Caribbean School was in a great position to take the lead for the administration’s plans. The Caribbean School could accommodate more Latin American military personnel since it’s courses were taught in Spanish.

Following the creation of, “President Kennedy’s staff to combat insurgency,” and the recommendations following NSAM 131, Robert Kennedy visited the U.S. Caribbean School in 1962. Though no records exist of his meetings with the Commandant and faculty, according to Otto Juan Reich, a former instructor and former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela who is now being considered to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for

71 Heymann, Pg. 262.
Latin American Affairs, Kennedy closed his speech to the students with, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible, make violent revolution inevitable.” This message stayed above the chalkboards in every classroom throughout the 1960’s.

Interestingly, the Attorney General’s visit appears very crucial to the changing mission of the Caribbean School. Following his visit, the Caribbean School created a supplemental course catalog that expanded the School’s mission and reflected the Kennedy Administration’s intentions to read,

“Support U.S. Army Missions, Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and Commissions operating in Latin America by instructing military and paramilitary personnel in the U.S. military technical skills, leadership techniques, and doctrine covering military action and counter-insurgency operations during peace and war.”

Colonel Edgar W. Schroeder, Commandant of the Caribbean School (July 1961-July 1963), outlined the attitude expected by the White House to better coordinate political, military, and civilian security forces charged with achieving national interests. He stated in the course catalog that the Caribbean School had now,

“Developed a closer relationship with the Inter-American Police Academy in order to form a more potent counterinsurgency team... All courses have undergone major modifications during the past eighteen months in support of the counterinsurgency effort. Not only those courses whose title includes the term counterinsurgency, but also every course taught has definite application in the counterinsurgency field. Without exception, the instructor and student are made fully aware of the importance of the total effort which must go into the establishment of internal security and the nation-building effort necessary to the

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73 Reich, Otto. Interview by Author, November 8, 2000. Instructor at the USARSA for civil affairs and counter-insurgency.
74 U.S. Army Caribbean School, 1962 Supplemental Course Catalog, Pg. 10, Cited in Leuer, Pg. 6.
stamping-out of communist-led and communist-fed insurgencies. Currently the Department provides instruction in every aspect of counterinsurgency operations, be it military, paramilitary, political, sociological or psychological. Stimulation of economic growth by military civic actions is emphasized. Lastly, we fully realize the great importance of our work which is actually a part of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America.”

This statement is more of a political move on behalf of the Caribbean School.

While Colonel Schroeder outlined the actions of the new organizational structure of the school, he reported that “his” school was doing exactly what the Kennedy Administration and the Special Group wanted. All courses were oriented around the counter-insurgency effort, including paramilitary operations to stamp out communism, closer ties with the police of Latin America were formed, and civic action principles that supported the economic and social development encouraged by the Alliance for Progress stemmed directly from several policy guidelines directed by the Kennedy Administration. The counter-insurgency emphasis was a direct result of the Special Group’s creation and Robert Kennedy’s visit. Paramilitary operations are taken directly from NSAM 56 and NSAM 88 directing more emphasis on paramilitary forces and the training of Latin American Armed Forces to combat communist insurgencies. Closer police ties were directed by NSAM 114 that called for a review of training for “friendly police and armed forces in Counter-insurgency, counter-subversion, riot control, and related matters.” Finally, NSAM 119 called for civic action to support the contribution of Latin America’s military forces to economic and social development. To attest to this total course indoctrination, in 1969 Miles Wolpin discovered that the syllabus for a

75 Ibid, Pg. 7.
course titled “Automotive Maintenance Officer” included instruction in “fallacies of the communist theory, communist front organizations in Latin America, and communism vs. democracy.”

It was not long after the curriculum changed at the U.S. Caribbean School when in June 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara redesignated the Caribbean Command as the U.S. Southern Command. This decision reflected the reality that the command no longer had significant responsibilities in the Caribbean and had become a command with missions focused on Central and South America. The same conclusion concerning the U.S. Army Caribbean School’s responsibilities to all of Latin America led the U.S. Army to rename the USCARIB School the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) one month later. The name change reflected what the Kennedy administration wanted in training Latin America’s armed forces; the appearance of hemispheric solidarity to combat communist insurgency.

The School implemented many changes in appearance during its reorganization and renaming. Below is a Panama Canal Zone Stamp dedicated to the U.S. Army Caribbean Command. It was issued before the name change on November 21, 1961 reading “United States Army Caribbean School, Fort Gulick For Latin America.” Not withstanding the

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78 Stamp can be ordered from worthingtonstamps.com
propaganda statement “For Latin America,” and the shaking hands, the stamp also shows the school’s insignia. The distinctive unit insignia was originally approved for the U.S. Army Caribbean School on January 23, 1963. It was redesignated on September 13, 1963 for the U.S. Army School of the Americas and amended to delete the abbreviation “USARCARIB” from the design on 13 Sep 1963. The blue disc background has a white galleon with a red Maltese cross on the sail and a red flag at masthead, riding on a white wave line. Below the galleon is a gold line over a gold star; around the circumference between narrow gold bands the motto "UNO PARA TODOS Y TODOS PARA UNO" in gold letters. The galleon is symbolic of the Caribbean area and bears a replica of the red cross insignia used by Columbus during his explorations in the Caribbean area. The motto is a Spanish translation meaning “One for all and all for one” of the well known quotation from Alexander Dumas' “Three Musketeers“ which is well known and frequently used by democratic leaders in Latin America.79

The new USARSA reorganized into two training departments to better integrate the changing national security strategy themes.80 The Internal Security Department reorganized to include the Counter-insurgency, Command and Staff, Infantry, Military Intelligence, Jungle Operations, and Military Police Sections. The Technical Department continued with the Engineer, Communications, Medical, Supply, and Maintenance Sections. Joseph Leuer identifies

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parachute rigging, the basic airborne and air movement course, and the Jumpmaster/Pathfinder Course as necessary additions to the curriculum to improve the mobility of Latin American militaries. The Jungle Operations Course previously conducted by the Joint Warfare Training Center was moved from Fort Sherman, Canal Zone to the USARSA. Army Special Forces taught the Jungle Operations Course that included counter-insurgency tactics. This training paid off when in 1967 the 8th Special Operations Group and the 2nd Bolivian Ranger Battalion and nine other companies of USARSA’s Mobile Training Teams killed insurgent leader, Che Guevara later that same year in La Esperanza, Bolivia, thereby ending the insurgency in Bolivia.

Critics of U.S. involvement in Latin America and present detractors of the USARSA question whether the United States should be associated with foreign internal politics or political assassinations. It seems apparent that the mission of the school drastically changed since its original purpose in the 1940s. The United States already had advisors in Vietnam by 1961 as well as practically paying for France’s colonial war throughout the 1950’s. Rather than “sending in the Marines,” it seemed more practical to support the effort of local anti-Communist movements. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor confirmed this belief in 1965 by stating,

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80 Leuer, 2000, Pg. 13.
81 Cited in Leuer, 2000, Pg. 13. USARSA 1964 Course Catalog, Pg. ix.
82 Cited in Leuer, Pg. 13.
83 Mobile Training Teams were created to train military forces that were unable to send personnel to the USARSA. Primarily Army Special Forces taught most of these courses on an ad hoc basis.
“The outstanding lesson of the Indochina conflict is that we should never let a Vietnam-type situation arise again. We were too late in recognizing the extent of the subversive threat. We appreciate now that every young emerging country must be constantly on the alert, watching for those symptoms which, if allowed to grow unrestrained, may eventually grow into a disastrous situation such as that in South Vietnam.”

Evidence shows that U.S. policy makers understood General Taylor’s attitude and what was a mechanism to garner Inter-American military cooperation became a training ground for the United States’ “other” military forces to combat communism. The allocation of resources demonstrates the changing importance that training programs in Latin America had in U.S. foreign policy. The graph below shows the attendance at the USCARIB and the USARSA from 1961-1970.

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Graduates of the USARCARIB and USARSA from 1961-1970

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Note: Student records obtained by from the School of the Americas under the Freedom of Information Act.
Numbers reflect graduate numbers without those who took multiple courses, were dropped, or who failed.

In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a Congressional subcommittee that,

“Probably the greatest return on our military assistance program investment comes from the training of selected officers and key specialists at our military schools... These students are the coming leaders, the men who will have the know-how and impart it to their forces. I need not dwell upon the value of having in positions of leadership men who have first-hand knowledge of how Americans do things and how they think. It is beyond price to us to make such friends of such men.”

This attitude is further reflected in the increased funding to training at the USARSA and overall Military Assistance Programs as well as International Military Education Funds.
These funds are grant aid given by the United States to foreign countries who in turn purchase training at military schools.

The graph below shows the amount of IMET funds to Latin America from 1953-1989. This offers a good view before the 1960s' counterinsurgency-training heyday and the following decline of allocated IMET funds in the late 1970s.

Not surprisingly, the Kennedy administration saw expenditures and assistance for internal development and internal defense drastically increase. This was in large part a protectionary measure for the Alliance for Progress as well as the fact that countries wanted to send greater numbers of their officers to receive counter-insurgency training. The more there appeared to be a need to combat insurgencies within a particular country, the more students of that particular Latin American countries attended the USARSA. Once the U.S. military was suffering post-Vietnam blues, officials declared that the counter-insurgency programs had been effective and that there were few instances of

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86 Brewer, Barry. Chapter 5, Pg. 2. Graph has been modified to demonstrate only the amount of IMET funds allocated to Latin America.
internal insurgency. Consequently, aid was reduced and grant assistance funds were cut.

**Shifting Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy**

Latin American security assistance training during the Carter administration decreased significantly. The Carter Administration reflected critics’ views that felt that the United States should not support “bad governments.” The U.S. Congress’ enactment of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 coupled with Carter’s promotion of human rights as a primary element of foreign policy made security assistance available only to those nations complying with U.S. requirements for human rights. Latin America took a beating with the new human rights policy change. Many Latin American countries voluntarily withdrew from the foreign aid program or were, by law, eliminated from receiving IMET funds. The United States restricted 9 countries from receiving training at military schools: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It would not be very long until the USARSA was affected by these budget cuts under the new human rights foreign policy. The graph below shows the annual progression of students that attended the USARSA from 1971-1980. Attendance in 1976 was 1,727 followed by less than half that amount of 842 in 1977.

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87 Ibid.
Graduates of the USARSA from 1971-1980

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Note: Student records obtained by from the School of the Americas under the Freedom of Information Act.
Numbers reflect graduate numbers without those who took multiple courses, were dropped, or who failed.

The budget reductions and ideological restrictions reflected a debate in Congress that is heard even today in the protests from organizations like the SOA Watch. Many felt that the scarce Latin American resources from the U.S. were being unduly devoted to military expenditures to the detriment of social and economic development.88

Restrictions were placed on the amount allocated for military sales to Latin America, but it was argued that if the United States did not sell military supplies to Latin American countries, that each country would be forced to look elsewhere, namely the

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88 Atkins, Pg. 285.
Soviet Union. Interestingly, from 1966 to 1973, Latin American states placed a total of $1.7 billion in military supply orders with the United States only receiving 13 percent. \(^{89}\)

However, in some cases, the United States accepted military regimes as necessary to thwart a greater perceived threat, communism. This is most likely how the USARSA got its nickname “School for Dictators.” General Underwood addressed this sentiment while serving as the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command even before President Carter made his cuts when he stated,

“What is not understood is that our assistance is not designed to maintain a particular authoritarian military government, but is directed at giving that country and its people the capability for internal security and nation-building that are imperative prerequisites to social and economic improvement... We cannot wait until a so-called ‘good government’ comes along to create such an instrument for national good. It must be there, ready for use when that ‘good government’ takes over.” \(^{90}\)

The chart below shows the countries that experienced antipolitical military regimes from 1964-1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1963-1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1964-1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1968-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1968-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1972-1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1973-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1973-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1948-1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{89}\) Ibid, Pg. 286. Western Europe (mainly Britain, France, and West Germany) received 75 percent of orders, Canada 10 percent, and Australia 2 percent.

\(^{90}\) Leuer, Pg. 8.

Politics aside, the threat of “more Cubas” drove training in counter-insurgency warfare well into the 1970s.

Congress did not agree with the “more Cubas” mentality during the Carter Administration however. Led by Congressman Michael Harrington D-MA, the House of Representatives outlawed the Urban Counter-insurgency Course at the USARSA in 1977. According to Walter LaFeber, the school continued to teach the subjects under new names. He argues that this was made easier due to the “distance” between the school and Washington. After close examination of primary documents, the USARSA maintained a course titled Irregular Warfare Operations and did shift urban warfare instruction to this class. To add to increasing pressures in the late 1970s, former USARSA graduate of four classes, General Manuel Noriega, demanded that a Panamanian general be named commandant over the USARSA if it remained in the Panama Canal Zone. This violates U.S. law prohibiting command of U.S. military personnel and assets by a foreign officer. No action was taken to move the school directly following the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty, but the U.S. Army began looking for a new location for the USARSA as well as the Southern Command Headquarters.

On October 1, 1984 the school closed and began the move out of the Canal Zone. Several locations were considered such as Fort Polk, Louisiana, Fort Stewart, Georgia,

93 Ibid.
and Camp Blanding, Florida. On December 18, 1984, after three months of closure, the
USA RSA opened its doors in Building 35, later dedicated Ridgway Hall, after General
Matthew B. Ridgway, at its temporary location at Fort Benning, Georgia. This
relocation was made permanent in 1987 and the school still calls the old Infantry School
building its home.
Chapter 3 “The USARSA: Running from its History?”

Many consider the USARSA to stand for an imperialistic institution helping to repress the lower classes in Latin America so that the United States can obtain its economic interests through military control. The struggle to close the USARSA has so far only forced the Department of Defense to change the name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation on January 17, 2001. What is not clear is the cause and effect of the training at the USARSA and the alleged atrocities committed by some of its graduates. This chapter seeks to explore the rationale behind the criticism of training programs at the USARSA. It seeks to explore the origins of the SOA Watch, a peace group intent on the school’s closure, and the ideologies behind their rhetoric. This chapter will determine whether there is sufficient cause and effect that proves whether the criticisms of the USARSA are justified or is the institution a symbol for peace activists intent on changing U.S. foreign policy.

USARSA’s New Home and Renewed Mission

Human rights based foreign policy did not have a place in the new Reagan Administration. Priorities during the Cold War changed as “America’s Backyard” became a Cold War hotspot. In particular, a civil war raged in El Salvador and the war on drugs was declared in Colombia. The USARSA was again in a prime position to spearhead the training requirements to achieve U.S. foreign policy doctrines in Latin America. Figure 3-1 below demonstrates the graduates of the USARSA from 1981-1990. It is evident that while some countries did not resume their attendance at the USARSA
or sent relatively fewer students, both El Salvador and Colombia experienced huge
growth. In 1983 alone, the USARSA trained 781 Salvadoran personnel, which was more
than was trained during the previous decade (750). Colombia’s attendance more than
tripled from the 1970s (1,038) to the 1980s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 3-1</th>
<th>Graduates of the USARSA from 1981-1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>4410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti-Last attended in 1962</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua-Last attended in 1978</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>11629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Student records obtained by from the School of the Americas under the Freedom of Information Act.
Numbers reflect graduates not including those who took multiple courses, were dropped, or who failed.

Two departments were responsible for all training intended to meet the demand for
certain instruction and reflect the changing needs of Latin American personnel.

The Department of Command and Staff was tasked to teach the Joint Operations
Course, Resource Management, Command and General Staff Officer Courses, Combat
Arms Officer Advanced and the Military Intelligence Officer Course. The Department of Combat Operations was responsible for all other officer, cadet, and noncommissioned-officer courses.\textsuperscript{95} The USARSA’s organization remained the same until 1989 when Colonel William DePalo, Jr. assumed command and established the Department of Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict. This department taught a course dealing with the military intelligence, psychological operations, commando and sniper instruction, counternarcotics operations, combat engineer skills, and two cadet courses. In 1991, the USARSA ushered in the Helicopter School Battalion, which taught helicopter operations and maintenance at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

**Latin American Military Training Under Scrutiny**

Just as the argument was enunciated in Congress during Eisenhower’s administration, legislation concerning Inter-American military cooperation is once again under scrutiny. Scholars such as Charles Tilly and Martha Huggins argue that the protected state, Latin America, subordinated itself to its protector, the United States in exchange for military assistance. This patriarchal relationship of the United States can transform recipient countries’ military in Latin America into subordinate actors in global politics and, in the process, further strengthen the United States’ control over Latin America.\textsuperscript{96} Critics of the USARSA, and most likely of any U.S. military involvement in Latin America, argue that only United States’ interests are being served

\textsuperscript{95} Leuer, 2000. Pg. 20

3-58
at the expense of human rights and freedom for the lower classes in Latin America.

According to Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, author of an obviously critical work entitled School of Assassins, writes, “The only point of agreement between witnesses defending the School of the Americas and those advocating closure is that the school is an implement of foreign policy which serves vital U.S. interests.”97 This quote may seem understood, but Nelson-Pallmeyer’s 200-page work is an extreme, one-sided view of the school that lacks real cause and effect rationale concerning its graduates. He points out what certain graduates have done after attending the School of the Americas. For example, he points out El Salvador's Roberto D'Aubuisson, who formed the death squads that killed thousands during the Salvadoran civil war. In fact, D'Aubuisson took the Chief Officer’s Communications course from 10 January to 30 March, 1972. Joseph Leuer responds that, “People want to connect the dots and allege the school which taught him how to operate radios efficiently also taught him how to create death squads.”98

Alternately, the USARSA and its supporters are not immune from this cause and effect rationale either. They argue that Latin America is more stable and democratic due to the presence of U.S.-trained domestic military forces (See graph below).99

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96 Martha Huggins argues a similar point concerning police training for Latin Americans in her work Political Policing: The United States and Latin America. 1998.
From this graph is seems that there is sufficient cause for people to question U.S. military aid and training to those Latin American countries with authoritative regimes.

However, the debate between the USARSA and the SOA Watch, is not just over the institution and its practices. The issue is U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Since the SOA Watch has grown over the past decade, it has done like most other institutions and has “taken on a life of its own.” After looking past the propaganda and researching the purpose behind the SOA Watch and it’s founder’s intentions, the debate to close the USARSA is a story of a non-governmental organization winning the public opinion battle over an institution that is just one tool of foreign policy. Father Roy Bourgeois may have had different intentions when he founded the SOA Watch in 1990, as will become evident, but peace activists use the “Close the SOA rallies” each November for their organizations’ interests, not necessarily those of the SOA Watch. Each
organization condemns U.S. foreign policy, but this is not a new controversial issue, it is just being fought in a different fashion.

The Origins of the SOA Watch

Before the USARSA came to Fort Benning, Vietnam veteran and Maryknoll priest Roy Bourgeois walked unchallenged into the military base wearing surplus fatigues. He climbed up a tree near the barracks used by Salvadoran soldiers training with the U.S. Army. There he waited until “lights out,” then blared out into the night a recording of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero calling,

“I want to make a special appeal to soldiers, national guardsmen, and policemen: Brothers, each one of you is one of us. We are the same people. The campesinos you kill are your own brothers and sisters. When you hear the words of a man telling you to kill, remember instead the words of God: ‘Thou shalt not kill’ ... I beseech you, I beg you, I order you in the name of God, stop the repression!”

Romero himself was killed in 1980 while conducting Mass in San Salvador. Of the three men accused in Romero’s assassination, two were graduates of the School of the Americas. Again the association is made with the school’s instruction without clear proof that the training they received taught them how to kill priests and repress the lower classes. Bourgeois served 18 months in a federal prison for his actions. But his protest paved the way for larger demonstrations against what he labeled a "School of

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100 Nelson-Pallmeyer, Pg. 77-78.
Assassins." This term stemmed from the Soviet backed TASS news service who called for the Republic of Panama to close the “School of Assassins” in 1979.

The next few years for Father Bourgeois had him setting up an apartment directly across Fort Benning’s main gate. There, he and his Catholic supporters from the Maryknoll Order provided financial support for his living expenses and provided propaganda tools such as videos and books. The videos represented the SOA Watch’s “Talking Points” that depict the School of the Americas as the representative institution for torture instruction and the epitome of all that is wrong with U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.

“Talking Points”

Both the SOA Watch and the USARSA argue their case to the public and media. It became obvious from walking around the most recent protest at Fort Benning that most supporters are students, primarily from Catholic schools, who wish to participate in an annual rally against an institution that most of them are not very familiar with. However, the “burden of proof” is up to the USARSA to prove against allegations of torture and producing graduates with the worst human rights violations in Latin America.102 USARSA officials contend that these are just a few bad apples. Should Harvard be shut down for training the likes of Admiral Yamamoto, responsible for the

101 CNN Cold War Website.
102 SOA Watch reports that from Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina to Omar Torrijos of Panama, and Hugo Banzer Suarez of Bolivia, USARSA graduates have led military coups and are responsible for massacres of hundreds of people. Several USARSA graduates are responsible for the Uraba massacre in Colombia,
Pearl Harbor bombing? Not likely, but the SOAW says they would attempt to shut it down if Harvard taught combat courses. The fact still remains that graduates from the USARSA are two of three officers cited in the assassination of Archbishop Romero, three of five officers cited in the rape and murder of four U.S. churchwomen, ten of twelve cited for the El Mozote massacre of 900 civilians, and comprise over 100 of 246 soldiers cited for atrocities in Colombia. In the USA’s defense however, is Francisco Elena of the Salvadoran army, a graduate of the USARSA, took the names of the participants of the Jesuit massacre to the Salvadoran Supreme Court and demanded their trial in a civilian court to prevent a military cover-up. Elena’s action demonstrated an unknown phenomenon of an El Salvadoran army officer challenging the military organization to see that justice was carried out.

Since the many allegations and increased scrutiny by the SOAW and its Congressional supporters, the USARSA has taken steps to reform. The SOAW contends that despite assertions that the School of the Americas has reformed, it continues as a combat training school that focuses on courses with titles such as Combat Arms Officer, Psychological Operations, Battle Staff Operations, and Commando Course. According to the SOAW, only the Democratic Sustainment Course centers on issues of democracy and human rights. It is interesting to note that in 1997, only 13 students took this

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the El Mozote massacre, the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the Jesuit massacre in El Salvador and the alleged torture and murder of a UN worker in Chile.

103 Ramsey, 1997, Pg. 2
104 www.soaw.org
course, compared with 118 who took Military Intelligence.\textsuperscript{105} After researching the
documentation, in fact every student at the School of the Americas is required to receive
at least 8 hours of human rights instruction. Furthermore, in a 9 August 1993 \textit{Newsweek}
article by Douglas Waller, he is clearly mistaken when he reports, “the SOA does not
trust nor allow Latin American instructors to teach human
rights.”\textsuperscript{106} Actually, while roaming the halls of the
USARSA, I ran into Venezuelan Captain Vargas (shown in
the picture) whose job it is to teach just that. In addition to
Captain Vargas and the 8 hours required for each student,
every instructor receives 16 hours of human rights
instruction to prepare him or her to discuss human rights
issues when they arise. It is not clear whether this instruction was added in 1993 to
head-off increasing pressure from detractors, but each course at the school always
addressed issues of the law of war and international law.

School officials respond that USARSA has benefited the region due to this
human rights instruction that has been incorporated all throughout the school’s
existence. The chart below is a case study that demonstrates the impact that USARSA
involvement has within a country.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} www.benning/army.mil/usarsa
The chart shows that while there was little or no participation at the USARSA, military responsible deaths actually increased.\textsuperscript{108} Here, the USARSA employed the cause and effect rationale to imply that when certain military personnel attended the school, atrocities drastically went down. However, it is hard to believe that when 6 people from the entire Guatemalan military attended the USARSA in 1986, that atrocities could drop for that reason. Guatemalans attended the school since 1946.

One issue that deserves special attention is certain courses that still existed in the curriculum following the end of the Cold War. As mentioned before, the Special Operations/ Low Intensity Conflict Department was added in 1989 to meet the needs of the regions security threats. However, courses such as the Sniper Course and Commando Operations seem to hurt the USARSA’s image more than it met foreign
policy in the region. The United States lacked a clear strategy for Latin America in the immediate post-Cold War years. However, the USARSA continued to instruct Latin American militaries in the same courses as was deemed necessary in the 1980s. After discussing this issue with the faculty of the USARSA, it was revealed that attempts to alter the mission of the institution failed in 1993, 1994, and 1996.\textsuperscript{109} According to Joe Leuer, USARSA Commandant in 1993, Colonel Jose Feliciano directed a team to develop a plan to convert the U.S. Army-controlled SOA into a more visible Department of Defense-level institute that would attract more than just military professionals, but civilian authorities from both the United States and Latin America. The Army’s Training Doctrine Command refused the proposed institute citing dwindling resources under the new Clinton Administration.\textsuperscript{110} This proposed institute seems to resemble USARSA’s successor, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. However, criticism of the USARSA grew in the early 1990s and had both detractors and supporters arguing their position to the public using whatever information served their cause.

Without getting into the lengthy debate over specific talking points of both organizations, suffice to say it’s all in the eyes of the beholder, but the truth lies in the documents. Each side employed the rationale that attendance at the school propagated graduates to commit atrocities or that graduates would have a better sense of

\textsuperscript{108} USARSA Website.
\textsuperscript{110} Leuer, 2000, Pg. 23.
democracy. Either side can point to individuals from the school’s past to support their claims, but it is the USARSA that is automatically on the defensive.

What should be explained is how the School of the Americas has lost, by their own admission, the “information campaign” to the SOA Watch. Several key events took place that shaped the current debate and tends to mystify the image of what the USARSA really does. It is obvious from the recent protest and the USARSA information session that I attended that the rhetoric at the protest is much easier to comprehend and attracts a wider audience. Hearing about the “torture cells” and the “corrupt U.S. Army school training future dictators in the art of repression” is more intriguing to the public than listening to a series of statistics of what the alleged human rights violators took at the School. For instance, Father Bourgeois claims that the USARSA graduates found guilty of human rights violations learned all they needed from the USARSA. However, the SOA Watch is standing on facts and figures that may have involved graduates of the School in the 1960s and 1970s when combating communism was paramount to secure U.S. national interests. Now, at the same time as the SOA Watch has grown and attempted to shut down what they call a Cold War school, the USARSA’s reformed mission in the post-Cold war era is still under scrutiny.

111 Only 3 news organizations attended the information session. One left early and one came an hour late.
New Congressional Campaigns

The SOA Watch’s cause was helped when on January 11, 1990 the acronym “USARSA” was shortened to SOA. The rationale for the change was to emphasize its hemispheric orientation and the amount of Latin American contribution to its mission. According to Joe Leuer, Chief of the Training Management Division, eliminating the U.S. Army from the School’s title provided detractors of the School an avenue to psychologically separate SOA from its core association with the U.S. Army.\(^{112}\) To further hurt USARSA’s image, it seems that it was the U.S. Army that did not feel the need to address the early criticisms from the SOA Watch. It was not until April 15, 1994 that an SOA Inter-Agency Working group was established by the Army’s Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, later headed by the Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs.\(^{113}\) The group appeared to have great success in obtaining Executive branch support and informing Congress of the School’s value to Latin America. As shown in the chart below, the lack of a Congressional vote in 1995 and the successful 1996 vote, the group seemed to be working. However, this would not last.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In Favor</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>No Vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Bill Withdrawn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{112}\) Leuer, 2000, Pg. 19.

\(^{113}\) The Department of State, U.S. AID, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Southern Command and other agencies were all represented for policy formulation and execution.
The Secretary of the Army, Togo West, issued an order on November 4, 1996 making his office the center of the political fight for the USARSA. In compliance with the order, the task force was shut down and the members were ordered to not “generate position papers, advocacy pieces designed to influence outside audiences, including Congress, the media, and the general public.”\textsuperscript{114} This effectively inhibited the USARSA and the U.S. Army to respond to misinformation campaigns by its detractors, and further more removed its presence from the Congress. It seems that it was only personal friendships and a working rapport between the USARSA Commandant Colonel Alvarez and the former members of the Inter-Agency working group that helped maintain Congressional funding. From personal conversations with the present faculty of the USARSA, they feel the higher authority in the Army and the Defense Department is greatly responsible for the years of unaddressed allegations of misconduct at the USARSA. Additionally, these years also represented a growing strength for the SOA Watch.

Once SOA officials regained control of the information campaign responding to atrocious allegations in late 1997-early 1998, it seemed too late. Other than producing videos and gaining increased media recognition for their cause, the SOA Watch continued to push their cause straight to the floor of the U.S. Congress. There, the two men shown in the picture, Congressman Joseph

\textsuperscript{114} Leuer, 2000, Pg. 20
Kennedy II, D-MA and Congressman Joseph Moakley, D-MA have led the charge to cut the funding for the School of the Americas. The most recent attempt to close the School of the Americas by the “Moakley Amendment” to the House version of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act failed by only 10 votes. This is in stark contrast to the first vote to cut the funding in 1994.

The House votes seem to be along partisan lines, with Republicans in favor and Democrats opposed. However, former President William Clinton sent repeated endorsements for the USARSA’s continued operation to the Congress. In a June 1996 letter to Congressman Kennedy he wrote, “The School of the Americas provides military skills training and human rights-based teaching, which together help foster military professionalism and respect for civilian authority in Latin America. For these reasons, I believe the school should be maintained.” This did not sway the two Congressman from Massachusetts who each year receive increased pressure from their Catholic constituents.

Also driving the intense effort to cut Congressional funding was the September 1996 Pentagon release of seven Spanish-language training manuals used at the USARSA from 1989 to 1991. The New York Times reported, "Americans can now read for themselves some of the noxious lessons the United States Army taught thousands of Latin Americans... [The USARSA manuals] recommended interrogation techniques like..."

\[115\] Picture from Congressman Moakley’s Official website.
\[116\] Clinton, William. Letter to Congressman Joseph Kennedy II, June 14, 1996-courtesy of Joe Leuer. See Appendix D.
torture, execution, blackmail and arresting the relatives of those being questioned."\footnote{117}

The response to these allegations is as stated by the USARSA officials:

"An analysis of the manuals concluded there were no indications, or even suggestions, that "torture" was acceptable. When "torture" is mentioned, it is to warn the reader not to use it under any circumstances. The manual titled "Interrogation" has an entire chapter devoted to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Department of Defense (DoD) has acknowledged that approximately two dozen short passages (out of over 1100 pages of text) contained material that was either inconsistent, or could be interpreted to be inconsistent, with U.S. policy. Two investigations were conducted specifically to discover how this material surfaced within the School. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) conducted the first as soon as the Army discovered the manuals in 1991. Completed in March 1992, it concluded that there had been no concerted effort by the DoD or the U.S. Army (to include the U.S. Army School of the Americas) to violate U.S. and DoD policies, and no individual liability was assessed. The results of the investigation were reported to both the appropriate Congressional Oversight Committees and to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. In 1996, the Secretary of Defense directed the DoD Inspector General (IG) to conduct further investigations into the manuals and the material contained therein. The DoD IG report concurred with the previous report and its conclusions."\footnote{118}

This seemed to be the smoking gun for detractors of the USARSA and still is after witnessing this year’s protest. However, in a recent question and answer session, Colonel Weidner explained that 41 students actually received the manuals and once USARSA officials learned of their content, they were immediately retrieved and handed over to Army officials.\footnote{119} Not withstanding this information, SOA Watch claims that it was the content in the first place that was the problem. Placing this debate in context has many shades of truth, but history shows that Latin American militaries did not

\footnote{117 Cited from www.soaw.org}
\footnote{118 Handout at USARSA information session on November 17, 2000.}
\footnote{119 Weidner, Glenn. Information session presenter. November 17, 2000.}
need the United States to show them how to torture. In fact, Tina Rosenberg, in her work *Children of Cain*, questioned an Argentine navy officer whether he learned torture at the USARSA, he responded, “The School of the Americas was useless, we had to learn how as we went along. I read a lot about the French methods in Algeria. That helped a little.” On the other hand, Ernesto Urien, an Argentine Army officer who attended the USARSA in the 1970s said, “In informal talks the theme of torture would come up, and they’d say, ‘Do what you must to get what you need. The tools you choose, legal or illegal, are up to you.’” After discussing this “implied policy” with present USARSA instructors, they commented that it was possible this happened. I was reminded that most of the instructors during that time served in Vietnam and carried their personal views with them, but those opinions were not dictated nor condoned by the School, maybe only by one or two instructors.

As shown in the chart, the Moakley Amendment of 1999 passed 230-197, but was not included in the conference report. Credit for this belongs to USARSA’s Commandant 1998-2000, Colonel Glenn Weidner who visited key members to personally brief them on USARSA’s accomplishments. The members of the conference committee voted 8-7 against passing to the Senate a bill that deleted funding to USARSA.

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120 Rosenberg, Pg. 129.
121 Ibid. Pg. 114.
The End of an Era

The effort to close the U.S. Army School of the Americas is a relatively new struggle that is in its 11th year. The SOA Watch leads an intensive campaign to paint the image of an institution that is in business to train repressors of Latin Americans. With an annual operating budget of over $100,000 and the sales of nearly $20,000 in videos and books, it succeeded in closing the School of the Americas. On December 15, 2000, the institution that began in 1946 seemingly closed its doors, but only to reopen the following month, with the most of the same staff and only minor changes to the curriculum. What is a drastic change is the leadership. Instead of operating under the policy direction of the U.S. Southern Command, it will be directed by the Department of Defense. Its new title as mentioned before is the Western Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation. Representative Joseph Moakley denounces the “new” institution saying, "Even with a new coat of paint, the School of the Americas has trained far too many killers of innocent people to remain a part of our foreign policy." Debate still rages on with the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Louis Caldera replying, "I thought it would be a mistake to close the school down because that would be turning our backs on the countries of Latin America." Father Bourgeois commented that, "After thinking this thing out, we realized what they’re really talking

122 The WHISC’s first Director is Colonel Richard D. Downie, U.S. Army.
123 www.soaw.org
124 www.benning.army.mil/usarsa
about is a name change. For us, this is the same old school doing what it's always been doing."\textsuperscript{125}

The USA RSA officials claim that the new institute is created by Congress that carries, “no political baggage or controversial history, dedicated to promoting, through education and training, the value of human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a democratic society to the militaries, police, and civilian officials of Latin America.”\textsuperscript{126} This statement is astonishing and lacks any sense; the only real change is indeed the name. It is blatantly clear and evident each November at the front gate of Fort Benning that the new institute still has political baggage, since it will keep the same faculty and make only minor changes to its curriculum. I asked Father Bourgeois that if the new institute removed the controversial courses that he and his organization had formed a platform on for years, would there still be a need for the SOA Watch. To my surprise he said, “No.” He continued, “It’s all about the guns,” acting like shooting something. “If the school removed its Commando Course and sniper instruction, we wouldn’t have a problem.”\textsuperscript{127} I responded, “Sir, the new institute will remove the Commando Course in December, what will your organization do now?” “Well,” shaking his head, “the school’s past is hard to forget.”\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{125} www.soaw.org
\textsuperscript{126} Leuer, Pg. 27.
\textsuperscript{127} Father Roy Bourgeois, Interview by Author at the November rally. November 18, 2000.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
It seems that the SOA Watch truly believes in their hearts that U.S. training of Latin American militaries should stop immediately. This is more of a foreign policy debate for the SOA Watch, but for Father Bourgeois it is clearly a personal struggle solely against the USARSA. I asked him why he started the SOA Watch, he replied, “I knew those churchwomen in El Salvador that were killed by those SOA grads!” The SOA Watch has indeed become an institution that has “taken on a life of its own.” Meaning, the concern for most of the protestors is U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. The annual rallies just offer thousands of peace activists a forum to express their interests; not necessarily the ones intended by Father Bourgeois when he started the group. As mentioned before, the USARSA is not the only institution teaching military tactics to Latin American military personnel. There are protests outside the Command and General Staff College in Ohio and the Inter-American Air Force Academy in Lackland, Texas, but ironically they only receive a small paragraph in Section D of the local newspaper while the SOA Watch constantly receives a front-page story for at least 10 days in the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer.

Whatever the sentiment and feelings are about the School of the Americas, its detractors will always remember it as the “School for Assassins” due to the information campaigns. It will be impossible to discuss the School without mentioning the allegations of human rights abuses by its graduates or the close Congressional votes each year in attempts to close it down or even the annual protests that received vast

129 Ibid.
media attention all across the United States. It is obvious, that without the media and support from popular celebrities like Martin Sheen and Susan Sarandon and a Congressman with the last name Kennedy, the SOA Watch would be a small faction looked upon as subversive and radical. The media attention that the local Columbus Ledger-Enquirer receives each year as thousands of protestors flock to Fort Benning, GA propels the small newspaper to get the “inside story” so that a larger newspaper, namely the New York Times, catches wind of a continued “scandal” occurring at the USARSA.

Finally, with the presentation of military training statistics in the 1980s and 1990s, the organization of the USARSA, as well as the “talking points” from both sides in this heated debate, this story is basically one of a non-governmental organization successfully utilizing the media, peace activists, students, and other NGOs to bring pressure on an institution that represents U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. A foreign policy that these groups do not feel the United States should continue in the 21st century. Until it is easier for the American public to believe a man in an Army uniform rather than a priest, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, which will still be a tool for U.S. foreign policy, will continue to suffer from attacks regardless of the name change.
Conclusion

“In the fabric of human events, one thing leads to another. Every mistake is in a sense the product of all the mistakes that have gone before it, from which fact it derives a sort of a cosmic forgiveness; and at the same time every mistake is in a sense a determinant of all the mistakes of the future, from which it derives a sort of cosmic unforgiveableness.”

George F. Kennan

Whether the U.S. Army School of the Americas is a mistake for U.S. foreign policy depends on when and how it was serving U.S. national interests. The training of approximately 50,000 Latin American civilian, military, and police personnel throughout the USA RSA’s 54-year existence placed the United States in an influential position to achieve U.S. national interests by thwarting communist insurgencies while indoctrinating Latin American militaries in democratic theories of government. However, geopolitical realities are diminishing American military influence. Without the communist threat to undermind U.S. national interests, the USA RSA’s purpose to influence Latin American militaries seems no longer necessary. However, it is essential to maintain the perception that the United States is still very concerned with Latin America’s economic and infrastructure development. The USA RSA in itself is not essential to this task, but the influence and the appearance of cooperation found at the USA RSA has always been at the heart of U.S.-Latin American relations.

First, the United States had a vital interest in the Canal protection. This evolved to the training of soldiers in jungle warfare operations. Eventually, as the Axis Powers threatened the Canal, the “hemispheric defense rationale” was employed to garner the
cooperation of the American Republics. In order to obtain Inter-American military cooperation, the United States supplied arms and materiel accompanied with training to correctly operate the equipment. This also allowed the United States to indoctrinate Latin American militaries while supplanting German, French, and Italian military missions. Once an Allied victory was in sight, Military Departments sought to sustain the influence and cooperation obtained during WWII. To achieve this, existing training programs in the Canal Zone were formalized.

The Army’s Latin American Training Center-Ground Division was intended to maintain influence with Latin American militaries while necessitating the need of surplus arm sales to Latin American nations. Criticisms concerning the arms sales surfaced in the Congress, but the training at the newly renamed Caribbean School reassured Congress that the United States was not supplying arms that could be used against the U.S. or other American Republics without thorough U.S. indoctrination. Here, the School continued to supplant new influences during the early stages of communist penetration in the Western Hemisphere. However, the balance of power was upset in 1959 with the Cuban Revolution.

Though counter-insurgency operations and civic action programs were already implemented at the Caribbean School, the first National Security Meeting of the new Kennedy Administration made them a top priority. Since the school’s instruction was in Spanish, it was in a prime position to take the lead in counter-insurgency training programs for Latin American militaries. The creation of the Special Group for Counter-
Insurgency established a clear link from the President to training programs at the Caribbean School. U.S. Attorney General and “Brother, Protector” Robert Kennedy ensured that his brother would not suffer another public embarrassment like the Bay of Pigs fiasco created. Robert Kennedy visited the Caribbean School in 1962 to personally guarantee that White House directives were being successfully acted upon. Directly following the visit, the Caribbean School’s mission was altered to emphasize the counter-insurgency mission. The school published a new course catalog with every course centering on combating communist insurgency. Once again criticism arose during this time of increased military aid spending. Questions were raised concerning whether the United States should back repressive governments. It was clear that as long as those governments were not communist, the U.S. was prepared to do whatever it took to insure that “another Cuba” was impossible.

The Caribbean School’s name changed to the U.S. Army School of the Americas to reflect the United States new emphasis on all of South America, not just Central America. During this time, Latin American governments manipulated the United States to obtain arms and instruction. As long as Latin American governments expressed concern over communist insurgencies, the more the United States supplied training to those countries. Criticism sparked many changes in the USARSA’s mission in the late 1970s though.

The Carter Administration ushered in a time known as human rights based foreign policy. No countries guilty of human rights abuses could attend U.S. military
schools. Congress supported this sentiment and subsequently 9 countries were cut from the USARSA's attendees. This new policy did not affect the USARSA for very long however. Foreign policy paradigms once again shifted as the Cold War heated up in Latin America in the early 1980s.

The Reagan administration lifted the ban on human rights violators and the USARSA again supported foreign policy needs. The United States trained 4,410 Salvadoran soldiers at the USARSA during the 1980s since that country was embroiled in a bloody civil war. Furthermore, the school also played an important role in the War on Drugs in Colombia. Still, criticism did not loom far behind the changes at the USARSA as the Cold War came to an end.

The USARSA then operated within a fragmented U.S. foreign policy for the region, but the school did not reorganize fast enough to escape criticism in the 1990s, though not without trying in 1993. According to Kennan’s theory, the USARSA’s “cosmic unforgiveableness” derived from its objectable courses and mission during this period when Cold War pressures subsided. The USARSA continued its instruction in courses like the Sniper Course, found in the newly instituted Special Operations Department, left over from the needs of the Cold War and soon came under direct scrutiny, not only from Congress, but also from a non-governmental organization called the SOA Watch. Led by a Maryknoll Priest, allegations of former USARSA graduates plagued the current operations of the school. As somewhat “smoking guns” emerged implicating certain graduates of atrocities, propaganda campaigns targeting the school
began to turn opinions in Congressional funding hearings. Though there was no clear cause and effect rationale concerning the USARSA instruction and certain graduates’ behavior, the growing information campaign finally caused the Department of Defense to close the school on December 15, 2000. Erected in its place is a “new” institute dedicated to “keeping a seat at the table” with Latin American governments, militaries, and civilian authorities. Therefore, its “cosmic forgiveableness” lies in the “new” institute’s ability to maintain the perception that training Latin American militaries helps the United States influence the political stability of its hemisphere’s backyard.

In conclusion, the USARSA has changed as much as George Kennan’s assumptions about foreign policy. Interestingly, George Kennan is the author behind America’s containment strategy in the Cold War. Although the school was established prior to the Cold War, it was the United States’ national interest to contain foreign influence, which therefore legitimated the school’s operation and mission of containment. Prior to World War II, the training of Latin American militaries was intended to supplant German and Italian military missions. As the Allies neared victory in WWII, training programs formalized to sustain Inter-American military cooperation. The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the Soviet Union’s pledge to spread communism created a bipolar superpower conflict. As Cold War flashpoints arose such as the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, the school continuously reorganized to grant the United States a clear political advantage to influence rising military leaders,
government leaders, and consequently its political system and the future relations with that country. The institution, whatever its name throughout its operation, captured the intent of the United States’ continuous aims for the Western Hemisphere and should be viewed as a product of the overarching purpose of U.S. national interests in the twentieth century, the containment of non-U.S. influence in “its backyard.”
Appendix

Page 1 of a letter from Col. Enrique M. Benitez, U.S. Army, Commandant of the Latin American Training Center to the Adjutant of the School of the Americas attempting to correct the school’s origins in 1966.

COL. ENRIQUE M. BENITEZ, U.S.A.
1080 N.E. 104th Street
MIAMI SHORES, FLA.

June 13, 1966

Major Robert E. Scofield, Inf.,
Hqrs. USA. School of the Americas,
Fort Gulick, Canal Zone.

Dear Major Scofield:

With reference to your letter, dated April 14, 1966, I would like to make the following comments:

a. Paragraph 1 of the History of the School, as given in the current School Catalog, contains several erroneous statements which, in my opinion, should be corrected.

b. The School was founded in 1946 at Fort Amador and was reorganized and transferred to Fort Gulick in 1949.

c. The statement that prior to 1949 the primary mission of the School was the training of technicians for the U.S. Army is in error; the opposite is true. The Latin American Training Center was founded and functioned for the sole purpose of training Latin American students, not for the training of technicians for the U.S. Army.

d. The statement that in 1949 the School had 743 U.S. graduates and only 103 Latin Americans is also in error. What happened after my departure in 1949, I am not prepared to comment; but I do know that, prior to 1949, the School had graduated about 250 Latin American personnel. As an example: In 1948, Venezuela alone sent a group of soldiers, about 75 in number, for training, as it will be explained later on.

After the War, I was ordered for duty in the Canal Zone; I was assigned as Commanding Officer of Fort Amador, garrisoned at the time by the 4th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA); one M.P. Company; one Chemical
Our Chiefs of Missions in Latin America were handicapped by the lack of trained personnel of Latin American Armies and their lack of familiarity with American equipment, who could assist them in the performance of their training missions. To remedy this situation, the Caribbean Defense Commander, Lieut. General Willis D. Crittenden, directed that a Latin American Training Center be established at Fort Amador under my direct supervision. Accordingly, School Headquarters were set up and office and dormitory for students were established using barracks formerly occupied by Battery "F" 4th Coast Artillery. Spanish speaking instructors were selected and by early 1946 the School, officially designated as the Latin American Training Center, was functioning. Courses then taught were: signal communications, including the use and repair of radio equipment; engineering, emphasizing bridge construction; motor mechanics; infantry equipment and maintenance; mess sergeants, cooks and bakers. The latter course was established at Fort Clayton, due to lack of facilities at Fort Amador.

Commencement Exercises were held at the Fort Amador Chapel and diplomas and certificates were usually presented by the Caribbean Defense Commander or by his Chief of Staff. The enclosed photograph shows Costa Rican students receiving their diplomas from the Chief of Staff of the Caribbean Command, General Lemuel Mathewson.

The School was a success from the very beginning; but the situation was unsatisfactory due to the fact that it was practically impossible to take care properly of the ever increasing number of students. I submitted a report covering the entire school set-up in the Command and strongly recommended the consolidation of all the Schools—including the leadership—under one Command. It happened that the newly constructed hospital at Fort Gulick was available. Neither this building nor the nurses' quarters had ever been occupied and their facilities, as well as the conveniences available at Fort Gulick, on the shores of Gatun Lake, were ideal for this purpose. My recommendations were approved and all the schools were moved to Fort Gulick without delay.

The first Commencement at Fort Gulick was held in 1949; over 250 students (about 120 U.S. soldiers) received their graduation diplomas, presented by the Caribbean Defense Commander, Major General Ray W. Porter, at which practically all members of the Latin American Diplomatic and Consular Corps were present. It was a memorable occasion as far as the School was concerned. My tour of duty had already been extended once and the second request was disapproved as I was slated for duty with the Interamericain Defense Board in Washington, D. C.

Prior to 1949, the School had graduated students from Peru,
Appendix
Benitez Letter Page 3

Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela.

As an illustration of the work of the School, I would like to mention in detail events that happened during an inspection tour by the Caribbean Defense Commander, General Edward H. Brooks. In 1948, General Brooks made an inspection trip to Latin America and I accompanied him as a member of his Staff. In Asuncion, we were greeted at the airport, besides the usual Guard of Honor, by 20 Paraguayan soldiers and noncommissioned officers, graduates of the Latin American Training Center. Returning, via Venezuela, we were informed that the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Marcos Perez Jimenez (later President of the Republic), desired a conference with General Brooks. The newly constructed buildings for the “Escuela Militar de Venezuela” were ready for occupancy and the School had been provided with the latest equipment modeled after West Point. Colonel Perez Jimenez wanted equipment without delay; General Brooks expressed his willingness to help in every way possible; but he pointed out that the Venezuelan Army lacked the trained personnel to run the various activities of the School, and that we were ready to train the necessary personnel at the Latin American Training Center. Colonel Perez Jimenez agreed with this suggestion and, without delay, he sent about 75 men for training. It had been the rule in the past that the hotels and oil companies immediately, upon graduation, offered good jobs to graduates, particularly the mess sergeants, cooks and bakers. To stop this procedure, the Venezuelan Army issued instructions to the effect that graduates of the Latin American Training Center had to serve at least two years, after graduation, in the Venezuelan Army, before they could be discharged.

It hardly seems necessary to go into more details; it is regrettable that the School Historian (the Adjutant) failed to keep up to date the School records from its very beginning.

About three years ago, an article appeared in the Service Journal in which erroneous statements were made. I wrote a letter to the then School Commandant; but I never received a reply and, judging from the first paragraph on the History of the School, no action was ever taken. It is hoped that you, as Historian, will correct this situation and give a true picture of the development of the School. It would add, in my opinion, to the well deserved prestige that the School now enjoys.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely,

/s/ E. M. Benitez
E.M. BENITEZ,
Colonel USA, Retd.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

June 14, 1996  

Dear Joe:  

Thank you for letting me know your concerns regarding the School of the Americas. I agree with you on the desirability of extending education on defense issues and programs to civilians from hemispheric governments; we are currently considering how best to do so.  

The School of the Americas annually trains about 700 Latin American armed forces personnel in a variety of courses. All courses contain a mandatory core module on human rights -- and this extends into practical field training. In addition, the school has expanded its curriculum to include courses on counterdrug and peace operations, civil affairs, sustaining democracy, and resources management.  

The School of the Americas provides military skills training and human rights-based teaching, which together help foster military professionalism and respect for civilian authority in Latin America. For these reasons, I believe the school should be maintained.  

sincerely,  

Bill Clinton  

The Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy II  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515-4801  

Courtesy of Joseph Leuer
Appendix Cont.- Second Letter from Former President William Clinton to Representative Joseph Kennedy concerning the alleged “Torture Manuals”

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 6, 1996

Dear Joe:

Thank you for writing to express your views regarding the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

When the Defense Department discovered the existence of improper materials in the School’s training manuals in 1991, it conducted an investigation and condemned their use. After completing its investigation in 1992, the Defense Department reported its results to the appropriate Congressional committees and to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. For our part, my Administration firmly repudiates the offending materials and is determined to take steps to prevent such an incident from occurring again.

Over the last several years, the Defense Department and the Army have initiated and overseen a number of important changes at the School of the Americas, including human rights instruction not found at any other military school. Secretary Perry has also directed the Defense Department’s Inspector General to conduct an evaluation of the 1991-92 investigation. This inquiry is looking at the implementation of the corrective actions ordered in 1992 and in reviewing present policies and procedures for approval of training and training materials given to foreign military personnel.

You also request a commutation of sentence for three persons convicted of unlawful activities during protests directed at the School of the Americas. Two of those individuals have completed their sentences and have been released and the third, who received a longer sentence because of prior offenses, will complete his sentence next month.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy II
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1901

Courtesy of Joseph Leuer
Appendix Cont.- Letter from Congressional Representatives to their colleagues calling for their support to as they wrote, “Close the School of the Assassins”

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515
February 9, 1998

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH:
Close the School of the Assassins

Dear Colleague:

We are writing today to ask for your co-sponsorship of legislation to permanently close the U.S. Army School of the Americas at Fort Benning, GA. We hope to gain your support in this fight against an institution that we personally feel is responsible for thousands of brutal deaths and some of the most heinous acts against human rights across Central America.

Many of the darkest figures in Central America over the last two decades have been School of the Americas graduates -- including: (1) 19 soldiers linked to the 1989 murders of six Jesuit Priests, their housekeeper and her daughter in El Salvador; (2) Salvadoran death squad leader Roberto D’Abuisson; (3) Panamanian dictator and drug trafficker Manuel Noriega; (4) three of the five soldiers involved in the 1980 rape and murder of four U.S. churchwomen in El Salvador; (5) two of three officers cited as the intellectual authors of the 1992 murder of Myrna Mack in Guatemala; (6) two of the three killers of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero; and many others. The list is horrifying.

Despite claims by the Defense Department of efforts to clean up the School, numerous cases of human rights violations committed by School of the Americas graduates continue to arise. Nearly every time another atrocity occurs throughout Central America and South America, we can point to the School’s involvement. Recent allegations of human rights abuses by Colombian officers, who happen to be graduates of the School of the Americas, refute any theory that the brutal results are only in the past.

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. The people of Central America have endured too many years of pain and suffering. As federal representatives, we cannot continue to stand by as our tax dollars go to training future murderers, torturers and dictators. If we are ever going to build a lasting post-cold war relationship with the people of Central America, we must close this institution so synonymous with their painful past.

Please join us in co-sponsoring this legislation to close the School of the Americas by contacting Steve LaRose of Congressman Moakley’s Office, at 5-8273.

Sincerely,

Joe Moakley
Member of Congress

Jim McGovern
Member of Congress

Joe Scalzi
Member of Congress

TOM CAMPBELL
Member of Congress

Courtesy of Joseph Leuer
The U.S. Army School of the Americas (top) in June 2000 with USARSA sign and in November (bottom) with its USARSA designation already removed.

Doormat to the USARSA stating its motto, "Uno Para Todos Y Todos Para Uno" "One for All and All for One."
Portraits of the former Commandants since 1946.

Display showcasing the gifts received from Latin American governments in appreciation to the USARSA.

SOA Watch stage during the November 2000 protest. The backdrop says, "No Mas! Close the School of the Americas!"
Veterans for Peace bus with "Shut down the School of the Americas," in its windows.

Many organizations were present promoting their own platforms at what has become more than the SOA Watch rallies, but more of peace activists' annual gathering.

I looked on as thousands of protestors prepared to "Cross the Line" into Fort Benning re-enacting a funeral procession with celebrities such as Martin Sheen leading the solemn march.
A majority of the marchers were college students that create elaborate puppets symbolizing what they feel the USARSA stands for. The 2000 protest was the first year that a puppet parade was incorporated in the protest.

The most blatantly anti-U.S. puppet was this one of Uncle Sam saying, "I want you for Latin American death squads."
This was a booth by the Veterans for Peace not necessarily advocating the closure of the USARSA, but certainly identifying the U.S. Army, in their view, as hostile oppressors.

This event usually brings together hundreds of police personnel. Though the SOA Watch advocates peaceful civil disobedience, the Columbus Police Department works with the Fort Benning police to maintain a safe demonstration. Each year, besides the thousands that are arrested for "Crossing the Line" several dozen protestors are arrested for attempting to enter Fort Benning prior to the reenacted funeral procession.
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Carlton T. Fox, Jr.
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EDUCATION

1999-2001 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia
M.A. History, 3.57 QCA Cum Laude

1995-1999 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia
B.A. Political Science, 3.2 QCA

ACADEMIC INTERESTS

20th Century American History
Military History
U.S. Foreign Relations
Cold War History
20th Century Latin American History
History of Counter-Terrorism

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

1999-Present United States Air Force
Intelligence Officer

1999-2001 Virginia Tech History Department
Graduate Assistant
• Assistant Instructor for the Modern Military course
• Designed the Cold War web-based course supplement
• Computer and/or technical maintenance and assistance
• Office assistant

1999 Virginia Tech Computing Support
Administrative Team Leader
• I trained and managed a 6-person team whose task was to connect dorm students’ computers to the Virginia Tech Ethernet network. My work required an understanding of TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), Windows 95 and Windows 98, Windows NT, Macintosh, Ethernet cards and their drivers.

1999 Virginia Tech History Department
Student Teaching Assistant
• Prepare a syllabus and lesson plans
• Present classroom lectures
• Administer tests and quizzes
1998-1999 Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets

Company Commander

- Commanded and was responsible for 100 cadets; largest company in the Corps
- Voted Most Likely to Succeed

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

President of Pi Xi Chapter Phi Alpha Theta National Honor Society in History
Vice President of the History Graduate Student Association
Southern Historical Association
Optimist International
American Legion

AWARDS RECEIVED

Distinguished Graduate- Air Force Field Training
Commander’s Leadership Scholarship
Presidential Service Citation Award
National Air War 2000 Champion
Reserve Officer’s Association Medal (2)
Retired Officer’s Association Medal
Warrior Spirit

CONFERENCES

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